1. Introduction
1. It is over fifteen years since the end of the conflicts
that ravaged the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
The purpose
of this report is to consider bilateral relations between the countries
that emerged from the former Yugoslavia and to find out what the
Council of Europe could offer to the process of reconciliation and
political dialogue in the region. It was my view from the outset
that we should not be the protagonists and that reconciliation cannot
be imposed. On the contrary, it is our role to assist and facilitate
initiatives that originate from citizens, governments and NGOs of
the states of the former Yugoslavia. It is my intention to underline
the positive actions undertaken at a political level to overcome
the legacy of the past and foster reconciliation between the neighbouring
states.
2. By default, all the states which emerged from the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) will be discussed, to some
degree, in this explanatory memorandum. However, in reality, the
main focus of the report will be on relations between Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and, to some extent, Montenegro.
3. I do not wish to deal with the question of Kosovo
in any great detail here.
The Parliamentary Assembly has covered this elsewhere and I refer
the reader to Mr Björn von Sydow’s excellent report on the situation
in Kosovo and the role of the Council of Europe.
The
Council of Europe applies a policy of status neutrality towards
Kosovo, and in
Resolution
1739 (2010) on the situation in Kosovo and the role of
the Council of Europe the Assembly emphasised that the focus of
the Council of Europe’s attention as regards Kosovo should not be on
status but on standards. That said, the issue of the status of Kosovo
has affected relations between the states of the former Yugoslavia
and will be considered in this regard, as an element of stability
in the region as a whole. Also, while this report focuses only on
the consequences of the wars between 1991 and 1995, some of the
statistics contained in it will be affected by the later conflict
in Kosovo.
4. It may be useful to describe the different stages in the preparation
of this report. I was appointed rapporteur on 22 June 2009. The
Political Affairs Committee was invited by the Serbian delegation
to the Assembly to hold its committee meeting at the Serbian Parliament
on 6 and 7 September 2010. On 6 September, the committee held an
exchange of views with government ministers and the Speaker of Parliament.
In the afternoon, the Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention through
Dialogue and Reconciliation organised a hearing on peace building
in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, where I was able to present an
introductory memorandum on the subject. We then heard views from
several NGOs as well as from my colleague, Mr Miljenko Dorić, who
will be presenting a report to the Assembly on the obligation of
member states of the Council of Europe to co-operate in the prosecution
of war crimes,
at
the January 2011 part-session. I took advantage of this opportunity
to carry out a mission in Belgrade on 7 and 8 September 2010, where
I met with government ministers, parliamentarians, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)
and a number of NGOs.
5. I subsequently visited Zagreb on 28 and 29 October 2010 and
Bosnia and Herzegovina on 22 and 23 November 2010, where I met with
parliamentarians, government officials, the office of the Attorney
General and the State Court, the Ombudsman, several NGOs, representatives
of international organisations and media representatives. I also
met with the Croatian and Serbian delegations to the Assembly during
the June 2010 part-session and the Slovenian delegation during the
October 2010 part-session in Strasbourg. Finally, I visited Brussels
on 29 and 30 November 2010 to discuss my report with key European
Union players and to participate in a hearing organised by the European
Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights on “Human rights in the Western
Balkans”. The discussions I had with my colleagues and interlocutors
have been extremely useful for this report.
2. Overcoming the legacy of the war
6. The conflicts that ravaged the territory of the former
Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 were the deadliest in Europe since
the Second World War. They were characterised by heinous war crimes,
including genocide, with ethnic cleansing and rape being used as
an instrument of warfare. They provoked mass population displacement,
within the region and beyond. According to estimates, the wars cost
the lives of approximately 140 000 people, a quarter of whom went
missing.
Fifteen years after the end
of the war, 340 808 persons are internally displaced and there are
still over 120 000 refugees, unable or unwilling to return to the
areas they lived in before the outbreak of war. The identification
of missing persons and the discovery of mass graves is ongoing,
and approximately 14 000 people are still unaccounted for.
7. One should not forget that, in the former Yugoslavia, the
post-conflict transition has also coincided with a post-communism
transition which took the form of state building in the literal
sense of the word. The basis for democracy, rule of law, political
dialogue and human rights was not fully established and the countries
that emerged from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia were
also faced with the task of improving their democratic governance
and restoring a climate of mutual trust and stability in the region.
8. When my colleagues and I initially tabled the motion for a
resolution which led to this report on 22 January 2009, relations
between some of the states of the former Yugoslavia looked weak.
Many of the deep wounds caused by the conflicts seemed to have no
prospect of healing. Indeed, from the outside, it appeared that,
as the states of the former Yugoslavia made progress towards further
European Union integration and entertained greater dialogue with
Brussels, their bilateral relations were at a standstill and, in
some cases, deteriorating. Ambassadors of the neighbouring countries
were being withdrawn or expelled and we were particularly concerned
about strong public statements and discourses that were being made
by nationalistic politicians, reinforcing old divisions.
9. Nevertheless, I was encouraged by what I saw on my visits
to the region. I found that, since the committee embarked on this
project, the governments concerned have taken many positive steps,
which indicate a greater willingness to overcome the legacy of the
past. There was an abundance of positive examples of people working
together for change: there has been an intensification of relations
between Zagreb and Belgrade; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia pledged
to overcome their historic differences when issuing the Istanbul
Declaration; and states are beginning to agree to have outside bodies
arbitrate over border disagreements. The region has come a long
way and these positive developments should be acknowledged and supported
by the international community.
10. This, however, does not prevent us from looking at the problems
that persist in the region. The principal problem is the constitutional
deadlock which continues to be an obstacle impeding Bosnia and Herzegovina from
moving ahead towards a fully fledged democracy, and a solution also
needs to be found for the refugees and internally displaced persons
(IDPs), who remain the most visible reminder of the conflicts.
3. Nationalism, ethnicity and civic states
11. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were characterised
by inter-ethnic violence and mass population transfers between the
new states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, as people were
either forcibly moved or fled to neighbouring states where they
felt that they would be better protected.
12. At the end of the conflicts, the solution proffered by the
international community was the concept of civic states, whereby
citizens and public officials owed their allegiance to the newly
formed state institutions rather than to the ethnic group to which
they were perceived to belong. In principle, this was a positive
basis from which to begin the peace-building process in the region.
However, in practice, minorities have often been discriminated against
or have been unable to participate in public life in the way that
they should, which has hampered reconciliation in the region. This
is particularly the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the complex
constitutional architecture that it was left with following the
1995 Dayton Peace Agreement has facilitated voting along ethnic
lines. Furthermore, minorities or the “others” that do not belong
to the “three constituent peoples” (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs)
are unable to stand in elections for the House of Peoples or the
Presidency, a situation which has recently been held to be in violation
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5).
13. Steps have been taken across the region to introduce measures
to combat discrimination. All states are parties to the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157)
and Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS
No. 177), which, among other things, prohibits discrimination on
grounds such as race, colour, language, national or social origin
and association with a national minority. Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia,
Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have ratified the European Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages (ETS No. 148). “The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” is a signatory but has yet to ratify it.
14. Anti-discrimination laws have been adopted in Croatia (2008),
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), Serbia (2009), “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” (2010) and Montenegro (2010). National minority councils
have also been established in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia
to represent the rights and interests of minorities. The passing
of these laws is a positive development as it goes some way towards ensuring
that minorities are represented and their voices are heard. This
is essential in countries that were at one time engulfed in inter-ethnic
violence.
