1. Introduction
1. This report was drafted in light of the motion for
a resolution on “Increasing co-operation against cyberterrorism
and other large-scale attacks on the Internet” (
Doc. 13319). The challenge presented by the motion focuses on balancing
the need for increased efforts by Council of Europe member States
against cyberterrorism and large-scale cyberthreats with respecting
fundamental rights and freedoms. In an effort to contribute to the
debate, this report presents a regulatory perspective on how countries
could deal with large-scale attacks. To this end, it explores the
following questions:
- What are
large-scale cyberattacks and botnets, how do they relate to cyberterrorism,
and how do these affect the functioning of society?
- What is the current international regulatory landscape
to address large-scale cyberattacks?
- Which legal and non-legal approaches can be suggested
to improve regulators’ efforts to deal with large-scale cyberattacks?
2. The fight against cybercrime and botnets in particular involves
more than criminalisation of offences. Effective mitigation of threats
includes enabling effective co-operation for exchanging and analysing
infection data, stimulating Internet service providers (ISPs) to
inform authorities of significant security threats, discussing the
legal limits of mitigation and counter-measures and exploring non-legal
measures, improving the possibilities for cross-border investigation
of cyberattacks, an effective framework for urgent co-operation requests,
and supporting disinfection solutions and campaigns targeting the
end-user. This report cannot comprehensively address all these issues.
Rather, it provides an overview of the current developments at the international
level and discusses some major legal challenges around large-scale
cyberattacks. In addition, it provides policy recommendations for
improving the current legal framework on cybercrime and suggestions
for non-legal measures, including the potential of capacity-building
programmes and public–private partnerships. It also emphasises the
need for a reconsideration of the perspective from which large-scale
cyberattacks are addressed by regulators.
2. Preparatory
work
3. Having been appointed rapporteur by the Committee
on Culture, Science, Education and Media on 4 December 2013, I participated
in the European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG) in Berlin
on 12 and 13 June 2014. On 16 and 17 April 2015, I participated
in the Global Conference on Cyber Space 2015, which was organised
in The Hague and launched the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise on
cybersecurity, cybercrime, data protection and e-governance.

4. For a discussion on the subject of this report, the Sub-Committee
on Media and Information Society heard Professor Yaman Akdeniz,
from Istanbul Bilgi University, at its meeting in Istanbul on 12
and 13 May 2014. Following my contacts with Professor Dr Bert-Jaap
Koops (University of Tilburg, Netherlands), he prepared a background
report which was presented to the committee in Strasbourg on 29 January
2015 and constitutes the bulk of this explanatory memorandum. On
12 March 2015, the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and
Media held a hearing in the Dutch Senate in The Hague with Mr Jacob
Kohnstamm, Chairperson of the Dutch Data Protection Authority, Mr
Olivier Burgersdijk, Head of Strategy, European Cybercrime Centre
(EC3), Europol, Mr Menno van der Marel, CEO, Fox-IT, Delft, Professor
Bart Jacobs, Professor of Software Security and Correctness, University
of Nijmegen, as well as Ms Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni, Deputy Secretary
General of the Council of Europe.
5. I am very grateful to all the experts, and in particular Professor
Koops, for their substantial contributions, which have underlined
and defined the importance and urgency of Council of Europe action
aimed at increasing co-operation against cyberterrorism and other
large-scale attacks on the Internet.
3. Background
6. The 2013 Norton Report,

observing a sample of 24 countries
around the world, found the scale of consumer cybercrime to be above
1 million victims daily, with an estimated overall global cost of
US$113 billion annually. These numbers are modest when compared
to the McAfee Net Losses Study issued in June 2014.

Here, the security software company
evaluated the global cost of cybercrime to be US$400 billion per
year, with a total of 800 million victims in 2013 alone. These figures
have to be treated with caution, since the methods of calculation
are unclear and reports on cybercrime are often influenced by private
interests of security companies that benefit from them. Nevertheless,
there is consensus that cybercrime is growing and becoming more
profitable on a global scale. A growing national security concern
is that cyberterrorist attacks become more prevalent and sophisticated,
and that cyberterrorists make use of large-scale attacks to target critical
services and infrastructure. To ascertain the regulatory issues
related to this particular issue, it is necessary first to define
cybercrime, cyberterrorism and the implications of large-scale attacks.
3.1. Cybercrime
7. The misuse of computer networks for illegal purposes
has given rise to a particular criminal domain, generally referred
to as cybercrime. Offences committed in cyberspace, however, can
take various forms, as computers can be both target and means of
criminal offences. Initial typologies on cybercrime identified three categories
of offences:

- computers as instruments of
an offence (computer-assisted crimes);
- computers as targets of malicious activity (computer-integrity
crimes or cybercrime sensu stricto);
- computers as the environment for committing an offence
(computer-related crimes).
8. While these three categories often overlap, the overall idea
behind this classic distinction is important for illustrating that
traditional offences such as fraud, money laundering and racism
have not necessarily been redefined by information systems, but
have migrated to a new arena, which often changes their scope and scale
if not their nature.
3.2. Cyber terrorism
9. The word terrorism is used in such an inconsistent
manner and in so many different areas that one should question whether
terrorism itself is a unitary concept. If on the one hand the conceptualisation
of terrorism remains a challenge, on the other hand counterterrorism
law has precise implications, often subjecting “terrorists” to a
stricter regiment of increased penalties and lesser rights. Aside
from the conceptual implications of the term “terrorism”, the classification
of an unlawful behaviour as “cyberterrorism” imposes additional
challenges. This is because a cyberterrorist offence will involve
committing a cybercrime offence in the first place. The question
is then how to distinguish between the two. For instance, if one
considers that terrorist offences are inexorably connected to a
political, religious or social cause, cyberterrorism would be a compound
of two elements: the objective element of commission of a cybercrime,
plus the subjective element of the motives and intentions of the
perpetrator. In the absence of the subjective element, a potential cyberterrorist
offence could only be considered a violation of cybercrime law.
10. Furthermore, the attribution issue is particularly relevant
to establish the applicable set of laws. Defining authorship of
cyberattacks is a complex process, which may be hindered by perpetrators
using technologies to hide their trace and identity, and require
solid international co-operation. For example, consider an attack launched
from computers in State A targeting the information systems of an
airport located in State B. Here the lines dividing cybercrime,
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare are contingent not only on digital
forensics, but also on the subjective evaluation of the intention
of the attacker, as well as on determining the presence of legal responsibility
of a State behind the attack. This attribution challenge was particularly
visible in the case of Estonia in 2007, when a DDoS (Distributed
Denial of Service) attack was launched against several public and private
sector information systems. In the words of the United Nations Working
Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,
although Estonia was visibly under attack, it was not clear whether
this was a case of cybercrime, cyberterrorism or cyberwarfare.
11. Because of the difficulty of distinguishing cyberterrorism
from cybercrime in general, and of establishing for a concrete attack
whether it involved a subjective element of a terrorist purpose,
this report will largely focus on large-scale cyberattacks in general,
which may or may not be of a terrorist character. We are primarily concerned
with the effects of large-scale attacks on critical infrastructures
and essential services in society, which require serious counter-measures
regardless of the subjective purposes behind them.
3.3. Large-scale attacks
and botnets
12. While a small number of computers may cause substantial
damage to a targeted system, cyberattacks are made more profitable
by involving a significant network of machines. Massive attacks
are thus more aggressive and more likely to cause serious harm.
Today, some of the most profitable cyberattacks are made possible
by manipulation of armies of infected machines, so-called botnets.
13. The term botnet is the shorten version of “roBOT NETwork”,
meaning a collection of machines (zombies) infected by a partially
autonomous piece of software that can be controlled remotely (bot)
by a botmaster, who manages the Command-and-Control server (C&C).

Examples of unlawful use of botnets
include click fraud, DDoS attacks, keylogging (intercepting keyboard
strokes to capture personal or financial data), warez (unlawfully
distributing copyrighted works) and spam.
14. But the traditional definition of botnet with infected machines
controlled by a botmaster no longer reflects the stage of sophistication
and complexity of modern botnets. A more contemporary definition
of botnet is one of a network of bots or “advanced malicious software
that often incorporate one or more forms of viruses, worms, Trojan
horses and rootkits for propagation and hostile integration into
a foreign system, providing the functionality of the compromised
system to the attacker as they connect back to a central server
or other infected machines”.

While
centralised botnets continue to be used, more and more botnets distribute communication
protocols via decentralised structures, increasing their resilience
by avoiding a single point of failure. Current forms of sophisticated
botnets are structured via peer-to-peer networks (p2p botnets) where there
is no single C&C controlling the activity, but infected systems
performing dual zombie and C&C functions. Other creative forms
of botnets have taken the form of Botclouds, in which attacks are
launched via cloud services, turning cloud computing into attack
vectors. If on the one hand cloud computing has brought several useful
functionalities, they have also been largely fertile for botnet
activities. Botclouds do not require attackers to spend much effort
in spreading the bot: they can be set up on demand, on a large-scale
and at low cost. Furthermore, they do not rely on owners’ activities:
botclouds are permanently online and free from interruption.
15. The combination of botnet capabilities and large-scale attacks
meets few technical obstacles. As noted by the United Nations Working
Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,
critical information infrastructures, such as the energy sector,
water supply, telecommunication networks, public administration,
transport, health care and banking, are attractive targets for powerful
and widely harmful attacks.

This threatening scenario calls
for an efficient and proportionate framework for countering large-scale
cyberattacks.
3.4. The international
regulatory landscape
16. International policy and regulation of cybercrime
and terrorism has been traditionally inserted in separate instruments.
Nevertheless, recent events demonstrating the connection between
the two areas have increasingly called for a combined strategy on
countering cyberterrorism. In the Appendix, a brief overview is given
of the most relevant legal and non-legal measures undertaken at
the supranational level with particular attention to cybercrime,
cyberterrorism and large-scale attacks.
17. From this overview, it appears that the Council of Europe
and the European Union have the most prominent regulatory responses
to cybercrime. The Council of Europe Conventions on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185)
and on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196) shape the Council
of Europe response to cybercrime and terrorism. However, since the
launch of these two treaties, cybercrime has evolved significantly.
New forms of crime have appeared and old forms have become more
complex. In that light, the question arises whether criminal activities
such as botnets and large-scale cyberattacks are currently sufficiently
covered by Convention No. 185. Additionally, criminal procedural
law issues impose severe obstacles on the investigation and prosecution
of these offences, particularly in the context of cross-border networks.
18. The European Union has recently adopted Directive 2013/40/EU
on attacks against information systems, replacing the earlier framework
decision on such attacks. The Directive closely follows the substantive
provisions of Convention No. 185, but in addition sets minimum standards
for penalties, including aggravating circumstances. It does not,
however, regulate investigation powers. The European Union’s proposal
for a Directive on network and information security (NIS Directive)
is another important initiative, but this has yet to be finalised
and adopted.
19. Within the United Nations, relevant for this report is the
Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist
Purposes within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.
In a report on the challenges, best practices and recommendations
on legal and technical aspects, the Working Group found botnets
a special reason for concern, and pointed to several procedural
law issues that hampered the investigation of large-scale botnet
attacks. In its recommendations, the Working Group emphasised the importance
of ensuring protection of fundamental rights, the key role of public–private
partnerships (PPPs), and the need for a multi-pronged approach.
20. The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL),
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are also making important
efforts in relation to cyberattacks, but these lie more in the field
of capacity-building and practical guidelines than in effecting
new regulatory approaches.
4. Legislative approaches
4.1. Substantive law
21. To enable effective prosecution of large-scale cyberattacks
in member States, a harmonised minimum level of criminalisation
of the offences is indispensable, inter
alia in light of the requirement of double criminality for
mutual legal assistance. A minimum form of harmonisation may not
be sufficient, however. Conventions Nos. 185 and 196 have laid the
foundations of the Council of Europe regulatory framework in the
fields of cybercrime and terrorism and are valuable mechanisms covering
unlawful behaviour. Although Convention No. 185 is applicable to
cybercrime committed via large-scale attacks, it makes no distinction
as to the type of attack in terms of level of criminalisation. An
important legislative approach in terms of substantive law is to create
a more fine-grained set of criminal offences, in which more serious
forms of attack incur higher penalties.
4.1.1. Scale as an aggravating
circumstance of a cybercrime
22. Prosecution of a specific offence launched via single-point
attacks and via botnets, on the basis of the regulatory framework
of the Council of Europe, could result in the same penalties. However,
when considering the potential damage caused by large-scale attacks
on the targeted systems together with the harm imposed on the owners
of infected devices, it is reasonable for the legislator to stipulate
an elevated punishment for large-scale attacks that is proportional
to the threat created by the unlawful behaviour of the botmaster(s).
The size of a cyberattack could thus be interpreted as an aggravating
circumstance of the crime, for it increases the severity and culpability
of the criminal act. Following this argumentation, the current framework
of the Council of Europe can be improved by increasing the sanctions
pertaining to large-scale attacks. While Convention No. 185 refrains
from establishing minimum or maximum penalties for criminal offences
covered therein, a guidance note on the implementation of an additional
provision on the use of botnets as an aggravating circumstance could
help member States to comply with the provision in an efficient
way.
23. EU Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems
could serve as an example of the approximation of criminal law by
establishing higher penalties for aggravating circumstances. With
respect to the earlier Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks
against information systems, the Directive established higher penalties
in general, providing for aggravating circumstances in particular
for the offences of illegal system interference and illegal data
interference. According to Article 9.3 of the directive, illegal system
or data interference should have a maximum penalty of at least three
years’ imprisonment if the crime was committed using a botnet.

