1. Introduction
1. Following a current affairs
debate on: “Addressing the humanitarian consequences of the blockade
of the Lachin corridor” held by the Parliamentary Assembly on 26
January 2023, the Bureau decided on 27 January 2023 to seize the
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons for a report
on the same topic. The committee appointed me as rapporteur on 15
March 2023 and authorised me on 27 April 2023 to carry out a fact-finding
mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
2. During its meeting of 11 May, following my request, the committee
agreed to change the title of the report as “Ensuring free and safe
access through the Lachin Corridor” and decided to ask the Bureau
of the Assembly to hold an urgent debate on this issue during the
June 2023 part-session.
3. On 31 March 2023, a request for a mission to both Armenia
and Azerbaijan was sent to the respective heads of delegations.
As my intention was from the outset to hear and witness all viewpoints
in order to produce a fair, accurate and honest report, and to report
quickly given the tense situation, it was important that I could travel
to both countries and in particular get first-hand information on
the freedom and safety to access and to move along the Lachin corridor.
I visited Armenia from 30 May to 2 June 2023. I was unable to go
to Azerbaijan and hold discussions with interlocutors there because
I did not receive an invitation to travel to that country. The furthest
I could go near the Lachin corridor was on the Armenian side, just
above the new road which was built from Kornidzor, from where I
was able to see the check-point erected by Azerbaijan on 23 April
2023.
4. The situation has escalated very recently and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to suspend medical transfers
to Armenia through the Lachin corridor because of increased tensions
at the border reported by Armenia.
2. General context
5. After a war which took thousands
of lives and caused many tragic human situations, not least the displacement
of thousands of persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan between 1991 and
1993, both countries – when they applied to join the Council of
Europe – committed themselves to settle the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh
through peaceful means.
6. In 2020, a new outbreak of war was ended by a ceasefire agreement
signed on 9 November 2020 by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan
and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, referred
to as the Trilateral Statement.
7. Following the 2020 war, and pursuant to the terms of the Trilateral
Statement, the Kalbajar and the Lachin districts, which had been
under Armenian control since 1993, were returned to Azerbaijan.
The return of these districts necessitated the clear establishment
of the exact delimitation of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
It also resulted in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh no longer having
direct contact with an area under the control of the Armenian military,
requiring specific provisions on access through the Lachin corridor. This
was the object of specific provisions in section 6 of the Trilateral
Statement:
“The Republic of Armenia
shall return the Kalbajar district to the Republic of Azerbaijan
by November 15, 2020, and the Lachin District by December 1, 2020.
The Lachin Corridor (5 km wide), which will provide a connection
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia while not passing through the
territory of Shusha, shall remain under the control of the Russian
Federation peacemaking forces.
As agreed by the Parties, within
the next three years, a plan will be outlined for the construction
of a new route via the Lachin Corridor, to provide a connection
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and the Russian peacemaking
forces shall be subsequently relocated to protect the route.
The Republic of Azerbaijan
shall guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving
along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.”
8. On 12 December 2022, passage through the only road still linking
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia after the 2020 44-day war – the Lachin
corridor – was impeded by certain persons, presented by themselves
and the Azerbaijani authorities as “eco-activists”.
To this day, the fact that
the flow of goods and persons, as well as energy supplies between
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, is interrupted, is disputed by Azerbaijan.
9. On 21 December 2022, the European Court of Human Rights decided
to indicate interim measures in respect of the Lachin Corridor.
Noting that the extent to which Azerbaijan was “currently in control
of the situation in the “Lachin Corridor” was disputed and unclear
at this stage, noting in addition the obligation of Azerbaijan under
Article 6 of the Trilateral Statement mentioned above, the Court
decided “to indicate to the Government of Azerbaijan […] to take
all measures that are within their jurisdiction to ensure safe passage through
the “Lachin Corridor” of seriously ill persons in need of medical
treatment in Armenia and others who were stranded on the road without
shelter or means of subsistence”.
10. In an Order of 22 February 2023, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) concluded that Azerbaijan shall, in accordance “with
its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, take all measures at its
disposal to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo
along the Lachin Corridor in both directions”.
11. Both Courts rejected the mirror applications brough by Azerbaijan
against Amenia.
12. Following a letter of 13 December 2022 addressed to the President
of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Armenia
to the United Nations, the Security Council held a meeting on 20 December
2022 with the participation of Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General
for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, Departments of Political
and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.
The latter stated that “[d]espite
a “glimmer of hope” regarding diplomatic efforts by Armenia and
Azerbaijan towards a resolution of their ongoing dispute, a current
escalation of tension and incidents threatens to derail fragile progress
and unleash a dangerous resumption of violence”.
13. In the Council of Europe, the Chair of the Committee of Ministers
called for the reopening of the Lachin corridor in a Declaration
of 19 January 2023.
