1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. The motion for a resolution
on “Counter-narratives to terrorism” (
Doc. 14032) was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights for report on 25 November 2016.
I
was appointed rapporteur by the committee at its meeting in Strasbourg
on 23 January 2017. On 14 February 2018, I participated, in my capacity
as rapporteur, in a Symposium on “Religious Values, Human Rights”
(Birmingham, United Kingdom) which looked into the overlap between
Islamic values and the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No.
5, “the Convention”).
1.2. Mandate
2. The motion for a resolution
which I tabled with a number of other members of the Assembly, recalls
that the Parliamentary Assembly has “discussed at length the crisis
in the Middle East, its attraction to foreign fighters and the exodus
of refugees it has provoked”. The motion goes on to state that “[d]efeating
Daesh will require us to defeat its ideas and its promotion of the
idea that Islam is under attack, that there is a clash of civilisations;
that the ‘West’ and Islam are ‘at war’, and that it is the religious
duty of Muslims to come to the defence of Islam by joining Daesh.
We must stand united in exposing the truth and simultaneously defend
the European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 9, which
Daesh seeks to destroy”.
3. Hence, taking into account this specific mandate, the present
report only addresses Daesh and Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism and
not terrorism inspired by other ideologies. This should not leave
the impression that I consider it as given that all terrorism is
Daesh/Al-Qaeda-inspired, and that other acts of political violence are
not terrorist in nature.
1.3. Issues
at stake
4. “Over the past two decades,
the international community has sought to address violent extremism primarily
within the context of security-based counter-terrorism measures.”
However, “there is a growing international consensus that such counter-terrorism
measures have not been sufficient to prevent the spread of violent
extremism”.
5. The Council of Europe has taken an important role in countering
terrorism, by drafting the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention
of Terrorism (
CETS
No. 196) in 2005 and its Additional Protocol (
CETS No.
217) in 2015. The Committee of Ministers’ Action Plan for
2015-2017 on “The Fight against Violent Extremism and Radicalisation
Leading to Terrorism” also identified a number of areas of key importance, including
“providing a counter-narrative to the misuse of religion”, aiming
to counteract the destructive messages of extremists with counter-narratives
(
CM(2015)74, section 2.1.3). In its
Resolution 2091 (2016) on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, the Parliamentary
Assembly called for action “to spread counter-narratives aimed at
exposing extremist discourse and dissipating illusions about the
real situation in the territories held by Daesh and the fate of
its recruits, in particular by using testimonies of returnees who
have witnessed first-hand the nature of Daesh”. Furthermore, the
Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism (
CODEXTER) approved in November 2017 a new draft recommendation
on terrorists acting alone, which was adopted by the Committee of
Ministers in March 2018, an element of which focuses on the development
of counter-narratives and alternative messages.
6. The internet has transformed the way that terrorist organisations
can influence and radicalise people, with terrorist narratives easily
accessible to a large global audience. Nearly every terrorist group
has its own website and some even maintain multiple sites in different
languages with different messages tailored to specific audiences.
This has raised questions of how defenders of peaceful coexistence
between persons having different religious or philosophical convictions
can respond with their own media and communication strategies.
7. In the light of recent events, the development of counter-narratives,
that is to say messages that offer a positive alternative to or
deconstruct or delegitimise violent extremist narratives and challenge
their ideologies, is growing increasingly necessary.
Defeating Daesh and other terrorist
groups will require us to defeat their ideas, including the suggestion
that Islam is under attack, that “the West” and Islam are “at war”,
and that it is the religious duty of Muslims to come to the defence
of Islam by joining these violent extremist groups.
8. In this report, I shall therefore highlight the need to better
understand the radicalisation process, exploring how and why individuals
become terrorists. I shall then address the difficulties faced by
counter-narrative strategies in targeting these narratives towards
relevant audiences and measuring constructive impact, and suggest
factors to consider in creating effective counter-narrative initiatives.
Lastly, I shall discuss the concept of shared values and the importance
of identifying the overlap between Convention values and core Islamic
teaching, in order to develop effective positive alternative narratives
based on this over-lapping consensus in our ideals.
2. The radicalisation process
2.1. Current
issues
9. Prior to the events of 11 September
2001, the causes of terrorism were considered within a three-level framework,
“involving factors of: individual motivation and belief systems;
decision-making and strategy within a terrorism movement; and the
wider political and social context within which terrorist movements
interact”.
But
in recent years, the idea of a linear relationship between radicalisation
and terrorism, also known as the “conveyor belt” theory, has gained
ground as a policy framework for re-thinking strategies for prevention
of violence. However, this theory is widely disputed
and
has been discredited to some extent.
Some researchers
argue that violent activity can also precede radicalisation; individuals
can adopt a terrorist group’s ideology after engaging in terrorism
to retroactively justify their violent action.
Moreover,
it has been shown that radicalisation does not necessarily lead
to violence; it is therefore possible for individuals to hold extreme views
without transgressing to violent extremism.
10. There is currently no internationally accepted definition
of “radicalisation”’ and no consensus on this complex and controversial
issue, since “about the only thing radicalisation experts agree
on is that radicalisation is a process”.
However, radicalisation
cannot be effectively prevented without first better understanding
its root causes.
2.2. Factors
to consider
11. “There is no single path that
leads people to violent extremism”,
every case is different, and men
and women of all social origins may be affected. However, a number
of possible contributory factors have been identified.
12. One definition of radicalisation presents the process as a
“multifaceted combination of push-pull factors involving a combination
of socio-psychological factors, political grievance, religious motivation
and discourse, identity politics and triggering mechanisms that
collectively move individuals towards extremism”.
“Push factors”
operate at a personal level. These might include a dysfunctional
family setting or abuse
such as bullying,
personal crises, plus a lack of integration, or an element of criminality.
These
factors add up to the same psychological effect; removing the inhibitions
that typically prevent a person becoming violent. The second stage,
which may overlap with the first, involves the “pull” factors or
“radicalising influences”. These might arise as a result of a family
member or friend becoming associated with extremist influences or
a radicaliser, who could be found in a university, a prison, a community
setting, or online.
13. For online influences to work there is typically both an absence
of obstacles, and a “switch”, such as some kind of “shock” or an
“ideological opening” which might be a single event or exposure
to a particular cause, which provides a connection to meaning. Thus,
radical ideology then “battens on to the grievance and makes sense
of the grievance and that makes sense of the person’s life”.
This
journey could be described as a “fork in the road”.
A multiplicity of
factors stoke an anger that take an individual to a critical junction;
one path leads to the pursuit of a violent path to secure change;
the second path, leads to the pursuit of change through peaceful,
civil means. Many violent extremists exploit a “DIY-Islam” to persuade
people to settle grievances not through peaceful strategies for
change but through violence, motivating young people to seek, “renown,
revenge, and reaction”.
14. Recent studies have associated increases in online extremist
language with increases in offline extremist or identity-based crimes.
However, whilst “there is some evidence suggesting patterns of discourse and
communication such as hate speech, dehumanisation, and identity-based
narratives (or propaganda) can contribute to conditions where” violent
extremism becomes more likely, “the causal relationship remains unproven”.
15. The reasons why certain violent extremist narratives can be
so appealing should therefore be further considered, alongside the
reasons why individuals join terrorist organisations and why some
have decided to leave. The differences in the radicalisation and
de-radicalisation processes in different countries, and the ways in
which the radicalisation process is changing require constant assessment.
These comprehensive assessments, on all aspects of the radicalisation
process, should be carried out in order to develop a shared understanding
of the patterns of radicalisation.
3. Counter-narrative
strategies
3.1. Definition
of counter-narratives
16. Although there is no single
pathway to terrorism, terrorist groups’ extensive range of communicative strategies
“are critical for promoting the adoption of beliefs and attitudes
that place non-violent target audiences at greater risk for subsequent
engagement in terrorism”.
The
most persuasive of these strategies involves the use of narratives,
the main function of which is to “convey ideology, values, justifications,
or core concerns” to audiences including sympathisers, would-be
members, and the wider public. Analysis reveals what has been termed
the “5Ps of extremist messaging”:
- Piety. Daesh and
al Qaeda make a heretical claim to speak as the “true believers”
of Islam, and crucially offer a religious justification for violence;
- Pride. Daesh makes
a strong appeal to a conjured sense of honour in service and sacrifice,
with iconography which stresses the “nobility” of violent jihad;
- Potency. Both Daesh
and al Qaeda have absorbed the lesson of Osama Bin Laden, who said
in 2001: “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature
they will like the strong horse.” So both promote a “winner’s narrative”
of ever-expanding borders;
- Perfectionism.
