1. Introduction
1. This report is based on Order 584 (2003), in which
the Assembly instructed this Committee to present to it, at its
next part-session, a report on the human rights situation in the
Chechen Republic. In accordance with the Order, this report is based
on information made available by the competent authorities, international organisations,
NGOs and journalists. I would like to thank everyone who shared
information with me, but I would like to single out Human Rights
Watch, Memorial, the Chechnya Justice Initiative and Amnesty International
for their especially valuable assistance.
2. I have had very little time to prepare this report – less
than four weeks, in fact. Mr Sultygov, the Special Representative
of the President of the Russian Federation, has compiled information
for me, which was received in Russian by Mr Haller, Secretary General
to the Assembly, on 3 March 2003
(and
is currently being translated). I have not yet received the list
the Assembly requested of the Russian authorities in
Resolution 1315 (2003).
Needless to say, this information
is crucial to a balanced report on the human rights situation in the
Chechen Republic. I thus propose that any information of value which
has not been received in time be included and evaluated in an addendum
to this report, to be considered by the Committee on the first day
of the April part-session. Should this information make amendments
to the draft resolution and the draft recommendation necessary,
the Committee could consider these at the same time, and table them
in the name of the Committee.
3. In this report, I will concentrate on the current human rights
situation in Chechnya, i.e. I will in principle not deal with violations
that predate the current conflict (which started in autumn 1999).
This is not to say that the human rights situation in Chechnya was
unproblematic beforehand: indeed, grave human rights abuses have
been committed by both sides since the first conflict began in winter
1994
3,
many say even earlier, since Dzokhar Dudaev came to power in Chechnya
in 1991. However, even a “truth and reconciliation commission” –
for which the time is not yet ripe - would probably find it difficult
to chronicle all that suffering; “just” dealing with three-and-a-half
years of human rights violations is daunting enough a task.
4. I will start this report with those human rights violations
which are generally attributed to Russian forces, before going into
those abuses generally attributed to Chechen fighters. The violations
attributed to Russian forces are often better documented (especially
by NGOs) than those attributed to Chechen fighters, and are thus
examined here in greater detail. This does not mean that the crimes
committed by Chechen fighters are any less gruesome than those committed
by Russian forces – on the contrary. (In any case, for the victim,
the identity of the perpetrator makes no difference to his or her
suffering.) However, the scale of the human rights abuses perpetrated
by both sides does seem to differ, a fact that could be explained
either by numbers – there are over 80.000 Russian troops stationed
in the Republic, in contrast to an estimated number of 1.500 Chechen fighters
remaining – or by other factors, such as fear of reprisals. Following
this in-depth analysis, which will also treat individual cases of
particular concern in accordance with my mandate as defined by Order
No. 584 (2003), I will then try to draw the appropriate conclusions
from the information currently at my disposal, and make a few constructive
recommendations.
2. Human
rights violations attributed to Russian forces
2.1. General statistical
analysis
5. Over the last three years, the Russian authorities
have made quite a lot of statistical information available to the
Assembly and/or its Joint Working Group on Chechnya about human
rights violations in the Chechen Republic, their investigation and
prosecution. The information has been of varying quality and detail,
and sometimes contradictory, but I will nevertheless attempt to
analyse the most important and recent data.
6. The latest information on criminal cases instigated by the
prosecutor’s office concerning crimes committed against the civilian
population in the Chechen Republic was provided to the Assembly
by the Russian authorities on 17 January 2003
. According to this document, since
the beginning of the “counterterrorist operation” military prosecutors
instigated 162 cases, 97 of which were closed (nearly 60%), 57 –
referred to military courts (35%). No information on the nature
of these cases (which concern military servicemen only) was provided,
nor on the number of convictions, the length of sentences, etc
.
7. The same document also listed the number of cases instigated
by the civilian prosecutor’s office on crimes committed in 2002
by members of police and special forces against the civilian population
(77 cases, of which 37 suspended and 7 referred to court). For military
prosecutors, the numbers for 2002 were 44 cases instigated (of which
15 cases closed, 4 suspended and 18 referred to military courts).
There does not seem to be much difference in the efficiency of the
military and civilian prosecuting authorities in view of these numbers.
8. In January 2001, the Assembly asked to be provided with a
detailed list and the current status of all criminal investigations
by military and civilian prosecutors into crimes against the civilian
population committed by servicemen and members of special police
forces in the Chechen Republic before the April 2001 part-session.
This list was received in time, and made available to the Bureau
and the Joint Working Group on Chechnya (JWG).
9. However, an analysis of the list revealed that most investigations
had not led to tangible results. Few cases made it to trial; most
were suspended, transferred, or dismissed. The NGO “Human Rights
Watch” conducted a detailed analysis of this list
,
concluding that more than 50% of all opened investigations had been suspended
(and 79% of all investigations into “disappearances”). 12% of the
criminal cases opened by the Military Procuracy concerned driving
accidents. At that time, only 3% of all the listed cases had been transferred
to the courts.
10. Updates to the list were provided only on a piece-meal basis;
the Assembly is still waiting for a detailed updated list as requested
in
Resolution 1270 (2002) and again in
Resolution
1315 (2003). Until such a list is received, the Assembly will have
to assume that the current breakdown of cases is similar to that
in April 2001; this means that it is quite possible that even some
of the 57 cases investigated by the military prosecutors’ office
in the last three years which did reach the courts might have been
concerned with traffic accidents and the like.
