1. Introduction,
aim and scope of this report
1. Our shared values – human rights,
democracy, and the rule of law – are not for sale. However, they
are increasingly relevant in the context of global trade. As noted
in the motion for a resolution (
Doc. 15144) tabled by the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, we see a wave of new generation trade agreements
which increasingly “govern and establish norms of behaviour within
and between States” while at the same time the multilateral trading
system embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO) is being weakened.
2. We are witnessing a sustained increase in both the volume
and the geo-political significance of trade and investment agreements
(TIAs).
2021 saw the highest ever number of notifications
to the WTO of new agreements in force. This is in line with a consistent
cumulative year on year increase in agreements in force since 2006.
We have also seen, since 1992, a
sustained increase in the number of multilateral/regional trade agreements.
The cumulative effect of
these developments is that a greater volume of global trade takes
place subject to the provisions of TIA than ever before.
3. The Parliamentary Assembly first raised this matter in relation
to social rights, public health and sustainable development,
as well as with regard to arbitration
between States and investors.
It expressed concern that such
trade and investment protection agreements would grant “new powers
for transnational companies to use arbitration courts … to sue member
States for laws they pass that could impede future profits.”
Moreover, the Assembly
saw a lack of transparency and public or parliamentary scrutiny
in the process of negotiations over such agreements and feared unfair
distribution of any economic gains from those agreements. It considered
that “the new generation trade agreements should be designed to
promote environmental sustainability, human rights and the rule
of democratic law, and to facilitate the mutual benefits of trade.”
4. As rapporteur I believe that it is time for this Assembly
to assess if the earlier concerns expressed over the protection
of our shared values have been duly considered by the member States.
This report therefore seeks to take stock of recent developments
in the domain of TIAs, in particular in terms of democratic scrutiny over
“the setting of the negotiating mandate, the conduct of negotiations,
and the conclusion of [such] agreements”.
The report also considers how the
Council of Europe’s core values are promoted through those agreements
and how essential rights are upheld in terms of sustainable development,
public health and environmental and food standards. It seeks to
establish whether such agreements actually support implementation
of the Paris Agreement on climate change and the UN Sustainable
Development Agenda 2030. There may be shared interest agendas the
international community can pursue through trade across democracies
and autocracies, in particular to mitigate climate change collectively.
5. Finally, this report considers how “old generation” trade
agreements should be interpreted and adapted in the new light of
imperatives to promote sustainable development and shared values.
In particular, as trade accounts for 25% of greenhouse gas emissions
and
has an influence over the relative economic power of democracies
and autocracies, the rules of conducting trade have an enduring
impact on our environment and shared values. As trade can be influenced
by war, unilateral measures, economic sanctions, and other geopolitical
phenomena, it is not a value-free economic activity. Trade rules
therefore need to be considered in terms of their impact on our
values and shared environment – beyond the interests of particular
industries or economies. Indeed, as one participant stressed at
the WTO’s Public Forum 2022,
“trade
should be governed by rules, not power” and no single country can
solve any big problem alone.
6. In the light of the above remarks, the report focuses on three
areas: (1) Democratising TIAs through the exploration of domestic
and international best practice in order to identify recommendations
for easing the tensions between TIAs and democratic governance;
(2) Promoting Council of Europe core values through TIAs – consideration
of practical proposals to safeguard democracy, human rights and
the rule of law through TIAs, based on existing best practice and
proposals from academic and policy-development literature; (3) Reinforcing
policy coherence and action to support sustainable development in
the light of the global climate treaties and Sustainable Development
Goals.
2. Two “generations” of trade and investment
agreements
7. The development of TIAs since
the Second World War can be broadly described in two “generations”.
The
first generation emerged following the collapse of European colonial
empires. Newly free States needed to attract investment from oversees
(“foreign direct investment”). Investors, however, were wary of
doing business in such States due to concerns around political instability
and the independence of local courts. Newly free States consequently
signed trade agreements with their former colonisers. These agreements
conferred various trade privileges (generally focused on market
access and tariffs for goods) while also guaranteeing the property
rights of investors and creating the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) mechanism. ISDS allows investors to settle disputes with
host States in an independent international tribunal; however, there
have been growing concerns about the transparency, the consistency
of decisions and the high cost of such arbitration. While opinion
is divided about the desirability of such first-generation agreements,
with some experts suggesting that these were merely a continuation
of a form of colonialism by other means, they appear to have had
some effect in encouraging foreign direct investments.
