1. Introduction
1. On 9 December 2009, the rapporteur was appointed
by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population to prepare
a report on Rule 39 of the Rules of the European Court of Human
Rights (hereinafter “the Court”) (See Doc. 11978). Rule 39 reads
as follows:
“Rule 39
(Interim measures)
1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may,
at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of
its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which
it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or
of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.
2. Notice of these measures shall be given to the Committee
of Ministers.
3. The Chamber may request information from the parties
on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure
it has indicated.”
This Rule enables the Court to indicate necessary measures
to be taken which are in the interests of the parties or the proper
conduct of proceedings.Such
measures are ordered to avoid irreparable harm to the applicant(s) pending
a decision on the admissibility and merits of the case.
2. In the preparation of this report, the Sub-Committee
on Refugees held a hearing on the issue in Strasbourg on 28 April
2010 with the participation of Ms Liselot Egmond, Deputy Government
Agent (Netherlands), Ms Elisabet Fura, Judge of the European Court
of Human Rights (Sweden), Ms Catherine Meredith, Barrister (United
Kingdom), AIRE Centre, and Mr Stan Naismith, Deputy Section Registrar
at the European Court of Human Rights. The rapporteur would like
to thank them and convey his special thanks to Ms Catherine Meredith
who acted as a consultant in the drafting process of the report.
3. Some might ask themselves why the Parliamentary Assembly has
decided to prepare a report on a procedural rule of the Court. At
the outset, the rapporteur underlines the fact that Rule 39 is much
more than a simple procedural matter. It allows, for example, the
Court to avoid people being extradited to a place where they risk
imminent and irreparable harm, such as inhuman or degrading treatment,
torture or even death. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for
Human Rights recently, and rightly, underlined that “Rule 39 is
vital for individual applicants. For those who might face a risk
of violation of their human right, the [European Court of Human
Rights] is often their ultimate hope to stop a forced return to
a country where they could be exposed to a treatment in violation
with the European Convention on Human Rights.”
4. Furthermore, this report has not only been drawn up to stress
the importance of Rule 39 and to explain how its works, but also,
more importantly, to ensure that applicants enjoy effective access
to interim measures and that member states are not allowed to show
disregard for measures ordered by the Court. Both the Chair of the
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population and the Chair of
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
have
expressed their shock and concern at instances of non-compliance,
insisting on the fact that such action directly undermines the authority
of the Court.
Furthermore, in his recent human
rights comment, the Commissioner for Human Rights highlights the
cases of Italy, which has failed on at least four occasions to comply
with interim measures ordered by the Court by expelling applicants
to Tunisia, as well as the expulsion from the Slovak Republic of
an Algerian national.
5. This report is divided into five sections. The first section
examines the Rule 39 mechanism – how it works, what it is used for,
and in what circumstances it may be used. The second section focuses
on the potential beneficiaries of the Rule 39 mechanism – vulnerable
asylum seekers and migrants – the problems they face and possible
reasons for this. The third section deals with state acts and omissions
in situations of non-compliance and the question of whether a state
has taken all reasonable steps to remove any objective impediment
to compliance. The fourth section is concerned with the institutional
responses to cases of non-compliance, the role of the Court, the
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Commissioner for
Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The conclusions are contained in a final section.
2. The Rule
39 mechanism and its use in extradition and expulsion cases
6. Rule 39 of the Rules of the European Court of Human
Rights
enables
a Chamber of the Court or its President to indicate
any
interim measures to be taken which are in the interests of the parties
or the proper conduct of proceedings.
Rule 39 is a
procedural rule of the Court which, according to the Court’s case
law, is binding for the member states, in addition to their obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the
Convention” or “the ECHR”).
7. The Court may grant interim measures under Rule 39 to prevent
imminent, irreparable harm occurring in serious and urgent cases
– the majority concerning the suspension of the extradition or expulsion
of an individual facing a real risk of ill-treatment on return.
The
measure has been applied in other contexts, for example to prevent
harm by reason of the refusal of urgent medical treatment or to
tackle deplorable prison conditions.
8. There is no particular domain of the Convention in which Rule
39 is applied. However, until recently, Rule 39 has been applied
in limited fields: under Article 2 of the ECHR (the right to life
and prohibition of the death penalty) or Article 3 of the ECHR (the
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).
Rule 39 indications are exceptional
in non-Article 3 matters.
9. The purpose of a Rule 39 indication is to preserve the substance
of the rights of the parties pending a final judgment on the issue
in question which would otherwise be rendered useless but for the
grant of Rule 39.
In
this respect, interim measures maintain the status quo – a typical
example being that removal is suspended until a specified date or
until further notice. Interim measures in international law pursue
the same purpose and the domestic equivalent is interim or injunctive
relief (an injunction).