11. One fact stands out in all the prosecution statistics listed
above: the small number of criminal cases instigated, and the even
smaller number of those transferred to the courts. The numbers provided
by the Russian authorities, that only 121 crimes against the civilian
population were committed by Russian forces, and only 311 by Chechen
fighters, seem very low for an active war-zone during the whole
year of 2002. In contrast, the Office of the Special Representative
Mr Sultygov has received 1.085 applications on criminal cases, and 1.568
applications on abduction cases for the period of 1 January 2000
to 1 November 2002 alone, with the majority of people disappearing
in Grozny, the surrounding district, and the Shali district
. The numbers of both criminal
and abduction cases have steadily increased in nearly all districts.
12. NGOs have documented even more crimes against the civilian
population which, it thus seems, are inefficiently investigated
by the prosecuting authorities or not at all. To be fair, the work
of prosecutors on the ground is difficult: prosecutors risk being
kidnapped or murdered while doing their duty, and their efforts
are hampered by the lack of co-operation of the armed forces – for
example, Order No. 80 by General Moltenskoi
is regularly
flouted, and no detailed records of special operations and the location
and activities of military vehicles seem to be kept and/or made
available to the prosecuting authorities. No wonder that a climate
of impunity reigns in the Chechen Republic. I will now present some
brief examples of the types of crimes which go unpunished:
2.2. Mass killings
13. Russian forces are alleged to have committed at least
four mass killings of civilians in the course of the current conflict:
three of them in the course of the “hot” phase (in Alkhan-Yurt in
December 1999, in Staropromyslovsky in December 1999/January 2000,
and in Novy Aldy in February 2000) and one of them after large-scale
military operations had already ceased: in Mesker-Yurt in late May
2002. I will briefly examine each of these cases.
2.2.1. Alkhan-Yurt
14. On 1 December 1999, after weeks of heavy fighting,
Russian forces took control of Alkhan-Yurt, a village located just
south of Grozny. According to a report by the NGO “Human Rights
Watch” of April 2000
,
“during the two weeks that followed, Russian forces went on a rampage
in the village, summarily executing at least 14 civilians. They
first expelled, temporarily, hundreds of civilians from Alkhan-Yurt,
and then began systematically looting and burning the village, killing
anyone in their way”.
15. According to the report, the last of the civilians to die,
Aindi Altimirov, was killed and beheaded by Russia soldiers on 18
December 1999. On 17 December 1999, Russia’s then highest ranking
representative for Chechnya, Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Koshman,
and Malik Saidulayev, a prominent pro-Moscow Chechen leader, travelled
to Alkhan-Yurt, to investigate allegations of serious abuses by
Russian forces in this, Saidulayev’s, home village. Much of the
visit was filmed, and shows the two walking around the devastated village,
discovering several caches of goods looted by Russian soldiers,
and even being threatened with being shot themselves by some (apparently
intoxicated) soldiers. The subsequent criminal investigation has reportedly
been closed “for lack of evidence of a crime”. No further information
has been made available to the Assembly on this case, despite several
requests of the past years.
2.2.2. Staropromyslovsky
district of Grozny
16. The mass murder of civilians in the Staropromyslovsky
district of Grozny took place over several weeks in the context
of the fight over Grozny between late December 1999 and mid-January
2000. On 7 February 2000, the NGO “Human Rights Watch” chronicled
the unlawful killing of 38 civilians in total, claiming that most of
the victims were women and elderly men, apparently shot by Russian
soldiers at close range
. According to the same
NGO, the body-count has risen to 70 in the meantime.
17. Unfortunately, it is impossible for me to go into all these
70 summary executions within the framework of this report. However,
the relatives of several of the deceased have lodged applications
with the European Court of Human Rights, two of which were declared
admissible on 19 December 2002. The cases in question are those
of the applicants M. A. Khashiev and R. A. Akaev, concerning the
deaths of five of their relatives. In the words of the Malgobek
City Court’s decision of 7 April 2000, which was, however, later
repealed, “on January 17, 2000, Russian soldiers – the 205th battalion
– entered in Staoproyslovskii district of Grozny, where his [Magomed
Khashiev’s] relatives resided. These troops committed outrages.
On January 19, 2000, soldiers of this battalion entered the courtyard
of his brother and sister, and brutally murdered his brother, Khamid,
his sister, Lida, and her two sons, Anzor and Rizvan.”
18. The investigation of these killings, as of the other killings
in this district, has been slow, incomplete and confusing. Even
though on 10 February 2000, relatives of the deceased brought the
mutilated bodies of Magomed Goigov, Khamid Khashiev and Rizvan Taimeskhanov
to prosecutors in Ingushetia, and forensic experts examined the
bodies, and subsequently Ingush prosecutors interviewed relatives
of the families about the circumstances in which the bodies had
been found, the Grozny prosecutors’ office did not instigate criminal proceedings
until 3 May 2000. According to information put at my disposal by
the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic on 16 January 2001
, the grounds for opening the case
“was the publication of the article “Freedom or Death” in the newspaper
“Novaya Gazeta” No. 12, dated 27 April 2000”. In accordance with
the same document, the bodies of murdered local residents were discovered
only in February 2000, and the operational investigation found no
eyewitnesses to the murders by members of the Russian armed forces
.