Daesh offers recruits a utopian vision of building a new caliphate
in which the ideals of Muhammed’s life are revived and brought to
life once more. One survey found that about half of ISIS propaganda
depicts happy civilian life;
- Provocation. Daesh
and Al Qaeda seek to create a powerful feeling of victimhood, offering
graphic evidence of civilian casualties and framing the struggle
with the West as a “defensive jihad”.
17. In order to address this issue, recent counter-terrorism discourse
has tended towards confronting the underlying supportive narratives
of terrorist groups through the creation of counter-narratives and,
in turn, discouraging the support for terrorism that these narratives
foster. Counter-narratives, in the context of countering violent
extremism, have been defined as “intentional and direct efforts
to deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging,
whether through ideology, logic, fact or humour”.
Counter-narratives aim
to challenge and contradict the themes intrinsic to the terrorist
narrative.
18. As mentioned above, identifying those at risk of being radicalised
and then attracted to extremist behaviour is very challenging, which
makes the task of finding a solution for countering extreme, terrorist
views a complicated and difficult one. Clearly, a single, overarching,
counter-narrative cannot be developed. As will be seen, a complex
construction of a multitude of different types of messaging and
media should be used instead, in conjunction with local action on
the ground.
3.2. Issues
to consider
19. It is important to recognise
the difficulties counter-narratives have faced in the past, so as
to be able to create successful strategies for future use. Counter-narrative
strategies have been criticised as being too removed from the everyday
lives and experiences of the people, in particular young people,
whom they target.
Moreover,
some research proposes that counter-narrative strategies may, if
they fail to gain traction, do more harm than good and prove to
be counter-productive, reinforcing rather than contradicting the
terrorist narrative. It has also been suggested that this issue
“is compounded by an insistence that European Muslims condemn terrorism
– which serves only to entrench the Islamisation of the problem”.
20. Several academic reviews of national counter-narrative policy
in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia (where
most counter-narrative activity has taken place to date)
have criticised
such policies and been unable to identify tangible positive outcomes.
It remains difficult,
however, to determine the success of counter-narrative initiatives
since methodologically robust monitoring and evaluation is currently lacking
in this area, although more rigorous impact assessments are being
developed.
3.3. Message
21. “There is still limited understanding
about what makes an effective counter-narrative campaign.”
However, a number of important
factors have been identified. It is essential to start with defining
the objective of the campaign. It has been suggested that targeting
counter-narratives “solely at those few who are on the brink of
being recruited” is far too restrictive an approach.
Target
audiences could be geographically based (i.e. local projects) or
globally based (i.e. online, through the use of social media), and
may also include those who for different reasons feel connected
to a war or conflict in a foreign country, regardless of their country
of origin or nationality.
Where possible, counter-narrative content
should be developed in co-operation with members of the target audience
themselves to enhance the effectiveness of their reception. “More
research is [also] needed to understand how a specific target audience
responds to certain ideas.”
22. At an expert meeting in June 2014, the International Centre
for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) identified a number of different types
of counter-narratives. It was noted that the term “counter-narratives”
implies responding and reacting to terrorist narratives. However,
merely reacting is not enough. It was recommended, therefore, that
counter-narrative efforts focus on creating proactive, positive
and alternative narratives.
Other types
of narratives suggested included strategic counter-narratives, condemning
violent extremists and their efforts; ethical counter-narratives,
pointing out that violent action is not a moral way of achieving
aims and focussing on shared values, highlighting the commonalities
between all humans and calling for a better co-operation between
all nations and peoples; ideological and religious counter-narratives;
tactical counter-narratives, emphasising that in the long term violence
is often less effective than more peaceful methods (although it
was noted that the main obstacle here is providing an alternative
that still allows for the individual, group or organisation to potentially
achieve their goals in a non-violent way). A positive call for action
and a clear articulation of a shared identity and sense of belonging
are also important components of a counter-narrative strategy.
23. “Undermining terrorist and extremist leadership should constitute
one part of the approach”, creating messages that significantly
detract from their authority and credibility.