10. Rule 39 measures are legally binding, as are interim measures
in international law generally. Failure to comply with interim measures
gives rise to a breach of Article 34 of the ECHR (the right to individual
petition),
which
may or may not be accompanied by a breach of Article 3. However
where the government demonstrates an “objective impediment” to compliance,
Article 34 of the Convention will not be violated.
11. Non-compliance with Rule 39 measures in the context of removal
may also breach the principle of
non-refoulement under
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol
and for those 27 member
states which are also members of the European Union, their obligations
under European Union law.
12. It was not until 2006-2007 that the Court began to publish
statistics on the number of Rule 39 requests made or measures granted.
The 2007 report included a section on Rule 39 for the first time,
which
stated that 1 000 requests for Rule 39 had been received. However,
the Annual Report for 2006 did not publish any figures suggesting
that they could have been much lower that year. In 2008, the Court
stated that it dealt with an “unprecedented” number of requests
for Rule 39 – over 3 000 in total.
In
2009, it received 2 400 requests for interim measures; an average
of almost 50 a week.
13. Of those requests made in 2009, a considerable proportion
related to matters falling outside the scope of Rule 39 (about 340),
in respect of which no formal decision was taken by the Chamber
or its President, but the number of requests on which a formal decision
was taken was well over 2 000 (2 060), slightly higher than in 2008
(1 908). The number of cases in which Rule 39 was applied dropped
slightly from 747 to 654, or rather less than one third of the requests
falling within the scope of the provision. The vast majority of
requests never actually come to the attention of the governments
concerned. Furthermore, there are some member states to which the
Court has never been asked to indicate, nor has ever indicated measures
under Rule 39.
14. From the outset, the rapporteur notes that in the absence
of information and explanations, further studies and analysis are
required to,
inter alia, establish
the reasons why indications against some states are plentiful and
against others there are none. Similarly, there are few requests
from individuals in Greece (and Spain) but, conversely, there are
indications against states sending individuals to Greece (including
under the Dublin II Regulation
). The rapporteur therefore
encourages the publication of as much information as possible in
this fast-developing area of law and practice in order to identify
trends and respond appropriately to protect the needs of refugees,
vulnerable asylum seekers and migrants and ensure that they have
full access to appropriate legal protection against
refoulement and breaches of their
Convention rights.
3. Rule 39 and the
individual
3.1. Recent practice
15. As the statistics above indicate, the Court now receives
an unprecedented number of Rule 39 requests for interim measures,
but not all are granted. Interim measures are usually requested
by individuals
who claim
that they are facing imminent and irreparable harm to their Convention
rights. Whilst the focus of this report is the application of Rule
39 in suspending extradition and expulsion cases of refugees and
asylum seekers, the scope of application of the measure is much
wider.
16. Requests for Rule 39 have sometimes been in waves, where large
numbers of individuals have complained to the Court that they are
at risk on return to their country of origin, for example in countries
wracked by armed conflict such as Somalia or Sri Lanka. The Court,
faced with hundreds of requests for Rule 39 from Tamils fearing
a risk of death or torture in Sri Lanka, wrote to the United Kingdom
stating that Rule 39 would be applied in such cases pending the
adoption of a lead judgment. The lead judgment in
NA v. the United Kingdom and the steps taken by the Court
to deal with the 342 cases in which Rule 39 had been applied may provide
an indication of what to expect in the future in other contexts.
Lawyers
in the Netherlands were successful in obtaining Rule 39 indications
for a group of Somali clients, culminating in the lead judgment
of
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands.
Since
then, large numbers of interim measures have been indicated to states
preventing return to Somalia. In light of the deteriorating situation
in Somalia, the lead judgment concerning the risk on return is awaited.
17. Whilst not on the same scale, there have been a large number
of requests for Rule 39 from asylum seekers from Iran whose asylum
claims have been ignored in Turkey (due to the geographical reservation
on Turkey’s protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, which are restricted to persons originating
from Europe). In
Abdolkhani and Karimnia
v. Turkey, the Court found a violation of Article 3 as
the authorities remained “totally passive” to the applicants’ asylum
requests. The Court has seen no reason to depart from its reasoning
in
Abdolkhani in a line of
cases which follow it.
18. In another context, large numbers of individuals have requested
Rule 39 measures to prevent their transfer between European Union
member states under the Dublin II Regulation. Statistics show that
within a seven-month period in 2008, there were 141 requests made
by individuals in five out of 47 member states alone. Some 94 out
of 141 requests were granted. Some 83 of the 94 Rule 39 indications
were made to the United Kingdom Government between May and September
2008. In the first five months of 2009, there were 103 requests
for Rule 39, 58 of which were granted, 46 in May 2009 alone. Again
the statistics refer to only five Council of Europe states (the
United Kingdom, Finland, Belgium, Italy and Austria). The bulk of
these requests and of those granted was against the United Kingdom.
19. Rule 39 requests have been made in respect of Dublin II transfers
complaining that reception conditions in the receiving European
Union member state breach the Convention (
inter
alia Articles 2, 3, 5, 8 and 13) and/or because of the
lack of access to an effective asylum determination procedure following
which is the risk of onward return. The Court previously stated
in
K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom that
reception conditions are a matter for the receiving state and does
not engage the responsibility under the Convention of the sending
state (and in any event noting that the European Commission can
institute infringement proceedings at European Union level).
However,
this question together with that of onward return from Greece to
another country (for example Somalia and Afghanistan) goes to the
assessment of real risk under Article 3 – the Court previously having
found that it did not exist. However, these issues are expected
to be resolved in
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.
3.2. Scope
20. The majority of expulsion or extradition cases in
which Rule 39 is applied fall within the scope of Articles 2 or
3 of the Convention (death, inhuman and degrading treatment or torture).
The individual must show that he or she faces imminent, irreparable
harm, including that he or she is personally at risk from the harm
feared or that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed
to a practice of ill-treatment. In this context, the Court will
consider the question of risk where necessary on the basis of human
rights reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
or the Commissioner for Human Rights and other well-respected bodies
or
guidelines from the UNCHR (which the Court has stated should be
given “due weight”).
21. However, the possibility is not excluded of a Rule 39 indication
being made to prevent harm within the scope of Articles 5, 6 and
8 to 11 of the ECHR. However, the application of Rule 39 in such
cases would be exceptional and require a “flagrant” violation of
the right in question.
More
recently, indications have been made to suspend removal where the
individual fears being subjected to forced labour, sexual exploitation
or trafficking under Article 4 of the ECHR.
22. The rapporteur remains concerned about the high refusal rate
of asylum and trafficking claims generally. In addition, the rapporteur
urges member states and the Court to be aware of the gender perspective
of Rule 39. In this context, the rapporteur emphasises his concerns
about a protection gap for victims of trafficking.
23. Furthermore, in cases of gender- and identity-related violence
and forms of persecution including rape, female genital mutilation
and violence from family members, under- (or non-)reporting of acts
of persecution have a bearing on the applicable standard of proof
and make it difficult for women and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(“LGBT”) persons to succeed. These difficulties are often compounded
in that negative domestic findings are carried forward to the point
when the Court is called upon to examine the prima facie risk on
return in the context of requests for Rule 39. There is a disproportionately
high refusal rate for LGBT cases,
although
there has been a selection of successful Rule 39 requests.
24. In asylum and immigration cases, the right to family and private
life under Article 8 is often invoked as a barrier to removal but
Rule 39 indications in this context have been rare, essentially
because the situation in family cases is rarely irreparable in the
same way as exposure to ill-treatment or death. In the non-immigration context,
a Rule 39 indication was made to prevent destruction of frozen embryos
with which the applicant argued she had private life within the
scope of Article 8.
25. In the immigration context, the rapporteur is aware of only
one Rule 39 granted in respect of Article 8 in a case yet to be
communicated. The Court indicated that the United Kingdom Government
stay the removal of an applicant involved in care proceedings and
seeking contact rights with his child. The applicant argued that irreparable
harm would be caused to him and his children if he was deported
to Jamaica prior to the conclusion of the care proceedings and that
his significant mental health difficulties would impede his ability
to regain contact rights from abroad. In another exceptional case,
the Court indicated interim measures to stay the transfer of individuals
under the Dublin II Regulation, forcing them into a situation of
destitution due to the unlawful action of the Greek authorities
– contrary to Articles 3 or 8 of the Convention.
26. The number of expulsion or extradition cases in which Rule
39 is granted in a non-Article 3 context, such as Article 8, is
exceptional and should not be an open invitation to applicants to
file Rule 39 requests in cases where imminent and irreparable harm
is not threatened. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that
the Court is taking such cases very seriously and has recognised
the need to preserve the applicant’s position pending the full application
being lodged with the Court.
27. In situations not concerning removal, the Court may order
release or specific measures to allow access to a lawyer or family
members, receive medical treatment or be transferred to or kept
in hospital.
Some asylum
seekers have requested one Rule 39 to stay removal and another to
secure their release from appalling conditions in detention.
28. Procedurally, in many cases, the application of Rule 39 is
accompanied by the application of Rule 40 (urgent notification of
an application to the respondent government) or Rule 41 (prioritising
cases). These Rules can be applied simultaneously or at different
stages of the procedure.
3.3. Access
29. The published figures on Rule 39 requests represent
the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number of requests which
could be made. In many member states persons in need of international
protection are denied access to the asylum procedure. The prospect
of applying for Rule 39 is illusory even when an asylum request has
been ignored or refused. Individuals intercepted at sea being sent
back without being granted access to the asylum procedure stand
little chance.
30. The first point is that the growing demand for Rule 39 requests
is undoubtedly an indication of the problems faced by many of those
in need of international protection and in securing respect for
their rights and their safety at national level.
31. The shrinking of the asylum space in Europe undoubtedly propels
some individuals who are refused international or humanitarian protection
at national level to seek the subsidiary protection of the Court.
32. The rapporteur is concerned that many individuals are not
able to file a request for Rule 39 measures because they are in
detention and are denied access to the outside world, including
the European Court of Human Rights or UNHCR, NGOs and legal representatives.
They may not have access to a telephone. The position for individuals
at liberty may only be marginally better in terms of access or opportunity
to access Rule 39 measures – due in part to general levels of ignorance
amongst all concerned, including lawyers.
33. Free legal aid provision is critical in ensuring access to
the Rule 39 mechanism as well as safeguards, including interpretation
to make basic information understood. The rapporteur is concerned
that even in countries with legal aid in place, funding dries up
once domestic proceedings come to an end and there is a glass ceiling
of representation. Countless individuals are either unrepresented
throughout or at the most crucial stage, when their appeal rights
have been exhausted and they are facing expulsion.
34. Furthermore whilst in some states there are many requests
(for example the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands), in others,
such as Greece or Spain, there appear to be few. One would expect
there to be equal or similar numbers of requests for Rule 39 from
individuals in those states which are popular destination countries
(and receive large numbers of asylum applications), but this does
not appear to be the case.
35. Rule 39 practice is nevertheless an emerging one; therefore
the rapporteur does not attempt an exhaustive explanation here,
but recommends instead further awareness raising and greater publication
of information and statistics, as well as training of lawyers, judges
and immigration officials at national level.
3.4. Nature and timing
of enforcement action
36. The rapporteur is concerned about examples of removals
which show that detention is often considered a precursor to
refoulement or that the rapidity
with which enforcement action is taken denies individuals the opportunity
to contact a lawyer, let alone request the Court’s intervention.
37. The rapporteur considers that the root of the problem here
is the lack of procedural safeguards in the domestic asylum system,
the use of automatic timescales
(in
particular in accelerated or fast-track asylum procedures) and the
lack of remedies without automatic suspensive effect, all of which
have been found to be contrary to Article 3, or Article 3 in conjunction
with Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy).
38. Further examples of the problems faced by individuals are
considered below in the context of non-compliance by states.
4. Rule 39 measures
and states parties
4.1. Recent practice
39. The emerging trends show that the number of requests
in general has been most significant in respect of a relatively
small number of countries (for example Sweden or the United Kingdom).
Since 2005,
when dealing
with situations of non-compliance with Rule 39 in extradition/expulsion
cases, some have led to a finding of a violation of Article 34 (but
no violation of Article 3, for example because of a lack of information), and
recently to a violation of both Articles 3 and 34 (
Ben Khemaisv.
Italy, see below). The incidences of non-compliance
have risen during this time.
40. Of the decided cases since 2005, the majority concern the
expulsion or extradition of alleged or convicted terrorists. In
the context of Rule 39 examination, as with any judgment of the
Court, the Court has repeated the maxim that given that the absolute
nature of Article 3, no individual should be sent back to face torture,
irrespective of the heinousness of their conduct.
The majority of the applicants claimed asylum
in the sending state, claims which were either ignored or failed
and the others of course claimed that their return would violate
their human rights.
41. Some countries, including Italy and Russia, have repeatedly
failed to comply with interim measures; however,
the United Kingdom does not have a clean record either and nor does
the Slovak Republic.
Further cases
pending before the Court have been publicised by Council of Europe
bodies, including the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers
and the Commissioner for Human Rights.
42. Following the judgment in
Ben Khemais, Italy
has expelled more Tunisians in breach of Rule 39 (see
Hamidovic v. Italy, Trabelsi v. Italy and
Toumi v. Italy)
. In other cases, the
rapidity of the expulsion order precluded the applicant from applying
for Rule 39 beforehand. This has also been criticised by the Commissioner
for Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly.
43. There are further cases where Rule 39 has been granted and
the Court, when communicating the case to the government concerned,
has been forced to ask whether or not the applicant had actually
been deported and for his whereabouts.
This is also of grave concern; not
only can states not ignore their obligations under the ECHR and
the 1951 Refugee Convention, they cannot simply allow individuals
to fall under the radar. The Grand Chamber in
Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey stated that Article 34 not only
prevents states from applying pressure to individuals but also from
conducting themselves in a way which prevents the Court from considering
the application. The letter and spirit of compliance is considered
in the section below.
4.2. Compliance – letter
and spirit
44. Interim measures are binding on the state to which
they are indicated.
In
Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey, the Court held that failure to comply
with interim measures would result in a substantive breach of the Convention
under Article 34 (the right of individual petition). The point of
departure for verifying whether or not the respondent state has
complied with the measure is the formulation of the interim measure
itself. The Court will therefore examine whether the respondent
state complied with the “letter and the spirit” of the interim measure
indicated to it.
45. The Court will specify that a Rule 39 indication made to a
respondent government must continue in force until a specified date,
until further notice, or in practical terms until such time that
the Court examines the case in full.
During this time, the Court
may request that the state provide the Chamber with information
on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure
it has indicated (under Rule 39(3)). This might include,
inter alia, further information
relating to the individual’s personal circumstances, location or conditions
of detention, or whether or not the authorities have permitted access
by the individual’s representatives or family, and the country to
which removal is proposed.
46. The provision of more information to the Court, following
a request, has in some cases resulted in a Rule 39 indication being
lifted. However, attempts to challenge or make submissions on the
granting of Rule 39 have not been welcomed.
Similarly, any
request to have the Rule 39 lifted, either by the applicant or the respondent
state is treated very seriously and the final say ultimately rests
with the Court.
47. Attempts by states to try to coerce individuals into withdrawing
their cases,
in particular where
persons are in detention or other situations of increased vulnerability,
have been found to violate the effective exercise of the right to
petition the Court and have one’s case heard.
The rapporteur is concerned that
this may infringe the principle that Rule 39 indications are binding
both in letter and in spirit.
48. Governments, and sometimes individuals, have been critical
of the lack of reasonsfor
applying Rule 39, but the Court remains reluctant to provide reasons.
Not only would the giving of reasons delay these urgent matters,
but it would inappropriately enlarge the Rule 39 assessment stage
beyond the question of whether or not there is a prima facie risk
to an examination of the merits of the case. However, in some cases
the Court imports a degree of specificity into the wording of an
indication to ensure that the purpose of the measure indicated is
practically realised – and the specific needs of an applicant (for
example as a minor, a pregnant woman or a detained person) are met.
49. The rapporteur is concerned about violations of the Convention
in letter and in spirit. The most obvious cases are those of clear
non-compliance, where the state has ignored measures ordered by
the Court. The Court has clearly ordered that expulsion or extradition
be suspended and the state concerned has gone on and done it regardless
of the Rule 39 in force. These grave cases have been found to violate
Article 34 of the Convention and some have also violated Article
3. However, there are other cases which are not so obvious but which
may also be found to violate the Convention. For example, where
there may have been an “objective impediment” to compliance – situations
which the Court has to scrutinise to discover whether or not there
has been a violation of the Convention. For example, this may be
where the state argues that it was informed too late about a measure.
These two categories are considered in the following sub-sections.
However, there is also a third category which the rapporteur is
concerned about – where states have sought to circumvent a measure
entirely by rapid expulsion or other questionable tactics displaying
bad faith.
50. An example of this third category of case is
Sivanathan v. the United Kingdom. The
rapporteur is concerned about this decision by the Court to retrospectively
exonerate the United Kingdom for removal of an individual from its
jurisdiction despite a Rule 39 measure being in force. On 3 February
2009, the Court decided to strike out the case of
Sivanathan v. United Kingdom on
the basis of Article 37(1), holding that the applicant no longer
wished to pursue his application and that respect for human rights
did not require further examination. When removal directions were
issued, Mr Sivanathan wrote to the Court stating that he feared
ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 if deported to Sri Lanka and
that he would suffer great distress if separated from his family in
the United Kingdom. He also asked for an interim measure, which
was granted on 5 September. On the way to the airport, removal directions
were cancelled. However, the United Kingdom authorities claimed
that, on being told, Mr Sivanathan changed his mind and asked for
the removal to go ahead. There were no records of this due to an
“administrative oversight”, a reason which the Court accepted. Given
that the Court clarified the test in the later Grand Chamber case
of
Paladi v. Moldova and given
the remarkable nature of the Sivanathan case, even though the case
had been struck out of the list, steps are being taken to request
the Court to restore the case to the list under Article 37(2) for
a full examination.
51. Sivanathan is illustrative
of the rapporteur’s concern about the closed nature of the system
of removals and detention in which the individual is in a situation
of heightened vulnerability. He therefore recommends open and transparent
procedures and record keeping and once again urges the wider publication
of statistics.
4.3. Non-compliance
52. Non-compliance with a Rule 39 indication can result
in a violation of Article 34 of the Convention because the individual
can no longer pursue his or her application before the Court. The
first case in which interim measures were considered legally binding
within the Convention system was
Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey, which
concerned the extradition of two
Uzbek nationals to Uzbekistan under a bilateral treaty. The Court
indicated that the applicants not be extradited to Uzbekistan before
the Court heard the case. However, the very next day, the Turkish
Government ordered the applicants’ extradition under an expedited
procedure.
53. Taking into account the binding nature of interim measures
in international law, the Court held that under the Convention system,
interim measures, as they have consistently been applied in practice,
play a vital role in avoiding irreversible situations that would
prevent the Court from properlyexamining
the application and, where appropriate, securing for the applicant
the practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights asserted.
54. Accordingly, in these conditions a failure by a respondent
state to comply with interim measures will
undermine
the effectiveness of the right of individual application guaranteed
by Article 34 and the state’s formal undertaking in Article 1 to
protect the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.
55. This has been followed in subsequent cases, so the principle
is beyond doubt. The “letter and spirit” formulation is applied
generously, including in
Aoulmiv. France and
Shamayev and Others, where difficulties
faced by the applicants following their extradition or removal were
of such a nature that the effective exercise of their right under
Article 34 of the Convention was “seriously obstructed”. The right
of individual petition lies at the heart of the Convention system
and any incidences of non-compliance undermine its integrity.
56. The case showed clearly that even the single fact of non-compliance
with interim measures per se entails a violation of Article 34 of
the Convention. Furthermore, violation of this provision may be
found irrespective of whether the harm feared actually occurs. Where
the harm is found to occur, the violation of Article 34 may be accompanied
by a breach of one of the other Articles, such as Article 3.
57. The rapporteur considers that the
Ben
Khemais v. Italy case and those Italian cases which followed
it provide a focal point in terms of unacceptable state practice.
The case concerned the expulsion of an individual to Tunisia by
the Italian Government because of his role in terrorist activities
and using diplomatic assurances. The Court indicated to the Italian
Government that the applicant not be expelled to Tunisia, but the
Italians enforced removal in breach of Rule 39. The Court held that
this conduct violated Articles 34 and 3 given that the applicant
was detained on return to Tunisia. It was not possible to verify
whether or not he was being ill-treated, but ill-treatment in detention
and human rights abuse in Tunisia is well documented in international reports.
58. The rapporteur considers important the fact that
Ben Khemais confirmed the now often
repeated principles in
Saadi v. Italy and
Soldatenko v. Ukraine that
diplomatic assurances cannot be relied upon to reduce or negate
the risk of torture when returning an individual to a country where
international sources reliably report that torture is carried out
by the authorities.
59. Therefore, the
Mamatkulov and
Ben Khemais cases demonstrate further
that continued attempts to expel or extradite individuals suspected
or convicted of terrorism offences, with or without diplomatic assurances,
is also directly in contravention with the absolute prohibition
on torture. Not only does this principle feature in the Court’s
judgment, but also at the Rule 39 stage on prima facie risk.
4.4. Objective impediments
60. The rapporteur first acknowledges those cases considered
by the Court where there have been objective impediments to compliance
or lack of notice given before removal
. On
the other hand, the rapporteur is concerned that states have sought
to circumvent condemnation by the Court where the breach of Rule
39 is alleged by claiming ignorance of the indication, lack of time
to comply, difficulties en route to the airport, lack of staff,
or on the basis that relevant officials on the ground never received
the information.
States
should put in place procedures to deal with these eventualities.
More worrying however, are attempts by states to exonerate themselves
before the Court by reference to the fact that there was an “objective
impediment” to compliance. These tactics clearly demonstrate the
same lack of respect for the Convention system as clear non-compliance
cases, as well as a creeping element of bad faith.
61. When examining a complaint under Article 34 concerning the
alleged failure of a contracting state to comply with an interim
measure, it is for the respondent government to demonstrate to the
Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional
case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance
and that the government took all reasonable steps to remove the
impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation. The
intentions or reasons underlying the state’s acts or omissions in
question are of little relevance when assessing whether Article
34 was complied with; what matters is whether the situation created
as a result of the authorities’ act or omission conforms to that
provision.
62. A non-expulsion case,
Grori v.
Albania, demonstrated that where there appears to be
no acceptable explanation for the domestic authorities’ failure
and a delay in complying with an interim measure, without an objective
justification for it, a violation of Article 34 will result.
This principle has been applied
in the context of expulsion. The Court has also rejected arguments
that the absence of a domestic legal mechanism to comply with Rule
39 absolves it from its responsibilities under Article 34.
63. A practical example of the way in which the objective impediment
test may be applied is in
Al-Saadoon v.
the United Kingdom, concerning the transfer of prisoners
from British custody in Iraq to the Iraqi Higher Tribunal to stand
trial for war crimes punishable by death (an analogous situation
to returns cases). The United Kingdom sought to justify the breach
of Rule 39 by reference to their lack of sovereignty at the end
of the period of the United Nations mandate. The Court found a violation
of Article 34 given that the state did not demonstrate that it took
all reasonable steps to remove the impediment.
64. The finding in Al-Saadoon was
accompanied by a breach of Article 3 because the men feared execution by
the Iraqi courts. A violation of Article 13 was also found because
the transfer of the applicants out of the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction
exposed them to a serious risk of grave and irreparable harm at
the hands of the Iraqi authorities and had unjustifiably nullified
the effectiveness of any appeal to the United Kingdom courts.
5. Institutional support
for the Rule 39 mechanism
5.1. Recent practice
and the role of the Court
65. The increased number of requests for Rule 39 received
by the Court has placed an extra burden on its case load and the
government agents who have to deal with the requests. This has also
forced new and changing trends in the law and practice regarding
Rule 39, not only in terms of the application of Rule 39 as seen
in cases but also internally in terms of the Court’s internal workings.
It is still too early to map all of these trends properly.
66. The statistics cited earlier in the report in relation to
Dublin II transfers show that the distribution of Rule 39 cases
is not spread equally between different sections of the Court. Some
sections receive a substantial number of requests and others receive
none or few. Asylum seekers and irregular migrants in the member states
of the Council of Europe should have an equal opportunity to request
interim relief under Rule 39, but for reasons beyond the scope of
this report, they do not. Furthermore, the Court must ensure consistency
in its practice as regards Rule 39 in order to ensure the continuing
and effective operation of the Convention system.
67. A grave misunderstanding is that a violation of Article 34
carries less of a stigma than a violation of Article 3, with the
resulting lack of incentive to comply with interim measures. However
the more robust approach seen in recent cases includes a violation
of Article 34 accompanied by a violation of Article 3. The rapporteur emphasises
that the state’s failure to comply with an indication under Rule
39 should not necessarily prevent the Court from examining the merits
of a complaint under Article 3 or other Articles of the Convention. Otherwise
it would be less burdensome for a respondent state to remove an
applicant from its territory in cases in which Rule 39 was applied
and to be held in violation of Article 34 of the Convention than
to comply with Rule 39 and to be found to have breached Article
3.
68. The rapporteur recognises the important and difficult work
of the Court in examining so many urgent requests for Rule 39 measures.
The rapporteur also recognises the concerns that within the Court
this may shift the focus away from substantive applications, reduce
overall productivity and on a human level can be stressful for the
judges, lawyers, government agents and Court staff involved.
69. Of course there are practical difficulties involved in the
smooth operation of the Rule 39 mechanism. It depends on all parties
playing fairly, meeting deadlines on time, and co-operating fully
and providing the Court with as much information as possible in
order that it has time and opportunity to make a proper assessment
of requests for Rule 39 measures. To this end, the Court has provided
a Practice Direction which should be followed by individuals making
requests. The UNHCR has also produced a toolkit to assist its staff
in responding to requests from lawyers and refugees by providing
an understanding of the workings of this important system.
70. The biggest problem faced by the Court in relation to Dublin
cases is that the domestic authorities transferring an individual
are relying on the Dublin Regulation as a means of allocating responsibility
for examination of the asylum claim on another state. Inherent in
the process of removing a person back to the state deemed responsible
for examining an asylum application is the fact that the Court has
little to go on by way of findings of the domestic authorities in
the removing state when examining risk on return. However when assessing
whether or not there is a prima facierisk
for the purpose of granting Rule 39, the Court will consider independent
reports about the lack of a fair and effective asylum determination
procedure in the receiving state and will give more weight than
usual to the general situation in the country of origin were an
individual to face onward return.
71. Requests are currently dealt with by several different sections
of the Court and usually without much time for proper consultation
and verification of facts. This heightens the risk of inconsistency
between the sections. However, the Court has sought to tackle this
by improving the available internal resources. A new working party including
the section presidents and the deputy section registrars has been
established precisely with a view to securing greater co-ordination
and agreement on a common approach where possible. The deputy section registrars
also maintain regular contact with each other to ensure a flow of
information and to exchange ideas and suggestions.
72. The rapporteur encourages the Court to strive further for
a coherent approach, including improving the flow of information
between the sections. Where serious divergences of opinion persist,
the matter will be referred to the sections and eventually to the
Grand Chamber, which is exactly what has happened with the issue
of Dublin Regulation expulsions – the case of M.S.S.
v. Belgium and Greece.
73. The rapporteur encourages the Court to co-operate closely
with the Committee of Ministers in cases of non-compliance. Cases
of non-compliance are rare and of course it is a matter for the
Committee of Ministers to take action on a collective level following
a finding of the Court of a violation of Article 34. However, it
would be disappointing if the Court were to wash its hands of the
matter or resign itself to taking no action.
74. It is the possibility of repairing the damage caused in cases
of non-compliance that is important here. The approach preferred
by the rapporteur is that seen in
Al-Saadoon, where
in its judgments the Court required the United Kingdom authorities
to take practical steps (namely getting assurances from the Iraqi
authorities) to put an end to the applicant’s already existing suffering
under Article 3.
5.2. Recent practice
and the role of the Committee of Ministers
75. Rule 39(2) states that notice of the measures shall
be given to the Committee of Ministers, who play a role in supervising
compliance with interim measures.
76. Furthermore, under Article 46 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, states have made an undertaking to abide by the judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights in cases to which they are parties.
Compliance with this obligation is supervised by the Committee of
Ministers.
77. In the past two years the Committee of Ministers has been
called upon to supervise interim measures, albeit at the point of
non-compliance when seeking to repair damage caused. Despite the
judgment in
Ben Khemais v. Italy and
the action taken by the Committee of Ministers in supervising the
execution of this judgment (namely an action plan to prevent further
breaches) there have been several more cases of non-compliance (as
stated above).
78. The Committee of Ministers has responded by issuing an interim
resolution.
The
Committee of Ministers deplored that on 1 May 2010 the Italian authorities
had disregarded another such measure indicated by the Court and
expelled another applicant to Tunisia. It noted with concern that
the same had already happened in at least two other cases in 2008
and 2009. The Committee urged the Italian authorities to take all necessary
measures to prevent new similar violations.
79. The rapporteur encourages both the Court and the Committee
of Ministers to capitalise on this relationship in order that Rule
39 remains a strong and effective mechanism of preventing harm to
refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants facing removal.
5.3. Role of the Parliamentary
Assembly
80. The rapporteur has been encouraged by the extent
to which members of the Parliamentary Assembly have shown interest
in the serious issue of Rule 39 measures in the context of extradition
and expulsion. He hopes that parliamentarians will implement change
at national level – acknowledging the dual task of improving asylum
determination procedures on the one hand and co-operating with the
Court in respect of any indications made on the other.
81. Whilst non-compliance applies only to a very few states, the
rapporteur urges the Parliamentary Assembly to monitor cases of
non-compliance and seek to find appropriate remedies. The Assembly
has an important political and awareness-raising function. Its reports
and public statements need to be heard by state officials and actioned
when necessary.
5.4. Role of the Commissioner
for Human Rights
82. The rapporteur welcomes the new role played by the
Commissioner for Human Rights in third party interventions before
the Court and invites the Commissioner to use this important new
power. The rapporteur welcomes the third party intervention in the M.S.S. v. Belgiumand Greece case and others because
the Commissioner’s views carry particular weight in the interpretation
of the Convention. This will clearly have an impact on Rule 39 practice
in respect of Dublin II transfers and the interface of ECHR and
European Union law.
83. Furthermore, the rapporteur welcomes the Commissioner’s country
reports, as well as his recent human rights comment,
which have highlighted cases of
non-compliance and made recommendations to the authorities in relation
to these.
5.5. Role of the UNHCR
84. The rapporteur encourages further co-operation between
the UNHCR and the Strasbourg organs in strengthening the Rule 39
mechanism. The rapporteur invites the Strasbourg organs to give
“due weight” to the views of the UNHCR when considering issues of refoulement of asylum seekers and
refugees, which clearly go to the heart of the mandate of both organisations
in protecting human rights. The rapporteur also welcomes the steps
taken by the UNHCR to raise awareness about interim measures and
their application and encourages them to continue their work in
this area.
85. Relevant training has taken place within the framework of
the Council of Europe’s Joint Programmes. The rapporteur encourages
this to continue and calls for further projects aimed at training
civil servants, the judiciary, national asylum authorities, ministries,
local lawyers and NGOs. The rapporteur encourages further co-operation
between the Council of Europe and the UNHCR in this context.
6. Conclusion and
way forward
86. The rapporteur deems it appropriate to stress by
way of conclusion that non-compliance with Rule 39 measures is unacceptable.
The repetitive breach of the Convention by any state in any manner
is unacceptable. Similarly, the attempts made by states (including
the United Kingdom) to evade the Rule 39 mechanism or exonerate
themselves when those attempts fail by resorting to the “objective
impediment” line of argument, are also unacceptable.
87. However, the rapporteur is also concerned about:
- the lack of access by individuals
to the Rule 39 mechanism where persons are detained, have no means of
support, are destitute, have no access to a lawyer either practically
speaking (for example access to a telephone) or financially (for
example because they are excluded by the lack of legal aid), or
because of language barriers and flaws in the asylum procedure in
addressing this;
- the lack of compliance by states (which is on the increase),
failure to co-operate, failure to act in good faith, and the increasing
albeit rare trend towards seeking to justify situations of non-compliance;
- the lack of consistency in the approach to Rule 39 by
the Court;
- the prospects that there will be even greater use of interim
measures in the future.
The rapporteur also emphasises
the need for the Court and the Committee of Ministers to work together
more closely on this issue, even if their relationship is strengthening
steadily from recent initiatives in this area.
88. The rapporteur considers that the Committee of Ministers and
member states should:
- ensure
that all individuals should have real access and opportunity to
use interim measures;
- take measures to ease the burden on the Court, and government
agents, in particular if there continues to be a rise in the number
of such cases;
- respond robustly to cases of non-compliance in a way which
will mitigate individuals’ suffering caused by the breach of their
rights;
- act collectively to prevent further cases of non-compliance.