1. Introduction
1. In February 2010, a motion for a resolution on “Increasing
drug traffic from Afghanistan as a threat to European security”
was tabled by Mr Sergey Markov, then member of the Russian delegation,
and a number of other members.
2. The motion pointed out the growing threat to European security
from heavy drugs such as heroin, of which up to 90% originated from
Afghanistan, and called for increased co-operation between various
agencies of all Council of Europe member States with a view to combating
drug production in Afghanistan and stopping drug traffic from that
country.
3. Subsequently, the committee heard an oral presentation by
Mr Markov and held a preliminary exchange of views on the issue.
Mr Markov also prepared an outline for a report, and was authorised
to carry out fact-finding visits to Tajikistan and to Turkey, which
he did not have an opportunity to undertake.
4. Following the elections in Russia in December 2011, Mr Markov
left the Assembly and, consequently, ceased to be rapporteur. In
January 2012, I was appointed as the new rapporteur.
5. In September 2012, the committee held an exchange of views
on the basis of an information note prepared by the Secretariat
under my instructions. The committee expressed itself in favour
of keeping the focus on drugs smuggled to Europe from Afghanistan,
and not broadening the scope of it to drugs originating from other
regions, such as cocaine from Latin America.
6. The committee authorised me to carry out fact-finding visits
to Brussels (European Commission and European External Action Service,
EEAS) and to The Hague (European Police Office, Europol). These
visits were conducted on 7-8 November 2012. I am grateful to all
the officials I met in Brussels and The Hague for providing valuable
information which enabled me to better understand the challenges
posed by, and the ways of counter-acting, drugs traffic from Afghanistan.
7. Subsequently, I visited Ankara (Turkey) on 14 February 2013
and met with the key figures, both at the political (Ministers of
the Interior, Justice and European Co-operation) and the operational
level (National Police, Gendarmerie, Customs Enforcement and Coast
Guards), responsible for combating drugs trafficking. I am particularly
grateful to the Turkish Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly
for organising this very informative visit.
8. In March 2013, the committee considered my preliminary draft
memorandum and held an in-depth discussion on issues raised therein.
In this report, I have tried to take into account useful comments
made, and provide additional information suggested by the committee
members. To my regret, due to the lack of time, I was not in a position
to carry out a fact-finding visit to Russia as was suggested during
the discussion, but I have added some supplementary data related
to that country.
2. Scope
and aims of the report
9. From the outset, I wish to stress that my aim is
not to produce an exhaustive report on drugs-related problems: such
reports are available from a variety of competent sources.
10. Illicit drugs production, trafficking, trade and abuse are
not new phenomena in our societies, and there exists abundant information
on them. Most countries have developed national anti-drugs policies
and have established specific bodies which produce dozens of publications
on drug-related issues annually.
11. Moreover, since the drugs trade is of a transnational nature,
international anti-drugs co-ordination and co-operation exist at
various levels and so does the reporting. For instance, the two
major European Union agencies involved in combating drugs, the European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and Europol,
have just published a joint 160-page “EU Drug Market report – A
Strategic Analysis”. At the global level, the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) publishes a yearly “World Drug Report”
(the 2012 edition contains 100 pages), as well as regional or substance-specific
reports, including on Afghanistan.
12. This report aims to provide some general information on drugs
as a major threat to modern society, and on heroin and opiates from
Afghanistan as a sizeable part of the illicit drugs market in Europe.
It is mainly based on the official publications of the above-mentioned
United Nations and European Union bodies (UNODC and EMCDDA), as
well as on the data collected during my visits.
13. As mentioned earlier, the report focuses on drugs from Afghanistan,
as suggested by the original motion, and leaves out drugs from all
other origins, however dangerous they may be to our societies. In
addition, it mainly concentrates on supply policies (poppy cultivation,
production of opium and heroin, and trafficking) and does not touch
upon the demand side, although I am fully aware that both supply
and demand need to be addressed in order to reduce heroin abuse.
14. Another important point to stress: though the analysis of
the situation in Afghanistan, and especially its possible evolution
after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdrawal
by 2014, is highly important for understanding the dynamics of drug
production and for proposing policies to combat it, this report has
no ambition to study it in detail.