In addition to the current affairs
debate held during the January 2023 part-session, the Assembly also
reacted through three of its committees. On 16 December 2022, the
four co-rapporteurs for the monitoring of Azerbaijan and Armenia
declared in a joint statement that they were deeply concerned by
the interruption of freedom of movement in the Lachin corridor,
causing considerable hardship to the population”, adding that “[f]reedom
and security of movement of persons and goods must be urgently restored
along the corridor” and [calling] on all parties to the Trilateral
Statement of 9-10 November 2020 to immediately take the necessary
measures”.
They renewed their call for the
restoration of freedom of movement along the Lachin corridor in
a joint statement dated 26 April 2023.
Following a visit to Armenia from
17 to 19 February 2023, the co-rapporteurs of the monitoring in
Armenia shared their findings in a declassified information note,
which assessed that based on their observations, movement along
the corridor was “severely obstructed”. They urged the Azerbaijani
authorities to “authorise an independent fact-finding visit and
to allow independent journalists to operate freely in the whole
area.”
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights issued a statement on the obstruction of the Lachin Corridor
on 22 April 2023.
I myself, in my capacity as rapporteur
for this report, issued a statement on 24 April seeking access to
the Lachin corridor to see the situation on the ground at first-hand.
Unfortunately, I did not succeed
in achieving such access.
14. In its Resolution of 18 January 2023 on “the implementation
of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022”,
the European Parliament “strongly [denounced] Azerbaijan’s illegal
blockade of the Lachin corridor, in violation of the trilateral
statement of 9 November 2020, as it threatens to precipitate an intentional
humanitarian crisis for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh; [demanded]
that the Azerbaijani authorities restore freedom of movement through
the Lachin corridor with immediate effect; [recalled] that only
diplomatic means will bring a just and lasting response to the conflict
that will benefit the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan”.
Furthermore, in its Resolution on
“Humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh”
of 19 January 2023, the European Parliament “[deplored] the tragic
humanitarian consequences of the blockade of the Lachin corridor
and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; [urged] Azerbaijan to respect
and implement the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and immediately
reopen the Lachin corridor to enable free movement and ensure access
to essential goods and services, thus guaranteeing security in the
region and safeguarding residents’ livelihoods; [underlined] the
need for a comprehensive peace agreement, which must guarantee the
rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population; [called]
on Azerbaijan to protect the rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh
and refrain from its inflammatory rhetoric that calls for discrimination
against Armenians and urges Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh;
[urged] Azerbaijan to refrain from undermining the functioning of
transport, energy and communication connections between Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh in future”.
15. Negotiations are ongoing between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with
the help of separate mediation efforts by the European Union, the
United States, and the Russian Federation. Charles Michel, President
of the European Council, has hosted multiple sets of talks between
President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan, notably in Brussels
on 14 May 2023, where the leaders agreed to the resumption of bilateral
meetings on border issues.
French President Macron and German
Chancellor Scholz joined talks in the margins of the second summit
of the European Political Community on 1 June 2023.
Further negotiations have been planned,
including in Brussels on 21 July 2023 and in the margins of the
next meeting of the European Political Community in Spain on 5 October
2023.
Antony
Blinken, the US Secretary of State, has hosted negotiations between
the leaders,
as well as between the states’ foreign
ministers, where terms have been agreed to in principle.
A meeting of both leaders with President
Putin of the Russian Federation was held in Moscow on 25 May 2023.
16. Both President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan have declared
their recognition of each other’s country’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty, by confirming their commitment to the Charter of
the United Nations and the 1991 Almaty Declaration, in the margins
of the first European Political Community summit in Prague on 6
October 2022.
Under the terms of the 1991 Declaration,
the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia agreed to
recognise and respect each other’s territorial integrity and the
inviolability of existing borders.
3. Azerbaijan’s position
17. In the absence of an invitation
to visit Azerbaijan and meet with relevant interlocutors there,
the information on Azerbaijan’s position on the matter below is
drawn – unless explicitly stated otherwise – from a letter from
Samad Seyidov, head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Assembly,
addressed to me in response to a questionnaire I had previously
sent him, and dated 24 May 2023.
It should be noted
that in order to remain consistent with the wording of the Trilateral
Statement, I use the term “Lachin corridor” below, while the letter
speaks about the “Lachin road”. While not strictly verbatim, the
information below is identical to that provided in the letter.
Situation at the border
18. The Trilateral Statement of
10 November 2020 signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation
and Armenia envisaged a 5 km-wide “Lachin Corridor” for the movement
of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions between Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Russian peacekeeping contingent
is temporarily deployed. The latter is in charge of organising the
movement of citizens, goods and vehicles along the Lachin road,
while Azerbaijan guarantees their security moving along the road.
19. The letter indicates that Azerbaijan has not put any restrictions
on the traffic along the Lachin road. The regime for the movement
continues to be the same as before. There have been no impediments
for local residents both individually or accompanied by the Russian
peacekeepers or ICRC to cross the border. Humanitarian cargo continues
to pass without hindrance.
