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Report | Doc. 11787 | 22 December 2008
Private military and security firms and the erosion of the state monopoly on the use of force
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
Summary
The report points to a growing trend of involving private companies in assuming various tasks in the military and security areas, which traditionally had been a domain of the states.
The increasing use of private military and/or security companies (PMSCs) undermines the position of a state as the only actor allowed to legitimately and lawfully use force. It presents a challenge to modern democracies, as the right to use force shifts from the state, guarantor of the public interest, to private actors driven by corporate interests.
The activities of PMSCs raise a whole range of concerns related to the lack of democratic control, transparency and accountability, higher risk of human rights violations, the growing influence of private businesses on political choices and policy orientations, and the shift from crisis prevention to rapid reaction and from the civilian handling of crises to the use of force.
Many of the challenges arising from the increasing role of PMSCs reach to the core of the values protected by the Council of Europe. Our Organisation, with its experience in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, offers the appropriate framework for regulating activities of PMSCs on the basis of common principles.
The report recommends that the Committee of Ministers draw up a Council of Europe convention aimed at regulating the relations of its member states with PMSCs and laying down minimum standards for the activity of these private companies.
A. Draft recommendation
(open)1. In recent years, there has
been a growing trend in a number of states, including in Europe,
to involve private companies in assuming various tasks in the military
and security areas, which traditionally had been a domain for state
actors.
2. According to some research publications, there are currently
more than a million employees working as private soldiers or security
officers for over one thousand private military and/or security
companies (PMSCs) in over one hundred countries in the world. In
2006, the turnover in this new branch of the service industry was estimated
at about 200 billion US dollars.
3. As this new industry seeks to develop its own markets, serious
questions arise of a systemic and principled nature. On the one
hand, most of the large PMSCs are organised as shareholder companies
or are part of profit oriented entreprises. As such, they have every
interest in the outbreak or maintenance of conflicts as a means
of securing their economic growth. The more conflicts increase,
the more the market for their services becomes profitable. On the
other hand, for states, the emergence and pursuit of conflicts place
a major strain on public budgets and resources, leading to a conflict
of interests as between the public and private sectors.
4. States are the main contractors of PMSCs, but other actors,
such as major international organisations (such as the United Nations),
private businesses, humanitarian agencies, the media and non-governmental organisations,
more and more often turn to these services to provide security in
zones of conflict or instability.
5. The increasing privatisation of the military and security
apparatuses undermines the traditional position of a state as the
only actor allowed to legitimately and lawfully use force, both
internally and externally. It presents a fundamental challenge to
modern democracies, as the right to use force shifts from the state, guarantor
of the public interest, to private actors driven by corporate interests.
6. Bearing in mind that PMSCs respond to some real needs and
are already part of the reality, it seems difficult to prohibit
them. However, it is at least necessary and possible to create an
adequate framework for their activities in such a way, that they
are performed in compliance with the basic principles of democracy, respect
for human rights and the rule of law.
7. To date, the main public concern about the PMSCs’ activities
is related to possible – and in many cases real – human rights abuses
by the personnel of these private companies and the difficulty of
bringing perpetrators to justice, with the ensuing risk of impunity.
8. PMSCs’ personnel and their employers are bound by general
provisions of international humanitarian law. They are also bound
by provisions of human rights law, insofar as they perform tasks
which are normally performed by state actors. However, there are
multiple difficulties in applying these provisions in practice.
9. However, apart from the deficit of legal answerability, the
activities of PMSCs raise a whole range of concerns related to the
lack of democratic control, transparency and accountability, higher
risk of human rights violations, the growing influence of private
businesses on political choices and policy orientations, the blurred division
of tasks between the military and the police, and the shift from
crisis prevention to rapid reaction and from the civilian handling
of crises to the use of force.
10. As the PMSCs often operate internationally and their activities
have transnational aspects and consequences, there is a clear need
to regulate such activities at the international level. However,
there are no specific legal instruments under existing international
law that explicitly regulate such activities.
11. Many of the challenges arising from the increasing role of
PMSCs reach to the core of the values protected by the Council of
Europe. Our Organisation has therefore particular responsibilities
in addressing the issue of regulating activities of PMSCs on the
basis of common principles. The Council of Europe, with its experience
in defining, promoting and protecting common standards in the field
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, offers the appropriate
framework for this, and should take the lead in this process, as
it did before in many other groundbreaking areas.
