



AS/Mon/Inf(2013)13

2 July 2013

amoninfdoc13_2013

English only

Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

Summary report¹

Hearing on frozen conflicts²

(follow-up to the meeting organised in Berlin on 5–6 November 2007)

held in Tallinn, Estonia, on 24 May 2013

Introduction

Mr Herkel, Chair of the Monitoring Committee: The last hearing on frozen conflicts took place in November 2007. Since then the situation has only worsened but it's important to keep the frozen conflicts in our focus because these are always shadowing our actions. We must keep on top of the events even when there is no obvious solution.

Unfortunately, the Russian delegation apologised for being unable to attend today.

An introductory statement will now be made by Ms Jane Morrice who has some personal insight into frozen conflicts as a participant in Northern Ireland peace process.

Ms Morrice: I have no real experience of frozen conflicts, or even solved conflicts, but I can tell you the story of Northern Ireland peace process as I saw it.

I was born in Belfast and I was a teenager when "The Troubles" started in 1968. All I wanted was to get out of Ireland. I became a journalist and worked for the BBC in England, but at one point realised that if I wanted to be a serious journalist the only place to be was Northern Ireland. In 1987 I became the Northern Ireland correspondent for the BBC. Our job description was pretty much "chasing fire brigades" to conflict sites.

At one point I decided that it was not enough just to observe things and that I needed to act. In 1992 I became the Head of the European Commission Office in Northern Ireland. In 1996 I helped to organise the Women's Coalition. Our aim was to register our party in time for the peace negotiations to send our representation there. Fortunately, regulations for political organisations had been relaxed to allow smaller warring factions to become legal and we managed to get our party running in six weeks. None of us had any previous political experience and we were politically "homeless", i.e. we did not adhere to any single political view or religion, we were just women and thought we had a perspective to offer. No one took us seriously at first but we managed to send two of our members – myself included – to the peace negotiations which ended with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Our contribution to the Agreement was the provisions on integrated education, housing, etc. Before, nobody even proposed that Protestant and Catholic children could study in the same schools or that these communities could live in the same housing area. The

¹ This summary report was made public by decision of the Monitoring Committee dated 24 June 2013.

² See appendix for the programme of the hearing.

parties were not interested in integration at all, they were all in for their own people, to guard their own schools and their own interests.

The Women's Coalition got two seats in the newly founded Northern Ireland Assembly. I was one of the deputies and also became the Deputy Speaker in 1998. To my knowledge we are the only women's party in the world to have ever done this, although I would be only too happy to hear about another one. Our priorities in the Assembly were equality, inclusion and human rights. Most important of these was inclusion because the opposing factions were not talking to each other directly, only through the Chair – which means that they forwarded their message to the other side without seeming to do so, which was all just optics. There were terrible arguments in the National Assembly but I was glad of it because it showed that the Assembly was working and that difficult issues were being discussed. It was better to quarrel in the Assembly than to take the quarrels into the streets.

As women we talked to everyone. That could be very dangerous for us back in our neighbourhoods. I was accused of consorting with terrorists many times. But it was important to talk to everyone who had come together. The more extreme Unionists refused to even participate or talk to the opponents.

We lost the 2003 elections and closed the party in 2006.

Since then, the Catholic identity has become stronger. They had a lot of catching up to do to feel at least equal to Unionists, but now they are starting to overtake the Unionists. Catholics now no longer feel like 2nd class citizens. Unionists, on the other hand, are now worried because they feel that the Catholics would at one point outdo them in numbers. There is also a big worry about the status of the British flag.

Finally, I would like to say that European diplomacy is very different from the American. Americans like to do flashy things, like Bill Clinton meeting Gerry Adams at the White House. Europe prefers grassroots peace programmes uniting women, former paramilitary, ex-convicts, etc. A lot of work is also done through the International Fund for Ireland.

Mr Walter (United Kingdom): As Rapporteur on the post-monitoring dialogue with the Republic of Macedonia I see a strong lustration process going on in Macedonia. People who worked in any kind of public office or for the Communist regime are hunted out and called collaborators. They are banned from holding any office in the current regime. I keep telling them that this must not be done, let the bygones be bygones, they must reconcile, but they do not listen or want to understand! Maybe they need a Women's Party in Macedonia.

Ms Morrice: I could draw a parallel with Martin McGuinness, whom some call a terrorist leader. He became our first Minister of Education and many people asked how such a person could become a Minister. I remember that when it was announced in the Assembly, the whole room went quiet. It was difficult to swallow. But now I can say that it was an amazing advancement as far as peace was concerned, and he was a good Minister of Education.

It is important to bring the extreme ends of the political spectrum together and get them talking. But I personally did not lose anyone during The Troubles. It would be more difficult of course for victims to swallow. It is easy to be a middle-class liberal on a high horse but it is important to remember that these men were the ones doing the actual heavy lifting and getting everything ready for us.

Mr Evans (United Kingdom): It seems that in the long run, the moderate parties lost. The once biggest moderate Unionist party has almost no support now. The Assembly might be so successful now because the extremes have come together.

Mr Mota Amaral (Portugal): The Irish Catholic population is growing faster than the Unionist population. Is there a possibility that Northern Ireland will join the Republic of Ireland one day?

Ms Lundgren (Sweden): In Sweden, we very much admired the role that the women played in bringing peace to Northern Ireland. I would like to know if the parties to the Agreement are still committed to what they signed? Do they think it's a good agreement or will there be new fights?

Ms Morrice: I do not think that joining the Republic is in the plans.

With the Agreement, the Catholics started to feel more equal, they do not feel better than Protestants yet. It is the Unionists now who feel threatened because they think that the British flag is in danger and therefore their British identity. But many teenagers are shocked when they hear politicians argue about the flag on TV,

they were not even aware that there was such a problem, they don't remember the conflict. I think young people should contribute more.

As with all agreements, what happens after a while is more important than what happens in the beginning. As the wonderful politician Mo Mowlam once said "The conflict lasted for 30 years, it could take another 30 years till peace arrives."

Session 1: Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Mr Herkel: It is sad that the planned visit of the Committee's delegation (the four co-rapporteurs on Russia and on Georgia and the Committee Chair) to Tskhinvali and Sukhumi had to be cancelled because the refusal of the de facto authorities to meet with us and allow us access to the break-away regions..

Mr Socor: What is difficult for the international community to realise about many conflicts at the moment is that these conflicts often start as internal conflicts and only later, because of changes in the status of the countries, become inter-State conflicts. This is true of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There have been internal conflicts and ethnic cleansing there for a long time but these were viewed as internal Georgian affairs. For a time they were temporarily settled by force, but remained unresolved and unaddressed.

