1. Introduction
1. With some 2.5 million
people
displaced in the North Caucasus region, internal displacement remains
a key human right and humanitarian challenge. The main cause of
internal displacement in the Russian Federation has been the conflicts
in the Chechen Republic (Chechnya) and the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
(North Ossetia). More than 800 000 people have fled their homes
in Chechnya since 1994, the result of generalised violence and two
rounds of armed conflict between rebels and government forces. A
brief armed conflict in North Ossetia over the Prigorodny district
displaced up to 64 000 ethnic Ingush people in 1992. Many people
were displaced more than once.
2. The Parliamentary Assembly, and in particular its Committee
on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, has been following
the humanitarian situation in the North Caucasus since 1997 and
it has prepared numerous reports, opinions, resolutions and recommendations.
In April 2004, the Assembly adopted
Recommendation 1667 (2004) on the
situation of refugees and displaced persons in the Russian Federation and
some other CIS countries, and
Resolution
1404 (2004) on the humanitarian situation of the Chechen displaced
population.
3. Seven years later, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Displaced Persons decided to return to the issue of internal displacement
in North Caucasus. It tasked your rapporteur with examining the
current humanitarian situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
and returned IDPs in the region, and formulating new recommendations.
The present memorandum is based on numerous sources, but in particular
on information he gathered during a fact-finding visit to the Russian
Federation from 18 to 24 September 2011. In this context, your rapporteur
is grateful to the parliamentary delegation of the Russian Federation
as well as representatives of the Federation Council for their hospitality
and assistance. He also extends his gratitude to the Danish Refugee
Council (DRC) who facilitated the selection of temporary IDP settlements
and hostels to visit and who arranged meetings with IDP representatives
and non-governmental organisation (NGO) in the three republics.
Finally, your rapporteur wishes to thank Ms Nadine Walicki from
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), who travelled
to the North Caucasus in parallel with your rapporteur's visit and
has acted as a consultant in the preparation of the present report.
4. Your rapporteur wishes to underline that, in accordance with
his mandate, this memorandum concentrates primarily on the humanitarian
and human rights issues pertaining to the subject matter of this report.
General political and human rights aspects are only touched upon
insomuch as it is necessary to explain the background context. Your
rapporteur's intention is to present a balanced overview of the
various issues at stake and the complex tasks facing the authorities
at federal, regional and local level. He hopes that this report will
help contribute to the establishment of a road map towards finding
durable solutions for the many families still displaced in the North
Caucasus region.
2. General context
2.1. Security
5. The North Caucasus remains a dangerous place. The
years 2006-08 saw some stabilisation; however, more recently, the
overall number of security incidents has increased. Suicide bombings
and other attacks occur regularly on military, law enforcement and
other targets in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and more recently
Kabardino-Balkaria.
While
the security situation in Chechnya has improved considerably, the
most violent republic is currently Dagestan, where attacks have
also targeted high-ranking government officials and religious figures.
In
2009, the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, called insecurity
in the region his country's "most serious domestic political problem",
and
acknowledged that it was fuelled by economic woes, unemployment,
abuses of power, embezzlement of government funds and corruption
among the ruling elites.
6. At a meeting with the rapporteur on 19 September 2011, the
Deputy Prime Minister and Special Envoy of the President of the
Russian Federation to the North Caucasus Federal District, Alexander
Khloponin, characterised the security situation in the region as
"stably tense". Government-led "counterterrorist" measures continue
throughout the region, and, in Mr Khloponin's words, some 80% of
the "terrorists", despite using Islamist slogans, are in fact ethnic
mafia groups fighting for the redistribution of property. There
are also groups of radical Islamists in the region, which often
recruit unemployed youth and are fighting for the establishment of
an Islamic State and Sharia Law in the North Caucasus. Dominating
the situation, however, is the complex system of clans, with the
executive power and entire segments of the economy being concentrated
in the hands of one or another ethnic clan.
7. On the positive side, relations between North Ossetia and
Ingushetia have normalised with the coming into power of the new
Ingush government in 2009 under the leadership of Yunus-Bek Evkurov.
In December 2009, the presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia
signed a Joint Programme on Establishing Good-Neighbourly Relations,
which is intended to facilitate, inter
alia, the return of people with forced migrant status to
their places of origin in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia.
The conflict over the Prigorodny district, however, remains unresolved.