12. Accordingly, the Parliamentary Assembly recommends that the
Committee of Ministers draw up a Council of Europe instrument aimed
at regulating the relations of its member states with PMSCs and
laying down minimum standards for the activity of these private
companies.
13. The Assembly suggests that such an instrument should, as a
minimum, include the following elements:
13.1. definition of those areas of internal and external security
that must remain a sovereign function of the state and that are
‘inherently governmental’ in character;
13.2. standardisation of the principles for the safeguard of
the state monopoly on the use of force;
13.3. clear affirmation of the dividing line between internal
and external security as established by law and the constitution;
13.4. confirmation of priority of conflict prevention to rapid
reaction and of the civilian handling of crises instead of the solution
of conflicts by use of force;
13.5. standardisation of the principles for the use of PMSCs;
13.6. determination of criteria regarding the activities, obligations,
duties, responsibilities, including accountability for breaches
of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, and the
areas of tasks and competences of PMSCs;
13.7. definition of criteria that must be applied to admission
of PMSCs for carrying out military and security services;
13.8. introduction of a registration and licensing system for
PMSCs;
13.9. adjustment and harmonisation of national and international
criminal law (especially rules of law enforcement) regarding criminal
acts committed by PMSCs and their personnel;
13.10. introduction of specific rules for PMSCs in civil law
(especially as regards conditions of liability);
13.11. setting up of a legal and regulatory framework for PMSCs
who wish to export their services (e.g. mission and project-oriented
authorisations which provide democratic oversight, control, supervision,
accountability and specification of responsibilities; it would
be advisable to combine such regulations with the existing arms
export regimes);
13.12. requirement of parliamentary approval for missions of
PMSCs outside their national territory, and provisions establishing
co-operation, information sharing and assistance between the states
involved;
13.13. application of laws and rules governing deployment of
national military and police forces abroad to PMSCs as well;
13.14. introduction of rules and regulations (e.g. code of conduct
and requirement to register with the foreign ministry) for business
companies, non-governmental or humanitarian organisations etc. who
wish to contract PMSCs for their security purposes abroad;
13.15. obligation on the part of the PMSC sector to set up a
framework for self-control, including a binding code of conduct
and the establishment of a “PMSC-Ombudsman” and/or a “PMSC violations
investigation team”;
13.16. regulations that include the following elements: an effective
vetting and training system for PMSC personnel; effective oversight
and investigatory system; an effective enforcement system, and the protection
of social rights of PMSCs employees.
14. With regard to a possible nature of such an instrument, the
Assembly states its preference for a legally binding document (convention).
However, the Assembly would welcome it if, prior to drafting such
a convention, and in order to achieve a sense of common purpose,
the Committee of Ministers could adopt a Recommendation to the member
states.
15. In the meantime, the Assembly recommends that the Committee
of Ministers supports, on behalf of the Council of Europe, the “Montreux
Document” which sums up legal obligations under existing international
law and best practices related to PMSCs’ activities, and call on
member states that have not already done so, to endorse it.
B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Wodarg, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction
1. In recent years, the traditional
state monopoly on the use of force has been diluted, or even undermined, in
a growing number of states. This phenomenon, which became noticeable
since the end of the Cold war, grew stronger after the 9/11 terrorist
attack on the World Trade Centre in New York.
2. Many former military professionals and a lot of military hardware
lost their raison d’être and function after the breakdown of the
iron curtain. This was the ground on which the new private military
and security business were rapidly growing.
3. The erosion of the state monopoly on the use of force is today
taking form by way of an increasing recourse by states to services
offered by private organisations providing military and policing
services, hereafter referred to as Private Military and Security
Companies (PMSCs).
4. This phenomenon is not limited to sovereign states and their
governments. Other actors, such as major international organisations
(like the United Nations), private businesses, humanitarian agencies,
the media and non-governmental organisations, avail themselves of
such services in pursuit of security-related goals.
5. The shift in public security obligations to the private sector
has already contributed to transforming the balance of power inside
societies affected by this trend, and to a gradual destabilisation
of international relations.