Russia was allowed to take on a triple role as a party to these conflicts, as well as the peacekeeper and the arbiter. This has made the peace process deeply flawed. The EU, on the other hand, did not become a peace agent in the region.

In 2008, Russia recognised Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent States, claiming that their situation was exactly like Kosovo's. Yet the situation is not at all the same. In Kosovo, the conflict aimed at reversing ethnic cleansing operations; Georgia had also suggested reversing ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, but this was not done. Apparently there are two zones in Europe: a Western zone where ethnic cleansing is not allowed and an Eastern zone, where it is.

In negotiations, the initiating party that assumes responsibility for getting results needs the other party more. In this case Georgia needs Russia more than Russia needs Georgia. Georgia is still hopeful that it will again be able to have good relations with Russia while also becoming a member of NATO, but these two are just not compatible and it is only a matter of time until Georgia realises this. Armenia, on the other hand, has good relations with both the West and Russia.

It is important to discuss contentious issues in a multilateral format, not to transfer these to the bilateral format. Right now Russia is sitting tight and waiting for Georgia to take the initiative. Russia does not need to move. Georgia wants to get its products back on the Russian market, which has been closed to them since 2006. But competition in Russia has become much fiercer since then. It would be very difficult for Georgian products to find their niche. Maybe Georgian wines would have the best possibilities. Borjomi water is a slightly different case, because it is owned by Russian capital.

Russia has made demands to every Georgian government to install chosen Russia-friendly individuals in high offices. Shevardnadze accepted some of them, Saakashvili not. It remains to be seen what the new government decides.

The success of Saakashvili's reforms was extremely uncomfortable for Russia, it feared that Georgia would take Ukraine's path and that others might follow the example.

Russia might at some point activate the Common States option that it first proposed in the 1990s. This means a bilateral set up of de facto independent States which would formally remain within Georgia but under a military security umbrella guaranteed by Russia. This could actually enable Georgia to claim that it has won and has managed to maintain its territorial integrity.

The example of West and East Germany has also been aired. Bonn did not foresee the possibility of the reunification of Germany in the 1970s and 80s, so it finally recognised the GDR and even sent an ambassador there in an attempt of build human contacts. This culminated with a visit by Mr Honecker to West Germany in 1987, where he was treated with full honours as any other Head of State. The recognition of the East German regime by West Germany started a gradual, peaceful, long-term integration.

If Georgia loses confidence in recovering Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and if NATO and the West fail to offer security guarantees, Georgia might be tempted to return to the 1997 model of common States, which might be a solution to the problem.

Mr Cornell: Many old conflicts exist in this region, but now they have been subsumed to the Georgia-Russia conflict. Although the war took place in 2008, its roots probably lead back to 1989 when the Soviet authorities violently dispersed an anti-Soviet demonstration. There was also an armed conflict with Russia in the early 1990s, as well as smaller clashes in 2001, 2002, 2007... Georgia is the only former Soviet republic who has had multiple run-ins with Russian military.

Russia issued Russian passports to ethnic Abkhaz in Abkhazia already in the 1990s. This practice has been now condemned by the EU as illegal.

Although the war ended in 2008, the conflict did not. There were terror attacks until 2010. The war was disastrous for Georgia.

Russia tries to gradually take over territories – a creeping annexation – in an attempt to stop Western influence.

The only really positive outcome of the war was that Russia was for the first time seen clearly by the international community as an instigator; before this, Russia was allowed to pose as a peacekeeper in the region. The war was a premeditated attack on Russia's part, something that had been prepared for years. It was not a reaction to Georgia's actions.

The Russian occupation of the region continues: South Ossetia has disproportionate Russian army units considering its very small population (in the low 10,000s). Basically, the local population serves as service personnel for Russian military bases. But it is a very strategic location, only 60 km from Tbilisi.

Abkhazia is bigger and therefore would have a better likelihood of surviving independently. The Abkhaz have been issued Russian passports very easily, but the Armenian and Georgian minorities, which form the majority if the inhabitants, are treated like 2nd class citizens and are denied passports.

President Saakashvili has made a no-force pledge but Russia refuses to do so. It claims that it has no role in the conflict and therefore its signing the pledge is irrelevant, yet the evidence shows the contrary. Russia wants to get back to where the conflict was viewed as an internal affair of Georgia and Russia was accepted by the international community as an arbiter.

There has been a slight change in Russia's rhetoric: whereas before it said that it had no problems with Georgia but only with the criminal regime of Saakashvili, after October 2012 it has started to blame Georgia for the war. Russia purportedly needed military action against the aggression of the violent Georgian State.

In actual fact, Russia never had a problem with Saakashvili but with Georgia's independence. It has always personified its conflict with the State of Georgia by blaming Shevardnadze, Saakashvili, or any other president of the country.

It is not in the interests of Georgia to take the negotiations from the multilateral level to the bilateral because Russia and Georgia are not equal in size or resources and in bilateral format it would be easier for Russia to dictate its will to Georgia.

The biggest danger in the short term is not another military conflict – although that is very possible as well – but rather the creeping normalisation of the situation. Russia hopes that in time the international community will accept these regions as part of Russia. With this in mind, it tries to make the Geneva discussions as boring as possible – and I really do feel sorry for the politicians who have to sit in them. It is in Russia's interests that nothing happens and no changes are made. Russia has failed distinctly in obtaining recognition for the States of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but has nevertheless obtained a sort of de fact recognition of the situation.

Also, the expression 'frozen conflict' is a complete misnomer for such conflicts. These are never frozen but, on the contrary, very dynamic processes. This word conjures up the image of a piece of meat in the freezer that you can leave for next week if you don't feel like eating it now. But this does not work with these conflicts. We made the same mistake in 1990s and it made us blind to the nature of the conflict. A more appropriate name would be "unresolved conflicts".

Mr Cilevičs (Latvia): Our main task is to monitor the fulfilment of the commitments the parties have made. Our capacity to deal with inter-state conflicts is limited.

Mr Gross (Switzerland): “Frozen conflicts” is absolutely not the correct term. Firstly, we need to look deeper than the 1990s, we need to look at the history of the Abkhaz people. The issue here is not only peace but their right to self-determination. You cannot underestimate the nature of the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict which has been going on for some 200 years. The Abkhaz never had the right of self-determination. Secondly, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not the same thing and should not be put together. Both have fallen victim to the attention that the West accorded to the Balkans in the 1990s.