2.2. Reconstruction
8. Today, the Chechen capital of Grozny shows few signs
of having suffered nearly fifteen years of war. Large-scale hostilities
have long ceased, the military maintain a lower profile and the
city has been rebuilt from charred ruins. Companies from Turkey
and the United Arab Emirates are constructing new parks, broad avenues,
clusters of high-rise flats and sports stadiums. Damaged infrastructure
such as roads, water mains, schools and medical facilities have
been rebuilt. Other areas of Chechnya have also benefited from the reconstruction
effort, though these plans have been more modest.
This is a considerable achievement
on behalf of the Chechen government. However, it appears that much
funding has gone to grandiose "showcase" projects.
2.3. Socio-economic environment
9. The transformation brought about by the reconstruction
effort indicates prosperity, but appearances may be misleading.
The economy of the North Caucasus, including Chechnya, remains underdeveloped
and is largely subsidised by Moscow. Productivity is below the average
for the Russian Federation, wages are low and unemployment high.
There are also major obstacles to investment, including ongoing
low-level violence, mined land and rampant corruption.
10. Despite efforts to improve essential infrastructure, most
ordinary citizens have failed to benefit from the reconstruction
effort in Chechnya. Foreign workers and companies have been hired
to rebuild infrastructure, and factories or other initiatives that
could create jobs on a large scale have not been restored. As a
result, many ordinary citizens continue to depend on social benefits
as their main source of income. Quality of life remains poor with
a lack of affordable housing, limited access to water, sanitation
and other utilities, inadequate transport infrastructure and a shortage
of medical facilities. Where education is available, standards are
low.
11. Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism. As explained by
Mr Khloponin, it has taken the Russian Federal Government more than
ten years to improve the security situation in Chechnya, reconstruct infrastructure
and residential areas, search for missing persons and make efforts
to bring ethnic groups together, among other initiatives. To continue
this effort, the Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of the North
Caucasus Federal District to 2025
was
adopted in 2010. The strategy provides for major investment in agriculture,
food processing, building materials, tourism, industrial parks and
logistics for the coming years. However, more time will be needed
to improve the situation for everyone.
12. Tackling unemployment is a major priority for federal and
regional governments alike: overall unemployment in the North Caucasus
Federal District dropped from 438 000 to 300 000 unemployed between July
2010 and July 2011.
In Chechnya alone, unemployment
decreased from 45% in 2010 to 30% in August 2011.
2.4. Human rights
13. Human rights abuses continue to be reported in the
context of government-led "counterterrorist" operations. Lawyers,
journalists and human rights workers report the use of abductions,
arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances and unlawful
killings.
Such
abuses have spread beyond Chechnya to Ingushetia and Dagestan, and
as far as Kabardino-Balkaria.
The
Russian Commissioner for Human Rights (ombudsman) has repeatedly
reported violations in the North Caucasus, as have the Assembly's
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights. Such reports, however, appear to
have had little effect on the ground.
14. Impunity for human rights violations continues despite nearly
200 related rulings from the European Court of Human Rights ("the
Court"). The Court has repeatedly found the Russian Federation to
be in violation of Article 2 and/or Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, "the Convention"). The violations relate
to unlawful killings, disappearances, torture and ill-treatment,
and the failure to investigate such crimes effectively. Moscow has
paid compensation to the victims as required, but has failed to
hold the perpetrators accountable.
15. Human rights defenders continue to be targeted for their work.
Increased pressure and intimidation combined with a lack of independent
media
serve
to reduce human rights monitoring and reporting in the region. Pressure
and intimidation emanates even from high-level government officials.
The Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, for example, has described those
from the NGO Memorial as "enemies of the State, enemies of the people,
enemies of the law". Regrettably, the Ombudsman of Chechnya, Nurdi
Nukhazhiev, appears to share a similar view. He did little to hide
his dislike for international and local human rights organisations
at our meeting. Your rapporteur has serious doubts as to the Chechen
Ombudsman's understanding of his role as an independent institution
protecting human rights in the republic. In significant contrast,
the Ombudsman of Ingushetia, Dzhambulat Ozdoev, has created an office
that is welcoming complainants and NGOs alike, which inspires confidence
towards the ombudsman's institution.
3. Displacement
3.1. Internally displaced persons
16. There are no authoritative numbers of IDPs in the
North Caucasus. Your rapporteur was unable to receive concordant
figures, even from different branches of the Federal Migration Service.