Article
9.4 of the directive stipulates that maximum penalties for illegal
system or data interference have to be at least five years’ imprisonment
if they were committed within a criminal organisation, if they cause
serious damage or if they are committed against computers belonging
to a critical infrastructure.
24. These new provisions in Directive 2013/40/EU are a good example
of supranational initiatives against large-scale attacks. Nevertheless,
limiting the aggravating circumstance only to illegal system inference
and illegal data interference implies that not all botnet-enabled
cybercrimes face an increased penalty. For instance, in a keylogging
scheme the bots listen to victims’ activities looking for particular
pieces of personal data, such as passwords and bank account information.

Keylogging surveillance gains access
to data but does not necessarily amount to system or data interference
and is arguably out of the scope of the aggravating circumstances
of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of Directive 2013/40/EU. Nevertheless, through
their automated nature, also the use of botnets to commit illegal
access or illegal interception constitutes cybercrime on a large
scale, and this type of crime could also be considered a large-scale
attack on information systems. Since botnets can be used for many
different purposes and stages of criminal offences, one could consider
stipulating botnet use for large-scale attacks as an aggravating
circumstance, incurring a higher penalty, more generally than only
in relation to illegal system or data interference.
4.1.2. Serious consequences
as an aggravating circumstance of a cybercrime
25. As observed above, Directive 2013/40/EU also applies
causing serious damage as an aggravating circumstance in illegal
system or data interference. According to recital 5, “[m]ember States
may determine what constitutes serious damage according to their
national law and practice, such as disrupting system services of
significant public importance, or causing major financial cost or
loss of personal data or sensitive information”. This is one regulatory
approach that can be considered as dealing with cyberterrorist attacks, since
these are usually particularly aimed at causing serious damage,
if not in actual financial cost, then at least in terms of their
broader impact on society. The Council of Europe could thus also
consider, through a Guidance Note, establishing a similar aggravating
circumstance for cybercrimes (Articles 4 and 5 or possibly also
Articles 2 and 3 of Convention No. 185) causing serious damage.
26. The same could be considered for attacks on critical infrastructure,
which the EU directive also applies as a separate ground for higher
penalties. Although this has advantages in terms of clarity and
signalling the importance of critical infrastructure protection,
one could also argue that this ground is already subsumed by the
ground of serious damage, since attacks on critical infrastructure
will typically cause serious damage (and if they do not, the attack
need not necessarily be considered particularly serious to warrant
enhanced penalties). Focusing on serious harm instead of the type
of computer being attacked has the advantage of avoiding interpretation
problems as to which computers belong to the critical infrastructure
in terms of Article 9.4 of the directive; after all, not all computers
used “within” a critical infrastructure are related to the critical
systems at issue, and it is questionable whether an attack on a
computer used for human-resource management or value-added customer
services of an electricity company should count as an attack on
a “critical infrastructure information system”.
27. Another argument should also be taken into account in the
approach to stipulating “serious damage” as an aggravating circumstance.
The Internet of Things is coming closer to being a reality: a world
in which not only computers and smartphones, but also a variety
of things are connected to the Internet: domestic appliances such
as a fridge, washing machine, television, and the thermostat, as
well as cars and devices monitoring, for example environmental conditions,
infrastructural operations or industrial applications. Most of these
devices will not be part of the basic catalogues of critical infrastructure,
but attacks on these devices can cause serious malfunctioning and
therewith serious damage, not only to the device itself, but also
to its environment and the people therein (think of malware infecting
a smart car that allows a perpetrator to remotely take over control
of the car navigation). In addition, although we are nowhere near
an “Internet of people” as yet, humans are also becoming more wired,
with smart devices monitoring body functions and with various human
implants, ranging from pacemakers and cochlear implants to bionic
limbs connected to the nervous system and brain implants. These
implants make also humans vulnerable to cyberattacks, and although
these would not (necessarily) be large-scale attacks, they can definitely
cause serious damage. And since remote attacks on things in people’s
near environment as well as on humans themselves could seem particularly frightening
to many people, they might become primary instruments for cyberterrorists
once the Internet of Things and human implants become more common.
Although the attacks are in principle sufficiently criminalised
under Convention No. 185, as this gives a comprehensive conceptual
list of possible types of attacks on information systems, the one-size-fits-all
approach in Articles 2-6 of Convention No. 185 may not do justice
to the variety of attacks in a world where everything is connected,
and where attacks significantly differ in character from traditional
attacks on old-fashioned computers.

