1. Introduction
1. After a century of natural population increase, the
demographic outlook for 21st-century Europe is one of declining
birth rates and excessive ageing of the population, leading to the
absolute number of people in the workforce decreasing, and the share
of the population over 60 years of age increasing.
2. This is, in turn, expected to create difficulties for labour
markets and contribution-based social security and health-care systems,
as there will be fewer people available to work, and therefore fewer
people contributing to social security and health-care systems,
combined with more people requiring services and payouts from these
systems.
3. This has led some to believe that migration might solve the
demographic problem, both in terms of overall population size and
age structure.
4. The relationship between demography and migration is, however,
more complex. This report will therefore look first at the wider
demographic context of births, deaths, age structure and growth
and then at the impact migration may have on demographic trends
in Europe.
5. The rapporteur will concentrate on a number of essential and
interrelated questions. What are the demographic issues facing Europe
and to what extent is migration a solution to these demographic
problems? Does Europe need immigration to continue to meet demographic,
economic development and labour market needs? What are the dangers
associated with migration? What are the political barriers and how
can they be overcome?
6. The report is mostly based on expert testimonies presented
at two hearings of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population
held in Geneva on 25 November 2008 (the “Geneva hearing”) and in
Paris on 31 March 2010 (the “Paris hearing”). It also builds on
the work previously carried out by the Parliamentary Assembly in
the field of population, and notably on the recommendations presented
in
Recommendation 1564 (2002) on
the state of the world population,
Recommendation 1683 (2004) on population
trends in Europe and their sensitivity to policy measures,
Resolution 1502 (2006) and
Recommendation 1749 (2006) on demographic
challenges for social cohesion and
Recommendation 1903 (2010) “Fifteen
years since the International Conference on Population and Development
Programme of Action”.
7. The rapporteur recognises the amount of relevant work carried
out over thirty years by the Council of Europe’s European Population
Committee in identifying policy responses to the demographic challenges facing
European societies, as well as that of the European Committee on
Migration in elaborating migration management and good integration
policies. She believes that, even though the responsibility for
finding proper responses to countering demographic decline and population
ageing lies primarily with individual countries and acknowledges
that the European Union might be in a stronger position to influence
migration or development policies, the Council of Europe has a role
to play in this field. She regrets that the discontinuation of the European
Population Committee in 2006 and the proposed plan to discontinue
the European Committee on Migration have deprived the Council of
Europe of a possibility to contribute to the relevant debate that encompasses
not only the European Union but the European continent, and to involve
all 47 member states – as equal partners – in finding common and
multidimensional approaches to the demographic challenges ahead.
2. Key demographic
issues facing Europe – Are we in trouble?
2.1. Birth rates
Birth rates have been falling in most European countries over
the last few decades. Many countries seem poised for continued declines.
However, there are notable exceptions that indicate promising directions
for effective policy development.
8. Globally, birth rates
have fallen drastically
in almost every country around the world. In 1950, the average was
five children per woman, today it is 2.6. The United Nations projects
that this number will reach the “replacement level”
of 2.1 by 2050.
9. Europe is no exception. In fact, Europe was the first region
in the world to experience falling birth rates, starting in France
in the late 1700s. The rates have continued to fall. By the 1970s
they fell below the replacement level, and today women in Europe
have on average 1.5 children.
10. However, this average hides great variations amongst European
countries. In southern Europe (for example Italy, Greece, Spain),
in German-speaking western Europe (for example Switzerland, Germany, Austria)
and in eastern Europe, women have 1.4 or fewer children. In northern
Europe and most of western Europe women have more than 1.8 children.
11. This has not always been the case. Northern and western Europe
were some of the first regions to experience decline, in the 1960s
and 1970s. Some reached levels as low as 1.3 children. However,
with some exceptions, they have now increased again, to over 1.8,
and several countries are now almost back to replacement levels
(for example Iceland, Norway and France).
Southern and eastern Europe
experienced the decline later, in the 1980s and 1990s respectively,
and are not yet showing indications of increase.
12. Prior to the 1970s, countries where women had low participation
in the labour market (for example southern Europe) maintained more
“traditional” patterns of family structure, including high birth
rates. Countries where women had entered the labour market in higher
numbers (for example France and northern Europe) experienced rapid
decreases in birth rates.
13. Since around 1980, this pattern has reversed: countries with
higher female labour participation have experienced higher birth
rates.
14. This difference seems to be correlated with public policy.
Many countries have instituted policies that are intended to increase
births. These policies vary: some aim at making it financially more
advantageous for women to stay at home with their children (for
example tax breaks instituted in several German-speaking countries
and Estonia). Others aim at making it easier to combine working
outside the home and having children (for example availability of
child care, instituted in northern Europe and France).
15. So far, unfortunately none of the measures or programmes has
resulted in a significant increase in fertility rates over an extended
period. Nevertheless, even though financial investments are about
the same in German-speaking countries as in northern Europe and
France, birth rates seem to be increasing faster in those countries
that allow women to remain on the labour market than in those that
encourage women to stay at home.
16. It is natural that it takes time for policies to have an influence:
France, for example, had some of the world’s lowest birth rates
in the first half of the last century, despite having a comprehensive
set of policies to encourage births, with broad support across the
political spectrum. It is only in recent decades that rates have begun
to increase.
17. Southern Europe, especially Italy, is also seen as having
the additional difficulties for young people to enter the labour
market and find housing, thus making it more difficult for them
to start families.
18. A different issue is that women across Europe are having fewer
children than they would like. According to one estimate, on average,
women in Europe want 2.36 children and men want 2.21, compared to
the actual number of around 1.5.
