PROGRESS REPORT of the Bureau of the Assembly and the Standing Committee

Information report on the parliamentary elections in Albania (29 June and 6 July 1997)

ADDENDUM I to the Progress Report of the Bureau of the Assembly and the Standing Committee

1. This report on the Albanian elections speaks essentially of the tragedy of a people plunged into the chaos of anarchy, and of the great efforts made by domestic and international institutions to help it back on its feet and place it on the road to peace and democracy.

2. Albania is a country situated in a sensitive region at the centre of the Balkans, with a population of 3,5 millions. It first made its appearance in contemporary history in 1912. Following its independence, it experienced a period of upheaval, resulting from internal conflict. In 1939 it was occupied first by Italy and later by Germany. After World War II, before the country was able to establish democratic institutions, an oppressive, totalitarian regime installed itself, and remained in power for forty years.

3. The fall of the communist regime was followed by a collapse of its machinery, organisations and institutions, with no new ones emerging to take their place. The concept of democracy was something unheard of and perhaps even misunderstood. Since then, Albania has made agonizing efforts to define itself within the modern world. If the Albanian people are to succeed in this difficult feat, they will require steady and continuous support from Europe for some time to come.

4. Europe and European organisations have moved to help Albania, not only for reasons of solidarity, but also because it has now become a deeply held conviction that, in an independent world, stability, peace and democracy must belong to all, and can only be secured through practical support.

5. The Albanian problem has acquired particular importance as it concerns a sensitive part of the Balkans with bitter experiences of the past.

6. On 26 May 1996, parliamentary elections in Albania were marked by violence and irregularities. The results were contested by Albanian opposition parties. As a consequence, the Socialist Party, which boycotted the second round, refused to participate in the new parliament, in which the ruling Democratic Party held an overwhelming majority.

7. On 26 June 1996, the Assembly adopted Resolution 1095 (1996) aimed at promoting reconciliation and dialogue between the political forces in Albania. The Assembly proposed a "round table" of all political parties to provide the framework for a discussion on the changes to be introduced in the relevant legislation in order to comply with the commitments entered into at the time of Albania's accession and the recommendations made by the OSCE. It further suggested that new elections be considered after these changes in the legislation.

8. An ad hoc committee of the Bureau, chaired by the late Lord Finsberg (UK, EDG) visited Albania from 27-30 August 1996. The main topics discussed with President Berisha, Prime Minister Meksi and representatives of main political parties were the participation of the opposition in Parliament, the preparation of the local elections and co-operation on a draft for a new constitution.

9. Following the recommendations in the report of the ad hoc committee, President Berisha convened a round table of all political parties, which led to amendments to the electoral law and the law on public meetings, passed by the Albanian Parliament on 12 September 1996.

10. These changes paved the way to the successful organisation of local elections on 20 and 27 October 1996, with the participation of the Socialist parties and other opposition parties. Following an invitation by the President of the Albanian Parliament, the Assembly agreed to co-ordinate, together with the Central Electoral Commission, the observation of the local elections. The Assembly delegation was satisfied with the conduct of the elections, judging that they were fair and free, although it regretted irregularities that occurred and which, in some cases, warranted careful examination by the Central Electoral Commission (see Addendum I to Doc. 7699, information report on the local elections in Albania - Rapporteur: Sir Russell Johnston).

11. In spite of the participation in the local elections and, consequently, in the local administration, the opposition continued its refusal to participate in the work of the Parliament. On 15 January 1997, the collapse of pyramid saving schemes triggered riots in Tirana, Vlora and other cities in Albania.

12. The Assembly continued its efforts to end the political crisis in the country. On 29 January 1997, it adopted Resolution 1114 (1997) containing a number of specific proposals to this effect.

13. The Government of Prime Minister Meksi resigned on 1 March 1997 and the state of emergency was proclaimed the following day. On 3 March, the Assembly called for the formation of a government of national consensus. On 6 March, an Assembly delegation, led by René van der Linden, Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee, visited Tirana and held talks with all political parties. On 9 March, the government and the opposition agreed to form a government of national reconciliation and to hold general elections before the end of June 1997. The new government was appointed on 12 March, led by the socialist Bashkim Fino.

