1. Foreword
1. In June 2008, my predecessor, Mr Holovaty, prepared
a comprehensive progress report covering the functioning of democratic
institutions in Europe, as the contribution of the Monitoring Committee
to the Assembly’s debate on the State of democracy in Europe. Mr
Holovaty’s comprehensive analysis took stock of all key developments
with respect to the functioning of democratic institutions in all
members states engaged in the monitoring procedure and post-monitoring
dialogue. In order to avoid repetitions and, in some respects, duplicating
Mr Holovaty’s work, I suggested to the Monitoring Committee that
this year’s progress report should be more focused and address a
particular element of the functioning of democratic institutions
in order to identify challenges which are common to all member states
engaged in the Assembly’s monitoring procedure as well as suggest
targeted recommendations.
2. On the basis of an exchange of views in the committee which
took place on 17 March 2010, it was suggested that this year’s progress
report should focus on the efficiency of Parliaments in the member
states covered by the monitoring procedure and engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue. Consequently, I prepared an outline of the report, suggesting
to focus the analysis on the following key issues: a) firstly, the
report would analyse the electoral arrangements and their implications
for ensuring pluralism in Parliaments; b) secondly, the report would
deal with the issue of dialogue between political parties working
in Parliament; c) thirdly, the report would address the role of
Parliaments in exercising oversight functions, as well as attempt
to analyse the challenges Parliaments in some member states have
to face in terms of expert, financial and material capacities.
3. In preparing this report, I have of course limited myself
to references to texts adopted by the Assembly, reports or other
public documents prepared by our committee’s co-rapporteurs who
follow the situation in each specific country. I have also used
the reports drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committees of the Bureau of the Assembly
on election observation in these countries since this exercise is
closely linked to the work carried out by our committee. I have
not engaged myself in any analysis or conclusions beyond what has
been proposed by the co-rapporteurs concerned or the Assembly observer
delegations. In some cases, I also make reference to the documents
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
which have been used by committee co-rapporteurs in the preparation
of their fact-finding visits.
4. In the draft resolution, I have tried to make a synthesis
of the recurrent issues raised in all countries under monitoring
and (to a lesser extent) in countries engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue with respect to the subject-matter of the report.
5. At the same time, and in accordance with the practice established
since 2006, periodic reports on the second group of 11 member states
among those member states which are not subject to a monitoring procedure
or involved in a post-monitoring dialogue have been prepared and
are appended in the addendum to this report: Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta
and the Netherlands. As in the previous two years, they are based
on the country-by-country assessments made by the Commissioner for
Human Rights and other Council of Europe monitoring bodies and human
rights institutions. The draft resolution contains conclusions drawn
from these periodic reports (see also Appendix).
2. Efficiency
of Parliaments in Council of Europe member states covered by the
monitoring procedure
2.1. Elections and political
pluralism
2.1.1. Albania
6. The parliamentary elections of 28 June 2009 marked
the beginning of the current serious political crisis. Although
they were conducted on the basis of to the provisions of the revised
Electoral Code, amended in 2008 in line with the recommendations
of the Venice Commission, particularly in respect of the procedures
for registering and identifying voters, and the functioning of the
Central Election Commission, these improvements were overshadowed
by the politicisation of the electoral process and infringements
noted during the campaign.
7. Under the new electoral system, the 140 members of the Albanian
Parliament, for the first time, were elected by a regional proportional
voting system. The threshold for representation in parliament was
set at 3% of the votes cast in a given constituency for political
parties, and 5% for coalitions.
8. The Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee observing the elections concluded
that, despite progress, some irregularities had persisted from one
election to the next, referring in particular to cases of administrative resources
being misused, pressure exerted on people during the election campaign,
lack of editorial independence, and lack of transparency regarding
the funding of the media, as well as to the alleged existing links
between the owners of the media and the political party leaders.
9. The vote count was marked by a very high level of mistrust
among the representatives of political parties at all levels of
election administration. In many cases, the vote count was temporarily
blocked, and, ten days after the elections, the official results
had not been announced. In several cases, the problem was to decide whether
votes from certain voting centres should be recounted or not. Consequently,
the Ad Hoc Committee recommended that, for future elections, the
vote counting procedure should be considerably improved and the number
of counting teams be substantially increased in each of the regional
counting centres.
10. The Ad Hoc Committee also emphasised that it was unacceptable
that, ten or more days after the date of the ballot, Albania’s citizens
and the international community were not informed of the official
results of the parliamentary elections in a country with some 3.1
million voters. The significant lapse of time between the closure
of the polls and the announcement of the official election results
considerably weakened the people’s confidence in the electoral process
and its outcomes.
11. The Ad Hoc Committee invited the Albanian authorities, under
the procedure for monitoring their compliance with their commitments
and obligations, and in close co-operation with the Venice Commission,
to improve the legislative framework and enhance the capabilities
of the electoral administration as regards:
- the civil status register and the electoral register,
and in that context, the need to find a solution to the problem
of the franchise for Albanian citizens resident abroad;
- regulation of media coverage and public funding of campaigns,
which disadvantages political parties not represented in Parliament;
- the rules of transparency relating to media ownership
and their effective implementation so as to strengthen voters’ confidence
in the equity of the electoral system;
- the manner of dismissal of members of the lower-level
election commissions, which is incompatible with an impartial, professional
electoral administration;
- the ambiguous requirements as to the inclusion of women
on the lists of candidates, which should be reviewed so as to guarantee
that women candidates are in an eligible position;
- the need to abolish the granting of special rights to
political party chairs to stand for parliamentary elections.
12. In the opinion of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Electoral Code
should undergo revision only on those points where this was dictated
by the need to ensure compliance with international standards or
to solve particular problems. For the remainder, in order to guarantee
the confidence of the country’s citizens, the Albanian authorities
were invited to step up their efforts to implement in full the electoral
legislation. The Ad Hoc Committee also recalled that sincere implementation
of the rules was just as important as the rules themselves.
13. Following what it considered as frauds in some electoral zones,
the main opposition party of the newly elected Parliament, which
won 66 seats, namely the Socialist Party (SP), made use of all legal
remedies stipulated in the Electoral Code in order to contest the
results. When the case was finally dismissed it decided to boycott
the work of the parliament. This boycott continutes to date and
prevents the parliament from passing necessary constitutional and
other reforms.
14. In
Resolution 1709
(2010) on the functioning of democratic institutions
in Albania, the Assembly deplored the political and institutional
crisis, and regretted the absence of any meaningful parliamentary dialogue.
15. In February 2010, the Assembly’s Presidential Committee carried
out a visit to Albania in order to support the process of resolving
the political crisis and assist President Topi in his role of mediator
and his efforts to restore political dialogue, and help achieve
an end to the boycott.
16. On 25 February, MPs of the Socialist Party entered the Parliament
and took their oath, on condition that their further presence in
the Parliament was subject to the setting up of an inquiry committee
into the June 2009 parliamentary elections, which was done on 19
March. In the absence of an agreement between the two main parties
on the mandate of this inquiry committee, Socialist Party MPs refused
to join the committee. The sitting of the inquiry parliamentary
committee was put on hold and the committee did not convene.
17. The situation continues to worsen, following demonstrations
of both opposition and governing parties on 30 April and 1 May 2010,
and the subsequent confusion in the main avenue of Tirana where
some 200 supporters of the Socialist Party, including 22 MPs, who
have gone on hungerstrike since then. This deadlock is all the more
regrettable that all political leaders should ensure the resumption
of political dialogue within the Parliament and ensure the support
of the population for this democratic process. It is the responsibility
of political leaders to call on the population to demonstrate their
support within the democratic institutions and not in the street.
2.1.2. Armenia
18. The presidential election in Armenia, held on 19
February 2008, triggered one of the worst political crises in Armenia
since its accession to the Council of Europe. This crisis underscored
the lack of public confidence in the electoral sytem and raised
questions about the credibility of the electoral process. Regrettably,
the elections have remained a controversial issue in Armenia since
the 2008 presidential election.