Many
different reasons are given for the gap – health, supportiveness
of the partner or financial reasons. One health problem contributing
to this situation is the reduced ability to conceive. This again
is linked to the age of child bearing (fecundability decreases with
age). However, it is also linked to other health issues, including
unsafe abortion and untreated sexually transmitted infections. As
an extreme example, in Romania the pro-natalist policy of the Ceaucescu
government in the period from 1966 to 1991 included outlawing abortion
and limiting the availability of contraception. The result was that
women had on average five illegal and unsafe abortions by the time
they were 40 years old, and about 20% became sterile as a result.
The
availability of contraception has increased in eastern Europe since
1990 and, as a consequence, levels of abortion have decreased. However,
funding of contraception by governments remains low, and levels
of abortion remain high.
Levels of sexually transmitted infections
have also increased in much of eastern Europe, and this again is
linked to secondary sterility.
19. However, estimates to date indicate that in some of the countries
with the lowest birth rates, Austria for example, the gap between
desired and actual birth rates is the lowest – that is, the desired
norm of few or no children seems to have been integrated into public
opinion.
20. Therefore, if the aim is to increase birth rates, then the
evidence to date is that the most effective measures are those which
make it easier for women to combine family and professional life.
Where women have to choose between children and work, they generally
choose work. It seems likely that measures which make it easier
for young people to start work and families might be favourable
to increasing birth rates. In addition, there is evidence that lack
of public health measures may contribute to involuntary childlessness.
2.2. Life expectancy
and health
Life expectancy is increasing throughout Europe, with only
a few exceptions. However, healthy life expectancy and need for
care vary greatly.
21. Globally, the average life expectancy has risen from
around forty-seven years in 1950 to around sixty-eight years today.
Global life expectancy is continuing to improve – by four to five
months per year – and the United Nations no longer refers to an
upper limit for longevity in its projections.
22. Here again, Europe is no exception. Europe was the first to
experience consistent improvements in life expectancy, starting
as early as the late 1700s, especially in northern Europe and France.
At present, life expectancy averages around
seventy-seven years.
23. For Europe, the only recent exception to this overall positive
trend has been eastern Europe. Between 1990 and 2000 a handful of
countries in eastern Europe experienced a dramatic worsening of
life expectancy. However, this disturbing trend seems now to have
reversed, and eastern Europe is almost back to the level of life
expectancy of the 1960s.
24. The Eurostat population projections expect further increases
in life expectancy of about six years for men and five years for
women (European Union-25) between 2004 and 2050. These will be brought
about mainly by declining mortality at higher ages, thus contributing
to the increasing share of older and very old people in the total
population. Such progress in life expectancy will, however, be contingent
on the avoidance of unhealthy lifestyles, including smoking, poor
diet, lack of physical exercise and excessive alcohol consumption.
25. The question is: are increases in life expectancy inevitably
accompanied by concurrent postponement of physical disability, or
do people merely live longer in a state of old age frailty? If we
turn from overall “life expectancy” to “healthy life expectancy”,
there is great variation between countries in terms of years lived without
major ill health or disability, with ranges of 14.5 years for men
and 13.7 for women. Evidence is as yet not conclusive, but research
suggests that ageing processes are evolving and that people are
living longer free from severe disability.
This
in turn can have a major impact on the cost of old age health care.
2.3. Population decline
and ageing – Are they real?
The native-born population of Europe is beginning to decline,
although its overall population is still increasing due to migration.
Whereas depopulation will concern some European countries, ageing
will be a universal phenomenon.
26. Globally, the world population is still growing,
at close to 80 million a year. The medium projection of the United
Nations is that the world population will grow from 6.9 billion
today to 9.1 billion in 2050.
27. Like any projection, this one is based on assumptions. The
principal assumption is that utilisation of family planning will
continue to grow rapidly, thereby reducing the birth rate, from
2.6 today to the replacement level of 2.1 in 2050. If, instead,
one assumes that family planning utilisation and birth rates remain
at present levels, then the global population will grow to 11 billion
by 2050.
28. In Europe, as noted above, women have been having fewer than
replacement level numbers of children since the 1970s and are now
down to 1.5 children. Due to a “momentum” of past generations and
immigration, there is still a slight “birth surplus” in the European
Union, but this is predicted to be down to zero by 2015.
In
the European Union-27, between now and 2050, the “birth deficit”
of the native population in Europe will total 68 million.
29. Many of the newer member states of the Council of Europe are
losing their populations as well, not only due to low fertility
but also because of emigration to western Europe and, to a lesser
extent, to North America.
30. All in all, the total population size of Council of Europe
member states (excluding Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and
Monaco) is envisaged to decline from 808 million in 2005 to 763
million in 2050, that is to say by 6% over forty-five years.
31. With respect to age structure, as noted above, globally, the
world has been going through a “demographic transition” from high
birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. This results
in a predictable, but also limited, period where populations go
from a first phase, with a high proportion of children under 15,
to a second phase, with a high proportion of adults of working age
(15-59), and then progress to a third phase with a high proportion
of persons aged 60 and above. The second phase, with a high proportion
of working age population and a low proportion of dependent children
or older people is often referred to as the “demographic dividend”
or “demographic window of opportunity”.
32. Until very recently, the European Union was in that second
phase of a favourable age structure aiding economic growth. In fact,
the number of the population aged 15-64 is currently at its peak
(331 million). Even though the size of the population is expected
to decline, total employment is projected to increase due to higher labour
force participation.
33. Globally, the proportion of persons aged 60 or over is estimated
to increase from around 11% today to around 22% by 2050, and the
proportion of the “oldest old” – those aged 80 and above – will
almost quadruple in the same period – making over 80 year-olds the
fastest growing age group, not only in Europe, but worldwide.