6. In all the countries where PMSCs are active, it is becoming
more and more perceptible that the relationship between citizens
and state power institutions (military and police) is changing and
is becoming increasingly disturbed.
7. The recourse to services of PMSCs – especially in “weak” and
“fragile” states – entails disempowerment of the state, the weakening
of public governance and a decreasing capability to resolve conflicts
by civilian means. It often leads to erosion of public order, and
may ultimately result in the collapse of the state itself.
8. The growing activities of PMSCs in various conflict zones
throughout the world, often beyond any government or public control,
also weaken and undermine the role of the international community
of nations in maintaining international peace.
9. One of the consequences of this latter trend is the shift
in priorities in political choices from prevention to rapid action,
and from the civilian handling of crises, to the solution of conflicts
by the use of force.
10. The European democratic model, with its way of dealing with
internal, common, external and international problems in accordance
with its values, has become more and more attractive worldwide.
11. The uncontrolled activities of European private military and
security companies, whose practices often run counter to the principles
to which the European states are committed, may undermine the moral
standing and international reputation of these states.
12. Therefore, Europe has particular responsibilities in addressing
the issue of regulating activities of PMSCs on the basis of common
principles. The Council of Europe, with its experience in defining,
promoting and protecting common standards in the field of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law, offers the appropriate framework
for this, and should take the lead.
13. I wish to thank Mrs Caroline Holmqvist, Department of War
Studies, King’s College London, Mr Daniel Klingele, Head of Section,
Section Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Directorate of International Law, Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland and Lieutenant–Colonel
Tim Spicer, Chief Executive, Aegis Defence Services Ltd., for their
valuable contributions to the hearing on Private Military and Security Firms
organised by the Political Affairs Committee on 10 September 2008.
14. I would also wish to express my particular gratitude to Mr Hans
Born and Mrs Anne-Marie Buzatu from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), who also took part in the hearing
and prepared for it a most useful study entitled “Recommendations
to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly for Effective Regulation
of Private Military and Security Companies”.
15. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to Mr Rolf Uesseler, independent
expert on private security firms, who has been most helpful during
my work on this report.
2. Emergence of the private military and security industry
16. Since the early 1990s, a rapidly
growing market for PMSCs has taken shape. An entirely new industry has
emerged, providing services in the highly sensitive area of internal
and external security, which had been exclusively the domain of
state responsibility.
17. These developments started in the industrialised West. In
particular, the United States and the United Kingdom were most instrumental
in promoting this new trend. In the meantime, the phenomenon of
PMSCs has spread throughout the world and can now be observed in
most diversified forms and quantities.
18. There are a number of reasons why this trend has recently
been gathering momentum: – inter alia, changes
in the distribution of geopolitical power; the downsizing of national
armies; the electronic revolution affecting the armament industry;
and the neo-liberal concept of “slim state”, with the tendency to
outsource governmental functions.
19. But above all, it was the new manner in which political crises
have arisen in the international arena since the demise of international
“block” allegiance (“Capitalist” versus “Socialist” states). Conflicts
no longer occur in a single fashion, no longer have an easily identifiable
single causative factor, and no longer occur by being planned, provoked
or assisted by the power-elite in either of the two superpowers,
the USA or the USSR.
20. Instead, new areas of conflict have their origin in a number
of sources of destabilisation which were hitherto non-existent.
A multiplicity of agents of violent social transformation have created
a new concept of villainy to be dealt with, involving a variety
of persons and parties, and state and violent non-state actors beyond
the control of political entities.
21. The “classical” security policy oriented on wars between nations
or on civil wars has been challenged by the new forms of conflict.
Traditional armed forces were no longer adapted to the evolving
character of this new kind of conflict. Many state – as well as
non-state-actors – therefore, saw the solution for the emerging
new security problems in an engagement of PMSCs.
