Doc. 8759

7 June 2000

European air transport policies - the need for a truly "One Sky Europe"

Report

Committee on Economic Affairs and Development

Rapporteur: Mr Knut Billing, Sweden, European Democratic Group

Summary

Air traffic delays are rising rapidly to the point of becoming intolerable, causing as they do massive economic and time losses to all market participants, particularly to passengers. The main reason, the report contends, is insufficient coordination between air traffic control centres and insufficient route and air space structures across national borders.

The 38 member states of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) therefore urgently needs to install a continent-wide, seamless and fully integrated air traffic management (ATM) system design, starting with the bottleneck region of Switzerland, Italy, Spain and France. Ratifying the Revised Eurocontrol Convention would represent a first important step. Beyond that, says the report, any lasting improvement will require separation between ATM service providers and the ATM Regulatory Authority.

The timely and safe arrival of millions of European air travellers must be at the centre of the air transport concerns, concludes the report – not vested interests or the rigid adherence to a status quo that no longer works. Countries, airports and airlines all have to work closer together and find new solutions in the years to come, in order to face the doubling of passengers expected by the end of the decade.

I. Draft resolution

1. At a time of rapidly growing air transport demand, Europe's scattered air traffic management framework is in urgent need of fundamental overhaul and full, continent-wide integration. The current critical situation of long and worsening air traffic delays causes massive economic losses to all market participants. It is due mainly to insufficient co-ordination between air traffic control centres and insufficient route and airspace structures across national borders. This situation can no longer be accepted, at a time when passengers should be at the centre of air transport concerns; when Europe's future growing-together critically depends on efficient, while safe, air transport; and when the technology in the form of satellite navigation and computer capacity is readily available to make "One Sky Europe" a reality.

2. The Assembly recognises the valiant efforts of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and Eurocontrol to prevent delays from worsening even further within the parameters of the present framework. In particular, it sees the new, revised Eurocontrol Convention as a major step forward in the direction of an integrated air traffic management (ATM) system. It calls for the Convention's rapid ratification by all member states, with a view to its early entry into force. The Assembly also calls for the European Union's speedy membership of Eurocontrol, not least in consideration of the EU's active role on behalf of ATM integration.

3. However, ECAC and Eurocontrol member states, which over the past decade have liberalised the airline industry, must now do the same with ATM in looking beyond national prerogatives toward a Europe in urgent need of a continent-wide, seamless and fully integrated ATM system design. Action is particularly urgent in the bottleneck region of Switzerland, Italy, Spain and France, where most delays originate and quickly spread and amplify across the continent.

4. A better functioning ATM system will also require the separation between ATM service providers - who, whether private or public, should be independent of governments - and a European ATM regulatory authority, preferably Eurocontrol. The latter should remain responsible for safety, optimal air space use, economic efficiency and interoperability between system components.

5. The Assembly welcomes ECAC's and Eurocontrol's widening membership in central and eastern Europe, whose full participation in "One Sky Europe" is vital to the continent's future, including successful EU enlargement. To the extent that a "One Sky Europe" can be put into place rapidly, ECAC and Eurocontrol must receive funds commensurate with increased tasks.

6. Beyond the urgent need for a "One Sky Europe", the future of Europe's air transport industry will also increasingly depend on increased airport capacity - including better road/rail access and check-in facilities – and, where appropriate, continued healthy competition in the air transport industry. There remains an urgent need for an integrated strategic approach towards a European transport system, in which railroads in particular could become a viable alternative to mid-distance air travel.

7. Finally, the Assembly calls on ECAC to establish, in co-operation with the European Union, a charter of air passenger rights applicable in all ECAC member countries, especially as regards compensation for undue delays and flight cancellations that are the fault of airlines, overbooking, and in the application of the rights of passengers with reduced mobility or children. The Assembly in this context welcomes ECAC's work toward an agreement on the treatment of such persons and hopes it can be brought to a speedy conclusion.

II. Explanatory Memorandum by the Rapporteur

CONTENTS

I       INTRODUCTION: THE RISING DEMAND FOR AIR TRANSPORT

      Background

II       THE WORSENING AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CRISIS

      Demand and delays take off

      Europe's antiquated Air Traffic Management (ATM) system

      Can demand be ordained?

      The case for more market

      The need for a new departure

III       REACTING TO THE CRISIS? THE ECAC SUMMIT OF JANUARY 2000

      A soft landing?

IV       AIRPORTS (AND PASSENGERS) UNDER STRAIN

      Airports as the next bottleneck?

      Passengers: patient for how long?

      The need for political action

Appendix:        Intervention by Mr A. Auer, President of the European Civil Aviation Conference (before the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development on 30 March 2000)

I.       INTRODUCTION: THE RISING DEMAND FOR AIR TRANSPORT

Background

1. The aim of this report is to:

- describe the present air transport situation in Europe;

- point to shortcomings to what is becoming an increasingly critical, indeed intolerable, situation as regards delays; and

- point to ways in which these various deficiencies may be overcome.

2. The report is drawn up in pursuance of the special role of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly as the Parliamentary forum of, in particular, the Civil Aviation Conference or ECAC. ECAC, it will be recalled, is a 38-member state intergovernmental organisation established in 1955 following an initiative by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It aims to promote the continued development of a safe, efficient and sustainable European air transport system.1

3. In view of the critical situation on delays, the Rapporteur in the preparation of his report wanted to meet as many different players in European civil aviation as possible. He is particularly grateful to ECAC's President, Mr André Auer, for coming before the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in March 2000 for a very full exchange of views. Mr Auer's introductory statement is set out in the Appendix to this report. The Rapporteur also thanks ECAC's Executive Secretary, Mr Raymond Benjamin as well as his colleagues for extensive discussions held in the autumn of 1999.

