Doc. 8308

26 January 1999

Crisis in Kosovo and situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteurs: Mr András Bársony, Hungary, Socialist Group and

Mr Peter Bloetzer, Switzerland, Group of the European People's Party

Summary

Despite the signature on 16 October 1998 of the « Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement », the situation in Kosovo has considerably deteriorated during the last weeks. Following the killings of 45 Kosovo Albanians in Racak, on 15 January 1999, by Serbian security forces, the Assembly decided to hold an urgent debate on the crisis in Kosovo and the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The report proposes that the Assembly condemn strongly the killings in Racak. It also recommends that the Committee of Ministers define the modalities of the Council of Europe’s contribution to the settlement of the conflict and consider sending back the request for Council of Europe membership by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, if the non-respect of international obligations by the Yugoslav authorities continues. Further, the Assembly is asked to request that the Serbian law on public information and the law on universities be abrogated immediately.

I. Draft recommendation

1. The Assembly expresses its strongest condemnation of the killings of 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999 by Serbian security forces. The Assembly takes note of the reports by the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), stating that some of the victims, including women, elderly persons and at least one child, had been shot at close range.

2.       The Assembly demands that the instigators and perpetrators of this crime be brought to justice. It recalls that, according to Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the court has the competence to investigate this and other allegations of crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo. Consequently, it demands that the Yugoslav authorities end their obstruction of the Tribunal’s work and in particular, to allow ICTY officials into Kosovo to investigate these killings.

3. The Assembly expresses its full support for the work of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and demands that the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovar political forces fully co-operate with the KVM.

4. It requests the Yugoslav authorities to respect the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the agreement concluded between the Special Envoy of the United States President, Ambassador Holbrooke, and Yugoslav President Milosevic, as well as subsequent agreements concluded by the Yugoslav authorities with the OSCE and NATO.

5. If the non-respect of international obligations by the Yugoslav authorities continues, the Assembly calls on the relevant international bodies to actively consider all options to ensure their compliance.

6. The Assembly strongly condemns all acts of terrorism committed by the "Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK)" and other armed groups. It calls on the Albanian political forces in Kosovo to put pressure on the "KLA/UCK" to make it comply with the demands of the international community.

7. It calls for the deployment of substantial international military forces on the frontier between the FRY and Albania with a view to preventing the smuggling of arms to fighting groups in Kosovo.

8. The Assembly notes that the escalation of the conflict in recent weeks has led to further deterioration of the situation of refugees and displaced persons in the region, in particular preventing their return. The Assembly considers that, pending agreement on a political solution to the conflict, priority should be given to protection and assistance for refugees and displaced persons. The Assembly expresses its full support for the efforts made in this field by the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.

9. It urges both sides to begin negotiations without preconditions on the future political status of Kosovo in the framework of the FRY and lends its support to the efforts of the Contact Group in this respect.

10. The Assembly reiterates that a long-term, peaceful solution to the crisis will require democratic reforms throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this context, it expresses its grave concern at the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in Serbia, in particular the further restrictions on the freedom of expression imposed by the recent Serbian law on public information and the law on universities. It calls for both laws to be abrogated immediately.

11. The Assembly considers that, until now, its political dialogue with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not produced any significant results. Maintaining such a dialogue will largely depend on the compliance of these authorities with the Assembly's Recommendations.

12. It re-affirms its decision to continue dialogue with democratic political forces and representatives of civil society committed to a peaceful solution of the Kosovo crisis and democratic reforms in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this context, it welcomes the initiative of the Political Affairs Committee to invite them to attend a Parliamentary Colloquy on the future political status of Kosovo in Paris on 12 March 1999.

13. The Assembly considers that the present Yugoslav authorities do not respect any of the principles of the Council of Europe.

14. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers :

II. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Bársony and Mr Bloetzer

I.       Introduction

1.       In the course of 1998, the Assembly adopted several texts on the subject of the situation in the FRY and the crisis in Kosovo in particular.1 In the latest Recommendations 1384 and 1385 adopted in September 1998 part session, it strongly condemned the constant escalation of the violence in Kosovo and called for an immediate cease fire and the creation of conditions that permit the voluntary return of the refugees and displaced persons.

2.       On 8 October 1998, the "Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK)" declared a unilateral truce and on 16 October 1998 the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr Slobodan Milosevic and the Special Envoy of the President of the United States, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, signed an agreement which led to the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The conduct of this mission was entrusted to the OSCE (ground verification) and NATO (air surveillance and possible extraction of the members of the KVM). Each of these two organisations signed a separate agreement with the FRY authorities2.

3.       These agreements initially put an end to several weeks of Serbian offensives against the Albanian separatists. Sporadic clashes continued nevertheless. At the end of December, as a result of a new Serbian offensive in the north of Kosovo, the “KLA/UCK" broke the truce decreed on 8 October and the situation has been worsening ever since.

4.       At the same time the human rights situation has also deteriorated further in Serbia and in Kosovo. The adoption of new laws put an end to freedom of expression and to the independence of university teaching. The last two pillars of opposition in Serbia, the independent media and the universities, were thus muzzled.

5.       In Kosovo, the massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanians near the village of Racak in the south of the province, on 15 January 1999, by Serbian security forces was unanimously condemned by the international community.

6.       On 18 January, the Bureau of the Assembly decided to propose that the Assembly should hold an emergency debate on the crisis in Kosovo and the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the next part session in January

7.       The subject was referred to the Political Affairs Committee for a report, and to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography for opinions.

8.       As part of the preparation of this report, Mr Barsony, one of the rapporteurs, went to Belgrade on 21 January 1999. He met representatives of the Yugoslav authorities (Mr Jovanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr Ristic, President of the Foreign Policy Council of the Federal Assembly and Mr Sainovic, Vice-president of the federal government) and the ambassadors of several Council of Europe member States (Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia).

II.       Mr Barsony’s visit to Belgrade (21 January 1999)

9.       During his visit, Mr Barsony concentrated on the subjects of particular relevance to the emergency debate: the Racak massacre and the competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the implementation of the "Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement" of 12 October, the prospects for a political settlement of the Kosovo conflict and the Serbian law on public information.

a. The Racak massacre

10.       According to a report by the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), Serbian forces penetrated the village of Racak on 15 January 1999. The next day the bodies of 45 people, including women and one child, were found there. According to the declaration of the Head of the KVM, Mr Walker, FRY security forces were responsible for the massacre, in which uniformed members of the FRY armed forces and the Serbian special police are said to have taken part. Following this declaration, the FRY authorities declared Mr Walker persona non grata. They also refused access to Kosovo to Mrs Arbour, the ICTY prosecutor.

11.       On 18 January 1999, the Bureau of the Assembly condemned this massacre, calling it a crime against humanity, and reiterating the Assembly’s position, according to which the field of competence of the ICTY extends to Kosovo. On 19 January, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe qualified this act as a "flagrant violation of the most basic values upheld by the Council of Europe", demanding access to Kosovo for Mrs Arbour and the cancellation of Mr Walker’s expulsion order. Similar declarations were made by other international bodies, such the United Nations, NATO and the OSCE.

12.       The Yugoslav authorities assert that it was a contrived scenario set up to compromise the FRY. According to their version of the facts, the aim of the police operation in Racak was to arrest Albanian "terrorists" accused of the murder of a Serbian policeman. The operation had been reported to the KVM and its observers had gone to the village. When approaching the village, the Serbian forces had been attacked by "Albanian terrorists" and in the fight several of the latter had been killed (including the daughter of one the "terrorists"). The Serbian forces had not entered the village and withdrew when night fell. The next day Mr Walker had visited the site and made his declaration.

