Doc. 9736
17 March 2003

The cultural situation in the South Caucasus

Report

Committee on Culture, Science and Education

Rapporteur: Mr Ali Abbasov, Azerbaijan, EDG

Summary

The Assembly stresses the importance of the cultural sector for the political and economic stability of the region and welcomes the contribution already made by the Council of Europe on individual, regional and multilateral levels by initiating educational and cultural projects.

It also stresses the importance of involving young people actively in the cultural and the political development of the region.

While pointing out the need to avoid the simplistic tendency to see the region as a coherent entity, the Assembly encourages the development of cultural co-operation between the three South Caucasus countries.

Convinced that positive cultural interaction stimulates new types of social integration and political interaction, it recommends that member states of the Council of Europe provide financial and technical support to the countries in the region for programmes and projects in all cultural fields.

It also calls on the three South Caucasian Republics to take particular steps in the fields of conflict resolution, cultural diversity and minorities, culture in general, media, education, young people and heritage.

I. Draft recommendation

1.       The Assembly has followed closely cultural developments in the South Caucasian Region in the transitional period, including the historical background and the impact on culture of the economic and political situation. In this context culture is used in its broad sense to include arts, heritage, religion, media, science, education, youth and sport.

2.       The Assembly is concerned by the difficult overall political and economic situation in the three South Caucasus countries. It stresses the importance of the contribution of the cultural sector to the stability of the region.

3.       It emphasizes, however, the need for international aid to this sector through co-operation with the countries and through foreign investments and assistance, for example in the form of subsidies for European networks in the fields of education, science and culture to hold their meetings in the region.

4.       There is a need for improving culture policies in the countries involved and for improving cultural co-operation not only within the region but also with the neighbouring countries and with the whole area covered by the European Cultural Convention.

5.       The Assembly welcomes the contribution already made by the Council of Europe on individual, regional and multilateral levels by initiating educational and cultural projects for the Caucasian Republics.

6.       It notes in particular the series of informal conferences involving the ministers of culture and of education. It also welcomes the contribution all three republics made to the recent informal meeting of the European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs in Strasbourg in February 2003.

7.       It stresses the importance of involving young people actively in the cultural and the political development of the region.

8.       The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers encourage the member states of the Council of Europe to:

i. contribute to the preparation and funding of programmes and projects relating to the various fields of culture in the region;

ii. provide financial and technical support to the countries in the region for structural reforms of the education system, especially in education for democratic citizenship and in higher education and research;

iii.       develop co-operation between the three countries in all cultural fields;

iv.       support and facilitate the development of regional co-operation in the cultural sector through the creation of regional structures and the encouragement of regional initiatives, including encouraging relevant regional networking of non-governmental organisations;

v. promote activities involving civil society and in particular those aiming at preparing young people for an active role in the democratic and cultural life of the region.

9.       The Assembly calls on the South Caucasian Republics to:

on conflict resolution

i. refrain from politicisation of the cultural sector;

ii. refrain from using cultural values and property for political ends;

iii. seek the peaceful settlement of existing controversies in the cultural sector;

iv. work on the promotion of a culture of tolerance and mutual respect;

v. discourage the expression of ultra-nationalism and ensure positive attitudes;

on cultural diversity and minorities

vi. adopt measures to maintain and promote linguistic and cultural diversity;

vii. accede to the European Charter for Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

viii. protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities of minorities within their respective territories, to encourage conditions for the promotion of these identities and to develop cross-community understanding of the differences;

ix. provide for and facilitate the effective participation rights of minorities in political, social and economic life, in keeping with international norms;

on culture in general

x. improve the legislation relating to the fields of culture including the status of languages and amend all provisions which interfere with international co-operation;

xi. develop inclusive and intercultural educational provisions and curricula, that are culturally and linguistically appropriate, to ensure that all groups have an understanding of their multicultural society, but with particular emphasis on the younger generation, and that there are shared and common values in the public domain which evolve through democratic consultation;

xii. look for international funding for the implementation of concrete projects in the fields of culture;

on media

xiii. support the development of pluralistic public service broadcasting to guarantee freedom of expression in the media in line with the standards of the Council of Europe;

on education

xiv. pursue the reform of education systems in general, with special reference to history teaching, education for democratic citizenship and the development of language teaching, in the light of the declarations adopted by the ministers of education of the region;

xv. strengthen teacher education and especially for linguistic minorities;

xvi. support mobility and exchange programmes for students and young people;

xvii. increase the budget for education and educational co-operation;

on young people

xviii. encourage the development of formal and informal structures for the participation of young people in civil activities and cultural life

on heritage

xix. avoid condemning, without sufficient evidence, neighbouring governments for damaging and appropriating their cultural heritage;

xx. work together on documentation and preservation of cultural heritage at a regional level and not least in relation to conflict zones (e.g. Georgian heritage in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Armenian heritage in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azeri heritage in Armenian-occupied territory and so on), using such co-operation to build confidence and nurture respect for each other’s cultural traditions and achievements;

xxi. support and develop institutional networks aiming to promote and develop the cultural heritage of the people of their countries, including that of past or minority ethnic groups.

II.       Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Abbasov

Contents:

A. Introduction

B. The cultural situation in the South Caucasus

Some Key Elements for Understanding the Region

Cultural and Ethnic Diversity

The ‘Past’ as the Future

Traditions of Ethnic rather than Civic Identities

‘Ascribed’ Identity

The Post-Soviet Dilemmas - Paradoxes and Psychological Factors

Legislation

Governance Issues

C. The South Caucasus as Region and Countries

D. Why Culture Matters

E. Background Considerations and Possible Areas for Assistance

F. Postscript - Culture and the Council of Europe

A. Introduction

1.       In the context of recent debate on European cultural co-operation and the role the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should play in it, this report¹ focuses on the cultural situation in the South Caucasus and key factors relating to it. It also tries to explain why culture is such a particularly important issue and highlights the complexity of the region. This is partly to balance an often simplistic tendency to see the region as a coherent entity or even when differentiating between the three countries to see them as conventional or traditional unitary nation-states. Some thought is given to possible priorities for potential Council of Europe cultural cooperation and assistance to the South Caucasus.

2.       The word culture is a notoriously fluid term depending on context and language and whether defined broadly or narrowly. In this paper culture is generally used in its broad Council of Europe sense to include the arts, heritage, media, science, education, youth and sport in no order of priority.

3.       For those who feel uncomfortable with a paper that begins without a more specific definition of culture I would tentatively offer the following which might be helpful in a specifically Council of Europe context and which also takes into account the developmental nature of culture. This would be to define or view culture as the unfinished process of self-development, self-definition and transformation of individuals, groups, societies, countries and regions.

4.       Whatever definition is used it is vital to recognise that culture in its broader sense is something dynamic. Crucially important contemporary cultural phenomena such as the new information technologies, mass travel, mass media and youth and life-style issues which are shaping our world both globally and locally do not fit comfortably into past classical, traditional or Soviet definitions either of culture or of education. Alongside traditional conceptions of culture including, for example, architecture, literature, education, language, traditions, religion, etc., it does encompass industry and production as well as economic, social and political problems. There is no doubt, that tourism, book publishing, cinematography, television and radio broadcasting are an inseparable part of national culture.

5.       Culture in the region is not remote from everyday life. Culture is often used as the currency of political combat. Terry Eagleton wrote recently that in some of the world’s tougher neighbourhoods “culture is not just what you put on the cassette player, it is what you kill for” (The Idea of Culture).

6.       In Europe in particular we now live in a globalising world where there are fewer borders in trade and commerce. This has made us more aware of the fact that the important borders, which still remain, are about culture, identity, belief, religion and tradition. In a globalising world many people feel a need to retain a defined cultural identity. Understanding these cultural sources of identity is vitally important for everyone in Europe but is impossible at whatever level without being able to engage in cultural interaction and expression and without our being open to different cultures.

7.       Culture can of course build bridges between communities and peoples and be a great healer of conflict but it can also be destructive in regions like the South Caucasus and can be used to provide justification for dehumanising acts of hatred, violence and war. Culture both in its positive and negative manifestations must be recognised as the potent force that it is.

