1. Introduction
1. The motion underlying the present report – abuse
of the criminal justice system in Council of Europe member states
– covers a vast field, both in terms of the subject matter and geographically.
I therefore attempted in the introductory memorandum
to
bring it down to a manageable volume that can reasonably be tackled
in a report for the Parliamentary Assembly.
2. The formulation in the last paragraph of the motion introduced
by Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc and others:
“to examine, on the basis of concrete examples, possible
abuses of the criminal justice system in member states and their
impact on the functioning of relevant legal instruments of the Council
of Europe with a view to making recommendations to improve relevant
legal instruments of the Council of Europe, as well as national
rules and practices”,
is particularly helpful
in this respect, as it acknowledges that we can only work on the
basis of concrete examples. The first task at hand is therefore
to develop objective criteria enabling us to select appropriate examples
that are most likely to give rise to general conclusions – bearing
in mind that we are looking for proposals to improve the Council
of Europe’s instruments in the field of judicial co-operation as
well as national rules and practices.
3. As agreed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
during the discussion of the introductory memorandum, I have made
use of two sets of criteria enabling me to provide the most relevant
examples, in the most objective and non-discriminatory way: by identifying
distinct categories or groups of criminal justice systems in Europe,
and by cross-referencing these categories with statistics concerning
the number of complaints made and violations found by the European
Court of Human Rights with respect to European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) procedural safeguards, in particular the guarantee
of a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.
2. Fact-finding
visits to London, Paris, Moscow and Berlin: collecting relevant
information on four distinct families of criminal justice systems
4. As announced in the introductory memorandum, I have
made use of a classification of criminal justice systems in Europe
on the basis of their reliance on a more “adversarial” or more “inquisitorial”
system
of procedure – the working assumption being that “adversarial” elements
provide a greater degree of immunity from politically motivated
or otherwise abusive interferences. I found this a useful approach
to bring some order into the study of the diverse criminal justice
systems in Europe. These can be categorised into four distinct groups:
one that is predominantly adversarial, another that is predominantly
inquisitorial, a third that is a mixture of inquisitorial and adversarial
elements and, finally, a fourth, that is, whatever its formal characteristics, heavily
influenced in practice by the Soviet legal tradition.
5. The systems that are described as adversarial are ones in
which the parties – the accused (or more usually his or her lawyer)
and the public prosecutor – have the responsibility of preparing
the case for trial and the judge or adjudicator acts as an umpire,
as in a football match, ensuring that the rules of the game (procedural
requirements) are observed and deciding (or overseeing a jury’s
decision) on whether the accused is guilty or innocent solely by
reference to the evidence adduced by the parties. In such systems,
both the guarantees for the independence of the judiciary and the
active role played by defence lawyers are seen as essential safeguards
against the possible abuse of power by the executive. One weakness
of this system is its reliance on the quality and the resources
at the disposal of the representatives of the opposing parties.
6. Inquisitorial systems are ones in which judges play the dominant
role both as regards the investigation and the calling and examination
of witnesses at the trial, with the prosecution and the defence
lawyers tending to have only a subsidiary role in the proceedings.
There is an assumption in such systems that, as a result of safeguards
for the judiciary's independence, the judicial system can generally
be trusted to conduct a neutral investigation into the truth. That
assumption does not always stand up to scrutiny.
7. Adaptations of these broad systems have occurred following
concerns at the national level in the countries concerned – notably
about abuse of the role played by the juge
d'instruction at the investigative stage in inquisitorial
systems; after all, the judges’ qualities can be just as deficient
as those of the parties’ representatives in the adversarial system.
Adaptations have also been motivated by the requirements of the ECHR,
which undoubtedly lays down certain adversarial requirements in
Article 6, notably as regards equality of arms.
8. An important point of difference between criminal justice
systems is the prevalence, or otherwise, of the “principle of legality”,
in which the authorities have a duty to prosecute any criminal acts
that have come to their attention. In the alternative, the judicial
authorities have discretionary powers (“principle of opportunity
of prosecution”). The difference is often not so important in practice,
as countries using the legality principle as a starting point (such
as Germany) have been obliged to allow for some flexibility in order
to allow a rational use of judicial resources such as the de minimis rule, and the prosecution
of certain offences only following a request of the victim, whereas
those who allow for discretion (like France, England and Wales)
have brought in codes of conduct or general guidelines to ensure
the respect of the public interest and equality of treatment. But
as we will see, any discretion always raises the question of whether
“political” authorities have the possibility to influence its exercise
in general terms (in principle, not a problem) or in individual
cases (a potential gateway for politically motivated abuses).