19. On 17 January 2003, the Russian authorities provided the following
information on the “current results of the investigations concerning
the alleged massacres of civilians”: “On May 3, 2000, a criminal
case (No. 12038) was instigated on the fact of discovery of corpses
of the civilians in Novy Katayama of the Staropromyslovsky district
of Grozny. 28 witness were interrogated. On November 10, 2002 preliminary investigation
was suspended because the persons who had committed the crime were
not identified. At present the investigation of the case was resumed
and is under investigation.”
2.2.3. Novye Aldi
20. On 5 February 2000, in the course of a large-scale
“sweep operation”, Russian forces summarily executed at least sixty
civilians in Aldi and Chernorechie, suburbs of Grozny. The NGO “Human
Rights Watch” published a report on the incident in June 2000
,
which very clearly chronicles the killings by Russian riot police
(OMON) and contract soldiers – they included a one-year-old boy
and an eight-month pregnant woman. According to information put
at my disposal by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic
on 16 January 2001
, a criminal case was instigated
by the Grozny Prosecutor’s Office on 5 March 2000. “In the course
of investigations it was established that during the day of 5 February
2000, unknown persons, using firearms and dressed in camouflage
clothing, murdered more than 50 residents of these settlements.
… The investigation could find no confirmation of participation
by the armed forces in the aforementioned events. “
21. On 17 January 2003, the Russian authorities provided the following
information on the “current results of the investigations concerning
the alleged massacres of civilians”: “On March 5, 2000 criminal
case (No. 12011) was instigated on the fact of execution (shooting)
of the civilians in Novy Aldy in Grozny. More than 100 witnesses
were interrogated. Medical expertise was carried out. On April 15,
2002 preliminary investigation was suspended because the persons
who had committed the crime were not identified. At present the investigation
of the case was resumed and is under investigation.” However, I
have at my disposal a letter from the military prosecutor’s office
in which it states that Russian riot troops conducted a sweep operation
in Novye Aldi on the day of the massacre.
22. Five members of the Estamirov family were among those killed
that day. With the help of the NGO “Chechnya Justice Initiative”
(CJI), their relatives have filed an application with the European
Court of Human Rights. The case is currently awaiting communication.
According to this application, the investigation of the Estamirov
case was badly flawed. Russian law enforcement agencies did not
take any investigative steps immediately after receiving the complaint
(dated 22 February 2000), and first visited the crime scene on 8
April 2000. Although the bodies were exhumed, no full forensic examinations
were carried out, and no physical evidence collected at the scene
of the crime.
2.2.4. Mesker-Yurt
23. From 21 May to 11 June 2002, long after the large-scale
military operations in the Chechen Republic were meant to have ended,
a “sweep” was organised by Russian forces the village of Mesker-Yurt.
The Russian NGO “Memorial” has written a report about this incident
, according
to which at least 12 residents of the village were killed by the
Russian forces, with another 10 having “disappeared” after being
taken into custody on 30 May 2002, and another 10 suffering the
same fate in the first days of June 2002.
24. Russian Duma Deputy Aslanbek Aslakhanov managed to visit the
village on 8 June 2002, and is credited by the NGO with saving a
number of persons from illegal detention and torture. I have no
information at my disposal concerning a possible prosecutorial investigation
into these events.
2.3. Mass graves
25. Several mass graves have been uncovered in the Chechen
Republic in the last three years. The biggest was found in Zdorovye/Dachny,
an area just outside the Russian military base in Khankala on 24
February 2002, which contained 51 corpses. But smaller mass graves
have been found regularly, such as a mass grave of 15 corpses near
the border to Ingushetia found on 9 September 2002, and another
mass grave of 10 corpses discovered early January 2003 on the outskirts
of Grozny. Individual corpses have also often been found simply dumped
by the roadside, or buried in shallow graves in fields, such as
that of Shamil Akhmadov, who was detained in 12 March 2001 during
a sweep operation in Argun, “diappeared”, and whose body, bearing
signs of ill-treatment and summary execution, was found in May 2002
in a vacant lot on the outskirts of the village
.
26. The treatment of the mass grave in Zdorovye/Dachny, however,
became a sort of test case for the ability and willingness of the
Russian authorities to deal with the most serious human rights abuses.
In the view of all the NGOs who provided me with information on
this issue, the Russian authorities botched the investigation. In
March 2001, the then Special Representative of the President, Mr
V. Kalamanov, carried out a fact-finding mission to the site, after
which technical and expert assistance was offered through the Council
of Europe experts working in his office, notably by involving forensic
experts. Mr Kalamanov refused. At about the same time, the Prosecutor-General
indicated that the Russian prosecuting bodies did not need assistance.
27. According to a report by the NGO “Human Rights Watch” of May
2001
, “the Russian government’s investigation
into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of those found at
the site has been wholly inadequate”. Russian authorities failed
to provide adequate time or information for identifying the bodies
(34 bodies that had not yet been identified were buried by the Russian
authorities without prior announcement on 10 March 2001), and failed
to preserve crucial evidence that might have led to the identification
of those responsible for the torture and execution-style killings
of the more than fifty persons found at the site.
28. The NGO “Memorial” has gathered details on the detention by
federal forces and subsequent “disappearance” of sixteen of the
identified bodies. Nevertheless, federal and local Russian authorities
deny responsibility for the deaths of those found at the site and
instead blame the deaths on Chechen fighters and criminal gangs
– despite the fact that the mass dumping ground is adjacent to the
Khankala Russian military base and has been under Russian military
control since December 1999, long before the vast majority of the bodies
were deposited there. I have not been provided with any information
on the current stage of the investigation by the prosecuting authorities.
29. The NGO “Chechnya Justice Initiative” (CJI) has filed applications
with the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of the relatives
of several of the people whose bodies were identified from this
mass grave. For example, on 3 June 2000, armed masked men on an
armoured personnel carrier detained Nura Lulueva, her cousins and
several other people at the Northern market of Grozny, where they
had been selling strawberries. Lulueva’s body and those of her cousins
were among those retrieved from the mass grave in question. No full
forensic examination was conducted on Lulueva’s body, and physical
evidence, including clothing and blindfolds, was not saved for forensic
examination. Almost two years after the discovery of the body, the
investigation has led to no results. The case currently awaits communication
.
2.4. Unlawful killings
30. A high number of individual unlawful killings have
been reported by both human rights organisations and the press over
the last three years. However, it is often difficult to determine
whether Russian forces or Chechen fighters were responsible. I am
thus only going to briefly outline three cases of particular concern here,
where I can be reasonably sure that Russian forces are responsible.
31. On 27 October 2001, Madina Mezhieva was being driven home
from a turnip field in Komsomolskoe by Amkhad Gekaev to breastfeed
her child. Russian military helicopters opened fire on their car.
Soldiers took them away alive, although injured, and then damaged
the car in an attempt to make it appear as if it had hit a landmine.
Several days later, the military commander’s office in Gudermes
returned their dead bodies (both missing limbs) to their families.
Authorities failed to conduct full forensic examinations of the
bodies. Although the criminal investigation into the killing was
transferred to the military prosecutors’ office, indicating that
the preliminary investigation implicated servicemen, no suspects
have been named in the case, and the families were informed that
no wrongdoing has been found in the 27 October 2001 operation. The
NGO “CJI” filed a preliminary application with the European Court
of Human Rights in April 2002 and will submit the full application
shortly.
32. The NGO “Human Rights Watch” calls the killing of Malika Umazheva
on 29 November 2002 “the first clearly retaliatory murder of its
kind in Chechnya”
. Mrs Umazheva served
as head of administration for Alkhan-Kala, a village on the outskirts
of Grozny. Unlike many other village administrators, she had been
very outspoken about abuses by Russian forces in her village, worked
with human rights organisations, and repeatedly confronted the Russian
military about them. According to eyewitnesses, soldiers in masks
came to the Umazhev home late in the evening and took Mrs Umazheva
to the shed, where she was shot in the back, in the heart, and in
the head. Her family is convinced that Russian forces are to blame,
due to the fact she had received death threats from Russian soldiers
before, and that the soldiers who came to her house spoke unaccented
Russian, and fled in Russian military vehicles. The official investigation
into the case is reportedly continuing.
33. Another shocking case is that of Khadzhimurat Yandiev. Televison
cameras shot footage of him after he was detained (wounded) on 2
February 2000 at a hospital in Alkhan-Kala. On camera, a Russian
officer gives an order to his subordinates to shoot him. He was
never seen again. The television footage has been submitted to the
prosecutor’s office, which refused to open a criminal investigation
into Yandiev’s disappearance and has not identified the officer
clearly visible on the footage. Mrs Fatima Bazorkina, his mother,
has filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights
with the help of the NGO “CJI”. The case is currently awaiting communication.
2.5. Disappearances
34. No-one really knows how many people have “disappeared”
in the Chechen Republic since the beginning of the current conflict
,
even less so how many have disappeared since the first conflict
began in December 1994. The numbers depend on how one defines a
“disappearance” – thus, for example, the Office of the Special Representative
of the President of the Russian Federation reportedly includes all
missing persons (also those who have, for example, left the Chechen
Republic without informing their relatives, or those who left home
to gather firewood but stepped on a mine and whose bodies were never
found).
35. In this report, I will use the definition of the International
Criminal Court, whose statute defines “enforced disappearance of
persons” as: “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or
a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time”.
36. For the year 2002, the Russian NGO “Memorial” has sent me
a detailed list of 173 persons who were detained by representatives
of the Federal law-enforcement bodies and subsequently “disappeared”;
some of them were later found dead
.
The list makes terrifying reading: people are detained during “sweep”-operations,
at checkpoints, or in their own homes, taken away by Russian law-enforcement
officials (often with armoured personnel carriers), never to be
seen again alive. Many have been subsequently found dead in mass graves
or simply dumped by the roadside. In response to a request by the
OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, the Prosecutor’s Office of the
Chechen Republic sent a list to the group, detailing the investigative steps
taken in a number of disappearances. Regrettably, most cases were
suspended within two months of being opened (the minimum length
of an investigation as required by law).
