1. Introduction
1. The economic downturn affecting the global economy
since mid-2008 is having a deeper and more global effect on the
movement of people around the world than any other economic crunches
in the post-World War II era of migration.
2. In addition, with the number of jobless worldwide having soared
to nearly 212 million in 2009 following an unprecedented increase
of 34 million compared to 2007,
the
financial and economic crisis is today developing into a serious
employment crisis. The Council of Europe member states are among
those worst hit by the crisis. In many of them, and especially in
the European Union countries, unemployment is projected to increase
even further in 2010.
3. While it is still too early to draw conclusions on the full
impact that the current global crisis has had on migrants and migration,
migrants represent those worst hit and most vulnerable during times
of crisis. Migrant labour is often used as a cyclical buffer, aimed
at maximising growth and minimising unemployment. For migrants,
this means they are often the last to be hired and the first to
be fired and their employment relationships are frequently non-standard
and in poorly regulated sectors of activities.
4. Apart from the various studies concluded on the examples of
previous crises, and despite many of the competent international
organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and others actively
dealing with the issue, there is still much too little sound evidence
concerning the real effects of the crisis on migration. The key
concerns raised at international fora include issues such as return
of migrants, a possible decrease in remittances, the prospect of
rising unemployment among migrants (particularly among irregular
migrants), the effects on migrant women and the further stigmatisation
of migrant communities.
5. The present report will address these concerns and how various
Council of Europe member states have reacted to the migration-related
implications of this global crisis. It will particularly analyse
the challenges that the Council of Europe member states face in
ensuring that the rights of migrants are protected during the economic
downturn, and gauge the implications of national and international
responses to the crisis.
6. The rapporteur finds that the Council of Europe is well positioned
to contribute by its own means to the global debate on how to best
relieve the impacts of the current crisis on migrants. He will argue
that a key response lies in the more effective application of its
own human rights standards and protection mechanisms.
7. The report is largely based on the information shared at the
forum “Remain, migrate or return: what to do in a global recession?”
organised by the Sub-Committee on Migration of the Parliamentary
Assembly Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population on 12 and
13 November in Antalya, Turkey. The rapporteur would like to thank
the various organisations that participated in the event as well
as the Platform for International Co-operation on Undocumented Migrants
(PICUM) for the answers that the rapporteur received from several
national organisations in reply to a questionnaire on the effects
of the crisis on irregular migration.
2. Crisis
impact on migration and migrants
2.1. Impact on migration
flows and migrant employment
8. There is no single “global” trend in the impact of
the current crisis on migration flows and migrant employment. The
effects are likely to vary by labour market sector, duration and
intensity of crisis in particular regions. Education and skill level,
length of stay, legal status, gender and country of origin of migrants
are also likely to have an impact, along with policy, legislative
and practical measures put in place in response to the crisis.
9. The impact on the migrant labour market is more visible in
countries such as Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United
States where the crisis began earlier and where immigrant labour
has played a key role in the recent expansion period. Nevertheless,
even if statistical evidence is still largely missing for other countries
of the Council of Europe, there are ample signs of a fall in labour
migration inflows in virtually all member states due to a significant
decline in international recruitment and restrictions imposed by
the states on access of foreign labour to the labour market.
10. In Spain, for example, new entries under the employer-nominated
system (
Régimen general) fell
from more than 200 000 in 2007 to 137 000 in 2008.
In the United Kingdom, the number of approved
applicants to the Worker Registration Scheme was down from 46 600
in the first quarter of 2008 to 21 300 in the corresponding quarter
in 2009 (that is, 54%). Similarly in Ireland, fewer than 9 000 people
from the 12 new European Union member states were granted Personal
Public Service numbers in the first quarter of 2009, a 57% fall
from the same period the year before.
11. Just as countries are accepting fewer migrants as markets
wither, migrants are also less attracted to move, both through legal
and illegal channels. For example, the United Kingdom saw a 60%
decrease in quarterly inflows from eastern Europe from 2006 to the
second quarter of 2009. Similarly, Spain experienced a 25% decrease
in new arrivals in 2008, especially from Romania and Bulgaria.