8.       Civil society plays an important role in supporting and fostering cultural life in many European countries. In these countries, the government not only provides public funding for cultural projects and directly manages cultural activities but must also devise strategies to encourage the best possible use of resources over which it has no control, i.e. those of the private sector. In the transition countries, the relationship between the government and civil society poses special problems on account of the need to strike a balance between the independence of cultural institutions and their need for stability.

9.       European states have recognised that the cultural sector is a source of employment, particularly now that the process of industrial reorganisation has led to a remarkable decrease in employment in traditional sectors. Employment in the cultural sector poses particular problems, given that it is dependent on the quality of human resources, but it also presents a major opportunity for growth.

10.       The cultural industries are both a source of income and one of the main areas for the expression and dissemination of a people's creativity. Consequently, it is an area where private and public interests overlap and which covers widely varying forms of expression: recording companies, publishing houses, the film industry, etc.

11.       Art and culture have an important international dimension. The cultural industries are among the most mobile and most globalised sectors. Knowledge of the forms of art and culture of another country can also promote respect for and contact with other peoples. International co-operation can help to develop peaceful relations and friendship between peoples and improve their understanding of one another's life-style.

12.       Cultural tourism, not yet developed, is one of the priorities of the three Caucasus countries, since it is rightly considered to be a means of promoting cultural heritage and living culture, a source of sustainable socio-economic development and a tool for creating jobs.

13.       The economic and cultural development of the South Caucasus countries in the post-independence period is distinct with special peculiarities and controversies caused by objective and subjective factors not observed in any other regions of the former Soviet Union. At one stage, amongst ideas on the development of this region was one to create a “common Trans-Caucasian home”. However, in spite of the existence of some uniting factors – geographic proximity, common borders, similarity of Caucasian temperament and mentality, economic relations developed during the Soviet period – the development of the three independent countries in the 1990s was affected by growing separatist movements, which led to the aggravation of the internal social and political situation of these countries and to full-scale military conflict. The crisis in the military-political and cultural spheres put additional negative pressure on the economic reform process, intensified social tension and resulted in more than a million refugees.

14.       Peace and social cohesion both within the three individual countries and in the region as a whole, which is a prerequisite for long-term investment and economic development, is only possible within an actively supportive cultural environment. The political and economic arguments for taking culture seriously in the South Caucasus, quite apart from any humanistic ones, are self-evident to anyone familiar with the region. The main humanistic argument for investment in culture in the South Caucasus is that as elsewhere people are looking for something beyond the market to provide their lives with meaning. This report was written before the Informal meeting of the European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, Strasbourg, February 2003. The Assembly should take account of this activity following the adoption of a declaration on intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention.

B. The Cultural Situation in the South Caucasus

Some Key Elements for Understanding the Region

15.       Some of the key elements for an understanding of the cultural situation in the South Caucasus include

• its cultural and ethnic diversity

• the problem of the ‘past’ as the future

• traditions of ethnic rather than civic identities

• the problem of ‘ascribed’ identity

• the post-Soviet dilemmas - paradoxes and psychological factors

• cultural legislation

• governance and democracy issues, including confused or weak powers and structures at local and local government level.

Cultural and Ethnic Diversity

16.       The Caucasus region is a complex mosaic of nationalities, cultures and languages. It is a region characterised by national and ethnic spaces which do not coincide or share the same borders.

17.       Classic nineteenth century notions of the nation state and the temptation of ‘reading’ the region in this way are fraught with danger. Whereas in much of 19^th century Europe the concepts of state, nation and territory merged, this was never the case in the Caucasus.

18.       The demographic ramifications of Caucasus history and the dislocations between political and ethno-cultural frontiers are sometimes dramatic. To take a simple example, we may focus on Azerbaijan when we think of Azeris, yet of some 30 million Azeris, more than 20 million live in northern Iran. This particular example was the result of the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 between Russia and Persia which included the annexing of part of the region into the Russian Empire (which eventually became today’s Azerbaijan) while the other part became part of an Iranian state which has Tabriz as its regional centre. This Treaty had other ramifications. In 1828-30 in accordance with the Treaty, Russia settled more than 130,000 Armenians from Iran and Turkey in Mountainous Karabakh.²

19.       This pattern is duplicated, albeit with smaller numbers involved but often with greater complexity, both within and immediately beyond the Caucasus region. For example Ossetians are spread both sides of the border between Georgia and the Russian Federation, the Lezgins similarly between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, there are Armenians in Georgia and ethnically Georgian Turks in Turkey, many, incidentally, holding senior positions, and so on. The Caucasus region’s rich diversity is a cultural blessing but often a political curse. Voluntary and involuntary migration, forced displacement, ‘ethnic cleansing’ (which included in the nineteenth century mass deportations to the Ottoman Empire, i.e. Turkey and Middle East and in the twentieth century to Central Asia and Siberia), invasion and conquest have been an historical feature of the region since the earliest times right up to the present.

20.       As a result of ethnic conflicts which emerged after independence, a number of national minorities and significant numbers of the majority populations left their homelands, which in turn had a negative impact on cultural development. The war over Mountainous Karabakh resulted in the occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory and created close to one million refugees and displaced people in Azerbaijan. In spite of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (Resolutions N 822, 853, 874, 884) calling for the immediate withdrawal of military forces and liberation of the occupied lands, the situation of refugees has remained unchanged for the past 10-12 years, as the majority of them continue to live in tent camps and abandoned railway wagons. Armenia has approximately 300,000 refugees from Azerbaijan, who are relatively well integrated into society (like the Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia). In Georgia, up to 264,000 IDPs live in equally poor conditions, most in the Samegrelo province bordering on Abkhazia but also in other parts of Georgia, including the capital Tbilisi.

21.       Migration and displacement of groups produce fear, isolation and anxiety, distancing them from their traditional attachments which in turn produces cultures of defensive solidarity. Culture in such circumstances becomes collective identity and a distinctive way of life, which defines the group from ‘the Other’ rather than equipping them with a set of values which might be relevant to any way of life. Identity politics and culture are of course often a response to social instability or social exclusion.

The ‘Past’ as the Future

22.       The diversity of the Caucasus is exceptional by any standards. The present cultural situation cannot be understood without knowledge and understanding of the region’s longer past. While important and extremely relevant, its Soviet past can also be seen as a mere interlude in an ancient region’s turbulent history which goes back to the earliest times and which has seen continual invasions and incursions of peoples from all directions producing its very complex ethnic composition.

23.       To understand the present cultural situation of the region, so much of which is referenced in the past, an understanding of the history (or histories) of the region is vital. Yet history in the Caucasus is a very complicated and contentious subject. The use and abuse of history for political ends is all too common and not helped by the fact that the line where myth ends and history begins is often unclear. There is a general tendency in the region to project history back from the present with teleologically specious results (as in the “we-were-here-first syndrome”) and there are all too often claims of an ethnic particularism and purity in either history or culture, improbable if not impossible in a region which has been one of the world’s greatest cultural crossroads. It is a problem not only of the past dictating the present but of the present manipulating the past.

24.       In antiquity amongst the conquerors of the region were the Scythians, Persians, Greeks, Romans and Parthians and there were strong Hellenistic settlements. It was later conquered by the Arabs, Byzantium, Khazars, Cumans, Mongols and Turks. In modern times the region has been the object of the imperial and geo-political ambitions of its three big contending neighbours, Russia, Ottoman Turkey and Persia, particularly in the 18^th and 19^th centuries.

25.       Russian imperial rule was extended over most of the Caucasus region between the end of the 18^th century and the 1870’s and this colonial rule in practice continued until just over a decade ago when the former Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the southern part of the Caucasus emerged as independent countries.

26.       While the South Caucasus’ present can only be understood by knowledge and understanding of its past, history is more a problem than a solution for the future. History is holding the peoples of the region prisoner. The conflicts and ‘frozen wars’ which are currently devouring the region’s human and other resources and its people’s energies are but one witness to that history. Unfortunately for many people in the region there is a simplistic tendency to see the ‘past’ as the future. The majority populations in all three countries tend to cite and romanticise the period when ‘they’ ruled the whole region. For Azeris it was the rule of the Albanians (whom they, and not only they, see as their forefathers - the Albanians are nothing to do with present day Albania). For the Georgians it was the medieval period when Queen Tamar ruled and for the Armenians it is the period of II Tigran (1st century B.C.).