22. The growing demand for PMSCs by western and other powerful
states seeking to preserve their geo-strategic interests can be
put down to four main factors:
- the increased need for military intervention capacity outside the respective states’ zone of influence (the concept of “extended self-defence” with which the United States and their allies legitimised their intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq may serve as an example);
- the possibility to increase the limited means available to governments under downsized defence budgets by contracting private security services, as well as to have additional personnel capacity at their disposal in times of peace;
- the general trend in line with the neo-liberal concept of reducing state activity to its core tasks and leaving the rest to the market, including internal as well as external security needs;
- the changes within military forces and police services, both in structure and function. Large units designed for intrastate warfare with its multiple and undifferentiated tasks were in many parts restructured into differentiated smaller units with special tasks, focused on deployment overseas. The internal law enforcement and security services had their responsibilities reduced to core tasks and oversight duties.
23. Three main forms have emerged in the process of transformation
of the military and policing security services in the politically
desired direction: outsourcing, privatisation and commercialisation:
- Outsourcing means the short, or long-term, transfer of particular tasks and services to private providers of services, in this case PMSCs. Forms of outsourcing vary as far as state participation rights and the delegation of authority control are concerned.
- In the case of privatisation, the state sheds itself of certain security tasks under its authority and leaves them completely to the private sector.
- In the case of commercialisation in military and policing areas, private suppliers of security services compete with the state actors.
3. Consequences of the growing use of private military and security companies
24. These transformations in an
area of sovereignty that until now has been exclusively reserved
for the state have created a new mixed pattern, not only in the
western states but throughout the world. The actors involved are
hardly identifiable, in particular in violent conflicts fought out
by military means. This is mainly due to the fact that it is no
longer only the states with their regular armed forces that are
opposed to each other in wars (or parties of a civil war). Instead,
various types of state and non-state actors with different functions
and responsibilities may be involved in any of the conflict parties.
25. As regards the relationship between states and PMSCs, it is
possible to make the following distinction:
- Contracting states are those states that sign a contract with a PMSC, commissioning the latter to act on their orders and to perform certain tasks. Those states remain in the role of a contracting state in the case where the PMSC holding the initial contract subcontracts with other PMSCs.
- Territorial states are those states on whose territory PMSCs operate.
- Home states are states of the nationality of a PMSC. This may refer to:
a. the legal seat of the PMSC;b. the business headquarters of the PMSC, i.e. the base where the management is located and where the business procedures ranging from acquisition to administration are transacted;c. the operational seat, i.e. the centre from where the different activities on the territory are directed;d. the homeland of the PMSC core personnel.
26. Depending on the category in
which states fall in their relation with PMSCs and their operation,
certain specific obligations arise for such states under customary
international law, international humanitarian law and human rights
law. I refer in this context to the “Montreux Document” 
released
on 17 September 2008 and summarising legal obligations and best
practices related to PMSCs operations.
released
on 17 September 2008 and summarising legal obligations and best
practices related to PMSCs operations.27. PMSCs are private business entities that provide military
and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves.
When operating in “strong” Western states where they take care of
internal order or security, many private military companies (PMCs)
present themselves as “security” companies. In turn, when they operate
in conflict areas of “weaker” states, where they support or replace
the regular national forces, they describe themselves as military
companies.
28. However, a distinction – if at all necessary – between private
security companies and private military companies can only be made
on the basis of the tasks that these private service companies perform
in the execution of functions which normally are part of the state
monopoly on the internal and external use of force.
29. Among the variety of tasks which may be performed by PMSCs,
the following areas of service are of particular relevance as regards
the maintenance of international peace and peaceful co-existence
of nations, as laid out in the United Nations Charter:
- putting combat units at the disposal of the contracting state (most often, but not exclusively, for the support of the regular forces of the respective nation);
- providing special combat units to fight terrorists, subdue rebellions or to fight insurgents or militias;
- armed protection of infrastructures, industrial facilities and institutions (e.g. protection of government buildings, escort of convoys and protection of maritime transportation and oilfields, shipping and insurance companies as well as armed bodyguards);
- instruction and training for military personnel as well as for police personnel in instruction centres and training camps run by the PMSCs;
- military counselling, including instruction in strategic and tactical warfare, especially for the high-echelon staff of foreign forces;
- the whole range of logistics supplies and reinforcements and maintenance sector, including the construction of complete military bases, supplying troops in combat with fuel, food, ammunition, and the maintenance of highly complex systems of weaponry;
- activities throughout the intelligence sector. This includes employment of specialised interrogators and espionage activity, gathering and analysing secret information, as well as employment of undercover agents, development of deception strategies, military reconnaissance and risk analysis.
