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3 May 2001
Co-existence of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on Human Rights
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Rapporteur: Mr Serhiy Holovaty, Ukraine, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group
This report focuses on the compatibility of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Convention) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Committee takes the view that no regional human rights mechanism should be allowed to weaken the unique unified system of human rights protection offered by the ECHR and its Court of Human Rights. The CIS Convention offers less protection than the ECHR, both with regards to the scope of its contents, and with regard to the body enforcing it.
The Committee thus confirms the primacy and supremacy of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Court of Human Rights for all member states of the Council of Europe, and recommends to those Council of Europe member or applicant states which are also members of the CIS not to sign or ratify the CIS Convention on Human Rights, or – if they have already done so - to issue a legally-binding declaration confirming that the procedure set out in the European Convention on Human Rights shall not be in any way replaced or weakened through recourse to the procedure set out in the CIS Convention on Human Rights.
The Committee furthermore recommends that the Committee of Ministers request that the Court give an advisory opinion on the interpretation of Article 35 § 2(b) of the ECHR (on whether the CIS Commission should be regarded as "another procedure of international investigation or settlement" in the sense of that Article).
I. Draft resolution
1. The Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Convention on Human Rights) was opened for signature in Minsk on 26 May 1995, and signed by seven of the eleven CIS member states on that day (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan). It has since been ratified by the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Belarus, and entered into force on 11 August 1998, the day the third instrument of ratification was deposited by Belarus.
2. The CIS Convention on Human Rights foresees a control mechanism in the form of the Human Rights Commission of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Commission on Human Rights). The CIS Commission monitors the execution of the Convention by issuing recommendations. The members of the Commission are appointed representatives of the State Parties.
3. The Council of Europe has always felt some concern about the legal implications for states ratifying both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the CIS Convention. In particular, concerns were expressed about the possibility that the CIS Convention might jeopardise the effective use of the right to submit individual applications to the European Court of Human Rights. For this reason, the Assembly, in general, recommended to the concerned applicant states not to sign or ratify the CIS Convention until further research on the compatibility of the two legal instruments had been carried out.
4. The Assembly, having carried out such research, remains concerned about the compatibility of the two Conventions. The CIS Convention offers less protection than the ECHR, both with regards to the scope of its contents, and with regard to the body enforcing it – the CIS Commission cannot offer the guarantees of impartiality and independence offered by the European Court of Human Rights, nor do its recommendations enjoy the same enforceable character as judgments issued by that Court.
5. The Assembly has consistently taken the view that no regional human rights mechanism – neither the CIS Convention nor the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms – should be allowed to weaken the unique unified system of human rights protection offered by the ECHR and its Court of Human Rights. While the CIS Convention may offer a minimum of human rights protection to those members of the CIS who do not or cannot aspire to Council of Europe membership, adherence to the ECHR system of protection should be mandatory and exclusive for members (and prospective members) of the Council of Europe.
6. The Assembly thus confirms the primacy and supremacy of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Court of Human Rights for all member states of the Council of Europe, and resolves to:
i. recommend to those Council of Europe member or applicant states which are also members of the CIS not to sign or ratify the CIS Convention on Human Rights;
ii. recommend to those Council of Europe member and applicant states which are also members of the CIS and have already ratified the CIS Convention on Human Rights to issue a legally-binding declaration confirming that the procedure set out in the European Convention on Human Rights shall not be in any way replaced or weakened through recourse to the procedure set out in the CIS Convention on Human Rights.
iii. recommend that member states of the CIS and of the Council of Europe keep their citizens informed about the difference in the legal nature of the mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights and the mechanism of the CIS Convention.
II. Draft recommendation
1. The Assembly refers to Resolution … (2001) on the co-existence of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. The Assembly states that the issue whether the CIS Commission should be regarded as "another procedure of international investigation or settlement" in view of Article 35 § 2(b) of the ECHR and on that basis any application that has already been or is simultaneously being examined by it could be declared by the European Court of Human Rights as inadmissible remains open.
3. Therefore, the Assembly, taking into account the weakness of the CIS Commission as an institution for the protection of human rights (from the point of view of control mechanism; its political nature; legal nature of its decisions; impartiality, independence and competence of its members), and considering that the CIS Commission should not be regarded as "another procedure of international investigation or settlement" in the sense of Article 35 § 2(b) of the ECHR, recommends that the Committee of Ministers request that the Court give an advisory opinion on the interpretation of Article 35 § 2(b) of the ECHR with regard to this specific issue.
III. Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Holovaty, Rapporteur
1. The Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter referred to as the CIS Convention) is an international legal instrument drafted under the auspices of the CIS and opened for signature in Minsk on 26 May 1995. On that day it was signed by seven of the eleven CIS member states (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan) and has since been ratified by three, the Russian Federation (21 December 1995), Tajikistan (1 July 1997) and Belarus (11 August 1998). The Convention entered into force 11 August 1998, when the third instrument of ratification was deposited by Belarus.
2. The CIS Convention comprises a preamble followed by 39 articles: Articles 1 to 29 cover all the rights protected, and the remaining articles deal with interpretation, authorised restrictions, reservations, arrangements for entry into force and other matters. Integral to the convention are the Regulations on the Human Rights Commission of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter, the CIS Commission), comprising five numbered sections plus final provisions.
3. The CIS Convention concerns three Council of Europe member states: Russia, one of the countries to have ratified it so far; Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, which have signed but not ratified it, and Azerbaijan and Ukraine which have not signed it.
4. From the outset, the Council of Europe felt some concern about the legal implications for states ratifying both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the CIS Convention. Accordingly, a study was made for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe by Professor Cançado Trindade (Brazil) and Professor Frowein (Germany). It was published on 20 December 1995 as document SG/Inf (95) 17. The Venice Commission also gave an opinion (CDL-INF (1998) 8), based on a report by Professor Malinverni (Switzerland).
5. The Assembly has dealt with this matter in the context of admitting Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Armenia as member countries of the Council of Europe. It asked Moldova in June 1995 “to withhold ratification of the CIS Convention on Human Rights until the implications of the co-existence of that convention and the European Convention on Human Rights, especially as far as the control mechanisms [were] concerned, [had] been clarified by the Council of Europe; and furthermore not to ratify the said CIS convention without the prior agreement of the Council of Europe”; it asked Ukraine, in September 1995, “pending further research on the compatibility of the two legal instruments, not to sign the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Convention on Human Rights and other relevant CIS documents, given the fact that individual applications submitted under this convention might render impossible the effective use of the right to individual application under Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
6. In Russia’s case, the Assembly asked the authorities in January 1996 to ensure “that the application of the CIS Convention on Human Rights … [did] not in any way interfere with the procedure and guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights”, given that Russia had already ratified the CIS Convention. In the more recent case of Armenia, the Assembly's opinion of June 2000 makes no mention of the CIS Convention. The amendment proposed by our Committee to introduce a similar commitment to the one required of Moldova and Ukraine was not adopted by the Assembly.
7. The Assembly now needs to adopt a position of principle on the co-existence of the two conventions and the resultant legal implications.
B. The CIS Convention and Commission: substantive and procedural provisions
8. The substantive norms of the CIS Convention – the rights it protects - are to a large extent based on those contained in the ECHR, except that in some cases they are expressed with greater precision, apparently on the basis of the case-law of the Commission and Court set up by the ECHR. For example, Article 3 in both conventions concerns the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the CIS Convention adds the following provision: “No-one shall be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without his free consent” (a provision which is also to be found in the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Article 13 of the CIS Convention similarly expands on Article 12 of the ECHR with regard to the right to marry.
9. Practically all of the rights covered by ECHR are covered by the CIS Convention. There are thus corresponding articles to Article 2 (right to life), Article 5 (arbitrary arrest) and Article 6 (fair trial) of the ECHR, but the wording in the CIS Convention may be somewhat different. There are other such examples, too numerous to enumerate here.
10. At the same time, the CIS Convention contains many economic, social and cultural rights (such as the right to work, health protection and the right to social security) which are probably based on the European Social Charter and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights but which are scarcely legally enforceable.
11. As far as the control mechanism is concerned, unlike the ECHR which set up a judicial system that eventually produced the single Court, whose judgments are binding on states, the CIS Convention has set up a totally different system based on a commission, the CIS Human Rights Commission, which is responsible for the “monitoring of the execution of [the] Convention”.
12. Pursuant to the regulations appended to the Convention, the members of the CIS Commission are “citizens of the Parties possessing high moral qualities as well as recognised expertise in the human-rights field. The utility of having members with legal experience shall be taken into consideration” (Regulations, Section 1, paragraph 1). Consequently, legal training is not indispensable. Furthermore, the members of the Commission are appointed by the contracting parties, each state having one representative and one deputy representative.
13. Clearly, then, the members of the CIS Commission cannot offer the same guarantees of impartiality, independence and competence offered by the judges of the European Court of Human Rights.