4. Main issues affecting reconciliation and political
dialogue
4.1. Missing persons
15. As a consequence of the armed conflicts of the 1990s
in the Western Balkans, it is estimated that 40 000 persons went
missing. Today, approximately 26 000 persons have been accounted
for and an estimated 14 000 persons are still missing in the region.
While the governments in the region have made significant headway,
the progress made in Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly noteworthy
as two thirds of the missing persons from the conflict there are
now accounted for.
16. I was told that the Western Balkans region also benefited
from the DNA-led process of identification of the International
Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP). Of the number of missing persons
outlined above, the ICMP has assisted Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo – and to a lesser extent Croatia – in using DNA to make
accurate identifications of missing persons. The approximately 14 000
persons that remain missing will be more difficult to find. The
ICMP believes that the process has reached a virtual impasse in Croatia
and Kosovo for both technical and political reasons.
4.1.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina
17. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process is now slowing
down as the majority of missing persons have been accounted for.
The search and recovery of missing persons from the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina will be particularly difficult for non-Srebrenica
cases. As regards Srebrenica, it is estimated that 1 600 persons remain
missing; however, owing to the existence of hundreds of secondary
mass grave sites, the recovery of disarticulated body parts of already
identified and buried persons may continue for years. The creation
of the Central Records by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Missing Persons
Institute (MPI) will be of great help to the ICMP in understanding
how to address strategically the remaining missing persons’ cases
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18. The ICMP assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina in setting up the
MPI in 2005. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has also been assisting the Bosnian authorities in building up the
capacity of the MPI at state level and has published on its website
a list of the names of those that remain missing.
19. The MPI is an independent institution tasked to assist, facilitate
and co-ordinate the missing persons process in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in line with universal human rights principles and without regard
to the religious or national origin of those missing. However, since
its creation, owing to the deteriorating political situation in
the country and the tendency to shift jurisdiction from state-level
institutions back to the entity level, the MPI operates under constant
political pressure. For example, immediately after the MPI became operational
in 2008, the Republika Srpska entity government established its
Operational Team for tracing missing persons, which is an attempt
to move back to an entity-based process where only one group would
be searched for.
20. The MPI claims that the political manipulation of the missing
persons issue has been worse over the last two years than at any
time over the previous ten. Ensuring sustainability and continuation
of a non-discriminatory process within the context of finding the
missing is a challenge, particularly in a country where aggressive
nationalism is growing. The success of state-level structures such
as the MPI, and the adoption of the Law on Missing Persons, which
transcend nationalistic agendas and approach the issue in a universal sense,
are the only long-term hope for relatives of the missing to continue
to find answers.
4.1.2. Croatia
21. According to the Government of Croatia, there are
almost 2 000 persons still missing. In an effort to assist Croatia
in a small-scale DNA-led programme, the ICMP has created a joint
project of DNA-led identifications with the Croatian Ministry of
Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity and its Office
for Detained and Missing Persons. The project was formally launched
in November 2004, following the signing of an agreement that defined
the parameters of co-operation concerning cases of joint interest
for Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
22. In line with conclusions reached at the ICMP’s 11th Regional
Conference on Missing Persons at the beginning of 2010, an agreement
between representatives of the Croatian Government and the ICMP
was reached to expand the Joint Identification Project.
23. The Croatian Office for Detained and Missing Persons regularly
reports on its activities to the associations of families of missing
persons in Croatia and Serbia. Families are also informed about
results of joint meetings between the Croatian Office for Detained
and Missing Persons and the Serbian Commission on Missing Persons,
as well as trilateral meetings that include representatives from
the Bosnia and Herzegovina MPI.
4.1.3. Serbia
24. Co-operation between Serbia and the ICMP on resolving
the missing persons issue has remained good since 2001. As a consequence,
over 1 400 mortal remains have been recovered on the territory of
Serbia since 2001. In 2010, the Serbian Commission and the Bosnia
and Herzegovina MPI worked well together at the Lake Perućac site
and, as a result, the remains of approximately 97 persons were recovered
on both the Bosnian and Serbian sides of the lake.
25. To date, five meetings on joint co-operation between Serbia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were held under the auspices
of the ICMP and the ICRC. These meetings have resulted in improved
co-operation and a better exchange of information between the three
countries, as well as an increase in the number of DNA-led identifications
through this exchange of information.
4.1.4. Recent developments
26. I was encouraged to read that, meeting in Vukovar
on 4 November 2010, Serbian President Tadić and Croatian President
Josipović spoke in favour of resolving the fate of missing persons
during the conflicts of the 1990s and considered that much remained
to be done for the reconciliation of the two states. On 10 March 2010,
at the presentation of the second edition of the ICRC Book of Missing
Persons on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, Croatian Prime
Minister Jadranka Kosor, stressing the appeal “Nemojmo ih zaboraviti!” (Let us
not forget them!), delivered a promise on behalf of the Croatian
Government to make greater efforts to complete the search for the
missing persons. I was also encouraged to read about the recent
statements of President Tadić and President Josipović, who met in
Zagreb on 24 November 2010, and said that the issue of missing persons
was the priority. For this purpose, the two presidents also advocated
opening the archives.
4.2. Refugees and long-term displaced persons
27. The wars in the former Yugoslavia were marked by
mass population movements. Between 1991 and 1995, over two million
people from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were displaced, both
within and beyond the region. Since the end of these conflicts in
1995, many have decided to settle permanently in the places they
fled to, whilst others have returned to their homes and communities.
28. Nevertheless, a solution has yet to be found for the approximately
half a million refugees and IDPs that remain. The majority do not
have adequate housing, live in poverty and are unemployed. Integration
into their new communities has not always been facilitated by the
authorities. Many continue to live in collective centres in appalling
conditions. Fifteen years after the end of the conflicts, the problem
is particularly acute in Serbia, which continues to host 82 603
refugees, the vast majority of whom had fled from Croatia (61 186).
According to the Serbian Government, there are a further 204 753
IDPs in Serbia as a result of the Kosovo conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina
has yet to resolve the plight of the 113 465 IDPs on its territory.
Table 1: Refugees and IDPs as a result of the conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia
State
|
Refugees
|
IDPs
|
Total
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
7 064
|
113 465
|
120 529
|
Croatia
|
986
|
2 199
|
3 185
|
Montenegro
|
16 451
|
0
|
16 451
|
Serbia
|
82 603
|
204 753
|
287 356
|
Kosovo
|
233
|
19 399
|
19 632
|
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
|
1 564
|
621
|
2 185
|
Totals
|
108 901
|
340 437
|
449 338
|
29. The UNHCR provides assistance to those who wish to
return. However, there are many obstacles for those who wish to
return to their former homes, including poor economic prospects,
lack of documentation, legal impediments to repossessing their property,
not to mention the hostile attitudes of local communities.
4.2.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina
30. At the end of the conflict, the international community
provided Bosnia and Herzegovina with assistance for repossession
of pre-war existing homes to alleviate the problem of refugees and
IDPs under the “Property Implementation Plan”.
This plan was largely completed
in 2003 and, since then, nearly 200 000 homes, including roughly
equal numbers of private and socially owned properties, have been
returned to their pre-war residents. This facilitated the return
of some one million persons, almost half the population displaced
by the conflict, to their original homes.