20. The letter specifies that the Trilateral Statement does not
envisage the extra-territoriality of the Lachin corridor. The 5
km-wide area remains a part of the sovereign part of Azerbaijan,
like the other areas where the peacekeeping contingent is temporarily
deployed. It does not envisage either the non-controlled entry and
exit of persons, vehicle and cargo to and from Armenia and nothing
in the document can be construed or interpreted as preventing Azerbaijan
from exercising its sovereign right to control of movement of persons, vehicles
and cargo along the Lachin corridor.
21. The letter states that since the signing of the Trilateral
Statement, the Lachin road has been used for illegal military purposes,
including the rotation of military personnel, the transfer of weapons
and ammunition, as well as landmines produced in Armenia in 2021.
Azerbaijan has been calling for order and transparency over the
movement across the Lachin corridor.
22. Protests of Azerbaijani civil society activists took place
from 12 December 2022 to 28 April 2023 along the Lachin corridor.
23. With the establishment of a border crossing point at the starting
point of the Lachin corridor on the border between Azerbaijan and
Armenia on 23 April 2023, with appropriate border and customs procedures, Azerbaijan
has ensured transparency over the movement along the road, the rule
of law, security and safety. As a result, the movement of persons,
vehicles and cargo is predictable and regulated in both directions.
24. Those crossing the border are required to present appropriate
identification documents. The inhabitants of the region are considered
as Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin.
25. The border crossing checkpoint has been equipped with X-ray
and other modern technologies in order to facilitate the quick inspection
and fast movement through the road.
26. The letter indicates that Azerbaijan monitors the situation
on the ground and will use all measures at its disposal to fend
off any further security threats related to the movement along the
Lachin corridor. Any attempt to abuse the Lachin corridor for purposes
inconsistent with the Trilateral Statement will be thwarted accordingly.
Statistics
27. Between 12 December 2022 and
24 May 2023, a total of 2 000 persons have crossed the Lachin corridor in
both directions with the assistance of ICRC. Nearly 9 000 have passed
through the road, including those transporting humanitarian goods
and ICRC convoys, which means almost 100 a day.
28. In total, 1 266 medical evacuations were carried out with
the assistance of ICRC (486 patients and their 290 relatives to
Armenia and 308 patients and their 182 relatives from Armenia).
In addition, 714 persons benefited from family reunification in
both directions (336 persons travelled to Armenia while 378 returned
from Armenia). The ICRC facilitated passage has continued after
the establishment of the border checkpoint, with the passage of
113 patients and their 56 relatives to Armenia and 84 patients and
their 54 relatives. Between 28 April and 7 June 2023, a total of
169 persons were medically evacuated to Armenia in 63 vehicles,
while 138 returned in 62 vehicles. No request for passage by the
ICRC has been rejected.
29. Between 10 and 16 April 2023, 430 tons of flour were transported
by the ICRC from Armenia to Khankendi/Stepanakert.
Energy supplies
30. The letter states that there
have been no gas and electricity interruptions. The ICJ rejected
Armenia’s request to grant a provisional measure to “immediately
fully restore and refrain from disrupting or impeding the provision
of natural gas and other public utilities to Nagorno-Karabakh”.
31. The cases of temporary disruption of gas supply in the area
were due to technical failures or bad weather conditions. In some
cases, the Azerbaijani authorities have taken measures to fix the
problems with their own resources in order to ensure the provision
of gas without any disruptions.
The construction of the new alternative
road
32. Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of
the Trilateral Statement according to which “…within the next three
years, a plan will be outlined for the construction of a new route
via the Lachin Corridor, to provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia, and the Russian peace-making forces shall be subsequently
relocated to protect the route”, Azerbaijan implemented its obligation
by finalising the construction of a new alternative road bypassing
Lachin city. The road has been operational since August 2022.
33. This construction was carried out in dialogue between the
Azerbaijani authorities and the local Armenians without any impediment,
and without the involvement of the Russian peacekeepers. This testifies that
communication between the stakeholders is not only possible but
also useful, as it allows the Armenian population of the region
to benefit from the opportunities presented by Azerbaijan’s large-scale
reconstruction and rehabilitation works in the region.
34. Upon the construction of the new road, the city of Lachin
and the Zabukh and Sus villages were returned under Azerbaijan’s
control pursuant to the Trilateral Statement. This will enable and
accelerate the return of tens of thousands of displaced Azerbaijanis
from these territories.
35. Because Armenia delayed the construction of the new road on
its territory, Azerbaijan constructed a 4,7 km temporary road to
respond to the needs of the local inhabitants, who used it until
March 2023, when Armenia finalised the construction of the missing
road within its territory.