12. As regards irregular migration, the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) reported a 16%
decrease in illegal border crossings in the first quarter of 2009
compared to the year before. According to the UNHCR, there was also
a 20% reduction of apprehensions for illegal arrivals by sea in
Greece in 2009.
13. All this relates to shrinking employment opportunities. According
to the latest data published by the ILO in January 2010, Europe
is particularly touched by the jobs crisis. Between 2008 and 2009,
the largest increases in unemployment rates occurred in the developed
economies and the European Union, which saw an increase of 2.4%,
in Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-European Union) and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (2%), and in Latin America
and the Caribbean (1.2%). These regions account for more than two
thirds of the increase in the global number of unemployed in 2009,
despite only accounting for 30% of the global labour force.
14. Unemployment touches all workers; however, migrants are proportionally
more affected as they tend to be concentrated in boom-bust sectors
such as construction, manufacturing, wholesale and hospitality.
They tend to be younger, have less formal education, less work experience,
have on average less secure contractual arrangements in their jobs,
and they may be subject to selective layoffs. They also often lack
local language skills, especially the recent arrivals who also lack
social capital or job networks.
15. In Spain, for instance, every fourth legal migrant (28%) was
officially unemployed in the second quarter of 2009 compared to
15.2% for natives. Other European Union countries where migrants
have been particularly touched by unemployment compared to the local
population are: France – 18.5% compared to 9% for natives, Portugal
– 17.2% to 8.5% respectively, Sweden 15.4% to 7%, and Germany 15.4%
to 7.2%.
Whereas
the economic crisis may have reached its lowest point in terms of
the stock exchange and economic growth, both the ILO and OECD predict
that joblessness will continue to rise for at least a year in Europe.
16. Unemployment rates among migrants vary considerably from one
sector to another. In the construction sector, which employs many
short-term labour migrants, job losses have been particularly high.
For example, in Spain, the unemployment rate of African immigrants,
who work mostly in construction, reached almost 33% in the fourth
quarter of 2008, 50% more than the recorded average for immigrants.
17. The current economic crisis occurs in the midst of increasing
competition and ongoing restructuring in manufacturing industries,
which is affecting the demand for labour, notably for low-skilled
workers. In any European countries, settled labour migrants are
over-represented in these industries and are at greater risk of long-term
exclusion from the labour market, particularly if they lack the
basic qualifications and skills required to take advantage of new
job opportunities in other industries, notably in the service sectors.
18. In contrast, health care and education sectors, notably in
Ireland and the UK, have witnessed employment growth.
19. Considering the sectoral distribution of male and female migrant
workers, it would seem that the crisis has had a greater impact
on the men than the women migrants. The redundancy rates for men,
who are concentrated in construction and manufacturing sectors,
is twice as high as for women who are mostly engaged in health,
education and domestic services.
On
the other hand, the fact that women migrants tend to be more in
an irregular situation and be employed in the informal economy,
increases their vulnerability to delays in wages, hazardous conditions
and denial of benefits.
20. Low-skilled migrant workers tend to be more affected than
the highly skilled, since the latter group often has skills in demand.
The persistence of labour shortages in engineering and health care
also positively affects highly skilled migrants’ work opportunities.
21. Trends in other types of migration flows have been less clear.
Because family reunification is subject to income limits, entries
under this regime may have been delayed as potential sponsors have
become unemployed. Alongside the closing down or restrictions in
labour migration opportunities, many countries have simultaneously
tightened family unification opportunities. For example, in Portugal,
where presently people with a two-year legal stay can bring in their
families including their parents, a reform of the Law on Foreigners is
envisaging raising the requirement to a five-year legal stay for
the parents to join.