14. With regard to procedure, the Commission receives applications from contracting parties, individuals and NGOs “concerning matters connected with human rights violations by any of the Parties and falling within the competence of the Commission”. In addition, the Commission “may” decide to hear applicants, which contrasts sharply with the inter partes procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. On the other hand, one of its plus points is that NGOs are also able to submit applications under the CIS Convention, unlike the Strasbourg system.
15. The Commission’s decisions are in the form of “understandings” or “recommendations”, which raises serious doubts as to their bindingness on parties. Moreover, the CIS Commission’s regulations contain no provision for supervision of compliance with the Commission’s decisions such as is carried out by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
16. In the absence of a genuine court and given the intergovernmental (and political) nature of the CIS Commission, there are serious grounds for fearing that the Commission cannot be an effective international supervisory body in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
C. The relationship between the CIS Commission and the Strasbourg court: Appeals and lis alibi pendens
17. The question has been raised as to whether the control mechanisms established by the CIS Convention are to be regarded as affording a domestic remedy within the meaning of Article 35 ECHR, which stipulates that the Strasbourg Court may deal with a matter only once all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The view has never been taken either in international practice or by legal scholars that exhaustion of domestic remedies includes remedies at regional level – except by certain legal scholars in the CIS-region.
18. In the 1970s the point was raised whether “regional remedies” – such as those provided by the ECHR and the American Convention on Human Rights – must also be exhausted before an application to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Such an interpretation was speedily rejected - it was held that the exhaustion requirement applied only to domestic law remedies and not regional remedies. Otherwise it would have created another obstacle for persons complaining of violation of their human rights, thereby weakening their protection at international level.
19. Furthermore, one of the foundations of international protection of human rights is the absence of hierarchy between the different protection mechanisms. As Professor Cançado Trindade points out, domestic remedies operate within a vertical relationship between international law and domestic law, whereas regional remedies operate within a horizontal scheme.
20. The lis alibi pendens issue is whether the European Court of Human Rights should declare inadmissible any application alleging violation of human rights that has already been lodged before the CIS Commission. This is a question of interpretation of Article 35.2b ECHR, on admissibility requirements, which states that the Court cannot deal with any individual application if it is “substantially the same as a matter that has … already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement …” Paragraph 2a of Section 3 of the CIS Commission regulations in fact contains a very similar provision.
21. To date, institutions as diverse as the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the committee set up under the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg and the bodies established within the International Labour Organisation are regarded as institutions affording procedures of international investigation or settlement.
22. This concept therefore encompasses a variety of procedures functioning in widely differing ways and providing parties with diverse guarantees. It is therefore probable that the European Court of Human Rights will indeed consider that, despite its inadequacies, the CIS Commission should be regarded as “another procedure of international investigation or settlement” (Article 35.2b ECHR) and will declare inadmissible any application that has already been or is simultaneously being examined by it.
D. Standards of protection under human rights regimes
23. Any regime of human rights must serve to raise the aggregate standards of protection of victims of abuse. The credibility and utility of any new effort in this area must meet the test of whether these new procedures are victim oriented, whether the framework of the universality of human rights is enhanced, and whether it reinforces, and does not undermine, other norms, treaties or regimes in this area .
24. It is in this context that the viability and utility of the CIS Convention must be judged. As pointed out by Mr. Malinverni and other authors, the procedural and substantive deficiencies of the CIS Convention, viewed in the context of the relative guarantees provided by the ECHR, necessitate the development and enforcement of clear rules regarding the supremacy of the standards of the ECHR in relation to the CIS Convention.
25. As explained before, on virtually every level, the CIS Convention falls short of the overriding procedural protections afforded to victims, including the lack of independence and impartiality in appointment procedures and control mechanisms, and jurisdictional failings regarding the non-binding, and therefore largely advisory nature of decisions reached by the CIS Human Rights Commission.