30. State governments are not the only commissioners of PMSCs,
even if they represent the largest group among the consumers of
military/security services at present. Companies in the extracting
industry, as well as those producing consumer goods, often use PMSCs
services. The global players in the insurance sector and international
high finance also contract PMSCs. More and more NGOs and humanitarian
organisations rely on PMSCs to ensure their security in regions
where no alternative reliable means or mechanisms of protection
are available.
31. The responsibility for the activities – and possible wrongdoings
– of PMSCs and their personnel has to be assumed by the providers
of services themselves and by their respective state or non-state
employer. However, when problems arise in connection with services
provided by PMSCs to the private sector or to private organisations,
responsibility has also to be assumed by the states in which PMSCs
are located (national states and home states), as well as by those
states in which the PMSCs are acting on the order, or on behalf of,
private entities (territorial states).
32. Although PMSCs do not operate in the situation of “vacuum
of law” and the general provisions of international law or international
humanitarian law are applicable when specific national law related
to such private services providers does not exist, the activities
of PMSCs have raised a variety of problems that up to now either
have not been addressed, or have only been solved in an unsatisfactory
manner.
33. These problems relate not only to criminal law – even if the
violation of human rights by PMSCs (including, in extreme cases,
murder and torture) raises most serious concerns – but also to some
aspects of civil and contractual law. They also raise political
questions.
34. Problems related to PMSCs mainly result from the fact that
standards for PMSCs activities, – which would be comparable to those
applicable for the military or for state law-enforcement forces,
– either do not exist, or have only been formally introduced without
being really implemented.
35. Furthermore, there are problems arising from the fact that
there are no agreements between the contracting, the territorial
and the home states, setting out clear rules for the activities
of PMSCs.
36. Problems related to PMSCs activities include, inter alia:
- a lack of democratic monitoring;
- a lack of transparency;
- unclear responsibilities;
- a lack of traceability as regards responsibility;
- a lack of accountability at the political level, as well as with regard to criminal law and civil law.
37. A few examples may illustrate this.
38. PMSCs are generally private service organisations which conclude
contracts with employers under civil law and are thus protected
by contractual secrecy. As a result, the usual mechanisms of democratic accountability
are ineffective, and democratic investigation into contract conditions
and fulfilment is almost impossible:
- parliamentary oversight is extremely complicated since the government can provide information about contract contents only to a limited degree;
- the judiciary cannot play any active role as, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law, the fulfilment of the contract does not lie within its sphere of jurisdiction;
- the audit office is not in a position to effectively investigate the lawfulness of use of public funds because it lacks sufficient information about contract conditions;
- the media and the public lack information in order to supervise the government effectively;
- furthermore, the executive itself is hardly in a position to exercise effective control over the fulfilment of concluded contracts in terms of quantity and quality, since it often does not have the adequate personnel at its disposal and, moreover, it only has a limited capacity to conduct oversight or investigations into activities of PMSCs abroad.
39. There have been a number of spectacular cases where PMSCs
and their employees have disregarded rules of criminal law and/or
were involved in human rights abuses (e.g. acts of torture committed
by the employees of the US companies CACI International and Titan
in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq; involvement of DynCorp personnel in
sexual abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina; shooting of 17 civilians
in 2007 by employees of Blackwater in Baghdad).
40. It is not that there is no legal basis for bringing crimes
to justice, or for making individuals liable for crimes committed,
but that the enforcement of law is difficult or even impossible.
This is due to an unclear distribution of competences and responsibilities
within and between the states involved. As a result, crimes cannot
be attributed convincingly, accountability is lacking, perpetrators
cannot be judged and impunity prevails.
41. The growing recourse to services provided by PMSCs presents
a considerable risk for the democratic order within nations as well
as for the peaceful co-existence between states.
42. In some situations, it may appear more advantageous to governments
to use services of PMSCs in order to be able to react to certain
conflicts in a quick and “non-bureaucratic” manner, or to avoid
embarrassing situations, or to secure national and/or particular
internal groups’ interests unofficially. In this way, the government
can avoid debates in parliament (especially with the opposition),
it will not have to face public opinion (especially when the loss
of lives has to be accounted for), and it will not have to respond
to the questions of international bodies or justify its way of acting.