Implementation of the International
Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights’ interim decisions
36. The letter states that the
Lachin corridor is open and safe passage is guaranteed in accordance
with the Trilateral Statement. Since receiving the ICJ Order, Azerbaijan
has continued to take all measures at its disposal to ensure unimpeded
movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin corridor.
37. Azerbaijan is in regular contact with the ICRC to facilitate
the humanitarian traffic along the Lachin corridor. Russian peacekeepers
are also involved in medical evacuations of seriously ill persons.
38. After the establishment of the border checkpoint, the eco-activist
civil protestors followed the advice of the Azerbaijani authorities
and suspended their civil action at the Lachin corridor on 28 April
2023.
39. As a result, the border crossing checkpoint has been effective
in preventing the illegal entrance and use of the Lachin corridor
for the purposes other than envisaged in the Trilateral Statement.
It thus prevented the passage of military personnel and cargo (except
those for the needs of the peacekeeping contingent), the movement
of terrorists and illegal migrants, the illegal entrance of nationals
of third countries and stateless persons, the trafficking in arms,
drugs, and other dangerous and hazardous materials, and the use
of the road for illicit trafficking of natural resources and cultural
property.
Return of internally displaced
people
40. The letter states that sustaining
peace, rehabilitation and reconstruction and the return of the IDPs
are absolute priorities for the Government of Azerbaijan. Large-scale
constructions and new infrastructure activities are underway. A
major obstacle to these efforts is the mine contamination of the
territories which passed from Armenian to Azerbaijani control. More
than 300 persons, mainly civilians, have fallen victim to Armenian
mines, some of them smuggled and planted by Armenia after November
2020.
41. Azerbaijan is cooperating with UN agencies in these efforts
of reconstruction.
42. On the occasion of Azerbaijan’s Independence Day, on 28 May
2023, a ceremony was held in the city of Lachin in the presence
of President Aliyev who presented house keys of the returnees.
43. Since 27 May 2023, on the eve of Azerbaijan’s Independence
Day, the first 20 families returned to the city of Lachin. Some
4 000 persons are expected to move to Lachin in the near future.
A total 700 buildings were built in the last months, of which 620
individual residential buildings and 9 apartment buildings with
a total of 144 apartments. A school will be ready for the next school
year and a medical centre will be built. More than 1 100 jobs will
be created. Lachin has become one of the most beautiful cities in
the world.
Fact-finding mission
44. The letter states that the
main obstacle for the movement of civilians along the Lachin corridor,
as well as passing through the border control checkpoint, is the
intentional and consistent refusal of Armenia to co-operate to this
end and pressure on the civilians to avoid using them.
45. Armenia’s objective is to jeopardise the reintegration initiatives
of Azerbaijan, regardless the on going post-conflict rehabilitation
and construction activities of its government, and thus, receive
international support for their campaign against Azerbaijan.
46. In this context, the exploitation of international organisations
by Armenia is of serious concern. Armenia speculates on the idea
of so-called “fact-finding” and other missions to substantiate its
propaganda campaign, evade from the implementation of its commitments,
and thus, undermine efforts for normalisation. Furthermore, the
dispatching of such a mission would be counter-productive in the
context of the direct negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
which have recently resumed at the highest political level.
47. The letter ends by asserting that Azerbaijan remains open
for constructive interaction and dialogue.
Azerbaijan position as expressed
by President Aliyev
48. In his speech delivered on
the occasion of Independence Day, President Aliyev spoke about the liberation
of [Azerbaijan’s] “native lands from the invaders” and highlighted
that “we – the owners of the land – have come here to build and
create”.
Armenians
are described as the “contemptible”, “loathsome” and “hated” enemy,
who were brought “to their knees and expelled from [Azerbaijani]
land”.
49. According to President Aliyev, the border checkpoint established
on 23 April 2023 “should be a lesson for the Armenians living in
the Karabakh region today”. Moreover, he added that “the Karabakh
region where Armenians live today is our ancestral and legitimate
land”. President Aliyev continued by saying that “there is only
one option left – to obey the laws of Azerbaijan, to be loyal and
normal citizen of Azerbaijan, throw the false state attributes in
the trash…”. Towards the end of his speech addressed to returnees,
President Aliyev also sent a message to his Armenian neighbours:
“Let them know that we can see Armenian villages from here. We can
see those villages, so they should not forget about that.
50. In his address, President Aliyev confirmed that the movement
along the Lachin corridor is under full control [of Azerbaijan].
4. My assessment of the situation on
the ground
51. I agree with President Aliyev
about Azerbaijan’s full control over the Lachin corridor. Indeed,
since 12 December 2022, first with the presence of persons describing
themselves (and also by the Azerbaijani authorities) as “eco-activists”,
and then with the establishment of a border checkpoint on 23 April
2023, the control established along the Lachin corridor has made
movement through it highly restricted and limited to only a small
category of persons, vehicles and goods through the mediation on
the ICRC and the Russian peacekeepers.