4. Furthermore, the Rapporteur paid a rewarding visit to Eurocontrol in September 1999. In order also to ascertain the views of airlines, he visited the Association of European Airlines (AEA) in Brussels in January 2000, and held a very informative exchange of views with its Secretary General Mr. Karl-Heinz Neumeister. In London he met with Mr. Philip Martin, Secretary General of FATURE (the Federation of Air Transport Users in Europe), which represents passengers' interests. Finally, he held fruitful consultations with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in Geneva in March 2000 and wishes to put on record his thanks to its Director General, Mr. Pierre Jeanniot, and his staff for a very rewarding discussion. Finally, the Rapporteur wishes to thank all his colleagues on the Economic Committee who have, in the course of his work, given him many valuable comments, including at the final adoption of the report in Dubrovnik in May 2000 (see also paragraphs 35 and 36).

5. The report will strive for brevity. Unlike earlier reports prepared by the Rapporteur for the Assembly on this matter, it will not deal extensively with a number of otherwise very important subjects, such as aviation and the environment, air safety or security (against terrorism). The report's underlying philosophy is that we first of all have to think of air transport customers - their safety, comfort and timely arrival. Air transport, after all, is ultimately there for the customers, not for national governments or airlines, however important their roles obviously are.

II.       THE WORSENING AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CRISIS

Demand and delays take off

6. Civil aviation is a complex system. It involves carriers, air traffic management (ATM), manufacturers of aircraft and various facilities, maintenance, national aviation authorities, international organisations, airports and the list is not complete. They have to work in perfect symbiosis with each other in order to be able to ensure a safe, timely and cost-efficient aviation system.

7. In many parts of Europe, however, the civil aviation system is now operating at or even beyond the limits of its capacity. The central argument in this report will be that the present limits are lower than they need be, in particular as concerns air traffic management or ATM, and that they are so low because of the inability of governments to abandon old structures and ways of thinking, and instead embrace a truly "One Sky Europe" ATM system.

8. Over the last few decades, demand for air transport - and hence air transport itself - has increased around five per cent per year, while in the present phase of European recovery the figure is even higher, or around 7% in 1999. Prospects for the summer 2000 are for 18% more traffic than in 1997. On present trends, the number of passengers will double within a decade, while the number of 'air traffic movements' (that is, aircraft taking off and landing) will double in 13 years. With an enlargement of the European Union around the corner and Europe growing rapidly together anyhow, European air traffic can be expected to grow all the faster. Generally speaking, the faster economic development and integration proceed, the faster air traffic will also grow; for it is largely the manifestation of a more human contact, trade, international investment and tourism. The 'new economy' of the Internet, e-commerce and the like can be expected, if anything, to add even further to the growth in air traffic, both for passengers and cargo.

9. The British Airports Authority forecasts that passenger traffic at London airports will increase by 35% by 2009 over present levels, with the number of people using Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted reaching 137 million a year.2 London Heathrow would have more than 100 million passengers per year, while Frankfurt would have 90 million. The number of runways would have to double within the next 15 years, implying some 6 new runways at Heathrow, 6 at Frankfurt and 10 at Amsterdam - with the only alternative consisting of building new airports. The number of aircraft of over 100 seats is expected to double from 12,000 today to 24,000 in 2020.

10. Is this increase being handled? At present it is not. Following an earlier crisis of rising delays of aircraft in late 1980s, both airports and European air traffic management carried out a number of reforms which, although not as radical and imaginative as could have hoped, nevertheless brought down congestion in the air to more or less acceptable levels. However, recent AEA statistics show that the percentage of aircraft departures delayed by more than 15 minutes has gone from 12.7% in 1993 to 31.4% in the period January-November 1999, the latest figure available. 3 Although the indication is slightly unfair in that it also reflects delays caused by the Kosovo conflict from March to June 1999 (when it rose to 37.5%), the percentage was still 22.8 the year before, in 1998. Eurocontrol estimates that if ATM capacity remains the same, for each percentage point that traffic increases, delays will go up by 7 per cent. Thus, if a given year produces 5 per cent more air traffic, delays could increase by 35 per cent and affect many routes so far untouched. To save kerosene, delays are where possible 'placed' on the ground through delayed take-off, rather than in the air.

11. Delays in takeoffs and arrivals can be attributed to many different factors: the weather, social conflict, airlines, airports or air traffic management. The main sources of delay in Europe are, however, air traffic management (around 50%) and airlines (about 20%). Airlines differ widely in the extent to which they contribute to delays. One interlocutor maintained that if the best performing airline, Lufthansa, were emulated by all the others, the industry's share of responsibility would go down even further. Airports for their part are still managing, even though they could soon turn out to join the two others as a main bottleneck if the present gap between increase in demand and extension of airport capacity continues to widen.

12. In addition, delays cause added costs to airlines (inefficient use of aircraft, extra fuel while waiting for permission to land, etc). The European Commission estimates the overall cost of airline delays - not counting lost business and ruined vacations - at €10 billion a year, about half of which is attributable to congestion of the airspace. Delays are also having an impact on the environment: 1.9 billion extra litres of kerosene are spent due to delays or re-routings, amounting to between 6 and 12 per cent of the airlines' total kerosene consumption and costing them about € 700 million annually (which they for natural reasons will be likely to try to pass on to the consumer).

Europe's antiquated Air Traffic Management (ATM) system

13. The main cause of the present bottleneck situation - and the one that must be tackled most urgently - is, however, the current antiquated air traffic management and, by implication, Europe's all too slow-moving national civil aviation authorities. Characteristically, the biggest ATM bottleneck is not in the take-off and landing phases at airports, but during the flight itself - 'en route'. It is here that the scattered ATC picture is most keenly felt. It is hard to believe it, but it is true.