14. In Recommendation 1316 (1997) on the state of emergency in Albania, adopted by the Standing Committee on 19 March 1997, the Assembly called for the establishment of a special tripartite task force (Council of Europe, OSCE, European Union) to provide immediate international support for Albania's new coalition government. Recommendation 1328 (1997), adopted on 24 April 1997, following a second visit of the delegation, led by Mr van der Linden to Albania, welcomed the all-party agreement on fresh elections. It also identified a number of requirements for the holding of fair and free elections.

15. The Chairmen of the political groups and the Clerk of the Assembly visited Albania on 4-5 May 1997. They launched an appeal to all parties to reach a consensus on reforming the electoral law to introduce more proportionality, on disbanding the "salvation committees" and on amending the Anti-Genocide law (see Addendum II to Doc 7830, Information report on the visit - Rapporteur: Mr Peter Schieder). Following negotiations undertaken by Mr Vranitzky, personal representative of the Chairman-in-office of the OSCE, on 9 May, the Albanian political parties signed a "political contract" on the holding of elections, a draft electoral law, the dissolution of the "salvation committees" the reformulation of the Anti-Genocide law and the international monitoring of the elections. In this text, they also asked the international community to appoint a political figure of international stature as co-ordinator for the monitoring of the elections. On 16 May, President Berisha called the elections for 29 June 1997.

16. On 27 May 1997, the Bureau of the Assembly confirmed its decision to send an observer delegation (a Bureau's ad hoc Committee) to Albania, approved its membership (see Appendix I) and appointed Sir Russell Johnston as its Chairman.

17. On 9 June 1997, Mr Petersen, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, appointed Mrs Lalumière, member of the European Parliament and former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, as Special Co-ordinator for the certification of the parliamentary elections in Albania. He also invited Sir Russell Johnston and Mr Rupérez, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to co-operate with Mrs Lalumière in assessing the elections. This "Parliamentary Troika" and Mr Vranitzky attended the OSCE Ministerial Troika meeting, held in Vienna on 18 June, to discuss the preparation for the elections. It was agreed that a common assessment based on the findings of international observers would be issued after the elections. The final report of the "Parliamentary Troika" is reproduced in Appendix 2.

18. The ad hoc committee on the observation of parliamentary elections in Albania meeting in Strasbourg, on 24 June, discussed the programme of the observation (see Appendix 3) and appointed me rapporteur.

19. The decision to send observers and, in particular, parliamentarians who would attract great media attention, was particularly useful and helped to control the situation. The public figures of Albanian life, as well as people themselves, had the feeling that their country's course towards elections had placed them at the centre of European interest. This contributed to the smooth running of the elections. The gratitude of ordinary citizens towards the parliamentarians-observers was expressed in a multitude of ways. The observers were seldom looked on with suspicion or reservation.

20. The participation of parliamentary observers of the first round of the elections was as follows :

21. Members of the secretariats of the Parliamentary Assemblies present also acted as observers. Non-parliamentary observers were also present from OSCE member states.

22. In the second round of the elections, there were nine observers from our Assembly, including the Chairperson of the Ad hoc Committee, Sir Russell Johnston.

23. The parliamentarians, together with the members of the secretariat who went to Tirana, divided into eight groups of observers in the Durres and Tirana areas. The only National Parliament represented in the second round was the Italian, with 6 parliamentarians.

24. As indicated in paragraph 11, the country was plunged into deep anarchy after the collapse, in early 1997, of the pyramid saving schemes.

25. These were saving schemes where workers and expatriate Albanians deposited their money and were promised a quick return of up to 300%. The system was in operation for 3-4 years, and naturally yielded significant profit to the depositors in the early stages. However, payments ceased in early 1997, and on 16 January 1997, the first violent incidents occurred in Vlora. These quickly spread to the entire country and led to a breakdown of all state authority, institutions and power. Army camps were abandoned, weapon stores were plundered and armed groups took control of many areas.

26. Casualties from this state of anarchy are estimated at about 1,600, while some put the number at over 2,000. The numbers of injured and disabled are certainly much higher. These tragic figures increase daily and will keep growing until law and order are re-established. Insecurity, fear and terror are in the hearts of all citizens, including children in whom traumas are created from which they may never recover. Many families mourn at least one dead relative. Life is cheap, and human beings are commodities in the hands of abductors and extortionists.

28. For this reason, it would be a mistake to assess the situation as just a political or economic crisis. In Albania, more than in other former communist countries, it was widely believed that, with the collapse of the system and establishment of a market economy, wealth and prosperity would automatically come to the country. In the early years, with the money sent from Albanians working in neighbouring countries and the entry of some foreign capital, the country appeared to be on the road to progress. However, the desire for a life of luxury and quick wealth brought speculators to the fore and eventually led the country to the brink of disaster.

29. Unfortunately, there was a substantial lack of a close and objective monitoring of the situation on both the domestic and the international front, and this led to a failure to prevent or manage the crisis.

30. The government of Albania which had been re-elected in May 1996 was overtaken by the events of January 1997 which it had not forecast and was unable to prevent. The Democratic Party government resigned in early March.

31. The crisis was brought under some control following the agreement by the country's political forces of the 9 March which provided for the setting up of a government of national reconciliation headed by the socialist Bashkim Fino, and the release from prison of the leader of the Socialist Party, Fatos Nano. Following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1101 of 28 March 1997, a European Multinational Protection Force was deployed under Italian leadership. Intensive groundwork followed for the elections, with the involvement of several International organisations, European states as well as the USA. The last political agreement among the parties was made three days before the elections.

32. The calling of elections in a climate of anarchy with so many weapons in the hands of citizens was considered from the outset to be risky. A large number of members of the Assembly believed that order should be restored before elections could take place.

33. It was finally decided that, to delay elections would only extend the crisis with no hope of improving the situation.

34. The already mentioned report (see paragraph 15) of the delegation of Chairmen of Political groups which visited Albania on 4-5 May, contained proposals which were eventually accepted by the Albanian parties, on basic issues of the election procedure such as:

35. The briefing we received in Strasbourg as parliamentary observers was based on the relevant documents and decisions of the Council of Europe, and in particular, on the report (Doc 7830) of the Ad Hoc Committee of Chairpersons of Political Groups. The report included all the elements of basic agreements of the Albanian government with the personal representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, former Austrian Chancellor, Mr Vranitzky.

36. On our arrival in Tirana on Friday 27 June 1997, we had our first briefing . It was jointly chaired by Sir Russell Johnston, Mr Rupérez and Mrs Lalumière. Representatives of the Council of Europe, OSCE and the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) gave us basic information concerning the electoral system, our duties as observers and the general state of the country.

37. On Saturday 28 June, the members of the Ad Hoc Committee were invited to a further briefing session. In addition to Assembly members, parliamentarians of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament, North Atlantic Assembly and at least three national parliaments were also present.

38. The presence of members of various parliaments immediately gave rise to problems and questions concerning the co-ordination, the nature of the meeting and even the need for such a meeting.

39. Co-operation among the various parliamentary bodies proved difficult, with evident friction among them. In the future, we will have to make every effort for the best possible co-operation for the benefit of Europe itself.

40. The most probable reason for the friction was the different way in which the various bodies operate. Efforts should be made to ensure complementarity and specialisation.

41. The first item on the agenda was a briefing from the ambassadors of the member states of the Council of Europe. I am sorry to say that they were not very forthcoming. The information we received from the few ambassadors who were present was elementary and contradictory. The ambassadors were more interested in the presence of parliamentarians from their own country than in the content of the meeting itself.

42. At a later stage, more ambassadors were present, but the improvements in this field are essential in order to make the contribution of European organisations more effective, particularly when dealing with a crisis situation.

43. We met the Secretary of the Albanian Central Electoral Commission (CEC) who gave us further information on the electoral system.

44. Extremely useful meetings were held with the Albanian parties, both the larger Democratic and Socialist parties and other smaller parties. Many questions were asked and the replies helped to form a fuller picture of the political situation in Albania.

45. On Sunday 29 June, about 55 groups of parliamentarian observers monitored the elections in about 400 election centres in Tirana, the rural areas around Tirana, Durres and the villages in the mountain region.