52. All the information presented in this report has been crossed-checked
with my Armenian and international interlocutors. I regret very
much that I was not invited to visit Azerbaijan, and I trust that
this lack of access to the Lachin corridor and lack of possibility
to discuss the issues directly with the Azerbaijani authorities
will not be used as a pretext for refuting or throwing doubt on
my findings, conclusions and recommendations.
53. Since 12 December 2022, extremely challenging living conditions,
notably regarding access to food, hygiene, healthcare, medicine
and education, have affected the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh
and for whom the Lachin corridor is the only possible route to Armenia.
This
includes a high number of children and elderly persons. A significant
number of Armenians living in the region who were in Armenia at
the time have been unable to return home. I have met a number of
them in Goris: they all hold onto the hope that family reunification
will eventually happen.
54. When the “eco-activists” appeared, they were perceived from
the outset as a threat by the Armenians living in the region. It
is difficult to say to what degree fear or overtly hostile behaviour
of the “eco-activists” prevented them from passing through the Lachin
Corridor, but I was told of two specific incidents where people trying
to return from Armenia to Stepanakert were harassed, and in, one
of them, prevented from doing so. The first incident occurred on
7 April 2023, where a group of women tried to return with the help
of the Russian peacekeepers, and were prevented from doing so, except
for four of them who became ill and fainted, and were then transported
to the Stepanakert hospital. The second incident concerned teenagers
returning from the junior Eurovision song contest held in Yerevan,
who were harassed on their way back. In both cases, these persons
were transported by the Russian peacekeepers.
55. With the establishment of the border checkpoint on 23 April,
the Lachin corridor has become one of the three border posts between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and is intended exclusively for the use
of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. Has any Armenian tried to
pass the checkpoint on her/his own and been rebuffed? It is difficult
to say, but fear is a crucial factor, in particular for men who
have all been involved in a way or another in the war, at least
as servicemen, and who are threatened to be prosecuted for terrorism,
sabotage and subversion.
A foreigner
with an Azerbaijani visa would not be able to pass through.
56. All supplies, be it energy, medical, food etc. were imported
from Armenia until 12 December 2022. These imports have become almost
impossible since then. Shortages have become part of daily life.
Azerbaijan’s offer to provide energy and other supplies from Azerbaijan
is not welcomed by the local population, who appear terrorised by
the idea of reintegration and of their possible future under the
Azerbaijani authorities. The Russian peacekeepers and the ICRC play
an essential role in transporting people and goods along the Lachin
corridor as free movement is impossible in practice.
57. I cannot ignore the frustration towards the international
community which was voiced during my mission. Armenians are worried
that they are not heard and that only force will end up prevailing,
with Azerbaijan getting rid of a large part of the local Armenian
population. I very much hope that this report will serve, among
other things, to highlight the very difficult humanitarian situation
the Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh have had to face since
12 December 2022. I will not dwell on the broader geopolitical issues
because this is not my mandate and because I want to target this
report to the concrete action the Council of Europe could take to contribute
to solving this situation.
The “eco-activists’
58. If I use inverted commas to
evoke the group of people who presented themselves as “eco-activists”
when they appeared on 12 December 2022, it is because I have received
sufficient information from different sources to put in question
their real intent. Their appearance at the Lachin corridor on 12
December seems to me to be a demonstration of an intention on the
part of Azerbaijan to create a hostile and uncomfortable situation
for the Armenian inhabitants of the region.
59. The most picturesque of these characters was the lady with
mink fur, speaking with a megaphone, who threw a dead dove in the
air.
Probably a subliminal sign of the
peace spirit that she brought with her.
60. Different Armenian governmental and non-governmental sources
have identified some 300 persons, including ex-military, youth,
“eco-tourists” from Brazil etc.
Some organisations funded by the
new state agency co-ordinating the work of NGOs established in 2021
also took part in the gatherings at the Lachin corridor. They disappeared
soon after the establishment of the checkpoint, presumably having
fulfilled their mission. I was informed that some of them recently
started demonstrating before the Presidential administration because
they were not sufficiently paid for their demonstration at the Lachin
corridor.
The role of the Russian peacekeepers
61. Under the 2020 Trilateral Statement,
a peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation was deployed
along the Lachin Corridor.
It consisted
of 1 960 servicemen with small arms, 90 armoured personnel carriers
and 380 units of automobile and special equipment.
The
peacekeeping contingent was to stay in place initially for five
years, with a possibility of further extensions.
The peacekeepers were responsible for
regulating traffic along the Lachin Corridor until the establishment
of a checkpoint by Azerbaijan on 23 April 2023.
In spite of the Russian peacekeeping
mission, there have been multiple reported violations of the ceasefire
agreement.
62. During the period when the ICRC had to suspend its operation
between 29 April and 16 May 2023, the peacekeepers continued to
transport ill patients towards Armenia and to bring Armenians from
Nagorno-Karabakh back from Armenia, including some of the persons
I met in Goris, who were, however, not allowed to return.