19. In
Resolution 1609
(2008) on the functioning of democratic institutions
in Armenia, the Assembly noted that
electoral
reform was essential to restore public confidence in the electoral
process. In response to this Resolution, the National Assembly of
Armenia set up an ad hoc Committee on electoral reform. However,
in February 2010 the co-rapporteurs for Armenia expressed their
concern that this ad hoc Committee had been inactive for a number
of months and had not yet produced its recommendations, despite
calls from the Assembly to the authorities to make electoral reform
one of its main priorities.
20. In the same resolution, the Assembly pointed out that a relevant
part of the political spectrum in Armenia is not represented in
the current National Assembly. In this situation, it considered
that the only way to allow the country to move forward with urgently
needed reforms is to establish a political dialogue that includes
both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces.
21. On 1 August 2008, a coalition of parties that had supported
the presidential candidature of Mr Levon Ter-Petrossian formed the
Armenian National Congress (HAK) and decided to participate in the
Yerevan City Council elections. Its establishment and entry into
politics has substantially strengthened the opposition and, in consequence,
increased, to a certain extent, the pluralism of the Armenian political
environment. However, as a result of its recent establishment, the
HAK is not represented in the Armenian National Assembly.
22. On 31 May 2009, elections for the City Council of Yerevan
took place. Given that Yerevan houses more than 40% of the population
of Armenia and is responsible for more than half of the country’s
economic output, these elections had an important national dimension
and were widely seen as a test for the authorities to make good
their promise to firmly establish the principle of genuinely democratic
elections in Armenia.
23. The elections for the Yerevan City Council were observed by
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. In their statement
issued the day after the elections, the observation mission of the
Congress declared that “[their] satisfaction in seeing the citizens
electing their city council has been tempered by deficiencies in
the conduct of the vote”. For their side, the opposition in Armenia
alleged that these elections were marred by widespread fraud and
violations. The authorities conceded that irregularities had taken
place, but asserted that they were localised and did not affect
the overall outcome of this election. The Prosecutor General of
Armenia brought charges against a number of persons for electoral
fraud committed during these elections.
24. In a separate development, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
(Dashnaktsutyun) announced that it was leaving the governing coalition
as a result of its disagreement with the signature by Armenia and
Turkey of a road map to normalise their relationship. This increased
the number of parties belonging to, and generally strengthened the
opposition in the National Assembly.
2.1.3. Azerbaijan
25. On 15 October 2008, a presidential election took
place. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly
,
which observed the election process, concluded that the results
“were the reflection of the will of that country’s electorate”.
The voter turnout was 75.64% and the election was won by Mr Ilham
Aliyev, who obtained 88.73% of the votes cast.
26. In general, the election took place in a calm and orderly
manner, but on election day in some constituencies some violations
were noted during the counting and, in particular, the tabulation
of the votes. According to the Ad hoc Committee’s report, it is
also regrettable that five political parties did not take part in the
election. There is still no real competition in the country between
the platforms and political ideas.
27. On 18 March 2009, a referendum on the amendments and the additions
to the Constitution took place. The final results of this referendum,
in which 70.83% of the voters took part, were announced by the Central Electoral
Commission (CEC) on 30 March. The 41 amendments presented in 29
questions were accepted, with the percentage of “Yes” votes between
87.15% and 91.76%.
28. A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly was present in
the country during the referendum and published a statement on the
day after the ballot
, in which they
concluded that “the result of the referendum shows the willingness
of the people of Azerbaijan to have greater stability and elements
for further democratisation; a better balance of power will nevertheless
require further reforms in the future”.
29. Municipal elections held on 23 December 2009 were observed
by an eleven-member delegation of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities at the invitation of the Azerbaijani authorities. The
delegation concluded
that
the elections were generally well-prepared from the technical point
of view and that they taken place off in a calm and orderly atmosphere.
It welcomed the considerable step forward in relation to the previous
local elections, but raised three issues of concern:
- the lack of genuine political
pluralism among the parties; there were few candidates who represented
the opposition; the campaign was not very active (either in the
streets or on television);
- the candidate registration process and vote counting procedure
(owing to incidents in some polling stations);
- the situation of territorial democracy in Azerbaijan.
30. Referring to the reports of its Ad hoc Committees on the observation
of the 2008 presidential election and of the 2005 parliamentary
elections, as well as to the report of the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities on the 2009 Municipal elections, it can be
noted that considerable progress has been made, particularly during
the last presidential election in 2008, in meeting European standards.
Regrettably, however, none of these elections has fully complied
with democratic requirements.
31. The Electoral Code, as amended in 2008, remains complex, especially
with regard to the provisions on the registration of candidates,
campaign financing, lists of persons entitled to conduct pre-election
campaigns and limitations on the content of election campaign material.
According to the Venice Commission, a number of important issues
relating to the composition of the Central Electoral Commission,
and territorial commissions, candidate registration, observers,
the electoral roll and its accuracy, as well as the complaints and
appeals procedure, still need to be addressed.
32. The recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
in the case of Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, concluded
that the actions of the electoral commissions and courts concerned
had resulted in the violation of the applicant’s right to stand
freely and effectively for election in his constituency.
33. Furthermore, as regards the general environment needed to
allow the democratic electoral process to develop, concerns are
raised by reported violations of basic freedoms such as freedom
of assembly and the media, in particular the frequent arrests and
intimidation of journalists.
34. The period since the previous parliamentary elections has
been marked by a further weakening of the opposition both within
and outside the Parliament, which has been exacerbated by subsequent
splits within the opposition itself. This has resulted in the scarcity
of opposition candidates, which is damaging the democratic process
of the country.
35. In November 2010, Azerbaijan will be holding the second parliamentary
elections since the country’s accession to the Council of Europe.
The Monitoring Committee attaches great importance to the setting
up of conditions which will enable these elections to comply fully
with European standards and be considered as free and fair.
2.1.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
36. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, electoral legislation
provides for the participation of a wide array of political forces
in elections. In 2006, thirty-six registered political parties,
with 8 formal coalitions, and 12 independent candidates, participated
in the general election. In the last election observation report,
the Assembly noted that the manner in which the 1 October 2006 general
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were conducted was generally
in line with Council of Europe standards. However, as a result of
constitutional ethnicity-based limitations to the right to stand
for office, these elections were again in violation of standards
of the European Convention of Human Rights and Council of Europe
commitments.
37. The composition of Parliament is directly affected by the
constitutional ethnicity-based limitations on the right to stand
for office. While the members of the House of Representatives are
elected on the basis of free, equal and universal suffrage, according
to the proportional system, the delegates to the House of People
are elected on the basis of an indirect procedure. According to
Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
House of Peoples shall comprise 15 delegates, two-thirds from the
Federation (including 5 Croats and 5 Bosniacs) and one third from
Republika Srpska (5 Serbs). The delegates from the Federation are elected
by the House of Peoples of the Federation while the delegates from
Republika Srpska are elected by the RS National Assembly.
38. The Assembly has, on several occasions, called upon the authorities
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to remove these limitations in order to
bring the electoral legislation and composition of Parliament in
compliance with the standards of the European Convention of Human
Rights.
In
late 2009, the European Court of Human Rights adopted its Judgment
in the case
Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Applications Nos. 27996/05 and 34836/06),
which confirmed that the electoral arrangements as well as the constitutional
ethnicity-based limitations on the right to run for elections to
the House of Peoples are contrary to the European Convention of
Human Rights. In this context, the question of the democratic legitimacy
of the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
arises.
39. Virtually no progress on the constitutional reform front has
been made by the authorities and the key political stakeholders
to date. In this context, the Assembly held a debate on the functioning
of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina during its
January 2010 part-session calling upon the authorities to “
fully engage in a meaningful and constructive
dialogue about concrete proposals for amendments to the Constitution,
in line with the 2005 recommendations of the Venice Commission,
with a view to adopting a reform package in time for the 2010 parliamentary
elections which should be organised in accordance with the revised
Constitution”.