9. The above-mentioned adaptations of the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems of criminal justice have led to the identification of four
broad categories of criminal justice systems, namely, the English,
French, German
and
Russian. The first covers to a great extent the common law jurisdictions
in Europe,
the second is applied in many countries
in Europe in addition to France as a result of the influence of
the system dating back to Napoleonic times. The third represents
a more recent approach embodying some significant departures from
the French model (especially as regards the principle of legality,
but without coming close to the purely adversarial system prevailing
in England and Wales). The fourth is still struggling with the legacy
of its Soviet past, which includes the overbearing role of the
Prokuratura and problems relating
to the independence of judges, in particular as regards actual practice.
2.1. The English model
10. The English system is one that is essentially adversarial
in the sense already described, that is to say the parties have
an indispensable role both as regards the collection and preparation
of evidence at the pre-trial stage and its submission at the trial
stage. The judge plays a neutral role, ensuring that rules as to procedure
and the admissibility of evidence are observed during the trial,
but is responsible for determining guilt or innocence (magistrates’
courts), or for ensuring that the jury can make this determination
in the most objective way. He or she may put questions to witnesses
and experts, but this should be for purposes of clarification and
should not dominate the proceedings. The personality of the judge,
and his or her independence, is nevertheless of great importance
for the functioning of the system.
11. During my visit to London in Ma rch/April 2009, I was impressed
by the strong spirit of independence prevailing both in judicial
circles and in the office of the Director of Public Prosecution
(DPP). In reply to my standard hypothetical question of how he would
react if he were to receive a phone call from Downing Street telling
him what to do in a particular case, he replied without hesitation,
in front of his senior collaborators: “I would refuse, and if my
interlocutor would insist, I would resign from my office, and my
senior colleagues would probably follow me. And there is a good
chance that within a few days of our press conference explaining
the reasons for our resignation, the government would fall ….” His
collaborators nodded in agreement. I was personally rather impressed
by the director’s outspoken personality. Several barristers and
solicitors had commented that the very appointment of this lawyer,
who is widely reputed for his steadfastness, is a demonstration
of the government’s political support for the independence of this
office.
12. The general principles of the functioning of the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) are laid down in “the code”
that guides all prosecutors, including
the DPP himself, in their daily work. As it is readily available
to the general public and drafted clearly and concisely, it is an
important tool to ensure that fairness and transparency prevail,
and are seen to prevail.
13. The same spirit of independence also thrives among English
judges. Their status is traditionally very well protected from any
political influence. In the light of my talks in London, I can confirm
that the procedures for judicial appointments, promotion, and –
in very rare cases – disciplinary action ensure a high degree of transparency
and objectivity.
14. The creation, in 2006, of the Judicial Appointments Commission
(JAC), as part of the implementation of the Constitutional Reform
Act, further strengthens the principle of independence of the judiciary
from political influence also in respect of the process of the appointment
of judges. The promotion of judges is governed by a similar panel-based
procedure. The JAC proudly reports in its last annual report
that in 2007 and 2008 it handled 2 535
applications and made 458 selections and that the Lord Chancellor
accepted all their recommendations for appointment. I was informed
at the ministry of justice that, whilst the Lord Chancellor may question
the recommendations made by the JAC on very limited grounds, he
or she cannot, under any circumstances, substitute a JAC-recommended
candidate for one of his or her own choosing. The composition of
the JAC, comprising a majority of judicial personalities and legal
professionals, but also qualified lay persons such as academics
and journalists (but not politicians), as well as its functioning
in practice, is explained very well in the above-mentioned report.
The creation of the JAC was intended to further increase the transparency of,
and public faith in, a process that was already pervaded historically
by a strong spirit of independence. It was also intended to set
an example for other countries. In this context, I should like to
add that the United Kingdom is also one of the small number of States
Parties to the ECHR that has established a transparent procedure
for the selection of candidates for the European Court of Human
Rights.
15. But in the English criminal justice system, there is another
possible avenue for possible political influence in individual cases:
the role of the Attorney General. This office combines legal administration,
the provision of independent legal advice and the political duties
of being a member of the government. The post holder is also superintendent
of the prosecution services in England and Wales. When I asked the
DPP for explanations as to the relationship between his office and
that of the Attorney General, I was treated to a diplomatic non-reply, and
a reference to a report of the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs
Committee on the constitutional role of the Attorney General.