Providing
for aggravating circumstances for cybercrimes causing serious damages
could be one fruitful way of responding to new threats posed by cyberattacks,
be they large-scale attacks, attacks on critical infrastructure
or attacks on vulnerable cyber-connected things or people.
4.2. Procedural law
28. Although substantive law can be improved somewhat
to deal with large-scale -attacks, the main legislative challenges
lie in the area of procedural law. Most cyberattacks can be prosecuted
under one or other criminal provision in most legal systems, but
it is the investigation – identifying suspects and collecting sufficient evidence
– that tends to be a larger bottleneck for dealing with cybercrime.
There are many reasons for this; we will focus on three issues that
we consider important to highlight in this report.
4.2.1. Implementation
of the procedural provisions of Convention No. 185
29. Convention No. 185 has a fairly

comprehensive
catalogue of investigation powers that member States should enable
through their legislation. The conceptually most important powers
– production order (Article 18), search and seizure (Article 19)
and investigation of telecommunications (Articles 20-21) – are included, alongside
important, low-threshold, ancillary powers for expedited preservation
of data that are vulnerable to loss (Articles 17). Generally speaking,
the convention’s Parties have implemented in national law the substantive
legal provisions of Convention No. 185 more systematically and comprehensively
than the procedural provisions. For example, the power to conduct
a network search regulated in Article 19.2 – an extension of a search
in situ to search computer data
remotely stored in the searching authority’s territory that are
lawfully accessible from the premises being searched – is explicitly
regulated in the laws of, for example, Germany (Article 110.3 German
Code of Criminal Procedure), the Netherlands (Article 125.j Dutch
Code of Criminal Procedure) and the United Kingdom (Article 20 Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984), but no equivalent explicit provision
can be found in the laws of, for example, Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy
or Slovenia. Interestingly, the Philippines, which is not a party
to Convention No. 185 but has used it as a model law, has implemented
Articles 19.1, 19.3 and 19.4 of the Convention almost verbatim in
Section 15 of its Cybercrime Prevention Act, but has not transposed
Article 19.2). We think it would be useful to have a comprehensive survey
of the implementation of Section 2 (Procedural law) in Parties’
national laws, in order to identify whether the implementation of
Convention No. 185 indeed shows significant gaps and deficiencies,
and if so, to analyse the reasons underlying this insufficient implementation.
4.2.2. Streamlining mutual
assistance
30. Chapter III of Convention No. 185 contains important
measures to streamline mutual assistance in criminal matters, which
is crucial for investigating cybercrimes that very often have an
international component and involve data that are particularly vulnerable
to loss if they are not expeditiously secured. Besides provisions regulating
various investigation powers to use mutual assistance, the establishment
of a 24/7 network (Article 35) is particularly important to enable
speedy contacts between States to facilitate mutual assistance. It
seems that mutual assistance procedures, despite existing efforts
to streamline them and despite many good contacts among States and
practitioners, is still often slow, at least for the purposes of
investigating cybercrimes. Evidence collection following a request
for mutual assistance can still easily take a week or several weeks,
if not more, during which period the data sought may well be destroyed
or moved. This cannot be easily solved, but for an effective response
to large-scale cyberattacks, it is vital that mutual assistance procedures
function smoothly and expeditiously.
31. It could be considered whether stronger legal measures might
help; for instance, introducing maximum response times for responding
to mutual assistance requests.