40. Within the framework of a debate under urgent procedure on
“the urgent need for a constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
during its April 2010 part-session, the Assembly expressed serious
concern about the fact that the initiatives launched by the authorities
have not so far led to any concrete results. It noted that there
was a serious risk that the October 2010 general elections would
be once again held in violation of the European Convention of Human
Rights and its Additional Protocols, as well as of the judgment
of the Court in the Sejdic and Finci
case. While reserving the right to take the requisite
political stance on this matter in due course, the Assembly called
upon the authorities to lose no time and launch, before the general
elections of October 2010, a serious institutionalised process for
the preparation of a comprehensive package of constitutional amendments,
in accordance with the country’s post-accession commitments, while
making full use of the expertise and recommendations of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). The Monitoring
Committee will continue to examine regularly the progress achieved
by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this process, in
order to propose to the Assembly any further action to be taken
as required by the situation.
2.1.5. Georgia
41. In Georgia, the electoral reform is a key element
of the so-called “new wave of democratic reforms” package that was
introduced by the authorities in the wake of the August 2008 war
with the Russian Federation. The current Electoral Code and other
laws that govern the elections, have seen multiple cycles of amendments
to address shortcomings noted during elections. This has resulted
in, at times, contradictory or ambiguous provisions in the Electoral
Code. Moreover, prior to the last parliamentary elections in 2007, negotiations
were started between the ruling party and the opposition on a new
electoral system. However, these negotiations broke down in the
polarised and tense political climate at that time. As a result,
an election system was adopted that is heavily criticised by the
opposition as being favourable to the ruling party. The Assembly
has therefore recommended that a new Electoral Code be drafted and
a new election system agreed upon that has the widest possible consensus
among the political forces in Georgia.
42. A special cross-party working group to reform the electoral
system and to draft a new Electoral Code was established, moderated
by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The work of this group
was guided by a code of conduct in which all participating parties
committed themselves to constructive co-operation, consensus-based
decision-making and no prior pre-conditions for the discussions.
After some hesitations, a significant number of opposition parties
agreed to participate in the work of this working group. The ruling United
National Movement, which has a constitutional majority in Parliament,
publicly committed itself to supporting any consensus agreement
reached by the working group, thereby guaranteeing its adoption
in Parliament.
43. The work of the election group focused on the changes of the
electoral framework for the municipal elections foreseen for 31
May 2010. While the group could reach consensus on most issues,
regrettably, no agreement could be reached on the threshold for
the election of the Mayor of Tbilisi, with one party, the Alliance for
Georgia insisting on a 50%, later 45%, threshold for election in
the first round, while the ruling United National Movement refused
any threshold higher than 30%. In the end, the 30% threshold was
adopted by the Parliament in addition to those items on which the
group had reached consensus. The working group suspended its work
pending the municipal elections. The Assembly should urge all political
forces in Georgia to pursue the dialogue on the reform of the electoral
code and electoral system and agree on a new election code in good
time before the next parliamentary elections in Georgia.
44. The political scene in Georgia has changed since the last
parliamentary elections with the entry of new opposition parties
founded by former high-level officials from the ruling party and
authorities, which has enlarged the political spectrum in Georgia.
Regrettably the political atmosphere between the authorities and the
opposition is generally polarised and acrimonious. Among the notable
exceptions are the Christian Democratic party, which is represented
in parliament and the Alliance for Georgia, led by Irakli Alasania,
who advocates dialogue and a more consensual approach to the interaction
between the ruling coalition and opposition.
45. The ruling United Movement has a constitutional majority in
the parliament and is accused by opposition parties of imposing
its will and limiting political plurality. The authorities have
on several occasions indicated their willingness to strive for increased
pluralism in Georgian politics. The democratic reform package announced
after the war, therefore, also aims at strengthening party building
and the functioning of the extra-parliamentary opposition. Amendments
were adopted to the Law on Political Parties, which restore the
state funding for parties that did not qualify to enter parliament,
or who refused to take their seats, after the last parliamentary
elections, and to provide funding for research and development activities
of political parties and NGOs.
2.1.6. Moldova
46. In Moldova, electoral legislation needs to be further
improved in order to increase pluralism. Two problems should be
addressed as a priority. Firstly, the threshold for party lists
to access the allocation of seats in Parliament has to be thoroughly
reviewed. Since the last progress report on the functioning of democratic institutions,
it has been modified several times. In 2008, contrary to previous
Assembly recommendations, it was raised to 6%.
At the
same time, the establishment of coalitions of political parties
was prohibited. In the opinion of the Committee’s co-rapporteurs,
the combined effect of these measures did not help increase pluralism
in Parliament. After the parliamentary elections of April 2009,
only 4 parties cleared the threshold and were eligible for the allocation
of seats. The votes cast for the contenders who failed to clear
the threshold represented approximately 15% of all votes cast. Subsequently,
before its dissolution, in June 2009, as a result of the failure
to elect the President, Parliament revised again the Electoral Code
by lowering the threshold to 5% and reducing the participation threshold
from 50% plus one to 33% plus one vote for the elections to be valid.
In the opinion of the Assembly observers, the “early parliamentary
elections of [29 July 2009] overall were well administered, allowing
for competition of political parties representing a plurality of
views. Many of the OSCE and Council of Europe commitments were met.
However, the campaign environment was negatively affected by subtle
intimidation and bias in media coverage”.
As
a result of these elections, 5 parties cleared the threshold and
were allocated seats in Parliament.
47. Secondly, the lack of accuracy in the voters’ lists negatively
affects the electoral process. According to the amendments to the
Electoral Code adopted in 2007, it was anticipated that an “Electronic
Register of Voters” would be put in place in 2009. However, reportedly
for various reasons, including financial ones, this system was not
available for the elections of 5 April and 29 July 2009. Consequently,
the voters’ list was compiled on the basis of the permanent population
registry the quality of which varies between municipalities, opening
the door for manipulations. As noted by the Assembly members who
observed the elections of 5 April 2009, the difference between the
number of voters on the electoral lists compiled on the basis of
municipal registers and the initial data of the CEC from the 2005
parliamentary elections, amounts to approximately 315 641 voters,
which represents an increase of over 10% in relation to the 2005
elections.
This difference has raised
serious concern among observers and leaders of opposition parties
about the accuracy of the voters’ lists.
48. During the election observation in April 2009, observers saw
people voting with their ID cards without being included in the
main voters’ register; their names were added to the so-called “supplementary
register of voters”. According to the data provided by the Central
Election Commission, around 7.55% of voters who participated in
the ballot voted on the basis of the supplementary register of voters.
This is a high figure, especially because a significant proportion
of Moldova’s citizens live abroad and can vote only at polling stations
open in diplomatic and consular offices (in some 35 countries).
In this context, in
Resolution 1666 (2009),
the Assembly called upon the Moldovan authorities to “resume reform
of the electoral legislation, in co-operation with the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), in order
to lower the electoral threshold for political parties, thus opening
up the political process for more pluralism; immediately review
the voters’ lists in order to establish them definitively, introducing
an obligation for regular review, and abolish in future supplementary
lists; put in place mechanisms and procedures enabling the many
Moldovan citizens residing abroad to exercise effectively their
voting rights”.
49. A third related problem also hampered the electoral process
in 2009. In fact, on the basis of amendments to the Electoral Code
adopted in April 2008, Moldovan citizens holding multiple citizenship
were prevented from exercising public functions, including becoming
members of Parliament. The adoption of this amendment triggered
an application to the European Court of Human Rights; the latter
found this requirement contrary to Article 3 of the Additional Protocol
to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), as well as to
the European Convention on Nationality, which Moldova ratified on
30 November 1999.
The Moldovan authorities subsequently
appealed against this decision before the Grand Chamber of the Court.
In this context, in Resolution 1666 (2009), the Assembly called
upon the authorities to suspend the application of the corresponding
articles of the Electoral Code, while awaiting the judgment of the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
. I have to note, however, that
the Moldovan authorities have subsequently implemented this recommendation
by repealing the contested amendment. This was one of the first
measures taken by the new governing coalition established after
the early elections of 29 July 2009.
2.1.7. Montenegro
50. Contrary to the Assembly Opinion on accession,the Montenegrin authorities have
failed so far to harmonise the legislation governing parliamentary
elections with the new Constitution. The elections of 29 March 2009
were held in accordance with the 1998 Law on the Election of Councilors
and Representatives, which was amended several times since 1998
and, most recently in 2006. This law provides for the allocation of
mandates on the basis of a proportional list system, within a single
nationwide constituency, with a 3% threshold.