Thirdly, Georgia never had power over Abkhazia; Abkhazia only officially belongs to Georgia because Stalin put them together, as was his practice. Abkhazia never felt part of Georgia, and now they have come to hate the Russians as much as they hate the Georgians.

The example of West and East Germany is not good – the two sides were never at war with each other. Their separation was imposed on them and it was therefore easier to change by rapprochement.

Fourthly, we need to be more creative and keep an eye on the ongoing dynamic. Our inability to act is a consequence of seeing these conflicts as “frozen”.

Mr Sherr: Kosovo did not set a precedent in the Russian military and political mindset for recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead, Kosovo represents for them the danger that NATO would use human rights issues as a flag of convenience. The 1990s international intervention in the Balkans had already raised their fears. Russia in fact had already had the first armed conflict with Georgia in 1920s.

Mr Walter: Do we really need to know about what’s going on in the Russian mind? Georgia is after all not the only ex-Soviet republic to become independent, in the same region we have Armenia and Azerbaijan. Why have they not met the same fate, been treated with the same venom? I personally believe Russia just uses different strategies for each State. It does not really have a strategic interest in Ossetia or Abkhazia, a minor interest yes, but these countries have no vast natural resources. The real issue is that Georgia wants to become part of the Euro-Atlantic space. As long as the conflict lasts, there is little likelihood that Georgia would get EU or NATO membership, although Cyprus has been a precedent in the EU. Georgia has no resources to speak of, but it might be valuable as a transit country. There has been a plan to build a pipeline through Georgia. So GAZPROM might become an actor.

Ms de Pourbaix-Lundin (Sweden): I can understand Russia’s interest in keeping the present situation, but how about Georgia’s interest in solving it? Human suffering is also an important factor and must be taken into account in discussion. What can PACE do to solve this issue?

Mr Kandelaki (Georgia): I very rarely agree with Mr Gross, but this time I completely agree with him that there was a dramatic lack of attention given to this region by the West. There was just so much going on at the same time: the Balkans, the Baltics, the Kaliningrad region.

In Abkhazia, in the early 1990s, ethnic cleansing was carried out, but on the Georgian majority. This has been recognised by three OECD Summits of Heads of States. Abkhazia has been under the effective control of Russia, with high officials belonging to the chain of command of the Russian military.

Russia has been overly concentrated on Saakashvili’s personality, which is just a camouflage of its attitude towards Georgia as a fully sovereign State with aspirations towards the West.

Russia organised two assassination attempts against Shevardnadze. One main participant in these is on the Interpol wanted list but served in a high office in Abkhazia.

There is no need to go too deep into history. We are already going too far when we talk about Stalin. I heard repeated here the erroneous idea, which is common in the West, that Stalin put Abkhazia and Georgia together. The Republic of Georgia and Russia signed a Peace Treaty in 1920, where Russia recognised Georgian independence de jure, with Abkhazia as part of its territory.

Mr Japaridze (Georgia): We can all talk endlessly about Russia in this part of the world. We can talk about the long history of war in South Caucasus, but we need to find solutions. There is a joke about Stalin’s views on peace keeping where he goes around saying “I want to keep peace: I want to keep this piece, I want to keep that piece!”

We must not abandon the Geneva format, never mind how inefficiently it works, it's our only chance and progress is still being made. A bilateral format has also been started. There is too much talk about lost territories; instead we should talk about the Abkhazians and Ossetians. Now we have to talk to them through the Russians but it is still better to talk to them instead of fighting.

Mr Cilevičs: We are not academics but politicians. But international control is something that Russia does not want.

What would be the incentives to promote dialogue?

We should help to build inter-State relations. We should look at what forms of involvement are possible and helpful.

Ms von Cramon-Taubadel (Germany): We need to be flexible, to persevere, to be ready to compromise.

There is no mention here about Georgia's mistakes. Georgia is represented here in a unilateral way and this is not productive. Have you tried to understand the Abkhazians? Over time, there have been many popular revolts against the Georgians in South Ossetia. Have you been there? We should not limit ourselves to criticising Russia, Georgia has problems as well.

In Germany, a peace treaty improved the situation. I'm not saying that we should recognise Abkhazia, but we should play a more active role. We need confidence building: you must not reduce Abkhazia to a puppet in the hands of Putin.

If we want to be a creative and positive force, all parties must contribute towards the solution. Russia is very systematic in its support, but relations are better today than they were before 2008.

There is no need to look down on Georgian wine. If this really is the only thing that can enter the Russian market at first, so be it, it would be the first step. All millionaires in Tbilisi admit freely that they made their money in the Russian Federation. Georgian businesses should be encouraged to invest in Russia, it would be definitely better than to hide their money in tax heavens.

Mr Mota Amaral: Georgia might have hoped that the Common States solution would make it possible for Georgia to become a NATO member. But now it has become clear that NATO will not accept Ukraine or the Caucasian states. NATO no longer has the objective of surrounding Russia with its member States.

Ms Woldseth (Norway): No wonder that the Russian delegation does not want to be here! We always reprimand them. It is always like that in international forums. This cannot be much fun for them. We should instead talk to them. It is up to us to keep the issue warm, sit down with them, have a cup of coffee, and discuss it.

When we do our work as parliamentarians, we look at both sides. This might take us a little closer to a solution here as well, although it might not necessarily solve the situation completely.

Mr Xuclà i Costa (Spain): We must be very careful about our vocabulary. Each "frozen" conflict has its own internal dynamic. Many conflicts are linked to the philosophy of solving problems (ethnic cleansing, deportations). Stalin resettled whole nations.

Kosovo serves as an example to many who apply different approaches. But Kosovo will never get NATO membership.

When the general problems are solved, we can go to particularities.

Mr Japaridze: When the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia began, the Abkhaz made up 17% of the population. This means that it was carried out by the Russians, as the Abkhaz did not have the means to carry out an ethnic cleansing on the majority.

I agree about the fact that the region has fallen victim to the attention given to other regions: first to the Balkans, but even more to the US war against Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been de-prioritised.

Georgia is underutilised as a transit corridor. GAZPROM is planning a Russia-Azerbaijan pipeline through Georgia. This might improve the Russian's attitude.

NATO might accept Georgia, after all it accepted West Germany in 1950, although it had the biggest frozen conflict. This was used by Georgia as an argument in 2008; ironically, Germany's ears remained deaf, more so than any other State's.

