Parliamentary Assembly

Draft resolution

1The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about the extent of money laundering involving Council of Europe member States. The “Global Laundromat”, by which at least US$21 billion and perhaps as much as US$80 billion was illegally transferred from the Russian Federation to recipients around the world, and the “Azerbaijani Laundromat”, by which US$2.9 billion was moved out of Azerbaijan, are the most alarming recent examples. Money laundering, especially on this scale, is a serious threat to democratic stability, human rights and the rule of law in the countries from, through and to which illicit funds are transferred, inter alia by facilitating, encouraging and concealing corruption and other serious criminal activity.

2The Global Laundromat was made possible by serious structural issues, at various levels. It originated in the desire of Russian businessmen, organised criminals and, apparently, interests connected to State organs (notably the Federal Security Service, FSB) to illicitly transfer huge amounts of money out of the country, at minimal transaction cost. It typically depended upon corruption in the Moldovan judicial and banking systems; the opaque beneficial ownership of shell companies, often based in the United Kingdom or its Overseas Territories; and failures and inadequacies in the anti-money laundering (AML) systems of many banks, especially ABLV bank in Latvia, along with ineffective national AML supervisory regimes. Despite some encouraging developments in the Republic of Moldova and the promise of an investigation in the United Kingdom, the Global Laundromat has still not been subject to proper criminal investigation. It is of particular concern that the Moldovan authorities have accused their Russian counterparts of obstructing their work, allegedly under instructions from the FSB.

3The Azerbaijani Laundromat involved several similar features. The money often came from wealthy businessmen and others closely associated with the highest levels of government, including family members of government ministers and the president. It passed through shell companies with concealed beneficial ownership, the most significant of which were again based in the United Kingdom or its Overseas Territories. Much of the money was laundered through a Baltic bank, in this case Danske Bank’s Estonian branch; Danske Bank’s internal AML procedures at both branch and group level were catastrophically deficient. National AML authorities proved ineffective, with uncertainty over the division of responsibilities between the Estonian and Danish financial supervisory authorities.

4The Azerbaijani Laundromat also provided money that contributed to corruptive activities within the Parliamentary Assembly, as was established in the report of the Independent Investigative Body on the allegations of corruption within the Parliamentary Assembly (IBAC). Five former Assembly members most clearly seem to have received some of this money, all of whom have been sanctioned by the Assembly for breaches of its ethical rules. Luca Volontè is being prosecuted by the Italian authorities for bribery and money laundering. Alain Destexhe has been investigated by the Belgian authorities. The German Parliament has found that Karin Strenz violated its ethical rules. It is however not known thus far whether any action has been taken against the two others, Eduard Lintner of Germany and Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti of Slovenia. Despite Assembly Resolution 2185 (2017) “Azerbaijan’s chairmanship of the Council of Europe: what follow-up on respect for human rights?” having specifically urged the Azerbaijani authorities to start an independent and impartial inquiry into these allegations without delay, it would seem that nothing has been done and the two Azerbaijani parliamentarians who were most deeply involved – Elkhan Suleymanov and Muslum Mammadov – have not been subject to any form of sanction.

5Analysis of the Laundromats and other large-scale money-laundering schemes of recent years points to problems at various levels. These include the following:

5.1at the level of financial institutions and other commercial entities:

5.1.1inadequate understanding and implementation of AML requirements by trust and corporate service providers, financial institutions and other regulated entities, including failure to apply basic “know your customer” and source of funds/wealth procedures, incompatible information technology systems preventing application of AML common standards and procedures, branches relying on crucial documents in languages not understood in the head office and failure to fill key AML staff positions;

5.1.2deliberate or negligent minimisation of money-laundering risks by top and senior management of financial institutions;

5.1.3complicity between employees and known or suspected money launderers;

5.1.4lack or weakness of whistle-blowing procedures and protection within financial institutions;

5.2at the national level:

5.2.1inadequate domestic law and policy on prevention of corruption, notably a lack of publicly accessible declarations of the property and income of public officials, including parliamentarians and government ministers, and candidates to elected public office, and the possibility for persons charged or even convicted of corruption or money-laundering offences to run for and be elected to public office;

5.2.2inadequate AML legal frameworks, including provisions allowing for opaque beneficial ownership of companies and trusts;

5.2.3under-resourced AML supervisory and investigative bodies and fragmentation of AML responsibilities between numerous agencies, some of which may be uncertain of their precise role;

5.2.4failure to prosecute money laundering as a third party or standalone offence, instead requiring proof of a predicate offence, which is often committed in an unco-operative foreign jurisdiction;

5.2.5inadequate identification and tracing of the proceeds of crime during the early stages of criminal investigations;

5.2.6criminal sentences for money-laundering offences that are insufficiently dissuasive;

5.2.7repression and restriction of the activities of independent civil society and media actors, who provide an important democratic check on corruption and other criminal activity;

5.2.8failures by national authorities to co-operate with AML investigations by other countries’ authorities, and even obstruction of those investigations;

5.2.9uncertainty over the division of responsibility between national financial supervisory authorities in relation to AML supervision of multinational financial institutions;

5.3at the European and international levels:

5.3.1European Union AML supervision that is dependent on decentralised national authorities, despite their proven inadequacy in some countries;

5.3.2incomplete transposition into national law and implementation of key European Union instruments, notably the Fourth Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (Directive (EU) 105/849);

5.3.3until recently, relative inattention by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) to the effectiveness and implementation of national AML regimes.