Despite this, 113 465 people remain displaced
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
31. There was an issue with refugees from Croatia. At the height
of the conflict, there were estimated to be between 40 000 and 45 000
Croatian refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many decided to return
to Croatia and only 6 951 are left in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Voluntary
repatriation continues, albeit in small numbers (975 returned in
2006, 466 in 2007, 425 in 2008 and 620 in 2009). The majority of
those remaining intend to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
UNHCR has been assisting the most destitute. A substantial number of
IDPs and returnees remain in a precarious situation, lacking adequate
living conditions, and require continued support. Some 7 500 IDPs
remaining in collective centres are extremely vulnerable. On 28 November
2010, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas
Hammarberg, visited the collective centre for displaced persons
in Lukavica, near Sarajevo, and was gravely concerned by the substandard
living conditions there. He said that “it is not acceptable that
fifteen years after the end of the war more than 7 000 people, many
of them elderly and in ill health, continue to live in housing that
may not be considered as humane in today’s Europe. The human rights
standards of the European Social Charter are fully applicable to
these persons.”
32. However, needs far outstrip the resources available. Co-operation
among governments in the region needs to be reinvigorated and efforts
redoubled to enable some 7 000 refugees to find durable solutions. Ending
the chapter of protracted displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is critical for domestic and regional stability and in order to
move the country towards European integration.
4.2.2. Croatia
33. Approximately 550 000 people were displaced within
Croatia as from 1991-92. At the same time, 400 000 refugees from
Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to Croatia. It is estimated that 120 000
of these, who were mainly of Croat origin, went on to acquire Croatian
citizenship. Recently, the Croatian Government has taken steps to
assist non-Croat refugees to acquire nationality and, since March
2009, non-Croat refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina have been able
to access legal status and initiate the naturalisation process under preferential
terms, on the condition that they have lived there for over five
years. All refugees are entitled to housing assistance and have
access to the labour market.
34. The numbers of refugees and IDPs are significantly smaller
today than they were in the 1990s. I was told that housing solutions
are being found for the 986 refugees and 2 199 IDPs that remain.
35. By far the largest problem in Croatia is that of those who
wish to return from Serbia. The Croatian authorities have registered
over 132 400 returnees belonging to the Serb minority.
36. There were significant delays in the restitution of property
for those returning from Serbia who had lived in privately owned
accommodation before the war. The delays have been found to be in
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The process of private property restitution,
however, has now largely been completed and approximately 20 000
properties have been repossessed, mainly by ethnic Serbs. At the
same time, the Croatian Government has provided resources for the
reconstruction of 146 000 houses or flats.
37. That said, no legal remedies have been offered to the estimated
30 000 Serb families who had to flee from socially owned apartments
and who were stripped of their occupancy/tenancy rights as a result.
Some 6 400 families are still awaiting resolution of their claims.
On 8 November 2010, the decision on the merits of the European Committee
of Social Rights with regard to the case Centre on Housing Rights
and Evictions (COHRE) v. Croatia (Complaint No. 52/2008) became
public. The committee concluded that there was a violation of Article
16 of the European Social Charter (Right of the family to social,
legal and economic protection), read in the light of the non-discrimination
clause of the Preamble of the Charter, for displaced families wishing
to return to Croatia for whom the absence of effective and timely
offer of housing has for a long period of time constituted a serious
obstacle to return.
38. On my visit to Zagreb, government officials informed me of
a law passed in September 2010, which opens the possibility for
former occupancy/tenancy rights holders, beneficiaries of the Housing
Care Programme, to purchase their allocated flats outside the “areas
of special state concern”.
However, the economic crisis has halted
all programmes. While returnees no longer consider the security
situation of prime concern in Croatia, the social and economic situation
in war-affected areas remains an issue.
39. According to UNHCR data (September 2010), the 80 000 Croatian
refugees still registered in neighbouring countries are a reminder
that closing the refugee file remains a humanitarian and political challenge
in the region.
4.2.3. Serbia
40. According to the UNHCR, at the end of the conflicts,
Serbia hosted some 520 000 refugees, 44% of whom had fled Bosnia
and Herzegovina and 56% Croatia. 145 000 are thought to have returned
to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and between 250 000 and 370 000
are thought to have been naturalised by Serbia. There are 82 603
that remain, 72% of whom originated from Croatia. Research conducted
by the UNHCR and the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees indicated
that some believe that it is important to maintain their refugee
status so that they are eligible for assistance for property reconstruction
in their country of origin, as well as for housing programmes in
Serbia. However, it is thought that as few as 5% of those left are
considering returning to their country of origin.
41. Refugees are among the most vulnerable people in Serbia. Many
are still accommodated in the 42 collective centres throughout Serbia.
The unemployment rate is significantly higher among the refugee community
than in the general population. On my visit to Belgrade, I heard
how extremist nationalistic parties have attempted to capitalise
on the plight of refugees.
4.2.4. Steps towards finding a solution
42. On 31 January 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
and the erstwhile Serbia and Montenegro came together and signed
the so-called “Sarajevo Declaration” in which they agreed to find
a solution to the problem of IDPs and refugees by the end of 2006.
“Road maps” were drawn up for each of
the states parties but little action was subsequently taken to find
a durable solution. An International Conference on “Durable Solutions for
Refugees and Displaced Persons” was convened in Belgrade on 25 March
2010, and ministers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro
and Serbia attended. A follow-up meeting was held on 16 September 2010
in Podgorica, where concrete plans to find a durable solution were
drafted. An international donor conference will be held in December
2010 to discuss the setting up of a multi-donor fund to assist in
the process of return or local integration of refugees and IDPs,
the closure of collective centres and the provision of assistance
to the neediest. The European Union, UNHCR and the OSCE stand together
in supporting this goal.
43. Refugees and IDPs represent the most visible reminder of the
horrors and grave injustices that characterised the conflicts. I
was told by a number of interlocutors that their plight is often
seized upon by extremist parties, particularly in Serbia, for their
own purposes. Full reconciliation in the region can only be achieved
once the numerous issues surrounding displacement in the region
have been resolved.
44. I strongly believe it is high time for a solution to be found
for the almost 450 000 refugees and IDPs that remain and I encourage
the governments of the states concerned to commit their energies
to implementing any action plans created as a result of the resurrected
Sarajevo Declaration. Furthermore, I urge the international community
to provide the financial assistance to turn the plans into concrete
action and ensure that these long-suffering victims of the war are
finally able to settle. A solution for the refugees and IDPs needs
to be found not only for humanitarian reasons, but also to provide
stability to the region.
4.3. “Erased people” in Slovenia: an issue solved
45. After the dissolution of the SFRY, 171 132 citizens
of the former Yugoslav republics living in Slovenia were granted
citizenship of the new state. However, almost 26 000 people, mainly
nationals of other former Yugoslav republics, were removed from
Slovenia’s permanent residents register in 1992 as a result of a
law that was enacted following the dissolution. They either did
not request Slovenian citizenship within the time limit or, in a
small number of cases, their request for it was not granted.
Many
left and a few were deported as a result, mostly officers of the
Yugoslav National Army or members of their families. Those that
stayed had difficulties in accessing housing, work, health care,
basic services and social security.