46. All observers submitted written reports which can be summarized in the ascertainment that the elections could hardly be described as fair and free, but could be considered adequate, acceptable and satisfactory.

47. It must be made clear that the Albanian elections cannot be compared with an ideal election process, but are to be seen as part of a real and difficult situation which made elections a very dangerous venture. The very fact that elections were held and under relatively smooth conditions, is an enormous achievement and should be appreciated as such.

48. The fact that the elections were not described as "fair and free" questions neither the elections nor their result, nor the legitimacy of the Parliament which resulted from them. Although they did not meet the conditions, terms and standards of the Council of Europe, the elections did allow the Albanian people genuinely to express their will.

49. There were commissions present at all polling stations. These were housed in schools, medical centres or private shops. These Polling Station Commissions (PSC) supervised the voting and consisted of a Chairperson who belonged to the Democratic Party, a Vice-Chairperson who belonged to the Socialist Party, who had equal rights and power, and a secretary from some other party. Representatives of all parties were entitled to be present as observers. Candidates and representatives of the state machinery were kept away from voting centres on election day.

50. In the first round of the elections, there were two ballot boxes : one for the monarchy referendum and the other for the parliamentary elections. The ballot boxes were closed and sealed in the presence of all the members of the PSC. There were electoral lists in all the centres, and these were signed by voters. There was also a supplementary list with special certificates of workers returning from abroad to vote. The PSC did not allow anyone not on the list to vote.

51. Voters came to vote without any problems. It was generally felt that voting took place without intimidation and co-operation among members of the election committees was good. Family members helped each other to vote behind the screens. According to statistics collected by the OSCE on a total of 800 polling stations, the situation was good to excellent in 88% of centres and bad to very bad in 12%, but even there, anomalies were usually the result of ignorance or insufficient knowledge by PSC members.

52. Problems occurred during the counting of votes. For a ballot-paper to be considered valid the square in front of the candidate's name had to clearly filled in with an X, a cross, or a dash. If the mark indicating the voter's preference were placed after the name or party, the paper was considered invalid. This was the reason why a large number of ballot-papers in the first round was considered invalid.

53. It is not part of our duties to analyze the results, but it is important to note that the way elections were run, demonstrated stability, seriousness, and moderation. This shows that no opportunity was given to extremists or fanatics from any party to make their feelings known or to impose their will. No excuse was given to people who wanted to cause disturbances to intervene on election day and during the even more critical phase of counting the votes.

54. The elections brought about a clear division between the people on the one hand, who, through their mature behaviour, made it quite clear that their wish is for law and order, democracy and peace, and, on the other, armed gangs and the forces of illegality.

55. It was generally clear to the observers that the elections were run by the people. The polling stations were manned by simple, ordinary people. Farmers and labourers, employees and intellectuals who had taken on the elections with a sense of seriousness and responsibility. The presence of an armed police officer outside the polling-station, in or out of uniform had no effect on the situation. The presence of the police was rather unobtrusive.

56. After the votes had been counted and the election protocol was completed and signed by the members of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), the ballot-papers were transported to the Zone Electoral Commissions (ZEC) and then to the (CEC) accompanied by PSC or ZEC members and a police officer.

57. By Saturday 5 July, that is, the eve of the second Round of the elections, we still did not have full results. On Saturday night the results of 107 of the 115 constituencies were announced officially by the CEC.

58. The parties which received more than 2% of the votes and would participate in the proportional allocation of seats, were:

59. Representatives of the Central Electoral Commission told us that the delay in announcing the final results was due to three reasons:

60. The delay in announcing the results of the first round created tension and uncertainty about whether it would be possible for the second round to be held. In addition to the need to make the results known, new ballot-papers had to be printed and distributed. This delay caused anxiety and was at the origin of a direct intervention of both Mr. Vranitzky and Sir Russell Johnston in favour of a rapid decisions. Ms Lalumière also intervened strongly.

61. Meanwhile, allegations by the losing side as to the validity of the results increased.

62. The CEC played its important role with a great sense of responsibility. It ignored pressures and threats and undertook joint responsibility by working collectively despite the fact that its members came from different parties. Praise is due to all the CEC members, as the success of the elections is largely the result of their stable, fair and responsible attitude.