26. From a substantive point of view, a dual regime of protection of human rights in some of the former Soviet republics involving different extents of protection of rights and freedoms and different qualitative mechanisms of protection and jurisdictional controls, will leave much to the discretion of national legislatures. The possibility for broad interference of the state in the lives of its citizens will thus persist. The new states of the former Soviet Union face serious psychological, economic, social and political challenges in organising their societies along democratic principles. I do not think that they have made the transition from the Soviet concept of supremacy of the role of the state over the individual. In the absence of a developed legal culture and institutional protections of human rights in these countries, a dual regime of human rights will tempt many post-Soviet states to avoid their obligations to the Council of Europe where convenient to do so. In these circumstances, legislation could be passed diluting the rights of citizens to redress abuses which they would otherwise enjoy under the ECHR and its protocols, particularly, and most ominously, with respect to the death penalty. While of obvious concern, this situation is intolerable if an application under the CIS Convention would preclude an application to the ECHR under the principle of lis pendens. It would also permit post-Soviet states to influence or direct complainants to choose the forum most convenient to the state by limiting the access (through misinformation, intimidation, etc.) of their citizens to the most favourable jurisdiction to hear their allegations .
27. The superior jurisdictional mechanism under the ECHR is therefore vital to the protection of human rights in the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union. To allow parallel mechanisms for its new members from the east will only degrade the new rights which their citizens would enjoy under the ECHR. It is a principle of international human rights law that primacy must be given to the norms most favourable to the alleged victim . Parallel institutional mechanisms which are inferior to those provided by the ECHR will only serve, in the post-Soviet states, to confuse the citizens of countries who barely understand the rights they have acquired, and act as a further obstacle to redressing alleged abuses.
28. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recognised the institutional problem on a national level by calling for co-operation between the Council of Europe and the CIS on the matter of human rights, “on the basis that there can be no interposition of CIS procedures or institutions between the national judicial systems of member states and the European Convention on Human Rights” . In light of the position of some Soviet-era jurists that recourse must first be taken to the CIS Human Rights Commission prior to an application to the European Court, the Parliamentary Assembly should clarify its position to include CIS regional procedures. Indeed, use of the CIS Convention as a “regional remedy” has been termed “highly objectionable” by eminent Western jurists as a further obstacle to alleged victims to find redress, as well as weakening international protection of human rights at the regional European level .
E. The need for a unified system of human rights protection
29. As can be seen from the above explanations, the CIS Convention does not improve the international protection of human rights for member States of the Council of Europe as a recent convention might be expected to do, but rather tends to loosen or lower existing protection standards. While affirmation of the fundamental principles relating to the international protection of human rights by countries which ten years ago totally disregarded those rights is a very significant step forward, the Council of Europe’s gradual outreach towards the countries of central and eastern Europe should not - and this has been underlined on several occasions by the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly - be at the cost of lowering the human-rights protection standards established by the Council of Europe. It is essential therefore that the effective protection afforded by the ECHR should not be undermined by reliance on or use of the CIS Convention in countries which are or will become parties to both conventions.
30. I would thus like to stress the need for a unified system of human rights protection. The ECHR provides the requisite critical institutional mechanism by which human rights issues are regulated for its members. As Mr Malinverni maintains, the European Court of Human Rights has effectively emerged as the Constitutional Court for Western Europe . Therefore, at a time when the universality of human rights as expressed in the ECHR is becoming institutionalised in Europe, it is vital that the Council of Europe continue to promote the concept of a single standard in European human rights jurisprudence among its newest and prospective members and insist that they adhere to a unified concept of public order in the field of human rights among Member States of the Council of Europe. Otherwise, the existing standards of the ECHR will be compromised if certain states belong to both conventions. It bears reiterating that if the former states of the Soviet Union who are Member States or aspire to become Member States of the Council of Europe are not part of a single multilateral human rights system, the national legislatures of these countries might well vitiate the intent of the unified system of rules under the ECHR.
31. For those countries which are parties to both the ECHR and the CIS Convention, it is thus essential that individuals who believe they are victims of a human rights violation be free to submit their application to the jurisdiction of their choice, relying on the legal instrument which is most favourable to their case. The most-favourable-treatment principle is set out in Article 53 ECHR and serves to ensure that the generally lower protection standards contained in the CIS Convention do not reduce the scope of the protection afforded by the ECHR. The most-favourable-treatment clause also appears in virtually identical terms in Article 33 of the CIS Convention.
32. International practice and legal scholars have confirmed the principle of the applicant’s free choice of procedure. The co-ordination of international human-rights protection instruments must not be at the expense of alleged victims. If the latter wish to bring their cases before the CIS Commission, they alone will bear the consequences. But they must also have the possibility of bringing their cases before the Strasbourg court. Nothing in their country of origin must hamper, prevent or influence their choice, or steer them towards the weaker instrument, in this case the CIS Convention. The problem is that the information policies of most post-Soviet governments are oriented toward strengthening the power of the state over the individual. I doubt that this will change soon. People thus run the risk of being directed by their governments to the system, if at all, that is most beneficial to the state. Under these circumstances, the ECHR will inevitably become eroded as an instrument for the protection of human rights in these countries.