22. The impact of the economic crisis on humanitarian migration
is even more difficult to assess since it depends primarily on changes
in the economic, social and political situation in less advanced
countries and the most fragile states. Europe may be affected more
by an increasing risk of abuse of the asylum channel within mixed
migratory flows. According to the report of the Frontex, the first
half of 2009 saw a sharp overall decline in all relevant indicators
of irregular migration but asylum applications in the industrialised
world have not decreased accordingly. However, the UNHCR underlines
that in the context of mixed migratory flows, it may be difficult
to separate political and economic motivations for flight when the
political system is so bankrupt that it makes it impossible for
the population to survive – let alone thrive. In these cases, economic
and political motives for flight become intertwined.
23. The “psychology of migration” has also been affected by the
crisis in various parts of Europe. For instance, in rural areas
of Greece and Italy, migrants tend to stay in the areas where they
have better social networks that help them find employment, while
normally they would have circulated in different areas to look for
better job prospects.
24. Both countries of origin and destination have taken measures
in response to the crisis, in particular with regard to admissions
and return. The policy trends adopted vary to a large extent. Sweden,
for example, decided to liberalise its migration policies in December
2008 and to follow a demand-driven labour migration model while
the majority of member states are implementing or considering more
restrictive policies towards migrant workers in order to reduce
the inflow of new migrants, including by:
- cutting the numbers of work permits for foreigners, mainly
in low-skilled sectors (Greece, Spain, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom);
- offering incentives for migrants to return including one-way
tickets and lump-sum payments (Spain and the Czech Republic);
- reducing shortage occupation lists and reinforcing labour
market tests (France, Spain, United Kingdom);
- introducing changes in visa levels and entry requirements
(that is, minimum salary) (Italy);
- limiting possibilities to change status and/or renew work
permits (Russia);
- tightened controls on family and humanitarian inflows
(Portugal, Spain).
25. In addition, an increasing number of countries are on the
way to criminalise illegal immigration, which curbs access to minimum
social services for unlawfully present migrants. Several European
Union countries are pushing for tightening border patrolling, particularly
along the Mediterranean Sea.
26. The rapporteur recalls that past experience has proved that
the tightening of entry requirements will serve to increase the
numbers of irregular and therefore unprotected migrants and place
increasing numbers of migrants into the hands of human traffickers.
It has also proved that keeping markets open to migrants and migration
is important for stimulating a quicker economic recovery. In contrast,
reducing the ability to fill jobs in needed sectors risks prolonging
the crisis.
2.2. Impact on remittance
flows and investment in the countries of origin
27. After showing significant growth over the past few
years, remittance flows are now on the wane. In November 2009, the
World Bank estimated
that the remittance flows
to developing countries would fall from US$328 billion in 2008 to
US$317 billion in 2009. This 6.1% decline is smaller than an earlier
prediction of a 7.3% fall. Recovery in migration and remittance
flows is expected to occur in 2010 and 2011, but the recovery is
likely to remain shallow.
28. In Europe, like elsewhere in the world, the extraordinary
growth of remittances observed in recent years has slowed or even
reversed in some countries. In Turkey, for instance, official remittances
have fallen by 43% from 2008.
The
impact of Moldova’s 37% fall is especially severe, because remittances
are equivalent to a third of the country’s national income. Flows
to Armenia have also declined by more than 30%. Poland and Romania
have also experienced a sharp slowdown in flows.
29. Some suggest that informal transfers may partly compensate
for the drop of official remittances, which is,
inter alia, related to the loss
of confidence in the banking sector following the crisis. Yet even
a small drop in migrant remittances is likely to have far-reaching
consequences, particularly in environments where such transfers
constitute a main bulwark against poverty. For countries of origin
reliant on remittances, a decrease in their flow may lead to a reduction
in consumer spending and savings, a contraction of disposable income
as well as increased poverty and inequality levels, increases in
unemployment and informal sector work and further instability in
already fragile states.
30. The decrease in remittances also tends to have a disproportionate
impact on women who are very often the receivers of remittances
and girls who may see a reduction in opportunities, for example,
for schooling when household income decreases.