Furthermore, focussing on the hypocrisy
of the ideology has also been suggested, demonstrating civilian
and Muslim suffering at the hands of terrorists. Similarly, portraying
terrorists as common criminals may also aid in highlighting the
hypocrisy of the terrorist narrative. Counter-narratives should
also convey the reality of life as a terrorist.
24. Hate speech should be challenged, through both regulation
and legislation, but also by promoting media pluralism to ensure
no communities are excluded.
IT companies, including
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft, have taken a first step
towards assuming more responsibility for countering the spread of
hate speech online. In May 2016, these IT companies have committed
themselves to the European Commission “Code of Conduct on Countering
Illegal Hate Speech Online”, according to which they review notifications
and remove illegal hate speech within 24 hours. A January 2018
evaluation of the Code of Conduct shows that the IT companies removed
around 70% of illegal hate speech notified to them. While this percentage
seems rather positive (especially in comparison with the 2016 and
2017 evaluations, 28% and 59% respectively), there is a growing
debate around social media’s responsibility for the content they
disseminate and criticisms of their (relative) failure to remove
violent and extremist material. The British Government is reportedly
considering imposing a tax on IT companies for their failure to
remove such content.
However, “tackling hate speech requires
a far more comprehensive strategy than simply banning or blocking
content”.
Rather,
the root causes of tension and division must also be addressed through
counter-narratives to ensure that positive, alternative voices are
heard on the internet.
3.4. Messenger
25. The need for trust and credibility
in those delivering the message is crucial. It is important to recognise that
governments are not always the most effective messengers for presenting
the counter-narrative, often lacking in perceived credibility. However,
governments generally have a large degree of authority over the general
population, and government action taken, by way of counter-terrorism
measures and responses to a situation, can be considered an alternative
or counter-narrative in itself.
Furthermore,
governments could remove legal barriers that could make repentant
former terrorists or violent extremists reluctant to speak out,
taking inspiration
as relevant from measures to encourage and protect collaborators
with justice (
pentiti),
Governments
should therefore support community-led civil society organisations,
which often lack funding, to develop effective counter-narrative
programmes.
26. A better understanding of who can wield influence in different
communities is required. Local messengers, for example civil society
or religious leaders, can provide credible voices at the grassroots
level. Former terrorists and violent extremists could also aid in
presenting counter-narratives which resonate strongly with their
target audience, providing particularly strong messages about the
reality of life as a terrorist, utilising their own experiences
and disillusionment with the cause to “de-glamourise” and delegitimise
violent extremist narratives and disseminate a message of peace.
Moreover, it is
argued that counter-narrative messages which come from people who
are viewed by the younger generation, in particular, as “one of
their own”’ are likely to be much more effective. However, it can
prove difficult to find those who are willing to speak out and there
are often legal obstacles to engaging with those who are incarcerated,
for example. The families of terrorists can also play an important
role, as can victims of terrorist attacks. Both can offer emotional
reminders of the impact of terrorism and violent extremism. Finally,
the importance of the protection of any messengers in alternative
or counter-narrative campaigns must also be considered.
3.5. Medium
27. Using a variety of media can
maximise the message’s reach, and media should also be adapted to
fit the local context. The internet is an obviously effective tool;
however, it should be borne in mind that SMS, television, radio
and print media are still sometimes the main forms of communication
in many countries. Using media to influence behaviour or attitudes
within a development goals framework has been suggested as a credible
counter-narrative strategy, and studies have demonstrated the power
of drama or soap opera, for example, to effect social change and
to advance the cause of peace and development.
28. The use of new communication technology and social media has
facilitated the spread of misinformation through rumour, which can,
in turn, lead to tensions and fear within communities. However,
the same technology also presents the opportunity to provide accurate
information and dispel rumour during times of tension. The use of
SMS, as well as social media, to communicate messages of peace has
been suggested since a large number of people can be reached. Counter-imaging,
including the creation of alternative symbols, and online counter-videos
are also potential counter-narrative media.
29. The importance of face-to-face interactions and community
outreach activities is again stressed, even in a community where
access to the internet is high,
to
put into practice the ideas and options that the counter-narratives
have brought to attention.