15. Above all, the report is based on the understanding that the
Council of Europe, while participating in international efforts
to counter drug trafficking from Afghanistan,
is
not meant to be a leading institution in this process.
16. Therefore, the purpose of this report, as I see it, should
be to mobilise political support in Council of Europe member States
for a more active and efficient international co-operation in: a)
combating poppy cultivation and the production of heroin and other
opiates in Afghanistan; b) dismantling the traffic of opiates from
Afghanistan to Europe, as well as the chains of distribution in
Europe; c) disrupting the channels of diversion and smuggling of
chemical precursors; and d) combating the laundering and re-injection
of the proceeds of illicit drugs trade into criminal and terrorist
activities.
3. Drugs as a major
threat to modern society
17. The use and abuse of narcotic drugs is a problem
which human societies have faced for dozens, if not hundreds, of
years. The first efforts to address the challenges posed by drug
trafficking at international level date back to 1909, when the first
international conference to discuss the world's narcotics problems
was convened in Shanghai (International Opium Commission). Subsequently,
the first international drug control treaty, the International Opium
Convention, was signed in The Hague in 1912.
18. Nonetheless, a century later, the drug problem continues to
affect almost all countries in the world, with grave consequences
for individuals and society as a whole. The Political Declaration
adopted by the United Nations high-level segment of the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs (Vienna, 2009) stated:
“… notwithstanding the ever-increasing efforts and progress
made by States, relevant international organizations and civil society,
the drug problem continues to pose a serious threat to the health,
safety and well-being of all humanity, in particular youth, our
most precious asset. Furthermore, the world drug problem undermines
sustainable development, political stability and democratic institutions,
including efforts to eradicate poverty, and threatens national security
and the rule of law. Drug trafficking and abuse pose a major threat
to the health, dignity and hopes of millions of people and their
families and lead to the loss of human lives.”
19. According to UNODC estimates, about 230 million people of
the global population of 7 billion use an illegal drug at least
once a year, which represents 1 in 20 persons between the ages of
15 and 64. In the same age group, 1 person in 40 uses drugs at least
once a month, and about 1 in 160, that is 27 million people, use drugs
in a manner that exposes them to very severe health problems.
Thus, one out of eight people who use illicit
drugs will develop drug dependency.
20. There are four major families of illicit drugs: cannabis,
cocaine, opioids (including opium, heroin, morphine and non-medical
use of prescription drugs) and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).
21. While the large majority of illicit drug users consume cannabis,
about 17 million people worldwide use opiates, mostly heroin. Opiates
are considered to be the most problematic type of drugs. It needs
to be stressed that the consumption of heroin causes dependency
much more rapidly than other drugs: over 50% of heroin users are
considered as substance-dependent.
22. The key impact of illicit drug use on society are the adverse
consequences on public health; the most extreme are drug-related
deaths (by overdose, in a drug-induced accident, suicides, etc.).
Some 200 000 people die every year worldwide from drug use, half
of them from overdoses. According to estimates by the Russian Federal
Drug Control Service, more than one million people have died worldwide
since 2001 from Afghan heroin use. In western and central Europe,
drug-related deaths account for about 1% of all cases of mortality
amongst the population aged between 15 and 64, and are estimated
at 7 600 cases annually. In Russia, 9 263 drug-related deaths were
reported in 2010.
23. Drug use contributes to the spread of HIV and hepatitis B
and C: according to UNODC estimates, some 20% of 16 million injecting
drug users worldwide are HIV-positive; another 20% are infected
with hepatitis B, while about 50% are infected with hepatitis C.
24. Another aspect to bear in mind is the need to provide treatment
to drug-dependent persons, which has a considerable cost for the
individuals and their families, and for society as a whole. In Europe
(excluding Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and
the South Caucasus), about 1 million people received treatment for
problems related to illicit drug use in 2009.
25. The rise of violent crime is another consequence of drug abuse.
People under the influence of drugs, which alter the mental state
and lifts or weakens social inhibitions, more often engage in aggressive
or violent anti-social behaviour and commit crimes, both against
individuals and property. In addition, drug addicts in need of money
for buying drugs often perpetrate offences such as fraud, burglary,
robbery, theft, shoplifting, extortion, etc. In Russia, it is estimated
that drug-users account for about 80% of street crime.
The costs
of drug-related crime for society are very high.