31. However, it is equally important to recognise the adaptability
and resourcefulness of migrants during a crisis. Many are willing
to work in a new job sector or to relocate completely in order to
continue remitting to their families back home.
32. That being said, it appears that remittance flows remain less
volatile than export revenues or capital flows, which have plummeted
more rapidly. Nor will the remittances be the main channel through
which developing countries will be affected by the economic crisis.
Many of those countries will be primarily affected through the decrease
in global flows of trade, foreign direct investment, and perhaps
overseas development aid (ODA) as well.
33. The remittance situation should nevertheless be monitored
closely as remittances contribute to poverty reduction and play
an important role in supporting household spending on education
and health in developing countries. Remittance facilitation should
therefore receive priority attention to ensure that maximum amounts arrive
at points of destination and that more money flows into productive
activities.
2.3. Impact on return
migration
34. One of the lessons learnt so far from this crisis
is that, contrary to popular belief and expectations, there has
been little evidence of return migration, with the exception of
some return flows from Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom to
some new European Union countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania,
or from Russia back to some Commonwealth of Independent States countries.
35. Where exceptions have occurred, for instance, in the case
of returns from the United Kingdom and Ireland to new European Union
member states in central and eastern Europe, this has been linked
to the relatively low deterioration in the economic conditions in
those countries as well as to the fact that as nationals of European
Union countries, they can legally go back to their host country
at a later date.
36. However, the situation is more complex and more fluid than
that: first because the crisis affects in different ways different
categories of migrants and their families, and second because job
prospects and wages are probably worsening in source countries too,
keeping thus the comparative profit from migration similar to the
pre-crisis period. It may seem logical to assume that long-term
settled migrants and their families would be affected by the crisis
in ways similar to those of natives. They are less likely to lose
their papers if they lose their job and they are unlikely to move
because of the crisis. Migrants who are undocumented though and
mid-term migrants, notably those whose legal status is insecure
or who have left their families behind are more likely to consider
going back.
37. Nonetheless, despite growing unemployment in both host and
home countries – or perhaps because of it –, vast majorities of
migrants are most likely to stay in the destination countries and
to accept worse working conditions, lower wages or even periods
of unemployment. Even those losing their papers because of lack
of employment are likely to stay and go underground, working in
the informal market rather than returning to their countries where
employment opportunities are bleak and prospects of later returning
to the destination country limited.
38. In response to the growing rates of unemployment and migrants
losing their legal status, some countries, such as Spain and the
Czech Republic, have offered bonus packages to encourage voluntary
return of unemployed migrants. For example, the Spanish Ministry
of Labour adopted a new regulation at the end of 2008 to support
voluntary return of unemployed non-EU nationals. Eligible persons
could receive their unemployment benefits in two lump sums on the
condition that they return home and do not come back to Spain for
at least three years. According to the OECD data, only 10 000 unemployed
immigrants and 3 600 family members had signed up for this programme
by the end of January 2010 compared to the 137 000 unemployed immigrants
eligible for the programme in June 2009.
39. Three factors may explain the reserved reaction by migrant
workers. First, regular migrants, covered by social security systems,
might lose their benefit entitlements if they left. Second, the
much poorer labour market opportunities in countries of origin compared
to destination countries may act as a deterrent against return.
The cost of migration and the difficulty of re-entering the country
of destination when economic performance improves may also explain
the decision of workers not to return to their countries of origin.
40. Similarly, the “Voluntary Returns Programme” introduced by
the Czech Republic, aimed at returning the predicted wave of 12
000 unemployed foreigners (a large proportion of whom were Vietnamese,
Ukrainian and Mongolian migrants), offering the potential returnees
an incentive allowance of €500 in the first wave (first half of
2009) and €300 in the second wave (second half of 2009) to cover
the necessary living costs on arrival home. Some 1 871 foreign workers
with legal status returned within the first phase of the project
(mostly Mongolians), but as of 23 October, only 154 persons had
left and another 167 had applied to the second phase, indicating a
net decrease of interest in such programme.