34. In the European Union, the proportion of those over 60 is
already 22% and this is projected to grow to 34% by 2050.
That is, the proportion
is higher, but it is growing less quickly than in the world as a
whole. For the working age population, and exclusive of migration,
there are 4.2 people of working age per person over 65 today, and
this will decrease to 2.1 in 2050.
35. So, yes, the issues of depopulation of the native population
and ageing in Europe are real, although not uniform across the region.
Both will have a significant impact on labour markets, economic
growth and social cohesion. It should be noted that the proportion
of European governments that consider population growth too low
increased from 30% to 50% in the period from 1996 to 2009.
36. Are the demographic changes, in particular ageing, unavoidable?
The answer is yes, at this stage of demographic development, they
are.
The reason for this is that by 2030 the
baby boom and baby bust generations will have reached, respectively,
retirement and working age.
37. Will the consequences of these changes be detrimental to societies?
Here the answer is more complex: it depends. The consequences are
very difficult to predict, as they will, to a large extent, depend
on the policies adopted by governments and societies’ readiness
to accept necessary changes.
2.4. Are we in for a
“demographic problem”
There may be a “demographic problem” needing demographic solutions,
yet when translated into terms of productivity, there are many ways
of solving it.
38. As noted in the introduction, the concern generally
stated is that, with ageing populations, the workforce will decline,
and it will need to support larger groups of retired people, who
will not only draw pensions but will also be in the state of ill
health that comes with age, and therefore need expensive care. That
is, the population will consume more than it produces.
The
question will then be whether Europe will be able to maintain the intergenerational
social welfare support system that has been built up over the last
century, and whether it will be able to compete on global markets
if its population begins to decline.
39. To address these questions, it is first important to note
that “working age” does not necessarily mean “working”. Usually
“working age” refers to those aged 15 to 59 (sometimes 15 to 64).
If indeed the concern is whether Europe consumes more than it produces,
then many factors beyond demographic age are significant, such as
the official, and real, retirement age; the actual age when people
start working (15 or later); the proportion of unemployed or people
employed part time; the proportion of women on the labour market
or the productivity of those who do work.
40. In principle, perhaps the most elastic of these concepts is
that of retirement age. In Europe, the official retirement age in
many countries is 65 years. However, the actual retirement age is
lower, and varies from country to country. In most countries it
ranges between 59 and 63 for men, with Sweden and Romania as the highest
in the European Union, at 64 and 65 respectively.
In many countries,
actual and official retirement age and the number of years worked
has gone down since the 1960s, despite the fact that life expectancy
has increased by seven years in the same period.
41. Politically, the concept may be less elastic: there is much
political opposition to extending the retirement age. Yet, at least
some groups would like to continue working beyond the mandatory
retirement age, as evidenced by French scientists leaving for the
United States because they cannot work beyond the age of 65 in France.
42. This compares to the original model of state-financed pension
contributions, which were introduced by Bismarck in 1889, when retirement
age was 65 but average life expectancy was only to around the age
of 45.
Bismarck’s system
of social security worked well in young, growing populations, with
significantly lower life expectancy than retirement age. In ageing,
shrinking populations with life expectancy higher than retirement age,
the systems may become dysfunctional and threatened by bankruptcy.
43. Adjustments to retirement age have dramatic consequences for
ageing populations. For example, at present, the “working age” population
in the European Union is around 40% of the total population – if
one assumes entry into the labour market at the age of 20 and the
actual average retirement age as 60. If the purpose were to keep
that proportion constant at 40% over the next decades, then it would
require an increase in the retirement age from 60 to 65 by 2025,
and to 70 by 2050.
However,
the demographic target of constant population size is by no means
universally accepted by Europeans.
44. There are also the issues related to the age at which people
begin to work, whether or not they are able to enter the labour
market and whether they are unemployed or employed part time. For
example, the proportion of workers who are employed part time varies
greatly: 45% of wage earners in the Netherlands and less than 5%
in Bulgaria.
Another
important factor is whether a policy is developed for senior workers,
for example with “phase out” jobs which allow older workers to remain
in the labour market, as well as whether women are working. In the
United Kingdom 5 million people of working age do not work, but
only 2 million are registered as “unemployed”, including families
where successive generations do not work.
45. In other words, the measure of “total employment rate” meaning
the proportion of the population that is working, as a percentage
of same-age population, becomes important, and this varies greatly
across the region, for example from 46% in Turkey to 79% in Switzerland
for the population aged 15-64.
46. Finally, there is the issue of the productivity of those who
are working, including the skill set of the labour force, which
will be discussed briefly under migration issues below. However,
one general issue relates to education: in 2005, the total employment
rate for highly educated persons in the European Union was 82.5%, for
those with a mid-level education 68.7% and for lower educational
levels it was 46.5%.
47. It is also important to factor in health issues, both in terms
of labour participation, but also after retirement, in terms of
whether the population is in self-sufficient, frail or in long-term
care situations. Keeping populations healthy and finding alternatives
to extremely expensive long-term care will both be very important in
maintaining social welfare support without ruinous consequences.
48. The rapporteur thus concludes that it is important to look
at the demographic challenges in terms of productivity rather than
purely that of demographic age structure or birth rates. It is also
time for a complete rethinking of how ageing and old age is defined,
and how old people are perceived.
3. To what extent
is migration a solution to demographic challenges – Does Europe
need immigration to continue its economic development?
3.1. What is the situation
of migration in Europe today?
Migration is a highly complex issue – and trends in migration
patterns in Europe are shifting quickly.
49. The way population changes and migration interact
– both within countries and internationally
–
is very complex, and its results are not visible in the short term.