26. In addition, there is violence, including murder, resulting
from clashes between various criminal groups involved in drug trafficking.
27. Drug trafficking has close links with transnational organised
crime and constitutes a major source of income of organised criminal
groups. UNODC experts believe that drug trafficking generates between
a fifth and a quarter of all income derived from organised crime,
and almost half of the income from transnational organised crime.
28. As a result, illicit drug trafficking “generates large financial
profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organisations
to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government,
legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all
its levels”.
Consequently,
it undermines legitimate economies and threatens the stability,
security and sovereignty of States.
29. Drug trafficking also has a significant impact on social structures
and institutions. As American researchers Coletta Youngers and Eileen
Rosin put it, “international drug trafficking breeds criminality
and exacerbates political violence, greatly increasing problems
of citizen security and tearing at the social fabric of communities
and neighbourhoods. It has corrupted and further weakened local
governments, judiciaries and police forces…”
30. In addition, there are links between drug trafficking and
the activities of illegal armed groups and terrorist organisations.
The 2012 UNODC World Drug Report states as follows:
“Some well-known examples of this
include the links between various rebel armies and production of
and trafficking in opium and ATS in and out of the Shan State of
Myanmar, the links between coca trafficking and the Shining Path
in Peru in the 1990s, the use of income from the illicit drug trade
to finance the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in
Colombia in the 2000s and the use by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) of income from the heroin trade to finance illegal armed activities
in Turkey. Moreover, many of the militias involved in the instabilities
in Yugoslavia in the 1990s used drug trafficking – notably heroin
trafficking along the Balkan route – to finance their involvement,
and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been drawing some
of their income from the opium and heroin trade. Profits from cannabis
and cocaine trafficking have allegedly been used by Al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was also
allegedly involved in international drug trafficking. In Sri Lanka,
the Tamil Tigers were said to have derived some of their income
from heroin trafficking prior to being dismantled in 2009, while
in Lebanon Hizbullah has also been accused of involvement in drug
trafficking.”
31. My interlocutors at Europol confirmed the existence
of substantiated evidence of links between drug traffickers and
international terrorist organisations, including in Europe. In Afghanistan,
it is estimated that at least one half of insurgent activities against
ISAF is financed from drugs production and trafficking.
32. According to law-enforcement officials in Ankara, heroin trafficking
from Afghanistan is a significant source of revenue for the “Kurdistan
Workers’ Party” (PKK) and the “Union of Communities in Kurdistan”
(KCK), listed as terrorist organisations by a number of States and
international organisations. PKK/KCK are said to intervene at all
stages of heroin trafficking, and are also said to impose a “tax”
on other traffickers. In recent years, Turkish law-enforcement agencies
conducted about 370 operations where PKK traffickers were involved;
they arrested 878 individuals and seized 4 253 kg of heroin, 4 305
kg of morphine base, and about 26 tons of precursors. In addition,
Turkish officials pointed to the involvement of PKK members residing
in European countries, including children, in the street drugs trade.
33. In conclusion, despite many efforts by the international community,
illicit crop cultivation and illicit drug production, distribution
and trafficking have been increasingly consolidated into a criminally
organised industry generating enormous amounts of money, laundered
through the financial and non-financial sectors. There is an urgent
need to step up and consolidate joint international efforts in order
to respond to the serious challenges posed by the increasing links
between drug trafficking, corruption and other forms of transnational organised
crime.
4. Heroin
in overall drug consumption in Europe
34. The countries of Western Europe have been the key
market for heroin consumption. While the average global prevalence
of opiate use is estimated between 0.3% and 0.5% of the adult population,
the figures for Europe vary between 1.2% and 1.3%. These figures
are even higher in Russia,
where
the number of addicts has multiplied by 10 in the past 10 years.
35. As a result, opioids remain the most problematic drugs in
Europe, as they are the primary substances responsible for demand
for treatment for drug use, and a major cause of drug-related deaths
in European countries. From 1.3 to 1.4 million Europeans (European
Union) are considered as problem opioid users. About 700 000 opioid
users received substitution treatment in 2009.
36. In about 7 600 yearly drug-related deaths in the European
Union countries (plus Croatia, Norway and Turkey), opioids are believed
to be involved in three out of four cases.