Russia is not trying to reconstitute the USSR, but it wants to have the right to veto any accession by Georgia to Western structures, keep former Soviet republics under its influence. It can stop Georgia from being used as a transit corridor.

Recognition of Abkhazia is not possible until Abkhazia undoes ethnic cleansing.

Mr Cornell: I have studied these issues at length and I wrote my dissertation on the former Soviet nations.

Conflicts have only happened where there was external manipulation (with the exception of Chechnya). A history of conflict is not always a factor.

Russia inserted itself forcefully into these conflicts, the main victims are the Abkhaz. Russian politics have facilitated the Georgian policy of blaming Russia. Georgia has no need to solve the issue with Abkhazia if it can always blame Russia for everything.

The solution to this problem is strengthening the civil society.

The question about whether I've been there. Yes, I have. As for opening a PACE office in Abkhazia. Just try! Other international bodies have done this and been kicked out by the Russian controlled authorities. You get a different story by talking to the people in offices or on the street, in cafés: they are very willing to admit that an international presence would be very welcome.

In the short term there is little to be done. We must maintain the multilevel mechanism that exists. The Geneva format is boring, and kept intentionally so by the Russians who are interested in hindering progress, but it is important as the only multilateral format we have.

We need international integration and political modernisations. We need containment not of Russia per se but of the Putin regime.

Session 2: Nagorno-Karabakh

Ms Freizer: Some knowledge of the past is useful: there are some 600,000 displaced Azerbaijanis, 40,000 of these from Nagorno-Karabakh, which is still occupied by Armenia. The disputed territories make up 13–16% of the Azerbaijani territory. Both sides purchase weapons for huge sums, particularly now that Azerbaijan has resources from oil. Some European countries, even many that are represented here, supply weapons for them although they have been prohibited from doing that. Approximately 30 people are killed a year on the border, usually border guards. Sometimes Azerbaijani groups cross the Armenian border and not always in conflict areas. The line of contact between the two countries remains very much alive.

Both parties justify their actions and blame the other. Media and schools are very heavily used for propaganda and there is only very negative information about the other side.

The conflict is between two principles: the right to self-determination versus territorial integrity.

We encourage you to consider the 6 Madrid principles. We had high hopes for these until 2011. In general, both parties agree with these, but when it comes to details it is a different story. Since 2008, the former Azerbaijani President took part in at least 10 meetings with the President of Armenia and President Medvedev of Russia. Russia acted as a real go-between. Putin is much less interested in these negotiations and 2013 has been a wasted year for negotiations because it is an election year in many of these countries. Talks will hopefully continue in 2014 with the participation of Norway, Switzerland etc. Some have suggested that France could be replaced by the EU (so the mediators would be USA, the EU and Russia).

There are two possibilities: 1) a comprehensive peace agreement (which is actually already agreed on in principle); 2) a more piecemeal solution with the return of a couple of territories. This would open the line of communication.

Mr Sammut: I am very grateful to Ms Morrice for her view of Northern Ireland, especially the role played by the civil society in achieving peace. It is helpful.

Many people are starting to accept that the Nagorno-Karabakh situation cannot be solved at all, but I believe it can. We must just create the right conditions.

It can be called a territorial or ethnic or geo-political, etc. conflict. The right solution must be based on the welfare of the people. The conflict has lasted for nearly twenty years and has created hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs.

Both parties spend huge amounts on armaments and use war rhetoric in their daily lives. The other party is pictured as the enemy and no deviation from this or any public discussion is allowed. Chauvinistic patriotism is openly flaunted.

There is no room for any negotiations as long as military solutions are seen as the only solutions. The situation can be summed up as follows: 1) democratic deficit results in a lack of scrutiny and dubious accountability; 2) obstacles to the free media result in a lack of transparency and proper public debate; 3) judicial problems lead to the impunity of some who have an interest in keeping the conflict alive.

These problems are not at exactly the same level in both countries, but exist in both.

The most important contribution that the Council of Europe can make is to demand that both Armenia and Azerbaijan comply unconditionally with the commitments that they signed up for when they were admitted.

The Council of Europe should urge both sides to allow civil society maximum space and flexibility to contribute towards a peaceful settlement. Up to now, people who have dared to deviate from the official line have often been ostracised.

The European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has made a modest but useful contribution.

The Azerbaijani Parliament is currently discussing a new legislation which would make it illegal for Azerbaijani citizens to even talk to Armenians. This makes the work of the civil sector very difficult and even international bodies may become illegal.

European institutions must engage with Armenia and Azerbaijan in a friendly but robust manner to ensure that the process of change they agreed on when joining the Council of Europe is brought to a successful conclusion.

Mr Prescott (United Kingdom): The present process is not working, we should not continue it.

As the example of Northern Ireland showed, the only way to improve democratic society is to first do away with discrimination. People in Northern Ireland needed their civil rights recognised, like they do in this conflict. The problem, is that this conflict is used to mask the democratic deficit inside the countries. The truth is that the conflict will only be resolved if democracy has firmly established itself in the two countries that are technically at war. As long as the democratic credentials are lacking, the Madrid principles will be of little use as there is a risk that they will not be honoured.

I was asked to intervene in Armenia after large numbers of opposition followers were arrested following the 2008 political crisis. We managed to resolve the crisis and considerable democratic progress has been made by that country, but are not yet there. Also in the case of Azerbaijan's recent experience proves that such democratic progress is still lacking.

In this committee we spend more time on the functioning of democracies and the respect for human rights, give different views. Our job is to monitor how the parties fulfil the commitments they took upon themselves. They feel that they do not need to follow the democratic rules they signed for because they have a conflict, but that should not be allowed. We cannot go in situ and force peace; that is beyond our remit, but we can force them to implement their commitments.

Mr Agramunt (Spain): The title of "frozen conflict" should be changed to "hot conflict". Regrettably, people, including military and civilians, get killed and wounded there almost on a daily basis.

It is very unfortunate that for almost 20 years nothing has been done, and this is also true with regard to the talks within the Minsk Group.

Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly has not done much, either. Resolution 1416 adopted in 2005 has never been implemented. The ad hoc committee of the Bureau is not meeting.

We cannot be surprised that this situation creates climate of frustration within the Azerbaijani society and among their leaders.

The failure to resolve this conflict affects the country's territorial integrity and has an important impact on its progress in many spheres. The great number of IDPs and refugees remains an important challenge for the authorities.

The PACE cannot remain inactive. For example, we could and should support the civil society and confidence building measures.