But as long as huge disparities persist between continents and regions,
international migration will occur.
50. Globally, 3% of people live in a country that is not their
country of birth,
that
is to say one out of every 33 people is an international migrant.
This is not new – migration has existed for as long as humanity,
and the proportion of foreign-born persons may have been higher
in the 1800s than it is now. What is new is that migration is affecting
almost all countries, that migration flows are becoming more complex
and dynamic, and that a new type of transnational identity may be
emerging.
51. What is also new is the situation in Europe. During the last
two centuries the population in Europe was growing, and many Europeans
resorted to emigration. After a period of low migration between
the two world wars, the 1960s and 1970s saw economic growth attracting
an increase in migration from southern Europe, followed by a period
of considerable family reunification in the 1980s, still mainly
from within Europe. Starting in the 1990s, larger streams of refugees
and asylum seekers emigrated from eastern Europe to western Europe
and from regions outside Europe to most Council of Europe member
states.
52. Today, a total of 70 million people in Europe reside legally
in countries other than the country of their birth, generally making
up 7% to12% of the population of the countries in which they reside.
Apart from a handful
of Council of Europe member states that are experiencing net out-migration
(for example Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania and Moldova),
Europe has in general moved from being principally a region of emigration
to one of immigration. It has in fact become the top destination
of international migration – taking over from the traditional destinations
of North America, Australia and New Zealand. The European Union
now receives 41% of international migrants, compared to 38% in the
United States.
“The
American dream” has become “the European dream”.
53. For the first time, immigrants from non-western, Muslim countries
make up a major proportion of migrants.
54. However, not all countries in Europe are affected equally,
nor are the pressures the same on all member states.
The
profile, number, and situation of people arriving at different borders
vary significantly, and trends are constantly shifting. Migration
pressures, labour demand, levels of unemployment, housing shortages, social
tensions and public opinion also vary in the various European countries.
For instance, countries in northern and western Europe, which were
the focus of migratory flows in the second half of the 20th century, are
today seeing a decrease in international migration, while the burden
increasingly falls on eastern and southern European
states.
In addition, the European immigration situation is greatly influenced
by the existence of the European Union and its increasingly impermeable
borders, which force, for example, many asylum seekers to seek protection
in countries through which they had only intended to transit.
55. Whereas in the past most migrants came from countries with
post-colonial agreements, there has been a rapid increase in the
diversity of migrants as a result of a more interconnected world.
This increased diversity has changed the ethnic, religious and cultural
make-up of Europe.
56. The flow of migrants has also become more complex in terms
of movement and legal status. Permanent settlement is giving way
to more temporary and flexible movements, and a new generation of
migrant globetrotters. With cheaper and faster communication and
travel, migrants have greater opportunities to maintain links with
their countries, and as a result “return” and “circular” migration
flows are becoming increasingly commonplace. An increasing number
of people, both EU and non-EU citizens, have homes in more than
one country. Migrants may also have more than one national identity
(and in some cases citizenship), which has implications for traditional
concepts of integration focused on the process of belonging to and
participating in just one society.
57. Migration has also become more female: about half of today’s
migrants are women.
58. Irregular migration presents one of the most formidable challenges
for the whole of Europe. Although irregular migrants often respond
to genuine labour market needs, taking on jobs for which there are
insufficient numbers of candidates among legal residents and natives,
they remain “invisible” for population statistics. Various sources
estimate that there are 4 to 8 million irregular workers currently
in the European Union.
As regards
the non-European Union member states of the Council of Europe, in
Russia there are also many millions of irregular migrants, mostly
citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Lack
of data on the numbers, rates of employment, duration of stay, family
situation, etc. of irregular migrants in Council of Europe member
states makes it impossible to estimate their impact and contribution
to European societies, be it in terms of population, economy or
social cohesion.
3.2. Will migration
help solve the demographic challenges of depopulation and age structure
in Europe?
Migration can have a substantial short-term effect on population
size but immigration slows down population ageing only to a minor
degree. In terms of economic growth and productivity, immigration
is a small part of the solution, yet one that requires clear, comprehensive
and targeted policies.
59. Many developed countries rely on international migration
to balance their shrinking and ageing populations. According to
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), even at its
current levels, international migration is expected to contribute
to the population growth of developed countries three times more
than the natural growth from 2000 to 2010. This implies that without
immigration these populations would shrink even more.
60. With respect to depopulation, as mentioned above, the projected
birth deficit of the native population in the European Union countries
will amount to 68 million by 2050. According to a study commissioned
for IOM’s
World Migration Report 2010,
a net gain of 100 million migrants would be required in the European
Union alone between now and 2050 in order to “plug the [demographic]
gap” in the labour market.
As
this figure does not take into account emigration from EU countries
and migrants who choose to return, the total number of migrants
needed might be much higher.
61. It is worth noting in this context that, contrary to Europe,
none of the traditional countries of immigration, such as Australia,
Canada, the United States and New Zealand, are expected to experience
a population decline over the next fifty years. The continuing regular
inflow of migrants has traditionally been well above the number
of migrants needed to prevent a decline in the total population
in these countries. Even though the fertility level in these countries
is predicted to remain below the replacement level for the next
few decades, assumed future immigration intakes will be able to
offset declining population growth.
62. Therefore, migration has indeed a substantial role to play
in increasing population size in the short term.
63. With respect to age structure, however, demographers have
long shown that replacement migration is not a solution to demographic
ageing, because the average age of migrants is only three years
younger than that of the native population of European countries.
Just like the native population, migrants also grow older one year
at a time. Besides, the initially higher fertility rate of immigrants
soon decreases to levels similar to native populations. Both native
and immigrant populations would need ever more immigrants to compensate for
population ageing and guarantee replacement.