27.       In general, even amongst the benevolent and the enlightened, there is what could be described as a tendency to ‘rear-view mirror driving’ and a preoccupation of where one has come from rather than where one is going. This preoccupation potentially stops the governments of the region and the political leaders of the irredentist movements not only from seeing a common future but also a new, real threat on the road ahead. It will surely be looming sociological and cultural forces related to modernity and identity, globalisation, new notions of citizenship, new technologies and digital communication which will be the real shapers of its future, not the region’s disputed local histories.

28.       There is a real cultural challenge for the countries of the region which is two-fold. On the one hand it is how to emerge above the region’s histories and on the other how to be in a fit enough state in terms of education and culture to manage the new challenges i.e. the new sociological and cultural forces linked to modernity and identity.

29.       Without stability and investment in education, culture and creativity, particularly for young people, the region will fall victim to the negative effects of unavoidable modernisation and globalisation and not be able to maximise the benefits of them. For example the danger of a European digital divide, with the South Caucasus on the wrong side of it, already looks as though it has begun. There is a need for active intervention to counter the problem.

Traditions of Ethnic rather than Civic Identities

30.       The South Caucasus is a largely multiethnic region. Therefore, moulding a new civic nation out of this ethnic multiplicity continues to be a paramount task for the three countries, which aspire to join fully a family of modern and democratic countries. The Soviet heritage is largely a negative factor in this context. The Soviet system of identity registration contributed to embedding ethnic rather than civic identities and that undermined the legitimacy of any Enlightenment-based universalist ideas. These countries need to create a new model of common citizenship in ethnic diversity, something that would not be an easy task for any country.

31.       The creation of the three modern ‘nation-state’ countries has some historical basis but at another level they can also be seen as artificial or arbitrary constructions. The South Caucasus operates simultaneously at several levels with the local/regional being often the defining one, hence the threat or fear of fragmentation, and the political responses it provokes, in the three countries.

32.       The pre-revolutionary period of Russian rule produced economic and cultural development in the south Caucasus and brought in its wake the emergence of local intelligentsias with autonomist aspirations in the dominant ethnic groups.

33.       “Transcaucasia”, the Russian term for the region, became a short-lived independent state as the Transcaucasian Federation in 1917 after the Bolshevik seizure of power. It declared itself an independent democratic republic in April 1918. In May 1918 it dissolved into the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia partly as a result of an unhelpful international context. The Red Army, assisted by local communists, in 1920, reconquered the three republics and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic was formed in 1922 as a Union Republic of the USSR. This Transcaucasian Union Republic existed until 1936 when Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were created as Union Republics.34

34.       Both Russian and Soviet imperial policy used ‘divide and rule’ practices, with the manipulation of dominant or ‘progressive’ ethnic groups to promote the empires and to restrain or contain other difficult ethnic groups. This historically encouraged a concept of citizenship based on ethnic rather than civic principles and encouraged a process of assimilation of smaller ethnic groups by larger ones and of course fear of cultural extinction. This is one of the major issues, for example, in the Abkhazian conflict.

35.       The consequences of citizenship categorisation by ethnicity were, and are, manifold and are responsible for some aspects of the current irredentist tendencies and local conflicts in some areas of the South Caucasus. Notwithstanding its ‘internationalism’ and social and demographic engineering to create the new socialist state and the new ‘Soviet man’, there was a fairly rigid Soviet system of identity registration, nationality quotas and so on, which paradoxically emphasized nationality and reinforced ethnic rather than civic identities.

36.       The system was quite complicated as only certain groups were recognised as ‘minorities’ while some of the recognised minorities were given territorial status and some not. Ajara was a particularly interesting and exceptional territorial case as it was a territorial unit set up on the basis of religion although its Muslim population has in the meantime dwindled. Under the Russian imperial and then Soviet imperial administrative system there emerged a hierarchy of ‘official’ nationalities and ethnic groups with some having territoriality (in Soviet times ‘Autonomous Republic’, ‘Autonomous Oblast’” or lesser status) bestowed on them. The early Soviet period in particular sealed lots of destinies.

37.       It is not difficult to contextualise Abkhazia³, Mountainous-Karabakh (where there were already serious conflicts in the early ninteenth and twentieth centuries), South Ossetia and Ajara and other modern ‘trouble spots’ against this canvas. While three states formally exist in the region, the factual situation is that three geographic areas (Mountainous Karabakh and its surroundings, Abkhazia, and parts of South Ossetia) are ruled by secessionist ethnic movements outside government jurisdiction. These areas thus remain unrecognized entities, shielded from the influence of the international community. With the political and economic chaos of the post-Soviet period people naturally wanted to know who would protect them and whom they could trust - ethnic nationalism and ties of blood reinforced by the system provided an easy and obvious answer.

38.       The fact that certain groups were not recognised as official nationalities did tend to render them invisible for much of the time and lead to a process of assimilation. To take one example, the Megrelians, a West Kartvelian people living in Mingrelia, the western region of Georgia near Abkhazia, never became an ‘official’ nationality but have their own (unwritten) language although they speak Georgian and often have multiple identity as Megrelian and Georgian. At one level there has been assimilation of Megrelians as Georgians. On the other hand the identity still asserts itself and the political dynamics of the early period of the independence of Georgia in the 1990’s cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of this region of Georgia and its local perceptions.

39.       As most national minorities were deliberately ignored during the Soviet period, only a small number of them, those which were recognised, had opportunities to pursue secondary education in schools using the national language and to publish magazines and broadcast in the national languages. Therefore today most national minorities are encountering problems related to the preservation and regeneration of their languages and cultures. The constitutions and legislation of the three countries recognise equal rights for all national minorities but there exists a range of serious problems in ensuring real equality.

40.       There can be no doubt that one of the big challenges facing the countries of the region and in particular Georgia and Azerbaijan, is going to be constructing democratic societies where citizenship is based on civic rather than ethnic identities and principles i.e. where one’s sense of belonging is civic rather than ethnic. Such a process will only be achieved through education and intelligent cultural intervention.

‘Ascribed’ Identity

41.       The continual Russian and Soviet policy of officially recognising or not recognising groups and of encouraging assimilation of smaller groups within larger ones and even of deporting whole groups has led to a culture of ethnic labelling.

42.       One of the problems of this entrenched habit of ethnic labeling is that it tends to be a labelling of individuals or groups from the outside i.e. an ascribed identity. It is not, generally speaking, a labelling they choose themselves and even when it is, they have not chosen the content of that ‘label’. This defines them against other labeled groups and reinforces the concept of ‘the Other’ and all that that signifies.

43.       The link between culture and identity is direct and strong. This is not the place to go into detail about the question of identity and ‘the Other’, nor about social antagonism, dehumanisation, stereotyping, discrimination and marginalisation arising from labeling and externally ‘ascribed’ identity but it is fairly evident in the context of the region that it leads to undesirable psychological ghettoisation and social entrenchment. In a world where, for example, particularly for the younger generation in Europe, multiple identities are a positive, liberating and natural part of their lives, the issue of people ‘choosing’ their identities or labels is extremely important.

44.       In the context of the South Caucasus, the ‘ascribed’ label of being a Georgian or an Abkhaz, an Azeri or a Talysh, an Armenian or an Ossetian has attached to it some very heavy and normally undetachable ‘baggage’. That ‘baggage’ means for example that ‘true’ Georgians and ‘real’ Abkhazes cannot have multiple identities (nor views which dissent) and have to conform to the often crude political behaviour and ideology of their group. Pressure is put on them to believe that their deepest values and attachments are inherited not chosen. This limits the scope of individual self-determination and individual conscience, as well as commonsense, and stifles creative instincts, all of which are connected ultimately with, and inhibit, democratic impulses in any society.

The Post-Soviet Dilemmas - Paradoxes and Psychological Factors

45.       A key problem for the three countries is that of being ‘post-Soviet’. Post-Soviet, ipso facto, is connected with being, or having been, Soviet. The point is that although there has been enormous change throughout the region - and it is important to remember that for most ordinary people not for the better - there has been enough change to create massive disruption but in most areas not enough change to produce a true paradigm shift.

46.       This is certainly true in the case of culture and education. In essence ‘post-Soviet’ is still often simply a mutated form of Soviet rather than something really different.