It is also a matter of definition. While international organisations
use the definition of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement to count IDPs, the Russian Government counts "forced
migrants" according to the definition in the 1995 Law of the Russian
Federation on Forced Migrants. This definition of "forced migrant" differs
in several ways from the definition of an IDP in the Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement.
17. The Russian definition of a forced migrant is simultaneously
more and less restrictive than the definition of an IDP in the guiding
principles. It is more restrictive in that a person displaced within
a subject of the Russian Federation, say Chechnya, would not qualify
for forced migrant status, but would be considered an IDP according
to the guiding principles. The justification for this is unclear.
At the same time, a person who fled to the Russian Federation from
another country or former Soviet republic and managed to acquire
Russian citizenship might qualify for forced migrant status, but
would not be considered an IDP according to the guiding principles.
18. Given the definition of forced migrant, government figures
for displacement in the North Caucasus might be expected to be higher
than those provided by international organisations. The reverse,
however, tends to be true. While many of those who fled the first
conflict in Chechnya were granted forced migrant status, only a minority
of those who fled the second conflict in Chechnya were granted the
status.
Government figures are also low because
of those who were deemed forced migrants, many have lost their status
either because they failed to reapply for it, have it extended or
regain it after the required five-year period or because they received housing
assistance or compensation for their destroyed property.
19. In October 2011, the Federal Migration Service reported 19 136
people with forced migrant status in the North Caucasus Federal
District. This included 5 633 people from Chechnya and 2 864 people
from North Ossetia. In the same month, international organisations
reported at least 52 748 IDPs in the whole of the North Caucasus.
As
there has been no formal assessment of the achievement of durable
solutions, it is likely that some people no longer counted as IDPs
or forced migrants still have unresolved issues relating to their displacement.
3.2. Returned internally displaced persons
20. Data on returnees also differs according to the source.
According to government sources, 323 000
people
returned to Chechnya between 2001 and 2009, and more than 26 000
returned
to North Ossetia between 1994 and 2010. The Federal Migration Service
reported that all IDPs who wished to return to Chechnya had voluntarily
done so by 1 April 2009.
In both Chechnya and North Ossetia, some
went back to their former homes, while others received housing support
from the government, moved in with relatives or ended up living
in temporary accommodation in their second or third places of displacement.
21. Clear figures of the number of people who have returned to
Chechnya from abroad are also lacking. The branch office of the
Federal Migration Service in Chechnya reported 87 families having
returned from Europe, mostly from Austria. NGOs mentioned 300 Chechens
having returned from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. During a recent
visit to Jordan, the Chechen Leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, encouraged
Chechen nationals to return; reportedly some families returned as
a result. However, your rapporteur did not manage to obtain more precise
figures. He received no indication of any large-scale campaign encouraging
Chechens to return, nor was he informed of any cases of unwelcome
return. However, some authorities voiced concern over the fact that,
without former residents (notably the former intelligentsia) returning
from abroad or from other parts of the Russian Federation, modern
republics could not be built.
3.3. Refugees
22. The total number of refugees in the North Caucasus
is unknown to your rapporteur. However, it was brought to his attention
that some 30 000 ethnic Ossetian refugees from Georgia still remain
in North Ossetia from the conflicts in the early 1990s, of whom
10 000 persons (4 000 families) were in dire need of adequate housing
twenty years later.
23. Your rapporteur had the possibility to visit the temporary
accommodation centre "Ossetia" (formerly “Pervomaïsky” sovkhoz)
where 40 Ossetian refugee families from Georgia have been living
for twenty-two years in degrading conditions, without any sanitation
or gas supplies and suffering from a strong "refugee syndrome".
According to the local authorities, 39 similar temporary centres
existed in North Ossetia. Some six billion roubles were required
to solve the housing situation of these ethnic Ossetian refugees.
They could not benefit from the federal housing programme in the
foreseeable future, for most of them had only acquired Russian citizenship
in 2000, thereby coming in a very low position on the federal list.
At the same time, the local government officials claimed that no
funding was possible from their budget. Your rapporteur therefore encourages
the local authorities to seek foreign donors through partnership
programmes to solve the critical housing situation of these refugee
families.