63. The difficult situation in which the CEC found itself can be seen from the positions of the parties. While on the day after the first round all parties had initially stated that they accepted the election results, the losers then began to question the results in thirty areas, where they demanded that voting be repeated. While stating that they accepted the results, they refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Parliament. When told that this was a contradiction, they said that their view was supported by certain elected members who questioned the legitimacy of their election, and by the description of the elections as "acceptable" - a term referring to the elections, but not including Parliament. They added that the fact that, in the report of the Parliamentary Troika, the elections were not called "fair and free" but only "acceptable", questioned their legitimacy.

64. The defeated parties presented the Socialist victory as a return of the Communists and a spirit of revenge which would endure for another 50 years, and claimed that the elections of 29 June tolled the end of fair and free elections in Albania.

65. The Democratic Party and its allies were very insistent that they had been substantially and violently prevented from campaigning in the South of the country.

66. The Socialists declared that the will of the people had been expressed equally throughout the country, including Tirana and its surrounding areas. They asked for respect for the decision of the CEC, which according to the Socialist Party had requested a rerun in 4-5 constituencies.

67. They asked that the second round go ahead as planned, and any dispute be judged in Court. According to them, this chapter in the country's history had to come to an end so that Albania could proceed on the road to democracy.

68. The Socialist leader, Mr Fatos Nano, pledged that political opponents would not be persecuted, and that, on the contrary, they would be given significant positions chairing committees and in Parliament. They would be judged according to their professional ability and not their political views.

69. Regarding amendments to the Constitution, he stated that any new Constitution would be voted for by the people, and not just by Parliament, even though the Socialist Party possesses the 2/3 majority necessary to make constitutional changes. The Socialist Party also expressed complaints about the situation in the North of the country during the elections.

70. With regard to the monarchy, although the matter had acquired inflated importance owing to the fact that the referendum was inappropriately held at the same time as the Parliamentary elections. Mr Nano considered that time would lessen its importance. The parties would devote themselves to political competition and attach less importance to the monarchy.

71. There was no absence of incidents in the first round of the elections, the most serious of which was the murder of a Chairman of a polling station commission. In other polling stations, ballot-papers arrived late. The most significant episode reported by a Council of Europe observer, was that recorded by Mr. Bartodziej and Mrs Gelderblom-Lankhout. It involved the theft of ballot-paper and later an attempt to place a bunch of ballot-papers into the ballot-box. [A detailed report has been given to the Secretariat]

72. In some polling station, voting did not begin at 7 am, due to the late arrival of either the Commissions in charge and the ballot-papers.

73. There were certain other reports made to the competent OSCE services concerning interference from armed men or attempts to prevent observers from performing their task.

74. The result of the referendum on the monarchy, which did not involve us, either as observers or as European institutions, was surprising. While it was expected thats support for the monarchy would be about 3%, which is the strength of the monarchist party, or a little more than that, in fact it received 35,71% of votes, with the republic receiving 64,27%. The only possible interpretation is that the result expresses the strong wish of the people for stability.

75. As a result of their relative success, the monarchists began to question the election results and to demand a recount. They organized demonstrations which, though small, were dangerous due to the weapons carried by the participants. In one case, on Thursday 3 July at about 1 p.m., they surrounded the Central Electoral Commission building, creating dangerous implications for the election process as a whole. The pretender for the throne himself strolled among the demonstrators, dressed in military uniform with pistols in his belt. Shots were fired at the offices of the Council of Europe at the Conference Centre where the Central Electoral Commission was also housed. The lives of three members of the secretariat of the Council of Europe were in real danger from the bullets and the shards flying from the large panes of glass. During this incident a young Democratic Party supporter was killed in an exchange of fire with guards at the Conference Centre. It is possible that others were also injured.

76. At a meeting I had immediately after the incident with the Central Electoral Commission, I was told that the presence of the monarchists around the Conference Centre was unacceptable. I was told that the representatives of the candidate monarch had been informed of the results which were clearly pro-republican. They were told that if they had any doubt, they could take the matter to the Constitutional Court.