46. The Slovenian Government attempted to resolve this anomaly
in 1999, when it enacted the Act Regulating the Legal Status of
Citizens of the Former SFRY living in the Republic of Slovenia.
However, the act only gave foreign nationals three months within
which to register and as a consequence was subsequently annulled
by the Constitutional Court in 2003 for violating provisions of
the constitution, following a complaint by the Ombudsman.
A July 2010
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights found that Slovenia’s treatment
of the “erased people” amounted to a violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
The Court concluded that it
was necessary for Slovenia to pass legislation to regulate the situation
of the several thousand people who are estimated to be in the category
of “erased” and issue them with retroactive permanent residence
permits.
47. The Slovenian National Assembly adopted the Act Amending the
Act Regulating the Legal Status of Citizens of Former Yugoslavia
living in the Republic of Slovenia on 8 March 2010, and it entered
into force on 24 July 2010. The new act provides for the restoration
of the residency status and registration of permanent residence
with retroactive effect, under certain conditions, for all citizens
of the former Yugoslavia whose names were removed from the population
register in 1992. Permanent residence permits will also be made available
to “erased persons” who do not live in Slovenia, if it is established
during the procedure that they have been absent for well-founded
reasons that do not terminate the actual residence requirement as
defined by the act.
4.4. Negotiations over territorial borders
48. Owing to the complicated history of the former Yugoslavia,
there are a number of ongoing territorial negotiations between the
various states, which are also inextricably linked to minority rights.
Recently, a number of states have agreed to resolve their border
disputes. An Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Slovenia
and the Government of Croatia on resolving the border dispute was
signed in Stockholm on 4 November 2009. Both parliaments have ratified
the agreement and the notes on ratification were exchanged on 25
November 2010.
49. Similarly, Croatia and Montenegro have agreed to take a case
to the International Court of Justice to resolve their border dispute
and are currently co-operating on preparing their submissions. There
are further border disputes between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,
Croatia and Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, which
need to be resolved in order to give certainty and facilitate reconciliation
in the region.
50. Past experience has demonstrated that the European Union’s
pre-accession process has not been able to provide solutions to
these problems, as the acquis does
not entail any competence over border disputes or over minority
rights. However, the potential impact of the lack of border definitions
on the politics of the region and on the enlargement prospect is
huge.
51. I therefore share the view of some commentators
–
whom I also met during my visit to Brussels on 29 November 2010
– that the European Union could promote a region-wide process, decoupled
from the accession process, aimed at creating a context more favourable
to dialogue, building upon the leverage that the High Representative,
Catherine Ashton, had in persuading Belgrade and Pristina to agree
to bilateral talks.
52. The European Union should involve the relevant organisations
present in the former Yugoslavia, such as the Council of Europe,
the OSCE and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), and co-ordinate
with other international actors to address complex issues linked
to unresolved border problems. The Council of Europe, in particular,
upholds the most appropriate principles and standards regarding
democracy and minority protection. Minority rights need to be included
and addressed through creative and democratic institutional and administrative
solutions, especially in frontier and multi-ethnic areas.
4.5. The constitutional impasse in Bosnia and Herzegovina
53. Bosnia and Herzegovina is at the centre of the question
of reconciliation and ethnic divisions are still strong. The general
elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 3 October 2010 nevertheless
did represent some degree of progress. The climate of the election
campaign was peaceful and the polling and vote counting on election
day took place in a calm, organised manner. However, the Bureau’s
ad hoc committee, of which I was a member, concluded that the elections
were once again conducted with ethnicity and residence-based limitations
to the active and passive suffrage rights imposed by the Dayton
Accords. As such, the extant legal framework continues to violate
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and also
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12.
54. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Council of Europe
in 2002, the Assembly has been repeatedly calling for the implementation
of a constitutional reform with a view to improving the functioning
of the state’s democratic institutions, ensuring compliance with
the European Convention on Human Rights and speeding up the necessary
reforms to complete the fulfilment of its remaining commitments
and obligations.
55. In its
Resolution
1701 (2010) on the functioning of democratic institutions
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted in January 2010, the Assembly
called on the key political stakeholders to engage in meaningful
and constructive dialogue about concrete proposals for constitutional
amendments, with a view to adopting a comprehensive reform package,
removing in particular the constitutional discrimination against
the so-called “others”, as well as the members of the constituent
peoples who do not reside in the entity where their ethnic group
is largely represented, before the calling of the October 2010 general
elections. This message was reiterated in
Resolution 1725 (2010) on the urgent
need for constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted
in April 2010.
56. The elections underscored difficulties in forming a government
capable of launching political and economic reforms. I very much
regret that the required constitutional reform was not in place
in time to be applied to the October elections. That said, the Council
of Europe has been invited by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to take part in the meetings of the working group set up to prepare
the constitutional reform, having regard to the expertise of the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission)
on this subject.
57. As stressed by the Committee of Ministers in September 2010,
the political forces in the country should work constructively towards
a consensus to urgently address this very serious situation and
allow constitutional reform to be taken forward as rapidly as possible
as
well as to avoid the risk that the country slides into a dormant,
frozen conflict.
58. I believe that a new balance needs to be found between multicultural
living, “ethnic democracy” and equal rights of the three major communities
– which has been the framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement – and
the general principles of democracy and equal citizenship, which
are incompatible with an ethnic basis. This requires prudence, patience,
wisdom, courage and determination.
59. The political situation and the internal dynamics in Bosnia
and Herzegovina greatly influence the relations and political dialogue
within the region as a whole. The country needs to overcome its
stalemate and to work on establishing a functional administration.
Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat and Bosniak politicians will all suffer
politically if Bosnia and Herzegovina falls behind the rest of the
region.
60. The international community, and the European Union in particular,
should accompany this gradual process of change, through measures
aimed at strengthening an effective decentralised state with functioning democratic
institutions that work right across the territory.
5. Accepting the past while looking to the future
5.1. Identifying individual responsibilities: investigation
and prosecution of war crimes
61. Justice and accountability for war crimes committed
during the conflicts that occurred on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia are an essential precondition for regional reconciliation.
The process of bringing to justice those responsible for the most
serious crimes was spearheaded by the ICTY, which was established
by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 in order to bring
to justice those responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Since its inception, it has indicted 161 individuals
and has secured the convictions of over 64 wartime criminals.
In doing
so, it has contributed to creating an indisputable historical record
about the crimes committed during the 1990s.
62. At the time that the ICTY was set up, national courts were
either unwilling or unable to carry out this process and national
authorities’ co-operation with the ICTY was not always forthcoming.
However, co-operation has improved markedly over the years and the
vast majority of indictees have now been transferred into ICTY custody.
Notably, the capture and handing over to the ICTY of the wartime
leader of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzić, by the Serbian authorities
in 2008, demonstrates that key actors are trying to overcome the
legacy of the past. Today, two indictees, Ratko Mladić and Goran
Hadzić, remain at large.
63. It is expected that the ICTY will have completed the majority
of its trials and appellate work by the end of 2013. The ICTY has
never had sole jurisdiction to try those responsible for the crimes
committed, but shares it with the national courts of the countries
concerned. As the tribunal prepares to close its doors, it has been assisting
the national authorities in building up the capacity of the national
courts to deal with prosecutions of crimes committed during the
war. In general, I felt that there was willingness on the part of
the authorities to persevere with prosecutions at the national level.