41. Apart from the measures for legally residing labour migrants,
the Czech Ministry of Interior extended the programme to returns
for migrants with irregular status, promising a moderate sanction
in comparison to the ordinary procedure. According to the ministry,
this measure was supposed to offer a solution to the most vulnerable
group of migrants. However, between 15 September and 15 December
2009, only 53 persons applied for return, indicating that migrants
obviously prefer to believe that the economic and their personal situation
would improve. In the case of irregular migrants, especially those
who have paid monstrous fees to various intermediaries in order
to gain entry to the country and who now face extensive debts in
their home countries, indications are that they are reluctant to
return home unless they absolutely have to.
42. Hence, in both countries’ case, as motivating as these return
projects may have seemed, their effect has so far been minimal.
The rapporteur recalls also the experience of past crises, which
have also shown that monetary incentives are usually insufficient
to drive large return migration flows.
2.4. Impact on irregular
migration
43. As mentioned above, declines in irregular migration
are visible in some Council of Europe member states, especially
as regards African population arriving on boats to countries like
Spain or Greece. For instance, the number of people arriving in
Spain intercepted by the police fell from 18 057 in 2007 to 13 424
in 2008 (that is, 25.6%) and is estimated to have fallen even further
in 2009. This decrease can be explained by the increase in migration
control methods, but another reason is undeniably the fact that
the crisis and the lack of employment prospects have made the country
less attractive to potential migrants.
44. At the same time, the overall share of irregular migrants
among the total immigrants’ population appears to be on the increase.
This is for two major reasons.
45. The first reason is that closing the doors to regular migration
naturally opens the doors for irregular migration, even if pull
factors may decrease. As already mentioned above, it is more and
more difficult to immigrate regularly to most Council of Europe
member states. Some countries, among them Spain, Switzerland, Ireland,
have reduced the quotas of regular migrants to almost zero in 2009.
Various obstacles to and restrictions on family reunification, barriers
to regulations, and so forth must be added to this. While states are
fully entitled to exercise their sovereign prerogative to reduce
the admission of foreign nationals to their territory, an increase
in irregular migration is likely to occur if there continues to
be a structural demand for labour in the destination country that
is not being met by nationals and no regular channels are kept open
for migrants to enter and undertake the work in question.
46. The second trend is that this current crisis is forcing an
increasing number of regular migrants into an irregular situation.
Losing employment and subsequently their legal status puts an increasing
number of well-integrated migrants into an irregular situation and
makes them particularly vulnerable vis-à-vis trafficking.
Most of these people, many of whom are well-settled, with children
at school, mortgages to pay, and so forth, do not return but would
rather accept any conditions of work.
47. The above observations have been confirmed by the CLANDESTINO
research project
on the situation of irregular migrants
in southern European countries. It observed that the crisis has
not only affected newcomers but also many migrants who have been
settled legally for a number of years. Irregular migrants have in
general less to lose if obliged to return but they will find re-entry
very difficult, hence they may consider staying and enduring irregular
status for the years to come.
48. One of the dangers of the current crisis is that it appears
to be leading to the “normalisation of irregularity”: informal work
is likely to become commonplace among immigrant workers – both regular
and irregular ones – in the months to come. Migrants, especially
those without legal status, may be willing to accept the lowest
of wages and the heaviest of working conditions for fear of remaining
completely unemployed and with no means at all for subsistence.
49. On top of all this, xenophobic and racist incidents have increased
in countries where there were hardly any before, while random identity
checks at public places by police forces have become more frequent
in countries where there were none. These developments contribute
to a sense of insecurity among immigrants while legitimising a view
of irregular migration as a crime.
50. These tendencies have also been noted by Pueblos Unidos in
Spain.