77. The monarchists tried to exploit the young man's killing. The Democratic Party called on its supporters to attend the funeral on Saturday afternoon. The danger of incidents on the eve of round two of the elections was manifest. It is fortunate that the limited number of demonstrators at the funeral, and the self-restraint of the people, prevented an outbreak of episodes on Saturday night, as this would have had an adverse effect on the second round of the elections the following day.

78. The second Round was held in 32 constituencies, between the two leading candidates who had not received over 50% of the votes in the first round. The leading contenders were the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party.

79. Despite the events of the previous week, elections took place in an extremely calm atmosphere, the only exception being the killing of two members of a Polling Station Commission in the North. There was a spirit of co-operation in the PSC. The tension at the top did not work its way down to the base. The result of the second round confirmed those of the first one, proving that the people expressed their feelings clearly and consistently.

80. Of the 32 seats, 20 were won by the Socialist Party, 10 by the Democratic Party, and the rest went to independent candidates. The final results of the two rounds are presented in a table reproduced in Appendix 4.

81. The lower participation of about 55% in the second round can be attributed to the reduced interest of the voters of the two main political groups, and particularly those of the smaller parties, as the popular will had made itself known.

82. Despite the calm atmosphere of the elections, the incidents which also occurred during the second round indicate that the country is at an extremely critical and sensitive stage of its history. A small number of people with criminal intentions are capable of causing great harm to a people thirsty for peace and stability.

83. Although the second round took place on 6 July as provided by electoral law, the elections in Albania were not over. Elections also took place on the following Sunday, 13 July. These elections concerned eight constituencies in which the C.E.C. had found irregularities on 29 June, and decided that they should be repeated.

84. It is not yet known whether actions will be brought to the Constitutional Court regarding other constituencies. The results should be respected so that the new Parliamentary can concentrate on its creative task of building a better future.

85. In the first round of the elections, many observers complained that they had insufficient information concerning the polling stations they were to visit,or that the information they did have was incorrect, and this made their work much harder.

87. There were reports that some observers spent the whole day without food or water. In addition, there was little or no wireless communication, nor was there a monitoring centre for the results.

88. However, all observers commented favourably on the soldiers of the Multinational Protection Force which assisted them in their task. The soldiers who helped out in rounds one and two all deserve praise. They were always ready to co-operate with the observers.

89. The fact that the elections took place relatively uneventfully, is the merit of the Albanian people who, at a difficult time in their history, behaved democratically and peacefully. They were assisted in this by the international force, the strong political intervention of Europe and International institutions, and the evident presence of foreign observers. Special mention is due to the OSCE which was responsible for organising the elections.

90. The convincing results of the elections and their clear political message meant that the new government would take over and that the previous governing party would go into opposition.

91. The people must now regain confidence in the political system, parties and leadership. This is something which requires joint efforts by both government and opposition.

92. Particular attention must be given to the creation of stable economic and social institutions, it order to prevent the reappearance of phenomena such as those seen in the past. The country's economic growth will stem the currently huge wave of emigration.

93. The main task of the new government is to find ways to restrict the presence of armed groups, to control the possession of guns and, if possible, to recover them. The common aim of all political forces must be to break up the armed gangs, as they undermine the existence of the state.

94. Particular help and support must be given by the competent European institutions and neighbouring countries on matters of safety and the reorganisation of the country's police and armed forces.

95. Our role and responsibility towards Albania does not end with this report. The Albanian leadership clearly requested the help of European organisations - and in particular the Council of Europe - in order to create the necessary conditions for a viable democracy.

96. It is our belief that the country will also require political, technical and economic assistance from Europe in order to deal with the terrible economic disaster brought about by speculators whose victims were the people of Albania.

97. Albania is a country with wonderful people, a unique beauty, and enormous potential which can serve not only to make its own people happy, but also to contribute to the process of Europe as a whole.

98. The Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee, Sir Russell Johnston, played an important role in the observation process and in promoting dialogue between political forces. He was in continuous communication with President Berisha and Prime Minister, Mr. Fino, either alone or with other members of the Parliamentary Troika. The members of the Ad Hoc Committee were regularly informed of these contacts.