51. A serious flaw in the Law on the Election of Councillors and
Representatives is that, while it stipulates that half of the mandates
won by electoral lists must be awarded to candidates in their list
order, it provides that the other half of the mandates can be allocated
to remaining candidates in any order established by the party leadership.
This provision has been criticised both by the OSCE/ODIHR and the
Council of Europe as problematic because it restricts transparency
and risks misleading voters, who cannot be sure which candidates
will represent them. Another point of concern in the law is a provision
stipulating that, if a MP ceases to be a member of the political
party on whose list he or she has been elected, the mandate of that
MP terminates (i.e. party-administered mandate).
52. In this context, in
Resolution
1724 (2010), the Assembly called upon the Montenegrin
authorities to promptly adopt a new law governing the elections
of members of Parliament, in close co-operation with the Venice
Commission. I am aware of the fact that the Montenegrin authorities
are currently working on developing a new draft law on elections.
The draft law, prepared by a group of domestic legal experts has
been forwarded to the Venice Commission for opinion. The Committee
co-rapporteurs will continue to follow this issue closely and report
to the Assembly on the progress achieved by the authorities in reforming
electoral legislation.
2.1.8. Russian Federation
53. A presidential election was held in the Russian Federation
on 2 March 2008, parliamentary elections on 2 December 2007 and
regional and local elections were organised in a number of subjects
of the Russian Federation on 1 March 2009. The Ad Hoc Committee
from the Parliamentary Assembly that observed the parliamentary
elections concluded that, while the outcome of the elections overall
reflected the political will expressed by the Russian voters, significant
shortcomings resulted in an election process that undermined political
pluralism and did not comply with Council of Europe standards for
democratic elections. The Assembly delegation observing the 2 March
2008 presidential election concluded that these elections reflected
the will of an electorate whose democratic potential was, unfortunately,
not tapped. The ad hoc committee highlighted that this election
repeated most of the flaws revealed during the parliamentary elections
of December 2007. Candidate registration concerns could not be accommodated,
putting into question the degree of how free the election was. The
equal access of the candidates to the media and the public sphere
in general did not improve, putting into question the fairness of
the election. Independent observers also raised some concerns with
regard to the elections to some of the regional parliaments held
on 1 March 2009 and 14 March 2010.
54. Legal provisions that limit political pluralism are of particular
concern. In order to qualify for registration, a political party
needs to have at least 50 000 members and at least 500 members in
half of the subjects of the Russian Federation and at least 250
in the other half (the so-called double threshold). In addition,
in order to register for parliamentary elections, parties not represented
in the Duma must either pay a deposit of 60 million roubles or collect
200 000 supporting signatures of which less that 10 000 signatures
can come from one and the same region. Moreover, in order to compete
in a presidential election, candidates not nominated by a registered
party must submit to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) 2 million
signatures, with not more than 50 000 coming from the same subject
of the Federation, in support of their registration.
55. In addition to these registration requirements in 2005, the
threshold to enter parliament was raised from 5% to 7%, the formation
of electoral blocs was forbidden and an imperative mandate for deputies
was introduced. The combined effect of these provisions is to undermine
political pluralism and make the participation of new and/or small
parties in the democratic process extremely difficult.
56. A number of recent legislative initiatives have been taken
by the Russian authorities since the parliamentary elections in
2007 to address some of the concerns noted. Several draft laws that
aim, inter alia, at: introducing “reserved seats” for parties which
obtain between 5% and 7% of the votes in the elections to the State
Duma (2 seats would be reserved for parties which reach between
6 and 7% of votes and 1 seat for parties which reach from 5 to 6%
of votes); lowering the mandatory membership of political parties
from the current 50 000 members down to 40 000 members over the
period of 2010-2012; abolishing the electoral deposit for the registration
of party lists for political parties not represented in the State
Duma; decreasing the number of signatures necessary for registering
a party list for the elections to the State Duma from the current 200
000 signatures down to 150 000, for the next parliamentary elections
(to be held normally in 2011), and to 120 000 for all subsequent
elections. Moreover, parties that are represented in more than 1/3
of the legislative assemblies of the Subjects of the Russian Federation
are no longer required to collect signatures in order to register
for a federal election, as was already the case for parties represented
in the Federal Parliament. While welcoming these initiatives, the
co-rapporteurs with regard to the Russian Federation have stressed
that further improvements should be made in order to ensure that
the electoral system is genuinely pluralist and democratic.
57. Further reform of the legal framework for elections is therefore
necessary in the Russian Federation to ensure that future elections
are fully in line with Council of Europe standards. The Monitoring
Committee of the Assembly has repeatedly urged the authorities of
the Russian Federation to seek the opinion of the Venice Commission
on the legal framework for elections in the Russian Federation and
to establish close co-operation with it in addressing the shortcomings,
and implementing any recommendations, that such an opinion could contain.
2.1.9. Serbia
58. In Serbia, the legislation allows for the participation
of a wide range of political parties in the electoral process. Elections
to Parliament are organised on the basis of a proportional system,
with a 5% threshold which parties have to clear in order to access
the allocation of seats. This threshold is waived for political
parties representing national minorities in order to facilitate
their participation in the electoral process. That said, although
a wide range of political parties can participate in elections and
are represented in Parliament, political pluralism is hindered by
the so-called “party-administered mandate” system. In accordance
with the Constitution, the MPs are free to put their mandate at
the disposal of political parties. On the basis of this constitutional
principle, a practice of signing blank resignations upon taking
up duties has been established. These blank resignations are kept
by the leadership of the political parties in order to exercise
control over individual MPs elected on the basis of lists submitted
by political parties. Following the same logic, the electoral legislation
allows the leadership of the party arbitrarily to choose the candidates
from their lists to sit in Parliament
after
the election instead of determining the order of candidates
beforehand. In the view of the Venice Commission and of the OSCE/ODIHR,
"this limits the transparency of the system and gives political parties
a disproportionately strong position vis-à-vis candidates".
Seen
together with the constitutional provision on “party-administrated
mandates” of MPs, this provision constitutes a serious violation
of European standards and a threat to the proper functioning of
democratic institutions.
59. In this context, in
Resolution
1661 (2009), the Assembly noted that “the problems which
the National Assembly of Serbia is facing are, to a large extent,
rooted in the existing constitutional framework, which establishes
a “party-administered mandate” of MPs, as well as in the arrangements
for the allocation of seats in Parliament, which make the MPs dependent
on the decisions of their parties’ leadership and prevent them from
expressing their views freely, as democratically elected representatives
of the citizens of Serbia”. It furthermore recommended that the
authorities should amend the electoral legislation, in accordance
with the joint recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), in particular, to bring the system of
allocation of mandates in Parliament and in municipal assemblies
into line with European standards. Moreover, the Assembly called
upon the authorities to “eliminate from the Constitution the provisions
establishing party-administered mandates of members of parliament
and strengthen the capacity of the National Assembly to play an
increasingly active role in the political process”.
60. I am aware of the fact that the Serbian authorities are currently
working with the Venice Commission on the revision of the electoral
legislation. A new draft law governing local elections was submitted
to the Venice Commission for opinion in 2009 and an opinion was
subsequently adopted on 9-10 October 2009, at the Commission’s 80th
plenary session. In the view of the Commission, the draft governing
local elections responds to several issues previously identified
by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, including changes to protect
elected councilors from arbitrary forfeiture of mandates and a number
of important provisions to promote democratic election practices.
A changed system for candidacy and mandate distribution system is
proposed. I therefore would like to encourage our Serbian colleagues
to continue close co-operation with the Venice Commission on improving
the electoral legislation, using the law on local elections as a
basis and possible model for reforming electoral legislation governing
parliamentary elections.
2.1.10. Ukraine
61. A presidential election took place in Ukraine on
17 January and 7 February 2010. This election, which was observed
by the Assembly, was won by Mr Victor Yanukovych, who defeated Ms
Yulia Timoshenko in the second round of voting on 7 February 2010.
62. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Assembly that observed this election
concluded that the election was held in line with Council of Europe
standards for democratic elections, and consolidated the progress
made in the electoral field since 2004.