8. The second generation of TIAs emerged from the early 1990s.
Second generation agreements are distinct from first generation
agreements in three principal ways:
- Second generation agreements encompass a far broader range
of policy areas: in addition to tariffs and investment, they often
cover intellectual property, sanitary and phytosanitary provisions,
technical barriers to trade, subsidies, trade in services, visas,
recognition of professional qualifications, domestic regulation,
telecommunications and electronic commerce, competition, and procurement.
- Investment protection provisions in second generation
agreements are often given a far broader reading. They go beyond
merely protecting private property and give investors rights beyond
those enjoyed by citizens. This can allow investors to, in effect,
veto public policy (even when it has popular support), for example,
by forcing a State to withdraw fuel safety regulations, or by requiring a State to pay substantial
sums because a policy change may impinge on expected future profits (such as with the phasing out of
nuclear power prompted by the Fukushima accident) or to roll back
measures protecting the environment and outstanding landscapes.
- Many trade agreements create committees of officials to
oversee the functioning of the agreement. These committees often
have substantial powers to change certain parts of the agreement
but are wholly unaccountable despite exercising powers that may
influence legislation.
9. Although some international treaties do not resemble TIAs
at first sight, they may have a major influence on public policies
through ISDS mechanisms. One such treaty is the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) crafted in the mid-1990s with a noble goal of supporting multilateral
co-operation on energy issues; it was later instrumentalised by
some fossil fuel companies to sue States and claim exorbitant compensations
in reaction to climate-friendly policy turns. According to the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, “17% of all investor–state
disputes from fossil fuel investors have been brought under the
ECT – more than under any other international investment agreement”.
Although recent negotiations to modernise the treaty promised substantive
improvements, the proposed changes announced in June 2022 still
leave extensive protection for existing fossil fuel investments
through the so-called sunset clauses in some 20 contracting parties
(including the EU and the United Kingdom), mainly aiming to eliminate
intra-EU litigation, with still much legal uncertainty for both
governments and investors.
10. During the hearing held on 2 December 2022, our committee
members had the possibility to discuss ECT-related challenges with
Guy Lentz, ECT Secretary General, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, MEP (Renew Europe,
France), and Catherine Banet, Head of the Energy and Resources Law
Department, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, University of
Oslo (Norway). The discussion demonstrated how complex the situation is
and how difficult it is to reform the existing treaty. In short,
the ECT reform is uniquely challenging for two main reasons: first,
the treaty contains a 20-year sunset clause, and second, this treaty
is a multilateral one with a rigid amendment procedure, which entrenches
the
status quo situation.
A co-ordinated departure
of EU countries from the treaty does not seem to be an option due
to the opposition of some countries.
11. In this context, we should recall that, at the request of
Belgium in 2017, the EU seeks to establish a Multilateral Investment
Court and has already replaced the ISDS mechanism with bilateral
investment court systems in its recently negotiated international
investment agreements, such as those with Canada, Mexico, Singapore,
and Vietnam. Those agreements also provide for the gradual transition
from the bilateral investment court systems to a permanent Multilateral
Investment Court in due course.
The European Parliament in turn
has called for the European Union and its member States not to sign
or ratify any investment protection treaties that include the ISDS
mechanism. Moreover, recent EU case law (notably the Komstroy case)
has established that ISDS provisions under the ECT are not applicable
in the case of intra-EU disputes. However, private arbitration tribunals
are not bound to accept this argument as a procedural objection.
3. The
multiple layers of the global trade system
12. Global exchanges of goods,
services and capital across borders are generally framed by trade agreements
at multiple levels: bilateral (between two States), regional (between
several trading partners, such as NAFTA or North American Free Trade
Agreement covering Canada, the USA and Mexico; APEC or Asia-Pacific
Economic Co-operation trade agreement with 21 countries; and the
EU's framework agreements with trading partners) and multilateral
(driven by the WTO since 1995 and the GATT
between
1948 and 1994).
13. It is important to understand this multilayered architecture
of agreements so as to concentrate political efforts on advancing
the values we defend on a broadest possible scale. Indeed, the application
of values, standards and policies may occur through multilateral,
regional and bilateral trade settings, as well as through unilateral
measures. These trade facilitation agreements may be used in concert
and dynamically to encourage improvement and compliance. As it were,
the “public morality” provision under the GATT agreement provides some
basis for the evolution of interpretations concerning the values
of human rights, the rule of law and democracy in a multilateral
context. Moreover, the “new generation” of EU’s trade agreements
systematically includes sustainable development chapters.
14. The multilateral rules-based system supported by the WTO is
the most inclusive and balanced mechanism on a global scale. It
gives considerable weight to small countries, especially when it
comes to defending their interests versus big players by activating
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement mechanism and ultimately triggering
corrective measures. However, this Dispute Settlement is currently
blocked since 11 December 2019 because its Appellate Body can no
longer deliver binding decisions on interstate trade disputes. Pending
a solution to this situation, the EU and other WTO members put in
place a multiparty interim appeal arbitration arrangement; they
continue to work together on the reform of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism
to enhance its effectiveness.
15. The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)
is
a leading example of unilateralism enforcing domestic environmental
standards at the border by imposing CBAM certificates to be bought
by importers of carbon-intensive products.
It helps accelerate
transition to cleaner domestic production while rendering imports
of “dirty” goods and the relocation of production to countries with
low environmental standards less attractive. While being fully compatible
with the international trade rules, CBAM encourages EU’s trading
partners to enhance their climate-friendly ambitions and could serve
as a basis for retrofitting the “old generation” trade agreements.
CBAM also suggests that at-border adjustments may be possible to
support not only environmental but also social values and labour
rights. Moreover, EU’s leadership on due diligence requirements
promotes supply chains that are human rights compliant and ensure
environmental sustainability.
16. Furthermore, as highlighted during the WTO Public Forum 2022,
a sub-set of WTO countries is currently discussing an investment
facilitation mechanism in order to overcome problems linked to the
investment protection provisions and their often brutal enforcement
through the ISDS system. This is a so-called Joint Statement Initiative
(JSI), aiming to ease regulatory red-tape and streamline administrative
procedures around investment, together with more coherent and more
transparent domestic framework for attracting foreign direct investment.
Talks on the JSI expressly exclude dispute settlement, market access
and investment protection issues. When concluded, the JSI proposal
could potentially reduce tensions around ISDS clauses in international
investment agreements by promoting the prevention of disputes, notably
around State policies for more sustainable investment, and greater
co-operation between developed and developing countries towards the
latter’s capacity-building.
4. Impacts
on democracy: challenges and opportunities
17. Most TIAs are not subject to
the same level of scrutiny as domestic legislation, yet they can
have similar impacts. They can allow private individuals and enterprises
to influence public policy by exercising special rights denied to
citizens (as mentioned above). Even when investors choose not to
enforce their rights through the ISDS route, the mere possibility
of such action can discourage governments from pursuing popular
policies (several States, for example, delayed or shelved bans on
tobacco advertising after the
Phillip
Morris v. Uruguay case).
18. TIAs can also force legislatures to change the law. Where
the executive branch agrees an international treaty which is incompatible
with domestic law, legislatures (in practice) have little choice
but to change domestic law accordingly.
Moreover,
the committees of officials created by various TIAs are able to
influence various areas of public policy to ensure that they cohere
with the parent agreement.
19. TIAs are not, however, subject to a level of scrutiny commensurate
with their impact. Foreign affairs are generally the preserve of
the executive branch of government. This means that ministers and
officials enjoy significant latitude in the negotiating and agreeing
of such treaties. They can, in effect, commit their States to substantial
limitations for decades to come given that many TIAs have provisions
that bind for 20 years (such as with the ECT), well beyond an ordinary
electoral cycle and even after a State leaves the treaty. Some States and
entities like the EU require confirmation from the legislature before
a treaty can be ratified, but this is not always the case (in the
UK, for example, a TIA can be ratified without a vote in parliament).
20. A number of States and organisations permit scrutiny of proposed
TIA immediately prior to ratification. While the principle “some
scrutiny is better than none” undoubtedly holds, pre-ratification
scrutiny is of limited utility because the agreement in question
has already been substantially determined between the negotiation teams.