14. At the beginning of the third millennium - in an era of powerful computers, increasingly powerful satellite navigation systems and the internet - Europe's so-called ATM set-up consists of a hopelessly scattered 'system', or rather systems, of 68 national and local air traffic control centres, of which several are reaching their maximum capacity and therefore cannot cope with demand. Air traffic controllers still handle aircraft by giving pilots verbal instructions to change speed, direction and altitude, necessitating human communication, which is notoriously slow. Delays arise and amplify across the continent. Data link communication would reduce workload and thus increase system capacity.

15. The situation is particularly serious in parts of southern Europe. One interlocutor referred to the so-called 'CHIEF' bottleneck regions of Switzerland (CH), Italy (I), Spain (E) and France (F). Whenever the ATC centres responsible for these areas cannot master demand, the initial delays can 'knock-on' to subsequent flights causing so-called 'reactionary delays' (that is delays causing delays) during a whole day over most of Europe. (Paradoxically enough, a recent reorganisation of air space over the Alps - meant to create greater efficiency - has at least temporarily given rise to narrower passages over the area, often generating delays all over Europe.)

16. Both IATA - the International Air Transport Association - and the AEA complain bitterly about the present ATM situation. They want European governments finally to 'get their act together', to jointly overcome national thinking and to finally give Europe an ATM system worthy of the air traffic liberalisation started in the 1980s. The latter, it will be recalled, mainly concerned the airlines and has now led to a free and competitive civil aviation market. When, as could be expected, the liberated market led to more traffic, the lag in ATM became all the more apparent. In brief, IATA and AEA want a unified European ATM area, whether it be called 'One Airspace' or a 'Single Sky over a Single Market'.4

17. ECAC and Eurocontrol try their best to make a system overtaken by events work, but the latter hits upon the limits of its capacity more and more often as demand rises. Instead of replacing it with one capable of lastingly solving the problem they are obliged to tinker with the old, exchanging a part here and a part there - not necessarily compatible - in difficult negotiations among member states. Air transport historians will - like this Rapporteur - no doubt nostalgically look back at 1960 as the year of lost opportunity. At the time Eurocontrol was established only three European air ATC centres were foreseen - in Shannon (Ireland), Karlsruhe (Germany) and Maastricht (The Netherlands). Following protests in particular by France, that idea was unceremoniously buried. What resulted was the present system of 68 ATC centres and a multitude of different hardware and operating systems.

Can demand be ordained?

18. The Rapporteur held interesting discussions with his interlocutors about what to do - or not do - about growth. Especially the AEA feel that Eurocontrol's predictions about industry growth are constantly on the timid side, as if wishes for lower growth somehow come true just by being pronounced - delaying the day when the present ATM system will have to be completely overhauled. In the past, when actual demand was higher than forecast, airlines would be blamed for not sticking to 'dictated' growth. The AEA and IATA feel this is highly unfair. The market is not there to be told what to do. Rather, it is ECAC's and Eurocontrol's duty, the AEA argues, to do what is necessary to satisfy demand. The AEA and IATA, and indeed this Rapporteur, see governments as having the obligation as transport providers - in the case of air transport indeed as monopoly ATM providers - to follow and respect the market, not to tell it how to behave.

19. The main responsibility for bringing about new thinking on ATM falls on ECAC, and on Eurocontrol. ECAC, which has done so much in the past to identify new issues and to solve them in particular in the economic field, will now have to do something so radical to the European ATM system that whatever delays occur can be laid at the doors of other factors, not ATM.

The case for more market

20. The airlines, being the main representatives of the market, also object to a situation in which the state - or states jointly organised into Eurocontrol - at the same time serve as the regulating authority and a service provider (ATM). The Rapporteur fully concurs that these three functions ought to be in separate hands. While the regulator and safety ensurer can both be in state hands - though preferably separate hands - nothing argues in favour of having the ATM service provider under state management-ownership also, for it could just as well be run privately. This is indeed what happens in the construction of aircraft, where regulators specify safety standards to (mostly private) manufacturers. There is therefore a strong case for separating all regulatory functions from the operational ones, which latter could be given to private operators.

21. The monopolist nature of the present ATM system is becoming all the more apparent when one looks at the 'route charges' that air traffic users must pay to Eurocontrol, which acts as a clearing house on behalf of its member states. In 1998 these charges amounted to € 3.85 billion, of which AEA member airlines paid € 1.72 billion, or close to half. While the service rendered is acceptable in terms of safety, it must be strongly doubted whether this is so from the point of quality of service rendered, especially in terms of punctuality. Above all, there is no competition. If there were, passengers would surely stand to benefit through lower prices.

22. An ECAC ministerial meeting in February 1997 adopted what is called a new Institution Strategy for European Air Traffic Management. The strategy included a revised Eurocontrol convention meant to give the organisation more independence and greater responsibility for a wider range of tasks.

23. European ATM policy and planning would henceforth be decided in a single, new Europe-wide structure within Eurocontrol. The aim would be to achieve maximum, timely and cost-effective capacity for the ECAC area as a whole. ATC planning would be reinforced by combining the 'en route'' and 'airport' ATM elements within an overall 'gate- to-gate' concept. An independent Performance Review System would evaluate all aspects of ATM in the ECAC area. A "total aviation system approach" would be adopted as regards ATM air safety aspects, and the latter would become independent of the ATM service portion. Finally, decision-making would be streamlined through the introduction of majority voting. However, at the time of writing, the convention has not yet entered into force for lack of the necessary number of ratifications. This is something that the Rapporteur regrets deeply. The Economic Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly as a whole must find a way, together with ECAC and Eurocontrol, to speed up the process of signatures and ratifications. (The Rapporteur in this context welcomes the agreement reached in April 2000 between Spain and the United Kingdom on the application of EU legislation as concerns Gibraltar, especially insofar as it may facilitate the European Union's joining Eurocontrol.)

24. Indeed, even if the new Eurocontrol Convention had come into effect, it would in the view of the Rapporteur have represented much too timid an effort when compared with the crisis at hand. The treaty is based more on traditional intergovernmental agreements than on new thinking; more on the interests of national sovereignty than on the requirements of the market; more on today's definitions rather than tomorrow's visions; and definitely more on the current, traditional institutional structure than on those needed for the future.

The need for a new departure

25. What, then, is needed in order to overcome the ATM part of the delay problem? Firstly, since the fundamental cause is the fragmented nature of European Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the independent national systems that try to co-manage it, a clear chain of command must be established to enhance the capacity of all partners in what is known as the Trans-European Air Transport Network. This includes the 'en route' phase; the so-called 'Terminal Area' of takeoffs and landings; and airport capacity. It will also be necessary to ensure that decisions, once they have been agreed to by the various state authorities, are indeed carried out and properly co-ordinated with one another.

26. Secondly, a clear separation of responsibilities is needed between ATC service providers and ATC regulators. Only in this way can conflicts of interest be avoided by a national aviation authority that is both an ATC service provider and a Eurocontrol decision maker (collectively with other national aviation authorities).

27. Thirdly, we need a radically new, European-wide and fully integrated ATM system design based much less on 'artificial' frontiers between national air spaces and much more on the needs of the market. That will require much more competition - that is, many more corporatised and private ATM service providers. The Rapporteur very much hopes that ECAC and Eurocontrol can play an active role in introducing such a novelty, even though it may give them a more secondary role in this particular field. For that, they will have to overcome their tendency shown so far to side more with the status quo and national considerations than with change and truly pan-European ATM integration.

28. It is also essential that the countries of Central-Eastern Europe be fully incorporated into such a "One-Sky Europe", especially since their air space and airports will be increasingly used as they integrate economically with western Europe and as the EU prepares for enlargement.

29. With so much going on in the field of navigation by satellite, it is high time for it to become the centrepiece in this radically new European approach to ATM. One such system is under way under the auspices of Eurocontrol. It is to be called Free Route and will be introduced progressively in Europe over the next few years, as aircraft are equipped with the required navigation equipment, on-board computers and collision-avoidance tools. Free Route will enable pilots to navigate their own routes with the assistance of accurate area navigation systems, instead of following ground radio beacons that define corridors. With improved altimeters, controllers will be able to reduce the vertical separation between aircraft heading in the same direction at high altitude from the present 600 metres to a future 300 metres. In this way, six additional pathways can be provided, on condition that all countries adopt the new system simultaneously.

30. The Federal Aviation Administration of the United States is now testing an even more powerful system based on so-called Global Positioning System technology. The new system will tell controllers the exact position, speed and altitude of all aircraft - information that as of now is only partially available to air traffic control centres and airport towers. Each aircraft will broadcast its position to other planes in the vicinity. While the above is of course far from a full account of the navigational possibilities existing or around the corner, it at least tells us that a novel approach to ATM must take them fully into account.

31. What is the role of the European Union in the ATM imbroglio? The EU is the only European institution with supranational competences. It may not be the perfect instrument, beholden as it often is to individual EU member states. Nor is it free of tendencies to want to centralise excessively - tendencies that may not be in line with competition, decentralisation and market needs. However, at least some of the Rapporteur's interlocutors see the EU as their only hope for change and hoped that, for instance, a complaint against member states before the European Court of Justice for failing to introduce more market and competition in ATM could create new momentum.

32. At the time of writing, the European Union is pushing hard for a truly "One Sky Europe" as called for in this report. EU transport ministers have united civilian and military experts working in a number of different fields. They include:

- allocation of airspace between commercial users and the military;

- improving integration of air corridors and ATM systems through harmonisation of standards and equipment;

- simplifying air-use regulations as between such different bodies as Eurocontrol, the Joint Aviation Authorities, ECAC and national civil aviation authorities;

- deregulation or privatisation of air traffic control centres (also called for at the EU's Summit in Lisbon in March, 2000);

When the EU joins Eurocontrol, possibly already this year, work in all these fields can be expected to speed up.

33. One constraint to civilian air transport in Europe is the circumstance that much of the continent's airspace is military. In some key countries, the military zones are closed to civilian traffic whenever military training takes place, essentially during the day and in the week. Military aviation authorities often cannot reach agreement with those at civilian level, resulting in detours or congestion on ordinary civilian routes. Any reduction in the military airspace - or any greater sharing of that space also during the workweek - would help to improve the situation.

34. Some improvements have, however, taken place. West European air forces have reduced the number of planes and pilots by approximately one-third since the end of the Cold War. Since 1996, they have effectively opened up virtually all the military controlled air space to time-sharing with civilian traffic. The question is how much farther they are willing to go, considering current plans for the European Union to assume the new European Security and Defence Identity agreed upon at the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999. At any rate, it is not the military, which is responsible for the bulk of European delays. Even in 1999, a year which saw the Kosovo conflict, Eurocontrol attributed only 4.4% of delays to military requirements. In a 'normal' year, the figure is around 2%.

35. A satisfactory solution to the ATM problem must be found urgently, and the responsibility rests with us politicians. When bottlenecks grow more critical at a time when technology exists to ease them, then solutions will ultimately impose themselves. The all-critical question is when and with what vengeance. The Assembly's role is to make the 'ultimately' in question happen sooner rather than later and to take the best possible decisions. This Rapporteur considers that both ECAC and Eurocontrol can play important roles in bringing such new thinking about, especially if they abandon old and outmoded habits of thinking. On condition they do, their resources should be allowed to increase. At present, with air traffic increasing by over five per cent per year, the Eurocontrol budget for ATM increases only by 2 per cent. With lead time in the development of new technology being 6-7 years, the situation risks getting worse before it can get any better.

36. At the Committee’s final adoption of the draft Recommendation preceding the present memorandum, a stimulating, at times ideological, debate broke out over the presumed virtues or non-virtues of any separation between ATM service providers, and indeed over the benefits of any steps towards their independence from governments or their privatisation. Some members were clearly in favour of maintaining status quo – arguing that safety would otherwise be jeopardised, or that smaller regional airports or airlines would soon have to close down in the chilly wind of capitalism. And one member saw the Committee’s concern with air travel as one of “luxury” neglecting what he called the “collapse” of rural and inner urban transport.

37. It was only after the deletion of some especially sensitive phrases, and after the Rapporteur’s assurance that the report’s concern was not ideological but only how to bring down intolerable delays, that the Committee was able to agree on the text as it now appears. To be sure, safety is something on which we must never compromise. And smaller airports and airlines seem, if anything, to prosper from air industry deregulation, judging by the encouraging number of new entrants offering new destinations at highly competitive prices.

III.       REACTING TO THE CRISIS? THE ECAC SUMMIT OF JANUARY 2000

A soft landing?

38. In late January 2000, the eyes of 'Aviation Europe' were riveted on Brussels, where ECAC transport ministers met at Eurocontrol to discuss the delays crisis. Significantly, the meeting took place ten years after ECAC Ministers had launched their first pan-European improvement programme for air traffic management. The Ministers welcomed the decision of the European Commission to create a high-level group for the examination of the reform of the air traffic management system in Europe, aiming to build a "Single European Sky", as well as the decision of the Council of the European Union to consider, in June 2000, the report by the Commission on the outcome of the group's deliberations, to be integrated by Eurocontrol in its policies.

39. Furthermore, ECAC Ministers committed themselves to the "full implementation of the outstanding actions in the 'ECAC en-route Strategy for the 1990's' for the harmonisation and integration of Europe's air traffic control systems, so as to create additional capacity in the shortest time scale". The statement goes on to "endorse the overall performance target set for the year 2000 - handling at least a 5.3% increase over the 1999 level and decreasing the average delay per flight in the summer to the level observed in the summer of 1997…".

40. The Rapporteur finds this ambition somewhat disappointing, however, since the 2000 traffic increase over 1999 could well be around 8%. And his reaction is not helped when, later on in the communiqué, ECAC ministers use the term "appropriately adjusted demand" or when they assert that "there can be no certainty that the present imbalance between demand and capacity can be completely eliminated". ECAC ministerial communiqué goes on to "commission a study to be delivered by the end of this year [2000] of the implications with regard to safety, which remains our first and foremost priority: environment; inter-modality; cost; financing and practical matters - of continuing to increase capacity in line with forecast demand". Such expressions recall our earlier conclusion that demand cannot and should not ever be "appropriately adjusted" but simply met!

41. The ECAC communiqué goes on to re-launch, as it were, the "comprehensive 'gate-to-gate' ATM strategy for the years 2000+ plus, as a follow-up to our en route and airport strategies for the 1990's, designed to cater for the forecast increase in demand up to the year 2015 and beyond, and to pave the way for a seamless European ATM system". Again, this wording falls well short of the request for fundamental reform called for in the present report.

42. ECAC ministers go on to "invite Eurocontrol, in co-operation with the European Community, to establish a proper mechanism to reinforce the implementation by all the parties involved of the collective decisions taken through Eurocontrol". This wording reflects the difficulty of having Eurocontrol and its member states respect the commitment made already in 1997.

43. While ECAC ministers welcome the way in which Eurocontrol's Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) has assisted ATM, they nevertheless recognise that "punctuality has been poor". As for the medium term, they express their strong support of the "progressive implementation of the enhanced air traffic flow management system, from late 2001" and the "Europe-wide introduction of additional flight levels in the upper air space through reductions in the vertical separation minima applied by 2002".

44. It is heartening that ECAC ministers recognise that "the ECAC strategy for the 1990's now needs to be superseded by a major new initiative designed to meet the challenges of the new century". In a concession to Eurocontrol they commit themselves to placing such an initiative "within the organisational and legal framework of the revised Eurocontrol convention" (which, however, as has been pointed out earlier, has not yet entered into force).

They promise that this project will "exploit new technology on board aircraft and in air traffic control centres, as well as incorporate new satellite based communications, navigation and surveillance systems that will become available during the next decade". This is precisely what the present report calls for and we shall be curious and impatient to see whether words are met by deeds.

45. ECAC ministers also "note that the costs of provision of air traffic services have remained stable in real terms". However, this is not enough, since they should come down and would undoubtedly have done so if competition had been in place. Finally, ECAC ministers agreed to "meet in three years in the appropriate forum to review progress and consider what further action may be needed". This Rapporteur would recommend a ministerial meeting even sooner if necessary, with the emphasis on speedy implementation and further action.

IV.        AIRPORTS (AND PASSENGERS) UNDER STRAIN

Airports as the next bottleneck?

46. A 1996 report prepared by APATSI (Airport ATS Interface) suggests that by 2010, 38 European airports, including several major ones, may run out of capacity. By 2005, 25 out of the 29 top airports will have runway capacity shortages and 26 will suffer terminal capacity shortages. Capacity problems will also arise as regards transport access and space for expansion. The problems of major airports are exacerbated as they take along the role of interconnecting, or hub, airports. Most of the existing airports in Europe require new runways or additional terminal capacity.