37. Unfortunately, it is impossible to detail each of these cases
in the framework of this report
,
so I will have to limit myself to two of the worst examples: From
the very beginning, the Assembly has been worried by the disappearance
of the former Speaker of the Chechen Parliament, Mr Alikhodzhiyev,
on 17 May 2000. According to information put at my disposal by the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic on 16 January 2001
, “investigations in the case have
established that on 17 May 2000 in the town of Shali, unidentified persons,
dressed in camouflage clothing and travelling in an armoured troop
carrier, burst into R. Sh. Alikhadzhiyev’s residence at No. 97,
Suvorova Street, Shali, and took him away to an unidentified destination. …
According to information from the head of the Shalinskiy VOVD, Alikhadzhiyev
was not arrested by employees of this service, nor has he been held
in the Shalinsky VOVD’s remand prison.” I have received no update
on the criminal investigation into this case since then.
38. Another terrible case is that of Mr Said Magomed Imakaev,
an applicant to the European Court of Human Rights, and his son.
On 1 December 2000, Said-Khusein Imakayev was driving home from
the market when a group of armed men stopped his car and detained
him. He subsequently disappeared. The procuracy’s investigation
into his disappearance consisted of questioning two individuals
and writing four letters to law-enforcement authorities inquiring
about his whereabouts. When the letters failed to establish his
whereabouts, the procuracy suspended the investigation. Marzet Imakaeva
and Said-Magomed Imakaev, Said-Khusein’s parents, convinced that
there was no commitment inside Russia to prosecuting the guilty
parties, filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights
in February 2002.
39. Four months later, on 2 June 2002, during a sweep operation
in the Imakaev’s village of Novye Atagi, Russian federal forces
detained Said-Magomed Imakaev in his home. Despite concrete evidence
that could lead to the identity of the officer who detained Imakaev
(his wife was given a signed receipt for the confiscation of computer
discs), Russian authorities have denied detaining him and Marzet
Imakaeva’s repeated attempts to gain information about his whereabouts
have been unsuccessful. The “Chechnya Justice Initiative” filed
an application on behalf of Marzet Imakaeva in June 2002. The European
Court entered into preliminary correspondence with the Russian government
about this case in June 2002, and in September 2002 the Chechnya
Justice Project filed a response to the government’s first memorandum,
which had asserted that the likely version of events was that rebel
fighters disguised as federal forces had detained Said-Magomed Imakaev.
The case currently awaits communication.
2.6. Torture and rape
40. Torture and rape are two very serious human rights
violations which, NGOs allege, are common in the Chechen Republic.
However, it is extremely difficult to document them. Survivors of
torture are usually so frightened of reprisals that they do not
complain about their treatment in custody, especially not to the
official authorities. Many bodies found in Chechnya, do however,
bear unmistakable signs of some of the worst forms of torture, including
the cutting off of ears, fingers and even limbs. The Council of
Europe’s own Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has complained
of Russia’s lack of co-operation with it. Russia has yet to authorise
the publication of its reports, which might be due to the CPT having
documented cases of torture during its numerous visits to the region.
41. The case of Alaudin Sadykov is one of the few cases of torture
where the victim has had the courage to lodge an official complaint.
Police detained Alaudin Sadykov on March 5, 2000, and kept him in
the October district temporary police precinct in Grozny for over
two months. During those months, police cut off one of his ears,
broke several ribs and caused numerous other physical injuries.
Mr Sadykov was eventually released in May 2000.
42. He reported the ill-treatment in June 2000 and actively corresponded
with authorities, but the procuracy informed him of launching a
criminal investigation only in January of 2002. Despite the fact
that he knows the name and can recognise at least one of the police
officers who tortured him, and the fact that many fellow detainees
and guards were witness to the abuses, the investigation has failed
to identify suspects. The “Chechnya Justice Initiative” team filed
an application to the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of
Mr Sadykov in July 2002. The case is currently awaiting communication.
Mr Sadykov described to Amnesty International in detail instruments
used to torture detainees, including ice picks, hammers, surgical
and dental instruments, instruments for removing fingernails, spades
and saws.
43. Victims of rape are equally unlikely to make official complaints,
because Chechen society has strong taboos against revealing instances
of sexual assault. NGOs such as “Memorial” and “Human Rights Watch” have
nevertheless managed to document rapes, including gang rapes, by
Russian forces, for example during the “sweep” operation of 5 February
2000 in Novye Aldi (see above), of 3-4 July 2001 in Sernovodsk and
of 4-5 July 2001 in Assinovskaia
.
44. One of the few rape (and murder) cases to reach trial was
that of Colonel Budanov. On 31 December 2002 he was acquitted of
murdering the young Chechen woman Elza Kungaeva on 26 March 2000
on the grounds of “temporary insanity”, although the prosecutor’s
office is reportedly appealing the verdict. The rape charge, however,
was dropped by the prosecution before the trial, although the forensic
examination had found that Kungaeva had endured anal and vaginal
penetration just before her death. Instead, one of Colonel Budanov’s
subordinates was charged with “desecration of a corpse”, but the
investigation was closed under the 2000 amnesty.
2.7. Other human rights
violations
45. Other human rights violations deserve a quick mention
here
, although they are too numerous
to be described in detail – robbery, looting and harassment are
common allegations. Checkpoints remain notorious: not only are bribes
commonly necessary to pass them, but the Russian forces manning
them often harass passing civilians in addition, sometimes even
detaining them for no apparent reason. The Council of Europe experts
working in the Office of the Special Representative have reported
that they were informed “that an order issued by the military headquarters
in Khankala requires that the security clearance at a checkpoint should
last between 15 and 30 minutes”
. Since checkpoints are
so numerous in Chechnya (I counted 28 on a 40 km stretch of road
from Grozny to the Ingush border), travelling in Chechnya is thus
not only a hazardous, but also a very long procedure.