6The Assembly therefore calls on:

6.1the Russian Federation to:

6.1.1investigate fully and effectively the Global Laundromat, as revealed in widespread public media reports and making full use of evidence obtained in other criminal investigations, and to prosecute and punish all those who have committed related offences;

6.1.2co-operate fully with the relevant authorities of other countries in the investigation of the Global Laundromat and other international money laundering schemes involving Russia;

6.2the Republic of Moldova to:

6.2.1pursue its investigation of the Global Laundromat fully and effectively and prosecute and punish all those who have committed related offences;

6.2.2introduce provisions preventing persons charged or convicted of serious offences, including corruption and money laundering, from taking or exercising public office;

6.2.3pursue investigations and prosecutions of candidates for public office and public officials, including elected officials, expeditiously, whilst scrupulously avoiding unequal treatment on political grounds;

6.2.4consider repealing the “fiscal amnesty” introduced in July 2018, as it risks facilitating money laundering;

6.2.5ensure that its “golden visa” programme is strictly regulated, as this too risks facilitating money laundering, especially when taken together with the “fiscal amnesty”;

6.3Azerbaijan to:

6.3.1investigate fully and effectively the money laundering from Azerbaijan, as revealed in widespread public media reports, including the IBAC report, and prosecute and punish all those who have committed related offences;

6.3.2fully respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of independent civil society and media bodies, as previously requested by the Assembly on numerous occasions;

6.3.3respond without further delay to Assembly Resolution 2185 (2017) “Azerbaijan’s chairmanship of the Council of Europe: what follow-up on respect for human rights?”, in particular by starting an independent and impartial inquiry into the allegations of corruption of Assembly members set out in the IBAC report and by co-operating fully with the competent international authorities and bodies on this issue;

6.4the United Kingdom to:

6.4.1ensure full implementation of the new requirement that the authorities of British Overseas Territories introduce a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies and trusts within their jurisdictions;

6.4.2consider extending that requirement to the Crown Dependencies Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man;

6.4.3consider requiring full transparency of beneficial ownership of all United Kingdom-based companies and trusts, including limited liability partnerships, with a publicly accessible register;

6.4.4ensure that trust and corporate service providers comply fully with AML requirements and are effectively supervised by relevant domestic authorities;

6.4.5ensure that the new National Economic Crime Centre operates effectively to avoid fragmentation and inefficiency of AML activity;

6.4.6ensure that the potential of the new Unexplained Wealth Order is fully exploited;

6.4.7ensure that there is no weakening of AML standards or activity following the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, and make every effort to ensure that the United Kingdom remains as fully engaged as possible with relevant European Union bodies, including Europol;

6.5Denmark to:

6.5.1ensure that Danske Bank fully and effectively implements all orders given to it by the Danish financial supervisory authorities;

6.5.2take appropriate action, including criminal action, against any employee of Danske Bank, including top and senior management, who may have violated AML regulations and laws;

6.6Estonia to:

6.6.1ensure that Danske Bank fully and effectively implements any measures indicated to it by the Estonian financial supervisory authorities;

6.6.2take appropriate action, including criminal action, against any employee of Danske Bank, including top and senior management, who may have violated AML regulations and laws;

6.7all member States of the Council of Europe to:

6.7.1investigate fully and effectively any and all involvement in the Laundromats of natural or legal persons within their jurisdiction;

6.7.2require elected public officials and candidates for elected office, including candidates for president, to make publicly accessible declarations of their property and income;

6.7.3ensure that their domestic AML regimes are fully compliant with all applicable international standards and effectively implemented;

6.7.4ensure that their AML supervisory bodies are adequately resourced, with sufficient, appropriately skilled and remunerated staff;

6.7.5provide for non-conviction-based confiscation in their national laws, as well as the possibility of equivalent value confiscation and taxation of illegal gains, while establishing appropriate safeguards, as recommended in Resolution 2218 (2018) on fighting organised crime by facilitating the confiscation of illegal assets;

6.7.6implement promptly and fully all relevant recommendations of the FATF, MONEYVAL and the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO);

6.8the European Union to:

6.8.1ensure that its member States transpose into national law and implement fully and effectively the European Union’s Fourth and Fifth (Directive (EU) 2018/843) Anti-Money Laundering Directives;

6.8.2ensure that the proposed amending Regulation on banking supervision enables the European Banking Authority to co-ordinate and evaluate relevant national authorities, so as to ensure synergies, avoid discrepancies in the interpretation of rules and practical activities, and address weaknesses in and enhance the functioning of the overall AML system;

6.8.3ensure full and effective implementation of its December 2018 Anti-Money Laundering Action Plan;

6.8.4ensure that the proposed directive on whistle-blower protection provides for effective protection for whistle-blowers in the financial sector;

6.8.5enhance co-ordination of its AML activities with those of the Council of Europe.

Draft recommendation

1Recalling its Resolution … (2019) “Laundromats: responding to new challenges in the international fight against organised crime, corruption and money laundering”, the Parliamentary Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to:

1.1maintain national and international activities and co-operation to counter organised crime, corruption and money laundering as strategic priorities of the Council of Europe, bearing in mind the serious threats they represent to democratic stability, human rights and the rule of law throughout Europe;

1.2ensure that regardless of the future budgetary situation, such activities, notably the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), continue to be adequately resourced;

1.3enhance co-ordination of its anti-money laundering activities with those of other international bodies, notably the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations.