Doc. 10496

8 April 2005

Iran’s nuclear programme: need for international response

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteur: Mr Abdülkadir Ateş, Turkey, Socialist Group

Summary

There is an overwhelming agreement within the international community that if Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state, this would not only change the balance of power in the sensitive area of the Middle East but would also have far-reaching repercussions on international stability as a whole.

Consequently, there is a large international consensus that Iran should be prevented from becoming a new nuclear-weapon state.

The report suggests that the diplomatic efforts pursued by France, Germany and the United Kingdom in order to obtain guarantees of the civilian nature of the Iranian nuclear programme should receive full support from Council of Europe member and observer states.

I.       Draft resolution

1.       The Parliamentary Assembly is worried by various reports claiming that Iranian authorities have been developing nuclear technologies that might be used for producing nuclear weapons.

2.       Iran has acknowledged that it had developed, for almost twenty years and without informing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a secret nuclear programme including, inter alia, uranium enrichment. In so doing, Iran has failed in its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has raised suspicion that its nuclear programme has a military purpose.

3.       Iran as a new nuclear-weapons state would substantially increase the risk of destabilisation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area, and would become a major threat to the whole international community.

4.       Iran must be aware that the international community would not tolerate its attempts to develop nuclear weapons and is ready to adopt a common response which, in consequences for Iran, would largely outweigh the supposed benefits of its nuclear status.

5.       On the other hand, Iran should be assured that its legitimate security concerns will be addressed, while accepting to recognise security concerns of all states of the region and, in particular, the existence of the State of Israel and its right to security. Moreover, Iran should be reassured that the readiness to meet the international community’s concerns about its nuclear programme would open new possibilities for international co-operation for the benefit of the Iranian people.

6.       In this context, the Assembly welcomes ongoing diplomatic efforts by France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3/EU) aimed at achieving, through negotiations, that Iran proves its full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and clears international community worries that its nuclear programme is aimed at building nuclear weapons.

7.       The Assembly notes with satisfaction that the United States has recently announced its readiness to provide support to European diplomatic efforts.

8.       The Assembly calls on the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

i.       to fully co-operate with the IAEA;

ii.       to strictly abide by the NPT and Safeguards Agreement hereto;

iii.       to ratify the Additional Protocol to the NPT which provides a more efficient verification framework and to continue to comply with its provisions pending ratification;

iv.       to take further steps towards meeting the international community’s concerns over its nuclear programme and re-building a lasting confidence in its peaceful nature and inter alia to:

9.       The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member and observer states:

i.       to provide full support to the E3/EU diplomatic efforts with Iran;

ii.       through bilateral contacts, to encourage the Iranian authorities to show good will and restore the confidence of the international community by opening its nuclear programmes, in particular those which raise suspicion, to international control;

iii.       to envisage economic incentives that would compensate Iran’s readiness to go beyond its commitments under the NPT;

iv.       to give appropriate consideration to Iran’s security concerns, and to consider ways of ensuring peace, enhancing stability and promoting co-operation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, including the promotion of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly;

v.       to engage in a multi-level dialogue with Iran aimed at promoting pluralist democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and open society;

vi.       to provide full and efficient support to the IAEA activities in relation to Iran and to ensure full and timely information sharing;

vii.       to take advantage of the forthcoming NPT Review conference (May 2005) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, including, inter alia:

viii.       to encourage co-operation with the IAEA and accession to the NPT by states not yet parties to the Treaty.

10.       The Assembly calls on the European Union to:

i.       resume negotiations with Iran on a Trade and Co-operation Agreement with due regard to the progress of negotiations on nuclear issues;

ii.       envisage other incentives, including in the field of nuclear energy and other high technologies, that could be offered to Iran in the case of a substantial progress in the negotiations conducted by the E3/EU.

11.       The Assembly resolves to envisage measures to be taken in order to promote democratic values and open society in Iran through parliamentary dialogue.

II.        Explanatory memorandum by Mr Ateş

I.       Introduction

1.       The Iranian nuclear programme has been at the top of the international agenda and on front-pages of major international media for a while, and has raised many debates in political and expert circles.

2.       A motion for a resolution entitled “Iran’s Nuclear Threat” was tabled by Mr Eörsi and many other colleagues in June 2004. The motion suggests that Council of Europe member states should take political action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. I was appointed as Rapporteur on 5 October 2004.

3.       From the outset, I must stress that I don’t think that the purpose of my work, nor that of the Assembly, should be to establish whether or not Iran has the intention of building nuclear weapons, or has been working on its creation. Even if many countries believe it to be the case, there is no consensus on that issue within the international community, and no evidence, of any certainty, to substantiate this thesis has yet been established.

4.       The Assembly has neither legal authority nor technical expertise to make conclusions on this highly controversial and technical issue, and should therefore abstain from taking a position on it, leaving it to the competent international body – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is in charge of enforcing the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I will briefly report on the IAEA position on Iran on the basis of its documents and of my visit to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 17 February 2005.

5.       However, there is an overwhelming agreement between the members of the international community that if Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state, this would not only change the balance of power in the sensitive area of the Middle East, but would also have far-reaching repercussions on international stability as a whole.

6.       Consequently, there is also a large international consensus that Iran should be prevented from becoming a new nuclear-weapon state. This coincides with Iran’s official position of denying any intention, let alone action, of acquiring nuclear arms.

7.       Positions of major international players differ again on how this result is best achieved. While some countries seem to favour a tougher approach on Iran, not excluding any option, Europeans would prefer, and have actually been pursuing, diplomatic efforts and a positive engagement with Iran.

8.       I will try to consider, in my report, the pros and cons of both approaches. However, I personally believe that the European position has a better chance of producing the desired results, i.e. bringing the Iranian nuclear programme under strict international control through dialogue with Iran, so as to exclude any possibility that it is diverted from declared peaceful purposes. But this position needs to be strengthened by broader international support, including by the US. Therefore, I see the main purpose of this report as envisaging ways of achieving such support.

9.       A success in achieving Iran’s compliance with the international non-proliferation regime would help consolidate non-proliferation. A failure would put its future in serious doubt, and make the world a more dangerous place in which to live.

II.       Iran’s nuclear programme

Origin of Iranian nuclear programme

10.       Iran’s nuclear programme started in late 1950s, during the Shah’s regime, with a research reactor purchased from the United States, which remains in use to this day.

11.       In 1974, Iran signed a commercial agreement with France aimed at building several nuclear power plants.

12.       There are also some indications that the Shah’s regime considered the possibility of building the nuclear weapons capacity. However, no clear evidence to this effect is publicly known.

13.       After the 1979 “Islamic revolution” all Iranian nuclear programmes were suspended, but they restarted in 1984.

14.       At present, Iran has five research reactors and two partially completed but not yet operational power reactors initially started in co-operation with Germany and later with Russia (Bushehr).

Sanctions on Iran

15.       Following the “Islamic revolution” and the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran has been in conflict with the United States and, more generally, with the West. During the war between Iraq and Iran which started in 1980, the Western countries provided arms to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein while enforcing an embargo on arms and technology trade with Iran.

16.       Ever since, Iran has been isolated by the international community and under trade and economic sanctions introduced by the United States and supported to a certain extent by developed countries. As a result, it has been denied access to international markets where it could legally acquire modern technologies, inter alia nuclear ones.

17.       The sanctions are the main argument that the Iranians now mentions to explain why their nuclear programme has been kept secret for so long: their providers would have faced penalties for breaking the sanctions imposed by the Americans.

18.       By the same token, the lifting of commercial sanctions and all other discriminatory actions against Iranian interests could be a major trade-off that the Iranians hope to obtain in the negotiations on the nuclear issue.

Iran’s obligations under the NPT

19.       Iran acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, and signed the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 1973.

20.       Under the terms of the Treaty (Article II), Iran has committed itself “not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

21.       However, in accordance with Article IV paragraph 1, it has “the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes”, but only under the inspection of the IAEA.

22.       Furthermore, as a State party to the NPT, and on the condition of full compliance with it, Iran should be eligible for nuclear technology imports from other NPT states parties.

Iranian secret nuclear programme revealed

23.       From the mid-90s, various American intelligence sources have systematically revealed the existence of a secret nuclear programme in Iran, and claimed that it has the purpose of developing nuclear weapons.