3. Human rights abuses
attributed to Chechen fighters
46. Human rights abuses perpetrated by Chechen fighters
are notoriously hard to document. NGOs testify that it is already
difficult to persuade witnesses to testify when Russian forces are
the culprits, but that it is practically impossible to persuade
those who witnessed atrocities committed by Chechen fighters – the
fear of reprisals is too high. Thus, what I am presenting here might
well be only the “tip of the iceberg”.
47. The latest information on criminal cases instigated by the
prosecutor’s office concerning crimes committed against the civilian
population in the Chechen Republic provided to the Assembly by the
Russian authorities on 17 January 2003 also contained information
on the crimes committed by “members of illegal armed formations”.
In 2002, the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic instigated
311 criminal cases, including 120 cases of crimes against law-enforcement
officers, 81 cases of crimes against heads of administrations, and
12 cases of crimes against the clergy. Of these cases, 213 were
suspended and 29 referred to court. These numbers are very low,
in particular if one takes into account that they are most probably inflated
by crimes which the prosecuting authorities attribute to “unknown
persons in camouflage uniform” who could just as well be Russian
servicemen as Chechen fighters.
3.1. Acts of mass terrorism
48. The Assembly has always, and will always condemn
all terrorist acts in the harshest possible terms. While not on
Chechen territory, the hostage-taking in the Moscow theatre in the
last days of October 2002 by Chechen fighters was a terrible terrorist
act that deserves to be condemned in just such a way. Of course,
the liberation of the hostages by Russian special forces was not
without its own problems: Over 117 hostages died because of the
first unspecified gas used in the operation, some of whom might
have been saved if they had been given more adequate medical attention.
49. On 27 December 2002 a suicide bomb attack targeted the building
of the Chechen Administration and Government in Grozny, claiming
the lives of 82 persons and wounding 210 others. While, according
to the Russian Defence Minister, Mr Sergei Ivanov, those who masterminded
the attack have been identified, I have no other information on
the state of the investigation into this gruesome terrorist act.
3.2. Unlawful killings
and kidnappings
50. Heads of local administration and members of the
prosecuting bodies continue to be the target of violent actions
carried out by Chechen fighters. Many pro-Moscow Chechens (and members
of their families) have been brutally murdered, others kidnapped,
never to be seen again. Recently, the heads of administration of
the Tsotsin-Yurt village (Kurchaloy district) and of the Sharoy
district were killed by unknown assailants, while the deputy prosecutors
of the Shali and Shatoy districts were abducted. According to the
latest figures from the Chechen Prosecutor's Office, 94 officials
from local administrations died since October 1999, 139 were injured and
34 kidnapped. 139 Chechen policemen were killed, 149 were wounded
and 29 are registered as missing. In the last months of 2002, Chechen
fighters are believed to be responsible for seven assassinations,
several assassination attempts, and nine abductions since 15 November
2002
.
51. It is often very difficult to determine whether renegade Russian
forces or Chechen fighters, or even criminal gangs are responsible
for the myriad kidnappings in Chechnya and neighbouring Republics.
In cases where heads of administrations and prosecutors are the
victims, however, a pattern is discernible that points in the direction
of Chechen fighters.
52. One case of particular concern is that of Mr Arjan Erkel,
the 32-year-old Head of Mission for the Swiss section of the NGO
“Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)” in the Northern Caucasus. He was
abducted by three unknown gunmen on 12 August 2002 in Makhatchkala,
the capital of the Federal Republic of Dagestan. After more than
five months of focused efforts at many levels, MSF has not yet received
any concrete information about Mr Erkel’s fate, his whereabouts,
or as to why and by whom he was abducted. This has led MSF to conclude
that his abduction might be politically motivated. The relevant
authorities in the Russian Federation should give a higher political
priority to assuring the safe release of Mr Erkel, since such kidnappings
further hamper the humanitarian aid effort in the North Caucasus
to the detriment of the suffering population.
4. Conclusions
53. The conclusions to be drawn from the above-mentioned
cases are depressingly clear: For nearly a decade now, people in
the Chechen Republic have lived in constant fear. Fear of the Russian
forces, fear of the Chechen fighters. A brief chronology of the
events since 1 December 1994 can be described as follows: First,
the population of the Chechen Republic (especially in Grozny) had
to endure carpet-bombing by Russian forces, which cost upward from
20.000 lives
. Hot on the heels of the indiscriminate
bombardment came a campaign of mindless terror perpetrated by some
of these Russian forces, with murder, rape, torture, looting, pillaging
and extortion being the order of the day
.
54. Then the Chechens must have felt betrayed by their own people,
losing confidence in a government that could not or would not protect
them from bands of religious extremists and criminal gangs, who
in turn held the Republic hostage by means of kidnapping, drug smuggling
and other violent acts. Vicious punishments were meted out in a
perversion of justice under Sharia-law. But the “liberation” of
Chechnya in the form of the second Russian campaign brought no relief:
ruthless Russian forces, more often than not, seem to make no difference between
fighters and civilians
. To this day, the
civilian population in the Republic risks illegal detention, unlawful
“disappearance”, even rape, torture and murder at the hands of some
Russian forces, while not being protected from kidnapping, murder
and terrorist acts perpetrated by some Chechen fighters.