99. The Albanian people showed an extremely high degree of political maturity, with a reported turnout of 70% in the first round and 55% in the second. By helping to maintain calm on election day, the Albanian people expressed their willingness to participate actively in the political processes of their country, and thus to shape their own future.

100. Many believed that the elections could not take place owing to the illegal possession of weapons by a large number of citizens, and asked that they be postponed. The fact that the elections were held under such conditions was a major achievement.

101. The elections were adequate, acceptable and satisfactory. The fact that they were not described as "fair and free" does not leave them open to questioning. On the contrary, they were a clear expression of the will of the people. The elections should be judged within the context of the critical internal situation. This required the assistance of a military force, the involvement of Europe, and the presence of observers at all stages of the elections.

102. A series of problems and some violent events which were reported did not appear to indicate widespread problems which affected the process as a whole.

103. In certain areas, procedures were clearly not properly followed. In most cases, it was a question of ignorance of procedures rather than deliberate non-compliance.

104. The clear expression of the will of the people in both rounds made it easier for the parties to accept the results and pledge co-operation, within a democratic administration in order to tackle the country's problems.

105. Albania now needs a future: we should continue to offer our assistance when the time comes to implement the reforms needed to establish democratic stability through political dialogue and expert assistance.

106. For this purpose, economic assistance must be given to Albania, so that it can begin to implement a programme of moderation in order to catch up with the rest of Europe. The job of reforming the social and economic situation is a difficult one and will require the active participation of all, particularly the wealthier countries and European organisations.

107. However much technical and economic assistance is given from abroad, the country's progress will finally depend on the wisdom of its leaders, the adequacy of the state machinery and the hard work of the people.

108. Albania is an important part of the Balkans, and its return to democratic stability will contribute to peace in the region and Europe as a whole.

109. Particular guidance and encouragement must be given to the youth, education and culture. Women in Albania are faced with many problems and are particularly vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation.

110. The Multinational Protection Force was instrumental in the smooth running of the elections. The Force established control over the situation when the country slipped into anarchy, and great praise is due to its soldiers and the countries which participate in it.

111. The OSCE staff who worked systematically and with dedication to prepare the elections, performed a useful and positive role, as did all members of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the EU etc., who jointly monitored the whole process. The presence of observers was necessary and provided useful assistance to the Albanian people.

112. Albania is a potentially rich and beautiful country which possesses all that is needed for the development and prosperity of its people. What is needed is a stable political system based on the principles of democracy, freedom, and human rights.

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE OBSERVATION OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ALBANIA Composition

ARNAU Francisco Spain
BARTODZIEJ Gerhard Poland
BLAAUW Jan Dirk Netherlands
BRUNETTI Mario Italy
CANGEMI Luca Italy
COLUMBERG Dumenico Switzerland
CONTESTABILE Domenico Italy
DAVIS Terry United Kingdom
DIAZ DE MERA Agustin Spain
GELDERBLOM-LANKHOUT Hanneke Netherlands
GNAGA Simone Italy
GROSS Andreas Switzerland
IWINSKI Tadeusz Poland
JUNGHANNS Ulrich Germany
KALUS Jaromir Czech Republic
KELEMEN Andras Hungary
KOVACEVIC Bozo Croatia
LUNDHOLT Anne Birgitte Denmark
McNAMARA Kevin United Kingdom
ONAINDIA Mario Spain
PATNICK Sir Irvine United Kingdom
SELVA Gustavo Italy
SPERONI Francesco Italy
SQUARCIALUPI Vera Italy
SVOBODA Vaclav Czech Republic
VALK Gerrit Netherlands
VAN DER LINDEN René Netherlands
VERIVAKIS Elefterios Greece

Official results of the 29 June and 6 July 1997 parliamentary elections in Albania

PARTY	Majority System	Proportional System	TOTAL
Socialist Party	77	22	99
Democratic Party	18	11	29
Social Democratic Party	7	1	8
Union for Human Rights Party	3	1	4
Democratic Alliance	1	1	2
National Front	2	1	3
National Unity Party	1	-	1
Agrarian Party	1	-	1
Legality Movement	-	2	2
Republican Party	-	1	1
Independent	3	-	3
TOTAL	113	40	153