1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. The motion for a resolution by Jean-Charles Gardetto
(Monaco, EPP/CD) and others on “Promoting alternatives to imprisonment”
was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
for report on 3 October 2011.
At its meeting on
13 December 2011, the committee appointed me as its rapporteur and
on 13 March 2012 it discussed an introductory memorandum. On 11
December 2012, it held a hearing with the following experts:
- Dr Jovan Ciric, Director of
the Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade (Serbia)
- Professor Marcelo Aebi, Deputy Director of the Institute
of Criminology, University of Lausanne (Switzerland)
2. On 11 and 12 February 2013, I carried out a fact-finding visit
to the United Kingdom in order to study recent measures aimed at
promoting alternatives to imprisonment with a view to reducing recidivism
and improving the security of the population whilst containing budgetary
costs. I should like to thank the competent British authorities,
and in particular the United Kingdom delegation to the Council of
Europe, for their excellent co-operation and hospitality.
I
was impressed with the professionalism and personal engagement of
my interlocutors, both at the working level in the competent State
bodies and at the political level, and not least among specialised
non-governmental organisations or State-mandated autonomous bodies.
Other European countries have a lot to learn from the way in which
the United Kingdom has first experimented with and then phased in
on a large scale a number of novel non-custodial sanctions which
have indeed proven to be viable alternatives to imprisonment.
1.2. The Council of
Europe at the forefront of promoting alternatives to imprisonment
5. These documents all state clearly that the purpose and added
value of non-custodial measures is to find effective alternatives
to imprisonment for offenders and to enable the authorities to adjust
penal sanctions to the needs of the individual offender in a manner
proportionate to the offence committed. They permit the offender
to remain at liberty, thereby also enabling him or her to continue
work, studies and family life.
At the same
time, these documents – and I myself, I should like to add – also
fully support the general aim of the criminal justice system, which
is to reduce crime and the need to recognise the importance of taking
into account the situation of victims of crime.
6. Promoting alternatives to imprisonment is therefore by no
means a novel or “revolutionary” approach – it is just plain common
sense. As we will see, recent technological advances have added
new options to the panoply of alternatives to imprisonment, which
further strengthen the case for reducing imprisonment. At the same
time, care has to be taken that these new options do not cause a
“widening of the net” of criminal sanctions by targeting small-time
or first-time offenders committing minor transgressions which might otherwise
not have given rise to any formal criminal sanctions at all.
2. Imprisonment
gaining ground again in Europe and the problem of prison overcrowding
2.1. Imprisonment rates
in Europe: disparate but generally rising
7. Surprisingly, in view of the above, imprisonment
has gained ground in Europe over recent years. Despite the general
recognition that prison should be the “last resort” reaction to
deviant behaviour, imprisonment rates have increased rather than
decreased in many European countries since the 1990s. In most European countries,
imprisonment rates are well above those in the 1970s and 1980s.
The countries of central and eastern Europe still have the highest
rates (around 200 prisoners per 100 000 inhabitants), and these
rates are unfortunately on the rise again after an initial sharp
fall immediately after the political changes at the end of the 1980s.
A number of western European countries have also experienced steep
increases in the number of prisoners in the last decade and have
now reached imprisonment rates well above 100/100 000 (in particular the
Netherlands, England and Wales and Spain). On a more positive note,
some countries still have prisoner rates short of 100/100 000 (France,
Germany and Greece), whilst the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland
and Italy still have rates well below 100/100 000. In England and
Wales, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain, prisoner rates increased
at a particularly rapid pace between 1987 and 2006, whereas France,
Germany, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland saw relatively small increases.
8. The numbers cited above refer to the year 2006. The most recent
figures, available from the SPACE I statistics (Annual Penal Statistics
of the Council of Europe) published in 2012 referring to the situation
on 1 September 2010, generally confirm the trend described by Professor
Albrecht – with the positive exception of the Netherlands, where
the imprisonment rate has decreased again to 70.8/100 000, and the
negative ones of France and Italy, where imprisonment rates now
exceed 100/100 000 (France 103.5 and Italy 113.3).
The countries
with the highest imprisonment rates among the member States of the
Council of Europe, namely more than double the European average
of 149.3, are all in the east of the continent: the Russian Federation (590.8),
Georgia (533.9), Azerbaijan (410.0) and Ukraine (332.4).
2.2. Prison overcrowding:
a problem in 21 member States of the Council of Europe
9. Not surprisingly, in view of the above figures, and
as indicated in the motion underlying this report, many member States
of the Council of Europe suffer from prison overcrowding. According
to the most recent statistics published by the Council of Europe,
21 member States have more than 100
prisoners per 100 places of detention. This includes countries with
mildly overcrowded prisons such as Iceland, Ireland, Sweden and
Finland (less than 105 prisoners per 100 places), countries with
more serious problems (such as France at 108.4, Turkey at 115, Greece
at 123) up to countries with very severe overcrowding problems (including Serbia
at 172.3, Italy at 153.2 and Cyprus at 150.8 prisoners per 100 places).
10. Numerous reports of the European Committee for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
show that this leads to substandard prison conditions. These cause
serious human rights problems and dramatically reduce the impact
prison can have on the rehabilitation of offenders. In addition
to prisoners already convicted of an offence, there are hundreds
of thousands of prisoners on remand and pre-trial detainees in Council
of Europe member States. It should not be forgotten that these people
benefit from the presumption of innocence. This is a powerful reason
to make the best possible use of alternative measures in order to
achieve the purposes habitually pursued by the imposition of pre-trial detention.
11. In view of the difficult budgetary situation of most member
States, the high cost of imprisonment
is also a factor that should spur
reflection on alternatives to imprisonment. The SPACE I statistics
show that the cost per inmate per day
(as of 2009) ranges between, for example, just over 2 euros in Armenia
and Bulgaria, 9 euros in Azerbaijan, 15 euros in Albania and Serbia,
between 80 and 120 euros in most western European countries up to
300 euros in Norway. Even for the countries in the middle range
of expenditure per inmate, these expenses are considerable; and
in the countries with particularly low expenses, the question arises whether
those extremely limited resources can realistically be sufficient
in order to guarantee the respect of human dignity and minimum standards
of detention, especially with a view to rehabilitation.
12. Of course, legitimate security concerns of our societies and
the perceived need for retributive justice must be taken into account.
But I share the assumption of the signatories of the motion underlying
my mandate that suitable alternatives to imprisonment do exist.
This is particularly true for low-level or first-time offenders, juvenile
delinquents and others who do not constitute a present danger for
society and who may actually be in a better position to repair the
damage they have done to their victims if they are allowed to benefit
from alternatives to custodial sentences.
3. Offenders suitable
for alternative sanctions: taking into account the “purposes of
punishment”
13. The types of offenders for whom the use of non-custodial
sanctions would be socially acceptable and politically defensible
depend on the different purposes of criminal sanctions and their
complicated and sometimes contradictory relationship. I am aware
that the relative weight attached to the different “purposes of punishment”
goes to the very root of our cultural and political socialisation.
The Assembly represents 47 countries with different national penal
cultures and traditions and covers the full spectrum of political
tendencies from the left to the right. It is therefore not likely
and maybe not even desirable that we all agree on the relative importance
that we attach to the different purposes of punishment, in quantitative
terms. But I do think that there can be a consensus on a “non-weighted”
list of purposes that criminal sanctions should pursue, including:
- General
prevention, namely deterring potential offenders in the
wider context. General prevention depends in particular on high
elucidation rates for criminal offences, namely the probability
that an offender is actually identified and convicted. It also requires
that sanctions must be sufficiently “unpleasant” in order to have
a deterrent effect on potential offenders. This means that non-custodial sanctions
must not fall below a certain threshold of constraint.
- Special prevention,
namely preventing (additional) offences by the person to be subjected
to sanctions, both through deterrence and rehabilitation. As to
deterrence, the same factors as above come into play. Rehabilitation,
in turn, can be promoted both in prison and outside. It can also
be affected negatively by prison. The “school of crime” effect,
especially in overcrowded places of detention in which juvenile
or first-time offenders are exposed to the influence of hardened
multi-recidivists, is well-known.
- Retributive justice,
namely upholding the law by punishing offenders as a matter of principle
vis-à-vis society as a whole and the victims of the crime in question,
is more of a metaphysical purpose of punishment. Its weight is difficult
to quantify, but it plays an important role in the popular and (sometimes) populist
understanding of the relationship between crime and punishment.
Whilst all our societies have come a long way from the archaic principle
of “an eye for an eye”, custodial sentences are still widely seen
as the inevitable consequence of particularly serious crimes, especially
those involving wilful attacks on the life and health of others.
- Restorative justice,
namely repairing the prejudice suffered by the victim, including,
for some, an element of “moral satisfaction” for the victim seeing
the perpetrator punished. Restorative justice can be promoted more
effectively through non-custodial sanctions than through imprisonment,
given that the perpetrator does not automatically lose his or her
job and has therefore more funds for repairing the damage caused.
14. These “purposes of punishment” shall serve as guidance in
evaluating possible alternatives to imprisonment, though much depends
on the respective weight attached to the one or the other, possibly contradictory
purpose in our respective countries.
15. As a general rule, it can be said that non-custodial sanctions
are particularly suitable as punishment for non-violent crimes,
especially when committed by juvenile and/or first-time offenders,
and women.
But
this does not mean that all others should systematically go to prison.
This would be a serious step backwards in relation even to the existing
practice in many countries. When discussing the different types
of non-custodial sanctions, I will include references to the types
of crimes and delinquents for which they have proved most suitable.
16. The Tokyo Rules, in conjunction with the Commentary thereon,
give a first indication by stating that “imprisonment cannot be
considered an appropriate sanction for a wide range of offences
and many types of offenders, in particular those who are not likely
to repeat offences, those convicted of minor crimes and those needing
medical, psychiatric or social help”.
4. Different alternatives
to imprisonment: legal and human rights standards
17. Possible alternatives to imprisonment include fines
(section 4.1 below) as well as the use, separately or combined,
of so-called community sanctions and measures (CSMs) defined as
“sanctions and measures which maintain offenders in the community
and involve some restrictions on their liberty through the imposition
of conditions and/or obligations”.
CSMs
can either accompany a suspended prison sentence (section 4.2 below),
or completely replace a custodial sentence. The Council of Europe
SPACE II statistics
provide a wealth of interesting
data on the use of non-custodial sanctions and measures (excluding
fines) in most member States of the Council of Europe.
18. Minimum standards for non-custodial measures were first set
in 1990 in the Tokyo Rules. In 1992, the Committee of Ministers
adopted Recommendation No. R (92) 16 on the European Rules on Community Sanctions
and Measures, complemented in 2010 by Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1
on the Council of Europe Probation Rules.
19. Non-custodial sentences, whilst clearly preferable to prison
sentences in all but the most serious cases, must nevertheless fulfil
basic human rights requirements, as specified in the Tokyo Rules,
and the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures, including
the following, which apply in principle to all non-custodial sentences.
4.1. The principle of
legality
20. This principle means that the measures to be applied,
the conditions for their application, and the authorities responsible
for their implementation must be prescribed by law. Rule 3 of the
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures specifies that
“[t]he definition, adoption and application of community sanctions
and measures shall be laid down in law”. Whilst flexibility allowing
the personalisation of sanctions, in the interest of the rehabilitation
of the offender, is one of the strengths of alternative sanctions,
this must not allow for arbitrariness. The law must set a clear,
predictable framework for all penal sentences, including non-custodial
ones. The latter can also involve heavy interferences with the fundamental
rights of offenders. As regards the authorities responsible for
the implementation of such sanctions, the law may allow for the “privatisation”
of certain aspects. I am myself in favour of greater involvement
of civil society actors in this field, as their good will, experience
and human engagement can make a crucial difference for the chances
of rehabilitation of offenders. The “circles of support” launched
in the United Kingdom by the Quakers which I learned about in some
detail during my fact-finding visit are an interesting example.
By contrast, I am sceptical about the involvement of private enterprises
trying to derive a financial profit from measures such as community work
obligations imposed on offenders, or to whom the monitoring of electronic
devices may be delegated. In such cases, the law must make it very
clear that the ultimate legal responsibility rests with the competent
public authority, which cannot escape its duties by delegating them
to private actors.
4.2. Prohibition of
discrimination
21. Another important legal requirement in the application
of non-custodial measures is the prohibition of discrimination.
According to Rule 2.2, the Tokyo Rules shall be applied “without
any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, age, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status”. But not all differences in treatment are
discriminatory. Differentiation based on reasonable and objective
criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination.
One
of the great advantages of non-custodial measures is precisely their
flexibility, that is to say the possibility to adjust them to the
needs of the individual offender. It may in fact be justified, objectively,
to treat persons differently in view of their particular backgrounds
and personal needs and problems. But the decision-makers must be
constantly aware of the risk that the element of discretion involved
in the implementation of measures may, intentionally or not, reflect
an element of discrimination currently existing in the relevant
community.
4.3. Principle of proportionality
22. Respect for the principle of proportionality means
that there must be a reasonable relation between the seriousness
of the offence on the one side and the intensity of the afflictive
character and the interference of the measure applied with the rights
of the offender on the other. In the terms of Rule 6 of the European
Rules, “the nature and the duration of community sanctions and measures
shall be in proportion to the seriousness of the offence for which
an offender has been sentenced or of which a person is accused and
take into account his personal circumstances”.
23. This does not mean that alternative sanctions shall necessarily
place only a mild burden on the offender. On the contrary, if we
are serious about reducing imprisonment by promoting alternative
sanctions, we must be ready to include in the scope of such measures
perpetrators of fairly serious offences who might otherwise go to
prison for some time. For such offenders, the availability of fairly
“heavy” measures such as fines syphoning off the offender’s disposable
income for many months, possibly combined with house arrests over numerous
weekends and evenings, strictly enforced by electronic devices,
can provide a credible alternative to a prison sentence, taking
into account most, if not all, of the “purposes of punishment” outlined
above.
4.4. Consent of the
offender
24. The offender’s consent is required especially in
cases where non-custodial penal measures are applied before or instead
of formal proceedings or a trial (for example, the use of electronic
monitoring devices during the pre-trial phase in order to avoid
pre-trial detention; or so-called “diversion” measures intended
to prevent the stigmatisation of first-time offenders by a formal
conviction).
25. But in the interest of the success of the measure taken, the
offender’s consent and co-operation should be sought also in those
cases where he or she was formally convicted. The European Rules
on Community Sanctions and Measures include a very detailed set
of rules designed to ensure that the offender’s consent is informed,
explicit and not the result of undue pressure.
4.5. Right to review
26. Both the European Rules and the Tokyo Rules foresee
that the offender subjected to community sanctions and measures
enjoys judicial guarantees and complaint procedures.
The European
Rules are more protective than the Tokyo Rules in that they require
that the decision to impose or revoke a community sanction or pre-trial
measure shall be taken by a judicial authority, whereas the Tokyo
Rules also allow for “another competent independent authority”.
Less formal complaint procedures suffice for decisions concerning the
mere implementation of a sanction, once imposed by a judicial authority.
4.6. Respect for the
rights to privacy and human dignity of the offenders
27. The Tokyo Rules specify that “in the application
of non-custodial measures, the offender’s right to privacy shall
be respected, as shall be the right to privacy of the offender’s
family” (Rule 3.11). The Commentary on the Tokyo Rules warns against
surveillance measures that treat offenders solely as objects of
control and specifies that surveillance techniques should not be
used without the offender’s knowledge.
Rule 23 of the European Rules adds
that self-respect, family relationships, links with the community
and ability to function in society shall not be jeopardised and
that “safeguards shall be adopted to protect the offender from insult
and improper curiosity or publicity”.
28. It is worth recalling these rules in view of some experimental
practices in certain jurisdictions which in my view have clearly
gone too far, at least by European standards.
29. Nevertheless, those restrictions to privacy which are inevitably
inherent in electronic surveillance measures must be accepted if
we are to promote these measures as a credible alternative to custodial sentences,
which interfere with the offender’s rights much more intensively.
This said, the practical implementation of electronic surveillance
measures can be modulated in such a way as to limit interferences with
privacy as much as possible without jeopardising the objective of
the measure (for example, prevent recidivism or enforce curfews
at specified times).
4.7. Protection from
undue risk of physical or mental injury.
30. Based on Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), Rule 26 of the European Rules stipulates
that the “nature, content and methods of implementation of a community
sanction or measure shall not involve undue risk of physical or
mental injury”. Rule 25 specifies that a community sanction or measure
“shall never involve medical or psychological treatment or procedures
which are not in conformity with internationally adopted ethical
standards”. In the same spirit, Rule 3.8 of the Tokyo Rules prohibits
non-custodial measures involving “medical or psychological experimentation
on, or undue risk of physical or mental injury to, the offender”.
31. These rules inevitably raise the issue of the use of surgical
or chemical castration for sex offenders. Whilst castration was
used frequently in the more or less distant past as a sanction for
various types of crimes,
laws
enabling forced surgical castration were either amended to ban involuntary
castration or completely repealed. Although laws allowing for (voluntary)
castrations in some countries are still in force (Denmark, Finland,
Germany and Sweden), the actual practice of surgical castration
has been abandoned, with the exceptions of the Czech Republic, where
voluntary surgical castration of sex offenders is practiced not infrequently
to the present day, and of Germany, where it is very rare. The CPT
has strongly criticised both countries,
stating that “surgical castration
is a mutilating, irreversible intervention and cannot be considered as
a medical necessity in the context of the treatment of sexual offenders”.
Voluntary chemical castration,
on the other hand, is practised today in Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden and the United
Kingdom.
32. In 2009, a law on compulsory chemical castration was enacted
in Poland, making it the first country in Europe to allow such treatment
to be imposed on certain sex offenders (paedophiles). In March and
June 2012, the Republic of Moldova and Estonia passed similar laws.
33. In view of the difficult medical, ethical and legal issues
raised by surgical or chemical castration, I prefer not to take
position on this type of sanction in the framework of this report.
This issue, in my view, requires a separate report in order to be
treated with the necessary attention to detail. I trust that the
report by Ms Liliane Maury Pasquier under preparation in the Committee
on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development on “Putting
an end to coercive sterilisations and castrations” will do this
subject justice.
5. The need to avoid
“widening the net”
34. Special care should be taken to ensure that non-custodial
sentences are imposed instead of prison sentences, and certainly
not in addition to them, in such a way as to avoid widening the
scope of criminal punishment. Minor offences hitherto not giving
rise to any criminal sanctions should also not be punished by non-custodial
sentences. This issue was already flagged in the Commentary on the
Tokyo Rules in which it is pointed out that the reference to “the
observance of human rights, the requirements of social justice and
the rehabilitation needs of the offender” means,
inter alia, that, while the Tokyo
Rules aim at guaranteeing more frequent use of non-custodial measures,
such use should not lead to an increase in the number of people subject
to penal measures or to an increase in the intensity of such measures.
More recent studies do indeed show
the need to be vigilant regarding the “net-widening effect” of an
increased use of non-custodial sentences.
Professor
Aebi, at the hearing on 11 December 2012, also provided us with
some interesting data pointing to an apparent net-widening effect
of the increased use of alternative sanctions in certain countries, which
have not experienced a parallel reduction of their rates of imprisonment.
35. But it would appear from these findings that a “net-widening”
effect is not inevitable, provided judges and the general public
are aware of the risk and share the assumption that an increase
in the pressure of penal sanctions applied to lesser offences is
indeed undesirable. We must in any case be vigilant, which is why
I propose to dedicate a special paragraph to this issue in our resolution.
6. Summary review
of different alternatives to imprisonment
6.1. Fines (including
“day fines” calculated in proportion to the offender’s disposable
income)
36. Fines are by far the most frequently used alternatives
to imprisonment. In Germany, for example, fines are imposed in 80.7%
of cases, as compared to 13.5% of suspended prison sentences and
5.8% of non-suspended prison sentences.
In France,
35.7% of all punishments handed down are fines,
against
48.6% prison sentences (of which 19.6% non-suspended).
In
the United Kingdom, 65.6% of all offenders sentenced receive a fine,
3.6% a suspended sentence and 7.5% are given a custodial sentence.
Serbia, finally, has the lowest
percentage of fines, at 16.5%, and the highest of non-suspended
prison sentences (23.9%). These numbers cannot be compared directly.
For example, in France, less than 630 000 punishments were handed down,
which compares to almost 1.3 million in England and Wales alone,
whose population is well below that of France. This shows that France
uses responses to deviant behaviour other than criminal sanctions
more frequently than the United Kingdom. This explains why in the
remaining – presumably more serious – cases, custodial sentences
are, in turn, more prevalent in France than in England and Wales.
In Germany,
the above-mentioned percentages apply
to 645 000 persons sentenced under general criminal law (thus excluding juvenile
offenders), whilst less than half of the proceedings brought before
the criminal courts end in a judgment.
37. The German figures show that criminal fines can be used to
sanction a substantial part of the overall criminal activity that
is serious enough to warrant a criminal court judgment; this is
even the case in criminal justice systems such as that in Germany
where other forms of reaction to deviant behaviour play a relatively important
role. This may be linked to the fact that criminal fines in Germany
can be rather substantial, as their amounts are calculated on the
basis of the delinquent’s daily disposable income – one “day fine”
(Tagessatz) being the equivalent
of 1/30th of the person’s monthly net income, after deduction of
any maintenance obligations towards family members, etc. The system
of “day fines” has been in use in Germany since 1975 and was inspired
by Scandinavian countries such as Finland, where the system was
created as early as 1921. Both the number of “daily amounts” (from
5 to 360, and in exceptional cases up to 720) and the amount per day
(from a minimum of € 5 up to € 30 000 per day!) make this punishment
a sufficiently deterrent option even for fairly serious offences,
in particular economic crimes with a pecuniary motive. In such cases,
the punishment (fine) is added to the confiscation of the proceeds
or profits of the crime.
38. The “day fine” system has the advantage that it modulates
the “pain” involved in the punishment in such a way that it is in
principle the same for all, independently of a person’s financial
resources. It also ensures that the “pain” and the expression of
disapproval by society is both considerable and perfectly comparable
with a term of imprisonment of a given length – which a fine actually
turns into if it is not paid in due time. Its adoption in other
European countries which do not yet have such a system might in
fact open up an as yet underexploited avenue for reducing imprisonment.
39. At our hearing on 11 December 2012, the Serbian expert, Dr
Jovan Ciric, presented the practical obstacles that the “day fine”
system – which is available in law – still encounter in Serbia:
the delinquents’ resources are difficult to establish when he or
she works in the “grey economy” or in agriculture; and the rampant
economic crisis has led to widespread poverty, which makes it actually
preferable for certain delinquents to go to prison rather than to
pay a fine, which they could simple not afford. In my view, these difficulties
should not deter courts from applying this type of sanction in many
more cases. The difficulty of evaluating a person’s resources can
be overcome by imposing a duty to present vouchers to establish
actual income in order to avoid the use of estimations by the court
based on the person’s apparent living standard (house, car and so
on). It is likely that the extra time and effort to be invested
by the courts would be far outweighed by the savings through a less
frequent use of imprisonment – and the fines themselves, which should
be ploughed back into the budget of the judiciary.
6.2. Other non-custodial
sanctions, including community sanctions and measures
40. Community sanctions and measures (CSMs) are particularly
important tools to limit the prison population. According to the
SPACE II (2010) statistics,
the mean
number of people under the supervision or care of probation agencies
per 100 000 inhabitants is 205.7; the lowest number (0.1) is in
Serbia, the highest (721) in Georgia. Poland (654.2), Estonia (564.7),
Latvia (466), Belgium (370.4), Hungary (310.3), England and Wales
(307.5) and France (280.6) also have far more people in probation
than the Council of Europe average, whereas the numbers in Croatia
(14.6), Cyprus (37.6), Romania (44.9), Norway (47.8), Iceland (56.4)
and Italy (59.3) are either below or just above a quarter of the
European average, still in terms of persons in probation per 100 000
inhabitants.
In
Serbia, as Dr Ciric explained at our hearing, the extremely low
number is to a large extent explained by the organisational weaknesses
of the probation system, which does not appear to “cover” most of
the persons sentenced to a suspended prison sentence,
and which
does not even offer community service measures except in a small
number of cities. I agree with him that there is a lot of scope
for improvement in Serbia on this count, and I intend to follow
this up politically in my home parliament. The following measures
are available:
6.2.1. Suspended sentences
41. A traditional means of reducing actual imprisonment
is the suspension of prison sentences, which can take the form either
of suspending the sentence from the start, or of suspending the
remainder of the sentence after the offender has spent a given proportion
of the original sentence in detention and he or she is found to present
a low risk of recidivism. The suspension of a prison sentence is
usually tied to “probation” conditions. Probation is defined as
the “implementation in the community of sanctions and measures,
defined by law and imposed on an offender. It includes a range of
activities and interventions, which involve supervision, guidance and
assistance aiming at the social inclusion of an offender, as well
as contributing to community safety”.
42. Again, the use of suspended sentences differs widely between
countries. In Germany, suspended sentences are used more than twice
as often as non-suspended ones, at 13.5% of all criminal sanctions against
5.8%. France also uses suspended sentences far more often than non-suspended
ones: 29% of all criminal sanctions are suspended prison sentences,
whereas only 19.6% are at least in part not suspended.
By
contrast, the United Kingdom (England and Wales) hands down twice
as many non-suspended sentences as suspended ones (only 3.6% of
all criminal sanctions are suspended prison sentences, 7.5% non-suspended ones).
In Serbia, according to the 2009 data provided by Dr Ciric, suspended
prison sentences, at 57.2%, are handed down more than twice as often
as non-suspended ones (23.9%). According to the SPACE II statistics, the
mean number of persons per 100 000 inhabitants who are under probation
after having been given a fully or partially suspended prison sentence
is 35.9, the lowest number being 0 (in Serbia
),
the highest (100) in Romania. Monaco (80.6), Poland (79.5), France
(79.2) and Latvia (66.1) also have fairly high numbers of person
under probation following a suspended prison sentence, England and
Wales (25.6), Italy (10.7) and Spain (9.2) are in the lower range.
43. National practices also vary widely as regards suspension
of the remainder of a prison sentence. In Germany, early release
is quasi-automatic after two thirds of the originally imposed sentence
(one half in the case of juvenile offenders), provided the prisoner
has behaved adequately in detention and benefits from a favourable
“social prognosis”. In France, the part of the sentence to be served
in prison and the part suspended is fixed in the original judgment.
In England and Wales, early release is usually granted at the halfway
point of a fixed sentence, whereas sentences of indefinite duration
include a “tariff” period meted out in proportion to the seriousness
of the offence; after the expiry of the “tariff”, release is possible
if and when the risk of recidivism is considered acceptably low.
France has a particularly interesting
system regarding early release, on the basis of the Law of 9 March
2004.
This system, designed to motivate
prisoners to co-operate with the prison authorities in order to
improve their chances of rehabilitation, functions as follows: for
the first year of the prison sentence, three months are deducted,
and two months for each further year (except for recidivists). This basic
“credit” can be either reduced, in case of bad behaviour, or increased,
by up to three months per year of imprisonment, when the prisoner
behaves in a particularly exemplary fashion (for example, by taking
an exam).
44. In addition, early release is possible in many if not most
jurisdictions on compassionate grounds, when new circumstances arise
that were not foreseeable at the time of the judgment (in particular
serious medical grounds).
45. In Serbia, as Dr Ciric explained at our hearing, the number
of persons released early on parole has considerably decreased in
the last few years. Whilst the Criminal Code of 2006 allowed for
release on parole after one half of the original sentence, it was
amended in 2009 to allow early release only after two thirds of
the original sentence. Even then, judges are reluctant to proceed
with early releases due to pressures from certain media and political
forces.
6.2.2. Curfews, house
arrest and restraining/exclusion orders enforced by technological
means such as electronic bracelets and GPS
46. Curfews, house arrests and restraining or exclusion
orders, more and more often enforced by technological means (for
example electronic bracelets or other GPS-based devices) can either
be alternative sanctions in their own right or accompanying measures
for the suspension of prison sentences for all or part of the probation
period. With reference to the “purposes of punishment”,
it
is clear that such measures are particularly useful both as regards
the need to protect society from re-offending (general prevention)
and the need either to rehabilitate the offender or to prevent him
or her from becoming de-socialised in the first place (special prevention).
The former is true, in particular, when technological means are
used to enforce curfews, house arrests and restraining or exclusion
orders (for example, against harassers/stalkers or violent family members).
Offenders subjected to such sanctions must bear many of the – intended
– negative aspects of a prison sentence – in particular the loss
of personal liberty in what would normally be their “free time”.
But they can be spared many of the unintended negative aspects of
imprisonment – in particular job loss, disruption of normal family
relations and exposure to nefarious influences in the prison context.
47. The relevant statistics (SPACE II) are difficult to compare
in detail, but it is quite clear from them that these measures are
still underused in most jurisdictions, despite their high potential.
48. I have been particularly impressed, during my fact-finding
visit to the United Kingdom, by the efficient utilisation of high-tech
supervision devices in this jurisdiction. The cost per day and offender
is only a fraction of that of a custodial sentence, whereas the
rate of recidivism is considerably lower than that of former prison inmates.
Unit costs have also gone down considerably by the combination of
economies of scale due to the growing use of these measures and
to the reduction in the cost of the electronic hardware. It is clear
that the outcomes of different punishments in terms of recidivism
are difficult to compare because much depends on the selection of
the respective “populations” to which the one or the other punishment
measure is applied. But the United Kingdom experience does show
that curfew orders enforced by technical means have a very good safety
record. Electronic tagging also helps police investigations by reducing
the number of potential suspects. Limited investigatory resources
need not be wasted on persons whose whereabouts at the time of the
offence can be established by a few mouse-clicks. There are also
critical comments, such as the finding in the June 2012 Criminal
Justice Joint Inspection Report
that electronically-monitored
curfews may well be used effectively for the purpose of punishment,
but only rarely for promoting lasting change on the side of the offenders.
This would require a more targeted, personalised use of these measures
that in turn require a better flow of information between the different
actors in the process.
49. The effect on recidivism of the early release of prisoners
on home detention curfew (HDC), accompanied by an electronic tag,
was the subject of in-depth research by the United Kingdom Ministry
of Justice.
HDC was
introduced across England and Wales in 1999 to enable early release
on an electronic tag for offenders who had received relatively short
prison terms and who posed a less serious threat of reoffending
upon release. The study is based on data concerning almost 500 000
prison discharges between 2000 and 2006, including over 63 000 early
discharges receiving HDC. The study shows that offenders who received
HDC were no more likely to reengage in criminal behaviour when released
from prison when compared to offenders with similar characteristics
who were not eligible for early releases on HDC. As the cost of
monitoring an offender on HDC is considerably lower than that of
keeping an offender in custody, these findings suggest that HDC
is probably a cost-effective policy.
50. In France, different forms of electronic surveillance are
available at different stages of the criminal justice process.
According to the French Government’s
reply to a parliamentary question in 2011,
the “placement sous surveillance
électronique” is used quite frequently (almost 65 000 cases between
2000 and 2010) and is in fact the fastest-growing measure accompanying
or modulating custodial sentences. By contrast, the “placement sous
surveillance électronique mobile”, which has only been available
throughout France as of August 2007, is still only used in a small
number of cases (54 ongoing measures on 1 September 2011).
51. In Germany, the possibility of imposing mobile electronic
supervision devices (Elektronische Aufenthaltsüberwachung or EAÜ)
was included in the Criminal Code as of 1 January 2011.
It is applicable only
in fairly serious cases, to supervise an offender presenting a high
risk of recidivism during the probation period following release
from a prison sentence of three years or more. An extension of this
type of measure to cases in which potentially dangerous offenders
can no longer be kept in preventive security detention due to the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
or to other groups of cases with
a view to reducing prison overcrowding is currently under discussion.
52. The noticeable reluctance concerning the imposition of mobile
surveillance devices in France and Germany has the merit of drawing
attention to the fact that this is not a “soft” measure, also in
fairly severe cases. Electronic surveillance imposes considerable
constraints upon offenders and has psychological effects that should
not be underestimated. But in comparison with a custodial sentence,
it has clear advantages both for the offender and for society at
large, by avoiding the de-socialising effects of prison, including
job loss, severe reduction of relations with family and friends,
and the risk of criminal “contagion”. I was told in London that
even certain media which generally condemn any policies seen as
“soft on crime”, have accepted the point made by proponents of non-custodial
measures that being forced to go out and work with tough curfews enforced
by electronic tagging is much more demanding and in fact “harder”
on offenders than “sleeping off” or spending in front of the television
a few weeks or months in custody.
53. In Serbia, the case of a famous folk singer sentenced to house
arrest
for
an economic crime has triggered a wide public debate. While it was
argued that house arrest is a privilege for the rich and famous,
who did not want to give up the comforts of their luxurious homes,
the debate had the merit of creating an awareness of this type of
sanction among the general population, which has promoted its increased
use by the courts. As our colleague, Renato Farina, indicated, house
arrests are also difficult to administer in the numerous cases of homeless
or migrant offenders.
54. Nevertheless, on the basis of the positive experience in the
United Kingdom based on a large number of cases, I would recommend
an increased use of such measures, in place of custodial sentences,
in other European countries, including my own, which is still quite
far behind in this respect.
6.2.3. Intermittent or
weekend sentences
55. Intermittent or weekend sentences are distinct from
curfews, house arrests, etc. (including those enforced by electronic
surveillance measures) in that offenders actually have to go to
prison for some time – offenders having to spend their free time
at night, on weekends and possibly their annual vacation time in detention,
away from home.
56. Depending on how much time is to be spent in prison, this
can be a sanction of intermediary severity between uninterrupted
prison time and electronically enforced curfews or house arrests.
It avoids some but not all the negative effects associated with
prison.
6.2.4. Assistance and
supervision programmes
57. Programmes providing assistance and supervision by
probation officers, including participation in “offending behaviour
programmes” (drug rehabilitation programmes, drinking and driving,
anger management, domestic violence), have been used increasingly
since the 1970s. Whilst their focus was at first on the rehabilitation
of the offender, punitive and risk-controlling conditions have been
increasingly added to the panoply of such alternative measures since
the 1990s. It would exceed the limits of space available for my report
to try and give a full overview of all the measures in use in different
member States of the Council of Europe. In the following text, I
will just mention a few categories of measures which can usefully
be “mixed and matched” to achieve the desired result of rehabilitating
offenders, protecting society by reducing the risk of recidivism,
and providing adequate punishment whilst reducing imprisonment.
The package of measures must in each individual case be tailored
to fit the specific needs of each offender. I should like to encourage
the judicial authorities in all our member States to make the best
use of the considerable degree of flexibility that this “toolbox”
provides. The United Kingdom (England and Wales) experience that
I had the privilege of studying a little closer shows that all actors
involved in the treatment of offenders, including those providing social
assistance to particularly vulnerable groups such as young offenders
and women, and those implementing and supervising specific measures
must co-ordinate their efforts. The “Multi-Agency Public Protection
Arrangements” (MAPPA) in England and Wales provide a good model
for other countries. The recent “Thematic Inspection Report” by
the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection for England and Wales
provides useful
information on the strengths and weaknesses of these arrangements
and makes constructive proposals for further improvements.
6.2.4.1. Drug detoxification
and rehabilitation measures (drug treatment and testing order)
58. The so-called war on drugs has filled prisons in
many countries, the success in terms of reduction of drug crime
being at best doubtful. It is therefore increasingly accepted that
for drug offenders, who are themselves addicted, recidivism is best
avoided by drug detoxification and rehabilitation measures.
59. In my view, imprisonment (together with the confiscation of
any ill-gotten gains) is still an appropriate punishment for larger-scale
dealers who make a fortune off the backs of addicts who jeopardise
their health and often their lives. But the addicts themselves are
more akin to victims – of the said dealers – than to perpetrators,
and should be treated accordingly.
60. In order to maximise the chances of success, the consent of
the offender (see paragraph 24 above) is a particularly important
requirement for this type of measure. The same is true for the general
safeguards and standards laid down by the Tokyo Rules and the European
Rules on alternative sanctions regarding the protection of the offenders’
dignity and health and the need to respect medical and other professional standards.
6.2.4.2. Community service
obligations
61. Community service has been introduced as a sanction
in its own right in several European countries, including England
and Wales, France, the Netherlands and Norway. In Germany (for adult
offenders), it is only available as a condition for a suspended
prison sentence or as a substitute for prison following the failure
to pay a fine. Measures such as the “community payback” programme
that I encountered during my fact-finding visit to London can include
clean-up work in public parks, removing graffiti, shovelling snow
or any other type of work that is both useful and “additional”,
that is to say not in direct competition with work done by paid employees.