4. Government assistance
24. A number of legal acts and regulations for the protection
of IDPs exist. Government assistance to IDPs, outlined in the 1995
law on forced migrants, is conditional on claimants having forced
migrant status. The law outlines entitlements including special
allowances, temporary housing, job placements, loans, school and university
places, training, free medical care and help in recovering lost
documents and property. Further measures are set out for older people,
the disabled and orphans. The legislation also emphasises voluntary and
assisted return. Recent amendments allow for payments for the purchase
of homes.
Other
acts and regulations were put in place to provide assistance to
people displaced within and from Chechnya independent of forced
migrant status.
Although
no longer issued, this assistance included food, transport, maintenance
of temporary shelter and cash allowances to returnees.
4.1. Compensation for destroyed property
25. People whose homes were destroyed during the conflicts
in Chechnya are eligible to apply for compensation, and they are
not obliged to have forced migrant status to do so. Those who fled
the first conflict and settled outside Chechnya may receive up to
120 000 roubles (€2 900),
while those who fled the first
or second conflict and have settled within Chechnya may receive
a fixed amount of 350 000 roubles (€8 400).
Recipients
who settle outside of Chechnya must give up former titles to housing
and land, while those who settle in Chechnya retain theirs. Deadlines
for applications have not been set for either scheme. Towards the end
of 2011, there were 22 800 applications pending from people who
have settled inside Chechnya, but none from people who have settled
outside the republic. The Ministry of Regional Development together
with other authorities, including the Federal Migration Service,
are reportedly preparing a new programme of State support for citizens
who have lost their housing as a result of the conflict in Chechnya
and do not want to return.
26. Similarly, people whose housing was destroyed during the conflict
in North Ossetia are eligible to apply for compensation ranging
from 700 000 to two million roubles (€16 800 to €48 100).
It
is not clear why the amount of compensation is higher for those
dispossessed as a result of conflict in North Ossetia than in Chechnya.
Recipients must agree to return to their places of origin or, in
the case of some villages where authorities are unable to guarantee
security for returnees, to settle elsewhere within the republic. Compensation
is granted to permanent Prigorodny residents, those living in dormitories
in the district and those without titles to property but who can
prove in court that they were permanent residents in Prigorodny
before the conflict. The deadline for applications was 1 December
2006 and for the submission of essential documents 1 July 2008.
The government has reviewed all applications and decisions are pending.
4.2. Housing support
27. The federal government has provided temporary accommodation
to many people with forced migrant status for years, and it has
established other programmes intended to meet the housing needs
of forced migrants in the North Caucasus. These include long-term,
interest-free loans
or,
under a programme in place since 2002 and recently extended until
2015,
various
categories of citizens including people with forced migrant status
are eligible to apply for housing certificates. Housing certificates
are vouchers that can be used to buy housing and the amount is calculated
based on the number of family members and current market housing
prices.
28. Three further federal programmes – South Russia (2008-2013),
Socio-Economic
Development of the Chechen Republic for 2008-2012
and
Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Ingushetia for 2010-2016
–
aim to increase the standard of living, including housing conditions,
in the North Caucasus. Another 5.5 trillion roubles (€132 billion)
Socio-Economic Development Plan for the North Caucasus Federal District
to 2025 also aims to resolve housing and other problems for the
region's displaced people.
Chechnya's
Social Housing programme also includes measures to increase the
municipal housing stock in the republic to ensure adequate housing
is available for the most vulnerable people in the republic including
those who lost their housing during the conflicts.
4.3. Social support
29. The IDPs in Chechnya and North Ossetia who are not
eligible for forced migrant status may benefit from other measures.
President Kadyrov has established the Akhmat Khadji Kadyrov Fund,
named after his late father, which is intended to help meet the
needs of vulnerable people. The government has also set up social service
centres in the region, with the largest number in Chechnya. They
provide information on legal entitlements, social and psychological
services, including to IDPs and returnees, and help them meet their basic
food and hygiene needs. The Chechen authorities also provide a pension
top-up to residents who lost their labour record during the conflicts,
but no other republic of the Russian Federation has followed suit.
For their part, the authorities in North Ossetia are implementing
a socio-economic development programme in the Prigorodny district
to encourage Ingush and Ossetian communities to return and live
peacefully together. According to the information obtained from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in North Ossetia, in the academic year
2011-12, 2 112 Ingush students were enrolled in school in North
Ossetia, where they could elect to take Ingush language classes.