64. Only huge numbers of migrants would succeed in slowing down
or neutralising the ageing process, but this would result in a phenomenal
increase in population size. Moreover, mass immigration would not necessarily
supply migrants with the required qualifications for the economic
needs or opportunities of European countries. Given the fact that
unemployment is already strongly concentrated among the less-educated
and less-trained population strata, and particularly among less-trained
immigrants and second-generation migrants, massive immigration would
inevitably reinforce this problem.
65. In this respect, mass immigration is not a quick-fix policy
option to compensate for the decline in the population size or for
population ageing. It can help to reduce the decrease in the size
of particular age groups and of the population as a whole, but it
raises many other societal questions.
66. The 2008 United Nations report “Replacement migration: is
it a solution to declining and ageing populations?” and other research
indicate that additional large numbers of immigrants would be likely
to face social obstacles. The acceptance of large numbers of immigrants
coming from culturally distant populations requires substantial
efforts to ensure social, cultural and indentificational integration
of immigrants, and may provoke social and political strife especially
among groups that are less competitive on the labour market.
67. Consequently, it may be concluded that whereas migration may
undeniably have a demographic impact, it is an answer predominantly
to non-demographic norms and goals of a given society,
notably for productivity and economic
growth.
68. Immigration policies, therefore, should have clearly defined
goals and be preceded by an impact analysis of the long-term demographic,
socio-economic and political effects.
3.3. What are the costs
and benefits of migration on demography and economic growth?
The costs and benefits of migration on Europe should be assessed
in a comprehensive way and with a long-term view, taking into account
not only the short-term demand for labour and its immediate benefits,
but also the total cost in terms of development for origin and receiving
countries, as well as integration in host societies.
3.3.1. For countries of
origin and migrants
69. From the vantage point of countries of origin and
of the migrants themselves, first of all, economic factors are important,
but so are demographic “push factors”. Regardless of the various
policies introduced in the least developed countries to improve
family planning, many of these countries have a surplus population
that exceeds the capacities of their labour markets. Hence, encouraging
and facilitating labour migration is seen in those countries as
a policy response to a surplus labour force. A number of governments
actively promote overseas employment as a strategy to increase economic
growth and bring about full employment.
70. For those who migrate, their move is related to higher salaries
and the possibility of sending remittances to their home country.
Salaries for skilled migrants are often several times higher than
what they could earn in their home countries.
71. Remittances sent back to developing countries have been estimated
to be as high as €300 billion in 2009. Regardless of the current
economic crisis, registered remittances amount to well over twice
the amount of official development assistance (€119.8 billion in
2008 from members of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee)
and
are 10 times higher than net private capital transfers to developing
countries.
Remittances amount
to 34% of GDP in Moldova, 18% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 14%
in Serbia and Albania. Remittances are becoming a major international
economic factor (some call the recent attention to it “remittance
euphoria”). They can decrease poverty rates in poorer countries
of origin, and enable recipient families to increase spending on
health and education as well as investment in business.
For
many families, having members working abroad simply constitutes
“risk spreading”.
72. However, there is also growing evidence that remittances alone
do not generate positive effects; the country concerned must create
an environment where these remittances can be invested in development, whether
they are used for consumer goods; for the nutrition, health and
education of families; or whether they are used for investment in
economic activity or improving infrastructure. That is to say, in
order for development benefits to occur, remittances have to be
coupled with other development projects in the country concerned.
73. There are many other possible benefits for migrants, depending
on whether immigration is voluntary or induced. The incentive of
having the possibility to migrate can act as a motivation for up-skilling
in countries of origin, so that even where emigration rates are
high, there are still increased numbers of highly skilled graduates
in the workforce. Where migrants have been able to develop their
skills in countries of destination, their continuing links with
their countries of origin mean that it may also be possible for
them to transfer their skills to their home countries during long-
or short-term returns.
74. There are also geographical factors favouring migration towards
the European continent: although birth rates in North Africa, for
example, have declined (from more than six to fewer than three children
per woman), due to high levels in the past there is a large “bulge”
of young people seeking work. Also, travelling across the Mediterranean
can be easier than crossing the Atlantic.
75. Migrants may also have human rights incentives – as some migrants
leave their countries of origin, either as asylum seekers or economic
migrants, because of human rights concerns in their own countries.
76. In terms of costs, the brain drain does remain a significant
concern for countries experiencing large-scale emigration of skilled
workers. The loss of skilled citizens can be particularly challenging
for emerging economies.
3.3.2. For migrant-receiving
countries
77. From the vantage point of receiving countries, migration
is first and foremost a response to various societal needs and goals,
for example the attraction of specific qualifications (selective
versus indiscriminate migration), safe haven for asylum seekers
and refugees or family reunification. In the presence of specific labour
demands, immigrants can play an important role in the socio-economic
development of a country or region. They often contribute substantially
to the rejuvenation of the population, the reinforcement of the
labour force, the support of the social security system, the revival
of depressed regions or neighbourhoods, etc.
78. There is the overall challenge for Europe today of filling
in gaps in the labour force, but in particular to attract and employ
migrants with skill sets which are needed in European countries
and which do not drain countries of origin of needed manpower.
79. As an example, the European Union estimated back in 2005 that
there would be an overall need for 5 million new jobs in the period
from 2007 to 2008, and that at that time 3 million jobs in the European
Union were unfilled.
These figures may have changed as
a result of the financial crisis and some may in reality be filled
by irregular migrants, but they give an indication of the magnitude
of the problem.