Mr Debono Grech (Malta): I support my co-rapporteur in his position with regard to the conflict and its impact on the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

I would also like to express some surprise that the hearing is limited to the three conflicts at the same time overlooking some other like for example the occupation of Cyprus. I regret that PACE's resolutions remain on paper and most countries are not interested in the implementation of the recommendations included therein. However, this is reality and we should think of some other realistic ways of contributing to the peaceful settlement.

Ms Zohrabyan (Armenia): Armenia has never initiated an attack, it has always had to defend itself.

Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be part of Azerbaijan, the quicker everyone understands that, the quicker we can move on. Armenia has always honoured international agreements. Azerbaijan does not want to negotiate, it blocks all the mechanisms, refuses to call off its snipers who are shooting at the elderly, women and children. The huge armaments budget of Azerbaijan shows what the Azerbaijani intentions really are.

You have never been to Nagorno-Karabakh. You should go, there is nothing to fear. These are friendly hard-working people. All the local public institutions function well. It is not true that they could not make it on their own or that there is no alternative.

Mr Rustamyán (Armenia): It was again Stalin who put Nagorno-Karabakh together with Azerbaijan, it has never belonged to Azerbaijan.

We have not looked at the problem in depth.

Kosovo declared independence although they did not have the right to do so, it is fuel for official Azerbaijani propaganda. International resources have been used and efforts made, but Azerbaijan refuses to cooperate.

The Council of Europe should cancel all meetings until the parties have agreed to the conditions, as is the common practice. There are three parties: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, which is often overlooked. Armenia has so far represented the interests of Nagorno-Karabakh, but it cannot replace it. You cannot demand that from Armenia. Representatives from Nagorno Karabakh should be invited to participate in pace meetings, especially when the conflict is being discussed. Nop solution to the conflict is possible without their participation and consent.

The conflict cannot be used as an excuse to curb democracy to an important extent. The fact that a solution has not been found does not justify bailing out of the commitments assumed.

The Council of Europe is obstinately keeping its mouth shut, Azerbaijan creates obstacles.

All three parties must recognise the agreement and sign it. They must not be compelled to do it by the use of force.

Ms Fataliyeva (Azerbaijan): I agree that the conflict has received little attention. It is really not a "frozen" conflict.

If the hearing is not followed by any other concrete action , it will have no impact at all.

Yes, there are people in Azerbaijan who have suffered because of human rights violations – perpetrated by the Armenians. I am talking about the hundreds of thousands of IDPs. And even today, despite the 1994

ceasefire, people are killed, and have been killed over the last 20 years. Azerbaijanis must be allowed back to their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh. Only under these conditions can we agree to the self-determination of the region.

We will do our best to let democracy win, to find a peaceful solution.

Our arguments are based on international law. Armenia is interested in keeping the i the status quo.

I appreciate the remarks of Mr Prescott, who has been working with both countries for 20 years and is a member of numerous international organisations.

Obligations are mutual, resolutions have to be implemented by both parties. If Armenia does not change its attitude, there is no chance for a solution. If the conflict is solved, the economic situation of the region might also change. Conflicts with neighbours are destructive for the economy, they lead to failure.

Mr Xuclà i Costa: Two years ago I was the Chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh ad hoc committee. We worked on both countries' obligations in this respect, but Armenia did not wish to participate. Now the committee has a new Chair and the work is more discreet. One side takes part in it, the other not, although both agree that the right framework is the Minsk agreement.

The return of the IDPs is very relevant. The EU should replace France at the negotiating table only if it is interested. The EU has taken an interested in Ukraine and Moldova, which are very interested in relations with the EU. If the Caucasian States are also interested in the EU, it should participate.

Mr Nessa (Italy): I have read all the material on Nagorno-Karabakh and I must say the issue is as foggy as the weather in Tallinn today. It seems that no one wants to solve this conflict: the parties just spend more and more on weapons every year. This region is a nightmare!

The Minsk Group sat at a table and discussed, but in practice it did nothing. The Council of Europe should be more active. If we are not working on solving this conflict, what else is there for us to do?

This downtrodden region desperately needs democracy. We must show the way. If a party makes another wrong move, we should come back together and discuss it and find a solution. Otherwise this table has failed!

Mr Walter: The 6 principles are a good starting point, especially for returning the territory and ensuring a democratic end result.

I have three questions: 1) Nagorno-Karabakh became an autonomous region in 1923. Is this the current international status?; 2) in 1979, 79% of the population was Armenian. What is the ethnic composition now?; 3) the motif of the Russians. Is Russia interested in finding a new solution?

Mr Iwinsky (Poland): Armenia had presidential elections in February. None of the 8 candidates even mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh. This was a wasted opportunity to discuss the situation. Why didn't they use this opportunity?

Armenia and Turkey signed an agreement in Zürich, but this was not ratified by Turkey due to its support for Azerbaijan.

Armenia currently has the Council of Europe presidency. What is Armenia going to do to negotiate, to discuss the matter? If not now, then when? Time does not work in favour of the Armenians (the same situation as with Israel). In a worst-case scenario there will be another war.

Ms von Cramon-Taubadel: Mr Iwinsky is right. We always agree on the principles, but what happens if we recommend them on site? Nothing, zero! We must raise the pressure.

I receive letters from young Azerbaijanis about the civil society. They write about persecutions. Civil society needs our support in order to develop. Azerbaijan treats those who are in contact with Armenians as collaborators, but we must support them as important people for the peace process.

Mr Sammut: To answer some questions: the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is that international law recognises it as part of Azerbaijan.

Someone asked me about maps. I try to avoid maps in this region.

What can this committee do? You need to take stock and look forward.

Russia's standpoint is different than with Georgia. It is trying to balance its relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, it does not want to lose either. With Armenia, it offers security, with Azerbaijan, the relations are totally different. In this conflict, Russia is a positive actor. Russia is a partner in keeping the situation as it is. Russia recently made a remark 'better a bad peace than a good war.'

Concerning the Turkish-Armenian agreement: Turkey did not think things through before signing the agreement and immediately backed out. This was a very uncomfortable moment for Armenia: Turkey found that it could not move forward with what it had signed.

Ms Freizer: I completely agree with the fact that there is a democratic deficit.

If the draft law on outlawing any contact with Armenians, which the Azerbaijani parliament is discussing, passes, I hope that this Committee will be very angry.

Kosovo was a different situation, the UN made it very specific. This opened the door for status changes, but the conditions do not apply in this case.

There is no progress regarding the return of IDPs (there has been progress in the Balkans).