Spain has been particularly touched
by the current crisis, with unemployment having risen to almost
2 million people between the first quarter of 2008 and the third
quarter of 2009. Competition for jobs between the local population,
legal immigrants and irregular immigrants has intensified enormously
in the agriculture, building and service sectors, which are unable
to absorb the demand. This has resulted in a situation where most
male irregular migrants in urban areas are unemployed, which makes
them socially marginalised. The apprehension of some of those marginalised
irregular migrants becoming delinquents has further reinforced xenophobia
among the local population, which was already growing as a result
of competition for basic services and for jobs on the lowest rungs
of the employment ladder.
51. Although domestic service continues to be an alternative for
female migrants in an irregular situation in urban areas in Spain,
the economic difficulties facing Spanish families are having a considerable
impact on the demand for such services. The result has been a significant
drop in the wages, excessive working hours and, in general, with
opportunities to move into the formal sector of the economy fading
away, an increasing dependence on the families employing them.
52. Many of the long-term migrants in Spain who have long settled
in the country are also facing exclusion as a result of the legal
consequences of unemployment. The renewal of their residence and
work permits is subject to certain conditions, such as contributing
to the national health system and holding a work contract. To a
certain extent, labour migrants who previously arrived from countries
such as Equador, Peru, Colombia and the Dominican Republic took
advantage of the massive regularisation that took place in 2004.
However, families who have not yet secured a permanent five-year
residence permit may find themselves in an irregular situation as
a result of the crisis.
53. In view of the above, it appears highly necessary that regular
migrants should retain their residence permits a certain period
of time after their work contract ends in order to be able to seek
new employment. They should have access to the same employment seeking
aid as the local population.
54. Ireland, for example, is pioneering such an improvement. In
October 2009, the Irish Government introduced a scheme that would
allow participants who formerly held employment permits to apply
for a short-term residence permit before the end of the year 2009.
If successful, the applicant would be granted a permit for four
months during which time they may try to find employment and apply
for an employment permit. The rapporteur would be interested to
learn about the results of the above programme.
55. On the whole, the rapporteur deems that rather than reducing
legal flows and seeking to encourage return migration, which have
produced few results so far, policies are needed to help labour
markets react to the crisis in ways that do not further penalise
the most vulnerable and exploitable workers, notably irregular migrants.
There is a need to protect their human dignity, extreme poverty
and from falling prey to networks of organised crime.
2.5. Impact on migrants’
rights and protection
56. The possible erosion of the protection of the rights
of migrants and refugees and equality of treatment remain a particular
concern during the economic downturn, even if there are almost no
data or statistics available on this or on the impact of the economic
downturn on smuggling and trafficking.
57. Even without the crisis, underpayment or non-payment of wages,
physical abuse, sexual harassment and violence against migrant workers,
in particular against migrant women, denial and repression of trade union
rights are widespread situations for migrant workers. Their vulnerability
makes them attractive because they can be underpaid, provided with
little or no workplace safety and health protection, hired and dismissed on
a moment’s notice, with little prospect of unionisation. The crisis
does not change this; in fact it makes migrant labour even more
attractive for some employers who may seek to obtain advantage in
paying vulnerable foreigners less than prevailing wages and ignoring
basic health and safety protections.
58. It is therefore essential for member states to safeguard the
rights of migrants in terms of working and living conditions and
in the event of loss of employment, and ensure that migrants are
offered adequate protection from any form of discrimination and
xenophobia. This should be dealt through:
- strengthening of the rule of law by the adoption of relevant
international standards;
- elaborating administrative measures to ensure full implementation
of legislation, and accountability of all government officials;
- making racist and xenophobic discrimination, behaviour
and action unacceptable and illegal;
- promoting respect for diversity and multicultural interaction,
including through incorporating multicultural and diversity training
in educational curricula;
- mobilising civil society co-operation.