33. However, should one condemn the CIS Convention out of hand? This is a valid question because now that the CIS Convention has entered into force, it could complement the ECHR since it would apply in the CIS states which are not potential Council of Europe members (the countries of central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The CIS Convention could conceivably be useful for those countries since, despite its imperfections, it represents a minimum of international protection. Indeed, one of the advantages, and by no means the least, of the CIS Convention is that it introduces new concepts in countries which suffered from dictatorships in the past. The CIS Convention will raise public awareness and interest, and will also fill a number of gaps in the training of judges and lawyers, who will develop skill in dealing with international human-rights protection instruments.
F. Conclusion and Recommendations
34. Having multiple procedures regarding the protection of human rights can only be justified if it enhances the protection it is intended to extend; “it can never have the effect of undermining the standards of protection already achieved, or of pre-empting parallel procedures which can offer better protection” . The protection offered by the CIS Convention only duplicates existing international human rights norms and regimes and which more comprehensively and adequately protect the rights of their citizens . Therefore, it can be concluded that the aggregate contribution of the CIS Convention to the regime of the protection of human rights in Europe is largely negative. Indeed, the CIS Convention serves no legitimate purpose except as a political statement or, as suggested above, as a regime which offers the minimum of human rights protection to post-Soviet states which will not be joining the Council of Europe.
35. In the absence of a hierarchy of norms or a mechanism of control between the two different systems of the CIS Convention and the ECHR, the Council of Europe must insist that its members adhere to the highest standards of human rights which are consistent with the obligations set out under their terms of accession and the Statute of the Council of Europe. Therefore, prospective members from the former Soviet Union who have not ratified the CIS Convention should be advised that ratification of the ECHR, which is obligatory for Member States, and ratification of the CIS Convention are mutually exclusive. Countries of the former Soviet Union which have already ratified the CIS Convention and desire to become members of the Council of Europe must be advised that their applications will only be considered in the event of a special declaration confirming that the procedure set out in the ECHR cannot in any way be subsumed or pre-empted through recourse to the procedure of the CIS Convention.
36. The CIS Convention should reflect the separate needs of the different post-Soviet states. For those states aspiring for membership in, or who are members of the Council of Europe, adherence to the ECHR regime must be mandatory and exclusive. For CIS countries who do not aspire to Council of Europe membership or who are unlikely to be admitted soon, the CIS Convention, even with its deficiencies, may provide a minimum of international protection at the regional level if coupled with ratification of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its first Optional Protocol.
37. I would therefore suggest:
a. The Council of Europe should lay down clear rules for its new and prospective Member States from the former Soviet Union concerning which regime governs, in order to avoid any weakening of the structure of human rights protection in Europe.
b. Council of Europe Member States which have already ratified the CIS Convention should be asked to issue a legally binding declaration confirming that the procedure set out in the ECHR cannot in any way be replaced or weakened through recourse to the procedure of the CIS Convention.
c. Council of Europe Member States which have signed but not yet ratified the CIS Convention should be asked not to ratify the CIS Convention and to adhere only to the provisions of the ECHR.