Yes, Nagorno-Karabakh has functioning institutions, but the surrounding areas do not. The areas around it are almost completely depleted. 14,000 Armenians have now settled there, otherwise these areas are empty.

Representatives of IDPs should take part in negotiations.

The agreed points protocol has not been implemented. Azerbaijan wants the areas back, but now there is a new option of returning only some. It would be a step forward in the peace process.

Session 3: Transnistria

Mr Sheer: Firstly, let me give you three points of context related to what has changed since 2007 and then present two positive and two negative developments.

- 1) In Moldova, as in the whole ex-Soviet region, internal and external policies are fragmentalised which creates the conditions for external pressure and interests.
- 2) Denunciation of the wrongful Russian concept of dividing States into "interesting" and "not interesting". The rising importance of the Russian "civilisation factor". Russia sees Europe as essentially divided into two zones. The EU is a universe of practical values and it has expanded. This has intensified Russia's wish for an alternative model to elaborate more ambivalent forms of integration.
- 3) Rapid changes in the energy markets. For Russia this is an existential challenge. This is the main source of income for Russia, and makes it as influential as the military made the USSR. Russia is constantly trying to use this advantage.

There are some positive developments: 1) the disappearance, in Transnistria, of the former government led by Mr Smirnov and his apparatus in 2011. The new government has a different approach. The play between right bank versus Transnistria dynamic has also changed. Change is as much a challenge as opposition to Chisinau and the EU. 2) The results of the Eastern partnership status granted to Moldova and the progress made towards an association agreement. The analogy with the 2 Germanies is good, but in this case there has never been a richer part, a "West Germany", both are poor. Moldova has many prerequisites and benefits from the EU, but no progress has been made in that direction.

There are also some negative developments: 1) with the political crisis in Moldova, the interim government depend on the Communist Party, which puts the settlement process and the Eastern partnership negotiations into danger 2) There have been changes in Russian policies, there is more resistance. Russia wants Moldova to join the Eurasian Union, which would pull it away from EU integration.

The Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that a Russian embassy would be opened in Tiraspol, in violation of a 20-year agreement. It was not only announced, but demanded that Chisinau accepts and endorses this. Otherwise Russia threatened to increase its military contingency in Transnistria and that there would be no new gas contracts on affordable terms for Moldova.

Transnistria has not paid for energy since 1996. Their official debt is twice that of Ukraine. Russia, in a classically resourceful use of logic, claims that if Moldova wants Transnistria back, Chisinau should repay the debt. Whenever political demands arise, Russian demands become more forceful.

Lately, the Gagauz minority of less than 200,000 members has also started to make demands similar to Transnistria. They are obviously also under Russian influence. It would be very near-sighted not to connect the dots – these are further attempts to destabilise the country.

Russia uses several established themes for its diplomacy: Moldova is threatened with chaos, and the only party which could prevent that and guard Moldova's independence is Russia.

The Gagauz and Bulgarian minorities also see a threat in the "Romanisation" of Moldova, i.e. Moldova joining Romania. Actually, neither of the countries wants that.

If the association agreement is concluded in November in Vilnius, this has the potential to be a key change, although Moscow views association agreements as a prelude to accession to the EU.

Actually, the conflict is between different civilisation blocks. If Russia feels that the clock is ticking, it might behave differently.

Mr Calus: Let's start from the demographical situation in a region, which is alarming. Transnistria is constantly depopulating. This process has accelerated since the beginning of a world wide economic crisis in 2008. Main reasons are low birthrate (-0,4%) and massive emigration. According to official data (which might be underestimated), Transnistria lost from 2 000 to 4 000 inhabitants each year. Lots of Transnistrians leave the region and emigrate to Russia or Ukraine using Russian, Ukrainian or other passports (which they can easily get). We can assume that Transnistrian population shrinks by 1% a year. A new, even more disturbing wave of emigration can be observed since the beginning of this year. Officially, only in the first quarter of 2013, about 1 500 Transnistrians already left the region. One reason is that the two large companies, Steel Mill and Concrete Factory in Rybnica, which were considered the backbone of the Transnistrian economy, suspended their production because of the rise in gas prices which made their products less competitive on the international market.

Concerning the Transnistrian economy, Transnistria owes about USD 3.7 billion to Gazprom; this amount is almost four times bigger than the current GDP and twenty times bigger than budget revenue. The authorities simply stopped paying the gas bill in 2006; in addition they sell gas to industry four times below the buying price and to inhabitants six times below the buying price. Yet even revenue from this is not paid to Gazprom, but used to cover the budgetary deficit. A rise in the price of gas was introduced to improve the situation but now that the main consuming companies stopped production, Transnistria does not even have this money to fill their deficit. The major part of the Transnistrian budget is spent on social expenses, with pensions higher than in right bank Moldova.

The second key issue is the planned Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DFCTA) between the EU and Moldova. Tiraspol only sent one observer which means that the region will probably be excluded from the agreement. This means that Transnistrian companies would not be able to export to the EU and right bank Moldova, where they currently export 60% of their produce. Also, right bank Moldova will have set up de facto customs points to have control over goods transported from and via Transnistria to the West. This might be a death blow to the Transnistrian economy.

Concerning the civil rights in Transnistria, as soon as Yevgeny Shevchuk became the President in the beginning of 2012, the situation with regard to freedom of speech deteriorated. Independent or opposition related internet sites have been shut down or blocked. Politicians and journalists disloyal to the current government are being forced to leave the region or quit their jobs. I would like to stress that this is a completely new situation. During Smirnov's presidency, persecution of journalists was not common and there was no active control over the internet. Current situation can be explained by the fact that new leader is feeling insecure tries to strengthen his power and influences in the region. We can't ignore the fact that he remains in an open conflict with bigger part of Transnistrian parliament. This is probably the reason of growing persecution of regional media.

There is also a fear that NGOs could be completely banned under a planned "law on foreign agents".

Speaking about status of negotiations on reintegration (especially 5+2 talks which are taking place in Odessa as we speak), this format has, regrettably, reached a dead end. It has been rendered pointless at least as a platform which could eventually bring the country back together. According to a new Conception of Foreign Policy of Transnistria, which entered into force on November 2012, the separatist region declared the integration into the Customs Union (and eventually into the planned Eurasian Union) as its main goal. Since Chisinau is openly speaking about integration with European Union, any talks concerning reunification are - by default - groundless. The 5+2 talks can therefore work as an instrument for resolving minor economic and social issues, but we can't expect any political breakthrough due to the Transnistrian position.