59. The necessary normative standards exist, including international
conventions that address migrants (the 1990 International Convention
on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families, the Council of Europe Convention on the Legal Status
of Migrant Workers (ETS No. 93), the 1949 ILO Migration for Employment
Convention (revised) (No. 97) and the 1975 ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary
Provisions) Convention (No. 143)), and which provide the explicit
normative framework for non-discrimination and equality of treatment
(the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS
No. 177), the 1958 ILO Convention on Discrimination in Employment
and Occupation (No. 111)). They provide comprehensive “values-based”
definitions and legal bases for national policy and practice, which
should be observed, particularly in the time of crisis.
60. Governments can take a leading influential role in shaping
behaviour and interaction in society. However, it is within the
society: at workplaces, on the street, in schools, at market places
and elsewhere, that people, native and foreign, interact. It is
essential that stakeholders and all elements of civil society take
up action and practice towards non-discrimination and equality of
treatment.
2.6. Impact on society
61. Higher unemployment and worker layoffs are generating
resentment among some native workers who blame migrant workers for
taking jobs, for insecurity, crime, even rising disease and ill
health. With growing economic insecurity, migrants are particularly
vulnerable to stigmatisation.
62. It is important that migrant workers do not become scapegoats
of the current crisis. News stories from around the world show that
xenophobic sentiments and discrimination against migrant workers
are on the rise. It is expressed in dramatically increased murders
and lynching of migrants in some countries, in generalised expressions
of anti-foreigner sentiment, in hostile political discourse, and
in calls for exclusion of migrants from access to labour markets
and emergency social protection benefits. In many parts of Europe,
such attitudes have provided grounds for discrimination, and unlawful
termination of employment without payment of wages. The Moscow Bureau
for Human Rights, a Russian NGO, reported that 113 migrants were
murdered between January and October 2008,
double
the rate of the previous year. A number of xenophobic protests have
also taken place in many countries including the United Kingdom,
Italy and Greece.
63. Media play a great role in determining public attitudes. Special
attention should therefore be paid to a balanced public discourse
on immigration. It is important to refrain from a rhetoric that
can accommodate if not reinforce discriminatory attitudes against
migrants. The media should portray migrants in objective terms, particularly
during the economic crisis, recognising their positive contributions
to society.
3. Looking beyond
the crisis: longer-term dynamics and future prospects
64. There is no “one-fit-all” or definitive answer today
on how to cope with the consequences of the current economic crisis.
A lot of factual evidence is still missing as regards the effects
of the crisis on issues like employment, remittances, development
aid, and so forth. Further efforts in evidence-based data collection
and research are therefore to be encouraged.
65. Also, some of the trends predicted from the outset seem not
to have materialised: migrant sending countries are not seeing a
massive return of migrant workers as was predicted. Irregular migrants
have not been the hardest hit but have – in some cases – even benefited
from the crisis, as employers prefer them as cheap labour force.
Furthermore, contrary to the initial predictions that women would
be harder hit as they are less protected in the labour market than
their male colleagues, it has turned out that the crisis has affected contracted
employees more than it has undocumented labourers (of whom women
make up the majority).
It is
therefore very important that policy makers at national, regional
or global level take account of these trends as opposed to assumptions
when devising policies and coping strategies.
66. It is clear that the current crisis will not change much the
fundamental push and pull factors driving international migration.
On the destination countries’ side, migration is needed to respond
to the labour needs of the economy. In Council of Europe countries,
most of those labour needs are long term as they are related to
the ageing of the population and growth in service employment. All
avenues of legal migration must therefore be kept open, despite
the temporary shocks of the markets today.
67. It is key today to develop short-term responses that would
help reinforce the long-term efforts to ensure institutionalised
regulation of labour migration and adequate protection and integration
of migrants.
68. Immediate measures and policy responses are required to lessen
the impact of the crisis on migrant workers. In today’s context
of unfolding employment crisis and slow recovery,
avoiding a jobless
recovery should be the political priority of today, both for Europe
and the world in general. The same policy decisiveness that saved
banks in 2008 should today be applied to save and create jobs and
livelihoods of people.