3.6. Impact
30. Assessing the impact of counter-narratives
is extremely difficult. It is unlikely that a user who has violent views
will proclaim a change of heart having watched a counter-narrative
video, for example. However, counter-narrative campaigns can potentially
foster critical thinking or plant a “seed of doubt”, and sustained engagements,
i.e. individuals reaching out to counter-narrative campaigners for
assistance, can provide a clear indication of the impact of online
counter-narrative campaigns.
User engagement
strategies are therefore an important element of any counter-narrative
strategy, to provoke a reaction in the target audience and generate an
interactive debate.
4. Specific
initiatives to counter terrorist narratives at international and
European level
31. Various actors carry out initiatives
to counter terrorist narratives at supranational, international
or regional level. This section will present some of those initiatives
in a non-exhaustive manner.
32. It is widely recognised that the United Nations “has established
itself as a key player” in the field of counter-narratives.
A number of United Nations
resolutions and action plans have been approved in the context of
its
2006
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Amongst them, Security Council
Resolution
2178 (2014) highlights that countering violent extremism is a key
element to address the flow of foreign fighters. The United Nations
2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism asks not only member
States to develop action plans to prevent violent extremism, but
also argues for such plans to be developed at regional level. A comprehensive
framework to counter terrorist narratives was also published by
the United Nations Security Council in April 2017.
33. Other international initiatives include the 2011 Global Counterterrorism
Forum, complemented since December 2012 with the Hedayah Center
(an independent centre of excellence dedicated to countering violent extremism);
the 2015 Coalition to Defeat Daesh; the 2010 Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications – replaced in 2016 by the Global
Engagement Center. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
also runs important initiatives to counter terrorist narratives,
in particular via two of its Centres of Excellence: its Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga (Latvia) and its Defence
Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence in Ankara (Turkey). The Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has adopted principles
on countering terrorism (as part of the 2006 United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy) as well as a Consolidated Framework
for the Fight Against Terrorism.
34. A number of initiatives have also been developed at European
Union level, such as the 2015 EU Internet Forum (which attempts
to stop abuse of the internet by international terrorist groups),
the 2016 Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,
the European Strategic Communication Network (which provides strategic
communications advice and support to help stem the flow of foreign
terrorist fighters and violent extremism). Europol also plays a
key role in identifying terrorist material on the internet and in
informing internet service providers with a view to removing the
illegal content. In 2011, the European Council also created the
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN).
35. In January 2018, the Council of Europe CODEXTER was renamed
Committee on Counter-Terrorism (CDCT). According to its terms of
reference, one of the main tasks of the CDCT is to propose to the
Committee of Ministers areas for action in the field of counter-terrorism
and to co-ordinate Council of Europe activities in this field. The
CDCT is also charged with elaborating and overseeing the implementation
of a Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy for the period
2018-2022, focusing on prevention, prosecution and protection. It
is also to organise a counter-terrorism conference on the roles
of women and children in terrorism.
5. The
concept of “shared ideals”
36. “Extreme Islamists draw on
the supposed incompatibility between liberal democracy and their interpretation
of the Muslim faith to promote the idea of a “war on Islam” to create
a “them and us” narrative and stoke division”.
Developing a widely understood, well
articulated core of ideals and virtues that are common to both the
European Convention on Human Rights and Islam is therefore essential
in helping dismantle the core of the Daesh narrative that Islam
and the West “are at war”.
5.1. Developing
a common understanding
37. The European Court of Human
Rights has held that Sharia law is incompatible with the European Convention
on Human Rights.
This
does not, however, indicate an absolute incompatibility between
Islamic values and those enshrined in the Convention.
Islam
is itself a hugely diverse, pluralistic faith community. Indeed,
it is this diversity within Islam that Daesh seeks to eliminate;
“Islam entails a multitude of different voices, interpretations
and positions on human rights, promoted by different actors in different
historical, social, cultural and political contexts”,
but Islamic
“intellectual outlook supports the existence of shared values”.
This concept of shared ideals should
be explored and actively promoted in an exchange and dialogue between cultures
in order to develop a common understanding.
5.2. Alternative
narratives
38. In the United States of America,
one month after 11 September 2001, the Bush administration hired
an advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, as Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Political Affairs. Ms Beers created a series
of television, radio and print advertisements for distribution in
countries with large Muslim populations under the “Shared Values
Initiative”, intended to depict,
inter
alia, “images of an American Muslim and his family living
comfortably at home, praying openly, and otherwise enjoying America
while practising their religion freely”.
However, these advertisements
proved controversial and, less than a month after its launch, the
US State Department suspended the campaign. Nevertheless, it has
been argued that these advertisements were more effective than people
realised.
39. The promotion of shared values and the idea of community cohesion
have also been implemented in other domestic counter-terrorism strategies,
for example in the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy
and the Australian Countering Violent
Extremism Strategy. Again, these policies have been surrounded
by much controversy, and have even been labelled “counterproductive”,
undermining, rather than promoting, social cohesion. These existing
and historic counter-terrorism strategies should be considered and
evaluated to determine how best to utilise the concept of shared
values within the wider sphere of counter-narratives to terrorism.
40. Within the European Union, a Strategic Communication Task
Force is working with European Union Delegations in Arab countries
and with the Anti-ISIL Global Coalition to “identify shared values
and develop concrete actions”.
Moreover,
the importance of fostering a global dialogue in order to unite
“countries, people and communities on the basis of universally shared
values and principles” is also set out in the United Nations Plan
of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.
41. In May 2017, the US embassy in Belgium announced the allocation
of a year-long US$200 000 grant to be used in Europe by non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) or non-profit groups to create a programme, using
digital platforms, to “dispel the narratives of extremist groups
that incite violence and provide alternative narratives”, as well
as to “provide positive narratives concerning refugees and immigrant
populations”.
42. Positive alternative narratives to violent extremism therefore
play an important role in countering the appeal of terrorism and
should be considered as a viable type of counter-narrative. Alternative
narratives do not tend to directly challenge extremist messaging,
but “instead attempt to influence those who might be sympathetic
towards (but not [necessarily] actively supportive of) extremist
causes, or help to unite the silent majority against extremism by
emphasising solidarity, common causes and shared values”.
43. An effective positive alternative narrative strategy must
include Muslim communities as equal partners. By developing a greater
understanding of the ideals shared between the Convention and Islam,
we can build positive alternative narratives in a way in which all
communities can identify. Informed by a better understanding of
the radicalisation process, shared ideals, and the terrorist narrative
itself, an effective strategy to counter the terrorist narrative
can be constructed.
5.3. Input
from the Symposium on “Religious Values, Human Rights”
44. A symposium hosted by the University
of Birmingham (United Kingdom) on 14 February 2018 brought together
a range of scholars and experts to examine the “overlapping consensus”
between the European Convention on Human Rights and Islam. This
discussion helpfully emphasised the shared ideals and virtues which
the Convention and Islamic teaching have in common, including (but
not limited to):
- Universal scope of rights and equality before
the law. Article 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, underlines the universal scope of the application of human
rights; the parties “shall secure to everyone (emphasis
added) within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined”.
In addition, Article 14 provides for the “prohibition of discrimination”.
This reflects the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Articles
1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 12 and 17) and finds echo in the universality of humanity
emphasised in Islamic teaching set out clearly in 49:13 of the Qu’ran;
“O People! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female,
and made you into nations and tribes, that you
may know each other (not that you may despise (each other)”
(my italics). Muhammed’s “Last Sermon” underlines: “An Arab has
no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority
over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor does
a black have any superiority over a white except by piety and good
action”.
- Life. The right
to life is an absolute core ideal of the Convention. Article 2 of
the Convention sets out the right to life: “Everyone’s right to
life shall be protected by law.” This is reflected in Islamic teaching,
and underlined in a series of Islamic “divine names” which in Islam,
“designate characteristics of the divine nature”, namely:
“the Living” (al-Hayy) and “the Protector “(al-Hafiz). This is underlined
in many points in the Qu’ran, most famously in Sura 5:32, which
reads “whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption
[done] in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely.
And whoever saves one – it is as if he had saved mankind entirely”.
Muhammed, in his Last Sermon, emphasised the right of individuals and
sanctity for their blood: “O people, you have to respect each other's
life until the Resurrection Day.”
- Liberty and Security. The
right to liberty and security is set out in the Convention’s Article
5, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security
of person”, and Article 4, which provides for the prohibition of
slavery and forced labour. This finds an echo in Islam in the Qu’ranic
concept of non-compulsion (la ikraha) set out in Sura 2.256, which
states: “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion.”
- Fundamental freedoms of plural
societies. The Convention sets out a range of basic,
vital freedoms which are integral to plural society, including the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9), freedom
of expression (Article 10) and freedom of assembly and association
(Article 11). These ideals resonate with a key text in Islam, which
is the Madinah Charter, written by Muhammed to bring peace to a
hitherto fractious city. Imam Asim Hafiz, Islamic religious advisor
to the Chief of the British Defence Staff points out that at the
time, Madinah was a “pluralistic, multiethnic, multiracial, multilingual,
and multireligious” place and the Charter created a “‘Union of Free
People” conveyed in Covenants with people of many faiths (including
Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism) guaranteeing “freedom
of movement, freedom of work, freedom of study, freedom of religion,
and freedom of choice. These are the very freedoms that the Prophet
granted in his Covenants”. This tolerance for diversity is of course an
important characteristic of life in Council of Europe member States
and its importance in Islam is underlined in the importance attached
to the concept of “the Tolerant” (al-Halim). Shaykh Arif Hussain, Director
of the Al Mahdi Institute at Birmingham University, added: “Islamic
identity is about devotion not contracts, and this is shown in the
Qur’an, which says that Muslims and Christians have been given different
Sharias; it accepts religious difference.”
- Justice. This concept
of justice – al-Adl – is a core principle of Islamic thought and
is set out very clearly in the Qu’ran in Sura 4:135, “‘O YOU who
have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in upholding equity and
justice, bearing witness to the truth for the sake of God, even
though it be against your own selves or your parents and kinsfolk”.
Equally, justice is the central concept of the Convention; thus,
Article 6 provides for the right to a fair trial and Article 13
(Right to an effective remedy) states that “[e]veryone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law”.
45.
45.1. Finally, and worth underlining,
Islam underlines the obligations for Muslims to follow the laws
of the land where they happen to reside. Thus, the Qu’ran states
clearly: “O you who believe, fulfil your obligations.”
6. Conclusions
and proposals
46. Countering terrorist narratives
is a complicated task with no clear, easy solution. While reactive
counter-narratives have a role to play, it is even more necessary
to develop credible community-based, positive, proactive alternative
narratives, promoting shared values and facilitating conversation,
encouraging awareness and dispelling misinformation. Such alternative
or counter-narratives must be flexible, tailored and spontaneous
in order to appeal to a wide range of target audiences in a wide
range of situations, both online and offline. Through international
co-operation we should work towards building a collection of best
practice and effective counter-narrative case studies, evaluating
each member State’s efforts and better co-ordinating counter-narrative
approaches. The reasons why violent extremist narratives can be
appealing must also be addressed through the development of a shared
understanding of the radicalisation process, since narratives cannot
exist in a vacuum.
47. Hitherto, the “counter-narrative” approach has sometimes proved
problematic when purely politicised, securitised and rooted purely
in simplistic nationalistic traditions, I believe that there are
significant opportunities in this space for the promotion of religiously
and theologically focused alternative readings of the world, in
particular focusing on the “overlapping consensus” between Islamic
religious perspectives and Convention values. We should look into
defining messages based on what unites us, not on what divides us. In
the draft resolution, I propose to ask member States to explore
and promote the concept of “shared ideals” and the overlapping consensus
between traditions, examining the ways in which Convention values
overlap with Islamic values to create positive alternatives narratives,
emphasising universalism, the right to life, liberty and security,
the fundamental freedoms of plural societies and justice.
48. The ongoing preparation of a Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism
Strategy for the period 2018-2022 is very much to be welcomed and
provides an opportunity for the Organisation to take a more proactive
and prominent role in the definition of common responses for countering
terrorist narratives. The draft recommendation therefore asks the
Committee of Ministers to carry out an in-depth study of the actual experience
of member States in developing counter-narratives to terrorism and
on their impact. Based on the latter, the Council of Europe should
define guidelines on devising narratives and messages countering
terrorist propaganda, taking into account the need for such narratives
to be based on factual information.
49. One should not underestimate the importance of the communication
issue in the fight against terrorism since, as was rightly underlined
in a recently published study by the European Parliament, terrorism
is, fundamentally, communication; “Acts of terror themselves are
propaganda by the deed.”
Strategic communications
are by essence a necessity in all efforts to counter terrorism.