43. As a consequence, the requirement of parliamentary approval
for the use of military force which exists in many states, in particular
in Europe, can be by-passed. In such cases the parliament concerned
will not only be unable to take a decision, but often will not even
be informed of the action prepared or taken “in the name of the
nation”.
44. In addition, the role of public opinion, which is essential
for the functioning of democracy, can be sidelined or even ignored
by their own government.
45. Moreover, it can be observed, in particular in cases where
PMSCs perform their services abroad, that military and police tasks
become increasingly mixed. As a consequence, the division of areas
of competence of police and military forces in territorial states
where foreign PMSCs operate, has a tendency to fade away and thereby
fundamental rules of the constitution are disregarded.
46. In extreme cases, uncontrolled operations of PMSCs – as many
examples show – result in a militarised society.
4. Summary and conclusions
47. The growing and largely uncontrollable
presence of PMSCs in an increasing number of countries is a challenge
to the internal and external monopoly of the state on the use of
force, leading to the loss of effectiveness of the latter.
48. The operational activities of these private companies, often
performed in a violent manner and beyond any state and public control,
are more and more cause for concern, as they:
- weaken the democratic oversight and control of the use of force by private actors;
- challenge the democratic order of the states;
- undermine universal international law and in particular international humanitarian law;
- infringe, in an increasing number of cases, basic human rights principles and key international documents in this field;
- contribute to strengthening the influence of private companies and political elites on governmental choices in foreign, security, interior and defence policies, in contradiction with democratic principles;
- circumvent rules of civil and criminal law;
- endanger the peaceful co-existence between states.
49. In order to reverse these dangerous trends, the following
avenues should be explored:
50. First of all, states’ demand for the services offered by PMSCs
must be reduced. In the military sphere, this could be achieved
by reorganising national troops, creating synergies and establishing
international co-operation.
51. Secondly, a comprehensive mechanism should be developed for
monitoring these companies at national and international level.
It should include the following elements:
a. At national level:
b.
- need to identify private contractors’ tasks and remits, as well as the criteria governing their authorisation and activities;
- approval process, licensing of, and registration system for PMSCs;
- legislation and regulations governing national PMSCs who wish to export their services: authorisation for specific contracts and projects, providing for supervision, monitoring and the identification of responsibilities;
- regulations governing the intervention of foreign PMSCs on national territory;
- rules and regulations as well as a code of conduct for national business enterprises and organisations working abroad who wish to employ PMSCs for security purposes (for example compulsory registration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
c. At international level:
d.
- taking appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as possible, all states introduce rules and regulations for the use of PMSCs on their national territory (as in the national model above);
- multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental or interstate agreements concerning the monitoring of such companies (including the setting up of monitoring mechanisms and cooperation bodies);
- uniform rules for the use of the services of these companies by international organisations (e.g. UN);
- regional regulations governing PMSCs (e.g. a Council of Europe Convention, or Recommendation by the Committee of Ministers);
- steps should be taken by the UN to specify the international law provisions which apply to PMSCs.
52. Thirdly, political priorities
in the handling of crises must be changed. The trend towards militarisation must
be stopped and reversed. Priority should be given to civilian prevention
efforts and peaceful conflict resolution (even when using military
force) and the long-term handling of conflicts (inter alia through
“hybrid missions”).
5. Recommendations
53. It is advisable that the Council
of Europe elaborates a binding legal instrument (convention) to
regulate relations of its member states with PMSCs.
54. Prior to such convention, in order to achieve a sense of common
purpose, the Committee of Ministers could adopt a Recommendation
to the member states.