63. However, the Ad Hoc Committee also noted that the election
had been democratic despite the legal framework for this election,
which all parties had been trying to manipulate, even after the
first round was concluded. In that respect, the Ad Hoc Committee
underscored that stable election legislation is an essential prerequisite
for the holding of democratic elections and that, although the vote
had shown the democratic nature of the elections, it was concerned
about the dangerous habit of Ukrainian politicians to play with
the electoral rules rather than playing by those rules.
64. Ukraine does not have a unified electoral code. The electoral
process is governed by a series of different laws and legal acts
which are unnecessarily complex and unclear and at times in contradiction
with one another. In its joint opinion with the OSCE/ODIHR, the
Venice Commission noted a significant number of shortcomings with
regard to, inter alia: the electoral complaints procedure, the tabulation
of election results, the composition of election commissions, the
transparency of the electoral process and the integrity of the voters’ list.
The Assembly, on several occasions, has therefore called upon the
Verkhovna Rada to adopt, in close consultation with the Venice Commission,
a Unified Election Code that would address the concerns and shortcomings
noted by, inter alia, the Assembly.
65. Ukraine has a diverse and pluralist political environment
which is reflected in the Verkhovna Rada. However, the Ad Hoc Committee
that observed the presidential elections in 2010 expressed its concern
about the role of finance and economic interest in the elections
and political process, which could negatively affect the pluralist
character of Ukrainian politics.
2.2. Dialogue between
political parties in Parliament
66. Albania is
now undergoing a major political crisis, as mentioned in paragraphs
6 to 17 above. The Assembly has already in the past regretted that
relations between the political parties remained polarised and fraught,
thus slowing down parliamentary work on reform. Albanian political
parties share responsibility for strengthening the powers and role
of the Parliament, which remains a major challenge for this country.
67. In a Parliament where the governing majority does not have
the three-fifths majority required to pass major constitutional
reforms, the current boycott by the main opposition party makes
further much-needed reforms well nigh impossible. This situation
harms the Albanian people and their ambitions for European integration.
68. The political environment in Armenia remains
polarised and tense both between the authorities and the opposition
as well as within the opposition itself. The only exception to this
seems to be the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun)
which appears to maintain a normal dialogue with the authorities despite
having left the governing coalition. The Assembly has regretted
on several occasions that structures established in the wake of
the March 2008 events to promote dialogue between the opposition
and authorities either broke down, were in effect boycotted by part
of the political spectrum, or otherwise failed to fulfill their intended
function.
69. With regard to the reform of the political system, with a
view to giving a proper place and rights to the opposition, amendments
were passed to the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.
These amendments provide for, inter alia, the distribution of all
leadership positions on the Standing Committees of the Assembly
on the basis of the d’Hondt system, which will ensure opposition
representation in these leadership functions; the right of the opposition
to table an issue for debate during one of the sittings of each four-day
regular sessions; the introduction of the presentation of a minority
position in the reports of the Standing Committees that are sent
for debate in plenary session; and priority for opposition representatives
in tabling questions to the government. The co-rapporteurs with
respect of Armenia have welcomed these initiatives although they
have noted that some of the provisions will only come into force
after the next convocation of the National Assembly. The possibility
of implementing them at a much earlier stage should be considered
by the National Assembly.
70. In its
Resolution
1614 (2008) on the functioning of democratic institutions
in
Azerbaijjan, the Assembly regrets
that the main opposition parties did not participate in the discussion
of amendments to the Electoral Code of Azerbaijan concerning the
composition of the electoral commissions and the complaints and
appeals procedures. The Assembly has stressed several times that
it is urgent to install a political dialogue between the ruling
majority and the opposition, both within and outside Parliament,
if the political climate in the country is to be improved and the
population’s confidence in the electoral process is to be restored.
71. So far, no progress has been made in this area. The opposition
parties consider they have not been involved in the revision of
the Electoral Code and believe the forthcoming parliamentary elections
will be a farce. The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee
have urged all political parties to take part in the elections.
The current lack of confidence of the population in the electoral
process is a direct threat to the credibility of the forthcoming
parliamentary elections.
72. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, power
sharing deals between the 3 constituent peoples hamper the development
of a common and shared-by-all political vision of the country’s
future. The monopolisation of political decision making through
informal meetings of the 6 major political parties (SDA and SBiH
for the Bosniaks, HDZ and HDZ 1990 for the Croats, SNSD and PDP
for the Serbs, all in an unlikely coalition at the State level)
deprives both the Council of Ministers and Parliament of their constitutional
responsibilities. Lack of trust, more or less systematic obstruction,
and narrow party interests have taken their toll on legislative
and governmental activity. Important reforms relating to democratic
institutions, rule of law and human rights are being delayed and
the country is lagging behind in the implementation of its remaining
post-accession commitments. A constitutional revision and a profound
reform of the country’s democratic institutions, aimed at increasing
their functionality, is the ultimate recipe which will improve the
functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This process cannot be completed overnight. In the meantime, pending the
implementation of this reform, the key political stakeholders should
stop obstructionism and work constructively at the level of state
institutions, in order to speedily enact key legislation necessary
to advance on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration.
73. Moreover, the Assembly has, on several occasions, expressed
concerns about the increase in confrontational and inflammatory
rhetoric. Statements and possible actions by politicians at the
highest level of Republika Srpska, which undermine state institutions
and challenge the authority and powers of the High Representative,
are not contributing to strengthening trust and constructive dialogue
between key political stakeholders.
74. In October 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina will hold a general
election. In the current context of division and confrontation,
it is important to ensure that these elections are held in an environment
which is conducive to the free and fair expression of the will of
the people. I therefore call again upon all political stakeholders
within and outside Parliament to refrain from inflammatory statements
and engage in a normal political debate around issues important
for society, as well as the country’s advancement on the path of
Euro-Atlantic integration, including the completion of the reforms
required by Council of Europe post-accession commitments.
75. In Georgia, the political
atmosphere between the authorities and the opposition is generally
polarised and acrimonious. In spring 2009, a series of protests,
lasting several months, were organised by the extra- parliamentary
opposition with the aim of changing the power in Georgia via early
parliamentary and presidential elections in Georgia.
76. In order to strengthen the role of the opposition in the work
of Parliament, the opposition has been granted, inter alia, the
right to nominate up to three vice-chairpersonships of the Georgian
Parliament, as well as the right to nominate a vice-chairperson
on each parliamentary Committee. Also the procedures to set up a parliamentary
faction have been simplified and the number of MPs to form a faction
has been reduced from 10 to 6. In addition, a member of the parliamentary
minority has been elected to the High Council of Justice, which manages
the judiciary, and the number of MPs from the parliamentary minority
has been increased on the Trust Group, which supervises information
in the defence area.
77. In Moldova, relations
between the majority and the opposition are extremely polarised.
This has led to a political and institutional deadlock over the
election by Parliament of the President of the country. After the parliamentary
elections of 5 April 2009, none of the four political parties represented
in Parliament could secure the necessary majority of 3/5th (61 seats)
in order to elect the Head of State. Subsequently, after two rounds of
voting, in which the opposition did not participate, the Acting
President of the country had to dissolve Parliament and call a new
election. As a result of the early parliamentary elections of 29
July 2009, the balance of political forces in Parliament has changed.
A new majority coalition, called Alliance for European Integration, bringing
together four political parties (which previously were in opposition),
managed to appoint a new government (without the participation of
the opposition in the voting) but failed to secure the necessary
majority to elect the President of the State. Two rounds of presidential
elections were held again, in October and December 2009, with no
candidate securing the necessary majority. Consequently, the current
Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament is now exercising the functions
of the President on an interim basis.
78. According to Moldova’s Constitution, the current Parliament
has to be dissolved and early elections have to be organised. However,
the Constitution is silent as to the exact timetable. It also contains
some ambiguous provisions which may give rise to different interpretations.
In this context, the Moldovan Constitutional court asked the Venice
Commission’s opinion on the key open issues. On 12 March 2010, the
Venice Commission approved an Amicus Curiae brief on the interpretation
of articles 78.5 and 85.3 of the Constitution, stressing that a
dissolution of Parliament cannot take place twice within one year,
even if Parliament fails to elect the President twice. According
to the Commission, the words “in the course of a year” should be
interpreted as meaning one year, counting from the last dissolution
of Parliament and not within one calendar year.
This means that Parliament could
be dissolved at the earliest on 16 June 2010. The Commission underlined
that, following this date, dissolution must take place within a
reasonable timeframe.
79. At the same time, the Venice Commission noted that it was
necessary to amend the Constitution before dissolving Parliament
in order to avoid similar institutional crisis situations in future.
In the opinion of the Venice Commission, the proposal to revise
Article 78 of the Constitution so as to make it easier to elect
the President should be agreed as soon as possible by the leaders
of the political parties represented in Parliament. The proposal
could provide for a lower majority in Parliament to elect the President
as from the third round of voting or for a direct election of the
President by the people. The proposal should be voted by the current
Parliament as soon as possible following its approval by the Constitutional
Court, but would take effect only for the next Parliament. Parliament
should be dissolved after this vote. A more comprehensive revision
of the Constitution could take place during the term of office of
the newly elected Parliament.
80. The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee are following
the situation in Moldova very closely and will propose to the Committee
and to the Assembly any further action which may be required by
the situation.
81. In Montenegro, the
Coalition for a European Montenegro (composed of the Democratic
Party of Socialists, Social Democratic Party, Bosniak Party and
Croatian Civic Initiative) won a strong mandate in the parliamentary
elections of 29 March 2009, with nearly 52% of the votes and 48
out of the 81 seats in Parliament. The other 33 seats are distributed
between the Socialist People’s Party (SNP, 16 seats), New Serbian
Democracy (NOVA, 8 seats), Movement for Changes (PzP, 5 seats) and
4 small Albanian parties (1 seat each). Milo Djukanovic, President
of the Democratic Party of Socialists and former President of Montenegro,
was appointed Prime Minister. This is his fifth (non-consecutive)
term.
82. In political terms, the Assembly co-rapporteurs noted that,
although the ruling coalition has a comfortable majority, it still
needs to engage in a constructive dialogue with the opposition,
which appears to hold a solid mandate in the new Parliament. This
is particularly important as the adoption of some laws (for example, amendments
to the electoral legislation) require a qualified majority. Dialogue
between the majority and the opposition is therefore essential and
the Assembly expects both the ruling coalition and the opposition
to shoulder their political responsibilities and engage in constructive
co-operation.
83. In
Serbia, the newly
achieved political stability after the parliamentary elections of
May 2008 creates a favourable environment for society to progress
and implement the necessary reforms in the field of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law. In
Resolution 1661 (2009), the Assembly
called upon the majority coalition to create conditions for a meaningful
dialogue with the opposition on key issues. At the same time, it
urged some of the opposition parties to stop obstructionism and
the opposition in general to adopt a constructive attitude in the
parliamentary arena. Although some amendments were made to the Rules
of procedure of Parliament in spring 2009, parliamentary procedure
still needs to be improved and sufficient guarantees against abuse
of the procedure, together with effective guarantees of the rights
of the opposition, have to be established. In this context, the
Assembly noted that it was essential to adopt a new law on the National
Assembly of Serbia and new rules of procedure of Parliament, in
close co-operation with the Venice Commission.
84. More fundamentally, the system of “party-administered mandates”
needs to be changed in order to ensure that the members of Parliament
act as free, democratically elected representatives of the citizens
and not “spokespersons” of the leaderships of their political parties.
As long as the current system remains in place, a normal political
debate between and inside political parties cannot take place, as
exemplified by the long negotiations about the mandates of MPs between
the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Progressive Party, which
was established in 2008 as a result of a split inside the Serbian
Radical Party. In Resolution 1661 (2009), the Assembly therefore
called upon the authorities to remedy this problem as a matter of
urgency.
85. The political landscape in
Ukraine has
been dominated for the last few years by the systemic political crisis,
as a result of the unclear separation of powers between the President,
Parliament and Prime Minister, and the resulting political in-fighting
between the different political forces. This has seriously affected
the work of the Verkhovna Rada, as well as the relationship between
the ruling coalition and opposition.
2.3. Parliamentary oversight
over the activities of the executive and strengthening of the capacity of
Parliaments
86. In several Resolutions and reports, the Assembly
has underscored the role of the National Assembly of Armenia in trying to diffuse the
political crisis that ensued after 1 March 2008, and in initiating
reforms and laws to address the underlying causes of this crisis.
It is clear that the National Assembly is willing to strengthen
its role in the legislative process as well as in supervising the
activities of the executive. In a parallel development, on 17 September
2009, the parliamentary ad hoc Committee of the National Assembly
of Armenia to conduct an inquiry into the March 2008 events and
“the reasons thereof” published its report. In an information note
on the conclusions of the ad hoc Committee, the co-rapporteurs of
the Monitoring Committee welcomed the comprehensive recommendations
produced by the ad hoc Committee, while regretting, at the same
time, the manner in which certain issues were either stressed or
avoided in the report. This has given the impression that the ad
hoc Committee wanted, at all cost, to avoid discrediting too overtly
the official version of the events or criticising too harshly the
authorities on their handling of them. This tends to indicate a
need to further strengthen the independence of the parliamentary
oversight function.
87. Since accession to the Council of Europe, the Parliament of Azerbaijan is reinforcing step
by step its role vis-à-vis other State institutions. However, much
remains to be done to strengthen parliamentary control over the
executive and improve the checks and balances in a state governed
by a strong presidential system. As underlined in previous Assembly
reports on the functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan
and on the monitoring of the country, the separation of powers as
enshrined in the Constitution remains to be implemented in practice,
in particular by increasing the role of the Parliament vis-à-vis
the excecutive authorities.
88. As noted earlier, the performance of the Parliamentary Assembly
of Bosnia and Herzegovina has
been rather poor over the past years. Because of the complex power-sharing
mechanisms, as well as of the domination in the debate of the entity
and ethnic rhetoric, the work of Parliament is often obstructed
by different political forces and the legislative process remains
extremely slow. There is an urgent need to operate a comprehensive
reform of State institutions, including at the level of the Constitution,
in order to improve their functionality and enable the Parliamentary
Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Presidency effectively to
exercise their respective roles. In the view of the Venice Commission,
expressed in several opinions, the executive powers have to be concentrated
in the Council of Ministers which has to be made truly accountable to
the Parliamentary Assembly. At the same time, the Parliamentary
Assembly, especially the House of Representatives, whose members
are elected on the basis of a universal, free and direct suffrage,
in accordance with the proportional system, should exercise fully
its powers of parliamentary oversight over the activities of the
Council of Ministers, especially with regard to the implementation
of adopted laws.
89. In Georgia, a comprehensive
package of democratic reforms was introduced after the August 2008
war, with a view to, inter alia, strengthening the institutional
role of Parliament vis-à-vis the executive, strengthening the role
of the opposition in the work of Parliament as well as in state
oversight institutions, including those that oversee the defence
and national security sectors. An Anti-Crisis Council was formed,
with the aim to oversee the post-war reconstruction and distribution
of aid to IDPs, as well as to discuss further democratic reforms. This
Council is composed of representatives of the government, as well
as members of the parliamentary majority and opposition.
90. In addition, in order to strengthen the role of Parliament,
constitutional amendments are proposed that would, inter alia: make
it necessary for a newly elected Parliament to give its vote of
confidence to the Cabinet of Ministers; simplify the procedure for
Parliament to adopt a motion of no-confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers
and limit the number of times the President can dissolve Parliament.
The opinion of the Venice Commission has been sought on these amendments.
On 8 July 2009, the State Constitution Commission of Georgia was
established, composed of representatives of political parties, representatives
of the civil society and prominent academics, with the aim of drafting
a new constitution especially with a view to, inter alia, strengthening
the role of the Parliament, strengthening the independence of the
judiciary and enhancing the system of checks balances.
91. In Moldova, the ongoing
political and institutional crisis has prevented Parliament from
being fully engaged in the legislative process. The fact that, since
the failure of Parliament to elect the President of State after
two attempts in October and December 2009, the MPs from the Party
of Communists boycott the plenary sessions of Parliament does not
help develop a constructive co-operation between the majority and
the opposition. However, the majority and the opposition appear
to work together at committee level. It is important to note that
the majority and the opposition co-operate in a constructive manner
within the framework of the parliamentary inquiry committee which
was established in order to investigate the events of April 2009.