4.4. Legal advice and assistance
30. IDPs with or without forced migrant status may appeal
to the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation and his offices. The
ombudsman has raised the ongoing issue of some IDPs outside of Chechnya
not being able to receive their full pension as a result of the
archives being lost during the conflicts, concluding that the result
is a violation of their right to social security. In Ingushetia,
the ombudsman has recently suggested amendments to the Law on Forced
Migrants, hosted a round-table discussion on the problems facing
IDPs,
publicly
advocated for IDPs and received their complaints and concerns.
For
his part, the Chechen Ombudsman has highlighted some inadequacies
in the property compensation schemes
and the process
of evictions of IDPs from hostels. Your rapporteur nevertheless
reiterates his concern that the Chechen Ombudsman does not fully
protect human rights.
31. Additionally, Chechen Presidential Decree No. 451 of 6 December
2007 on additional measures to ensure rights and freedoms of people
and citizens in the Chechen Republic sets out a number of measures relating
to human rights. For example, Public Councils on the Safeguarding
of the Rights and Freedoms of the People and Citizens of the Chechen
Republic were established at municipal and district administration
levels and have reportedly taken up the complaints of numerous IDP
hostel residents and other vulnerable citizens on violations of
their housing, land and property rights.
5. Achievements and challenges
5.1. Chechnya
5.1.1. Achievements
32. The return of IDPs was made possible by the efforts
of federal and Chechen authorities, who ended the bombing and shelling
of inhabited areas, rebuilt towns and re-established social payments
and services.
The Chechen
authorities have provided housing support to some returned IDPs
whose homes had been destroyed, including plots of land, rental
subsidies, apartments, houses or placement in municipal housing.
Some hostels
for IDPs have also been renovated. International humanitarian organisations,
such as the DRC and UNHCR have supported construction of housing
for IDPs and returned IDPs.
Your
rapporteur visited one such housing project financed by the DRC
in Assinovskaya Usadba, and was considerably impressed.
33. Many IDPs who lost their property have also benefited from
property compensation programmes. Around 75 000 families (124 745
people) who resettled in Chechnya have received compensation for destroyed
property under Decree No. 404; and some 38 000 families who resettled
outside the republic – of whom 22 819 live in the North Caucasus
Federal District – have received compensation under Decree No. 510.
As of 2008, applicants
no longer need to include proof of their registration as a resident
at the destroyed property when they apply for compensation.
5.1.2. Challenges
34. Unemployment among IDPs remains a serious challenge.
More than 60% of able-bodied IDPs are out of work in Ingushetia
and Chechnya.
IDPs report obstacles to finding
work specific to their displaced status, including their lack of
registration as a temporary resident, gaps in schooling, disability
and the need to care for children and elderly or sick relatives.
Youth are particularly affected as many missed up to seven years
of education during the conflict, had poor access to bridging courses
and now face poor quality of education, due to the lack of teachers
and teacher training and the (illegal) sums of money frequently
demanded in exchange for issuing diplomas. In common with the rest
of the population, IDPs also suffer from a shortage of employment opportunities,
inadequate qualifications and kickbacks demanded in return for a
job. Some IDPs in Grozny pointed out that major construction projects
in the city did not offer skilled labour opportunities for local unemployed
people as foreign investors mostly brought their skilled staff with
them. Internally displaced women told your rapporteur that although
they had higher education degrees from before the war, they could
not find qualified work. The result is that most IDPs depend on
State pensions, social allowances and help from relatives.
35. Government housing support has not always led to a durable
solution. Settlement assistance from the Chechen government is only
available in IDPs' area of origin, and those who were not registered
as permanent residents before the conflicts are unable to claim.
Municipal authorities have not always provided this support, for
budgetary reasons. Plots of land offered to some IDPs were in remote
areas with no access to water, electricity or transport. Others
found the apartments and houses offered to be in inadequate condition
or that ownership was contested. Letters of guarantee for future
receipt of housing have not been honoured by the municipal administration
of Grozny.
Housing
offers have usually been calculated for families based on the number
of internally displaced parents and their children in the family.
Calculations have not included grandchildren or daughters-in-law,
who usually also live with the family since they have been unable
to secure housing on their own as a result of poverty of displacement.
As a result, the housing offered has often been too small and inadequate
living conditions persist even when a housing solution is found.