But
the obstacles in expeditious mutual assistance procedures are presumably
more organisational in nature, and policy measures to stimulate investing
in resources to handle mutual assistance requests, raising awareness
of the importance for the overall fight against cybercrime of expeditiously
meeting such requests, and perhaps giving clear guidelines on how
national authorities can set priorities, given limited resources,
in dealing with such requests, might be better suited than legislative
obligations that will remain a dead letter without adequate resources
or mindsets with practitioners who would have to fulfil these obligations.
Given that the challenge of adequate mutual legal assistance has
been recognised for a long time but that procedures, as far as we
are aware, are still insufficiently speedy, further research could
be undertaken to understand the particular reasons underlying the problem
and to come up with innovative ways to address it.
4.2.3. Cross-border access
to data
32. Given the limitations of mutual assistance, as well
as the problem that it is not always clear of on which territory
data are stored, for instance in the context of cloud computing,
there is an urgent need in practice to allow some form of remote
access to data by cybercrime investigators also if the data are,
potentially, stored on other countries’ territory. This issue is
being discussed within the Council of Europe by the “Transborder Group”,
an ad hoc sub-group of the Cybercrime Convention committee on jurisdiction
and transborder access to data. It is investigating possibilities
for an additional protocol or recommendation, and has proposed a number
of possible solutions that might be considered for a protocol:
“1. Transborder access with consent
without the limitation to data stored ‘in another Party’ ...
2. Transborder access without consent but with lawfully
obtained credentials ...
3. Transborder access without consent in good faith or
in exigent or other circumstances ...
4. Extending a search [from the original computer being
searched to connected systems] without the limitation ‘in its territory’
in Article 19 [paragraph 2] ...
5. The power of disposal as connecting legal factor ...” 
33. None of these options (except perhaps the second) provides
a clear direction for addressing the issue, because of the strict
limits that international law sets to accessing data on the territory
of another State without that State’s prior consent. Only in situations
where States have agreed on certain forms of unilateral access, such
as Article 32.b of Convention
No. 185 (which allows cross-border access to data with voluntary
consent of the user or provider, if these can lawfully consent to
providing access to the data), is such access lawful under international
law; and Article 32.b is limited
in scope and not uncontested.
34. Arguably, Article 32.b can
be interpreted as already including option 2, namely to allow cross-border searches
with lawfully obtained credentials (for example the login name and
password for remote accounts, if lawfully provided by the suspect
or service provider, or found, for example, on a post-it note on
the suspect’s desk during a lawful search), if the searching State
knows that the data are stored in a State that is Party to the convention.
This interpretation has yet to be agreed among the States Parties
to the Cybercrime Convention before it can be considered a legitimate
interpretation, but this could take the form of a Guidance Note
rather than a more cumbersome ratification process for a protocol.
35. Apart from this, it is unlikely that States will be able to
agree in the shorter term on further-reaching forms of cross-border
access to data, leaving law-enforcement authorities with severely
limited capacity to investigate cybercrime in an increasingly interconnected
and mobile era. Before this challenge can be adequately addressed,
considerable preliminary work is needed, which should include formal
recognition by State representatives of the problem in international
platforms and bringing together the community of cyber-investigation
and the community of international law, which seldom meet and often
lack basic knowledge of key tenets and developments in the other
field. The Council of Europe could play an important role in this respect
by hosting events involving both communities to discuss this issue,
thus contributing to growing awareness of law enforcement’s need
for some form of cross-border access to data while remaining within
the limits of international law. Once the problem is sufficiently
recognised and adequately framed, States can start attempting to
address the problem by drawing on existing international legal regimes
for atypical areas (such as space and satellite imagery, the high
seas, piracy and port State jurisdiction) to take into account cyberspace
and the cloud, in which some form of unilateral action within that
space would be seen as plausibly acceptable.
5. Non-legal measures
5.1. Capacity building
36. The Council of Europe has supported several law-enforcement
training and capacity-building activities in the field of cybercrime.
From 2006 to 2011, the Global Cybercrime Project (Phase 1) reached
several countries worldwide, carrying out more than 110 activities
aimed at strengthening criminal justice and improving implementation
and co-operation at the level of Convention No. 185. Capacity-building
programmes offer law enforcement and other relevant stakeholders
the chance to improve their knowledge and upgrade their techniques,
by coming into contact with other experts and bringing together
officials from different jurisdictions. Large-scale cyberattacks
are not the usual type of cybercrime and require law enforcement
to be well-trained and equipped to deal with organised or politically
motivated criminals and modern malware dissemination techniques.
This also implies an increased need for co-operation, as the very
characteristics of large-scale attacks will almost always result
in cross-border infections. The relevance of capacity building for advancing
cybercrime capabilities and resilience has been part of the cybersecurity
agenda of many countries and is now part of the programme of the
Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union.

37. Nevertheless, we could not identify specific training programmes
targeting cyberterrorism or large-scale attacks at the Council of
Europe level,

which shows the need to foster dedicated
training in this area. Due to the particular risks surrounding this
potential threat and the scale of its consequences, capacity-building activities
on large-scale cyberattacks are of utmost importance. There is potential
room for the Council of Europe, in light of its tradition and history
of advancing the rule of law, to launch a specific programme on
large-scale cyberattacks and the use of botnets, with emphasis on
the protection of critical infrastructure, Internet of Things and
cloud computing, and include the issue in related sessions and workshops
in cybercrime and counter-terrorism initiatives.
5.2. Public–Private
Partnerships
38. Public–private partnerships (PPP) against cybercrime
are growing as they bring together different stakeholders from the
public and private sectors, pooling information and expertise about
threats and enabling better strategies against cybercrime. The private
sector cannot be left out in the fight against cybercrime since companies
involved in the Internet infrastructure and various Internet services
are in the best position to, for instance, identify the launch of
a DDoS attack or recognise malicious use of their infrastructure.
In addition, IT security companies with their long-standing expertise
are the most capable actors to further analyse data about infections
and better understand the characteristics of threats, and they could
incentivise research and development of improved security tools
against vulnerabilities. All in all, an efficient framework targeting
large-scale cyberattacks requires the existence of a solid and highly
knowledgeable multi-stakeholder collaborative network. While we
are not aware of any specific PPPs against large-scale cyberattacks,
there are various examples of PPPs against cybercrime as well as
against terrorism,

including dedicated
PPPs against botnets.

39. PPPs are circles of trust and are most successful when supported
by reliable organisations, accredited before their partners and
the general public. Since the Council of Europe has a strong reputation
in fighting cybercrime and cyberterrorism, it can play an important
role in fostering PPPs, as well as bringing together already existing
initiatives. The collaboration and exchange that can be enabled
via a co-operative network of PPPs in cybercrime, counter-terrorism
and botnets can provide important elements to address large-scale cyberattacks.
The richness of such a framework would build on the expertise and
effort already deployed by many national teams and regional organisations
in different areas of crime.
6. Tilting the perspective
40. The threat of large-scale cyberattacks seems to loom
large – we do not know the actual threat level, for lack of reliable
statistics. Part of the problem of cybercrime governance is the
considerable mythology surrounding it, based as our knowledge of
cybercrime (or lack thereof) often is on portrayals of hackers in movies
and novels and on biased reports with blown-up figures by information
security companies. It would help, first of all, to have more reliable
statistics available. Regulators should stimulate independent research into
the prevalence of cybercrime, including botnet infections and large-scale
attacks, in order to better prepare for policymaking in this field.
41. At the same time, even where reliable data are available,
regulators should not fall into the trap of trying to reduce the
risks of large-scale attacks to near-zero level, by adapting ever
more repressive measures to find and sanction perpetrators and ever
more costly security measures. We live in a risk society that frames
social problems in terms of the risks posed and risk-reduction strategies.
In this risk society, an increasing tendency can be observed towards
a culture of fear, in which we let fear of bad consequences get
the better of rational, disinterested assessments of the real risks
involved. As the Snowden revelations suggest, governments can get
carried away in implementing anti-terrorism measures without adequately
assessing whether the measures are really necessary, legitimate,
effective and cost-effective. Although it is an unwelcome message
in a risk-averse society, people should realise that it is impossible
to live in a risk-free world and that we therefore have to learn
to cope with adversities, be they natural disasters, crime or terrorist
attacks. To be sure, the potential harm of terrorist attacks is
large and therefore, even if the likelihood of such attacks is low,
the risk is still considerable. But that does not imply that all
measures to minimise this risk are warranted. The cost of measures
to prevent or reduce the effects of large-scale cyberattacks can
be enormous, both in economic terms and in terms of negative impact
on human freedoms and fundamental freedoms.
42. Besides being aware of living in a risk society and the consequent
pitfall of policies targeted at achieving zero risk, regulators
should also take into account another perspective. Policies often
address the consequences and symptoms of new phenomena, but not
their underlying causes. With large-scale cyberattacks, it is easy
to assume that they are a consequence of the opportunities for abusing
the Internet for criminal or terrorist purposes, and hence to target
policy at both increased Internet security and stronger repression
of Internet-based attacks. But an important underlying cause of
the risk of large-scale cyberattacks is society’s increasing dependence
on ICT and the Internet. Almost all societal activities today are
facilitated by computers and computer networks, and because of the
large benefits of doing things online rather than offline, many
activities are rapidly becoming dependent on information systems
and the Internet infrastructure. Thus, we are creating an extremely
vulnerable society. The vulnerability does not lie in the threat
of cyberattacks per se, but rather in both the scale and the cascade
effects that such attacks can have on many sectors, people and activities.
43. In that light, we think it important to somewhat tilt the
perspective of the challenge of large-scale cyberattacks. Besides
asking which measures we can take to better protect our infrastructures
and to better find and prosecute those who attack them, regulators
should also ask themselves to what extent they want society to become
totally dependent on the Internet as a backbone of all societal
activities. The Internet is and will remain insecure, no matter
how many measures are taken. Attacks will happen, include large-scale
ones, with occasionally devastating effects, no matter how many
measures are taken. This implies that an important element of any
reasonable cybercrime governance strategy should be increasing the
resilience of society in light of an Internet infrastructure that
is inevitably vulnerable to attacks. Resilience implies not only
early warning and quick response systems, but also mitigating the
effects of attacks on critical infrastructures. An important part
of the latter is to have adequate fall-back options, in particular
to have functioning and tested fall-back infrastructures in case
Internet-based infrastructures are temporarily out of order. Hospitals
have power generators in case the electricity net melts down. What