The
committee noted that “[t]he evidence which we took relating to the
BAE case was particularly instructive in showing the inherent tensions
in the dual role of the Attorney General and in particular the sometimes
opaque relationships with the prosecution services”.
16. The British Aerospace (BAE) case was in fact mentioned by
all my interlocutors in London whom I asked for concrete examples
of politically motivated interferences in the criminal justice system
in the United Kingdom. The most prominent example of suspected political
interference in the criminal justice system in recent years was
the subject of judicial review proceedings brought jointly by Corner
House and the Campaign against the Arms Trade against the decision
of the Director of the Serious Frauds Office (SFO), Robert Wardle, not
to prosecute BAE. The SFO investigation had focused on bribes allegedly
paid by BAE to members of both the Saudi Arabian royal family and
the Saudi Arabian Government in return for securing a series of
lucrative contracts for the sale of arms by the United Kingdom to
Saudi Arabia, often referred to as the Al Yamamah arms contracts.
17. These allegations of corruption were first published in a
national newspaper in September 2003, which referred to the SFO
as having been approached by a former employee of BAE in early 2001
with information about a £60 million “slush fund” which BAE allegedly
used to finance the alleged bribes. Arrests followed in November
2004. In late 2005, BAE failed to comply with compulsory production
order notices requiring it to disclose details of its offshore payments
to the Middle East.
18. In late 2006, with the investigation threatening to last for
at least another year, BAE began to negotiate a new contract for
the sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia. The contract was
believed to be worth somewhere between £6 and £10 billion with the
potential for 5 000 to 10 000 jobs to be created for British nationals.
Press speculation subsequently emerged that Saudi Arabia had given
the United Kingdom ten days to suspend the SFO investigation on
grounds of the public interest or the deal would be offered to France.
A public relations campaign was mounted in response with a view
to stressing the importance of securing the contract for British
jobs.
19. In December 2006, the Attorney General (Lord Goldsmith) announced
that the investigation would be discontinued on grounds of public
interest and in view of representations that had been made both
to himself and to Mr Wardle concerning the need to safeguard national
and international security. Lord Goldsmith stated in the House of
Lords that: “no weight has been given to commercial interests or
to the national economic interest”. Prime Minister Tony Blair justified
the decision not to prosecute by saying: “Our relationship with Saudi
Arabia is vitally important for our country in terms of counter-terrorism,
in terms of the broader Middle East, in terms of helping in respect
of Israel and Palestine. That strategic interest comes first.”
20. Others disagreed, notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), which addressed a formal letter of complaint
to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office seeking an explanation as
to why the investigation had been discontinued. Transparency International
and a number of MPs urged the government to re-open the investigation,
and in a newspaper interview, Mr Wardle acknowledged that the decision
not to prosecute may have damaged “the reputation of the United
Kingdom as a place which is determined to stamp out corruption”.
In November 2007, two political campaigning groups (Corner House
and the Campaign against the Arms Trade) were granted permission
to commence judicial review proceedings to challenge the decision
of the SFO to drop the investigation.
21. In the judgment at first instance in April 2008, the High
Court ruled that the SFO had acted unlawfully by dropping the investigation.
The court
was scathing in its criticism of the political pressure brought
to bear upon the decision not to prosecute, commenting that “so
bleak a picture of the impotence of the law invites at least dismay,
if not outrage”. The court condemned how ministers had “buckled”
to “blatant threats” that Saudi co-operation in the fight against
terror would end unless the investigation was dropped: it was, the
Court said, as though Saudi Prince Bandar (one of the alleged recipients
of the bribes) “went into No. 10 and said ‘get it stopped’”. To
cave in to such interference, the Court said, “merely encourages
those with power, in a position of strategic and political importance,
to repeat such threats, in the knowledge that the courts will not
interfere with the decision of a prosecutor to surrender”.
The Times newspaper described the
ruling as “one of the most strongly worded attacks on government
action”.