24.       In August 2002, representatives of an Iranian opposition group called “the National Council of Resistance of Iran” accused the Iranian government of building two secret nuclear sites: a possible uranium enrichment centre and a heavy water production plant.

25.       In December 2002, satellite pictures of the two sites under construction were shown on CNN.

26.       On 9 February 2003, Iran’s President Mohammed Khatami publicly announced that Iran has been developing facilities that will enable it to produce its own nuclear fuel.

27.       Iran has claimed, and continues to do so, that its nuclear programme, including uranium enrichment, is exclusively designed for peaceful purposes. It argues that it needs an independent fuel cycle to assure that it will always have access to low-enriched uranium for nuclear power reactors.

28.       However, uranium enrichment technologies have, by nature, a dual-use character. A country that has the scientific and engineering skills and the facilities for civilian enrichment might rapidly adapt its technology for producing weapon-grade uranium.

29.       Accordingly, many countries suspect that Iran is using the civilian enrichment as a cover to dissimulate its nuclear weapons programme.

III.       International Community action

IAEA intensifies its activities in Iran

30.       From February to May 2003, after Iran’s acknowledgement, the IAEA conducted a series of inspections on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran admitted the existence of a number of sites under construction designed for its nuclear fuel programme, but insisted that it had only civilian purposes.

31.       In June 2003, the IAEA stated that “Iran failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities”, but stopped short of declaring it in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

32.       In autumn 2003, the IAEA teams inspected further Iranian nuclear sites. On the basis of these inspections, the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously presented to Iranians an ultimatum demanding that Iran replies to international concerns over its nuclear programme.

33.       In addition, in October 2003, the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) undertook a joint diplomatic action vis-ŕ-vis the Iranian authorities, in order to convince them to find a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. As a result, Iran agreed to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, only to restart a few months later.

34.       On 23 October 2003, the IAEA received from the Iranian authorities a detailed declaration on its past nuclear activities.

Additional Protocol to Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement

35.       Moreover, under strong international pressure, Iranian authorities agreed, on 10 November 2003, to sign the NPT Additional Protocol allowing more intrusive inspections by the IAEA.

36.       The model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997 with the aim of strengthening the verification of the compliance of States parties to NPT commitments. It is designed to enable the verification system to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the States are required to provide the IAEA with an expanded declaration that contains information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle activities. The States must also grant the IAEA broader rights of access to their facilities and enable it to use the most advanced technologies.

37.       Iran signed the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and declared its intention to implement its requirements on a provisional basis pending ratification by the Iranian Parliament.

EU-3 negotiations and Agreement on nuclear programme (15 November 2004)

38.       On 15 November 2004, following new negotiations, representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom reached in Paris, an agreement with Iranian representatives on Iran’s nuclear programme.

39.       By this agreement, Iran committed itself to suspending all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as a confidence-building measure, and to notify this suspension to the IAEA which was asked to verify it. The suspension should remain effective as long as the negotiations on long-term arrangements lasts.

40.       The E3/EU reconfirmed Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. The European Union promised to resume negotiations on a trade and co-operation agreement with Iran and to actively support the opening of WTO accession negotiations with Iran as soon as the IAEA confirms that the full suspension is in place. At the same time, a process of enhanced dialogue between the EU and Iran should be initiated, covering areas of technology and co-operation, nuclear issues, and political and security issues.

41.       The overall objective of the negotiations was to develop mutually acceptable long-term arrangements concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, and in particular, to provide lasting confidence, through “objective guarantees”, in the peaceful nature of this programme.

42.       On 22 November 2004, Iran suspended its uranium enrichment.

43.       The E3/EU’s position is that “objective guarantees” can be provided only if Iran completely stops the enrichment of uranium.

44.       Iran insists that its enrichment programme is in full compliance with the NPT, and maintains its will to continue it under the tighter control of the IAEA.

45.       The United States has long been an advocate for the immediate referral of Iran’s nuclear programme to the UN Security Council, for failure to report it to the IAEA as required by the NPT.

46.       However, after his visit to Europe in February 2005, President George W. Bush agreed to provide American backing to E3/EU diplomatic efforts. As a sign of opening, President Bush announced that the US would drop its opposition to the opening of Iran’s WTO accession process, and allow sales of spare-parts for Iranian civil aircraft.