13.       It is necessary to strongly condemn the brutal use of force in Racak, causing dozens of deaths, and demand that an exhaustive investigation be made immediately. While taking account of the fact that a team of Finnish forensic scientists has gone to Pristina to perform autopsies on the victims, it is necessary to insist that the FRY stop obstructing the work of the ICTY, in particular through allowing its prosecutors access to Kosovo. Those responsible for this massacre, both the perpetrators and those who gave the orders, must be brought to justice and punished as soon as possible. In addition, Mr Walker’s expulsion order, suspended for the moment, must be cancelled.

14.       Regarding the ICTY, the Yugoslav authorities assert that its territorial jurisdiction does not extend to the FRY and that its temporal jurisdiction ends with the conclusion of the Dayton Agreements. On this subject it is necessary to maintain the Assembly’s position which, like the other international bodies, calls on the FRY to recognise the territorial and temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY.

b.       Implementation of the "Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement" of 12 October and the subsequent agreements concluded between the Yugoslav authorities and the OSCE and NATO

15.       The international community considers the present activities of the Serbian forces in Kosovo (continuing offensives, failure to withdraw, reinforcement of the armed forces and the police, and failure to cooperate with the KVM) to be violation of these agreements.

16.       The Yugoslav authorities claim that they have respected the terms of the agreements, but that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) and other armed groups have taken advantage of this to take control of the territory evacuated by the Serbian forces and to step up their "terrorist" activities. They also claim that the KVM is not respecting the terms of the agreements, for example by not communicating its activity reports to them. It is impossible for them to implement the agreements so long as armed Albanian groups continue their attacks and go on receiving arms deliveries and troop reinforcements from Albania, as well as financing from abroad.

17.       It is now essential to implement these agreements immediately and, in particular, to secure the immediate withdrawal of the Serbian armed forces in conformity with these agreements.

18.       It is also necessary to condemn the terrorist acts committed by the KLA/UCK and other armed groups and to ask the Albanian leaders to do their utmost to put an end to them.

19.       It is also necessary that a substantial number of international troops should be deployed along the frontier between the FRY and Albania in order to stop the flow of arms into Kosovo. At the same time, Council of Europe member States should take steps to prevent the financing of terrorist activities in Kosovo.

III.       Prospects for a peaceful settlement in Kosovo

20.       While immediate steps must be taken concerning the Racak massacre and the implementation of the agreements of October 1999, political negotiations with a view to a future political status for Kosovo should resume as soon as possible, in a spirit of openness and without preconditions. So far, all proposals for a settlement have been rejected outright by one side or the other (Serbian rejection of Ambassador Hill’s plan; Albanian rejection of the Kosovo of the Agreement on the political frameworks for self-government in Kosovo and Metohija).

21.       In order for such negotiations to be able to succeed they need to be held discreetly, because the pressure of public opinion often makes it impossible to arrive at the necessary compromises. Similarly, it would be advisable to start by negotiating on the concrete methods of functioning of an Albanian entity in Kosovo, without trying to determine right at the outset the designation of this entity (autonomous or other).

22.       Democratic reforms in the FRY and the respect of human rights are an essential precondition for the negotiation of a lasting settlement of the conflict and constitute the best guarantee for the implementation of a possible agreement.

23.       In addition, the decentralisation of the Yugoslav State and the strengthening of local and regional self-government would enhance the prospects for a settlement.

24.       At its meeting of 27 November 1998, the Political Affairs Committee strongly condemned the Serbian law on public information of 20 October 1998 and called for its immediate abrogation, considering that the law is in flagrant violation of the Serbian constitution and all the relevant international instruments. This analysis was confirmed during the exchange of views organised by this Committee on 16 December 1999 with representatives of the independent media in Serbia.