36. The government's focus on return restricts IDPs' right to
make a free and voluntary choice of settlement, whether it be to
return, locally integrate in their area of displacement or resettle
elsewhere. The law does not prevent the Chechen government from
providing alternative housing in such cases, but, in practice, those
not registered as permanent residents of the locality prior to the
second conflict have been unable to apply for help. This runs counter
to Article 3 of Russian Federation Law No. 5242-1 of 25 June 1993
that states that registration as a permanent resident cannot be
a condition for the realisation of citizens' rights and freedoms, and
a 1995 Constitutional Court ruling that to make housing assistance
conditional on registration as a permanent resident was unconstitutional.
In
addition, registration as a resident in a new locality is difficult
to obtain, and without it access to services, jobs and entitlements
is limited.
37. Compensation schemes for destroyed property have also not
always enabled IDPs to secure adequate housing. A 2011 survey of
IDPs living in private accommodation
revealed that 33% of households
had received compensation, but were still waiting for a durable
housing solution. Among the reasons given were that the amount awarded
had not been indexed to inflation and so was not enough to buy or
build a new property; and that kickbacks demanded by government
officials meant families did not receive their full entitlement.
These
factors have discouraged many eligible IDPs from applying for compensation.
Others are simply not eligible. Families whose housing was less
than 80% destroyed, or who lost their homes in the violence that
led up to the official start of the first conflict are not able
to apply, and nor are tenants or occupiers of property other than
their own.
38. The combination of ineffective compensation schemes, inadequate
government housing support and widespread unemployment means that
many IDPs continue to live in sub-standard housing conditions. Some 20 000
vulnerable households affected by the war were still without a permanent
home and in need of housing assistance in 2009.
Their housing was inadequate in terms
of living conditions, location, availability of services, facilities
and infrastructure and legal security of tenure. Many IDPs continue
to live in dilapidated hostels, the homes of relatives and friends,
box tents they received as long ago as 2003 and other makeshift premises.
They live in more crowded conditions and have less protection from
the elements than the general population.
Your
rapporteur witnesses deplorable conditions in some hostels.
39. The number of evictions of IDPs from hostels increased in
2011. Most IDPs living in hostels in 2010 lacked any kind of proper
ownership or tenancy contract or residence registration at the hostel.
This put them at risk of unlawful eviction
which they could not legally contest. In carrying out evictions,
the government observed some procedural norms but ignored others.
Court orders were issued, government officials were present, those
carrying out the procedure were properly identified and evictions
were put on hold in the case of bad weather. There was, however,
no opportunity for consultation, the informed consent of the affected group
was never sought or given, notice was mostly very short (sometimes
only forty-eight hours), and evictions were carried out regardless
of whether those affected had access to a legal remedy or assistance.
40. Not all IDPs living in hostels were without alternative accommodation
or the means to rent. Upon eviction, some were able to fall back
on other options. IDPs for whom living in hostels was not a matter
of choice, however, were even more vulnerable once evicted. Without
an offer of alternative accommodation, it is not clear how this
group will cope. These cases clearly need special attention, but
the government has not adopted a case-by-case approach or monitored
the situation of evicted IDPs and so is unaware of their continuing
housing needs. Some IDPs who have received eviction orders have
appealed collectively to President Kadyrov and the Mayor of Grozny,
requesting the order be withdrawn or alternative accommodation provided.
41. Lack of security remains a problem for IDPs and returned IDPs
in Chechnya. Like their neighbours they are in the midst of ongoing
violence and exposed to the risks associated with landmines and
unexploded ordnance, which are still present in rural areas.
President
Medvedev had instructed the defence and emergencies ministries to
complete the demining process in Chechnya, but lack of funding appears
to be delaying the process.
5.2. North Ossetia
5.2.1. Achievements
42. Return has been facilitated in North Ossetia. Schools,
kindergartens, health clinics and sports complexes have been renovated
in several villages and hundreds of events have been organised since
2003 to bring Ossetian and Ingush people together at all levels
of society.
Over 4 000 Ingush families (21 823 people)
were assisted in their return
. By 2005, 19 530 people
had received housing support totalling more than 1.35 billion roubles
(€32.5 million).
43. IDPs unable to return have been helped to settle elsewhere
in North Ossetia.