Concerning the social aspects of the Transnistrian conflict, the gap between the people on the two banks of the Dniester River is constantly widening. Efforts undertaken to bring those societies closer to each other are in general ineffective. Virtually nothing, except trade and – to some extent – limited student exchange connects the right bank of Moldova and Transnistria. It seems that we can observe a growing Transnistrian self-identity, which is developing without any relation to Moldovan one. Similar process is underway on the other side of the river. Generally speaking, Moldovans don't feel any sentiments towards Transnistria, and they not only don't believe in eventual reunification of a country, but – what's even more important – they don't feel a need for this to happen. Most of Moldovans have never even been to Transnistria. According to opinion polls, the Transnistrian issue is one of the less important problems for Moldovans, far behind poverty, corruption, education, cultural development and so on. Only 2% of Moldovans claim that the Transnistrian issue should be treated with priority, and only about 14% of the entire population recognize this as a problem at all.

Ms Christoffersen (Norway): The settlement of the conflict must be based on full respect of Moldovan territorial integrity. The key actor is Russia. President Sevchuk is not independent from Russia either. Transnistria is important for Russia strategically and economically.

The political crisis in Moldova tends to overshadow the Transnistrian issue.

Human rights violations and oppression happen at all levels. We do not have time to wait for decades for living conditions to improve. We need a human rights strategy and a full-scale population census, because there is no current trustworthy data on the population. We need grass root programmes and international pressure – that might be a kind of solution.

Mr Japaridze (Georgia): I want to thank the Chairman, Mr Herkel, and the staff for the organisation of this excellent conference. We are receiving a bigger picture of the post-Soviet space. We seem to be talking about the Russians the entire day. We need to know how to make the Russians cooperate, become our partners.

Mr Schennach (Austria): Transnistria is very close to us, while the other conflict areas receive more international attention and are more dangerous. Transnistria has one advantage: there are no Atlantic issues, no talk of NATO (which always gives rise to such a negative reactions from Russia). The EU is interested in Transnistria, improvement of the situation is a priority for us in Austria, for Germany, for Switzerland, and others. Austria and Moldova are negotiating on army building in neutral states.

The Moldovan institutions have to work better. Emigration is also a problem for Moldova. Once these issues are solved, the problem would be solved by itself. The region is not like the other conflict regions discussed today. It is the conflict which, most likely, could be solved. The Danube strategy might be of help.

Mr Ghiletschi (Republic of Moldova): The Transnistrian conflict is indeed different from the others. The one similarity is Russia's involvement. All in all, this would be the easiest conflict to solve. After the change in the Transnistrian leadership, Moldova was optimistic, but became disappointed after a while, and is even more so now. The last negative step was the Transnistrian decision to move their parliament from Tiraspol to the right bank of the river.

Any time there is some news about Transnistria, there is a big reaction on the right bank. The Moldovan Government has taken some steps to build trust and has achieved some unfreezing of the situation.

I agree with Mr Sherr: the Transnistrian conflict could be solved. The situation is similar to the two Germanies, but Moldova is not West Germany yet. We need to be the prosperous side. If a Transnistrian company sees that there is economic profit to be made from being part of Moldova, they will agree to that (one example is the Transnistrian football team which represents Moldova at the international level).

However, statements by Russia can undermine efforts and add tensions.

The Gagauz autonomy model should be an example, Moldova should not be transformed into a federation.

We are responsible for the solution of the conflict. The 5+2 is not very effective, but there are currently no better alternatives (perhaps a 7 format instead of 5+2?).

How can we make the Kremlin a cooperative partner? We must make Russia understand that a solution is made for the good of the nation, not to be anti-Russian.

Ms Lundgren (Sweden): It is enlightening to learn about so many conflicts inside the Council of Europe. We are dividing ourselves up between countries.

We often say that this or that should be dealt with by others. Should we push some strategy issues more efficiently, or some new problems?

Mr Nikoloski (“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”): Part of the problem is caused by geography. Great powers make consensual agreements in the UN and other bodies to maintain the status quo. We often forget to cooperate with one another. Moldova will always have the same neighbours. If Moldova, Ukraine and Russia can cooperate with Germany, then why not with each other? The Baltic States cooperated with their neighbours and look at them now.

Regional unions might be more useful than the EU. Only regional unions can overcome local problems, create local cooperation.

In the former Yugoslavia there are now seven different administrations, tax systems, border controls, etc. The export route from Skopje to Vienna used to take 9 hours by road, now it takes 2 days. You can understand that this is very bad for business and discourages potential partners. It shows that countries are unable to cooperate.

There should be more regional unions in the Council of Europe. Even if a regional union is possible only at the economic level, let us have at least that, or economy and transport, at least those two. Or economy, transport and culture, those three – in however many fields as is possible!

Mr Calus: DCFTA has very specific rules, which makes many things impossible.

The Soviet Union put a lot of money into East Germany. If Moldova would do better, Russia would invest more in Transnistria.

Russia has no interest in cooperating because it is rational and pragmatic. If Russia would no longer invest in Transnistria, how would the conflict be solved? Transnistria would still be separate. The only way to bring the country together is through the economy. The two societies are completely separate. We must show them that their economies will survive only if they are joined.

But money would not change the fear of the Transnistrians that Moldova wants to join Romania, which is in the EU. The Transnistrians have great respect for the EU but they would not want to join it.

As long as Russia is in control, there is no political cooperation.

I personally believe that no one is interested in solving the conflict, which is why Russia gets its own way. The region will never become part of NATO. If Transnistria became part of Moldova, the Moldovan Government would have half a million voters who would no longer elect them. The economy would languish for many years. A government that unites the country would probably be seen as bad, as opposed to the government which united Germany.

Mr Sheer: If we want to make Russia a friend, we must understand their motif: to maintain the international conditions that would maintain the conditions at home.

Russia is interested in the former Soviet countries. It is often interested in preventing something from happening, like accession to Euro-Atlantic bodies. There is an analogy with Stalin's policy in Germany. Russia is not interested in Transnistria, but in all of Moldova. Shevchuk may be controlled by Russia, but he is interested in maximising his own autonomy.

We must behave in a way which makes Russia understand that certain policies are no longer working. We need top down as well as bottom up cooperation with Russia, plus we need to dictate our opinions. Russia must understand that there is a line between EU integration and membership. One does not necessarily lead to the other.

We should not fiddle with institutions: the format could be 5+2 or whatever. If Russia reconsiders its current politics, 5+2 might be very useful.