For instance,
out of 2 334 drug-related deaths in the United Kingdom in 2010,
more than 83% were due to opiates. As mentioned above, in Russia, 9 263
drug-related deaths were reported in 2010, of which 6 324 were attributed
to opioid use.
In Turkey, 88% of drug-related
deaths are believed to be caused by heroin consumption.
5. Dynamics of production
of drugs in Afghanistan over recent years
37. Today, Afghanistan is by far the world’s main opium
producer. According to the data published by the UNODC, over the
period 2005-2010, Afghanistan accounted for 88% of global opium
production.
While the potential global
opium production in 2011 is estimated at 7 000 tons, Afghanistan
produced 5 800 tons.
38. Opium output grew steadily in Afghanistan between 2001 (185
tons) and 2007 (when it reached the all-time high of 8 200 tons),
then it dropped slightly in 2008-2009.
39. According to UNODC estimates, in 2011, opium production in
Afghanistan increased by 61% compared to 2010, when it had considerably
dropped due to a disease of opium poppy plants which destroyed almost
half of the opium harvest. It amounts to about 16% of Afghanistan’s
gross domestic product (GDP), which is a very high proportion, even
if this figure needs to be compared to 60% in 2004.
More
than 190 000 households (5% of total population) are believed to
be involved in opium cultivation. Overall, the opium trade (including poppy
cultivation, transformation and traffic) involves 3.3 million of
Afghanistan's 23 million population (more than 14%).
40. Afghanistan is also a major consumer of drugs: almost 3% of
its population use opiates and this number is increasing.
41. During the Taliban rule in the second half of 1990s, taxation
of opium export was the main source of foreign currencies for the
regime (about US$75-100 million per year). However, under threat
of an UN-imposed embargo in 2000, the Taliban banned opium cultivation.
Afghan farmers respected the order and refrained from planting.
As a result, the 2001 harvest was close to zero. In the post-Taliban
period, drug trade taxation became the primary source of revenue
for warlords.
42. The new Afghan authorities have, since 2003, developed efforts
to reduce the illicit cultivation of the opium poppy, and eradicate
poppy plantations, but those have so far brought limited results
(15 300 hectares eradicated in 2006, 19 000 ha in 2007, and 9 600
ha in 2012, while the surface of plantations where the opium poppy
is cultivated is estimated at 154 000 ha in 2012
). At the same time, eradication
teams were attacked 48 times in 2011, with 20 people killed and
45 injured.
However, the effectiveness
of eradication is rather doubtful, since there is a high probability
that, in the absence of equally profitable substitution crops, these areas
will be replanted with opium poppy.
43. Currently, 95% of poppy cultivation is concentrated in the
most insecure southern and western regions of the country, where
the power of the government is limited and international experts
have virtually no access. Progress has been achieved in reducing
poppy plantations in the north, but there are still dozens of clandestine laboratories
in this area where opium is transformed into heroin. One half of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces are considered “poppy-free”, which means
that opium cultivation there covers less than 100 ha.
44. Most opium is now processed in Afghanistan itself: the number
of clandestine laboratories is estimated at between 300 and 500,
and the annual heroin output reaches 380-400 tons. Heroin is easier
to smuggle than opium, and higher value products bring more profits.
45. In addition to immediate shipments, some law-enforcement experts
believe that there exist massive stockpiles of opium and heroin
hidden in remote Afghan mountains, with capacities for up to two
years of production.
46. The weakness of Afghan law-enforcement agencies in combating
poppy cultivation and drug production is the most significant obstacle
to international efforts in this field. According to the former
UNODC Executive Director, Antonio Maria Costa, “While 90% of the
world’s opium comes from Afghanistan, less than 2% is seized there.
This is a major law-enforcement defeat, as it is incomparably cheaper
and easier to detect and interdict an illicit activity at the source,
rather than at destination”.
However, there have been some improvements
in interceptions in Afghanistan in recent years.
47. While the Taliban is believed to control the opiate trade,
and earn up to US$150 million per year, it seems more and more clear
that the Afghan officials, including in law-enforcement bodies,
are also very involved in the process. Therefore, in addition to
the training of Afghan law-enforcement agencies, the fight against corruption
must be made a priority in all co-operation programmes with Afghanistan.