More than 5 000
IDPs received State assistance to do so regardless of forced migrant
status. Two villages were built for this group in the Prigorodny
district towns of Maïskoye and Novy. Plots of land were allocated,
farms established and help provided for small businesses. Your rapporteur
was able to visit both these villages and observed that construction
was indeed under way, as was the building of infrastructure and
gas pipelines. Although these villages are currently predominantly
Ingush, the authorities plan to encourage ethnic Ossetians and Russians to
settle in Maïskoye, which is a welcome step. On the other hand,
your rapporteur has some reservations regarding the way some of
the federal funds are being used. For example, an enormous modern
school complex is being built in Novy for 560 pupils, whereas there
are currently only about 100 school-aged children in the village.
5.2.2. Challenges
44. IDPs face various challenges in securing durable
housing solutions. They report that their original homes have been
destroyed or illegally occupied and/or sold, that they have lost
their title documents or that they do not have the means to rebuild
their homes.
Some
IDPs from the Prigorodny district have struggled to obtain a new
passport with registration as permanent residents in their place
of origin – an important process to complete if they wish to claim
help with housing upon return. IDPs without forced migrant status
or only temporary registration in North Ossetia are not eligible
for assistance under the Prigorodny district's social development
programme.
IDPs also report
that there are few jobs, which does not help them to improve their housing
and general situation.
45. The prospect of return for some IDPs has been limited by continuing
tensions between Ingush and Ossetian communities. Such tensions
are particularly prevalent following events such as the 2010 bombing
of the market in the republic's capital of Vladikavkaz.
As
a result, the government has taken legal measures to restrict return
to some ethnically mixed villages in the Prigorodny district, including
by the declaration of some areas as conservation zones. IDPs affected
by such measures were offered plots of land in other villages in the
district, but some refused and insist on their right to return to
their homes. Some local administrations have also prevented return
by ruling that housing assistance cannot be used to buy or build
property in their jurisdiction.
5.3. Ingushetia
5.3.1. Achievements
46. Ingushetia was for a long time the only safe place
of refuge for IDPs. They were initially settled in tent camps and
temporary settlements, but the camps were closed in 2004 and most
IDPs now live in private accommodation or temporary settlements
administered by the government or private landlords. The Ingush authorities
have in recent years encouraged the local integration of IDPs from
Chechnya and North Ossetia. Internally displaced and local children
used to be taught separately, but now go to school together.
47. Your rapporteur wishes to commend the Ingush government for
their particularly clear understanding and down-to-earth approach
in trying to find durable housing solutions for IDPs from Chechnya
and North Ossetia. Today, there remain 608 internally displaced
families from North Ossetia and 1 400 internally displaced families
from Chechnya who would like to settle there. By the end of 2011,
the government will close the temporary settlements which have served
as temporary accommodation for IDPs for many years. Your rapporteur
visited two of these centres, the sanitary conditions of which he
found deplorable. He agrees that these settlements need to be phased
out; however, he also hears the concerns of the residents fearing
forcible evictions with nowhere else to go. The Head of the Ingush
Government, Mr Musa Tchiliev, confirmed at the meeting with the
rapporteur on 23 September 2011 that some will be offered apartments
in Magas while others will be assisted with renting private housing.
The small republic is already subsidising 107 million roubles in 2011
for the cost of rent and the new socio-economic development programme
2012-16 will ensure that the issue is addressed. Your rapporteur
nevertheless remains concerned that three months prior to the scheduled closure
of the temporary settlements, the government did not seem to have
a clear resettlement plan. He would also echo the Ingush Ombudsman
and encourage the authorities to better communicate their plans
to those concerned, and with sufficient notice.
5.3.2. Challenges
48. As is the case in Chechnya, IDPs in Ingushetia continue
to experience poor living conditions because of unemployment and
ineffective compensation schemes for destroyed property. More than
50% of IDPs are out of work and report reasons for their unemployment
similar to their counterparts in Chechnya.
IDPs
in temporary settlements live in far worse conditions than those
living in the private sector, and arguably the worst conditions
of all IDPs in the region. Some with forced migrant status may benefit
from Ingushetia's 2010-16 socio-economic development programme,
but the construction of housing is not due to begin until 2013.
6. The role of non-governmental organisations
49. Several NGOs in the North Caucasus offer legal counselling
to IDPs, returned IDPs and refugees. Most consultations relate to
social welfare, housing, documentation and registration, and assistance
is provided for pursuing administrative procedures or court cases.
Some of the NGOs, such as Memorial and Vesta, are doing laudable
work in offering legal assistance and intervening in evictions,
sometimes operating in very difficult circumstances, most notably
in Chechnya. Financing from abroad remains critical for local humanitarian
and human rights NGOs as Russian donors do not fund their work on
the basis that it is potentially political.
50. The United Nations will have left the North Caucasus completely
by the end of 2011 and will initiate no further projects for IDPs
there. As a result, the Danish Refugee Council will be the only
international body specialised in forced displacement with an office
in the region. It co-ordinates small-scale housing, legal assistance
and income generation projects in Chechnya, Ingushetia and North
Ossetia. The European Commission's humanitarian aid department (ECHO),
the largest donor in the region for many years, issued its final
round of funding for the North Caucasus in 2010.
7. Conclusions and the way forward
51. Despite the significant efforts of the Russian authorities,
IDPs and returnees in the North Caucasus continue to face numerous
obstacles to achieving a durable solution, defined as being when
they have returned, integrated locally or resettled elsewhere in
the country, no longer need assistance or protection and can exercise
their human rights without discrimination. The main obstacles are
the inadequacy of their housing, the ineffectiveness of compensation
schemes for destroyed property, difficulty in obtaining documentation, limited
choice of residence, unemployment and continuing insecurity.
52. Although substantial progress has been achieved in reviving
the region, the process of finding durable solutions is hampered
by flourishing corruption, insufficient political will to deal with
ordinary citizens and the expectation at the local government level
that the central government should provide all solutions. In addition, there
is a lack of monitoring of IDPs, a lack of targeted measures for
particularly vulnerable IDPs, and a lack of participation of IDPs
in the planning and management of durable solutions.
53. There is a need for an improved government response at all
levels to address these issues:
54. First, Russian legislation on internal displacement is not
in line with international standards and is not applied consistently.
Some IDPs have therefore been excluded from government assistance.
Legislation on internal displacement should be aligned with international
standards and applied consistently.
55. Second, there is no comprehensive information on the outstanding
displacement-related challenges facing IDPs. Domestic legislation
and policy does not call for such surveys and there has been a lack
of political will to monitor the situation of IDPs and ensure durable
solutions are achieved. An assessment of the achievement of durable
solutions should be conducted using the definition of IDP in the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The outstanding displacement-related
challenges that IDPs face should be addressed through existing or
new development programmes, with the most vulnerable IDPs prioritised.
56. Third, government housing support has been insufficient and
inadequate. Property compensation schemes have also been ineffective
since the compensation amount is insufficient to rebuild or buy
housing, the schemes are riddled with corruption, and not all those
persons dispossessed of their property are eligible to apply. The
result is that many IDPs continue to live in substandard conditions.
A survey of the housing needs of IDPs should be conducted using
the definition of IDP in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Those
in need of permanent housing should be given priority placement
in programmes such as municipal housing, rental subsidies and the
federal "Housing" programme.
57. Fourth, employment opportunities are scarce in the region
and some IDPs have difficulties in obtaining residence registration,
which is needed to apply for jobs in the formal sector. Others cannot
work because of family care obligations, disabilities, limited education
and mined land. The result is that IDPs are not self-reliant and
depend on government benefits as their main source of income. An
assessment of livelihood opportunities should be carried out and
the inclusion of IDPs in vocational training and other job creation
initiatives should be prioritised within current development projects.
58. Fifth, settlement options of IDPs are limited, including return
options. Some IDPs do not have titles to their original homes or
cannot afford to rebuild them. The lack of infrastructure and secondary
occupation of their homes are also obstacles to return. For IDPs
who wish to integrate locally, they have difficulties acquiring residence
registration at their current residence, and in Chechnya IDPs are
not eligible for housing assistance outside their place of origin.
Federal and local governments should establish conditions and provide
the means for IDPs to choose meaningfully between return, local
integration and settlement elsewhere. The Grozny Municipal Administration's
exclusion of IDPs originating elsewhere from durable housing aid
in the city should be discouraged.
59. Finally, insecurity continues to reign in the North Caucasus.
The insurgency is undefeated and unexploded ordnance and landmines
remain uncleared. This is a major obstacle to the achievement of
durable solutions for IDPs. Measures should be taken to ensure the
physical security of IDPs and to ensure that return, local integration
and settlement elsewhere are sustainable, including through guaranteeing
rule of law.