22. In terms of the nature and degree of the political interference,
the following points identified by the High Court, and explored
in the highly critical report of the OECD on the United Kingdom
dated 16 October 2008,
are worth noting:
- the United Kingdom had made
minimal efforts in implementing into domestic law the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
(the convention). Of particular concern was the lack of any specific
requirement to follow Article 5 of the convention, which requires
that considerations relating to the “national economic interest, the
potential effect upon relations with another state or the identity
of the natural or legal persons involved” should have no bearing
on the decision whether to prosecute. The OECD noted that in some circumstances
this requirement would appear to be inconsistent with the SFO’s
obligation to consider whether a prosecution is in the “public interest”
under the domestic Code for Crown Prosecutors. Moreover, to adopt
the language of Article 5, it was the United Kingdom’s “relations
with other states” that Tony Blair had referred to when attempting
to justify the decision not to prosecute BAE, and it was the United
Kingdom’s “economic interests” which were widely speculated as providing
the true motivation for that decision;
- the Criminal Justice Act 1997 had, so it would appear,
been drafted to grant Lord Goldsmith, as the Attorney General, the
power to supervise the decision-making process of the Director of
the SFO in such a manner that was neither entirely independent nor
accountable. As the court noted, Lord Goldsmith was himself subjected
to political pressure from numerous sources. First, the prime minister
took what the court described as the “exceptional step” of writing
to him, generating the “suspicion” that the security justification
subsequently trumpeted by both men was a “useful pretext” for ditching
an SFO inquiry that was harming commercial interests. Second, ministers
and other government officials (not prosecutors) wrote to Lord Goldsmith
to advocate both the discontinuance of the investigation for reasons
of the national economic interest and the non-applicability of Article
5 of the OECD convention. Third, as early as December 2005, BAE
itself was writing letters to Lord Goldsmith in which he was encouraged
to drop the investigation. These letters referred to meetings between
Saudi officials and the United Kingdom Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
which were aimed at preparing the groundwork for the new Eurofighter Typhoon
deals and a potential sales visit to Saudi Arabia by the United
Kingdom’s Defence Secretary. (Mr Cowper-Coles later informed Mr
Wardle that British lives would be at risk from terrorists if the
case were not dropped.) Faced with this confluence of pressures,
Lord Goldsmith’s review of the national security threat appeared
to become more compliant with the wishes of his political masters;
the OECD refers to his review as “disjointed and somewhat incoherent”;
- the court held that there was an apparent lack of any
meaningful consideration given by Lord Goldsmith, Mr Wardle or indeed
anyone in the government or the SFO as to legitimate alternative
courses of action in response to the Saudi threats, for example,
informing the Saudi authorities about the SFO’s independence or
making a reference to the UN Security Council about the threat to
withhold anti-terrorism co-operation.
23. On 30 July 2008, the House of Lords unanimously overturned
the High Court ruling, stating that the decision to discontinue
the investigation had been lawful.
The House of Lords noted that
the United Kingdom courts had historically demonstrated a general
reluctance to review investigative and prosecutorial decision making.
However, the High Court had bucked this trend by suggesting that
the issue in the present case was the effect of the Saudi threats
on the rule of law. The High Court had taken the view that, if the
threat was one which affected the criminal jurisdiction in this
country, the courts were bound to consider the steps that were needed
to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system. As noted
above, the High Court had concluded that submission to a threat
would only be lawful where it could be demonstrated that no legitimate
alternative course of action was open to the decision maker.
24. This principle was rejected by the House of Lords on the grounds
that it was not supported by authority and that it detracted from
the right question, which was whether Mr Wardle had exceeded the
extent of his discretion in weighing the public interest in continuing
the investigation and the competing public interest in safeguarding
British lives by discontinuing it. The House of Lords recognised
that he had been confronted by the “ugly and obviously unwelcome
threat” of Saudi Arabia withdrawing anti-terrorism co-operation
which could have put British lives at risk. Accordingly, the decision
not to prosecute involved “no affront to the rule of law” and “it
may indeed be doubted whether a responsible decision maker could
have decided otherwise”.
25. Notwithstanding the decision of the House of Lords, many of
the criticisms of the High Court and the OECD retain their force,
in particular the OECD’s concerns regarding the constitutional problems
created by the Attorney General’s sometimes contradictory political
and legal functions, and the United Kingdom’s notorious reluctance
to implement the convention despite having ratified it. The conflicting
decisions of the High Court and the House of Lords perhaps highlight
the difficulty of balancing competing public interests when deciding
whether to prosecute politically important cases. As the House of
Lords recognised, the decision maker would be obliged to probe any
evidence or advice in order to ascertain its accuracy and attach appropriate
weight. However, it is not difficult to envisage the problems likely
to be encountered by decision makers who are confronted with assertions
regarding threats to national security. Such assertions often lack specificity
and those who make them are unlikely to be willing to divulge a
great deal about the factual basis of their claims, still less to
provide decision makers with tangible evidence.