Once again, community service obligations or community payback sanctions
are not necessarily a “soft option”. In fact, in October 2012, a
“new approach” to Community Payback was launched in London “that will
see offenders completing tougher, more intensive punishments”.
I have had an interesting
information visit with SERCO, a private company tasked with implementing
the “community payback” scheme in the London area.
I
could see for myself that the work projects were being implemented
and supervised in a business-like, efficient manner, by highly-motivated
staff members in part recruited from the public probation service.
But I also heard criticism, both on grounds of principle – is law
enforcement not one of the fundamental functions of the State, even
in the view of the strongest defenders of free-market views? – and
on grounds of possible conflict-of-interest situations and the difficulty
of quality control. These issues are closely linked to the “Payment
by Results” approach of which we heard both the pros and cons in
London. Personally, I am rather sceptical about the commercialisation
of aspects of law enforcement. This may function, to an extent,
in the United Kingdom, which has both strong institutions capable
of effectively supervising any work delegated to the private sector
and generally has a low level of corruption. Such “privatisation”
may be a lot more difficult to implement properly in other countries,
such as those of central and eastern Europe. I am therefore not suggesting
the pursuit of privatisation in this sector in the draft resolution
and recommendation.
6.2.4.3. Victim-oriented
measures: restorative justice, restitution, compensation, mediation
62. The issues of reparation, restitution, compensation,
victim-offender mediation or reconciliation received much attention
during the 1980s in western European countries. The United Nations
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime
and Abuse of Power
recognised for the first time, at the international level,
that there was a need to improve access to justice also for victims
of crimes.
63. Restitution, for example of a stolen object, or compensation
for losses suffered by victims of crime, provided by the perpetrator,
should normally go without saying. In most, if not all jurisdictions,
criminal acts causing damage to others are at the same time civil
torts giving rise to claims in damages before the civil courts. Unfortunately,
the barriers for victims to access courts to obtain reparation can
be very high – which is why the French instrument of constitution de partie civile, namely
of the victim of a crime joining the criminal procedure against
the perpetrator as a civil party, is of particular interest: provided
proof of the criminal (and at the same time tortuous) deed is not
a problem (despite the fact that the standard of proof is stricter
in criminal cases), the victim is saved the effort and expense of
litigation in the civil courts.
64. The reparation of the damage done by an offender is not normally
on its own sufficient to fulfil the above-mentioned
“purposes
of punishment” – there should be a “downside risk” in the form of
an additional punishment for the sake of deterrence of potential
offenders as the elucidation rate is necessarily below 100%. But
when an offender co-operates in undoing the consequences of the
offence for the direct victim(s), to the extent possible, society’s
“need for punishment” is clearly reduced considerably. Whilst care
must be taken that the necessary contact with the offender does
not deepen the trauma of the victim, restorative justice measures involving
different forms of “mediation” between the offender and the victim
can make a contribution both to alleviating the suffering of the
victim and to improving the chances of rehabilitation of the offender.
65. In November 2012, the United Kingdom Government launched a
new action plan for restorative justice, supported by Justice Minister
Jeremy Wright in the following terms: “Victims deserve access to
a high standard of restorative justice no matter where they are
in the country and at a time that’s right for them”.
The Restorative Justice Council,
whose leadership we met, has
developed a highly professional and co-operative approach aimed
at reconciling the interests of victims and perpetrators. The testimony
I received in London from people involved in such work was very
impressive.
66. During my visit to the United Kingdom, I also learnt about
experimental measures designed specifically for sex offenders presenting
a high-risk of recidivism. The success of such measures depends
very much on the devotion and professionalism of the actors involved.
In the case of the “Circles of support” project presented to me
by representatives of the Quakers, the devotion and professionalism
of the initiators and leaders of this project is unquestionable;
their faith-based engagement in favour of rehabilitation of offenders
enjoys great respect also among public officials and other non-governmental
bodies involved in offender rehabilitation work. I can only encourage
similar initiatives to be developed in other member States. The
Quaker representatives have declared their readiness to freely share
their experience.
67. In light of available statistics, it cannot be denied that
“compensation and restitution as a main response or a sole penalty
range far behind imprisonment, probation and day-fines”.
On a more positive note, there
is still plenty of room for increases in the use of these progressive
measures in most, if not all, of our countries.
7. Conclusions
68. The information I have been able to collect, from
public, official sources, academic research, the contributions of
our experts at the hearing on 11 December 2012 and my fact-finding
visit to the United Kingdom has confirmed that the signatories of
the motion for a resolution underlying my mandate were quite right:
available alternatives to imprisonment, which have been tested in
different jurisdictions, are still very much underused and therefore
deserve to be promoted along the lines that I have presented in
this report.
69. In the draft resolution, I have proposed to sum up the present
state of affairs and encourage all member States, but in particular
those with particularly high rates of imprisonment, to reduce imprisonment
by the increased use of alternative sanctions.
70. In the draft recommendation, I suggest that the Assembly invite
the Committee of Ministers – which in fact has an excellent track
record regarding the promotion of alternatives to imprisonment –
to take new, specific action aimed at increasing the concrete use
of alternatives to imprisonment, in all member States.