47.       The politicians and leaders in the South Caucasus have been faced in the past decade with the dilemma of having to stop the collapse of the educational and cultural infrastructures.⁴ This has absorbed all the local resources available in the state system. They have halted the infrastructure collapse broadly speaking by freezing and protecting the old Soviet institutions and systems. They have done this even in those cases where they have moved away from the old Soviet command structures and ideology-driven content.

48.       The ministries concerned with culture and the ministries concerned with education, to take a simple example, are still essentially ministries of culture and ministries of education, not ministries for culture and ministries for education and the old Soviet definition of culture i.e. culture is anything that the ministry of culture (or its institutions) does is still prevalent. The philosophy and definitions of culture and education are still basically those of the past.

49.       Some of the distortions of the Soviet period inevitably have had to be worked through and lead to their own distorting cultural consequences. For an old Azeri there have been dramatic switches of script – Arabic, Cyrillic, Latin⁵. This has produced all sorts of ramifications - and not only for libraries and librarians. For certain generations it means being separated or distanced from parts of their heritage.

50.       Various problems have emerged in the sphere of education due to the difficult socio-economic situation in the region. The socio-economic development of the South Caucasus countries in the first half of the 1990s was characterised by a sharp fall in production, hyper-inflation, increasing poverty and social and demographic crises. According to World Bank data, in 2001 the decrease in real GDP compared to 1989 was 38% in Azerbaijan, 63% in Georgia and 26% in Armenia. The percentage of the poor was 49.6% in Azerbaijan, 54% in Georgia, and 47.4% in Armenia. A sharp drop in living standards has found its direct reflection in the education field and had a negative impact on the quality of education resulting in the decline of the overall educational level of the population. According to World Bank data, in 2001 the share of state expenditures on education in GDP terms was 3.5% (7.5% in 1990) in Azerbaijan, 2.8% (5.3% in 1987) in Armenia and 2.2% (6.2% in 1989) in Georgia. Due to insufficient funding a significant number of problems and difficulties exist at all levels of education and are characteristic for the system as a whole.

51.       The existing education system in South Caucasus countries is unable to respond to the demands of the new market economy. In the past, teachers were trained to deliver one curriculum that reflected a very positivist view of knowledge, where there was only one truth and that was contained in a single textbook. Students were seen as passive recipients whose main duty was to absorb all factual knowledge that the teacher presented during the lesson. A good student was one who could memorize and repeat the lesson. At present a similar teaching pattern is followed regardless of grade, subject, region or urban/rural distinction. So the present education system of the South Caucasus countries is the continuation of the one of the former Soviet system, characterized by total centralization and standardization in approaches to education.

52.       Insufficient funding is one of the main reasons causing the crisis in the fields of culture and education. The problem for ministers of culture and education in the three countries has been that in a chronic financial environment and where actual allocations of funding are often less than the inadequate budgets passed by the parliaments and ministries of finance, all resources and energies have been channeled into preserving the infrastructure i.e. paradoxically shoring up old Soviet institutions.

53.       The disappearance of the centralised system of government of the communist period means that new methods of managing and financing cultural institutions must be introduced. It is sometimes difficult for the cultural institutions to cope with this new situation owing to the traditional dependence on an identifiable central authority, in this case the Ministry of Culture, and to the absence of appropriate training in how to use this new independence, which presents as many risks as benefits.

54.       While the total collapse of the cultural and educational infrastructures has been stopped, on closer inspection one sees that the individual parts are often in a parlous or terminal state. This can be seen in many areas (although there are exceptions). The libraries sector for example still churns out meaningless statistics with a lot of libraries which serve no useful purpose at all except as museums for unread books. The museums themselves illustrate the problems behind the statistics. Many of the big museums are like beached whales - floundering, out of context, exposed and defenseless to predators. Often headed by older generation managers impotent and nostalgic for the certainties of Soviet times and with younger staff gone because of neither adequate pay nor hope for the future, these institutions have lost their purpose and their direction. Like many areas of the cultural and educational sectors they desperately need ‘reinventing’ or ‘re-imagining’ and taking into a post ‘post-Soviet’ stage.

55.       To move to a post ‘post-Soviet’ stage external assistance will be needed combined with a courageous local policy of fundamental institutional reform working on the principle of ‘keeping the best and reinventing the rest’. This also means letting some things, as is natural in life, die and disappear.

56.       The tendency to pour all resources into stopping the collapse of the infrastructures by ‘freezing’ them does not mean that much institutional change has not happened. The problem has been that it has often not gone far enough or that available resources have been swallowed up shoring up the old rather than sustaining the new. But even amidst change there has often been a holding on to the past, which is psychologically understandable, or a tendency to atavistic bad practice. Thus even in those areas of culture where there has been the most institutional change, for example in publishing, while the old state publishing system is now unrecognisable with the independent and private sector having been allowed to emerge, it is often the case that there is still a lot of state retention of ownership. By a closed system it is the remaining old state publishing house or its successor which will be given the lucrative textbook contracts - not the new publishers. This is the syndrome of shoring up the old rather than sustaining of the new.

57.       The Soviet distortions also affect current expectations. Again one can give simple illustrative examples. By European standards, the old Soviet Union had a very disproportionately high number of scientists so it was inevitable, even had there not been the difficulties of the past decade, that there would have probably been a downward turn in the number of scientists in the region as the Soviet planning system and its artificial quotas withered away. Even the unquestionably devastating impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on artists has to be seen in perspective. It is true that the creative processes of artists, musicians and writers have suffered as they have had to struggle to adjust to market realities and against a background where the market for arts and culture has often contracted because the general population has less to spend on recreational pursuits while those who have the money have wider choice than before. The point however is that in most countries in Europe the number of full-time professional artists is much lower than levels in the old Soviet Union and a high proportion of European artists, musicians and writers for example do not live solely from their earnings as artists but through secondary employment such as teaching. Their material position in society too, except for the fortunate few, is relatively lower than that of artists in the Soviet system but often such unknown realities do not inform the expectations of struggling artists of the older generation in the South Caucasus.

58.       Expectation and behaviour patterns from the Soviet system impact on culture in all three countries in a myriad of ways. A reluctance to empower people, especially young people, is found in a continuing paternalism at all levels. In most professional fields of culture this is a chronic problem as talented young people are migrating if not abroad then to other sectors where they can find better pay and some hope for a real professional, managerial or entrepreneurial future rather than serving time in stagnant institutions waiting for the old guard to retire. It should be noted that in the region it is not uncommon for pay not only to be dramatically low in the cultural sector but to be in arrears sometimes by several months.

59.       The manifest reluctance to encourage (or even register) NGOs is also an old Soviet reaction and derives from a fear that they will replace or duplicate the work of official bodies. In those instances where NGOs are encouraged the motivation is sometimes dubious. Healthy and vibrant NGO activity is crucial to future cultural development in the South Caucasus. It currently depends substantially on funding from abroad and this was temporarily threatened recently in two of the countries by ill-judged proposals that in order to receive foreign assistance NGOs had to be put under the relevant ministry i.e. the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Education in addition to all the existing registration procedures.

60.       It was inevitable, but understandable, that external assistance to the former Soviet Union has been primarily economic and has viewed the problems of the countries that emerged from it as economic. The Soviet system was of course about a certain style of economic management and control but it was equally about psychological management and control. The paradox is that possibly the latter is the more stubborn problem and for all but the younger generation it is psychological factors which are getting in the way of social, economic and political solutions. It is an unfortunate and unavoidable fact that there are generation and age issues in the former Soviet countries. The implications of this have not been thought through to their logical conclusion by external assistance agencies. This point will be taken up in the recommendations.

Legislation

61.       At one level, the record of law-making and legislative reform in the three countries in the area of culture is very impressive. All three countries have passed a very substantial amount of legislation, have in general tried to conform with Council of Europe, and even European Union, norms and have been open in consulting and seeking external expertise. In all three countries the motivation for introducing this legislation has often been positive and reflected a genuine desire to move away from negative aspects of the Soviet past and to make their countries ‘modern’.

62.       There is however a problem and that has been that in practice the passing of legislation has become an end in itself and not a means to an end. It is a fact that little of the legislation is known even to people who are, or should be, directly affected by it.

63.       No effort or resources seem to be put into making the laws known in terms of improving accessibility to the texts of the legislation or of including legislation and some legal training in the training of professionals in the fields of culture and education. In many cases the carefully drafted laws are never implemented in practice even in obvious areas such as infringement of intellectual property rights. In this particular case there may be a will to do something in parts of a country’s system but the resources devoted to supporting the fledgling copyright agencies are often derisory and as a result very ambiguous messages are sent to society at large.