47.       The new round of negotiations held on 23 March 2005 in Paris, showed that the parties, E3/EU and Iran, remain in their respective negotiating positions. The parties agreed, however, to continue the talks on a working level.

IAEA Assessment of Iranian compliance

48.       As previously agreed by the Committee, I visited the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 17 February 2005 and discussed both the details of their findings on Iran’s nuclear programmes and views on the way forward.

49.       Though the temptation is strong to inundate the report with technical terms and details, I will limit myself to the essentials.

50.       On the whole, the IAEA is satisfied with Iran’s co-operation since the signature of the Additional Protocol. Thanks to that co-operation, the Agency was able to conduct its investigation in Iran and has now a much better understanding of the extent of the Iranian nuclear programme and access to all known nuclear sites in the country. Though some issues remain outstanding, in particular the origin of high enriched uranium particles contamination, the trend has been rather satisfactory.

51.       The Agency is in a position to confirm that all declared nuclear materials are accounted for and haven’t been used for prohibited purposes. Nothing was found to substantiate claims that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons programme, or conducting weaponisation activities.

52.       However, the IAEA is not yet in a position to ascertain that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. Further Iranian co-operation and openness are needed to rebuild confidence damaged by the discovery of a hidden programme and before the Agency could come to the conclusion that Iran is in compliance with its obligations, it will continue its investigation and needs help from third parties.

53.       The Agency has also been verifying the implementation of Iran’s voluntary suspension of its enrichment related and reprocessing activities, which has been correctly observed by authorities.

54.       With regard to different scenarios of international action on Iran’s nuclear programme, the Agency strongly favours the diplomatic efforts by France, Germany and the UK known as “European Union Three”. The IAEA believes that confidence-building should be double-sided, in order to keep Iran inside the non-proliferation regime.

55.       I specifically raised the question whether my report should make any explicit recommendations to Russia, taking into account this country’s advanced co-operation programmes with Iran, including in the nuclear field. The IAEA position was that the Russian nuclear co-operation in Iran was in compliance with the Agency’s requirements and under its verification, and there was no need for any specific reference to it. Still I believe that it’s important that Russia continues to support international efforts with regard to Iran.

IV.       Need for further international action: force or diplomacy?

56.       A nuclear-weapon capable Iran, which also has a ballistic missile programme, would be a direct threat for its neighbours in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region, and also for the international peace and security as a whole.

57.       It would further harm the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, whether Iran obtains nuclear weapons legally (by withdrawing from the Treaty) or illegally (by violating it).

58.       Furthermore, the possession of nuclear weapons could enhance the support that the Iranian regime is believed to be providing to terrorist organisations (e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad), or even lead to providing these organisations with nuclear materials.

59.       The international community is therefore unanimous that Iran should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Opinions differ, however, on the best means to achieve this goal.

Coercive scenarios

60.       The international community has several gradual options at its disposal, from political isolation to economic sanctions to the use of force, which could be considered in order to compel Iran to abstain from becoming a nuclear-weapon State, provided that the UN Security Council receives hard evidence that Iran is developing these weapons and decides to take action on it. Their effectiveness, however, remains uncertain, and the risks may be too high.

61.       The political isolation may prove to have some effect on reform-oriented elites, but could hardly touch the core political establishment. Furthermore, it could weaken the positions of Iranian reformers and strengthen the hardliners. On the contrary, a broader political dialogue with Iran could foster the positions of the supporters of a greater opening of Iranian society to the outer world, and thus speed up the political transformation of the Iranian regime.

62.       The economic sanctions have so far failed to produce the desired effects on Iran’s internal and foreign policies, even if Iran’s economy is vulnerable and needs foreign capitals to stimulate growth. If decided by the UN Security Council and universally followed, the sanctions could damage the Iranian economy but would mainly hit ordinary people.

63.       Moreover, since Iran is one of the leading oil-exporting countries and oil exports are the main source of Iranian revenues, those would be the natural primary target for sanctions. However, this would create an additional pressure on oil prices and could aggravate the global economic situation, so that the ability of the international community to sustain sanctions would be in doubt.