63. I have heard expressions of frustration regarding the Russian
peacekeepers, because of their inaction and inability to protect
the Armenians when confronted with angry “eco-activists” along the
Lachin corridor.
The role of the ICRC
64. Since December 2022, in its
role as a neutral humanitarian intermediary and in agreement with
all sides; the ICRC has transported over 400 patients through the
Lachin corridor and reunited separated families (nearly 600, including
230 minors). It has been delivering medicine, baby formula and food
supplies to health facilities and is also ensuring the continuity
of emergency health and ambulance services. Furthermore, the ICRC
has distributed food and hygiene parcels to several institutions
and individuals, and has delivered various seeds to assist with
farming in rural and semi-urban communities.
65. From 29 April to 16 May 2023, ICRC’s operations were suspended
until its operating procedures were agreed with the Azerbaijani
authorities. There have been no major obstacles to its activities
since then.
The role of the European Union
Mission in Armenia
66. On 23 January 2023, the Council
of the European Union agreed to establish an EU Mission in Armenia under
the Common Security and Defence Policy, with the objectives of “[contributing]
to stability in the border areas of Armenia, building confidence
on the ground, and ensuring an environment conducive to normalisation efforts
between Armenia and Azerbaijan supported by the EU.”
It is composed of up to 100 unarmed
staff, including experts and monitors, and has an initial mandate
of two years.
Being unarmed and limited in numbers,
their mandate is confined to observing and reporting on the situation
along Armenian borders with Azerbaijan,
and
they cannot intervene to prevent or respond to violations of the
ceasefire agreement. They are present only on the Armenian side
of the border and cannot observe developments on the Azerbaijani side.
Access to health care
67. The only way for persons who
require medical treatment that cannot be performed on the spot is
to be transported to Armenia by the ICRC or the Russian peacekeepers.
It is not possible to take one’s own car or public transport and
just go, as was the case before 12 December.
68. The number of cases requiring treatment outside the region
has significantly increased since then for several reasons: the
lack of medicines and medical equipment, the impossibility for specialists
to travel from Armenia or abroad to the region to carry out specifically
challenging operations and the disruption of electricity. Also,
local doctors have been unable to travel to Armenia or abroad to
further their education.
69. For these reasons also, all planned surgical operations have
had to be cancelled and only emergency ones are still being carried
out.
70. Because of the electricity disruption, hospitals are connected
to the grid for only 6 hours per day and have to use generators
for the rest of the time, requiring diesel or petrol. The local
hospital generator cannot cope with the strain when a blackout occurs,
and such blackouts occur three times a day for two hours at a minimum,
with no possibility to anticipate their timing. There have been
electricity cuts for up to 10 hours.
71. In the Medial Centre for Children, all planned surgical operations
have also been cancelled, and children needing surgery had to be
sent in Armenia. The queues of children requiring treatment for
serious illnesses has significantly increased in Armenia as the
specialists who were coming to treat them to Stepanakert are not allowed
to do so anymore. During the winter, I was told that it was impossible
to keep the hospital warm. Rolling blackouts were in place, and
all children had to be kept in one ward to keep them warm, regardless
of their illness. Adequate nutrition for children is a pressing
problem.
72. It has become extremely difficult to deal with chronic diseases
that require specialist care, while the acute forms of illness have
now to be transferred to Armenia. The shortage of paediatricians
and neurologists, who cannot visit from abroad, has become very
worrying. The availability of medicines and medical supplies depends
entirely on ICRC’s transport. It is unclear how preventive medical
measures can be undertaken and whether vaccinations are still regularly
carried out.
73. Access to healthcare is neither reliable nor sustainable.
The transfer of patients is prioritised by a medical committee,
and it can take up to several days until a medical transport is
authorised. The ICRC has been unable to carry out any medical transport
at all during two periods of a fortnight, namely at the beginning of
the action of the “eco-activists” on the Lachin corridor and after
the establishment of the border checkpoint on 23 April, pending
the agreement of an authorisation procedure with Azerbaijan, which
has to green-light each transfer of patients.
74. The transfer of patients is a big challenge. Some patients
cannot move and have to be transported in a horizontal position.
The role of the hospital now is to regulate and stabilise the patients
before transferring them to Armenia.
75. The situation outside Stepanakert is even more challenging
as patients have first to be transferred to the hospital there.
There are four villages near Shusha/Shushi (Turshsu/Lisagor, Saribaba/Yeghtsanhogh,
Boyuk Galadarasi/Mets Shen and Khichik Galadarasi/Hin Shen) which
are totally cut from the rest of the region and Armenia.
76. It is not only patients who are affected by mental health
issues, but the medical staff as well. The terrible living conditions
they are subjected to and the uncertainty about their future has
fragilised the minds of many.