48. Bearing in mind the forthcoming withdrawal of the ISAF forces
by 2014, there is little hope, if any, that the effectiveness of
the Afghan authorities in the eradication of poppy plantations and
the dismantling of clandestine production and trade in opiates can
be improved. It is therefore crucial, while continuing to support the
enforcement efforts, to put an emphasis on an alternative development
of the Afghan economy, in particular, sustainable agriculture and
integrated rural policies. In this context, the Lima Declaration
and the International Guiding Principles on Alternative Development
adopted at the United Nations High-level International Conference
on Alternative Development (November 2012) are of utmost relevance.
6. Main routes of
trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe, the leading consumer of
Afghan drugs
49. There are three main export routes for smuggling
opiates, including pure heroin, from Afghanistan to its consumer
markets, mainly Europe.
50. The southern route goes across Pakistan, which is a major
consumer of opiates.
Drugs
are then shipped by sea through various trans-shipment destinations
in Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf. Main destination countries
are Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. At the same time, there is an increase in
direct trafficking to some European countries by air. It is estimated
that about 40% of drugs produced in Afghanistan are transported
via the southern route, which is considered to be relatively safe
for traffickers due to the porosity of the border and permanent
transfrontier movements of the local population (about 30 000 Afghan
nationals are estimated to cross the border into Pakistan every
day). The southern route is also believed to be the main point of
entry of precursors.
51. As the former UNODC Executive Director, Antonio Maria Costa,
put it, “Most of the Afghan borders with Pakistan are wide open,
enabling low-risk smuggling back and forth across the Durand Line,
especially in Balochistan. Almost no drugs are seized in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), although thousands of tons transit
the region. Abuse of the Afghan Trade Transit Agreement (ATTA) as
well as exploitation of centuries-old kinship ties, have turned
the Afghanistan/Pakistan border – already known for the unimpeded
movements of insurgents – into a massive, illicit, free trade zone
of drugs, chemical precursors, money, people and weapons”.
52. The western, or Balkan route, running through Iran and Turkey
and then the countries of south-eastern and western Europe, accounts
for about 35% of drug exports from Afghanistan. Iran, the first
transit country on this route, is also a major consumer of Afghan
opiates. According to the UNODC, the Balkan route has been the major
route for opiates and heroin to western Europe. The Turkish police
identifies the Netherlands as being the main destination country
on this route (2 113 kg seized in 2011-2012), followed by Germany
(721 kg), Albania (262 kg), Slovenia (136 kg) and Greece (122 kg).
53. However, the authorities of Iran and Turkey have stepped up
efforts to dismantle this traffic and have obtained significant
results as regards seizures of important amounts of drugs (in 2010,
27 tons of heroin were seized in Iran and 13 tons in Turkey). Iran
and Turkey jointly account for more than one half of global heroin seizures.
At the same time there have been no major seizures of precursor
chemicals in Turkey in the last years. However, organised criminal
groups from various ethnic origins
continue to operate along this
route, and seek to diversify both the routes from Turkey to western
Europe
and
the means of delivery.
Interception ratios
further down the route (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and the western
Balkans) are less than 2%.
54. Finally, the northern route (also known as the Silk route)
passes across the countries of central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan) to the Russian Federation, its main target, then some
portion of the drugs continues to the countries of northern and
eastern Europe. At the same time, the central Asian countries along this
route, which were previously only transit countries, have now become
major consumers. Criminal groups composed of ethnic Tajiks are believed
to be the main actors in this traffic. Authorities of central Asian
countries lack the necessary capacities to control the flow of drugs
through their territories, and may even be involved in it. Seizures
along this route are far less sizeable (only 4-5% of the total amount
of transported heroin is seized). The northern route is also believed
to be used for trafficking precursors into Afghanistan. According
to experts, heroin trafficking through central Asia is likely to
increase in the coming years, further fuelling health, economic and
security problems in the region.
7. Precursors
55. Drug precursors are licit industrial chemical products
which are necessary to manufacture illicit drugs. These products
have a wide range of licit uses and are legitimately traded on markets;
their trade cannot be prohibited. However, as these products are
diverted from licit distribution channels for the production of
illicit drugs, controlling precursors is a key element in combating
drugs.