25.       This question was raised by the rapporteur during his meeting with Mr Sainovic, Vice-president of the federal government, who asserted that the adoption of this law had been necessary to bring order to the media sector in Serbia, which had become very chaotic due to its rapid development. The law only introduced technical and material requirements for the functioning of media bodies. There were hundreds of such bodies freely exercising their activity in Serbia. Prior authorisation was not necessary and media bodies were subject only to the obligation of registration, which could not be refused if the conditions imposed by the law were fulfilled. Mr Sainovic also proposed that a Council of Europe expert should go to Serbia to analyse the situation at first hand.

26.       On this subject, we can but reiterate the position expressed very clearly by the Political Affairs Committee, which ought to be upheld by the Assembly.

IV.       Conclusions

27.       The Council of Europe should continue to actively concern itself with developments in the FRY and in Kosovo and contribute, to the best of its possibilities and competencies, to the democratisation of this country and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, it has to be admitted that months of dialogue with the FRY authorities have not brought any satisfactory results. This situation could even lead to further dialogue with the FRY authorities becoming counter-productive with respect to the desired results.

28.       Consequently, if the Yugoslav authorities continue to ignore their international obligations, the Committee of Ministers should envisage rejecting the FRY’s application for membership, reminding it of the fundamental principles of the Organisation to which it claims to wish to belong.

29.       The Assembly should maintain its contacts with the democratic political forces of the FRY and with representatives of civil society. The holding of a Colloquy on the future political status of Kosovo, to be organised by the Political Affairs Committee on 12 March 1999 in Paris, is a step in this direction.

30.       Similarly, the Council of Europe should participate in the efforts of the international community aimed at a peaceful settlement in Kosovo and remain in permanent contact with the other international organisations, in particular the European Union, NATO and the OSCE, in order to define the exact form of its contribution.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL EVENTS

from October 1998 to January 1999

1998

October

1.       The UN Security Council condemns the violence in Kosovo and calls on Belgrade to implement Resolution 1199 of 23 September.

2.       The Yugoslav Government rejects the visa applications from a large number of participants in the international conference "Television and radio broadcasting for a democratic Europe", organised under the auspices of the Council of Europe. The conference has to be postponed.

8.       The "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA/UCK) declares a unilateral ceasefire.

8.       A law is adopted on "special measures in the context of the threatened NATO attacks on our country". It prohibits the media from "inciting to pessimism and opposing the conclusions of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly and the Serb Assembly".

10.       Three Belgrade daily newspapers, Dnevni telegraf, Danas and Naša Borba are closed down after receiving a "warning letter" from the Minister of Information.

12.       The Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, and the American emissary, Richard Holbrooke, sign an agreement putting an end to several weeks of offensives by the Serb police against Albanian separatists. The agreement authorises NATO to monitor implementation of United Nations Resolution 1199, concentrating on the withdrawal of the Serb forces and the return home of refugees. It also provides for an air surveillance mission over Kosovo.

13.       NATO issues a final ultimatum to Slobodan Milosevic and threatens the Serbs with air strikes if the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fails to honour the commitments he has entered into (withdrawing Serb soldiers and police forces from Kosovo and accepting the deployment of 2 000 unarmed OSCE observers).

15.       Belgrade rejects the visa applications submitted by the International Criminal Tribunal.

16.       The OSCE President, Mr Bronislaw Geremek, and the FRY Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Zivadin Jovanovic, sign the agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).

20.       A Law on Public Information is adopted in blatant violation of all the relevant international instruments. This new law penalises any broadcasting of information incompatible with the Constitution and prohibits rebroadcasting in Serb or in the languages of the national minorities of foreign radio and TV programmes "of a political propaganda nature".

24.       The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1203 approving and supporting the establishment of the KVM.

25.       The American ambassador William Walker, former transitional administrator for Eastern Slavonia, is appointed to head the KVM.

26.       Serb police officers dismantle a large number of checkpoints throughout Kosovo. Convoys of tanks, light armoured vehicles, troop transporters and cannons take to the road 24 hours before the expiry of the NATO ultimatum to Milosevic.

November

4.       Four students from different faculties of Belgrade University are sentenced to ten days' imprisonment for writing unlawful slogans against the Law on Universities and the Serb Law on Public Information.

5.       Mr Jiři Dienstbier, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, declares that all international organisations, governments and NGOs should firmly oppose the Law on Information, the Law on Universities and the Law being prepared on NGOs.

9.       The Kosovo Diplomatic Observation Mission (KDOM) notes that the Albanian rebels and the Serb police forces are not respecting the United Nations resolutions calling for an end to hostilities and maintenance of a limited number of Serb troops and police forces in the province.

24.       The Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic dismisses General Momcilo Perisic from his post as Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army and replaces him with General Dragoljub Ojdanic.

December

4.       Eight ethnic Albanians are killed at the Yugoslav border near the town of Prizren.

15.       A terrorist attack in Pec, for which the KLA/UCK does not claim responsibility, kills six people and wounds three. The KLA/UCK accuses the Serbs of orchestrating this terrorist act as an excuse for a further violent intervention in the province. The Serb police react by combing the town of Pec, arresting eleven people and killing two ethnic Albanians.

17.       The Serb Ministry of Information issues warnings to various Albanian language newspapers and threatens them with sanctions if they continue to publish "intolerant" statements.

24.       The Serb police launch a large-scale operation in the north of the province against one of the bastions of the Albanian rebels belonging to the Kosovo Liberation Army. This is its most violent attack against the separatists for two-and-a-half months.

24.       Following this offensive, the Albanian separatists decide to break the ceasefire unilaterally declared on 8 October.

27.       Four days of confrontation leave sixteen dead on the Albanian side and one dead and six injured on the Serb side.

27.       A KVM mediation effort secures the withdrawal of the Serb security forces from the area between the town of Podujevo and the village of Obrandza, a KLA/UCK stronghold.

29       The bodies of five persons are found in Kosovo, thus ensuring that tension remains high in the north of the province. Belgrade invites the UN to condemn the KLA/UCK. The Yugoslav Government warns the UN that it cannot tolerate any further "terrorist" acts by the KLA/UCK Albanian rebels.

1999

January

2.       The bodies of three men, two Serbs and one Albanian, shot dead, are found in northern Kosovo near Urosevac (35 km south of Pristina).

4.       The Kosovo Liberation Army sets up a clandestine radio station ("Free Kosovo") and press agency ("Kosovo Press").

5.       Seven people (three Serbs and four Kosovars) are injured in a bomb attack in Pristina, sparking an outburst of violence in the area.

6.       General Wesley Clark, commander of NATO forces in Europe, accuses the Serbs of "violating their commitments to NATO" by deploying fresh regular troops in Kosovo and leaving the police forces in possession of heavy weaponry.

6.       A Serb guard is killed on the Orthodox Christmas Eve during an attack by KLA/UCK fighters on the Grabovac power station.

7.       Hundreds of armed Serbs block the main roads to Pristina in response to the murder of the Serb guard, further heightening tension.

8.       Three Serb police officers are killed in a grenade attack south-west of Pristina.

8.       Eight Yugoslav soldiers are taken hostage by the KLA/UCK, who hope to exchange the hostages for a number of Kosovars detained by the Serbs, but Belgrade refuses to negotiate with the KLA/UCK.

9.       The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Knut Vollebaek, begins a five-day tour of Balkan countries affected by the Kosovo conflict. One of the aims of Mr Vollebaek's mission is to bring both parties to the negotiating table and "find a lasting peace settlement" to the Kosovo crisis.

11.       Enver Moljoku, right-hand man of the unrecognised President of the Province of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, and head of the Kosovo Information Centre, is murdered outside his home by unknown gunmen.

13.       The KLA/UCK frees the eight Yugoslav soldiers. The OSCE President, Mr Knut Vollebaek, has reached an agreement with KLA/UCK providing for the release within ten days of nine of its fighters being held prisoner.