69. Migration may in fact be an important part of the solution
for economic recovery. Migrants are often more easily adaptable
and flexible; their contribution can help countries to recover and
adapt to new circumstances. The current crisis offers also a window
of opportunity to rethink national and pan-European migration policies, notably
how to best manage labour migration to support economic growth in
host countries and promote development in source countries, as well
as how to curb discrimination and xenophobia and enable effective integration
of migrants.
70. Last but not least, looking at the impact of the current recession
from the point of view of the Council of Europe, the Organisation
needs to continue to develop measures to promote and protect the
human rights of especially vulnerable migrants and those in need
of protection. It needs to seek guarantees from member states that
the rights of migrants are adequately and effectively protected
in terms of human rights, working and living conditions and in the
event of loss of employment; and that migrants and refugees are
offered protection from any form of discrimination and xenophobia,
in particular in the times of an economic crisis.
***
Reporting committee: Committee
on Migration, Refugees and Population
Reference to Committee: Doc. 11979, Reference 3602, 2 October 2009
Draft resolution and draft recommendation unanimously
adopted by the Committee on 30 March 2010
Members of the Committee: Mr
John Greenway (Chairperson),
Mr Giacomo Santini (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr
Tadeusz Iwiński (2nd Vice-Chairperson),
Mrs Tina Acketoft (3rd Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Francis Agius, Mr Pedro Agramunt,
Mr Francisco Assis, Mr Alexander van der Bellen, Mr Ryszard Bender,
Mr Márton Braun, Mr André Bugnon,
Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Mr Vannino Chiti, Mr Christopher Chope (alternate:
Mr Michael Hancock), Mr Desislav
Chukolov, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Titus Corlăţean, Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas
(alternate: Mr Bill Etherington),
Mr David Darchiashvili, Mr Nikolaos Dendias,Mr
Arcadio Díaz Tejera, Mr Tuur Elzinga, Mr Valeriy Fedorov, Mr Oleksandr Feldman, Mr Relu Fenechiu, Mrs
Doris Fiala, Mr Bernard Fournier, Mr Aristophanes
Georgiou, Mr Paul Giacobbi, Mrs Angelika Graf, Mrs Anette Groth,
Mr Michael Hagberg (alternate: Mr Göran Lindblad),
Mrs Gultakin Hajibayli, Mr
Doug Henderson, Mrs Anette
Hübinger, Mr Jean Huss, Mr Denis Jacquat,
Mr Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti, Mr Mustafa Jemiliev, Mr Tomáš Jirsa,
Mrs Corien W.A. Jonker, Mr
Reijo Kallio, Mr Ruslan Kondratov, Mr Franz Eduard Kühnel, Mr Geert Lambert, Mr Pavel Lebeda, Mr Arminas
Lydeka, Mr Jean-Pierre Masseret, Mr Slavko Matić, Mrs Nursuna Memecan, Mr Ronan Mullen, Mr Gebhard
Negele, Mrs Korneliya Ninova, Ms Steinunn Valdís Óskarsdóttir, Mr
Alexey Ostrovsky, Mr Evangelos Papachristos, Mr Jørgen Poulsen,
Mr Cezar Florin Preda (alternate: Mr Iosif Veniamin Blaga), Mr Gabino Puche (alternate:
Mr Gonzalo Robles Orozco),
Mr Milorad Pupovac, Mr Volodymyr Pylypenko, Mrs Mailis Reps, Mr
Branko Ružić,Mr Džavid Šabović,Mr
Samad Seyidov, Mr Joachim Spatz, Mr Florenzo Stolfi,
Mr Giacomo Stucchi, Mr László
Szakács, Mrs Elke Tindemans,
Mr Dragan Todorović, Ms Anette Trettebergstuen,
Mr Tuğrul Türkeş, Mrs Özlem Türköne, Mr Michał Wojtczak, Mr Marco Zacchera, Mr
Yury Zelenskiy, Mr Andrej Zernovski,
Mrs Naira Zohrabyan
NB: The names of the members who took part in the meeting
are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee: Mr
Neville, Mrs Odrats, Mr Ekström