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A. Draft resolution
(open)
Report | Doc. 14669 | 04 December 2018
Media freedom as a condition for democratic elections
Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media
Summary
Media freedom is an essential condition for democratic elections. The media must be able to inform the public independently, without political or economic pressure, as voters cannot be said to have genuine freedom of choice if that choice is not a well-informed one. In particular, member States must guarantee the editorial independence of public service media and put an end to any attempt to influence or transform them into government media.
Given their particular role, broadcast media have specific responsibilities during elections and national laws should require them to cover election campaigns in a fair and impartial manner. A free, independent and pluralistic media environment is an essential condition for countering misinformation and propaganda.
Given the expansion of online media and the growing role of social media, the electoral process needs to be better protected from the manipulation of information through these media and clearly establish their legal responsibility in the event of the publication of illegal content prejudicial to candidates. Internet intermediaries should co-operate with content verification organisations to ensure that any information is confirmed by an authoritative third-party source.
A. Draft resolution 
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
emphasises once again that free elections are a pillar of every
democratic society. The electorate cannot be said to have genuine
freedom of choice if that choice is not a well-informed one; consequently,
the right to freedom of information and media freedom are essential
preconditions of the right to free elections, in accordance with
Article 3 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 9). The media must be free to inform the public, without
being subject to any political, economic or other pressure, and
with due regard for professional ethics.
2. The professional media are subject to various obligations
designed to ensure balanced and impartial coverage of elections
and fair participation in the election process of all candidates
and political parties.
3. Alongside the professional media, new media players have arrived
on the scene: social media. These are having an increasing impact
on the public, including during election campaigns: they enable
political parties and candidates to pass on their messages “directly”
to the electorate, and are a means for their supporters to disseminate
those messages.
4. In many countries, social media are not subject to the general
regulations governing the media or to the specific rules that apply
at election times. Moreover, the particular nature of online communication
makes it difficult to apply to social media the principles which
the professional media must respect. Most attempts at regulation
have failed to yield convincing results of compliance; other attempts
have been heavy-handed and have amounted to censorship. Furthermore,
sites which have been closed down can respond by creating “mirror
sites” beyond national borders, which makes the sanctions adopted
by the domestic authorities less effective. There is also a lack
of self-regulation by social media, which often disregard the conventions
that have been widely accepted by the professional media.
5. Given the existing legal gaps, the various forms of malevolent
online communication endanger the smooth and fair conduct of the
electoral process and, ultimately, of democracy itself. Today, there
is sufficient proof that autocratic regimes and anonymous stakeholders
or interest groups use social media to manipulate public opinion
with false news, co-ordinated disinformation campaigns, and trolls
or bots, to attack not only candidates in the opposing camp, but
also human rights defenders, civil society groups and journalists. Furthermore,
even though recent research seems to show that social media users
are exposed to more diverse information sources than those not using
online sources, “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” may hamper
the potential benefits of such positive exposure, compartmentalise
information flows, and undermine internet users’ ability to think
critically, thus reinforcing prejudices.
6. In order to respond effectively to these problems, member
States should guarantee the right to information through independent
media; in addition, they should implement effective strategies to
protect the electoral process and democracy from the threat of information
manipulation and propaganda through social media.
7. In this context, the Assembly reiterates the obligations deriving
from Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS
No. 5), and the standards and practical guidelines contained in
numerous Council of Europe texts, including the following recommendations
of the Committee of Ministers: Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)15 on measures concerning media coverage of election campaigns, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)3 on the remit of public service media in the information
society, Recommendation
Rec(2004)16 on the right of reply in the new media environment, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)2 on media pluralism and diversity of media content, and
most recently Recommendation
CM/Rec(2018)1 on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership,
as well as Recommendation
Rec (2000) 23 on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities
for the broadcasting sector, and Recommendation No. R (97)
20 on “hate speech”, along with General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on combating hate speech, issued by the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) and the Guidelines
on Media Analysis during Election Observation Missions, issued jointly by the Venice Commission and the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR).
8. Accordingly, the Assembly recommends that member States review,
where necessary, their regulatory frameworks governing media coverage
of election campaigns, in order to bring them into line with Council
of Europe standards, ensuring in particular that they:
8.1. promote a free, independent
and pluralist media environment as an essential precondition for combating
disinformation and propaganda;
8.2. avoid media concentration, also paying attention to the
problem of cross ownership;
8.3. impose, where this has not already been done, on public
and private broadcast media an obligation to cover election campaigns
fairly and impartially, making sure that opposition parties benefit from
balanced media coverage in current affairs and information programmes,
and introduce, alongside this obligation, appropriate penalties,
by setting up the necessary monitoring and rectification mechanisms
to ensure that this is applied in practice;
8.4. limit to a strict minimum the use made of measures restricting
freedom of expression, which must not only be provided for by law
and have a legitimate aim, but also be necessary in a democratic
society; this means that they should not be arbitrary or politically
motivated;
8.5. guarantee for any party or candidate having been the victim
of false information broadcast by the media, including on the internet,
the right to a rapid correction of that information and the right
to seek redress in court;
8.6. adopt strict rules on media coverage of government activities,
to avoid media coverage of ceremonies attended or organised by the
government resulting in preferential treatment and undue advantages
for the parties in power and their candidates during elections;
8.7. guarantee, where political parties and candidates have
the right to purchase advertising space for election purposes, equal
treatment in terms of conditions and rates charged; in this context,
there should be a requirement for paid political advertising to
be readily recognisable as such;
8.8. ensure total transparency vis-à-vis the public when media
are owned by political parties or politicians;
8.9. guarantee the editorial independence of public service
media, putting an end to any attempts to influence them or transform
them into governmental media: the use of public service media to
promote a specific political party or candidate must be classified
as illegal misuse of public funds;
8.10. enhance the operational capacities of media regulators
which must be independent of the political and economic powers;
in this regard:
8.10.1. ensure that
the composition of these bodies is politically neutral and based
on media expertise and competence;
8.10.2. seek to reinforce their role so that they can contribute
more effectively to addressing the challenges posed by the use of
social media as a vehicle of political communication and to counter
information disorder.
9. Concerning more specifically the risks posed by disinformation
and propaganda on internet and social media for the smooth conduct
of the electoral process, the Assembly recommends that member States:
9.1. refrain from disseminating or
encouraging the dissemination on internet of statements, communications
or news which they know or reasonably should know to be disinformation
or propaganda;
9.2. develop specific regulatory frameworks for internet content
at election times and include in those frameworks provisions on
transparency in relation to sponsored content published on social
media, so that the public can be aware of the source that funds
electoral advertising or any other information or opinion;
9.3. establish clear legal liability for the social media companies
which publish illegal content harmful to candidates or violate essential
rules of media communication during election times;
9.4. ensure that sanctions provided for in relation to unlawful
content are not diverted to force self-censorship of opponents’
opinions and critical views, and limit the application of extreme
measures such as the blocking of entire websites, IP addresses,
ports or network protocols to the most serious cases, in full compliance
with the strict conditions set out in Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights;
9.5. provide specific training for electoral management bodies
and media regulators, so that their members can gain a better understanding
of the new media environment, with a view to enhancing implementation
of regulations on political communication via social media;
9.6. encourage all stakeholders – including internet intermediaries,
media outlets, civil society and academia – to develop participatory
initiatives to enable the general public to have a better understanding
of the danger of disinformation and propaganda on internet, and
to seek together appropriate responses to these phenomena.
10. The Assembly calls on professionals and organisations in the
media sector to:
10.1. develop self-regulation
frameworks which should contain professional and ethical standards relating
to their coverage of election campaigns, including respect for human
dignity and the principle of non-discrimination;
10.2. ensure comprehensive and analytical coverage of the election
campaign, candidates and their platforms, to enable the electorate
to make a more informed choice at the ballot box;
10.3. make a clear separation between the activities of the
powers in office and the activities of representatives of political
parties running for election, ensuring that no preferential treatment
is given to the powers in office;
10.4. adopt strict internal rules and sanctions against journalists
and editors to prevent them from accepting money and other benefits
in return for positive coverage of a candidate;
10.5. avoid disseminating messages based on unverified information
or rumours designed to cause a scandal or for propaganda purposes;
if such messages are deemed to be important or urgent, their dissemination
should be accompanied by a warning that the information has not
been verified;
10.6. expose any attempt to manipulate information during the
election campaign in the professional media or on social media platforms
and, in this context, establish strong and close co-operation within the
profession in order to combat disinformation and propaganda.
11. The Assembly calls on internet intermediaries to:
11.1. develop initiatives offering
users fact-checking services and tools to flag up misleading information,
and review their advertising models to ensure that they do not adversely
impact diversity of opinions and ideas;
11.2. co-operate with civil society and organisations specialising
in the verification of content to ensure that all information is
confirmed by an authoritative third-party source;
11.3. support the research and development of appropriate technological
solutions to disinformation and propaganda which users may apply
as they wish to detect disinformation and propaganda.
12. The Assembly calls on the European Federation of Journalists
(EFJ) to promote among its members awareness of the issues addressed
in this resolution and to facilitate the pooling of experience and
good practices relating to the coverage of election campaigns. In
this connection, the Assembly calls on the EFJ to promote among
its members effective collaboration regarding fact-checking and
myth-busting, particularly at election time.
13. The Assembly calls on the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)
to continue to promote its guidelines and editorial principles and
to encourage European public service media to fully apply them,
keeping in mind their particular role during election campaigns
as an independent source of impartial, accurate and relevant information
and of a diverse range of political opinions. In this context, the
EBU should support active co-operation between its members to combat
disinformation and propaganda in general and in particular during election
campaigns.
B. Explanatory memorandum by Ms Gülsün Bilgehan, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction
1. Freedom of expression and freedom
of the media are essential to any democratic process. The role of the
media is vital to the integrity of the electoral process as today
most voters gain essential information about politics through the
media. The latter provide a platform for
debates among parties and candidates, report on campaign developments,
inform voters on how to exercise their rights and on the results
of elections; but the media can (and should) also help monitor the
electoral process, including election day proceedings.
The latter provide a platform for
debates among parties and candidates, report on campaign developments,
inform voters on how to exercise their rights and on the results
of elections; but the media can (and should) also help monitor the
electoral process, including election day proceedings. 2. Thus, under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5), media freedom is a necessary condition in order
to ensure the fundamental right to free elections affirmed by Article
3 of the Protocol to the Convention (ETS No. 9). Free and fair elections
are only possible where the electorate is well informed by independent
media, in a pluralistic environment.
3. However, in many countries the incumbent governments benefit
from disproportionate and excessively positive media coverage, in
particular due to its control over the media, public and private,
or because of its close relationship with the media. Moreover, during
elections, the freedom of the media and the safety of journalists
are even more exposed than usual to serious threats, including intimidations,
physical attacks and application of laws restricting freedom of
expression, as well as denigration of the opposition media.
4. Events over the last few years have also shown that we live
in a world where disinformation and propaganda are becoming frequent
and omnipresent. This undermines public trust and confidence in journalism
as a public watchdog, and may mislead the public by blurring the
lines between disinformation and media products containing independently
verifiable facts.
5. Moreover, the media landscape in the Council of Europe member
States has changed dramatically in the last few years, particularly
given the expanding internet media and rapidly growing role of social
media. This technological and social shift is changing the impact
of media on the whole democratic decision-making process, notably
in the election period, and raises specific challenges that the
current regulations do not fully address. In particular, the restrictions
to print and broadcast media now seem outdated considering the significant
developments in online media services over the last decade and given
the increasing convergence of online services of traditional print
and of traditional broadcast media.
6. In this report, I propose to analyse how we can effectively
address these challenges, and more generally, consolidate the role
of the media as pillars of a truly democratic electoral process.
My analysis of these issues is essentially based on the expert report
by Mr Rasťo Kužel, whom I thank for his work. I
also rely on various Council of Europe standard-setting instruments,
including Committee of Ministers Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)15 on measures concerning media coverage of election campaigns;
and practical guidelines like the Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters drawn up by the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) or the Guidelines
on Media Analysis During Election Observation Missions issued jointly by the Venice Commission and the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR).
whom I thank for his work. I
also rely on various Council of Europe standard-setting instruments,
including Committee of Ministers Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)15 on measures concerning media coverage of election campaigns;
and practical guidelines like the Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters drawn up by the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) or the Guidelines
on Media Analysis During Election Observation Missions issued jointly by the Venice Commission and the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR).2. Differentiated status according to the types of media
2.1. Division lines: broadcasters and print media; public service media and private media; traditional and new media
7. The regulation of the media
coverage of elections must aim to reconcile, on the one hand, respect
for the editorial independence of the media and, on the other, the
need to guarantee the fairness of the media coverage during the
electoral period. Thus, certain restrictions on the freedom of expression
may be necessary, although they would not normally be allowed, in
order to guarantee the free expression of the opinion of the people
on the choice of the legislature. However, these restrictions are not
the same for all media.
However, these restrictions are not
the same for all media.8. Thus, print media (private) may be more “partisan” than broadcasters
which are subject to a wide array of rules regarding their activities
during elections, including the obligation to cover elections in
a “fair, balanced and impartial manner”. Fair access concerns in
particular the airtime allocated to candidates.
9. Public service media funded by the taxpayers have a legal
and moral responsibility to serve the interests of the general public,
not those of the government, political parties or private interest
groups. Using public media to promote a certain political party
or candidate is an unjustified misappropriation of public funds. Members
of the public are entitled to insist on fairness, balance, and impartiality
of public service media and make sure that the government’s attitude
towards the media will ensure their access to information to which they
are entitled.
10. It is important that public service media inform the electorate
about the role of elections in a democracy, how to exercise one’s
right to vote, the key electoral issues, and the programmes and
arguments of the various parties and candidates contesting the election.
In this context, programmes that allow questions to be put to party
leaders and leading candidates, as well as debates between candidates,
are particularly important.
11. Strict rules of impartiality and balance should be applied
to public service media when reporting on the governing party and
on government decisions and actions during an election period. They
should ensure to all parties and candidates equitable access to
airtime to communicate their messages directly to the public, either for
free or at subsidised rates. Equitable access means non-discriminatory
access allocated according to objective criteria for measuring overall
levels of support, and includes factors such as timing of access
and any fees.
12. In several member States, the principles applicable to broadcast
services of the public service media should be applicable to their
non-linear audiovisual services. In most instances, both types of
service will complement each other and users will expect similar
obligations regarding impartiality, fairness and balance.
13. Although the status of private media is different from that
of the public one, they are also expected to provide objective and
balanced coverage of current affairs, especially during the election
period.
14. “New media” is a broad term that describes a range of media
that are utilised for many different purposes, consisting of the
internet, mobile phones, social media such as blogs and micro-blogs,
video-sharing sites, and others. Unlike traditional media, new media
are usually interactive; they use digital, online and mobile technology
and are often audience-created and user-driven. In addition, they
function in real time and are usually borderless and thus more difficult
to regulate.
15. The line between professional media and social media is often
blurred. For instance, in many member States, the most popular online
news websites may be run by historically print media companies,
such as in Germany, where www.spiegel.de is the most popular online news site, or www.lemonde.fr in France.
16. In addition, most journalists use the internet as a key source
of information for reporting, and many traditional media create
online editions or transform into fully multi-media outlets. Moreover,
professional media also utilise “citizen journalism” pieces and
rely on personal mobile phone images and video to cover certain stories
where they do not have their own reporters. Indeed, the rise of new media provides
further avenues and possibilities for participatory citizenry, information
and knowledge sharing, inclusion and empowerment. At the same time,
however, online media can pose serious challenges to the integrity
of election process mainly due to the emergence of disinformation
and fake news.
Indeed, the rise of new media provides
further avenues and possibilities for participatory citizenry, information
and knowledge sharing, inclusion and empowerment. At the same time,
however, online media can pose serious challenges to the integrity
of election process mainly due to the emergence of disinformation
and fake news. 2.2. In particular: audiovisual media services
2.2.1. News and current affairs programmes
17. News programmes should reflect
a variety of news, which is relevant, fresh, accurate, balanced
and factual and, in principle, they should refrain from stating
opinions. It is important that a fair and equitable mechanism is
established to determine the proportion of election news coverage
to be allocated to election candidates. They should receive news
coverage commensurate with their importance in the election and
the extent of their electoral support. Thus, there is no need to
overexpose small parties – in particular, if this is done at the
expense of bigger parties. However, even minor parties should also
receive sufficient coverage during the campaign, for example at
the time of their manifesto launch.
18. The law usually provides general provisions on equal treatment
of candidates, but it is important that it is within the editorial
decision of each media outlet to determine the specific election
formats and models based on which they will distribute airtime to
candidates. For
example, the amount of news coverage devoted to the competing parties
is strictly controlled in the United Kingdom as the BBC takes measures
to ensure parity among the competing parties. In some member States, broadcast
media are criticised for not providing comprehensive and analytical
coverage of the campaign, the candidates and their platforms; this
can skew the choice voters will make on polling day.
For
example, the amount of news coverage devoted to the competing parties
is strictly controlled in the United Kingdom as the BBC takes measures
to ensure parity among the competing parties. In some member States, broadcast
media are criticised for not providing comprehensive and analytical
coverage of the campaign, the candidates and their platforms; this
can skew the choice voters will make on polling day.19. Although televised debates provide the best forum for exchanges
of views, non-participation by one of the front-running candidates
or parties always reduces their value in the eyes of the electorate.
An opportunity for the public debate of different viewpoints provides
voters with a better understanding of the choices available to them
on election day. As a supplement to news, these programmes offer
commentary, debate, or an opportunity for competing interests to
present their opinions directly to viewers and listeners. However,
the decision on how such fairness should be achieved (for instance,
deciding the format, the number of participants, the length, etc.)
should be left to the initiative of the broadcasting organisation
itself.
20. Talk show formats are attractive for viewers because they
offer diverse ideas and provide a good opportunity for voters to
receive more information about candidates. It is however important
to establish some rules for talk shows too, because if left totally
uncontrolled, they can mislead and misinform many viewers. It is important
that candidates are treated fairly when it comes to designing formats
of talk shows during electoral periods.
2.2.2. Free airtime on public broadcast media
21. Public service media often
offer, at no cost, free airtime for political candidates or parties
to communicate their messages to the electorate. It is considered
to be a direct form of communication between politicians and voters,
without any intermediary role by the media. One of the main advantages
of giving free airtime is to allow smaller parties or minor candidates
to have an opportunity to deliver their electoral messages, as they otherwise
do not get significant coverage by the media.
22. The amount of time allotted has to be sufficient to allow
candidates to effectively communicate and illustrate their platforms
to the public. The allocation of time can be offered on an equal
basis or a proportional basis according to the specific context
in which the elections are taking place. When the number of contesting parties
is limited, strict equality may be applicable. For presidential
elections, referenda and first democratic elections, the criteria
of strict equality better fits the need to provide all candidates
with a level playing field. In some member States, this provision
is used to demonstrate that candidates have equitable access to
State or public service media while at the same time there is a
huge disproportion in the amount of coverage the candidates receive
in the news and current affairs programmes.
In some member States, this provision
is used to demonstrate that candidates have equitable access to
State or public service media while at the same time there is a
huge disproportion in the amount of coverage the candidates receive
in the news and current affairs programmes.2.2.3. Paid political advertising
23. In addition to the allocation
of free time and space, paid political advertising constitutes another opportunity
for all political parties or candidates to disseminate their messages
through the media. While voters undoubtedly need as much information
about candidates as possible to make a reasoned choice, paid advertising
may give an unfair advantage to those parties or candidates who
can afford to purchase more airtime. Therefore, not all countries
accept this practice.
24. Given the growing impact of social media during elections,
it is reasonable to apply to them similar rules regarding paid political
advertisements as those that already exist vis-à-vis the traditional
media. The main question, however, concerns the ability to implement
these rules on internet and to determine which body would be responsible
for overseeing and enforcing the implementation.
25. In late October 2017, the United States senators announced
a new bill that would regulate online political advertising. The
new bill, called the Honest Ads Act, would require companies like
Facebook and Google to keep copies of political ads and make them
publicly available. Under the act, the companies would also be required
to release information about those targeted by those advertisements,
as well as information about the buyer and the tariffs charged for
the ads. The new rules would bring disclosure rules more into line
with how political ads are regulated in mediums like print and television,
and would apply to any platform with more than 50 million monthly
viewers. The companies would be required to keep and release data
on anyone spending more than US$500 on political ads per year.
2.3. Impact on the electorate of various types of media
26. While the broadcast media is
still a main source of news during electoral periods, the impact
of social media continues to grow, particularly among younger groups.
On the other hand, a research conducted by Reuters in 2016 found
that “television news still remains most important for older groups
but overall usage has continued to decline, particularly amongst
younger groups”. In particular, 28% of 18 to 24 year-olds said that social
media was their main source of news, which was “for the first time”
more than television (24%). Looking at Germany and France, the study
suggests that “television, particularly the widely watched evening
bulletins from PSBs ARD and ZDF, remains the most important news
source in Germany”, and television news remains the most important
source of news also in France.
27. Although reading the written press remains more widespread
than the use of online social networks, the gap is closing. In general
terms, if we equate influence with trust, radio is the medium in
which Europeans express the most trust, followed by television.
Trust in the written press has also gained ground; trust in the internet
represents a minority view, and distrust has risen. However, given
the increased impact of social media, there are a growing number
of voices calling for some kind of regulation of online media, particularly during
electoral periods. Social media are private companies with a level
of “public interest” tenet as they play a role in the information
ecosystem and users’ media preferences. They act as co-publishers
and not merely as platforms, using algorithms along with the production
of contents.
3. The challenges posed by the new media environment
3.1. Biased and one-sided coverage and emergence of disinformation and propaganda
28. Frequent media bias in favour
of incumbents, particularly with regard to public service media,
is generally one of the challenges to OSCE election commitments
and other international standards. The public service media or State-owned
media are in danger of being abused by the governments for the overt
promotion of their political agendas. Moreover, evidence suggests
that manipulation and propaganda have been used intensively – both
by States and non-State actors – on internet, particularly on social
media.
29. The Parliamentary Assembly noted its concern about the influence
of online media on elections in Resolution 2143 (2017) “Online media and journalism: challenges and accountability”,
expressing its concern about many online media campaigns, often
in the political context, with the objective of harming democratic political
processes.
30. According to a report by Freedom House, manipulation and disinformation
tactics play an important role in elections, damaging citizens’
ability to choose their leaders based on factual news and authentic
debate. Over the last few years, the practice has become significantly
more widespread and technically sophisticated, with bots, propaganda
producers and fake news outlets exploiting social media and search
algorithms to ensure high visibility and seamless integration with
trusted content. It is not just a problem
of using private data for political reasons but also of using counterfeited
videos and news and defamation against candidates. In these conditions,
any election campaign can be damaged. It is a matter of concern
that “the effects of these rapidly spreading techniques on democracy
and civic activism are potentially devastating.” These actions are destroying trust,
polluting the information space and attempting to destroy public
discourse and democratic institutions.
These actions are destroying trust,
polluting the information space and attempting to destroy public
discourse and democratic institutions.31. According to a study conducted by Oxford University, political
campaigns, governments, and regular citizens around the world are
employing both people and bots in attempts to artificially shape
public life. The study considers computational propaganda to be
a phenomenon connected with recent digital misinformation and manipulation
efforts and defines it as the use of algorithms, automation and
human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information
over social media networks. One person, or a small group of people,
can use an army of political bots on Twitter to give the illusion
of large-scale consensus.
32. Today there is enough evidence to suggest that autocratic
regimes use political bots to silence opponents and to push official
government discourse. Moreover, political bots have been used during
elections to influence the vote or defame opponents. The same Oxford
study also warns that anonymous political actors harness key elements
of computational propaganda such as false news reports, co-ordinated
disinformation campaigns and troll mobs to attack human rights defenders,
civil society groups, and journalists. Computational propaganda
is one of the most powerful new tools against democracy.
3.2. Inflammatory and hostile language
33. Some forms of disinformation
and propaganda may not only harm individual reputations and privacy,
but may also incite violence, discrimination or hostility against
identifiable groups in society. International standards and recommendations
on hate speech stipulate that media should refuse all open expressions
of intolerance and thoughtfully consider whether the publication
of such expressions is conducive to defamation and ridicule based
on sex, race, colour, language, faith and religion, belonging to
a national or ethnic minority or ethnic group, social difference,
or political or other opinion.
International standards and recommendations
on hate speech stipulate that media should refuse all open expressions
of intolerance and thoughtfully consider whether the publication
of such expressions is conducive to defamation and ridicule based
on sex, race, colour, language, faith and religion, belonging to
a national or ethnic minority or ethnic group, social difference,
or political or other opinion.34. The need to counteract such forms of expression is even more
urgent in situations of tension and in times of war or other forms
of armed conflict. The governments of the Council of Europe member
States, public authorities and public institutions at the national,
regional and local levels, as well as officials, have a special responsibility
to refrain from statements, in particular to the media, which may
be understood as hate speech, or as speech likely to produce the
effect of legitimising, spreading or promoting racial hatred, xenophobia,
anti-Semitism or other forms of discrimination or hatred based on
intolerance. Such statements should be prohibited and publicly disavowed
whenever they occur.
35. However, a clear distinction needs to be made between a media
outlet that would transmit racist comments, reflecting its editorial
position, and an outlet that would transmit such comments made by
others for the sake of reporting. The international standards provide
that the media should not be held legally liable for accurately
reporting the statements of others – even if those statements themselves
are held to be unlawful.
36. In this context, it is important to determine whether such
comments were reported in an inflammatory way, whether counterbalancing
views were also reported and other elements of context, in order
to understand whether these views were being presented in a positive
or negative light. The media should in principle be exempted from
liability for disseminating unlawful statements directly made by
parties or candidates – whether in the context of live broadcasting
or advertising – unless the statements have been ruled unlawful
by a court, the statements constitute direct incitement to violence
and the media outlet had an opportunity to prevent their dissemination.
37. Another aspect to take into consideration is the identity
of the individual who is being criticised. The European Court of
Human Rights has made it clear that the scope of defamation is far
narrower when the individual, whose reputation may be affected,
is a public representative or more generally a politician. The assumption
is that the needs of political debate and accountability necessary
in a democracy mean that vigorous expression of opinions should
not be restricted.
3.3. Insufficiency of investigative reporting and analytical coverage and decrease in critical thinking among audiences
38. A number of OSCE/ODIHR final
observation reports highlight the overall lack of investigative
and analytical coverage in the media reporting of elections. In
response to propaganda and disinformation, there is a need for good
quality journalism, and it would thus be advisable to support initiatives,
training and other activities aimed at enhancing the overall quality
of election-related reporting.
39. There is concern that social media are undermining the quality
of information and that the bad information people receive has a
potential to weaken democracy in the digital age. There is a lack
of meaningful debate, with internet users being split into “filter
bubbles” of like-minded people who are locked in echo chambers that
reinforce their own biases. The combination of the lack of analytical
coverage by the traditional media and the negative role played by
social media contributes to the decrease in critical thinking among audiences.
It is therefore important to consider how to eliminate these negative
trends and strengthen the existing democratic institutions.
3.4. Problems related to the regulation of new media
40. The principal question related
to the regulation of new media is whether the regulatory practices
that exist for traditional media could be used for new media. It
is clear that many of the assumptions that are applicable vis-à-vis
the regulation of traditional media do not apply in the case of
new media. For instance, the assumption behind broadcasting regulation
that the frequency spectrum is a finite resource that must therefore be
shared does not apply on internet. The convergence of traditional
and new media also means that governments face the challenge of
where and how to draw the line with regulation. Are opinionated
blogs to be regulated as third party campaigning? Can blackout periods
be enforced beyond the country’s borders or even within country
borders?
41. It should be mentioned that the most significant threat to
news diversity and quality remains the repressive legal restrictions
under which journalists operate. Traditional media can be regulated
in a way that does not constitute censorship and enhances, rather
than restricts, freedom of expression. However, such regulation
of new media has proven extremely difficult. New media can be regulated,
but the content of the internet, for example, is so diverse and
widespread that regulation has been heavy-handed and has amounted to
censorship: interception of emails, closure of websites, and pressure
or legal action against internet service providers. Further challenges
in terms of regulation of internet include the fact that it is difficult
to regulate it due to its international nature. Attempts by national
regulators to close down websites are met with the creation of mirror
sites (replicas) beyond the country’s borders. Self-regulation by
new media users is also more difficult, and new media has often
ignored conventions that have been widely accepted by traditional
media (for example not reporting exit polls before voting has ended).
42. On the other side of the argument is the growing impact of
internet and social media during electoral periods. For instance,
during the United Kingdom parliamentary elections in 2015, as much
as £1.6 million was spent on political advertising through Facebook
and Google. This figure was double the amount spent on campaign
broadcasts, and five times that spent on newspapers.
43. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on
online media has been developing in recent years. But in 2017, the
Court ruled for the first time on the online news media's liability
for reporting serious allegations against a political candidate.
The Court laid down important principles under Article 10 applicable
to online media during elections, in particular where online media
outlets follow “good-faith” journalism practices. In addition, it
has also delivered important judgments concerning the online news
media's liability for user-generated content.
44. It should be noted that in response to the criticism of its
role in the US elections, the social media platforms have started
to take initiatives to address the negative trends unveiled after
the elections. For example, Facebook now allows users to “mark a
news story as fake”; news stories reported as “fake” by users may
then be reviewed by a fact-checker.
45. Furthermore, in the area of political advertising, a number
of social media have introduced self-regulatory policies on election
coverage. For instance, LinkedIn’s advertising policy includes a
rule that all political advertising must clearly identify the person
or entity that paid for the message. Ads not financed by a candidate or
campaign must indicate whether the content is authorised by a candidate
and, if not, include contact information for the person or entity
that paid for the message. Political ads must comply with applicable
laws, including with respect to identifying the sponsors of such
ads or observing “news blackouts” or “quiet periods” prior to elections.
Similarly, Twitter’s advertising policy includes restrictions on
“political campaigning” and has country-specific rules. Twitter
also provides a purple “promotion” icon indicating tweets that contain
links to political campaign ads that have been paid for by candidates
or political parties. Google’s “AdWords” policy has rules on “political
content,” and when promoting political content, advertisements run
by Google must comply with applicable laws, notably those governing
“silence periods” during elections.
4. Good practice and possible solutions to the challenges posed by the new media environment
4.1. Towards new models to finance good quality journalism
46. As good quality journalism
is an essential response to the emergence of disinformation and
propaganda, it is important to provide more support to the existing
functioning models which prove to be successful. This includes but
is not limited to the public service media. Secondly, we should
not forget that information remains a valuable asset and it appears
that the media sector is currently not capable of fully monetising
that value. For example, the Dutch newspaper De
Correspondent has over five ways of generating revenue
(membership, technology reselling, speaker management, events, book
publishing). One way to better monetise the information is by applying
a wide array of formats and channels (books, consultancy, video-games).
47. There are a number of challenges facing traditional journalism,
and among the biggest ones is the fact that social media platforms
have swallowed much of the advertising revenues that once kept traditional
media companies afloat. According to an article in The Guardian, “by acting like technology
companies, while in fact taking on the role of publishers, Google,
Facebook and others, have accidentally designed a system that elevates
the cheapest and ‘most engaging’ content at the expense of more
expensive but less ‘spreadable’ material. Anyone who wants to reach
a million people with a poorly produced conspiracy theory video
is in luck. If, however, you want to run a well-resourced newsroom
covering a town of 200 000 people, that is not going to be sustainable”.
48. In the aftermath of the United States elections in 2016, the
role of the social media during elections has been the centre of
debates. While the debate so far has demonstrated that these social
media platforms (Facebook, Google and Twitter) are primarily interested
in protecting their business interests, they appear to at least
have acknowledged to some extent that they are part of the problem
and have started to take some initiatives to deal with the problem.
A number of analysts believe that the social media platforms should
be a part of the solution.
4.2. Fact-checking and myth busting
49. A number of new projects emerged
particularly after the United States elections in 2016. The main
aim of these projects is to provide the public with the necessary
information to form their own conclusions about the information
they receive.
50. For example, CrossCheck is
an online verification collaboration that began in February 2017
and their first project brought together 37 newsroom partners in
France and the United Kingdom to help report false, misleading and
confusing claims that circulated online in the ten weeks leading
up to the French presidential election in 2017. While it certainly
is important to utilise the latest technology to research how fact-checking
and identification of online trolls can be automatised, professional
journalists and media analysts appear to be best placed to provide
the most competent fact-checking and verification. Media outlets
should consider including critical coverage of disinformation and
propaganda, particularly during elections and regarding debates
on matters of public interest.
51. Another relevant example is First
Draft, a project of the Shorenstein Center on Media,
Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government. The project uses research-based methods to
fight online disinformation and additionally it provides practical
and ethical guidance on how to find, verify and publish content
sourced from social media. First Draft originated
in June 2015 from the collaboration between nine founding organisations
to raise awareness, perform research and address challenges relating
to trust and truth in media in the digital age. As one of the founding
organisations, Google News Lab provided assistance to develop and
maintain the project, supported the creation of new content and
co-ordinated the community of practice. In September 2016, First Draft began co-ordinating
with a community of newsrooms, technology companies, human rights
organisations and universities across the globe to help inform and
scale up its work, and to promote collaboration.
52. According to the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA),
“fact-checking and myth-busting work when they are targeted at key
audiences who are receptive to fact-based argument. To be truly
effective, this research needs to be targeted towards media and
policy makers and made relevant to their agendas. Whether reacting
rapidly to disinformation repeated by mainstream media, or contributing
to policy debates, myth-busting sites battling Kremlin disinformation
need to be strengthened and honed to achieve clear aims”.
4.3. Strengthening the mandate of public service media
53. The mandate of public service
media is to inform, educate and entertain. At the heart of this
mandate lies the notion of informed society. Public media should
be committed to nurturing and sustaining democracy and providing
citizens with the information they need to make informed decisions
that enable them to position themselves in relation to their community,
their country and the world. To do this, public broadcasters should be
engaged in comprehensive and critical coverage of State institutions.
54. We live in a world where disinformation and propaganda are
becoming frequent and omnipresent, where people don’t know whom
to trust. It is incumbent upon public broadcasters to affirm the
highest journalistic values by offering the public credible and
comprehensive newsworthy reporting, and by focusing more on fact- checking,
in-depth reporting and investigative journalism.
55. The public broadcaster will always be poorer than its private
competitors owned by oligarchs, and it won’t be able to fully compete
by reeling in audiences with big-money entertainment shows. However,
in a fragmented media landscape, a strong, independent public broadcaster
could grow to be the most trusted medium for its reliability, for
its capacity to be open to various parts of society, to raise the
right questions, and for its effort to provide answers through unbiased
investigations and citizen journalism. For example, Hromadske TV,
an online television and news portal, is trying this in Ukraine.
Established in November 2013, Hromadske TV is an ambitious attempt
to build, from scratch, a public broadcaster free of any political
and business interests, or government propaganda influences, and
only funded by donors and public donations. Employing just 20 full-time
journalists, it strove to produce impartial journalism, becoming
especially well known for its live reports from demonstrations on
the Maidan.
4.4. Strengthening the independence of media regulators
56. The body in charge of overseeing
the media coverage of elections should have experience, sufficient resources,
knowledge, know-how and a mandate to oversee respect of the rules.
It should act promptly upon candidates’ complaints, or whenever
it records a violation, properly investigate alleged violations
and impose effective remedies when violations take place. It is important that the sanctions
imposed by the regulator are commensurate with the gravity of the
offence committed by the media outlet.
It is important that the sanctions
imposed by the regulator are commensurate with the gravity of the
offence committed by the media outlet.57. The authorities in the member States should ensure (both in
legislation and in practice) the political and operational independence
of the media regulators, in line with Council of Europe standards. If media regulators are to be respected
as being independent and credible, the system of appointing their
members should provide for diverse membership, including experts
with media background and experience, selected inter alia from among
civil society organisations dealing with the freedom of expression.
If media regulators are to be respected
as being independent and credible, the system of appointing their
members should provide for diverse membership, including experts
with media background and experience, selected inter alia from among
civil society organisations dealing with the freedom of expression.58. Following the changes in the media environment, the next step
should be establishing of and/or strengthening the already existing
media monitoring departments, both in terms of allocation of funds
and of ad hoc training in
quantitative and qualitative media monitoring analysis.
4.5. Regulation of online content; legislation to tackle hate speech and incitement to violence online
59. Some measures taken by internet
intermediaries to limit access to or the dissemination of digital
content, including through automated processes, such as algorithms
or digital recognition-based content removal systems, which are
not transparent in nature, which fail to respect minimum due process
standards and/or which unduly restrict access to or the dissemination
of content, may raise legitimate concerns. State-mandated blocking
of entire websites, IP addresses, ports or network protocols, is
an extreme measure which can only be justified within the strict
framework set by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Content filtering systems which are imposed by a government
and which are not end-user controlled are not justifiable as a restriction
on freedom of expression. Since these questions are being dealt
with in other current reports, I limit myself here to recalling
them.
Since these questions are being dealt
with in other current reports, I limit myself here to recalling
them.4.6. Increased transparency of media ownership and prevention of media concentrations
60. To counter disinformation,
manipulation and propaganda, more independence is needed; however,
this is closely linked to transparency and pluralism. It is important
to further increase the transparency of media ownership in a number
of member States so that it does not allow the true owners to remain
hidden. Media ownership by politicians and political parties continues
to be a problem in some member States. While categorical restrictions
of such ownership would raise concerns with regard to Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is crucially important
that the public is aware of the potential influence of media owners.
61. Transparency helps to reduce undue influence also when applied
to political advertising. When the media accept paid political advertising,
it is necessary that all paid political advertising in all forms
of media is readily recognisable as such, and that the public can
request the identification of the party ordering the advertising.
There have been instances when media accepted money during election
campaigns and in return featured certain politicians more prominently
in their news reporting of the campaign. These are corrupt practices
which should be dealt with by the relevant regulators and competent
judicial authorities in the form of adequate sanctions. In addition,
the transparency of political advertising must also be ensured offline.
62. The enduring monopolisation of the media market in a number
of Council of Europe member States by powerful groups close to the
establishment has deprived audiences of an effective diversity of
sources of information, and has thereby weakened the guarantees
of pluralism. Such undue concentration of media ownership should
be prevented through appropriate measures. Suitable instruments
should be applied to improve competition, to motivate old players
to loosen information monopolies, and to allow new players to enter
the media scene.
4.7. Media monitoring and analysis
63. During elections, media monitoring
provides benchmarks to judge the fairness of the election process. Media
monitoring assesses the behaviour of the media during various phases
of the election process and evaluates their compliance with international
standards and local regulations on election coverage. It helps to establish
whether the candidates are granted equitable access to media to
convey their messages to voters and whether information available
through the media is adequate for voters to make a well-informed
choice at the ballot box. Statistical data, on the amount of time
dedicated to candidates, the manner in which candidates and other
key political actors are covered by the media, analyses of bias,
the extent and quality of voter education campaigns or relevancy
of election-related information, serve as a basis for analyses.
64. The results of the monitoring demonstrate how the media behave
and keep the public and candidates aware of these issues. When shortcomings
are identified, corrective action should be taken to improve media coverage
or protect media rights and freedoms. As such, media monitoring
should become a strong and ongoing process, both in quantitative
and qualitative mode, able to provide a feedback to the sector,
and to foster professional and ethical standards of the media.
4.8. Media and digital literacy
65. It is important for people
to understand the danger of disinformation and propaganda on internet. Member
States should take measures to promote media and digital literacy,
including by covering these topics as part of the regular school
curriculum and by engaging with civil society and other stakeholders
to raise awareness about these issues.
66. In their report on Defending and Ultimately Defeating Russia’s
Disinformation Techniques, the Center for European Policy Analysis
recommends that “to reach the most at risk audiences, media literacy
should be included in the structure of mainstream programming rather
than as a separate ‘news’ show or video game”.
4.9. Support for civil society
67. The main aim of propaganda
is to sow doubt, distort truths, divide member States, engineer
a strategic split between the European Union and its North American
partners and paralyse the decision-making process. Moreover, its
aim is also to erode the European narrative based on democratic
values, human rights and the rule of law. Its goal is also to kill
activism, which is why it is incumbent upon civil society to fight
back. It is important that civil society identifies and raises awareness
about deliberately false news stories, disinformation and propaganda
through ongoing fact-checking and media monitoring projects that
give an important feedback to people on the essence of the propaganda.
5. Conclusions
68. States have to promote a free,
independent and diverse communications environment, which is a key means
of addressing disinformation and propaganda and ensuring the effectiveness
of the right to free elections.
69. In this context, State authorities should always refrain from
any attempt to influence or censor media content or interfere in
any other way in activities of the media and journalists, undermining
their independence. No interference with the activities of journalists
and media personnel should be tolerated and any such allegations
should be promptly and seriously investigated. This is even more
important during election periods.
70. To promote pluralism, States must be careful to prohibit excessive
concentration of media ownership and to impose transparency on media
ownership structures. The presence of strong, independent and adequately
resourced public service media is at the same time a condition of
pluralism and a guarantee that the diversity of society can find
a place in an overpopulated media environment where to the risk
of misinformation and manipulation is added that of a majority line
of thinking that would impose itself as unique.
71. Public service media should be free to criticise activities
or inaction by the public authorities. The State is not the boss
of the public service media; they belong to the citizens, not to
the powers in place. They must not be subjected to any pressure
or retaliation for the information they disseminate, as long as
they respect their duty of impartiality.
72. All media should avoid broadcasting unverified information
or rumours to provoke scandal or for propaganda purposes. If it
decides that such a message is nevertheless important, it should
be broadcast with a warning saying that the message is not verified.
Facts have to be clearly distinguished from comments and opinions.
73. Protection against hate speech and State propaganda must be
strengthened. However, repression is insufficient. States should
encourage all stakeholders – including the media, internet intermediaries,
civil society and academia – in developing participatory and transparent
initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of
disinformation and propaganda on democracy, and for finding appropriate responses
to these phenomena.
74. A strong regulator is key to ensuring that the media maintain
journalistic standards. To be effective, regulators need clear guidelines
about when to sanction the media for violating laws on “hate speech,” “incitement
to violence” or other. Authorities should ensure the political,
operational and financial independence of media regulators, in line
with Council of Europe recommendations. In order to enhance public
confidence in its actions, consideration should be given to strengthening
the accountability mechanism of media regulators, including an obligation
to publish online detailed annual reports on activities and budgets
as well as all other decisions and outcomes of media regulators’
deliberations. The establishment of systematic media monitoring during
an election campaign would assist the regulators in identifying
any inequitable and preferential coverage of candidates and in taking
prompt corrective action.
75. Consideration could be given to creating platforms for discussion,
training, studies and self-reflection on the media, to enhance the
current level of journalistic profession and explain the unhealthy
aspects of journalism, such as propaganda. An opportunity to exchange
experiences through international media networks and journalistic
associations would also help to achieve these aims.
76. It is recommended that member States strengthen regulations
to ensure that political advertising is at least as transparent
online as it is offline. Moreover, tech companies should play their
part in the fight against disinformation and propaganda by re-examining
the algorithms behind news curation and disabling bots and fake
accounts that are used for antidemocratic ends. It is important
that advertisers do not fund websites which promote hate speech,
demonise LGBT people and incite violence.
77. Finally, beyond regulatory intervention, the possibility of
promoting self-regulation or co-regulation should be taken into
account. A regulatory system with strong government control is unlikely
to promote pluralism and diversity among the media. On the other
hand, a voluntary system with strong legal or constitutional guarantees
of media independence can safeguard pluralism in the media and protect
it against government or political interference and can help to
develop professional skills and standards.