Our greatest attraction is that we are an attractive model but a change is not going to happen quickly.

Mr Herkel: The hearing is closed. I should like to thank all the panellists, the rapporteurs, and our members, as well as the Secretariat and the interpreters.

APPENDIX

Programme**Hearing on frozen conflicts**

(follow-up to the meeting organised in Berlin on 5–6 November 2007)

held in Tallinn, Estonia, on 24 May 2013

- 09:30 **Opening of the hearing**
Welcome speech by Mr Andres HERKEL, Chair of the Monitoring Committee
- Introductory statement**
- Ms Jane MORRICE**, former deputy leader of the Women's Coalition and Senior Negotiator in the peace process in Northern Ireland
- 10:00-11:30 **Session 1: Abkhazia and South Ossetia**
- Panelists:*
- **Mr Vladimir SOCOR**, Senior Research Fellow, Jamestown Foundation
 - **Mr Svante CORNELL**, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
 - **Mr Boriss CILEVIČS** (Latvia, SOC) and **Mr Michael Aastrup JENSEN** (Denmark, ALDE), co-rapporteurs on Georgia
 - **Ms Theodora BAKOYANNIS** (Greece, EPP/CD) and **Mr Andreas GROSS** (Switzerland, SOC), co-rapporteurs on the Russian Federation
- Discussion**
- 11:30-13:00 **Session 2: Nagorno-Karabakh**
- Panelists:*
- **Mr Dennis SAMMUT**, Executive Director of the London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS)
 - **Ms Sabine FREIZER**, European Program Director, International Crisis Group
 - **Mr Axel E. FISCHER** (Germany, EPP/CD) and **Mr John PRESCOTT** (United Kingdom, SOC), co-rapporteurs on Armenia
 - **Mr Pedro AGRAMUNT** (Spain, EPP/CD) and **Mr Joseph DEBONO GRECH** (Malta, SOC), co-rapporteurs on Azerbaijan
- Discussion**
- 14:30-16:00 **Session 3: Transnistria**
- Panelists:*
- **Mr James SHERR**, Fellow, Advanced Research & Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
 - **Mr Kamil CALUS**, Centre for Eastern Studies, Poland
 - **Ms Lise CHRISTOFFERSEN** (Norway, SOC) and **Mr Piotr WACH** (Poland, EPP/CD), co-rapporteurs on the Republic of Moldova
- Discussion**
- 16:00 Closing remarks by the Chair of the Monitoring Committee

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS*(The names of the members present appear in bold)*

Members	Country
Mr Herkel	Estonia
Ms Christoffersen	Norway
Mr Omtzigt	Netherlands
Mr Correia	Portugal
Ms Acketoft	Sweden
Mr Agramunt	Spain
Mr Aligrudić	Serbia
Mr Allavena	Monaco
Ms Bakoyannis	Greece
Ms Blondin	France
Ms Boldi	Italy
Mr Bonnici	Malta
Ms Čigāne	Latvia
Mr Cilevičs	Latvia
Ms von Cramon-Taubadel	Germany
Mr Debono Grech	Malta
Ms Durrieu	France
Mr Dzurinda	Slovak Republic
Mr Evans	United Kingdom
Mr Fetisov	Russian Federation
Mr Fischer	Germany
Ms Fischerová	Czech Republic
Mr Flego	Croatia
Mr Gale	United Kingdom
Mr Ghiletchi	Republic of Moldova
Ms Grozdanova	Bulgaria
Mr Gulyás	Hungary
Mr Hancock	United Kingdom
Mr Harutyunyan	Armenia
Mr Hunko	Germany
Ms Huovinen	Finland
Mr Islami	Albania
Mr Ivanić	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mr Iwiński	Poland
Mr Jensen M.	Denmark
Mr Jensen M.A.	Denmark
Mr Kandelaki	Georgia
Mr Koç	Turkey
Ms Kyriakides	Cyprus
Mr Legendre	France
Mr Leyden	Ireland
Ms L'ovochkina	Ukraine
Ms Lundgren	Sweden
Mr Matušić	Croatia
Ms Maury Pasquier	Switzerland
Mr Meale	United Kingdom
Ms Memecan	Turkey
Mr Moriau	Belgium
Mr Mota Amaral	Portugal
Ms Muttonen	Austria
Mr Nessa	Italy
Mr Neugebauer	Austria
Baroness Nicholson	United Kingdom
Mr Nikoloski	“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
Mr O'Reilly	Ireland
Mr Papadimoulis	Greece
Mr Petrenco	Republic of Moldova

Ms	de Pourbaix-Lundin	Sweden
Mr	Preda	Romania
Mr	Prescott	United Kingdom
Ms	Reps	Estonia
Mr	Rigoni	Italy
Mr	Rusmali	Albania
Mr	Rustamyan	Armenia
Mr	Saar	Estonia
Mr	Sasi	Finland
Mr	Schennach	Austria
Ms	Schuster	Germany
Mr	Seyidov	Azerbaijan
Mr	Slutsky	Russian Federation
Mr	Sobolev	Ukraine
Mr	Stoilov	Bulgaria
Ms	Strik	Netherlands
Mr	Suleymanov	Azerbaijan
Mr	von Sydow	Sweden
Mr	Szabó	Hungary
Ms	Taktakishvili	Georgia
Mr	Vaksdal	Norway
Mr	Vareikis	Lithuania
Mr	Villumsen	Denmark
Ms	Vučković	Serbia
Mr	Wach	Poland
Ms	Woldseth	Norway
Mr	Xuclà	Spain

Ex officio:

Ms	Brasseur	Luxembourg
Mr	Chope	United Kingdom
Mr	Gross	Switzerland
Mr	Kox	Netherlands
Mr	Marcenaro	Italy
Mr	Volontè	Italy
Mr	Walter	United Kingdom

Also present:

Ms	Fataliyeva	Azerbaijan
Mr	Japaridze	Georgia
Mr	Vukčević	Montenegro
Ms	Zohrabyan	Armenia

Experts present at the hearing on frozen conflicts:

Mr	Calus
Mr	Cornell
Ms	Freizer
Ms	Morrice
Mr	Sammut
Mr	Sherr
Mr	Socor

Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly:

Ms Ravaud, Head of Secretariat of the Committee
 Ms Nachilo, Deputy to the Head of Secretariat of the Committee
 Mr Klein, Secretary of the Committee
 Ms Affholder, Secretary of the Committee
 Ms Bastier, Administrative Assistant of the Committee
 Ms Meyer, Assistant of the Committee