26. Whatever the precise combination of national security and
commercial considerations which determined the Saudi threats, and
in turn influenced the advice that Mr Wardle received, the investigation
gained a new life in June 2007, when the United States Department
of Justice launched its own investigation into Al Yamamah, examining
allegations that a United States bank had been used to funnel payments
to Saudi Prince Bandar. The United States investigation is ongoing.
27. The other high-profile case which contributed to triggering
the inquiry into the role of the Attorney General is the “cash for
honours” investigation.
28. “Cash for honours” was the name given to the political scandal
in the United Kingdom in 2006 and 2007 concerning the connection
between political donations and the award of life peerages. A loophole
in United Kingdom electoral law means that, although anyone donating
even small sums of money to a political party has to declare this
as a matter of public record, those loaning money at commercial
rates of interest do not have to make a public declaration. During
the police investigation, various members of all three main political
parties (including Tony Blair, the prime minister) were questioned
and the Labour Party’s chief fund-raiser, Lord Levy, was arrested
twice. Ultimately the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that the
matter should not be prosecuted: their decision stated that, while
peerages may have been given in exchange for loans, it could not find
direct evidence that this had been agreed in advance, which was
a prerequisite for a successful prosecution.
29. From the perspective of politicised criminal investigations,
the scandal is relevant because both sides – the politicians being
investigated and the investigating police officers – claimed illegitimate
interference in the other’s work. On the one side, some in the Labour
Party were reported as complaining that the police investigation,
which drained it of financial resources after the loans had to be
repaid, had sought to damage the personal reputations of particular
politicians and had been deliberately dragged out in order to hamper
the party’s campaigning efforts in the period immediately prior
to Gordon Brown’s becoming prime minister and potentially calling
a general election. On the other side, the senior police officer
in charge of the investigation told the House of Commons Public
Administration Select Committee that some politicians had placed
him under “intense pressure” and that they had treated the investigation
as a “political problem, not a criminal one”.
30. This mutual recrimination is perhaps inevitable where a criminal
investigation focuses directly on the actions of politicians, whose
legitimate interest in defending themselves against criminal charges
can nearly always be portrayed by others as political interference
in the criminal process. The scandal did, however, highlight once
again the controversial actions of Lord Goldsmith, who insisted
that he should play a role in deciding whether Tony Blair and other
politicians should be charged, despite the potential conflict of
interest generated by his close relationship with the prime minister
and the Labour Party. Lord Goldsmith also sought to prevent the
BBC from publishing a story on the scandal which revealed correspondence
between Downing Street and Lord Levy concerning the donations. Although
the e-mail was eventually publicised, albeit after the police had
submitted its report to the Crown Prosecution Service, Lord Goldsmith’s
attempt to suppress it sparked widespread claims of a “cover up”
of evidence incriminating the Labour Party and further criticism
of the incompatibility of the Attorney General’s political and legal
roles.
31. On becoming prime minister in July 2007, Gordon Brown announced
that “the role of the Attorney General, which combines legal and
ministerial functions, needs to change”. This led to an official
public consultation into the Attorney General’s role, aimed at ensuring
that “the office retains the public’s confidence”. On taking over
from Lord Goldsmith, the new Attorney General, Lady Scotland, also
appeared to accept that her role should change. However, the Constitutional
Reform Bill, which was reviewed by the House of Commons Joint Committee
in early 2008 and is expected to be debated by the legislature later
this year, appears to have made little difference: it is drafted
so that the Attorney General still retains the power to prevent SFO
investigations and to stop criminal prosecutions. Lord Falconer,
a former Lord Chancellor, called the bill a “missed opportunity”,
adding that “the Attorney General's advice on public interest issues
should be accountable to parliament so no political pressure can
be seen to be applied on individual prosecutions”.
32. This rather timid reform proposal effectively maintains the
Attorney General’s prerogatives with regard to the supervision of
the CPS and the SFO whose exercise may or may not transgress the
“red line” of illicit political interference. It reflects the “government’s
response to the above-mentioned report on the constitutional role
of the Attorney General,
which
accepts some, but not all of the committee’s recommendations. In particular,
the government “proposes to legislate to provide expressly that
the Attorney General has no power to give directions to prosecute
or not to prosecute in any individual case (except where national
security is involved)”.