55. These documents should include the following elements:
- definition of those areas of internal and external security that must remain a sovereign function of the state and that are ‘inherently governmental’ in character;
- standardisation of the principles for the safeguard of the state monopoly on the use of force;
- clear affirmation of the dividing line between internal and external security as established by law and the constitution;
- confirmation of priority of conflict prevention to rapid reaction and of the civilian handling of crises instead of the solution of conflicts by use of force;
- standardisation of the principles for the use of PMSCs;
- determination of criteria regarding the activities, obligations, duties, responsibilities including accountability for breaches of International humanitarian law and Human Rights abuses and the area of tasks and competence of PMSCs;
- definition of criteria that must be applied to admission of PMSCs to carry out military and security services;
- introduction of a registration and licensing system for PMSCs;
- adjustment of criminal law (especially rules of law enforcement) regarding criminal acts committed by PMSCs and their personnel;
- introduction of specific rules for PMSCs in civil law (especially as regards conditions of liability);
- setting up of a legal and regulatory framework for PMSCs who wish to export their services (e.g. mission and project-oriented authorisations which provide democratic oversight, control, supervision, accountability and specification of responsibilities. It would be advisable to combine such regulations with the existing arms export regimes);
- requirement of parliamentary approval for missions of PMSCs outside their national territory. Provisions establishing co-operation, information sharing and assistance between states involved;
- laws and rules governing deployment of national military and police forces abroad must be made equally applicable to PMSCs;
- introduction of rules and regulations (e.g. code of conduct and requirement to register with the foreign ministry) for business companies, non-governmental or humanitarian organisations etc. who wish to contract PMSCs for their security purposes abroad;
- obligation on the part of the PMSC sector to set up a framework for self-control, including a binding code of conduct and the establishment of a “PMSC-Ombudsman” and/or a “PMSC violations investigation team”;
- regulations that include the following elements: an effective vetting and training system for PMSC personnel; effective oversight and investigatory system; and an effective enforcement system.
56. In the meantime, Council of Europe member states should be
invited to endorse the “Montreux Document” which sums up legal obligations
under the existing international law and best practices.
Reporting Committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Reference to Committee: Reference N° 3370 of 1 October 2007
Draft recommendation adopted by the Committee on 16 December 2008
Members of the Committee: Mr Göran Lindblad (Chairperson), Mr David Wilshire (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Björn Von Sydow (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Kristina Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Fátima Aburto Baselga, Mr Françis Agius (alternate: Mr Joseph Debono Grech), Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mr Alexander Babakov, Mr Denis Badré, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr Fabio Berardi, Mr Radu Mircea Berceanu, Mr Andris Bērzinš, Mr Alexandër Biberaj, Mrs Gudfinna Bjarnadottir, Mr Pedrag Boškovic, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Mr Lorenzo Cesa (alternate: Mr Pietro Marcenaro), Ms Anna Čurdová, Mr Rick Daems, Mr Dumitru Diacov, Ms Josette Durrieu, Mr Frank Fahey, Mr Joan Albert Farré Santuré, Mr Pietro Fassino (alternate: Mr Andrea Rigoni), Mr Per-Kristian Foss, Ms Doris Frommelt, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutiunyan, Mr Joachim Hörster, Mrs Sinikka Hurskainen, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Mr Bakir Izetbegović, Mr Michael Aastrup Jensen, Mrs Birgen Keleş, Mr Victor Kolesnikov, Mr Konstantion Kosachev (alternate: Mr Sergey Markov), Mr Jean-Pierre Kucheida, Ms Darja Lavtižar-Bebler, Mr René van der Linden, Mr Dariusz Lipiński, Mr Juan Fernando López Aguilar (alternate: Mr Pedro Agramunt), Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Gennaro Malgieri, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Mircea Mereută, Mr Dragoljub Mićunović, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Ms Nadezhda Mikhailova, Mr Aydin Mirzazada, Mr Joāo Bosco Mota Amaral, Mrs Miroslava Nemcova, Mr Zsolt Németh, Mr Fritz Neugebauer, Mr Hryhoriy Omelchenko, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mr Aristotelis Pavlidis, Mr Ivan Popescu, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mr Gabino Puche, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Ingo Schmitt, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky, Mr Rainder Steenblock, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Han Ten Broeke, Lord Tomlinson (alternate: Mr Rudi Vis), Mr Petré Tsiskarishvili, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mr José Vera Jardim, Ms Biruté Vesaité, Mr Luigi Vitali, Mr Wolfgang Wodarg, Ms Gisela Wurm, M r Boris Zala.
Ex-officio: MM. Mátyás Eörsi, Tiny Kox
N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold
Secretariat to the Committee: Mr Perin, Mrs Nachilo, Mr Chevtchenko, Mrs Sirtori-Milner, Ms Alleon