77. While it is not possible to estimate the number of persons
who have died because of the inadequate healthcare available in
Stepanakert, at least one patient who required a kidney transplant
lost his life because he could not be transported in time to hospital
in Armenia, and the body of another one who died during treatment
in Armenia was not allowed to be returned for burial.
Infrastructure
78. I was informed that since 9
January 2023, the electricity supply coming from Armenia has been disrupted.
This has had serious consequences on the operation of schools (which
were simply closed during the winter), hospitals, businesses and
life in general. The electricity grid is situated in areas around
Lachin/Berdzor city which came under Azerbaijan control in August
2022, thereby making access impossible for repairs or adjustments.
The infrastructure was supposed to move along the new road, but
this has not yet been the case.
79. Before the 2020 war, there were 20 small river-based generators.
Now, electricity provision relies upon hydroelectric power from
4 small river-based generators and the generator at the Sarsang
water reservoir, of which the increased significant role in providing
electricity has proportionally decreased its water level since December,
because of overuse. In addition, no equipment is designed to be
in use all the time, so problems with the machinery are now occurring.
80. The Sarsang water reservoir is heavily relied upon. It traditionally
supplied 32 % of the electricity of the region. Because of a significant
use, there has been an unprecedented decline in water levels. Calculations indicate
that there were 345.45 million cubic meters of water in January
2022 and 117 left in January 2023. Longer electricity shortages
are expected in July and August, which will only contribute to the
deepening of the humanitarian crisis. Part of the water from the
reservoir has in the past been used for other regions of Azerbaijan,
but this is no longer possible, since the water only suffices for
the electricity generator.
81. Cutting electricity three times a day enables 30% of total
capacity to be saved. However, there are risks that electricity
will have to be cut completely because of insufficient hydropower.
Indeed, a hydro generator in reservoir needs a minimum of 70 cubic
meters to operate. The peak of the crisis is projected to happen
in August and could result in either full disruption or just few
hours a day of electricity.
82. Data indicates that the problem with supply is located within
the 31st km of line in the vicinity of the city of Lachin/Berdzor,
under Azerbaijani control. Azerbaijan has refused to give access
to either Armenian engineers/technicians or Russian peacekeepers
to fix this issue. Before 9 January, it was possible to repair breakage
with the help of Russian peacekeepers, since then, no one has been
allowed to access to this area.
83. The Sarsang water reservoir and four small hydro-electric
power stations in fast running rivers are the only sources of water
and hydropower. There is not enough river flow to generate the same
electricity in the winter.
84. The gas supply coming from Armenia has been interrupted many
times since 13 December 2022 and indefinitely since 21 March 2023.
No one, including the ICRC, has been allowed by the Azerbaijani
authorities to go on the spot and check what was happening. This
gas supply was used to help generate electricity. It was functioning
normally the day when the ICJ delivered its Order rejecting Measure
No. 3 regarding the disruption of gas and utilities for lack of
sufficient evidence (Order, paragraph 64).
85. Calculations of gas flow indicate that the gas goes to the
village of Pekh, and not beyond that point, suggesting that a valve
has been installed. The blockage can be checked with the level of
gas pressure.
86. In a meeting held between the parties before the new road
was put into operation, the possible transfer of communication lines
to the new road was discussed. Communication lines were transferred
but gas and electricity were not.
87. The lack of overall maintenance of infrastructure leads to
its erosion.
Shortages
88. The fact that the ICRC and
Russian peacekeepers have to bring food to Nagorno-Karabakh is evidence of
food shortages. By April 2023, ICRC had transported the following
humanitarian aid: 2 water pumps for the safe distribution of drinking
water, water cleaning chemicals and fitting materials, 7 tons of
corn seeds, over 1000 tons of wheat flour and 154 tons of potato
seeds). However, their logistic capacity is limited. As a result, some
goods are stuck in Goris.
89. Food rationing has been put in place, with ration cards used
to buy essential products such as pasta, buckwheat, rice, sugar,
oil, fruits, vegetables, eggs, etc.
90. I was also informed of the scarcity of cash money and of the
fact that people have to exchange goods or use vouchers for purchasing
goods. Money withdrawals have been limited to automated teller machines (ATMs).
On 11 January 2023, withdrawal amount of cash was restricted to
50 000 AMDs (around 127 USD) daily.
91. The economic activity in the region has been hampered since
the import of raw materials and the export of finalised goods have
become impossible. Some 6 000 persons have lost their jobs and their
main source of income. The unemployment rate is about 20%.
92. Shooting incidents at least on 28 April and 5 May targeting
civilian farmers have strongly discouraged the agricultural work
on land, crucial at this period of the year.
93. It is difficult not to conclude that these many hardships
and daily obstructive steps do contribute very overtly to a sense
that the Armenians living in Azerbaijan do not have a viable future
there.
The dilemmas of the Armenian
Government
94. The recognition of Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity by Armenia was a courageous step on the part
of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has to face criticism from
the opposition, the Armenian diaspora and the Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.