56. The main precursor used in the manufacture of heroin is acetic
anhydrite (AA). It also has many licit uses, in particular in the
pharmaceutical industry. According to the UNODC, about 216 000 tons
of AA per year are legally produced in 13 countries.
Between 1 and 4
litres of AA is required to produce 1 kg of heroin.
57. According to Europol, central and south-eastern Europe appear
to be the main transit hub to divert AA out of the intra-European
Union trade. In 2008, Slovenia and Hungary seized 156 tons of AA
(more than a third of that required to convert Afghan opium into
heroin).
58. The UNODC believes that AA is delivered to Afghanistan along
the same routes as those used to transport opiates, but in the opposite
direction. It is also likely that the same organised criminal groups
are involved in this trafficking. Pakistan is considered to be the
major consolidation point for smuggling precursors from Asia (China
and Korea) into Afghanistan. However, during our contacts in Ankara,
the Turkish law-enforcement officials stated that there have been
no sizeable AA seizures in their country in recent years.
59. Consolidating an international framework of control of AA
trade with a view to disrupting its diversion into the illegal market
and heroin production should be a key element of an anti-heroin
policy. At the European Union level, efforts are being taken to
establish a monitoring system of all EU-based registered AA manufacturers,
traders and end-users. Similar measures should also be taken at
international level.
8. Need to enhance
international co-operation
60. Drugs trafficking from Afghanistan is transnational
by nature: illicit products cross many borders and are handled by
organised criminal groups of different ethnic origins, if not multi-ethnic.
An adequate response to it requires enhanced co-operation between
national law-enforcement agencies of the countries involved and
the competent international bodies.
61. Such co-operation does exist in various forms and at different
levels, from global (UNODC, Paris Pact Initiative) to European (Europol,
Eurojust, EMCDDA), regional (Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
– Regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime (SECI); Southeast
European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC); Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
(SCO); Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO); Central Asian
Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating the illicit
trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their
precursors (CARICC); “Heart of Asia”–Istanbul Process on Regional Security
and Cooperation for A Secure and Stable Afghanistan, etc.), as well
as on bilateral levels. However, it needs to be considerably strengthened
and made less bureaucratic and more operational and results-oriented.
62. During my visit to Europol, I was told that this EU body had
developed good institutional relations with a number of countries
involved in the Afghan drugs traffic, but that it was not enough
to react in real time to rapidly evolving realities. Therefore,
Europol had concluded, or was in the process of concluding, operational agreements
with these countries which would allow rapid intelligence sharing,
provide support to cross-border law-enforcement operations, and
thus increase the effectiveness of co-operation. While prospects
were good of concluding such an agreement with Russia, the one with
Turkey seemed more difficult to reach.
63. While in Ankara, I stressed to my Turkish counterparts the
importance which Europol attached to concluding an operational agreement
with their country. To my satisfaction, I was informed that the
Turkish Government had prepared draft legislation on data protection
which was in line with EU standards and would remove obstacles to
concluding an operational agreement with Europol. At the same time,
the Turkish law-enforcement officials were worried that such an
agreement would not allow them to take part fully in the decision-making
process at Europol, which is an EU agency.
64. In the meantime, the Turkish law-enforcement agencies have
developed bilateral co-operation with colleagues from 19 European
countries, and reported 180 joint investigations with European partners
in recent years, including 70 controlled deliveries, which led to
876 arrests.
65. During my visit to Ankara, I was also impressed by the work
performed by the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and
Organised Crime (TADOC), which is a part of Turkish National Police
Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime Department (KOM). In addition
to in-service training of the Turkish law-enforcement personnel
and scientific research on drugs and organised crime, it offers
international training programmes, both on a bilateral basis and
in co-operation with international organisations,
to police officers from other countries.
Over the last few years, it had provided training programmes to
more than 7 100 participants from 86 countries, including from Afghanistan
(1 009 trainees), Turkmenistan (300), Kazakhstan (263), Pakistan
(226), Uzbekistan (197), Tajikistan (184) and Kyrgyzstan (164),
that is countries involved in drugs trafficking from Afghanistan.
In addition, it provides a series of 6-month basic police training
programmes for 500 Afghan police cadets. These initiatives are extremely
important for upgrading the operational skills of law-enforcement
officers of these countries, and should be followed by other partners.