64. These processes are important. The Assembly pointed out in
Resolution 1564 (2007) on
the prosecution of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that “justice
is an indispensable ingredient in the process of reconciliation
for the victims, communities and countries concerned and that it
is essential to resolutely fight impunity, which is unacceptable”.
There
have been a number of important steps forward stemming from the
process of national prosecutions. For instance, in April 2009, an
investigation into the Bukovica case in Montenegro was completed
and seven officers were indicted over the deportation of Bosnian
civilians in 1992. The Montenegrin Government has agreed to pay
an out-of-court settlement to the survivors and victims of these
deportations.
65. The process of trying crimes committed during the war in the
national courts has also meant that the states concerned have had
to co-operate with one another. For example, the so-called “Palić
Process” has promoted inter-state dialogue and judicial co-operation
in war crime proceedings by bringing together relevant judicial
and state administration actors from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Montenegro and Serbia.
66. That said, the process has not been without difficulties,
which the Assembly has been concerned with for some time.
Mr
Jean-Charles Gardetto’s report on the protection of witnesses as
a cornerstone for justice and reconciliation in the Balkans
highlights
the difficulties caused by the inadequate protection of witnesses in
the region. He points out that the testimonies of witnesses have
been indispensable to both the work of the ICTY and that of the
national courts. They have made an essential contribution to justice
and reconciliation in the region, since their testimonies not only
form the basis of court judgments but also reveal to those who live in
the region and beyond the truth about the crimes committed. Although
there have been many improvements in recent times, many witnesses
decide not to testify because of threats, intimidation and fears
for their safety. Without the protection and support that witnesses
need to be able to testify, prosecutions cannot be completed and
therefore justice and reconciliation cannot be achieved.
67. Mr Dorić, in his report on the obligation of member states
of the Council of Europe to co-operate in the prosecution of war
crimes,
explains how some prosecutions
in the national courts have been hampered as over 100 indictees
have emigrated beyond the states of the former Yugoslavia in an
attempt to evade justice. Some applications for extradition have
been accepted whilst others have not. Host states have a duty to extradite
war crime suspects or investigate them for the crimes committed.
Mr Dorić argues that there should not be a situation whereby, as
the immunity gap closes in the Balkans, it is able to open up in
other parts of the globe.
68. I urge members of the Assembly to support the draft resolutions
and recommendations tabled by Mr Gardetto and Mr Dorić. The states
of the former Yugoslavia should be given all the assistance necessary
to bring to justice the perpetrators of war crimes committed during
the wars.
5.2. Attempts to identify state responsibilities: applications
before the International Court of Justice
69. There have been attempts to identify state responsibility
for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia in applications made
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In February 2007, the
ICJ delivered its judgment on the application made by Bosnia and
Herzegovina against what was then Serbia and Montenegro for breaches
of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide.
The Court held
that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica, but that Serbia was not
responsible. It went on to find, however, that Serbia had violated
its obligations under the convention for failing to prevent the
acts committed and for not acting to bring the perpetrators to justice.
70. Croatia has also brought an application to the ICJ against
Serbia for violations of the Genocide Convention. In January 2010,
Serbia presented its written submissions on the case, making a counter-complaint
against Croatia for crimes of genocide against Serbia. The case
is pending. However, there are ongoing discussions between the Croatian
and Serbian Governments with a view to an out-of-court settlement on
the issue (see also below).
5.3. Public discourse concerning the war
71. Although judgments from the ICTY and the ICJ have
clarified the historical truth to a certain degree, it is common
for politicians to seize on nationalist rhetoric, particularly in
election periods, which has the effect of distorting the truth about
what happened during the war. As one of my interlocutors pointed
out, it is the responsibility of politicians in the region to replace
the language of hatred and difference with the language of rapprochement
and reconciliation.
72. On the other hand, there have been a number of recent encouraging
public statements, which indicate a more conciliatory attitude in
the region. In March 2010, the Serbian Parliament passed a resolution condemning
the massacre of 8 000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995 and
stating that Serbia should have done more to prevent it. Furthermore,
the heads of the states of the former Yugoslavia, including Serbian President
Tadić, attended a memorial ceremony in Srebrenica in July 2010 to
commemorate the 15th anniversary of the massacre.
73. In April 2010, Croatian President Ivo Josipović made a speech
to the two houses of parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his
address, he stressed the need to promote regional co-operation,
presented his condolences to the victims of the war and expressed
regrets for Croatia’s role in the conflict.
74. On 4 November 2010, President Tadić visited Vukovar (Croatia),
the most destroyed town in the war, and laid a wreath at Ovcara,
a farm where members of paramilitary formations and the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA) killed more than 200 Croat prisoners in 1991.
He also visited, with his Croatian counterpart, President Josipović,
the settlement of Paulin Dvor, near Osijek, where Serb civilians,
mostly women and old people, were killed during the war. On this
occasion, President Tadić said: “The President of Croatia and I
have a duty and obligation to turn this whole process, which received
its tragic dimension during the 1990s, into a process of reconciliation
and better understanding. For this to take place, it is necessary
to shine the truth on the 1990s, for no one who is guilty to remain
unpunished, for no one who is innocent to be unjustly convicted
and for every uncertainty about the people for which there is a
search to this day to dispel.” On 15 November 2010, Milorad Dodik,
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska, addressing
MPs in the National Assembly, also expressed regret over “every
innocent life lost on any side” in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
75. Some NGO representatives I met in Sarajevo plead for leaders
to apologise for the past wrongs but also to take concrete action
to follow and back their statements and gestures. They want full
investigations and disclosure of the facts as to what happened in
the recent past and they advocate the opening of the archives. They
claim that it is necessary to document all the crimes in order to
honour and acknowledge all victims and to guarantee that, in the
future, no further crimes will be committed.
5.4. History teaching about the war
76. Despite the many positive signs, during my visits
to Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, several interlocutors
acknowledged that the public discourse on the war remains segregated,
with each country having its own truth and interpretation of the
conflict. I believe that this can be a potential source of hatred
and further conflict. As argued by the philosopher Raimon Panikkar,
lasting peace requires more than nuclear, military, or economic
disarmament. Peace can be obtained only by a cultural disarmament,
which will require that absolution be abandoned for true reconciliation
through ongoing intercultural dialogues.
77. It is therefore critical in my view to promote and support
a
public discourse about the
war that departs from nationalist rhetoric, in particular in the
teaching of the younger generations. A number of NGOs from the region
as well as many fellow parliamentarians, in particular my Croatian
colleague Mr Gvozden Flego, Chairperson of the Committee on Culture,
Science and Education, shared my views. As pointed out by the Assembly
in
Recommendation 1880
(2009) on history teaching in conflict and post-conflict
areas,
history teaching can be a tool
to support peace and reconciliation as well
as
tolerance and understanding. A multiple perspective approach, instead
of a single interpretation of events, will encourage
students to respect diversity and
cultural difference. More specifically, the Assembly called on member
states to provide adequate and ongoing financing for history research,
particularly for multilateral and bilateral commissions on contemporary history,
and recommended that the Committee of Ministers continue to support
the work of the Council of Europe in conflict and post-conflict
areas on the revision and development of textbooks and teacher manuals, the
organisation of teacher seminars and source material identification.
I fully endorse these recommendations and can only encourage all
governments in Europe, including the governments of the former Yugoslavia,
to fully implement them.