47. The strain on airports is being increasingly felt. An AEA study of 1999 graded 27 European airports according to the number of delayed flights in the first 3 months of the year. The worst was the new Malpenza airport near Milan, followed by Geneva, Munich, Oslo and Rome. The airports with the smallest delays were Dublin, Athens, Vienna, Düsseldorf, Heathrow and Gatwick

Passengers: patient for how long?

48. Finally, a few words about the central underlying concern in this report, namely that for passengers. Several interlocutors pointed, not without surprise, to their often stoic patience in face of delays that can last for many hours if not a day or more -a circumstance which should not obscure airlines' growing problems with a minority of unruly passengers during flights.5

49. Several members of the Economic Committee also drew attention to the urgent need for a strategic approach toward an integrated European transport system, where in particular railroads could become a vital alternative to mid-distance air travel. The time factor is crucial here. Air travel is likely to be preferred to a slow train (or indeed a narrow winding road), while a fast train (or indeed a motorway) could easily gain the upper hand if the time spent even approaches that required for air travel from one city centre to another, i.e. including transport to often distant airports, queuing, delays etc. Travel to Strasbourg for example – the home of the Council of Europe and the object of many tears from travel weary parliamentarians and others – would clearly benefit from the long-awaited TGV high speed train now foreseen for the end of the decade, especially is a station is built in connection with the Paris airport system.

50. Perhaps passengers' relative patience - for how long it lasts - is due to their being at a loss as to whom they should complain to. A first natural target are the airlines, and so the latter may not be too interested in drawing passengers attention to delays. Perhaps passengers also think first of all about their own safety - which of course they should - and so take the delays in their stride. But only the smallest number of passengers will - at least until this report hopefully makes the rounds! - have the overall picture of why delays are there. And even so, it will be difficult for them to blame their national politicians alone, since the ATM problem is so patently a pan-European one, requiring a host of national interests and prerogatives to be given up for the larger cause of European integration.

51. In the meantime passengers must be better informed as to the reasons for delays. We also need a written commitment by airlines and charter operators on the treatment or compensation to be given in case of cancellations, lost or delayed luggage or delays that can be clearly attributed to them. (The latter is often difficult given the numerous causes behind delays.) Although there is, unfortunately, no universal 'bill of rights' of passengers, the European Commission is expected to publish, in the course of 2000, a Charter of Air Passenger Rights in the European Union. The Charter will sum up present EU Directives on such issues as "compensation in case of an accident" and "overbooking" - issues that have never before been assembled in one document. The idea is to inform people about their rights and how to enforce them. The Charter will contain lists of responsible authorities and consumer organisations that can give advice or assistance.6

52. It is also important that airlines treat handicapped or otherwise physically impaired passengers with due respect. One Italian member of our Economic Committee has meritoriously drawn attention to one particular airline's refusal to issue a handicapped official a ticket for a certain flight, even though the person in question had given advance notice of his condition. The airline said that it could not accept, on internal flights, passengers with motor disabilities who were unable to walk, unless they had someone accompany them. The Committee member posed a written question to the Chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers complaining of a case of "severe discrimination which disabled persons who wish to travel by air continue to suffer [and] which prevents these persons from living a normal life and exercising their occupation or profession7.

53. In order to bring remedy to situations such as these, ECAC has set up a working party dealing with the treatment of Persons with Reduced Mobility (PRMs). PRMs include persons with children in prams, persons with grip problems (such as arthritis) or walking difficulties, people in wheelchairs, blind or deaf persons or those with defective vision, as well as those who accompany them. Since Europe has a population of roughly 100 million elderly people, of whom about half may have various types of disabilities, the matter is of great considerable social importance. ECAC has issued special recommendations to airlines and airports aimed at helping PRMs.8

The need for political action

54. The greatest help to all the millions of European air passengers would, however, be a properly functioning, integrated European ATM system, ensuring no delays excepting those caused by nature. It behoves all of our countries, airlines, airports and others to work together to bring such a situation about rapidly. The Chinese word for 'crisis' also means 'opportunity'. George Bernard Shaw said: 'Nothing concentrates a man's mind more than knowing he is going to be hanged in a fortnight'. Is it really too much to expect that the present stranglehold on Europe's air transport system will have the same salutary effect on us, Europe's lawmakers?

APPENDIX

Intervention by Mr A. Auer, President of the European Civil Aviation Conference

(before the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development at its meeting

in Paris on 30 March 2000)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, allow me to thank you for your kind invitation to join in this meeting of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, under whose auspices ECAC was established in 1955.

Our two organisations have a long-standing relationship and ECAC’s spectrum of activities is well known to you. Without getting into lengthy description, I would like to highlight our efforts to ensure that the system is safe, secure and respectful of the environment. In doing so, one of our priorities is to assist our newer Member States in their integration into the European aviation family. Another one is an increase of safety related activities through the so-called SAFA Action Programme. May I also recall that all our activities are consumer-driven, as ECAC is extremely mindful of the well being of the travelling public.

In keeping with this thought, I shall focus on the prime issue facing the development of the European aviation system, which you have identified as being the Air Traffic Management function and its ability to achieve punctuality. At this point, I would like to share your view that ATM is one element of a complex system, which involves carriers, airports, air navigation services, and national as well as international organisations, which have to work in full synergy.

You will recall that ten years ago, in the late 1980s, ECAC turned its attention to airspace congestion and to the consequent delay situation, which were becoming increasingly serious. ECAC took several initiatives with a two-fold objective:

The first of these objectives was realised by the establishment of the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) while the second one was pursued through three successive and complementary strategies the so-called “En-route”, “Airports” and “Instar” strategies. The latter one led to the Revised EUROCONTROL Convention and to its signing in 1997. The former two strategies were implemented by means of the EATCHIP and APATSI Programmes respectively, which have now been concluded.