64.       As far as the use of force is concerned, it is to be considered as the last resort, but it also appears as the best way to achieve the opposite results from those sought. In fact, unless the whole country is occupied, it is difficult to imagine that all Iranian nuclear facilities are taken under control or destroyed by “surgery strikes”. Experience with Iraq shows that intelligence information on the location of sites to target is hardly reliable, and at least part of the facilities could resist the strike. An attack, whether or not approved by the UN Security Council, would consolidate the Iranian society on patriotic positions, and justify the effort to acquire nuclear weapons.

65.       Therefore, I strongly believe that diplomatic efforts to convince Iran to confirm its non-nuclear weapons status, by providing the international community with all necessary guarantees, is a better option.

Positively engaging Iran

66.       If the “give and take” approach were to prevail, for it to be successful, the offer must be in proportion to the demand.

67.       Iran has agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities for the duration of negotiations with E3/EU. In the agreement concluded on 15 November 2004 with Iranians, the representatives of E3/EU explicitly recognised that this suspension is a voluntary confidence-building measure, not a legal obligation for Iran.

68.       The European negotiators have now asked Iran to put an end to its enrichment programme, and to renounce its re-opening in the future. By this, Iran is in fact asked to go beyond the NPT obligations and to abandon its right to develop its fuel cycle – fully legitimate under the present conditions as long as it remains civilian.

69.       In order to make this demand acceptable for Iran, E3/EU should make offers that would compensate such an important political decision. The nature of these remains a matter for negotiators, and will certainly depend on the extent to which Iran is ready to meet E3/EU concerns.

70.       Certainly, there is a risk that Iran maintains its current position that its civilian nuclear fuel cycle is non-negotiable. The weakness of E3/EU negotiating position lies in the fact that they ask more than Iran is obliged to give under its NPT commitments. The referral to the UN Security Council, which is the option if ongoing negotiations were to fail, could prompt Iran to withdraw from the NPT, thus depriving the international community from any tool of peaceful control over Iranian nuclear activities.

71.       Therefore, it is important to engage Iran in a long-term dialogue where Iranian authorities could feel that their viewpoints are heard and their interests are recognised. They must be made confident that a successful outcome on nuclear issues would open the way for broader progress in Iran’s relations with Europe. This could, in turn, alleviate Iran’s feeling of isolation and help open the country to the world.

Addressing Iran’s concerns

72.       Iran argues that it needs the full nuclear fuel cycle because it cannot be sure of finding it on the international market since it has been under American sanctions.

73.       In this context, thorough consideration should be given to the proposal made by the IAEA Director General, Dr ElBaradei, for the establishment of an international consortium which would produce nuclear fuel, and guarantee its availability to those countries that have renounced development their own enrichment programmes.

74.       With regard to security issues, I share Dr ElBaradei’s assertion that “Insecurity breeds proliferation”. Moreover, it creates a vicious circle where proliferation brings even more insecurity. On the contrary, better regional stability would make nuclear weapons less attractive.

75.       The broad Middle East and Persian Gulf area has a vital importance for the whole world. It has so far been a theatre of conflicting interests and of fierce confrontation of inner and outer players, often with global spillover.

76.       It is therefore, high time for the international community to initiate, in this part of the world, an inclusive process of creating regional security mechanisms which would take into account the legitimate interests of all parties.

77.       Iran as a major regional power should be a part of such a process. In turn, it should unconditionally recognise legitimate interests of all other states of the region, in particular the existence and the right to security of the State of Israel. Furthermore, Iran should abandon any activities aimed at destabilising the countries of the region, and stop any support to terrorist groups.

Strengthening NPT regime

78.       In a broader perspective, the Iranian nuclear dossier has highlighted the need for a critical look at the current non-proliferation regime as a whole.

79.       For more than 30 years, the NPT and its implementation agreements have secured non-proliferation among states parties. However, the emergence of non-state actors as major international players to be taken into account, the development and the better availability of modern technologies and the liberalisation of international trade have revealed the insufficiency of the current non-proliferation regime.

80.       While Iran clearly failed to declare its nuclear programmes to the IAEA as it should under the NPT, it apparently didn’t break any existing NPT rules in acquiring the technologies and materials for developing those programmes.

81.       In order to exclude such cases in the future, and for the non-proliferation regime to remain efficient and credible, it should be reviewed and considerably strengthened. The forthcoming NPT Review Conference (May 2005) gives an opportunity for such reforms.

82.       The political authority and the verification capacities of the IAEA should be consolidated, and enhanced verification mechanisms provided by the Additional Protocol to the NPT must be generalised. Export control policies on dual-use and sensitive technologies must be better co-ordinated within the IAEA and properly implemented by all NPT states parties.

83.       Moreover, while uranium enrichment activities for civilian purposes are allowed under the current regime, it appears appropriate to consider ways of limiting the spread of enrichment technologies. Various proposals to this effect are now being studied and deserve careful consideration.

84.       The credibility of the non-proliferation regime depends on its universality as much as on its integrity. It is important that Iran remains within its frame, but it is even more important that countries which are believed to have nuclear weapons, e.g. India, Israel and Pakistan, become parties to the NPT, or, as is the case with North Korea, return to the regime, and put their nuclear programmes and facilities under IAEA control.

Reporting Committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Reference to Committee: Doc. 10244 and Reference 2994, 07.09.04

Draft Resolution unanimously adopted by the Committee on 05.04.05

Members of the Committee : Mr Abdülkadir Ateş (Chairperson), M. Mikhail Margelov (Vice-Chairperson), M. Latchezar Toshev (Vice-Chairperson), M. Dick Marty (Vice-Chairperson) , Mrs Manuela Aguiar, Mr. Giuseppe Arzilli, Mr David Atkinson,  Mr Claudio Azzolini, Mr Miroslav Beneš, Mr Radu-Mircea Berceanu, Mr Gerardo Bianco, Mr Haakon Blankenborg, Mr Giorgi Bokeria, Mrs Beáta Brestenká, Mr Doros Christodoulides, Mrs Anna Čurdová, Mr. Enrique Curiel (alternate: Mr Julio Padilla), Mr Noel Davern, Mr Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr Adri Duivesteijn (alternate: Mr Frans Timmermans), Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr. Mikko Elo, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Daniel Goulet, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich, Mr Jean-Pol Henry, Mr Joachim Hörster, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Mr Elmir Jahić, Mr Ljubiša Jovašević, Lord Frank Judd, Mr Ivan Kalezić, Mr Oleksandr Karpov, Mr Oskars Kastēns, Mr Petro Koçi, Mr Konstantin Kosachev (alternate: Mr Victor Kolesnikov), Mr Yuriy Kostenko, Mrs Darja Lavtižar-Bebler, Mr. Göran Lindblad, Mr Tony Lloyd, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr José Medeiros Ferreira, Mr Evagelos Meimarakis, Mr Murat Mercan, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Marko Mihkelson, Mrs Natalia Narochnitskaya (alternate: Mr Umar Dzhabrailov ), Mr Zsolt Németh, Mrs Carina Ohlsson, Mr Boris Oliynyk, Mr Algirdas Paleckis (alternate: Mr Jonas Čekuolis), Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mrs Eleonora Petrova-Mitevska, Mrs Sólveig Pétursdóttir, Mrs Clara Pintat Rossell, Mr Gordon Prentice (alternate: Lord Kilclooney of Armagh), Mr Dumitru Prijmireanu, Mr Gabino Puche, Mr Lluís Maria de Puig (alternate: Mrs Marěa Rosario Fátima Aburto), Mr Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, Mr Umberto Ranieri, Mr Michael Roth, Mr Jan Rzymełka, Mr Peter Schieder, Mr Adrian Severin, Mrs Hanne Severinsen, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky, Mr Michael Spindelegger, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Tigran Torosyan, Mrs Marianne Tritz, Mr Vagif Vakilov (alternate: Mr Azim Mollazade), Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Varujan Vosganian, Mr Andrzej Wielowieyski, Mr Bart van Winsen, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mr Marco Zacchera (alternate: Mrs Tana de Zulueta)

Ex-officio: MM. Mátyás Eörsi, Mats Einarsson,

N.B. : The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold

Head of the Secretariat : Mr Perin

Secretaries to the Committee: Mrs Nachilo, Mr Chevtchenko, Mrs Sirtori-Milner