78. Although joint textbooks have also been mentioned by the Assembly,
the obstacles are numerous and the wounds fresh. As I could sense
during the conversations I had in the region, the war is still recent
and a period of time is needed to allow for the development of a
common understanding and interpretation of the events. As a matter
of fact, the teaching of history must be based on documented research
and must reflect the different perspectives of the various national
and ethnic groups in the region if lasting results are to be achieved
in promoting reconciliation and improving inter-ethnic relations.
79. In my research, I came across a number of interesting co-operation
projects and exchanges between universities and historians that
exist in the region, which are worth mentioning. For example, the
Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE)
set up a “Joint History Project” to encourage debate, celebrate
diversity and recognise shared suffering and achievements through
a participative approach to history teaching, in order for students
and teachers to develop the understanding and skills needed for sustainable
peace and a democratic future. The project aims in the long term
to revise ethnocentric school history teaching by avoiding stereotypes,
by identifying attitudes that encourage conflict, by suggesting alternative
teaching methods and by promoting the idea of multiple interpretations
of one event.
80. I was also pleased to learn that the Council of Europe had
organised with the Slovenian authorities, in the framework of the
United Nations Alliance of Civilisations, a conference entitled
“Reform of History Teaching Methods and Pedagogy in History Teaching
in South Eastern Europe” in December 2010. Bringing together teachers
and teacher trainers for mutual discussion can be useful even in
very difficult situations. It is more appropriate to focus on what
unites, rather than on what divides, and on social and cultural
rather than political history.
An
example where such an approach has had some impact is in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where guidelines for writing and evaluation of
history and geography textbooks for primary and secondary schools
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were developed through a thorough consultation
process, both with experts and politicians, with the support of
the Council of Europe and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and published in 2005.
81. I believe that the Council of Europe should support the work
carried out by local actors to foster a more pluralistic view of
the past and present events. It could also organise conferences
and round tables with recognised historians from the region around
some key dates in history and a book of essays could be compiled
as an interesting piece of additional material.
82. With regard to the education system and inter-ethnic relations,
on my visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 22 and 23 November 2010,
I was told that the number of divided schools (the so-called “two
schools under one roof”) has decreased. However, separation of children
within schools along ethnic lines or with separate curricula for
each ethnic group remains an issue. During his discussions with
the authorities at state and entity levels in November 2010, Commissioner
Hammarberg noted the need to end school segregation and said that “the
policy of separating ethnic Bosniak and Croat children in schools
only reinforces prejudices and intolerance and perpetuates ethnic
isolation. Measures to unify the educational system are long overdue. Ethnically
based and divided education systems are not consistent with Council
of Europe standards and remain an obstacle to sustainable returns
of displaced persons after the 1992-95 war.” I also strongly encourage
all public authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to do away with
this practice throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and to develop a
common curriculum for all the children in the country.
5.5. The proposal for a truth commission
83. Truth and reconciliation commissions have proved
to be an important component in peace building across the globe
in regions that are emerging from conflict. The Assembly recognised
in its
Resolution 1613 (2008) on
use of experience of the “truth commissions” that “[d]ealing with
the past, establishing the truth and promoting reconciliation in
war-torn, post-conflict and transitional societies are key preconditions
for the achievement of lasting peace and a stable future in which
democracy can be built and the rule of law and the respect for human
rights ensured”.
84. I agree with Mr Andreas Gross’s conclusions, in his report
on the use of experience of the “truth commissions”,
that
“international experience shows that truth commissions may be an
effective mechanism for addressing past human rights violations,
identifying their roots and causes and promoting necessary reforms
which would prevent such violations from being repeated. By allowing
the victims of abuses to be heard, truth commissions help reconstitute
their sense of civic membership and thus facilitate reconciliation. They
may also play a complementary role to criminal justice but cannot
and should not be seen as an alternative.”
85. There have been several failed attempts to create such a commission
in different parts of the Balkans. In March 2001, the authorities
in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in an attempt to come to terms with the legacy of the wars in the
Balkans. Unfortunately, at the time, there was a lack of will on
the part of the authorities to deal with the past in a reasonable
way. It is widely thought that the Commission failed in its task
because it was appointed without due consultation, had very little support
from civil society and lacked credibility.
86. Only one commission, the Srebrenica Commission, established
by the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, managed to produce
any conclusive findings. Its final report, published in 2004, constituted
the first public admission on the part of the authorities that its
security forces had killed over 7 000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.
Although these findings were crucial, they represented only a part
of what went on in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
87. A coalition of about 950 NGOs from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and Serbia have proposed the creation of a Regional Commission
for Establishing the Facts about the War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia (RECOM
).
The purpose of the proposed commission would be to collate the facts
established by the ICTY and national prosecutions of war crimes.
However, this in itself is not enough to create a factual record
of everything that happened in the armed conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia. RECOM advocates believe that only a body centred on
war crimes would investigate and disclose the facts about everything
that happened in the recent past. They claim that it is necessary
to document all the crimes in order to honour and acknowledge all victims
and to guarantee that, in the future, no further crimes will be
committed.
88. Many victims still live in poverty with no hope of their life
getting any better. The organisers of RECOM believe there is very
little empathy and solidarity for the victims from other ethnic
groups and that there is no significant societal dialogue about
the past. It is hoped that RECOM could act as a forum where victims
would be able to have their voices heard. One of the ideas is that
the commission could help uncover the remaining mass graves and
therefore be able to name all victims as a part of the process of
reconciliation. The organisers believe that a regional approach
is the best strategy for facing up to the legacy of the past.
89. However, I must report that some of my interlocutors in the
region were cautious. Although they acknowledged the important role
of the NGOs during the 1990s, they also believe that it is now up
to the competent institutions and bodies to deal with the past crimes
and atrocities. Furthermore, many see relations in the region improving
and might not want to drag up the past and see these good relations
deteriorating. I had the impression that the majority of the institutional
actors I met were more prone to turning towards the present and
the future rather than the past. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a group
of NGOs met a few days before my arrival in Sarajevo to discuss
this initiative but could not agree on which countries should be
allowed to sit around the table.
90. I was told on a number of occasions that the only way that
the commission could be established would be through international
pressure. Members of the European Parliament expressed their support
for RECOM at a meeting that the Human Rights Subcommittee held on
16 September 2010. In my view, the Parliamentary Assembly could
also encourage the establishment of the Commission.
91. That said, the organisers of RECOM have made it clear that
the initiative must come from the region and that there must be
voluntary acceptance of it in order for it to achieve its purpose.
RECOM is due to launch the statute of the commission for investigating
and disclosing the facts on 5 and 6 February 2011 in Sarajevo. The organisers
then hope to collect one million signatures from citizens across
the region in support of establishing the commission, which they
will then present to the governments of the region.
92. The proposals received support from both the Croatian President,
Ivo Josipović, on 31 August 2010 and the Serbian President, Boris
Tadić, on 1 September 2010. The organisers feel strongly that the
establishment of the commission should be something separate from
the process of European integration. It is a process in itself and
could spark a change of mentality if it is set up.
93. The United Nations Security Council quite rightly established
the ICTY for the countries of the former Yugoslavia in 1993. The
rigour with which it has carried out its work means that its judgments
and the facts established therein cannot be denied. Nevertheless,
it is an external body that sits outside the region. The advantage
of a regional truth and reconciliation commission that receives
support from politicians and the general population is that it would
bring justice back home and could potentially facilitate a discussion
about what went on during the war.