As a lead-in to our discussions, I think it useful to give you an overview of the outcome of these programmes and their impact on the performance of the ATM System, planning activities underway for the Summer 2000, projects for the medium-term and, last but not least, the framework under which they will be progressed, as defined by the Ministerial meeting in January last.

MATSE/6 which is rightly referred to by your Rapporteur as the ECAC Summit has constituted an ECAC global effort as the European airspace is a major cross road for European and non-European airlines and its underpinning ATM System has to serve all users in full equity and efficiency.

EATCHIP and the performance of the ATM System

EATCHIP, the programme implementing the ECAC “En-route” Strategy for the ‘90s, has now been concluded. Its outcome has to be looked at against the complexity of the programme, which covers a wide range of technical and operational aspects. When quantifying its achievements, the finding is that, in overall terms, at the end of 1999, 91% of objectives, which had a target date of 1995, had been achieved. The corresponding figure for objectives, which had a target date of 1998, is 78%. These ratios vary considerably among ACCs, which have been urged to complete quickly outstanding actions and, hence, provide additional capacity for the coming summer. Giving justice to EATCHIP, I would like to say that it run quite well in spite of its significant geographical widening consequent to increased ECAC membership as project implementation went along. In other words, EATCHIP was implemented over a geographical area for which it was not initially designed by progressive adjustments.

The EATCHIP impact on the ATM System has enabled the latter to handle an increase of some 50% in number of IFR movements, over the period 1991-1999. This increase has been steady, over the past five years, at a rate of 6% annually. Traffic forecasts point to a continued increase at the same rate and, in some ECAC areas, even higher, with marked regional differences, consequently increasing the complexity of capacity enhancement measures.

Safety has been maintained at high level and, as confirmed by Ministers, will continue to receive high priority in planning future developments.

The picture is more contrasted when it comes to the delay situation. Delays marked a sharp drop in the early ‘90s, benefiting from the advent of EATCHIP, but as from 1997 onwards, the delay trend increases in parallel with traffic evolution. In 1999, delays reached an unacceptable level. Causes for their significant worsening have been identified as being firstly the introduction of a new ATS route network and the time span required to reach the break-even point, as in any investment, and resolve the teething phase. Secondly, the Kosovo conflict which resulted into the closure of a large portion of airspace in South-eastern Europe and required traffic to be diverted towards already overloaded sectors. Thirdly, the shortage of human resources.

Beyond statistics and figures collected to find out who is to be blamed, I think that what matters is to reflect on what lessons can we learn from this situation. The first one is that ATM improvements and capacity gains secured through EATCHIP are fragile and must be made sustainable. This calls for new pan-European initiatives to tackle the short-term and, in particular, the Summer 2000 and the medium and long term.

Short-term (including the Summer 2000)

A first measure is the adoption of an overall performance target for the region. For the Summer 2000, the target is to handle traffic increase, over 1999, of 5.3% at a minimum with an ATFM delay not exceeding on average 3.5mn per flight. This will bring back the delay situation to its 1997 level. In spite of being considered insufficient by airlines, this target is ambitious. It requires 25 out of 68 ACCs in Europe to improve their capacity. From these 25 ACCs, 7 must realise capacity increases above 25% and 6 others by more than 10%.

This is a challenge in itself and, in order that it is taken up in a timely manner, implementation tracking is carried out, under Eurocontrol’s auspices, to identify as early as possible potential imbalance between capacity and demand resulting into ATFM measures and consequent delays. Such a tracking review was carried out recently and findings are that delays for the Summer 2000 would be much lower than 1999 but not quite as targeted. Significant progress would have been made on weekdays but weekends would require more efforts.

At this point of my presentation, I would like to underscore the role played by the CFMU in the process and, not the least, the knowledge it has brought about to analyse the delays, their causal factors and how to apportion them. Further understanding is required on what is known as the reactionary delays which, as you will be aware, account for 40% of the total delay and are currently attributed in proportion to primary delays.

Medium and long term aspects

Starting first with the latter, the headline programme will be the implementation of the ATM 2000+ Strategy, which incidentally is seen by users as a laudable endeavour. Driving towards it will require effort and patience, particularly, from airspace users during phase I of the Strategy until 2005 while the programme gains momentum.

During this built-up phase, utmost vigilance is required to identify potential bottlenecks and how best to minimise their impact on traffic flows. In readiness for this critical phase, emphasis is being placed on forecasting, modelling and simulation tools. Also, co-operative initiatives, whether they be Europe-wide or multi-country, have been launched. Examples of such initiatives are, inter alia, the CHIEF project and the CEATS programme.

In spite of these significant endeavours to cope with the traffic growth we are aware that the moment will come where limits will be reached. Airspace is not an infinite wealth and as any physical elements it has its limitations. Therefore, Ministers anticipating on the need to take adequate strategies decisions in a timely manner have commissioned a study to evaluate the consequences, with regard to safety, environment, costs and organisational aspects, of continuing to increase the capacity. This study, the so-called “constraints to growth” is to be completed by the end of this year.

The success of the ATM 2000+ Strategy will be highly dependent upon its management process and the institutional framework within which it will be carried out. This brings me to my last topic.

Framework for the future

The institutional framework selected is the revised EUROCONTROL Convention, signed in 1997, which provides the means for more effective working of the Organization. Full benefits will be derived through the entry into force of the Convention when enabling ratifications are completed. Benefits can be amplified further through the EU membership. These two developments should be quickened and your good offices, as a parliamentary forum, is sought to press relevant governments to do so.

In addition, ECAC has embarked, in close co-operation with its airport partner Organization ACI, in substantial work in order to achieve capacity gains on the airport side. This is to be seen in the context of ECAC continued activities aimed at improving passengers’ welfare, as they are ultimately our “raison d’être”. I would mention as few examples, ECAC’s work for a number of years to assist persons with reduced mobility, our efforts which led to the new liability regime, the so-called Montreal Convention and, as a third example, the so-called one stop security concept aiming at easing the passenger travelling whilst keeping high level of security standards.

However, given the globalisation of our industry, there is additional need to protect consumers’ interests. This is why ECAC together with the European Commission has decided to engage in a dialogue with the industry, the purpose being to increase awareness of related issues and define the whole range of passengers’ rights.

Conclusion

A formidable challenge is laying ahead of us and we should avoid, to quote your Rapporteur, a repeat of the 1960 “lost opportunity”. Your Rapporteur promotes a new departure which for me implies that to varying degree the system has failed. I would contend this as we have always satisfied the demand, though sacrificing punctuality. Instead, I fully share the call for a new approach under which a strong dialogue and close co-operation can be furthered amongst all concerned including workers in the sector to find the best means of managing the continued growth. The time has come where we should move away from the blame culture which has featured the provider/user relationship and enter a partnership environment.

Thank you.

Reporting committee: Committee on Economic Affairs and Development.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.

Reference to committee: standing mandate

Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 23 May 2000.

Members of the committee: Degn (Chairperson), Valleix, Elo, Brunhart (Vice-Chairmen), Akgönenç, Aliko, Andreoli, Attard Montalto (Alternate: Agius), Billing, Blaauw (Alternate: Duivesteijn), Blattmann, Bojars, Bonet Casas, Braun, Budisa, Calner, Clinton-Davis, Cunliffe, Cusimano, Eyskens, Frey, Freyberg, Gonzalez Laxe, Gryzlov, Gül, Guma, Gusenbauer (Alternate: Schicker), Gylys, Haupert, Hoffmann, Jung (Alternate: Durrieu), Kacin, Kestelijn-Sierens, Kirilov, Kittis, Lazarenko (Alternate: Kosakivsky), Leers, Liapis, Lopes Cardona, Lotz (Alternate: Barsony), Makhachev, Mateju, Mitterrand (Alternate: Goulet), Moynihan-Cronin (Alternate: Connor), Niculescu, Nikologorsky, Paterkalishvili, Pereira Coelho, Popescu, Popovski, Prokes,  Puche, Ragnarsdottir, Rigo, Schmitz, Squarcialupi, Stepova (Alternate: Skopal), Stoyanova, Tallo Townend, Tsekouras, Vasile, Westenthaler, Wielowieyski, Zapfl-Helbling.

N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries of the committee: MM. Torbiörn, Mezei and Ms Ramanauskaite.

1 ECAC is composed of the following 38 member states: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the "former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia" and the United Kingdom. Future ECAC membership may extend to Georgia and Bosnia Herzegovina. Russia is not yet a member but it would of course greatly assist European aviation if she were. Indeed, ECAC member states pay some $200 million per year in over-flight royalties to Russia and it is the organisation's hope that bulk of this money will be devoted to improved ATM (air traffic management) facilities.

2 The forecast does not include London City Airport, the operations of which have also grown rapidly. The number of passengers in 1999 amounted to 1.4 million, up from 245,000 at its start in 1993.

3 Delays are calculated differently depending on whether one counts the departure time or arrival time of an aircraft. An aircraft late in take-off can be given a new slot by Eurocontrol, one opened up by, say, the delayed take-off of another plane. Airlines measure delays in relation to the scheduled departure from the gate, while Eurocontrol measures the take-off time. Official figures do not measure arrival delays. However, the only delay measure that should matter in the end is of course that affecting the consumer. The Rapporteur hopes to bring the various statistics onto a common denominator and looks forward to comments both from his colleagues on the Economic Committee and from the various organisations contacted in the course of the preparation of this report.

4 IATA represents airlines around the world, but it nevertheless has a strong interest in European ATM efficiency. One reason is that, of the some 430 million passengers now travelling with IATA airlines, 270 million do so either to or from Europe or within the continent's confines. Needless to say, the situation is even more critical for the AEA.

5 Unruly behaviour can take many expressions, from loud arguing with aircraft staff to excessive drinking to attacks of claustrophobia - the latter perhaps becoming inevitably more frequent as flights are delayed or cover longer distances. ECAC is working on recommendations on how to deal with such passengers.

6 The Commission has also published a consultation document entitled "Air Passenger Rights in the EU". It can be reviewed at www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg07/pass_-prot_cons/passprotcons.pdf

7 Written question number 380 "Discrimination against disabled persons who wish to travel by air" by Mrs Squarcialupi. Reply of the Committee of Ministers adopted at the 679th Meeting of the Ministers Deputies, (15 September 1999). A comparative analysis of the way in which air companies treat persons with disabilities is now underway within the Council of Europe.

8 As indicated at the outset of this report, it has not dealt with many of the very other useful activities of ECAC carried for the benefit of European air transport. ECAC's work in the environmental field largely focuses on noise reduction. The so-called ANCAT group of experts (on the abatement of nuisances caused by air transport) tries to ensure the speedy introduction of less noisy (so-called "Chapter 3") aircraft and also seeks to reduce the environmental impact of aircraft emissions. ECAC works closely in this field with both the EU and the international civil aviation organisation (ICAO).

ECAC's work on aircraft safety is done mainly through the so-called SAFA (safety assessment of foreign aircraft) programme. Through it, ECAC member states can collect and share data on aircraft obtained through ramp inspections.

ECAC is also active in aviation security, that is, protection against terrorist attacks. One aim is for so-called "one-security", signifying that a passenger travelling from one ECAC member state to another should not have to pass security more than once. Recommendations for the detection of detonators and metal parts are being issued regularly and 100% screening of checked in baggage is to be implemented across the ECAC area by 2002. Training of personnel is also of top priority.