66. As mentioned above (see paragraph 15), the Council of Europe
is not the main actor in international efforts to counter drug trafficking
from Afghanistan. At the same time, some of its instruments and
bodies could be better used to contribute to this process.
67. First, the Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking in Drugs (the Council of Europe partial agreement known
as the Pompidou Group
) should contribute more to combating
Afghan drugs trafficking through its activities on prevention of
chemical precursor diversion and illegal production and on the improvement
of drug detection in European airports, as well as by providing
training to drugs experts from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries.
68. The activities of Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms
such as the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
and the Committee of Experts on the
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of
Terrorism (MONEYVAL)
should be streamlined so as to keep
high on their agendas the fight against money laundering in the
context of the Afghan drugs trafficking, and co-operation in preventing the
proceeds from being re-injected to finance crime and terrorism.
69. Furthermore, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and
on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198, “Warsaw Convention”)
is an important tool to be used in order to step up co-operation
in disrupting financial flows related to drugs traffic from Afghanistan.
It was opened for signature on 16 May 2005 and entered into force
on 1 May 2008. Currently, 23 Council of Europe member States are
Party to the convention, and 13 more
have signed but not yet ratified it.
The following member States have yet to sign the convention: Andorra,
Azerbaijan, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In addition, the
convention is also open for signature by the non-member States which
participated in its elaboration,
and for
accession by other non-member States.
9. Conclusions
70. Throughout my visits, my interlocutors broadly agreed
that, over the last decade, illicit trafficking of opiates from
Afghanistan has been one of the world’s greatest transnational drug
and crime threats which had caused severe consequences for health,
safety, public order and governance. It is therefore a major threat
to security at national, European, and international levels.
71. Almost all Council of Europe member States suffer from the
consequences of illicit drug use, and pay a high price for this
scourge, which attacks individuals, families, institutions and society
at large.
72. Opiates, mainly heroin, are the most harmful drugs used in
Europe, and are the cause of three quarters of drug-related deaths.
73. Afghanistan is by far the main source of heroin and other
opiates consumed in Europe. Europe, including Russia, it is the
main target market for opiates from Afghanistan.
74. There is an urgent need to mobilise efforts of all European
countries to curb the production of opium and heroin in Afghanistan
and to dismantle networks of drug trafficking from that country.
75. Accordingly, the Assembly should call on the authorities
of Council of Europe member States:
as regards Afghanistan, to
- make anti-drugs policy
a priority in programmes of co-operation with, and of assistance
to, the Afghan Government;
- strengthen Afghan law-enforcement agencies with a view
to disrupting channels of drug traffic at source, with particular
emphasis on combating corruption;
- increase support for the capacity building of law-enforcement
agencies in Afghanistan, and to step up training programmes for
Afghan law-enforcement staff;
- step up joint operations with the relevant Afghan law-enforcement
agencies focusing on clandestine heroin-producing laboratories and
organised criminal groups involved in the drugs trade, and to combine them
with increased efforts aimed at integrated rural development, building
infrastructure and supporting farmers engaged in alternative production;
- assist Afghanistan in developing its economy and diversifying
agriculture so as to reduce dependence on revenues from the illicit
drugs trade, in line with the Lima Declaration and International
Guiding Principles on Alternative Development (November 2012);
- provide full support to, and co-operate effectively in
the framework of, the “Paris Pact Initiative”, aimed at combating
opiates originating from Afghanistan;
as regards the neighbouring
countries, to:
- increase support for
the capacity building of law-enforcement agencies of the countries
of central Asia, and to step up training programmes for central
Asian law-enforcement personnel;
- promote further anti-drugs co-operation at the regional
level, involving the countries of central Asia, Iran, Pakistan,
India and China, as well as existing co-ordination and co-operation
frameworks;
- create conditions, by concluding specific agreements as
appropriate, for enhanced operational co-operation between law-enforcement
agencies, including information and intelligence sharing, exchange of
best practice and joint investigations;
- step up international co-operation against the diversion
of drug precursors, and to consider ways to tighten the monitoring
of the acetic anhydrite (AA) trade by establishing databases of,
and sharing information on, licit AA manufacturers, traders and
end-users;
- step up co-operation as regards the confiscation and recovery
of assets from the illicit drugs trade.