94. The findings of the commission could also be used to contribute
to the creation of a regional history textbook. Perhaps more importantly,
a regional commission with political support could counteract some
of the nationalistic rhetoric that continues to be used by some
politicians in the region. However, if a truth and reconciliation
commission is to fully perform its function, I deem it critical
that all countries and regions be allowed to participate, irrespective
of their status.
6. The wider context
6.1. The process of European Union integration
95. Maintaining the European perspective for the countries
of the Western Balkans could potentially be the most important incentive
for the success of the process of reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.
96. The states of the former Yugoslavia are at different stages
with regard to the process of European Union integration. Slovenia
has been a member of the European Union since 2004, whilst Croatia
and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” have been candidate
countries for membership since 2004 and 2005 respectively. Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Serbia are potential candidates for membership.
On 25 October 2010, the European Council decided to referSerbia’s application for membership
of the European Union to the European Commission for an opinion.
In doing so, it set out precise conditions as regards co-operation
by Serbia with the ICTY. On 24 November 2010, European Union Enlargement
Commissioner Stefan Fuele gave the questionnaire on Serbia’s candidacy
for European Union membership to Serbian Prime Minister, Mirko Cvetković,
who agreed to answer it by the end of January 2011. The European
Commission recommended adding Montenegro to the list of candidate
countries in the opinion issued on 9 November 2010.
97. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s prospects of European
Union membership are being hampered by the constitutional deadlock
and the unclear vision of its political leadership over its European
aspirations.
98. According to the latest European Commission progress report,
published on 9 November 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited
progress in addressing the political criteria. Some progress related
to the rule of law, notably in areas such as border management and
migration policy, was made through reforms aimed at meeting visa
liberalisation requirements. Important steps were also taken to
promote regional reconciliation and co-operation, notably in terms
of refugee return. Nevertheless, overall implementation of reforms
was insufficient and the domestic political climate during the pre-electoral
period was dominated by nationalistic rhetoric. According to the
European Commission, the lack of a shared vision by political leaders on
the direction of the country is blocking key European Union-related
reforms and impeding further progress towards membership of the
European Union. Regarding international obligations, making progress
towards meeting the conditions which have been set for the closure
of the Office of the High Representative remains essential.
99. Border issues have held back Croatia’s candidacy but, as discussed
above, the situation now looks to be on the point of being resolved
and Croatia’s accession talks to join the European Union may be
completed towards the end of 2011. However, while important progress
has been made,
more concrete
reforms are needed, in particular with regard to chapter 23 (entitled
“Judiciary and Fundamental Rights”) of Croatia’s accession negotiations
on fighting corruption and full co-operation with the ICTY.
100. In 2008, a visa liberalisation dialogue was opened with a
number of countries of the former Yugoslavia, namely Bosnia and
Herzegovina, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Montenegro
and Serbia, and road maps for visa liberalisation were established.
The decisions on visa-free access to the Schengen area are based
on the progress made by the countries concerned in implementing
major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule of
law, combating organised crime, corruption and illegal migration
and improving their administrative capacity in border control and
security of documents. Montenegro, Serbia and “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” joined the visa-free regime on 19 December
2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 November 2010.
101. All the states of the former Yugoslavia are members of the
Council of Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia
are under the Assembly monitoring procedure, while “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” is under post-monitoring dialogue. Compliance
with the commitments made when joining the Council of Europe is
seen by the European Union as fundamental to candidacy.
6.2. Interparliamentary dialogue
102. I take the view that interparliamentary dialogue
should be supported at regional level and I stress the importance
of fully involving the national parliaments of the countries of
the former Yugoslavia in the process of European integration.
103. In 2008, the European Parliament and former Yugoslav parliamentarians
shared experiences on European integration and debated economic,
security and justice issues. While I welcome this initiative, I
also believe that the nature of the European Parliament interparliamentary
meetings should be improved in order to provide a functional, regular
and effective system for more focused and practice-oriented debates.
This
could be easily done by ensuring better co-ordination with the Parliamentary
Assembly and the delegations of national parliaments of the countries
of the former Yugoslavia.
104. On my visit to Brussels on 30 November 2010, I attended a
hearing on “Human Rights in the Western Balkans” organised by the
Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament. Several
MEPs, including the Subcommittee’s Chair, Ms Heidi Hautala, expressed
the wish for a regular exchange of views with national parliamentarians
from the region on the issue of reconciliation, political dialogue
and human rights in the Western Balkans, with a view to accompanying
them in their European integration process, in co-operation with
the Political Affairs Committee. I very much support this proposal
and I encourage the Assembly to follow this issue closely in the
coming months.
6.3. Regional integration
6.3.1. The Brdo process
105. The conference “Together for the European Union:
the Contribution of the Western Balkans to the European Future”,
which took place on 20 March 2010 in Brdo pri Kranju and was jointly
organised by Croatia and Slovenia, represented a fresh start in
co-operation in the Western Balkans. The intention was to send Europe
a message that:
- the leaders
of the Western Balkan countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia
and of Albania can reunite around the same table and share the same
goals;
- these countries can move forward beyond disagreements
and historical grudges and work together for peace and the future
of the region;
- all the countries are ready to co-operate on their path
towards membership of the European Union.
106. The conference was also seen as the initiation of the so-called
Brdo Process. All participating countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia”) agreed that they would “provide each other with mutual
support and an exchange of experience gained during the integration
processes” and that they would “promote good neighbourly relations
through [their] continuous work on projects of common interest and
invest best efforts in addressing open bilateral issues in a European
spirit”.
I do hope that Serbia
will also join the process in the future. The so-called “Visegrad
Group” was taken as a model for co-operation within the Brdo Process,
since this type of co-operation implies that none of the countries
assumes a leading or predominant role in the region.
6.3.2. Other regional initiatives
107. The European Commission has stated that regional
co-operation between the states of the Western Balkans is key to
future membership of the European Union. There are a number of regional
initiatives that the states of the former Yugoslavia are part of
that may help to facilitate reconciliation in the region including:
the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the objective of which
is to expand trade in the region; the RCC, which has the purpose
of supporting European and Euro-Atlantic integration; the South
East European Cooperation Process, which is tasked with promoting
multilateral co-operation, strengthening stability, security and
good-neighbourly relations in the region; and the Regional School
for Public Administration, an European Union-financed project which
aims to assist the states of Western Balkans to train public officials
for European Union accession.
108. I support these regional initiatives and I believe that they
can play a key role in strengthening regional ownership and in serving
as key interlocutors for the European Union and other international
organisations.
6.3.3. Impact of the situation in Kosovo
109. In June 2010, the Assembly debated a comprehensive
report on the situation in Kosovo and the role of the Council of
Europe,
to which I refer the reader.
It is clear that the unilateral declaration of independence from
Serbia in February 2008 adversely affected reconciliation in the
region to some degree as ambassadors were declared
persona non grata in Belgrade, and
Serbia decided to withdraw its ambassadors from neighbouring states
that had recognised Kosovo as an independent state. Full diplomatic
relations were subsequently reinstated.
110. It may be noted in this context that the International Court
of Justice, in its long-awaited Advisory Opinion on the declaration
of independence, delivered on 22 July 2010, found that the declaration
did not violate any applicable provision of international law.
Following
the publication of the Advisory Opinion, the Serbian Government
went on to work collaboratively with the European Union to table
a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly on the issue.
The resolution, adopted on 9 September 2010, encourages negotiation.
It “[w]elcomes the readiness of the European Union to facilitate
a process of dialogue between the parties” and affirms that “the
process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security
and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote
co-operation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union
and improve the lives of the people”.
111. I was pleased to hear, during the course of my conversations
with senior government ministers, that Serbia was intent on resolving
the impasse over Kosovo through dialogue with the authorities in
Pristina, a dialogue which will be facilitated by the European Union.
These symbolic steps have made the resolution of outstanding issues
between Belgrade and Pristina look like a realistic prospect. Early
elections in Kosovo, held on 12 December 2010, have inevitably delayed
the start of such a dialogue, but hopefully not for too long.
6.4. The reality on the ground
112. Discussions about reconciliation at a political level
can have the effect of ignoring the impact of ordinary people in
the process. As the authorities and politicians slowly begin to
reconcile their differences with their counterparts in the region,
the general public is already one step ahead. This is something
that particularly struck me on my visits to the region. One can
often get the impression from the outside that people stick to the countries
that they live in. It can easily be forgotten how interlinked the
countries were before the outbreak of the conflict. I was encouraged
to hear about Croatian businesses opening up in Serbia; Croatian
artists performing in Belgrade; and Serbs holidaying in Croatia.
I was told that it is now common to see Croatian number plates on
cars in Serbia; this was something that simply did not exist until
a short while ago.
113. However, I also believe that much remains to be done. The
violence of some Serbian extremist fans, driven by ultra-nationalist
sentiments and inciting racial, national and religious hatred, at
a recent football match in Italy on 12 October 2010, has provoked
anger and dismay in Serbia itself and led to official apologies
by the Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić.
114. A renewed effort by all governments in the region, in co-operation
with the international community, remains of critical importance if
we are to continue the ongoing process of political as well as cultural disarmament.
7. Conclusions
115. During my visits to the region and on my concluding
visit to Brussels on 29 and 30 November 2010, I could ascertain
that European integration is a key issue for many of my interlocutors.
I am convinced that the prospect of European Union membership is
generating momentum for political reform in the majority of the states
of the former Yugoslavia. The recent experience with visa liberalisation
shows that the European Union still has the power to motivate serious
reforms if it offers tangible incentives.
116. The past few months have seen gestures of commitment towards
regional co-operation and some first steps to start rethinking the
region’s recent history. Belgrade and Zagreb have started talking
about issues related to refugees and missing persons, and both sides
are considering dropping their lawsuits against each other for genocide.
The Presidents of both countries are taking the lead in what could
become a process of rapprochement,
and are beginning to work with each other on practical issues, such
as business matters and the fight against organised crime. Regional
co-operation is moving ahead. Talks between Belgrade and Pristina
are envisaged in the near future.
117. Hereafter are some of the key issues which I have analysed
in my report and where, in my view, renewed efforts are needed by
all governments of the region with a view to their full reconciliation
and European integration:
- The
issue of missing persons is the priority and I advocate the opening
of the archives in all countries involved in order to resolve this
issue, as well as appropriate funding for civil society initiatives
which attempt to fill the gap by creating records of victims of
the conflicts to address the legacy of the past and fight against
biased historical revisionism.
- It remains of critical importance for all governments
of the region, in co-operation with the international community,
to provide support for return and reintegration in the place of
origin, as well as for integration in the place of displacement.
While returnees no longer consider the security situation of prime
concern, the social and economic situation in war-affected areas
remains a challenge; priority should be given to the promotion of
access to basic rights, including housing, education, health, employment
and social services.
- War crimes prosecution and full co-operation with the
ICTY remain important elements both for reconciliation and for European
integration and top priority should be given to tracking and arresting
the remaining fugitives.
- The lack of border definition, which is also inextricably
tied to minority rights, may have a negative impact on the politics
of the region and on the European Union integration prospect. I
believe that settling this unfinished business is a practical precondition
to moving towards a context of integration in which borders have
less political resonance. If countries cannot resolve their disputes
bilaterally, which is of course preferable, they should commit themselves
to a binding arbitration mechanism.
- I believe that the European Union can also give the political
drive and leverage to create a context most favourable to dialogue
through the nascent European External Action Service, in co-operation
with the relevant organisations present in the Balkans, in particular
the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the RCC. However, the countries
themselves should assume their responsibilities, as regional co-operation requires
commitments on the part of the governments which are supposed to
carry it out.
- Grass-roots, civil society and local initiatives need
far more support and visibility. Cross-border co-operation, initiatives
aimed at reconciling citizens across different countries, property
restitution projects and developing social networks are all much-needed
bottom-up approaches to help people to climb out of the dark hole
of ethno-nationalism.
- As stressed by several interlocutors I met in the region,
Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to break a constitutional stalemate
following the recent elections which were once again conducted with
ethnicity- and residence-based limitations to active and passive
suffrage rights. The country needs to take important steps to live
up to its commitments after it was accepted as a member of the Council
of Europe, and comprehensive constitutional reforms need to be immediately
undertaken. The country also needs to work on strengthening functional
democratic institutions that work across the territory.
- During my visits, I observed that the public discourse
on the war often remains segregated, with each country having its
own truth, rhetoric and interpretation. I believe that this can
be a potential source of hatred and conflict. The Assembly could
support the work carried out by local actors to support a more pluralistic
view of the past and present events, also through strengthened interparliamentary
dialogue in co-operation with the European Parliament.
- In the same way in which ethnic conflict and civil war
are not natural but man-made disasters, their prevention and settlement
does not happen automatically either. Leadership needs to be capable, determined
and visionary in its commitment to peace. Leaders need to connect
to each other and to their followers, and they need to work with
them towards a peaceful future. I believe that the Assembly should support
the work carried out by the Council of Europe schools of political
studies, notably in Belgrade, Pristina and Sarajevo, in engaging
political and other elites in dialogues and should encourage them
to intensify efforts in the region with a view to fostering political
dialogue on all outstanding issues in the region and to strengthening
the multi-ethnic character of these political circles.
- By the same token, the Council of Europe could support
the work carried out by local actors to foster a more pluralistic
and shared view of the past and present events, in particular by
developing a long-term strategy and organising a round table with
recognised historians and educators from the region around some
key dates in history; a book of essays could be compiled as an interesting
piece of additional material.
- Reaching a mutual agreement among the parties in the conflict
as to what happened will remain a great challenge for years to come.
Reconciliation also means a change for the better of those structures
and groups in a society that induced, encouraged and supported violence
and lawlessness. It is my contention that reconciliation is a process
in which the reality of the conflict is treated in the perspective of
the future. However, reconciliation is not isolated from the past
and any attempt to bury the past is unacceptable for the people
who were exposed to serious violence and human rights violations,
and whom I met during my visits in the region. I take the view that
the Assembly should encourage the establishment of a regional truth
and reconciliation commission that would investigate and disclose
the facts about everything that happened in the recent past in order
to honour and acknowledge all victims. In my view, it is critical
that all countries and regions be allowed to participate, irrespective
of their status, if such a commission is to fully perform its reconciliation
function.