The Committee is expected to make its report public soon. It is
important to ensure that the report should be agreed to by all members
of the inquiry committee; this, of course, does not mean that the
individual members of the committee cannot express dissenting opinions
on the interpretation of the facts to be established by the inquiry committee.
Constructive co-operation between the majority and the opposition
has to be developed in the implementation of the recommendations
to be contained in the report, which have to be translated into
a set of concrete measures aimed at completing the implementation
of the remaining post-accession commitments, in accordance with
Assembly Resolutions.
92. In Montenegro, in accordance
with the post-accession commitments, provisions governing parliamentary
control over the armed and security forces were included in the
Constitution. A Security and Defence Council was created. The Speaker
of Parliament is a member of the Security and Defence Council. The
Council deals with issues of national security and defence strategy
and takes decisions regarding the inclusion of army units in international
forces.
93. At the same time, in
Resolution
1724 (2010), the Assembly noted that the capacity of
the Parliament should be further strengthened in order to enable
MPs to play an active role in the legislative process, as well as
to ensure parliamentary oversight over the implementation of adopted
laws. In fact, the Committee co-rapporteurs have gained the impression
that, although Parliament works efficiently and expediently, in particular,
with respect to laws relating to European integration laws are sometimes
adopted too quickly, without substantial discussion and without
prior dialogue with civil society.
94. This is partially due to the fact that Parliament has no real
capacity to provide MPs with expertise on technical and legal issues.
Moreover, the electoral system (providing for party-administered
mandates) makes MPs dependent on the goodwill of party leaderships,
which does not stimulate their personal involvement in law-making.
As a result, some tend to believe that Parliament is too often “rubber
stamping” legislation and, according to some surveys and public
opinion polls, amongst all public institutions, the public has a
rather low level of trust and the highest level of distrust in the
Parliament
.
In this context, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of Parliament
to exercise its supervisory functions better. At the same time,
Parliament should actively seek to involve civil society representatives
in the debate, within the framework of the legislative process,
in order to ensure that a wide consultation with all actors concerned
takes place in respect of draft laws submitted to Parliament.
95. In the report on “Reconsideration on substantive grounds of
previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation (Rule
9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly)”
,
the rapporteur stressed the limits of the influence of the
Russian Parliament [..] on the
political course of the government. This is partially due to the fact
that the electoral arrangements should be further improved in order
to increase pluralism in Parliament by giving an effective possibility
to a wide array of political forces to compete in parliamentary
elections. At the same time, Parliament has to develop further its
oversight function of the activities of the executive.
96. In
Serbia, in accordance
with the Constitution, effective mechanisms of democratic parliamentary oversight
of the activities of the Army, Security Forces and Police have been
established. The competent committees of the National Assembly are
responsible for this task.
However,
just as in Montenegro, due to the system of “party-administered
mandates”, the role of Parliament in the political process as well
as in the oversight over the executive should be further strengthened.
In parallel with the reform of the electoral legislation and mandate
system of MPs, the Serbian authorities should deal with this problem
in the process of development of new legislation on the National
Assembly, as well as in the preparation of new Rules of Procedure
of Parliament.
97. In
Resolution 1549
(2007), adopted in April 2007, the Assembly recommended
that the
Ukrainian authorities
re-launch the constitutional reform project, in close co-operation
with the Venice Commission, in order to improve the Constitution
of Ukraine and bring it in line with European standards, in particular
as regards the provisions on the separation between the different
branches of power.
3. Role of parliaments
in countries engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue
98. The 5 July 2009 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria were the first national
elections since the country joined the European Union in 2007. The
elections were held four weeks after the elections to the European Parliament
and the two campaigns were closely linked.
99. In its report on the observation of the parliamentary elections
in Bulgaria (5 July 2009)
,
the Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau noted a broad difference between
the overall orderly voting day and the defects revealed in the run-up
to the vote. Last minute changes of the electoral legislation ran
counter to the recommendations set out in the Code of Good Practice
in Electoral Matters worked out by the Venice Commission and approved
by the Assembly. The Ad hoc Committee deplored the lack of public
confidence in the democratic process in Bulgaria resulting in wide-scale
electoral cynicism, as exemplified by the reportedly widespread
practice of vote selling and vote buying.
100. That said, as a result of the July 2009 elections, a pluralistic
Parliament was formed. The centre-right GERB (Citizens for a European
Bulgaria) movement won 39.7% of the votes, while the former ruling
Coalition for Bulgaria obtained 17.7%; the Movement for Rights and
Freedoms (DPS, supported by Bulgarians of Turkish ethic origin)
obtained 14.5% of the votes, the radical nationalistic ATAKA received
9.36%, the liberal Blue Coalition obtained 6.7%, and the centre-right
Order, Law and Security, 4.13%.
101. With 116 seats out of 240 secured, including 50 women (i.e.
20.8%), the results did not allow Prime Minister Boyko Borisov to
form an outright majority. In this situation, he opted to form a
minority government as opposed to entering into a coalition with
other small right-wing parties. On the other hand, all right-wing parties,
including the extreme right nationalists declared that they would
support the Government with a view to solving Bulgaria’s problems.
102. The issues relating to post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly
are among the top priorities of the new Government. Particular attention
is being paid to guaranteeing the rule of law, to the fight against
corruption and crime, as well as the reform of the judiciary. The
Assembly rapporteur on post-monitoring dialogue noted in his report
that the new government has to seize the momentum and the strong
support of the population to set Bulgaria on the right track of
a modern democracy, in order to complete the necessary reforms.
I would like to encourage the Bulgarian authorities to pursue the
positive dynamic and work closely with the competent bodies of the
Council of Europe, in particular the Venice Commission, in order
to fulfil the Assembly recommendations in the post-monitoring dialogue
contained in
Resolution
1730 (2010).
103. Monaco held parliamentary
elections on 3 February 2008. In its report on the observation of
these elections, the Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Assembly
concluded that, given the particular situation of Monaco, the election
had taken place largely in line with Council of Europe electoral
standards. The Electoral Commission had conducted its work in an
impartial and professional manner, displaying considerable transparency
and efficiency. Following the recommendations of the Ad hoc Committee
on the observation of the elections, the Assembly, in its
Resolution 1690 (2009) on
the honouring of obligations and commitments by Monaco, reiterating
earlier recommendations, invited the Monegasque authorities to envisage
preparing a law on political parties, particularly to ensure greater
transparency in political party financing, and a law on the organisation
of elections and the election campaign.
104. However, it should be pointed out that the Principality of
Monaco remains a hereditary and constitutional monarchy in which
the Prince is an active Head of State and possesses extensive powers
that have no counterpart in other European monarchies, except perhaps
Liechtenstein (see
Doc.
11299). That said, strengthening the powers of the National
Council was the subject of intense negotiation during the accession procedure
so that Monaco would fulfil the criterion of “pluralist democracy”
within the meaning of the Council of Europe’s statute.
105. On this issue, in its Resolution 1690 (2009), the Assembly
recalled the recommendations in paragraph 11 of
Opinion 250 (2004) on
supervision of government action, particularly as regards the annual presentation
of the governmental programme, the right of legislative initiative,
and the budgetary debate. It is aware that the 2002 constitutional
revision prepared the way for an improvement in the institutional
balance specific to Monaco’s hereditary constitutional monarchy.
It nevertheless expects that these constitutional provisions be
transposed into the legislative and regulatory texts, thus allowing
the legislature’s independence vis-à-vis the executive, and balance
between the institutions, to be secured.
106. The Sovereign Prince expressed his view on this issue during
the meeting with the co-rapporteurs on 28 July 2009, stating that
the extension of the powers of the National Council desired by the
Assembly can be achieved by including the presentation of the governmental
programme and the discussion of the initial and rectified budgets
in the annual joint meetings between the government and the National
Council on the economic and social situation in the Principality.