55. The reaction of the Russian authorities has not been very
constructive. One does get the feeling that the Russian authorities
are doing everything to hide the real situation in Chechnya from
public view. The Chechen Republic has practically been closed off
– there is nearly no access for journalists and NGOs.
56. As I already clearly stated in my last report of January 2003
(Doc. No. 9688), after a certain number of years, to be told that
a criminal case is still under investigation with no tangible results,
leads me to the following conclusion: The prosecuting bodies are
either unwilling or unable (or are being systematically obstructed
in their efforts) to find and bring to justice the responsible parties.
Personally, by now, I suspect that all three factors play a role
in the ineffectiveness of the prosecution when the crimes in question
are those committed against Chechen civilians. Thus, the recommendation
of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Gil-Robles, following his
recent visit to Chechnya, that more means have to be put at the
disposal of the prosecutor’s office, can only be a partial solution,
if at all.
57. I would also like to refer to the case-law of the European
Commission of Human Rights in this respect, which has ruled in the
past that inquiries into a violation of a fundamental right (such
as the right to life or the prohibition of torture) that had not
concluded for two years after the alleged crime occurred and for
which the authorities had not provided an explanation as to the
cause for the delay, could not be considered as effective
.
58. Non-judicial redress mechanisms set up by the Russian authorities,
such as the Office of the Special Representative of the President
of the Russian Federation on Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic,
do little more than catalogue individual complaints. While the Assembly
should pay tribute to the courage of the Council of Europe experts
working within that Office, there are questions regarding the effectiveness
of their current mandate. Measures should be taken to increase their
possibility of influencing the human rights situation in the Chechen
Republic.
59. The mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya has not
been renewed by the Russian government. The recommendations of the
Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights are implemented
by Russia with long delays, if at all. For example, his excellent
and necessary recommendations made in May 2002 “on certain rights
that must be guaranteed during the arrest and detention of persons following
“cleansing” operations in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation”
were only beginning to be implemented during his visit to the region
in February 2003.
60. The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture
(CPT) has complained of Russia’s lack of co-operation with it. It
issued a public statement on 10 July 2001 (available from the Secretariat),
prompted by the Russian authorities’ failure to cooperate with the
CPT in relation to two issues: i) the carrying out of a thorough
and independent inquiry into events in a detention facility at Chernokozovo
during the period December 1999 to early February 2000; ii) action
taken to uncover and prosecute cases of ill-treatment of persons
deprived of their liberty in the Chechen Republic in the course
of the current conflict. The reports of its visits are still confidential,
as the Russian authorities have not authorised their publication.
61. The European Court of Human Rights, set up to deal with individual
violations of human rights, cannot hope to cope effectively with
systematic human rights abuse of the Chechen scale via individual
complaints. Lamentably, no member state or group of member states
has yet found the courage to lodge an interstate complaint with
the Court.
62. The result is a climate of impunity which encourages further
human rights violations by both sides, and which denies justice
to the thousands of victims, embittering the population to a point
where the Chechen Republic could truly become ungovernable. The
current human rights situation in the Chechen Republic is unacceptable.
If a meaningful political process is to develop in the Republic,
human rights violations must stop, and those guilty of past abuses
must be brought to justice. The people of the Chechen Republic have
a right not just to our pity, but also to our protection.
63. Of course, this will not be possible without the active co-operation
of the Russian authorities. Our Russian Duma colleague and respected
human rights activist Sergei Kovalev alleged last week that Russian “death
squads” operated in Chechnya
.
He suggested that these “death squads” responsible for the kidnappings
and murders of Chechen civilians must be centrally organised by
the federal forces as a “coordinated general policy”. He based his
assertion on the fact that mass graves contained bodies of people detained
at different times and places in different parts of Chechnya – if
these atrocities were committed by soldiers who got out of hand,
the corpses would be from one area and near those troops.
64. I cannot dismiss Mr Kovalev’s allegations out of hand, but
I do hope that he is wrong. However, he is right in that the protection
of the civilian population in the Chechen Republic, and the prosecution
of human rights abuses committed there, can no longer be left to
Russia alone, in view of its past failures. If Russia is not willing
or able to fulfil its obligations, the international community must
step in.
65. The international community can act in two mutually reinforcing
ways. First, member states of the Council of Europe could pursue
all avenues of accountability with regard to the Russian Federation,
including interstate complaints before the European Court of Human
Rights and the exercise of universal jurisdiction for the most serious
crimes committed in the Chechen Republic. Second, if the efforts
to bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses are
not intensified, and the climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic prevails,
the international community could consider setting up an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes
and crimes against humanity in the Chechen Republic, to be empowered
to try all such crimes committed in the Chechen Republic. It is
unrealistic to believe, of course, that such a tribunal could be
set up without the consent of the Russian Federation, either by
the UN Security Council or by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe. Without Russia’s active co-operation, crimes
in the Chechen Republic will continue to go unpunished.
5. Recommendations
66. I have decided to only make recommendations which
are precise, detailed and constructive. I think the Assembly should
make the following recommendations:
67. To ensure that human rights are respected in the Chechen Republic
in the future, the Assembly should recommend that:
i. Chechen fighters should immediately
stop their terrorist activities and renounce all forms of crime.
Any kind of support for Chechen fighters should cease immediately;
ii. Russian forces be better controlled, and discipline enforced:
all relevant military and civilian regulations, constitutional guarantees
and international and humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva
Conventions and the protocols thereto, should be fully respected
during all operations, including full co-operation with the prokuratura before, during and after
such operations;
iii. in so far as the security situation allows, troops should
be confined to their barracks or withdrawn from the Chechen Republic
altogether;
iv. those members of Russian forces suspected of committing
abuses be fully investigated and, if found guilty, severely punished
in accordance with the law, regardless of their rank and position;
v. the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights should be implemented immediately by the Russian
Federation.
68. To ensure that those responsible for abuses be brought to
justice, the Assembly should:
i. demand
better co-operation from the Russian authorities with national and
international mechanisms of redress, both judicial and non-judicial;
ii. call on member states of the Council of Europe to pursue
all avenues of accountability with regard to the Russian Federation
without further delay, including interstate complaints before the
European Court of Human Rights and the exercise of universal jurisdiction
for the most serious crimes committed in the Chechen Republic;
iii. consider that, if the efforts to bring to justice those
responsible for human rights abuses are not intensified, and the
climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic prevails, the international
community should consider setting up an ad
hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against humanity
in the Chechen Republic, to be empowered to try all such crimes
committed in the Chechen Republic;
iv. urge Russia to ratify the Statute of the International
Criminal Court without delay.
69. In addition, the Assembly should make the following recommendations
to the Committee of Ministers:
i. reorient
its assistance programmes in the North Caucasus towards an amelioration
of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic as the priority
objective, and allocate sufficient funds to these programmes to
make a real difference;
ii. ensure that non-governmental organisations active in preventing
and documenting human rights violations in the Chechen Republic,
as well as those assisting their victims in different ways, are
involved in said assistance programmes;
iii. urge the Russian government to fully comply with the recommendations
addressed to it in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution No. … (2003)
on the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic;
iv. if the efforts to bring to justice those guilty of human
rights abuses are not intensified, and the climate of impunity in
the Chechen Republic prevails, consider proposing to the international
community the setting up of an ad hoc tribunal
to try war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Chechen Republic,
to be empowered to try all such crimes committed in the Chechen
Republic.
__________
Reporting committee:
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Reference to committee: Order
584 (2003)
Draft resolution adopted
with 30 votes in favour, 1 vote againstand
2 abstentions, draft recommendation adopted
with 31 votes in favour, 1 vote against and 2 abstentions and draft order adopted unanimously,
by the Committee on 3 March 2003
Members of the Committee:
Mr Lintner (Chairperson),
Mr Marty, Mr Jaskiernia, Mr Jurgens (Vice-Chairpersons),
Mrs Ahlqvist, Mr Akçam, Mr G. Aliyev (alternate: Mr R. Huseynov), Mrs Arifi, Mr Arzilli,
Mr Attard Montalto, Mr Barquero Vázquez,
Mr Berisha, Mr Bindig, Mr
Brecj, Mr Bruce, Mr Chaklein, Mrs Christmas-Møller (alternate:
Mrs Auken), Mr Cilevics, Clerfayt,
Mr Contestabile, Mr Daly, Mr Davis,
Mr Dees (alternate: Mr Janssen van Raaij),
Mr Dimas, Mrs Domingues, Mr
Engeset, Mrs Err, Mr Fedorov,
Mr Fico, Mrs Frimansdóttir,
Mr Frunda, Mr Galchenko (alternate:
Mr Shishlov), Mr Guardans, Mr Gündüz, Mrs Hajiyeva, Mrs Hakl, Mr Holovaty
(alternate: Mr Shybko), Mr
Jansson, Mr Kelber, Mr Kelemen (alternate: Mr Németh), Mr Kontogiannopoulos, Mr S. Kovalev,
Mr Kroll, Mr Kroupa, Mr Kucheida,
Mrs Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Livaneli, Mr Manzella, Mr Martins, Mr Mas Torres,
Mr Masson (alternate: Mr Hunault),
Mr McNamara, Mr Meelak, Mrs Nabholz-Haidegger, Mr Nachbar, Mr Olteanu, Mrs Pasternak, Mr Pehrson,
Mr Pellicini (alternate: Mr Ianuzzi),
Mr Pentchev (alternate: Mr Arabajdiev),
Mr Piscitello, Mr Poroshenko,
Mrs Postoica, Mr Pourgourides,
Mr Raguz, Mr Ransdorf, Mr
Rochebloine, Mr Rustamyan, Mr Skrabalo,
Mr Solé Tura (alternate: Mrs Lopez Gonzales),
Mr Spindelegger, Mr Stankevic (alternate: Mr Lydeka),
Mr Stoica (alternate: Mr Coifan)
Mr Symonenko, Mr Tabajdi,
Mrs Tevdoradze, Mr Toshev,
Mr Vanoost, Mr Wilkinson,
Mrs Wohlwend
N.B. The names of those members who were present at the meeting
are printed in italics.
See 13th Sitting. 2 April 2003 (adoption of the draft resolution,
the draft recommendation and the draft order, as amended); and Resolution 1323; Recommendation
1600; and Order
No. 586.