80. Notwithstanding the inflow of 41% of total world migration
to European countries, Europe is experiencing difficulties attracting
highly qualified migrants, for example 5% of the most highly educated
and qualified African migrants come to Europe, with 90% migrating
to North America, whereas 80% of the least qualified migrants come
to Europe.
81. In this respect, Europe will need to attract a qualified labour
force from outside, even though the need for external unskilled
labour will also remain very high.
82. The needs include highly skilled workers such as engineers.
For example, in Germany, one estimate is that the lack of engineers
on the labour market costs the GDP €3.5 billion every year.
Regarding technology workers, who
generate 5% of European Union GDP, it was projected that there would
be a shortage of 300 000 by 2010.
83. A particular and highly visible concern is the health sector,
for both the high- and the low-skilled work force. The often quoted
statistic that there are more Malawian medical doctors in Manchester
than in Malawi, taken in the context that the World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates a global shortfall of 4 million health workers,
is particularly striking. It is also notable that migrants already
play an important role in the provision of care for the elderly.
84. Spain, which is often referred to as the “greengrocer of Europe”,
relies heavily on low-skilled and temporary inflows of migrant workers.
Indeed, agrobusiness throughout Europe is dependent on what are
often seasonal, and sometimes irregular, migrants. There is also
an especially high demand for workers in fields such as the service
sectors, for example hotels and restaurants, as well as construction.
In recognition of these needs, Italy adjusted its quota in 2008
from 170 000 to 520 000 legal migrants per year, mostly low-skilled,
for construction, private household help or agriculture. However,
these are also fields that have been particularly affected by lay-offs
since the beginning of the economic crisis.
85. The rapporteur regrets that the European Union, which was
established specifically with the purpose of furthering economic
co-operation, has so far been unable to come up with a common policy
on economic migration. Although immigration issues are high on the
European Union policy agenda and despite the efforts that have gone
into the attempts since 2001 to establish a “blue card” system,
the concept of which has been partially inspired by the United States’
“green card”, and which is intended to allow competition with the
United States, the “blue card” policy has yet to have the major
scale and effect intended. After four years of preparatory work,
a less ambitious transitional policy was established in 2005, covering
the admission of students, non-remunerated interns, volunteers and
researchers. The concerns expressed about the current policy is
that it is too bureaucratic, too specific and short term, and that
it does not respond to the hopes of the particular group which they
are intended to attract, namely highly skilled workers who are choosing
a country for long-term careers.
86. The area where European policies have failed the most concerns
irregular migration, the growth of which in recent years may be
linked to the increasingly impermeable borders, lack of regular
migration opportunities and incapacity of European states to combat
criminal networks that profit from migrant smuggling, human trafficking
and exploitation of migrants. States have the sovereign right to
decide who enters and remains on their territory. Approaches differ
from one country to another as to how they deal with the issue:
in Sweden, for instance, anybody who obtains a work contract receives
also a residence permit for the duration of the contract, so the
problem exists only to a minimal extent. Spain has regularised a
great number of its migrants that were formerly in an irregular
situation, whereas in a number of Council of Europe member states
the tendency is towards criminalisation and expulsion of irregular
migrants. However, it is unrealistic to believe that states would
be able to force all the estimated 10 to 15 million irregular migrants
to return, or that these migrants will return voluntarily. It is
therefore urgent, on the one hand, for the countries of origin,
transit and destination to take concerted measures to prevent further
irregular migration and combat human smuggling and trafficking and,
on the other hand, to consider options for regularising the situation
of those migrants who are already in Europe and/or guaranteeing
these persons at least certain minimum rights.
87. Perhaps the biggest cost of migration for European societies
is the lack of success in the economic and social integration of
migrants.
88. According to the OECD, integration outcomes for immigrants
arriving over the past thirty years have suffered, as have those
of the children of immigrants, even when the latter have been born
and educated in the host country. This is partly attributable to
below average educational levels among immigrants in many countries,
which are associated with less favourable outcomes whatever the
origin, but also because of the intergenerational transmission of
disadvantage, a phenomenon observed in every society. Geographic concentration
and social isolation have compounded the problem. Although the children
of immigrants have nonetheless made significant strides compared
to the educational levels of their parents, on average their educational
levels still trail behind those of children of native-born inhabitants.
89. Migrant unemployment rates in the European Union-27 are, on
average, 4.4 percentage points higher than native unemployment rates,
and this has become grossly exacerbated in the current economic
crisis situation. Migrant women are particularly affected by unemployment:
rates for migrant women are 2.7 percentage points higher than for
migrant men. This is why a net gain of 100 million persons through
migration would be required to plug a 68 million person gap: this
figure assumes that almost a third of migrants will not be able
to participate in the labour market.
90. Moreover, evidence suggests that highly skilled migrants have
difficulty making effective use of their human capital, due to issues
such as a lack of recognition of their qualifications,
which bars them from sectors that
need labour.
91. Lack of respect for the human rights of migrants, especially
for irregular migrants, is a problem both for the security of migrant
workers and for their ability to contribute to the economic development
of the host society. Particular problems exist for those who are
trafficked as part of organised crime, creating an invisible underclass,
living in sometimes desperate conditions outside the reach of protection
of human rights organisations, or other legal and social frameworks
of the recipient country.
92. Another challenge relates to attitudes towards migrants. Multiculturalism
appears to be in many respects socially dysfunctional and very expensive.
Everywhere
in Europe migrants are expected to adapt to their host country in
practically all important domains of social life – language, laws,
values and norms, with the exception of their beliefs and behaviour
that are purely private and are not against the law. In some forms,
for example dress or culinary customs, pluralism is indeed tolerated,
yet foreigners are seldom welcomed by native populations and racism,
ethnocentrism and xenophobia erupt easily in the event of competitive
economic, social or other group contexts. Immigrants from more distant
cultures have seldom been adequately assisted and helped to integrate
in their new country. Even where huge efforts have been made, progress
has been uneven.