The agreement is, in practice, often a fait
accompli. Scrutiny is only meaningful where there is
a real prospect that it will lead to changes in an agreement. There
are, therefore, three key stages at which scrutiny is required:
(a) scoping/mandate where the parties determine what policy areas
are to be (potentially) included in the agreement and their objectives;
(b) negotiations – scrutiny should determine where the parties stand
in relation to the original objectives and whether new proposals
(that is to say not considered during scoping) are included; (c)
pre-ratification. The EU is a world leader in making provisions
for scrutiny at each of these key stages, but many States lag behind.
21. While TIAs have a number of problematic aspects from a democratic
and rights perspective, they also offer important opportunities.
These agreements increasingly transcend both international and domestic
norms and (for at least some of their provisions) contain robust
and effective enforcement mechanisms. TIAs therefore contain the
potential to become an effective tool for the enhancement of democratic
norms and human rights, including social rights.
5. Safeguarding
core values and rights through trade
22. As briefly pointed out above,
promotion and protection of core values and standards in international
trade may occur universally, first and foremost at multilateral
level via the WTO, or at regional level through bilateral or unilateral
measures of large countries (such as the US, China) or country alliances
(such as the EU), notably through the inclusion of specific chapters
or provisions in TIAs.
23. On a multilateral level, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards
sets out some basic rules and enables
the use of safeguard measures by WTO member countries. “Safeguards”
here mean emergency action to protect the domestic market via a
temporary import restriction (for example, a quota or a tariff increase)
that a country can impose on a product if such imports have caused
or may cause serious injury to the importing country's industry.
Normally, safeguards should not last for more than four years; in
practice, they can be extended for up to eight years if deemed necessary.
Developing countries may keep safeguards in place for up to ten
years. However, safeguard actions lasting more than three years
require a compensation in the form of substantially equivalent trade
concessions.
24. A flexible interpretation of safeguards could also be used
for protecting virtuous domestic economic activity against imports
of goods that are produced without sufficient respect of basic standards.
In social terms, international labour treaties (notably conventions
of the International Labour Organization (ILO)) set essential benchmarks
for ensuring social and economic value, boosting productivity, business
resilience and adaptability while protecting basic labour rights
and ensuring a social protection floor. In addition, Article XX
of the GATT allows for general exceptions and the adoption of trade
restrictive measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health”. This provision permits the adoption of legislative
measures aiming to ensure socially and environmentally fair trade.
25. However, differing standards and the race to the bottom for
competitiveness reasons often render theoretical standards difficult
to enforce across borders. This is precisely where unilateral measures
and trade safeguards can come into play to compel lax countries
to improve the implementation of basic social standards under pressure
from more virtuous trading partners. I would highlight the need
to seek to eliminate harmful child labour and forced labour, ensure
implementation of minimum standards for health and safety at work
and help raise subsistence levels above the national poverty rate.
In this context, the EU leadership on due diligence could pave the
way for socially and environmentally cleaner, more human-rights-compliant
supply chains worldwide.
26. Friend-shoring may also be a way for advanced democracies
to promote and consolidate values through trade agreements. For
example, the EU-New Zealand trade deal has extensive environmental
and social compliance built in, including the protection of rights
of indigenous people. Old trade agreements can be retrofitted with
upgrades where mutual consent of parties exists: this is a major
area for future action. Thus, the UK could be encouraged to update
its trade agreement with New Zealand based on the more progressive
EU’s approach.
27. At the same time, I must caution against any ratcheting down
of environmental, health and social standards in negotiating new
trade agreements, especially when there is little, if any, democratic
scrutiny, accountability, and transparency. The EU countries and
the US seem to have greater democratic scrutiny and accountability
at key stages of trade negotiations than many others, including
my own country, the UK. In particular, the emergence of “freeports”
in the UK should not be allowed to undercut level playing field economically,
socially, and environmentally, or in terms of public health.
6. Reinforcing
policy coherence in favour of sustainable development: towards environmentally
sound and socially fair development of trade policies
28. As the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) studies show, trade and environment
are closely linked through economic growth which can put unsustainable
pressure on natural resources, generate pollution, and increase
greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, more trade can support
economic development and social welfare, thus boosting capacity
to manage the environment more effectively through access to new
technologies that reduce the use of energy, water, and other resources
and diminish the release of harmful substances into the environment.