The legislation “will
require the Attorney General to report any exercise of the power
to parliament as soon as is practicable (except where a delay is
itself required to protect national security)”. As regards the “inherent
tension” between the different roles of the Attorney General, the
government finds that the “synergy between the functions of the
Attorney General means that their concentration in a single office
strengthens the exercise of each”. In sum, the government “notes
the concerns of the committee and some respondents that the combination
of these roles gave rise to a perception that a conflict of interest
may arise”, whilst agreeing with those respondents who took the
view that “mistaken perception is a weak foundation on which to
base reform” (Lord Lloyd of Berwick).
33. My own view is that the Attorney General’s powers over individual
cases are a potential cause for concern, even after the proposed
reform enters into force. Whilst it will be clarified that these
powers must be limited to exceptional cases, it is usually these
“exceptional” cases, on the fringes of politics and corruption, which
are the most tempting for “politically motivated” interference.
State security is a concept that is wide-open to interpretation,
and the House of Lords’ views in the BAE case
grant the government much leeway. The obvious
remedy is transparency and accountability. It is therefore unfortunate
that the proposed obligation of the Attorney General to report to
parliament on the use of his or her prerogatives in a timely manner
is again submitted to a “national security exception”.
34. As is often the case in countries such as the United Kingdom,
the legal system of which has grown on a case-by-case basis “since
times immemorial”, express statutory provisions are often less important
in practice than the traditional culture of independence and the
strength of the personalities entrusted with positions of authority,
who discharge their responsibilities under the scrutiny of a parliament,
which takes its supervisory role very seriously, and of vibrant,
independent media. With this in mind, I find the situation in the
United Kingdom generally acceptable. I nevertheless tend to support
the conclusions of the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs,
and in the BAE case I would side with the High Court rather than
the House of Lords – a position I should also like to see reflected
in the Assembly’s resolution.
2.2. The French model
35. In the French system, the investigation of the case
and the collection of evidence in serious or particularly complex
cases (about 5% of all criminal cases) is entrusted to a judge –
the juge d’instruction. In these
cases, the juge d'instruction interrogates
the suspect and the witnesses, examines any other evidence, seeks
expert advice and can require specialist inquiries. He or she will
pass the case to the prosecutor when the case is ready to be tried.
In the vast majority of cases, it is for the prosecutor to prepare
the case for trial, again in an “inquisitorial” (ex officio) manner, with the help
of the police (police judiciaire).
The defence lawyer’s role tends to be limited to issues of bail
and custody, in addition to pleading in favour of the accused before judge
and jury. The defence lawyers’ access to the investigation file
depends on whether or not a juge d’instruction is
involved – only if that is the case has he access to the file and
can ask for measures to be taken. During police inquiries without
appointment of a juge d’instruction,
defence lawyers have no access to the files, and not even to the
suspect himself during his interrogation in police custody. Only
after twenty hours of police custody does the suspect have the right
to obtain the advice of a lawyer, for ten minutes.
36. During the trial – in which the professional judges may be
joined by lay assessors or jurors whose role is not limited to deciding
issues of fact – judges play an active role in establishing what
happened but the defence and prosecution can also question witnesses.
The defence is always the last to be heard.
37. Career judges (
juges or
magistrats du siège) and prosecutors
(
procureurs or
magistrats debout/du parquet) belong
to a common professional category (
magistrats) whose
members have gone through the same training (
Ecole
Nationale de la Magistrature, in Bordeaux), and may (and
often do) switch from one sub-category to the other during their
careers. In fact, most of the senior
magistrats I
met during my visit to Paris had started their careers as
juges d’instruction, which are traditionally
seen as a certain élite among
magistrats, and crossed over between the functions
of judge, prosecutor or ministerial civil servant several times.
38. In law and practice, judges (including the
juges d’instruction)
enjoy a high degree of independence, whereas
prosecutors are submitted to a clear hierarchy with the minister
of justice (
Garde des Sceaux)
at the top. But the Code of Criminal Procedure
and
the
Statut de la Magistrature provide
certain guarantees of independence for prosecutors, too. In particular,
the minister’s disciplinary powers are tempered by the obligatory
involvement of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, the French
judicial council; and the minister can give only general instructions,
or, as far as individual cases are concerned, instructions to proceed
with an investigation and to seize the competent court, but not
to abstain from doing so. Finally, whilst any written statements
by prosecutors must follow instructions given by hierarchical superiors,
even the lowliest prosecutor may speak freely in court,
which includes the final pleadings
asking the court for a particular sanction (
réquisitoire) in
order to allow the prosecutor to give proper consideration to the
actual results of the court proceedings.