64.       The ambiguous message problem is reinforced at working level. Difficulty of access to current legislation and ability to gain knowledge of laws related to one’s profession or work, especially if one is working in the still fragile independent or private sector, not to mention any lack of transparency and clarity in the legal system itself, creates scope for poorly-paid individual ministry employees to interpret the law and regulations as they see fit. This results in genuine confusion for a struggling cultural entrepreneur or publisher or NGO director as to whether repressive actions or arbitrary decisions which contradict the laws in force are part of state policy, directly or indirectly, or connected simply to the corruption of individual officials.

65.       In one of the three countries, looking at the cultural sector, the question of whether or not NGOs are genuinely allowed to emerge by the system and by the legislation was difficult to answer. The legal framework was there but the system of registration was baffling. In some instances, for example in particular regions, there appeared to be no problem with registration but in other areas there was. In the capital it was clearly very difficult or impossible for many to obtain registration but for others, for whatever reasons, not. Was this a problem of legislation? Was it a problem of knowledge of legislation? Was it a problem of transparency and lack of commitment from the top from the policy-makers themselves who worked in most cases so meticulously on introducing often model legislation? Healthy cultural development in the region will depend on a healthy NGO and independent sector which depends on legislation working in practice.

66.       It is probably little understood by those not directly involved that practical aspects of the law are central to a lot of cultural activity. A simple example will suffice. Mounting a small summer festival of music, for example, brings up a host of legally-related matters – contracts of numerous sorts (venue, artists, caterers, site contractors, rubbish disposal), crowd control (local regulations, liaison with police), health and safety issues, licences (public performance licence, performing rights issues, broadcasting rights), protection of copyright (recordings, piracy, repurposing issues), tax and local tax or VAT regulations relating to ticket sales, accounting and related procedures and so on.

67.       The same applies to other areas of culture. The world of journalism and mass media is also heavily dependent on the existence of a comprehensive, supportive and functioning legal context yet this sector is all too often only encountering the force of the law and regulatory activity through refusal of broadcasting licences and tax and libel court cases brought by ruling politicians. One may sympathise with a maligned politician, but respect for the rule of law will not come from lack of access to it or knowledge of it nor where it seems to be relevant only on a selective basis.

68.       In all three countries legislation is moving towards the concept of public broadcasting replacing the old Soviet-model state broadcasting but in Georgia, the most advanced of the countries in this respect, political expediency in an environment of crisis management, supersedes. Public broadcasting ultimately depends on political will and an informed and involved public not on well-intentioned but theoretical legislation.

69.       While it is unrealistic except in the longer term to expect the three countries of the South Caucasus to create strong civil societies with ordinary citizens aware of the laws, real efforts to ensure relevant professionals, for example in culture and education (who are often envisaged in the legislation as being responsible for aspects of its implementation), have access to and basic training in or familiarisation with the laws relating to their professional fields could be an immediate goal. This should be a priority for all three countries.

70.       It should be noted that where there are gaps in the legislation in the three countries, it is often for very good reason. There are, for example, unrealistic and naïve assumptions in the three countries about sponsorship for culture and education, it often being seen as an answer to all the problems. In practice, in ailing economies where businesses are not making good profits, it is unlikely that they will wish to, or be capable of, providing sponsorship funds - with or without legislation. In all three countries tax collection is a real problem and foregoing part of the small amount of tax that can be gathered is not appealing to economists or institutions like the World Bank which is one reason for slow legislative progress in this area.

Governance Issues

71.       Governance in the Caucasus has traditionally been societally-based with clan loyalties, client networks, authoritarianism and tolerance of corruption common features. The Soviet system if anything reinforced and legitimised these features. It is therefore not surprising that such behaviour patterns are still latent and affect all areas of life including culture. While corruption should be neither tolerated nor excused, the comment that some people are corrupt by greed but most are corrupt by need, is not entirely irrerelevant.

72.       Culture in its broadest sense and at a practical and basic level is mainly about delivering services and products. It is increasingly recognised even in European countries with strong state and centralist systems and traditions that it is desirable and usually more efficient and effective to have decision-making closest to the point of delivery. This means that the need for a clearly understood delineation of the responsibilities and powers of the different tiers of government and their power to delegate further, for example to the NGO sector, is fundamental.

73.       In the area of cultural development, it is important not only to increase the number of NGOs and voluntary organizations, but also to pave the way for their inclusion in the decision making process. Some channeling of funds to the creation and strengthening of the NGO sector has led to a situation where some NGOs in the region are not only grant-dependent but sometimes created for the main or sole purpose of providing employment to the NGO head and his or her relatives. Real civil society in the South Caucasus, as elsewhere, can only develop if NGOs truly participate in the decision making process and have real influence on the government.

74.       In many countries in Europe the key delivery mechanism in the field of culture is at local government level and often that level also provides a significant proportion of the funding. Although the three countries are all different, they have not yet achieved, for varying reasons, systems in which the various tiers of administration have clearly and democratically agreed roles. This is not just a problem that affects culture of course but it is vitally important to it. In some cases conflict and centrifugal political forces discourage a move to local empowerment and delegation and in others decades of Soviet ideological authoritarianism and top-down command-structure traditions prevent the political leaders, generally from the older generation, from breaking with old habits.

75.       Lack of local empowerment not only leads to distortions in the system, it also slows down the ability of the countries to implement reform and most importantly in the area of culture and education. It also stifles initiative and creativity and creates in some cases a ‘reliance culture’ i.e. waiting for the centre to do something. One practical consequence of this, again simply to take an illustrative example, is neglect of monuments and other heritage where confusion or failure to come to practical agreement over powers and responsibilities can undermine natural local interest in taking action and preserving their heritage of which they are proud.

76.       The governance issue in the three countries, while a much wider issue than the impact it has on culture and education and policies related to them, is still a central problem even after more than a decade of independence. It is also crucial to the related problem of the vast discrepancy in living standards and opportunity between the populations of the capitals of the three countries and their fellow citizens elsewhere in the country even in the urban centres and provincial capitals where basic provision of dependable supplies of electricity are often an issue. Running even a small school or theatre in such conditions, especially in winter, is hardly possible. Talking of ICT strategies and other 21^st century priorities renders one in danger of straying into fantasy if such basic local infrastructure and provision is not put in place.

C. The South Caucasus as Region and Countries

77.       The degree of diversity and difference within the individual countries has been noted above. Notwithstanding the fact that the state political borders do not coincide with the ethno-cultural ones, each of the three countries has its own very strong identity which distinguishes it from the other two.

78.       Although religion is extremely important in Georgia and a major source of identity for most Georgians, it is language more than anything which is the single most important defining matter that makes one Georgian (the Georgian alphabet, one of fourteen in the world, originates from the 3rd-4th centuries AD.) By contrast in Azerbaijan, particularly amongst some of the elite in Baku, many Azeris feel more comfortable communicating, even with family and friends, in Russian rather than Azeri. Paradoxically the single most important defining matter for an Azeri is probably religion yet for much of the Azeri population, at least hitherto, their Islam has been cultural rather than strictly speaking religious⁶. For Armenians their ancient religious culture and the diaspora experience have been their way of defining themselves.

79.       In terms of their ethnic composition the countries also differ considerably. Although there are minority groups in Armenia, including groups such as Kurds and Yezidis, it is not as culturally diverse as the other two countries. There were significant numbers of Azeris in Armenia before 1948-50. They made up 45% of the total population in 1918. Azerbaijan has a score and more recognised minorities (Talysh in the South and Lezgins in the North being two of the main groups). There are ethnic Armenians still living in Baku, but most of them – about 300 thousand left the country on the Karabakh conflict. Georgia is the most multi-ethnic country in the South Caucasus, with approximately 30% of the population being non-Georgian. The main minorities are Armenians, Azeris, Ossetians, Russians, Abkhaz and Greeks.

80.       Even where there are apparently evident common links, it can however be misleading. For example, while both the majority populations in Armenia and Georgia are predominantly Orthodox, the Armenian Gregorian Church and the Georgian Orthodox Church are quite separate having followed separate paths from a very early period.