Moreover, trade policies and agreements may promote more stringent
environmental standards throughout increasingly integrated and interdependent
global supply chains. However, as environmental degradation and
climate change continue, trade will be disrupted through impacts
of extreme climatic events on maritime shipping and agriculture,
resource depletion and price hikes for manufacturing, lower productivity
of land, the spread of invasive species and zoonotic diseases, to mention
just a few consequences.
29. With this in mind, how should trade and connected policies
be adjusted? The OECD research argues that strong environmental
policies are both compatible with trade and beneficial for its expansion
if environmental goods and services are embraced and co-operation
is strengthened on the global scale. The OECD also considers that
trade can be a major driver of environmental sustainability through
a combination of regulatory pushes, public awareness and consumer
demand that support clean supply chains, waste treatment and recycling
to recover raw materials and energy resources. At the same time,
insufficient regulation in “pollution havens” may lead to a concentration
of environmentally harmful activities in hotspots away from public
scrutiny. Maximising the environmental benefits from trade and minimising
the risks require, according to the OECD, the inclusion of environmental
provisions in trade treaties, reduction of environmentally harmful subsidies
and the cutting of tariffs on “green” goods and services, as well
as policy coherence and targeted co-operation.
30. In late 2020, the WTO launched a “structured dialogue” on
environmental sustainability and trade for interested member countries
and other stakeholders. The WTO’s Ministerial Statement of 2021
foresees discussions on trade and climate change, trade facilitation
in environmental goods and services, the circular economy and sustainable
supply chains. These structured discussions, involving 46 member
States, could also pave the way towards a global agreement on environmental
goods (progress in this area has stalled since 2016).
The existing
WTO agreements already provide policy space for States to take measures
to protect the environment. However, the WTO estimates that such
measures should not be applied arbitrarily nor be “more restrictive
than necessary to meet the objective”.
31. Council of Europe member States still face litigation risks
before ad hoc tribunals as
parties to “old generation” international agreements on trade and
investment when accelerating their energy transition to clean energy
and implementing their commitments under the Paris Agreement, the
European Climate Law and the European Green Deal. Even moving away
from ISDS may not remove the risk of litigation before national courts.
That said, it is possible to invoke a normative conflict between
the treaty referred to in arbitration and the Paris Agreement –
granting priority to the Paris Agreement, considering the latter
as lex posterior that should
prevail. Moreover, environmental due diligence obligations that
are increasingly being applied across EU countries would strengthen
the commitment of large private sector companies to forward-looking
and environment-friendly ways of making business.
32. In a similar vein, we can see reasons for promoting European
social standards through international trade which is one of the
strongest instruments in the hands of European countries, especially
in their relations with developing countries. Whilst the Paris Agreement
sets the tone for national and international action against climate
change, the UN Sustainable Development Goals embraced by the international
community in the same year set the broader benchmarks for sustainable
development, including a very substantive social dimension.
33. The EU as a major trading block of countries has particular
powers. It introduced social conditionalities as early as 1995 with
trade sanctions against goods made with the use of forced labour
and prisoner labour. Later, a social incentives regime was promoted
through trade preferences and an increasing emphasis on the ILO
labour standards as part of human rights protection on a global
scale. In practice, however, first- and second-generation human
rights are not always upheld with the same vigour, as social standards
are protected in a softer manner than market policies.
34. The 2022 independent comparative study of free trade agreements
shows the increasing use of sustainable development provisions which
cover environmental and labour issues, corporate social responsibility,
gender and indigenous people’s rights. This is particularly true
of the EU’s trade agreements, and other Council of Europe member
States could follow the pattern. Switzerland deserves a special
mention in this context because it played a precursor role in the
drafting of specific provisions on social and environmental aspects
of trade under new or revised free trade agreements since 2010.
The study also shows that civil society participation plays an essential
role in the monitoring of implementation of free trade agreements
and stimulating domestic reforms that embed progressive standards
on labour, the environment and human rights. Overall, the search
for effective sustainable development provisions in trade treaties remains
a dynamic, learning-by-doing process.
7. Conclusions
and recommendations
35. It is clear that international
trade and investment activities do not operate in a bubble insulated
from other human activities. Occurring as they do on various levels,
they interact with values we cherish, rights we seek to protect
and the vast societal context we want to improve in terms of democratic,
socio-economic, and environmental set up. Trade arrangements evolve
with the society and its increased attention to sustainability issues
and human dignity. We should therefore welcome individual countries’
and trading blocks’ efforts to develop trade in ways that help support
progress in society through targeted co-operation, capacity building, increased
sensitivity to the cause of sustainable development and the scaling
up of commitments to preserve and improve our quality of life. All
stakeholders have a role to play, including national parliaments
and parliamentary assemblies such as ours.