107. In fact, the National Council has no legal personality and
does not possess budgetary independence: it has to request Government
authorisation to use the funds allocated to it, as well as authorisation
on how it may spend them. The Government limits the National Council's
scope for action and exercises indirect political control over its
activities through the control it exercises over its financial resources.
108. A joint National Council-Government working group has been
set up. It has met on several occasions and the Assembly sincerely
wishes that its proceedings may lead to the early enactment of a
new law on the operation and organisation of the National Council,
accommodating the constitutional amendments which had been made
in 2002.
109. Therefore, in its
Resolution
1690 (2009), the Assembly invited the National Council
to revise its rules of procedure accordingly. It furthermore encourages
the government to espouse transparency in its relations with the
National Council to enable it to consolidate its role and improve
the system of checks and balances and, through its press centre,
to secure direct access for the National Council members to the
local television channel.
110. Moreover, it is important that the Monegasque authorities
revise the list of international conventions and treaties requiring
the passage of a ratifying law by the National Council under Article
14 of the Constitution and, in the meantime, put to the National
Council any draft reservation or declaration pertaining to a treaty
on which the National Council must pass a ratifying law.
111. The Assembly, through its Monitoring Committee, will carry
on the post-monitoring dialogue with the Monegasque authorities
on the questions raised in this Resolution 1690 (2009).
112. Since the last progress report on the functioning of democratic
institutions, no new reports on the post-monitoring dialogue with “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” have
been prepared. In the present report, I would like to refer to the
statement which the President of the Assembly, Mr Lluís Maria de
Puig, made after his official visit to the country in June 2009.
113. In the official statement about the conclusions of his visit,
the President of the Assembly noted that the country had made steady
progress on the path of strengthening its democratic institutions,
affirming the principles of rule of law and effectively protecting
human rights and national minorities. At the same time, he stressed
that “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” still has issues
to face in the process of consolidating its democratic institutions
and that confidence of all political players in the parliamentary
process must be bolstered. In particular, the President of the Assembly
called on the parliamentary majority and the opposition to continue
with constructive political dialogue, with due regard for legitimate
interests on either side. He also stressed in this connection that
the President of the Republic must help to facilitate a democratic debate
that included all the political forces and ethnic communities in
the country.
114. I trust the new rapporteur on post-monitoring dialogue with
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” to be appointed soon,
in accordance with the amended
Resolution 1115 (1997) on the setting
up of the Assembly Monitoring Committee, will promptly re-launch
dialogue with the authorities on the remaining issues, in accordance
with the Assembly
Resolution
1213 (2000) on the closing of the monitoring procedure
and the opening of post-monitoring dialogue.
115. As regards
Turkey,
Resolution 1622 (2008) was
the last report on this country to the Assembly. The Assembly recalls
that parliamentary elections in July 2007 were considered by the
Assembly and other international observers as generally in compliance
with Turkey’s commitments as a member state of the Council of Europe
and European standards for free and fair elections. The Assembly
notes that the high voter turnout confirmed that confidence in the
democratic process exists in Turkey. While regretting the Turkish authorities’
failure to comply with its previous calls to lower the 10% electoral
threshold, the Assembly notes that the current parliament is more
representative of the country’s political diversity than the previous
one, representing about 90% of the opinions of the electorate.
116. Resolution 1622 (2008) on the functioning of democratic institutions
in Turkey: recent developments, was adopted following the political
crisis which had erupted as a result of the failure of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly (hereafter “the parliament”) to elect a
new President of the Republic and the judicial proceedings instituted
to dissolve the ruling AK Party. The lawsuit against the ruling
party sparked a renewed debate about the legal basis for the closure
of political parties in the country and show that, despite the above-mentioned
reforms, the issue of dissolution of political parties in Turkey
is not closed.
117. In this regard, the Assembly reiterates that, in pursuing
such reforms, the Turkish authorities should in particular envisage
introducing stricter criteria for the dissolution of political parties,
such as condoning or inciting violence or overt threats to fundamental
democratic values, in line with the guidelines of the Venice Commission.
The full revision of the 1982 Constitution which, despite repeated
revisions, still bears the marks of the 1980 military coup d’état,
and a comprehensive review of the law on political parties, are
required in order to bring these texts fully into line with European
standards. A package of constitutional amendments has been adopted
in first reading on 29 April 2010. The second reading was underway
at the time of the drafting of this report.
118. The Monitoring Committee is following this issue within its
post-monitoring dialogue started with the Turkish authorities since
the closing of the monitoring procedure in 2004. A new rapporteur
on this post-monitoring dialogue will be apointed in June 2010 and,
according to the new Rules of Procedure, a report based on the information
notes considered previously by the Committee
should
be presented to the Assembly shortly. This report will deal with
the current constitutional reform.
4. Conclusions
and recommendations for follow-up
4.1. Country-specific
recommendations
119. In the light of the above considerations, the following
conclusions may be drawn:
a. with
respect to elections and political pluralism:
- the Parliament of Albania should improve the legislative
framework for electoral process and enhance the capabilities of
the electoral administration as regards the electoral register, regulation
of media coverage and funding of campaigns, the rules of transparency
relating to media ownership, the electoral commissions and lists
of candidates;
- the Parliament of Armenia should implement without delay,
and well before the next parliamentary elections, far going electoral
reform with a view to ensuring equal and fair conditions for all
candidates and increasing public confidence in the electoral process,
including the complaint resolution processes;
- the Parliament of Azerbaijan should revise in the Electoral
Code of 2008, a number of provisions with regard to the registration
of candidates, campaign financing and lists of persons entitled
to conduct pre-election campaign;
- the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina should bring
the constitution and the electoral legislation into line with the
European Convention of Human Rights with a view to eliminating discrimination
based on ethnicity;
- the Parliament of Georgia should proceed with the electoral
reform in time for the next parliamentary elections and to restart
the dialogue with the opposition with the aim of reaching a consensus
among an as wide as possible range of political forces on the electoral
system for the country;
- the Parliament of Moldova should improve the electoral
legislation as regards the threshold for party lists, the formation
of electoral coalitions, the accuracy of the voter lists as well
as the voting of Moldovan citizens residing abroad;
- the Parliament of Montenegro should harmonise the legislation
governing parliamentary elections with the new Constitution, in
line with accession commitments;
- the Parliament of the Russian Federation should eliminate
legal provisions which limit political pluralism, including restrictive
provisions for party and candidate registration and 7% threshold
to enter parliament;
- the authorities of the Russian Federation should be invited
to ask an opinion of the Venice Commission on its legal framework
for elections and seek its co-operation in addressing any shortcomings
and implement recommendations contained in such an opinion;
- the Parliament of Serbia should review the existing constitutional
framework with a view to abolishing a party administered mandate
and review the electoral legislation accordingly, in order to increase
the transparency for the voters of the process of seats to party
lists;
- the Parliament of Ukraine should make good on its long
standing promise and to adopt, without further delay, a Unified
Election Code that is in line with European Standards.
b. with respect to the dialogue between political parties
in Parliament:
- the main opposition
party in Albania (Socialist Party) should finish boycott of the
work of the Parliament and enter a constructive political dialogue
with other political forces;
- the Armenian authorities should continue its efforts to
establish a meaningful dialogue with the extraparliamentary opposition
on the political reforms needed for the normalization of political
life in the country;
- the Azerbaijani authorities should establish a meaningful
political dialogue with the opposition;
- the Georgian authorities should continue its efforts to
establish a meaningful dialogue on the direction and content of
the constitutional and electoral reform packages that are being
prepared;
- the political forces in Moldova should engage in a constructive
and meaningful dialogue with a view to creating the necessary guarantees
against the repletion of the current institutional crisis, including
by amending the constitution;
- the political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina should
establish a serious institutionalised process for the preparation
of a comprehensive package of constitutional amendments, in accordance with
the country’s post-accession commitments, while making full use
of the expertise and recommendations of the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).
a. with respect to parliamentary
oversight over the activities of the executive and strengthening
of the capacity of Parliaments:
- Parliaments of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, Georgia and Ukraine should review
their legislations with a view to strengthening their role as parliamentary
oversight over the activities of the executive;
- Parliaments of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia should strengthen
their material and organisational capacities.