81.       There are however reasons for it being helpful to see the South Caucasus as a region when dealing with culture. Apart form the fact that local ethnic groups are often found on two sides of a border and representatives of the majority populations of the three countries were often living in each others’ countries, territoriality has been quite fluid contrary to what is often claimed. Thus the bulk of Armenians in recent times lived in the north-east provinces of the Ottoman Empire until a period of ethnic clashes from 1894 –1922 when this led to the concentration of the Armenian population in the Transcaucasus where they were not only in present day Armenia but also numerically significant in places like Baku. In the 19^th and early 20^th century Baku was seen as the industrial capital of Transcaucasus (and was a world centre for the extraction and processing of oil, producing 95% of the Russian Empire’s oil and 50% of the world’s supply) and Tbilisi its cultural capital. Both were extremely cosmopolitan. The moving of populations was also matched by the moving of borders which included land transfers in the Soviet period between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For example land transfers to Armenia resulted in the territory of Azerbaijan shrinking from 113,900 sq km in 1920 to 86,600 sq km in 1988. Ironically some of the nationalities in the region competitively claim the same ancestral origins and traditions. In short, they have much in common culturally notwithstanding the differences.

82.       The region has historically been bound by strong, economic, social and cultural ties even in the Soviet period. In the Soviet period a lot of the intra-regional contact was via, and often in, Moscow, and the majority populations of the three countries often defined themselves together in the face of the common outsider in the form of Russia and the Soviet system. They had for example common fears about the erosion of their identities and cultures as well as other common problems. They were also often perceived by ‘Moscow’ and other parts of the Soviet Union collectively. This frequently took the form of stereotyping them as southerners and often in highly racial and pejorative ways which also fostered amongst them a sense of common identity or destiny.

83.       Russian and Soviet domination of the region led to their having broadly similar administrative and other infrastructures including for culture, education, science, sport, mass media and so on. In these areas, and at a time of transition where a lot of the problems and solutions are going to be broadly similar, it is of course sensible, and in some cases more efficient, to see and relate to the countries as a region especially if one is an external agency. It is however also understandable that differences between them, artificially suffocated by the Soviet blanket, will emerge and they will seek their own distinctiveness and perhaps have their own ways of doing things. In areas like curriculum reform however it is likely that with some local tailoring, projects and experiments in this area will be directly relevant to all three countries as long as it takes into account the differences and the internal complexities of each country.

84.       Their present relatively low level of cooperation and interaction (leaving aside the conflict dimension) in the region is perhaps inevitable (and transitory?) as they have moved from a past where fraternal ‘socialist cooperation’ was often discredited and to a stage where creating bilateral relationships with other countries, especially the major players in Europe, has taken priority. Joining European institutions also helps them to escape from what some of them see as a Caucasus ‘ghetto’.

D. Why Culture Matters

85.       There is a well-known anecdote about a stranger who is lost deep in the countryside who asks a local peasant the way to a particular place. The peasant unhelpfully replies: “If I was wanting to get there, I would not start from here.” In some respects that is at the heart of the crises facing all three South Caucasus countries in plotting the path of their futures including the planning of cultural development. One cannot change the impact of history but one can influence the future. The roots from the past need to be exchanged for routes to the future. Culture is undoubtedly the key to this.

86.       In a context where mere survival and crisis management consume most local resources and energies, the three countries have very limited options, without outside assistance, of navigating the narrow path between stagnation on the one hand and chaos on the other, not least in the cultural and educational sphere. Their difficulties are not helped by problems of historical memory, the mentality of wanting to create the ‘past’ as the future and the natural human tendency to incline towards what was described earlier in this paper as ‘rear-view mirror’ driving.

87.       There is however a real need for the countries of the region, and their friends and advisers, to take account in policy and strategic planning of modernising and globalising trends which will shape their futures and offer routes forward.

88.       There has of course been radical and disruptive change in the countries over the past decade but recent change has not been enough to produce the paradigm shift needed to liberate the countries and peoples of the region from the shackles of history and ethnic conflict to move beyond the intolerance, fragmentation and “frozen wars” which characterise the region at present.

89.       ‘Post-Soviet’ is an adjective that is unwittingly and ingenuously a mutated form of ‘Soviet’ rather than something fundamentally different. The region is not only a prisoner of its ancestral histories but also of a limiting psychology and redundant Soviet concepts unsuited to contemporary needs and policy. In general there is a need for the countries to move psychologically, practically and decisively from a post-Soviet phase of development to a ‘post post-Soviet phase’ and to the sharing of best European practice but not for reasons of expediency nor simply to be able to join ‘European clubs’ like the Council of Europe but to secure qualitative benefits for all their citizens.90

90.       There is no obvious evidence that the political structures and elites as currently constituted have the vision, will or energy to achieve this paradigm shift. These structures and elites, broadly speaking, are dominated by the understandably tired, generally unimaginative, older generations and by other people who, whatever their good intentions or politics, are in a literal sense congenitally Soviet.

91.       Any future with hope belongs to, and must be shaped by, the values and aspirations of a creative younger generation and this begins with culture and education. Any external investment in the region should be directly or indirectly geared to the younger generation and be carried out in the context of the modernising and globalising forces slowly emerging there, not by reinforcing the conflict-ridden roots of the past.

92.       In Europe we live increasingly in a more open, more tolerant, more self-governing world, in which people, especially young people, expect a voice and a stake in society. Recent research has shown interesting economic links between tolerance and prosperity. There is no reason why the countries of the South Caucasus should not be a part of this Europe, this future Europe.

93.       There is however already a crisis for all three countries even in beginning to aspire to this. Preliminary data on the latest census, released in February 2002, suggest the population of Georgia currently stands at about 4.4 million, about 900,000 less than at the 1989 census and suggesting about a million people have left the country in the past decade. The situation for Armenia is, if anything, even worse, in terms of the hemorrhaging of the population according to some recent research on emigration out of Armenia. The pattern, if not the scale, is repeated in Azerbaijan with large numbers of people having sought their fortunes outside the country and with trained musicians, for example, and people from other cultural fields flowing into Turkey and elsewhere. The people who move are often the young people and the more dynamic elements of their societies.

94.       It is impossible to look at cultural and educational policy and development in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in isolation from the sometimes painful and difficult realities that have arisen since independence. The economic, political, territorial, diplomatic and social problems, not to mention the equally important psychological ones, some a legacy of the past, some precipitated from outside and some self-inflicted, all of course have the most direct impact on culture and the cultural sector, limiting choices of possibility and action. It is unhelpful, but all too easy for outsiders to make facile recommendations based on ‘off-the-shelf’ solutions which are inappropriate or premature in the current South Caucasus environment.

95.       The problems of the South Caucasus both as a region and as individual countries, should however also be kept in perspective. This is particularly true of the cultural sector. It is easy, and dangerous, to allow the local belief to prevail that all difficulties and problems are financial. While not belittling the severity of the budgetary problems, exacerbated by the fact that agreed budgets and the funding eventually allocated often do not coincide, it is a fact that good governance at all levels and strong, intelligent public policy, effectively implemented, are two of the most important challenges facing the countries of the region and it is vital they get them right. Getting them right is not simply, or even mainly, about money.

96.       Culture must be positioned centrally to the wider state modernisation agendas in the countries. There is a need actively to change currently held outmoded and static views and perceptions of culture at governmental and public levels. Shackled by past influences, expectations and structures there is a need for a joined-up government approach to development in all three countries in which the two planks of culture - educational policy and cultural policy - are redefined. In the case of cultural policy it is the need to move to an instrumentalist approach and the use of culture as a crosscutting issue on a range of agendas: culture and conflict, culture and health, culture and employment and so on. In the case of educational policy it is the need to recognise the key role of creativity and educating the present generation in preparation for a world in which the creative economy, local empowerment, democracy and ‘soft’ power are key features.

97.       Human creativity, Unesco has recently argued, is the most evenly distributed natural resource in the world, both renewable and normally environmentally safe. Creativity is also vitally important to the existence of vibrant cultural ‘eco-systems’ and to cultural diversity. If the importance of nurturing creativity, which is at the core of cultural, educational and scientific development, is not recognised, valued and harnessed in Armenia, Azerebaijan and Georgia it is going to lead to marginalisation of the region in an increasingly globalising world.

98.       In the specific field of culture this is a world where cultural expression is increasingly being reflected through the so-called cultural industries. It is also a world where there is imbalance in the capacity, reach and geographical distribution of cultural industries activity and in the ability to commercialise products of human creativity. It is vital that the potential for cultural industries to develop in the three countries in the future is encouraged and that it applies not only to the traditional cultural industries such as publishing, crafts and music but also to the new ones related to digitisation and multimedia. It is important that the right climate is created in the South Caucasus for this even though the countries there are at a very early stage in this area and ‘cultural industries’ often seems to be a remote concept.

99.       The three countries cannot afford to ignore the issue of the creative economy. Culture and creativity will be the driving force in the European and global economy of the 21^st century. The economies of Europe will depend in the future more on television and tourism than on coal and steel and it is important that the South Caucasus countries equip themselves for this challenge.

100.       There is a desperate need for more professional contact and interaction with the rest of Europe by actively plugging into networks and creating opportunities for travel which produce wider experiences which contextualise the models, ideas and influences the countries are drawing on from Europe and elsewhere.

101.       In relation to cultural development, there is a need for a wider and more inclusive definition of culture and encouragement of wider commitment, debate and new partnerships in support of culture and its linkage to creativity, education and the economy. A redefinition of culture suited to a modern society, moving beyond the old Soviet definition of culture being what government institutions do, is required and with publicly agreed agendas to which all the regions of the countries and all sections and groups of their societies can happily subscribe. The cultural and educational sectors can provide leadership, hope and a positive example for their countries.

E. Background Considerations and Possible Areas for Assistance

102.       Any Council of Europe assistance given to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, collectively and individually should be focused clearly on the outputs from the assistance rather than on the inputs and take fully into account local capacity to absorb such assistance at the professional as opposed to the political level.

103.       Any Council of Europe assistance should consciously and consistently focus on the younger generation and younger people (the under 35s) and their involvement should in most cases be a basic criterion for such assistance i.e. any project or activity should either be exclusively focused on them or have an active and major dimension which involves them (e.g. any involvement with the museum field should focus on the professional development of younger museum workers and any inputs in the science sector should be targeted at the young scientists).

104.       Cultural administrators and managers in the region are in need of training to update and re-focus their skills in order to adapt to the new political and economic environment. Skills gained will enable arts managers and administrators to demonstrate the role of the arts in civil society, reconnecting citizens with their cultural heritage and encouraging participation in the contemporary arts scene. At the same time, arts, heritage and cultural facilities should be developed that appeal to foreign visitors if cultural tourism is a serious priority for the region.

105.       Even supposing substantial external assistance from various sources were available, given the enormous mismatch between the cultural development needs of the three countries and the resources available, it is vital that any Council of Europe assistance is properly coordinated with other external inputs to avoid fragmentation. Because of their stage of development and because of other specific local factors, including rivalry between interest groups, friction and distrust between the governmental and NGO sectors and between central and local government, coordination will almost certainly be non-existent or poor at local level for the foreseeable future with dangers of dissipation of effort and experience.

106.       Capacity-building locally and realistic assessments of what can be achieved should always be defined prior to any decisions on assistance not least to manage (unrealistic) expectations locally and to distinguish between desirable needs and achievable needs.

107.       Assistance should be both sectoral and sub-sectoral (e.g. assistance to educational reform or to aspects of heritage management) but also transversal (younger people; creativity; local, regional and international networking; social cohesion; capacity building; minorities). All assistance should have a formal or non-formal training or professional development dimension as part of urgently needed capacity building and updating/upgrading of skills locally.

108.       It is probably sensible to focus any potential Council of Europe assistance around a targeted theme encompassing various elements. A theme that covers Creativity and Diversity, Young People, Heritage, Networking and Policy-Making could be a good starting point and should build on any previous programmes such as the Council of Europe’s STAGE Programme and those of other agencies.

109.       Creativity and Diversity. A lot of work has been done on creativity, education and culture and it is a major item on the domestic agenda of a number of European governments. What the South Caucasus countries need initially is to catch up on the current research, debates and policy initiatives happening in Europe related to creativity and the ‘creative economy’. The Council of Europe would be well positioned to create a framework within which to kick-start this process which ultimately would feed into local policies and practical action such as curriculum development, training and opportunity creation programmes for young people.

110.       Young People. The focus on young and younger people should reflect an engagement with and commitment to the future rather than only to the present, a present which has been hijacked by often discredited older generation political elites. This also implies a real recognition of the importance of what the American Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’. It also recognises the increasingly important role of public diplomacy and civil society in the bilateral and multilateral relationships between European states and by extension away from, or the supplementing of, the one-dimensional and traditional government-to-government relationships.

111.       Heritage. The heritage of the region is immensely rich and varied by any yardstick. Much of it is also in crisis. External assistance in a limited form has been given by the World Bank, the Council of Europe, Unesco and some national agencies of other countries. It is however a huge area and one where vast resources can easily disappear both in a negative and positive sense. Caution is required particularly in the management of expectations. For this reason and to produce something that can be distinctive to the Council of Europe it would probably be best to concentrate on a specific heritage theme.

112.       The most obvious and urgent one is inspection and recording of the state of heritage currently in conflict zones e.g. Georgian heritage in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Armenian heritage in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azeri heritage in Armenian-occupied territory and so on and including also the heritage of minorities where it is threatened or neglected either because of conflict or simply because priority for heritage care is going into the heritage of the majority populations. Access was recently gained by the Georgian authorities to Georgian monuments in South Ossetia and represents a limited but concrete starting point or example for such a Council of Europe initiative. External assistance and involvement and the establishment of a formal programme could facilitate major progress and sensitively handled could be used for future confidence-building between conflicting groups.

113.       Such a heritage initiative in the South Caucasus could and should also be linked to the training and participation of young people – heritage professionals, architectural historians, photographers, researchers and so on as well as potentially young volunteers using ideas, locally adapted, from around Europe. Some of the volunteering initiatives of organisations such as the UK’s National Trust could be of practical interest or small local initiatives based on models like UNV, CSV and indeed even the old Soviet youth camps.

114.       Networking. The countries of the region are often so locked into their local culture problems, they often do not realise that their experience is not entirely unique. This is particularly true in the cultural sector itself. To take a simple example, there is probably no good cultural organisation anywhere, even in the richest European country, where its resources match its aspirations and ambitions. The professionals in these countries are also isolated both from each other and from colleagues in other countries outside the region. In the case of regional contact, the old Soviet system of All-Union and local in-service training, whatever its dubious political intentions, did at least bring colleagues from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia together physically and common professional questions and issues were addressed. This has ceased and nothing substantial has been put in its place. As for external professional contact, it should be remembered that present (often, but not only, financial) impediments to travel and contact come after over seventy years of restrictions by the Soviet system on travel and contact with Europe, especially western Europe.

115.       The Council of Europe cannot of course tackle all aspects of this problem but could make a significant contribution. It could, for example, encourage during the coming five years all the European networks related to culture, education and science as well as professional international bodies working in the same fields both to hold their meetings in the three countries and also give opportunity for wider local participation in them. This could be achieved by financial incentive through a system of subsidising grants for events. The subsidy would be used to offset for example the current rather high costs of travel to the region and make the holding of such meetings, gatherings and conferences there a genuinely attractive and feasible option. This would fit appropriately with the multiple attractions the countries of the region have for visitors and the strong traditions of hospitality which all three share. It would undoubtedly quite quickly build up the international contacts and international working of professionals in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as presenting the countries as real and equal players in Europe.

116.       Policy–making. There is a need for improving cultural and educational policies in the countries involved and for improving cultural and educational co-operation not only within the region but also with the neighbouring countries and with the other European countries. The area of policy-making is a natural area for Council of Europe activity in the region as it already does a lot. Existing assistance could be supplemented by thematic approaches focusing particularly on policy impact. In particular the practical consequences or lack of positive impact of policies on people under 35 could be a focus and so too could the whole process of ‘re-invention’ of cultural and educational institutions to meet the needs of the future. It is also generally true in the region that strategic planning and policy-making related to culture and education is weak or non-existent at both the local government level and at the city and town administration level and is an area of policy-making which is in real need of development drawing on experiences from around Europe.