CIS Convention on
Human Rights and
International Convents: International Convent on Civil
Rights, International Convent on
the Protection of
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
Other international treaties
Right to life
Article 6 ICPRC
Measures guarantee the protection of rights of persons sentenced to the death penalty, 1984, UN
Article 7 ICPRC
• European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
• UN Convention against Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Forced or compulsory labour
Article 4 ICPRC
ILO Convention on forced or compulsory labour
Liberty and security of person
Articles 9, 10 ICPRC
• Minimal UN standards of treatment for prisoners
• European prison standards
• Code of principles regarding the protection of all sentenced and arrested persons
Fair and public court hearing
Article 14 ICPRC
Retroactive power of the Law
Articles 14, 15
Deprivation of liberty merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation
Article 11 ICPRC
Article 1, Protocol No 4 to the ECHR securing certain rights and freedoms other than those included in the Convention and in the first Protocol thereto (Protocol No 4)
Respect to private and family life
Article 17 ICPRC
Freedom of thought
Article 18 ICPRC
Freedom of expression
Article 19 ICPRC
Freedom of peaceful assembly
Article 21 ICPRC
Right to marry
Article 23 ICPRC
• UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights – Articles 23, 24, 25
• Social Charter of the Council of Europe
Social Charter of the Council of Europe
Social Charter of the Council of Europe
Article 24, item 4
Article 14 ICPRC
Article 5 d)
• European Convention on the Existence of Children's Rights
• UN Convention on the Protection of Children's Rights
• "Peking Rules", 1985, UN
Social Charter of the Council of Europe
Effective restoration of rights
UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
Equality under the Law
Articles 26, 17
Article 27 ICPRC
• Charter for Regional and Minority Languages
• European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
• UN International Convention on the Liquidation of all forms of racial discrimination
Liberty of movement
Article 12 ICPRC
Protocol No 4
Article 16 ICPRC
Right on citizenship
Article 17 ICPRC
UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
Prohibition of collective expulsion
Articles 12, 13
• Protocol No 4
• Protocol No 7 to the ECHR
• Article 13, UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
• Article 17, UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
• Article 1, First Protocol for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the ECHR
• Article 2, First Protocol for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the ECHR
• Article 26, UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
Social Charter of the Council of Europe
Article 25 ICPRC
• Article 3, First Protocol for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the ECHR
Restrictions on the political activities of aliens
Article 5 ICPRC
Restrictions of rights for any other purposes
Article 5, part 2 ICPRC
Article 5, part 2 ICPRC
Article 4 ICPRC
List of signatures and ratifications
Date of signature
Date of ratification
26 May 1995
26 May 1995
11 August 1998
26 May 1995
26 May 1995
26 May 1995
26 May 1995
21 December 1995
26 May 1995
1 July 1997
Reporting committee: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Reference to committee: Doc 8226, Reference No. 2332 of 4 November 1998
Draft resolution and draft recommendation adopted unanimously by the committee on 27 April 2001
Members of the committee: Mr Jansson (Chairperson), Mr Magnusson, Mr Frunda, Mrs Gülek (Vice-Chairpersons), Mr Akçali, Mr G. Aliyev, Mr Andreoli, Mrs van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, Mr Attard Montalto, Mr Bartumeu Cassany, Mr Bindig, Mr Bordas, Mr Brecj, Mr Bruce, Mr Bulavinov, Mr Cilevics, Mr Clerfayt, Mr Contestabile, Mr Demetriou, Mr Dimas, Mr Enright, Mrs Err, Mr Floros, Mrs Frimannsdóttir, Mr Fyodorov, Mr Guardans, Mr Gustafsson, Mrs Hajiyeva, Mr Holovaty, Mr Irtemçelik, Mr Jaskiernia, Mr Jurgens, Mr Kelemen, Lord Kirkhill, Mr Kostytsky, Mr S. Kovalev, Mr Kresák, Mr Kroupa, Mrs Krzyzanowska, Mr Lacão, Mr Lento, Mr Lintner, Mr Lippelt, Mr Loutfi, Mrs Markovic-Dimova, Mr Marty, Mr McNamara, Mr Michel, Mr Moeller, Mrs Nabholz-Haidegger, Mr Olteanu, Mr Pavlov, Mr Pollo, Mrs Postoica, Mrs Pourtaud, Mr Rodeghiero, Mrs Roudy, Mr Rustamyan, Mrs Serafini, Mr Shaklein, Mr Simonsen, Mr Skrabalo, Mr Solé Tura, Mr Spindelegger, Mr Stankevic, Mr Stoica, Mrs Süssmuth, Mr Svoboda, Mr Symonenko (alternate: Mr Khunov), Mr Tabajdi, Mr Tallo, Mrs Tevdoradze, Mr Uriarte, Mr Vanoost, Mr Vera Jardim, Mr Wilkinson, Mrs Wohlwend, Mr Wojcik (alternate: Mr Walendziak), Mrs Wurm
N.B. The names of those members who were present at the meeting are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Plate, Ms Coin, Ms Kleinsorge, Mr Cupina
 See Professors Cancado Trindade and Frowein, SG/Inf (95) 17, paras 9 and 10.
 A dual regime would also have a negative impact upon the direction of the harmonisation of national legislation in these countries with the norms and standards of the Council of Europe, as the new Member States may feel they can “hedge” on fundamental legislative reforms in the area of human rights by resorting to another frame of reference.
 Cancado Trindade, op cit., para.53.
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1126 (1997) on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its interparliamentary assembly.
 Cancado Trindade, op cit., para.93.
 Malinverni Comments, p. 6.
 Cancado Trindade, op cit., para.96
 A comparative table is attached under Appendix I to illustrate this point.