93. One such example was given from the Netherlands, where local
communities are becoming more and more segregated, even when schools
are integrated. Evidence seems to show that the first generation
is better integrated than the following ones.
94. Another factor that indicates low levels of integration is
intermarriage. “The fact that children of migrants in western Europe
[notably from Muslim regions such as Turkey, North Africa or South-East
Asia] predominantly marry within their own group, often with someone
from the country of birth of their parents, for example, is a serious
hurdle on the road to integration. The relation between structural
and identificational integration is not always so straightforward,
however. Indians in the United Kingdom, for example, do very well at
school and in the labour market, in some respects even better then
native English, but overwhelmingly marry with co-ethnics. Nevertheless,
Indian women with higher qualifications have a higher propensity
to intermarry, and economic analyses of current intermarriage patterns
show that migrants who intermarry earn significantly higher incomes
than endogamously married immigrants, even when we take account
of human capital endowments.”
95. Institutionally, both the Council of Europe and the European
Union have initiated many activities to facilitate integration.
However, in practice, integration is often undertaken at local,
regional or national levels rather than at pan-European level; hence,
local integration policies should have the highest priority. These policies
should concentrate on introducing measures at the same time to integrate
those concerned into the local community and prevent them from becoming
socially excluded.
96. There is strong public scepticism among the native-born populations
toward migration and migrants, which has become a politically sensitive
issue. A Eurobarometer 2006 survey indicates that, whereas the public is
aware of the challenges of ageing, immigration is not the preferred
solution. According to the survey, increasing migration from non-European
Union countries ranked in fifth position with 5% of respondents favouring
this solution, behind other measures such as encouraging non-working
women to participate (17%), increasing full-time rather than part-time
employment (16%), increasing the birth rate (15%) and increasing
the retirement age (6%).
97. Another survey indicates that, on average, four out of 10
European Union citizens feel that immigrants contribute a lot to
their country, while a majority of citizens (52%) do not agree with
this statement. However, there are significant differences between
countries. While 79% of Swedes have a positive opinion of the contribution
of immigrants to society, only 12% of Slovaks hold this view.
This may be attributed to the
fact that many European societies have little or no history of systematically
accepting immigrants.
98. Finally, a major obstacle for the development of coherent
migration policies is the profound disagreement among the European
governments as regards the benefits and costs of immigration. There
is no consistent view about ways to manage migration flows and facilitate
economic, social and cultural integration of migrants. Although
efforts have been and are being made at both Council of Europe and
European Union levels, as evidenced by the drawing up of the Council
of Europe’s migration management strategy in 2005 or the recent
Stockholm Programme of the European Union, these efforts have not
had the desired results.
4. The way forward
– How can we achieve a win-win situation? Which policies should
be favoured?
99. The current economic downturn has significantly changed
the picture with respect to international labour migration, at least
in the short term. However, the crisis will not affect the reality
or the direction of demographic change which most European countries
are currently undergoing and which will have significant effects
on their economies and societies. The challenges of ageing remain
and will reassert themselves with the recovery.
100. As was already underlined by the Assembly in 2004,
the expected population decline and further population
ageing need to be addressed by comprehensive and specific long-term
population-related policies. These policies need to be partly responsive
to the new demographic regime in Europe, but will, in the long term, also
have to include policies to modify trends. All of the basic demographic
phenomena – fertility, longevity and migration – will have to be
addressed.
101. A mobilisation of domestic sources of labour is certainly
the most efficient way to compensate for the effects of low birth
rates and ageing. In terms of policy measures, an increase in fertility
and an increase in labour force participation should be two main
priorities, as they directly reduce the speed of population change.
Immigration
is not and will not be an adequate instrument to compensate for
population “greying”.
102. One of the consequences of ageing will be problems with maintaining
the social security systems, especially relating to retirement.
This calls for responsive policies to be adopted that are capable
of adapting social institutions and processes to the newly emerging
population age structure, as well as capable of modifying policies
to re-activate and re-integrate the younger seniors in the workforce
and in society in general.
103. To increase labour force participation, Europe has to say
goodbye to the current pan-European tendency to start retirement
before the age of 60. Some countries have already introduced necessary
legislative changes and increased the retirement age. Incentives
should also be introduced to facilitate legal employment. A way of
doing this could be by reducing the cost of employment and liberalising
labour codes, so that the unemployed find employment quickly. The
removal of unnecessary costs linked to termination of employment
would constitute an incentive for many employers and those employed
in the informal economy to come out and contribute to social security
systems. Employment of women needs to be further encouraged through incentives
that facilitate combining family and professional life. Finally,
development of atypical forms of employment, such as catering for
those who cannot or do not want to work full time, is necessary.
104. As regards population decline, policies will have to address
the current reproductive behavioural patterns. Increasing fertility
to or around generational “replacement level” will require addressing
the fundamental causes of low fertility and will require quite substantial
changes in values, gender relations, economic processes, financial
policies, environmental planning and the organisation of the entire
life course perspective of work, parenthood and retirement.
105. Nevertheless, population decline can be partially and temporarily
compensated by immigration which, however, raises many other societal
problems. Already today, immigration is a hard sell in almost all
European countries, both because of irregular migration and integration
difficulties. It also remains a politically sensitive issue and
one that is easily exploited for electoral reasons. With the economic
recovery, international migration movements are expected to increase
in numbers, which presents a special challenge requiring policies
to manage migration movements better, but also to ensure educational
and labour market results for immigrants and their children that
are more favourable than has been the case in the past.
106. Even though migration may constitute a mere “tree” in the
“demographic forest” that needs to find adequate responses, it is
clear that Europe needs migrants to compensate for its own labour
force shortages as well as to boost economic productivity and growth.
European governments at international, regional and national levels
will need to adopt a comprehensive approach to assess policy implications,
and include an evaluation of policies in all sectors that are potentially
affected by migration. This will include not only economic and labour
market policies but also social policies, in particular those related
to integration, social inclusion and human rights. At the same time,
demographic dynamics must be considered when formulating migration policies.
107. To date, evidence shows that the most effective and sustainable
policies are those that are stable over time, meaning that they
have support across the political spectrum, and from the public
(including that they must respect human rights) and are financially
realistic.
108. In order for the future migration management policies in Europe
to be sustainable, they will have to live up to a certain set of
criteria. They should:
- encourage
and attract the “desired” migration corresponding to European labour
market needs;
- discourage “undesired” migration, including irregular
migration and human trafficking;
- incorporate both short-term and long-term needs for migration;
- abide by established protection and human rights standards;
- foster integration of immigrant populations;
- take into account the development needs of the migrants’
countries of origin.
109. First of all, immigration must be selective and numerically
adjusted to the labour market needs and reception capacities of
host countries. Complex modern societies cannot cope, without provoking
or experiencing serious social strife and disorder, with indiscriminate
or mass immigration. Immigration needs to be sustainable for the
receiving country, and must contribute to the society's welfare,
security, stability and cohesion.
110. A successful labour migration policy involves a greater role
for employers in identifying and selecting immigrants. Sound migration
management thus needs to incorporate incentives for both employers
and immigrants to follow the rules, as well as safeguards to protect
immigrant and domestic workers from exploitation.
111. Secondly, Europe has to face up to the challenges posed by
irregular migration. It is evident that European countries cannot
absorb all of the existing and projected migration pressures from
outside. Border control management has improved to a certain extent,
but it needs to be made more effective, both within and outside
the European Union area. On the other hand, policies need to be
adopted that favour legal channels of migration. Any restrictions
are unlikely to be 100% effective and are likely to be costly both
in human rights and practical terms. Sustainable solutions will
have to be found for the millions of irregular migrants already residing
in Council of Europe member states.
112. Thirdly, migration needs to be seen from both short-term and
long-term perspectives. It has to respond both to the short-term
shifting (sometimes seasonal) needs and long-term structural needs
for migration. Many future labour needs will be of a long-term nature.
It is therefore illusory to believe that such needs can be filled through
temporary migration alone. There is a need for more high-skilled
immigration to complement the influx of low-skilled labour, for
which there is also likely to be much demand. The procedure adopted
by the European Commission in 2005 for the admission of third-country
researchers is a first step towards addressing this issue. Such
arrangements need not come at the cost of developing countries in
the form of a brain drain, but can and should be beneficial to all
parties. A better mix of both high- and low-skilled migrants may
exert a positive influence on the public perception of immigration
and may help overcome any reluctance to welcome further immigration.
113. Fourthly, human rights concerns continue to be significant,
both for practical and more “cultural” reasons. Lack of respect
for human rights reduces the practical feasibility of migration
measures, not least in situations of irregular migration. Measures
that are based on human rights stand a better chance of being more acceptable
in the long term, both for migrants and the native-born population.
The “rights arguments” will be more acceptable if they are also
demonstrated to foster a win-win situation – for migrants, as well
as countries of destination and origin.
114. Fifthly, migration is only helpful if migrants and their descendants
have equal opportunities for successful integration within the economy
and society of their host country. Improving the integration of
migrants is therefore a policy priority without which there would
be no successful migration management imaginable in Council of Europe
member states. The past and current failures call for a general
revision of policies and strategies, particularly those concerning
migrants of ethnically distant origin. New active multi-dimensional local
integration strategies are needed to avoid the creation of ethnically
stratified societies. People migrate in order to improve their living
conditions and their quality of life. Inadequate integration, especially
of second and third generation migrants, can result in ghetto formation
and limited opportunities for upward social mobility or full participation
in all aspects of social life in the host country.
115. Integration of migrants implies also the acceptance by the
national population of the cultural identity and values of the immigrants
as long as they are not against the law or in conflict with fundamental
European values concerning individual development, educational opportunity,
gender equality, human dignity, democracy and an individual's place
in society in general. All forms of racism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia,
both among the national population and immigrants, should be combated.
116. Associating the native population is all-important – constructive
public dialogue about the means, aims and objectives of immigration
policies should be clear, non-politicised and transparent. Governments
should be honest about what they are setting out to achieve through
their immigration policies, how they intend to achieve these aims,
and how they intend to maximise the benefits and minimise the negative
impacts of immigration. They should also challenge myths and misconceptions.
Issues
such as the recognition of migrants’ qualifications, addressing
prejudices and discriminatory practices, and addressing female immigrant unemployment
need to be addressed for migration to fill demographic and labour
market gaps.
117. Sixthly, migration pressures from developing countries can
only be adequately reduced by stimulating the social, economic and
human rights development in those countries. Europe might contribute
to this by substantially intensifying its development co-operation
with emigration countries. The “brain drain” from the latter may
require economic and cultural compensation measures.
118. Finally, the demographic view of migration presented in this
report calls for major institutional changes throughout Europe,
in terms of how we view citizenship, more transparent procedures,
access to services and institutions and entitlement to the components
of economic well-being.
119. In conclusion, the French demographer and sociologist, Auguste
Compte, is credited with the statement that “demography is destiny”.
This report argues that demography is indeed important for societies,
but that a concern with numbers is not in itself enough – parliamentarians
need to shape that destiny.