36. Problems arise when commitments are not respected, standards
are lowered, or obligations disregarded. States are responsible
for the shaping of policies and their implementation, including
in trade matters. Trade and investment agreements are powerful tools
for advancing progress and should therefore be constantly adapted
to realities and priorities. As rapporteur, I believe that all new
treaties should contain strong provisions on sustainable development
and human rights in line with the Sustainable Development Goals,
and older treaties should be upgraded with new provisions to this
end. This effort should in particular include adding references
to widely agreed-upon international standards – such as those contained
in the ILO conventions regarding social and labour issues, in the
Paris Agreement regarding international climate goals and in other relevant
international environmental law conventions.
37. We also face some unexpected legal complications when it comes
to the modernisation of certain treaties (such as the ECT) whose
sunset clauses or narrow interpretation by private arbitration tribunals
(in the framework of the ISDS mechanism) expose States to expensive
litigation, the lowering of standards (for protecting public health
and the environment) and even policy reversals under pressure from
influential enterprises. States should show more unity in demanding
changes to these treaties or by agreeing on their new interpretation,
by setting up alternative mechanisms for dispute settlement, such
as the EU’s proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court, and by
giving due consideration to the newest international treaties such
as the Paris Agreement.
38. Regarding the specific issues linked to the ECT, we encourage
States wanting to close the gap between the protection of investment
and the climate goals, to negotiate and conclude an
inter se modification agreement
on the sunset clause of the ECT.
This would help send
a clear message to other State Parties that such a long-lasting
sunset clause is incompatible with their commitments under the Paris
Agreement (paradoxically, the ECT’s Preamble refers to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change under the auspices of which the Paris
Agreement was signed). This is permitted by international law according
to Articles 41 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969) and in absence of specific provisions in the ECT. Thereby,
the sunset clause would be reduced or suppressed between State Parties
to the
inter se agreement
– but it would survive in its previous version (20 years) vis-à-vis
investors from other States. Despite such limitation, an
inter se modification agreement
should lead to a more socially and environmentally friendly interpretation
of the ECT by national courts and arbitrators, relying on its own
Preamble, its Article 19 and in line with other international conventions
(Paris Agreement, Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related
environmental aspects, etc.), and this pending a co-ordinated revision
or withdrawal from the ECT.
39. We should acknowledge that unilateral measures in international
trade (such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) may
be necessary for States to pursue their ambition of advancing more
rapidly towards sustainable and inclusive development. States should
continue to take advantage of all possibilities offered by international
trade and investments law to act unilaterally, including through
the adoption of measures under Article XX of GATT and the WTO Agreements
on Safeguards and on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. International forums, such as the International Carbon
Action Partnership,
should then aim at globalising these
virtuous developments and unilateral measures.
40. While this report has highlighted the need to mitigate the
risks posed by arbitration to enforce provisions for investment
protection based on TIAs, it is important to also note the opportunities
they present. Although those provisions can be problematic when
narrowly applied, they are highly effective in protecting the interests of
investors. Their enforcement mechanism could be taken as a model
for ensuring in the same way the honouring of provisions dealing
with the environment, labour, and fundamental rights. In this way,
we may draw lessons for the stronger protection of democratic decision
making and Council of Europe values.
41. Finally, due diligence requirements should be promoted and
enforced worldwide. Such requirements, paired with reporting obligations
for companies, are key to enabling public and NGOs scrutiny. Cases
on the basis of violation of due diligence and reporting obligations
have been multiplying lately
and
seem to be an effective tool for holding companies accountable and
aligned with their social and environmental care duties. Purely
economic trade agreements do not automatically promote human rights,
democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development. Purely economic
trade agreements do not automatically promote human rights, democracy,
the rule of law and sustainable development. Therefore, due diligence
in supply chains, reflecting the importance of these values, should
be built into TIAs. We also need to ensure that the technical negotiations
factor this in through democratic engagement so as to ensure that
the public has a voice and can influence change to promote our values
through trade more widely.