16.       The KVM observers discover the bodies of 45 Albanians in the village of Racak. According to the KVM the victims, including one child and three women, were killed by the Serb security forces.

17.       In view of the gravity of the situation, the ambassadors of the 16 NATO member countries hold an emergency meeting in Brussels. They condemn the Racak massacre, but do not advocate military intervention.

17.       Following this massacre, the Serb security forces conduct a fresh operation against the village of Racak, leading to fighting between the Serb forces and the separatists in the whole area around the village. UNHCR estimates the number of Albanian civilians driven out of their villages by the fighting at over 5 000.

18.       The Yugoslav authorities declare the head of the KVM, Mr William Walker, persona non grata and order him to leave the country "within 48 hours".

19.       The Yugoslav Government postpones William Walker's expulsion order by 24 hours.

20.       NATO dispatches its two top military officers to Belgrade, namely the American General Wesley Clark, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, and the German General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. The two Generals visibly fail in their attempt to persuade the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to honour his commitments and the ceasefire in Kosovo.

21.       Fighting breaks out between Yugoslav troops and Albanian nationalists for control of Shipolje, a village in the north of the province, where the Serb police are conducting a search operation.

22.       The Government in Belgrade freezes William Walker's expulsion order.

22.       At its meeting in London the Contact Group on former Yugoslavia considers a peace plan devised by Christopher Hill, which has been rejected in advance by Belgrade and KLA/UCK. The diplomats are pursuing the aim of securing "early negotiations on a political settlement with direct international involvement". In its declaration the Contact Group also demands the suspension of the Serb officers present in the village of Racak pending the outcome of the international inquiry which it strongly advocates.

Reporting Committee : Political Affairs Committee

Reference to Committee : Request for an urgent debate, Reference No. 2355 of 25 January 1999

Budgetary implications for the Assembly : None

Draft Recommendation unanimously adopted by the Committee on 26 January 1999.

Members of the Committee : Mr Ruffy (Chairman), Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Toshev (Vice-chairman), MM Arzilli, Atkinson, Bársony, Behrendt, Bergqvist, Björck (alternate: Mrs Näslund), Blaauw (alternate: Mrs Gelderblom-Lankhout), Bloetzer, Bühler, Chornovil, Daly alternate: Mr Aylward), Davis, Demetriou, Dokle, Domljan, Fico, Gjellerod, Gligoroski, Glotov, Gül, Mrs Iotti, Mr Iwinski, Mrs Kautto, MM Kirilov, Krzaklewski (alternate: Mr Adamczyk), Kuzmickas, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Lopez Henares, Lupu, van der Maelen, Maginas, Martinez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Micheloyiannis, Mota Amaral, Mutman, Nallet (alternate: Mr Baumel, Vice-Chairman), Nedelciuc, Mrs Nemkova, MM Neuwirth, Oliynyk, Pahor, Palmitjavila Ribo, Prusak, Mrs Ragnarsdottir, Mrs Roudy, MM Schieder, Schwimmer, Schlotten, Selva, Sinka, Mrs Smith, Mrs Stanoiu, Mrs Stepová, MM Surjan, Thoresen, Timmermans, Urbain (alternate: Mr Clerfayt), Vella, Volcic, Zhebrovsky.

N.B. The names of the members who took part in the vote are printed in italics

Secretaries of the Committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Sich , Mr Gruden.

1        See recommendations 1360 (1998), 1368 (1998), 1376 (1998), 1384 (1998), 1385 (1998) and Resolution 1146 (1998).

2

       Agreement signed by the OSCE Chairman in Office, Mr Bronislaw Geremek, and FRY Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Zivadin Jovanovic on 16 October 1998; agreement signed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Wesley K. Clark and Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, Chief of General Staff of the FRY Armies on 15 October 1998.