117.       There can be no doubt that many of the minorities and ethnic groups in the region have special cultural needs and problems which legitimately need addressing. At the same time it would be unfair and possibly counterproductive locally, in a context of general poverty of opportunity and resources, to emphasize them too much as a special priority. Minority issues are extremely important in the region but are best dealt with in wider general programmes and in the context of cross-cutting issues such as creativity, young people or policy-making.

F. Postscript - Culture and the Council of Europe

118.       The Council of Europe’s work in culture is distinguished and recognised. Culture has repeatedly been reinforced as central to its long-term mission through the Summits of Vienna (1993), Strasbourg (1997) and in the Committee of Ministers Declaration for a Greater Europe (Budapest 1999).

119.       It has a fine but possibly insufficiently recognised record of involvement in the narrower and more specific area of cultural cooperation and development. Against this very positive background there have however been weaknesses. Cultural cooperation and development is often about ‘process’ as much as ‘product’ and is more often than not something that happens on an extended time-scale thus requiring commitment, consistency and continuity something which has not always been evident at the practical policy level. The impact of the work of the Council of Europe in the area of cultural cooperation has suffered from lack of follow-up (see Doc. 9473). This needs to be borne in mind when proposing or designing any assistance for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, not least in the context of the STAGE project scheduled to be discontinued at the end of 2003.

120.       When looking at the cultural situation and dimension in the South Caucasus and the potential role of the Council of Europe – it is helpful to contextualise this in the Council of Europe’s and the Assembly’s formal and evolving position on culture.

121.       Culture has been the subject of specific Assembly recommendations and has featured in others. Specific recommendations such as Recommendation 1265 (1995) (Enlargement and European Cultural Co-operation) and Recommendation 1299 (1996) (European cultural co-operation: activities of the European Union and relations with the Council of Europe) and latest Recommendation 1566 (2002) on European co-operation and the future role of the Assembly are directly relevant to any examination of potential Council of Europe activity with the South Caucasus countries. For example it is vital - more so than elsewhere - that one avoids both the danger of duplication of efforts in the South Caucasus and failure to take account of, or even harness, the greater financial resources at the disposal of the European Union. In a similar way, duplication should be avoided in the South Caucasus region by communication and coordination with other players such as Unesco, OECD, OSCE etc as well as with bilateral agencies and some of the active international foundations. It is also important to recognise that with the enlargement of the Council of Europe - including the recent membership of the three South Caucasus countries - there now exist a number of new practical needs and urgent priorities. Different perspectives and agendas are coming from the so-called transition countries in the Council of Europe.

122.       These new needs and priorities have hitherto only partially been taken into account but the new perspectives and agendas from which they come will rise to the surface and increasingly influence policy and action as the new member countries become more used to using the Council of Europe structures and making their views known. This will almost certainly lead to an increasingly important role for culture.

123.       Culture and cultural co-operation are linked to the central problems of society and to key issues such as identity and social exclusion. It is generally accepted that they promote directly and indirectly tolerance, understanding, participation, democratic and humanistic values as well as contributing fundamentally to the quality of life in Europe. The question is how this should be translated into practice both within the Council of Europe structures and of course externally. The South Caucasus potentially presents an excellent focus and testing ground for this but management of expectations locally and reality checks on the gap between resources and identified needs are essential.

124.       On-going debate within the Council of Europe and its structures on the question of cultural cooperation and its use for wider political ends is particularly relevant to the South Caucasus situation. Recent heightened awareness of the political relevance of cultural values, intercultural dialogue, education and tolerance should make some of the key issues in the South Caucasus cultural situation more understandable and relevant than they might have been before 11 September 2001.

125.       Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ and ‘9/11’ remind us of the fact that frequently for many people and communities ‘my culture is my politics’. This has particular relevance to the South Caucasus. Unfortunately culture not only builds bridges but can also feed conflicts. Positive cultural interaction stimulates new types of social integration and political interaction. Understanding and misunderstanding of one’s own and other people’s cultures and cultural and intercultural development are now a core issue in politics, security, conflict prevention, diplomacy, economic and social development, trade and several other areas.

***



Reporting committee: Committee on Culture, Science and Education

Reference to committee: Doc. 8796, Ref. No. 2529 of 25.9.2000

Draft recommendation adopted unanimously by the committee on 3 March 2003

Members of the committee: MM. de Puig (Chairman), Baroness Hooper MM. Prisacaru, Smorawinski (Vice-Persons), Akhvlediani, Apostoli, Asciak, Banks, Barbieri (Alternate: Gaburro), Berceanu, Braga, Buzatu, Mrs Castro (Alternate: Varela i Serra), MM. Chaklein, Colombier, Mrs Cryer, MM. Cubreacov, Dalgaard, Mrs Damanaki, Mrs Delvaux-Stehres, Mr Devinski, Mrs Domingues, MM, Eversdijk (Alternate: Zvonar), Mrs Eymer, Mrs Fehr, Mrs Fernández-Capel, MM. Gadzinowski, Galchenko, Galyak, Gentile, Mrs. Glovacki-Bernardi, MM. Goris, Gündüz I, Gündüz S, Haraldsson, Hegyi, Howlin, Huseynov R, Iannuzzi, Mrs Isohookana-Asunmaa, MM. Jakic, Jarab, Jurgens, Mrs Katseli, Mrs Klaar, Mrs Labucka, MM. Legendre, Lengagne, Letzgus, Libicki, Livaneli, Lydeka, Mrs Lucyga (Alternate: Haack), MM. Malgieri, Marxer, Mrs Melandri, MM. Melnikov, Mestan, Mezihorak, Mrs Milotinova, Mrs Muttonen, MM. O’Hara, Ohlsson, Podeschi, Rakhansky, Rockenbauer, Rybak, Mrs Samoilovska-Cvetanova, MM. Schellens, Schneider, Shybko, Mrs Skarbøvik, MM. Sudarenkov, Theodorou, Tusek, Vakilov (Alternate: Abbasov), Mrs Westerlund Panke, MM. Wodarg, ZZ (Andorra), ZZ (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

      N.B. The names of those present at the meeting are printed in italics

Head of secretariat: Mr Grayson

Secretaries to the committee: Mr Ary, Mrs Theophilova-Permaul

¹ The Report has been written with the active assistance of Terry Sandell, Director of Visiting Arts, London

² This region is also referred to as Nagorno Karabakh or Daghlyg Garabagh

³ One could go into detail about numerous other nationalities but Abkhazia and Abkhazes provide an illustrative generalised example. While the origins of the modern Abkhazes is a subject of historical interpretation, it is known that the territory of Abkhazia became independent in 756 and in 985 was merged in an ‘all-Georgian state’. It became a separate principality in the 16^th century, falling under Turkish rule in 1578, under Russian rule in 1810 and was abolished in 1864. Uprisings against Russian rule resulted in emigration of the majority of Abkhazes to Turkey. The Soviet Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia was created in 1922. From 1936 it was reduced to an Autonomous Republic within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia and from 1938-1953 Abkhazes, like Megrelians and others, were subjected to a policy of assimilation.

⁴ This is in addition to specific crisis such as in Armenia where some 322 schools have been completely destroyed as a result of earthquake and civil conflict. According to Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2002, in the regions occupied by Armenian forces 850 educational facilities and 4,400 cultural and social service points have been almost entirely destroyed.

⁵ The Azeri language is by no means unique in this. Abkhaz was written in various adapted scripts until 1928 when a Latin script was adopted. Georgian script was introduced in the 1930s. In 1936-38 when many of the minority languages of the USSR were forced to move to Cyrillic, Ossetic and Abkhaz adopted a Georgian-based orthography which continued until 1954. When Stalin died they moved to Cyrillic.

⁶ The degree to which this is changing amongst some sections of society and in some regions is difficult to assess and for political and other reasons is probably being underestimated. There have been a lot of mosques built in the country in recent years which can of course be seen as the natural balancing of the Soviet period of repression but there are signs of militant religious activity uncomfortable to the government as the impounding of large quantities of religious material and other incidents seem to indicate. Islam has been traditionally tolerant, western-influenced and ‘progressive’ in Azerbaijan but again ‘rear-view mirror driving’ may well be inappropriate. Islam, possibly in new forms, is already having an important impact which is not yet clearly visible. Tolerance however is reflected in the fact that many people in Azerbaijan culturally relate to their pre-Islamic religious traditions of Zoroastrianism and Christianity.