39. The separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary
seem to be less than absolute in French political culture under
the constitution of 1958, which, after the perceived chaos of the
4th Republic dominated by a fractious parliament, deliberately strengthens
the role of the president of the republic. Several of my French
interlocutors drew my attention to the fact that the constitution,
whilst speaking of the “powers” (
pouvoirs)
of the president, of the government,
and of parliament,
uses the term “authority” (
autorité) when referring to the
prerogatives of the judiciary.
It has been said that
this deviation from the terminology going back to Montesquieu (who
I was told is more popular abroad than in France) is not quite innocent.
40. My visit to Paris, in January 2009, took place just a few
days after the announcement by President Sarkozy of a potentially
far-reaching reform of the criminal justice system: the proposed
abolition of the
juge d’instruction,
whose tasks would be entrusted to the prosecution. This proposal
is seen as the culmination of a process which French judges and
prosecutors’ unions perceive as the government taking control of
the justice system for the sole purpose of preventing the “little
judges” from prosecuting (or, as some politicians see it, persecuting)
political and business leaders for alleged corruption or other financial
wrongdoings.
Another
reform announced by the present government, the “decriminalisation”
of certain business practices currently defined as criminal in the
areas of company law and finance
is decried as completing this strategy as
far as substantive law is concerned.
41. Relations between the current political leadership and the
judiciary appear to be rather chilly. Judges’ representatives quoted
before me a public statement by the minister of justice in which
she describes herself as the “superior” (
chef)
of all prosecutors, and states that the courts hand down their decisions
“on behalf of the supreme authority of the president of the republic
elected by the people”.
The
judges’ and prosecutors’ union representatives with whom I spoke
were particularly disappointed by the lack of public outcry against these
statements. They are painfully aware of enjoying a lesser degree
of popular support than for example their Italian counterparts.
Whilst Italian judges and prosecutors
are also constantly criticised by the current Italian political
leadership, including Prime Minister Berlusconi himself, they enjoy
a high degree of popular support since their successful fight against
organised crime and corruption (the
mani
pulite campaign). Even though French judges have also
scored spectacular successes in high-profile anti-corruption cases,
their popularity has seriously suffered
from the perceived mishandling by a young
juge
d’instruction of the Outreau case. In this case, a large
number of inhabitants of this small town, accused of sexually abusing
children, were placed in preventive detention, but ended up being
acquitted after spending up to three years in prison.
French
judges are angry that the political leadership, on the one hand,
starves the judiciary of necessary resources and, on the other hand,
is quick to criticise it severely and publicly for any perceived
or real shortcomings or failures which may well have been caused
or aggravated by the very lack of resources – a situation that is
likely to further destabilise the judicial system.
42. As far as resources are concerned, the contrast between the
United Kingdom and France is indeed striking: in 2006, the legal
aid budget for England and Wales alone
was almost as
high as the total budget for the judiciary (including all courts,
the prosecution service and legal aid) for the whole of France!
,
I was informed by justice
ministry officials that the resources at the disposal of the judiciary
were increased in recent years, including the recruitment of an
additional 1 500 judges and prosecutors, but most of my interlocutors insisted
that much still remained to be done.
43. The judges’ representatives are convinced that the Outreau
case, which has even given rise to a parliamentary committee of
inquiry, is merely a convenient excuse for the political class to
finally rid itself of the institution of the all-too independent
juge d’instruction – something they
say the current president’s predecessors would have liked to do
for a long time, but never dared. Interestingly, the parliamentary committee
of inquiry into the Outreau case stopped short of recommending the
abolition of the
juge d’instruction,
favouring instead the continuation of a reform process that had
already begun earlier. In fact, the
juge
d’instruction no longer has the power to place a suspect
in preventive detention – this is now the task of the
juge des libertés et de la détention instituted
by a reform in 2000.
They also argue that
the issue of the “solitude” of the
juge
d’instruction has already been addressed by a reform
scheduled to enter into force at the beginning of 2010, which foresees
that up to three
juges d’instruction can
be appointed in particularly voluminous and complex cases to enable
them to work as a team. The judges’ representatives argue that the effects
of this measure should be tested at least for some time before the
institution of the
juge d’instruction is abolished
altogether.