95. The government prevented escalation by stopping the Armenians
who went to demonstrate to the Lachin corridor. The control point
which was installed by Armenia aims at preventing people from coming
too near and provoking an escalation of an already very tense situation.
96. Nikol Pashinyan’s speech at the Armenian Forum for Democracy
on 31 May 2023 expressed his positive hope that high economic growth
and peace will be the country’s supporting brand and that the unity
of democracy, economic growth and peace must serve this goal. It
has to be said that this approach contrasts starkly with certain
recent discourse of the Azerbaijan leadership and political class,
in particular the speech of President Alyiev mentioned above
and the declaration earlier this
year from the international relations committee of the Azerbaijani
Parliament that the Armenian diaspora was “long since a cancerous
tumor of Europe.”
97. While it is difficult to negotiate with a party keen to employ
hate rhetoric and even denying Armenia’s territorial integrity,
it is crucial for Armenia to continue to do its utmost to contribute
to the de-escalation of the tensions on the ground.
5. Conclusions
and recommendations
98. When I was appointed rapporteur
for this report, I wished to change its title from “The humanitarian consequences
of the blockade of the Lachin corridor” to “Ensuring a safe and
free access through the Lachin corridor” so as not to prejudice
the outcome of my work. At the end of this process, and in preparing
all the elements for my report, I have regretfully come to the conclusion
that access through the Lachin corridor is neither free nor safe.
99. The fact that I was not allowed to go through the Lachin corridor
and to visit Khankendi/Stepanakert to speak to the persons stranded
there did not prevent me from gathering valuable evidence coming
from both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and this evidence has led me to
this conclusion.
100. It is important to underline that the Lachin corridor is not
only a security issue for Azerbaijan and a humanitarian question
for the inhabitants of the region. It has also serious consequences
for the enjoyment of the basic human rights of the Armenians living
within the internationally recognised borders of Azerbaijan. At present,
the Azerbaijan authorities do not demonstrate recognition of the
problem of access, nor clear willingness to immediately resolve
the most urgent issues; indeed some elements of the recent rhetoric
are likely to exacerbate mistrust and fear. For these reasons, alongside
the Assembly, the Council of Europe as an Organisation and all its
bodies should be clear in voicing their concern and in proposing
solutions and support in the fields which are within its mandate,
thus contributing to upholding its values and standards on the territory
of one of its member States, and to promoting a peaceful coexistence
between two neighbouring member States after years of tensions and
war.
101. It is particularly sad and worrying if the fear felt by the
Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh is currently being fuelled
by threatening rhetoric at the highest political level in Azerbaijan.
Such fear must certainly contribute to their reluctance to cross
the border checkpoint erected on 23 April 2023. Azerbaijan – having recovered
territory within its internationally recognised borders – now has
the primary responsibility for ensuring that Armenians living under
its jurisdiction feel safe and free to live their lives as they
wish in accordance with the law and applicable international standards,
in particular the Council of Europe human rights standards to which
it is bound.
102. Yet on the contrary, the fear felt is being exacerbated by
the dire living conditions of the Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh
after electricity and gas were deliberately cut off. In these circumstances,
it is hard to escape the conclusion that there may be an intention
to make it as uncomfortable and difficult as possible for the Armenian
population to remain within Azerbaijan.
103. This report is limited to the mandate assigned to me and does
not go beyond the consequences connected to the impossibility of
crossing freely and safely the Lachin corridor. I did not dwell
on issues related to the peace negotiations taking place between
Armenia and Azerbaijan under the auspices of the European Union,
the United States of America and the Russian Federation. However,
I do believe that some of the issues I have tackled may be relevant
for these negotiations, in particular regarding the absolute necessity
to build genuine and sustainable trust between two neighbours which
have no other choice than live together. International presence
would undoubtedly help in this process.
104. The implementation of standards of democracy, human rights
and the rule of law to which Azerbaijan is committed and obliged
as a Council of Europe member State, must be at the heart of the
solutions to be identified and must be respected in order to alleviate
the suffering of the Armenians living in Azerbaijan, in particular
in the territories recuperated since 2020, and for which the Lachin
corridor is the only way to join Armenia. The Council of Europe
has relevant standards and valuable tools, which could greatly contribute
to build confidence between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between
Azerbaijan and the Armenians living under its jurisdiction, but
they can work only if sincerely applied and used.
105. Peace is not only the absence of war. Peace is feeling free
and safe in a society which gives you the opportunities to strive
for happiness, development and fulfilment. So far, Azerbaijan has
not demonstrated its readiness to guarantee such freedom and safety
for the Armenians living on its territory and under its jurisdiction.
The Council of Europe and its member States must use all possible
leverage to ensure that the commitments undertaken by Azerbaijan
when it joined the Organisation more than 20 years ago are fulfilled
so that fear and hatred between the two communities truly belong
to the past once and for all.