fall-back options and infrastructure do European countries have
for electronic banking, smart energy grids, smart transport systems,
distance learning, e-government services, etc.? If the need arises
when a cyberattack temporarily blocks the use of the Internet on a
large scale, can we still pay with non-electronic money, use devices
that function without online connections, drive “dumb” cars, learn
from a book, get a passport? If the answer is no, then any regulatory
strategy to deal with large-scale cyberattacks is likely to fail,
or else to cost so much that no e-citizen or e-consumer would be willing
to pay the price.
7. Conclusion
44. A major challenge in cybercrime governance today
is dealing with large-scale cyberattacks, particularly, although
not exclusively, those committed using botnets – large networks
of infected computers. Instruments developed in the past decades
to deal with cybercrime are applicable to such attacks, but not
particularly appropriate to deal with the scale and new ways in
which attacks are committed, including through botnets. At the same
time, instruments developed to deal with terrorist attacks are capable
of dealing with large-scale attacks, but are often not specifically
tuned towards cyberattacks. There is therefore room for improvement
in taking up the challenge of large-scale cyberattacks.
45. Therefore, the following regulatory measures could be considered
in order to address this challenge:
- Differentiating in substantive criminal law between basic
forms of cybercrime (which are already well covered by Convention
No. 185) and aggravated forms of cybercrime, in particular attacks
committed using botnets and/or attacks resulting in serious damage;
for the latter, harmonisation of national law could be considered,
stipulating that the minimum penalties for aggravated cybercrime
should be at least a certain number of years of imprisonment.
- A comprehensive survey of the national implementations
of the procedural law provisions of Convention No. 185, in order
to identify possible gaps and deficiencies and to analyse the reasons
underlying insufficient implementation.
- Further streamlining procedures for mutual legal assistance,
by investing in resources to handle mutual assistance requests,
raising awareness and giving guidelines for priority-setting to
deal with these requests, and possibly by introducing maximum response
times for handling mutual assistance requests. Further research
would be welcomed to understand the reasons why current efforts
to streamline mutual legal assistance do not seem to have been altogether
successful.
- Putting the challenge of cross-border access to data firmly
on the international agenda and involving both the cyber-investigation
community and the international law community in discussions on
this issue, in order to contribute to growing awareness of law enforcement’s
need for some form of cross-border access to data while remaining
within the limits of international law. An additional Guidance Note
could be considered to interpret Article 32.b of
Convention No. 185 as allowing unilateral cross-border searches
with lawfully obtained credentials. In a longer-term effort, a plausible
account needs to be crafted of cross-border searches in cyberspace
that fit within the framework of international law.
- Capacity building particularly focused on the specifics
of large-scale cyberattacks should be fostered. The Council of Europe
could launch a specific training programme on large-scale cyberattacks
and the use of botnets, with emphasis on the protection of critical
infrastructure, the Internet of Things and cloud computing.
- Combating large-scale cyberattacks cannot be done by law-enforcement
authorities or public cybersecurity agencies alone. Nor is this
the primary responsibility of the private sector. To stimulate the effective
and legitimate Public–Private Partnerships that are needed to jointly
combat large-scale cyberattacks, the Council of Europe could approach
and bring together existing PPPs in the fields of cybercrime and
terrorism, foster the creation of new PPPs as part of the Council
of Europe’s capacity- building and outreach programmes, and issue
a recommendation calling on member States to join regional efforts
and incentivise national PPPs against large-scale cyberattacks.
- Policy measures addressing large-scale cyberattacks should
be based on reliable, independently researched statistics on the
prevalence of such attacks. Policy should not attempt to minimise
the risk of large-scale attacks at all costs, but rather make rational
and substantiated assessments of the costs (both economic costs
and impact on human rights and fundamental freedoms), while being
aware that risks cannot always be calculated and that risks can
in any case never be completely eliminated.
- Measures need to focus on increasing society’s resilience
to deal with large-scale cyberattacks, which should include taking
steps to prevent society from becoming too dependent on Internet-based infrastructures.
Where governments stimulate, facilitate or condone the replacement
of offline forms of interaction with online forms of interaction,
care should be taken that adequate fall-back options remain available.
The Internet is and will remain insecure, and cyberattacks, small
and large, will happen, no matter how many measures are taken. Society
needs to be prepared to live with the consequences of large-scale
cyberattacks.