44. The proposed devolution of the
juge
d’instruction’s
powers
of inquiry to the prosecution is criticised not only by the elected
representatives of judges and prosecutors,
but also by lawyers
in private practice
who fear that their access to the
case file will be further reduced. My interlocutors in the ministry
of justice indicated that they were aware of the issue that lawyers
had access to the case files and a right to be present at interrogations
in the pre-trial procedure only if it was conducted by the
juge d’instruction. But they were
unable to reply to my question whether access would be extended
in all criminal procedures, or only in the small number of cases
previously handled by the
juge d’instruction,
and to what extent it would be extended. My interlocutors at the
justice ministry also realised that additional resources would be
required for legal aid to the extent that the reform would bring
in a more adversarial procedure, increasing the need for the defence
lawyers to perform investigative work themselves that is currently
carried out by investigative judges. But they were unaware of the
huge resources required for legal aid in a fully adversarial system
such as that of England and Wales.
45. On 6 March 2009, after my visit to Paris, the Léger Commission
published its interim report on the preparatory phase of the criminal
procedure. The view of the majority of the commission supports and
further elaborates on the president’s proposal to transform the
juge d’instruction into a
juge de l’enquête et des libertés who
would exercise exclusively judicial functions, the investigative
functions to be taken over by the prosecutor’s office. The majority
of the commission does not support the proposal to increase the independence
of prosecutors, for example by aligning their appointment procedure
to that applicable to judges; and it also does not favour the introduction
of the “principle of legality”, which would eliminate or reduce
the prosecution’s discretion as to whether or not to prosecute an
offender. The majority of the commission considers the future
juge de l’enquête et des libertés as
sufficient to counter-balance the increased powers of the prosecutor’s
office. In addition, the commission makes fairly far-reaching proposals
to increase the rights of the defence, but only for those suspected
of more serious and complex offences (“
régime
renforcé” with strong adversarial elements); for the
remaining cases (“
régime restreint”)
the procedure remains essentially the same as in the present system
in cases without the appointment of a
juge
d’instruction.
46. The three representative judges and prosecutors’ unions (USM,
SM and AFMI) reacted to the interim report of the Léger Commission
in a joint communiqué of 9 March 2009.
They
found that the commission, which they say was made up of persons
close to the president whose opinions were well known in advance, had
unsurprisingly followed the president’s directive to abolish the
juge d’instruction without guaranteeing
in return the independence of the authority that will be in charge
of the investigation instead, and without foreseeing adequate rights
and resources for the defence, whose proposed advances are subject
to numerous exceptions. The judges’ representatives consider the
proposed
juge de l’enquête et des libertés as
an “alibi judge” without a clear statute, and without real powers
to give impulses to and guide the investigation. Consequently, they
demand the dissolution of the Léger Commission, which had in their
view proven its partiality and incompetence.
47. The Conseil National des Barreaux (National
Council of Bar Associations), in a resolution adopted unanimously
at its general assembly on 14 March 2009, also strongly condemns
the interim report of the Léger Commission, in particular as regards
the rights of the defence.
48. On 21 March 2009, the Etats Généraux de la Justice Pénale
, under
the chairmanship of former Justice Minister Robert Badinter, launched
a series of consultations throughout France aimed at contributing
to the ongoing discussions on the reform of the criminal justice
system. The national appeal adopted at the launching conference
denounces “the attacks on the principle of separation of powers,
of which the announced transfer of all investigative functions to
a prosecution service that is hierarchical and dependent on the
executive is one of the recent manifestations”. The appeal also
stresses the need for the independence of the authority in charge
of the investigation.
49. These strong adverse reactions from the relevant, representative
professional bodies show that the Léger Commission still has some
work to do, as it would surely be unwise to simply force the reform
proposals onto those that must apply them in their daily work.
50. Another bone of contention between the government and the
judiciary is the reform of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature
(CSM), the task of which it is
to decide on disciplinary sanctions against judges and prosecutors,
and to give opinions on judicial appointments. Whilst in the case
of judges, the minister can generally not deviate from the CSM’s
opinion (procedure of
avis conforme),
the minister can do so in the case of the appointment of prosecutors
(procedure of
avis simple).
We were told that, under the present government, the practice of
ignoring the CSM’s opinion (
passer-outre)
has much increased, to the point of putting into question the role
of the CSM altogether.
My
interlocutor at the CSM explained that another reform that will enter
into force in 2010
will
substantially change the balance of power in this body in that the
representatives of the judges and prosecutors will be a minority.
Until now, six judges or prosecutors
face
four lay representatives appointed, respectively, by the president
of the republic, the presidents of the two chambers of parliament
and the State Council (Conseil d’Etat), with the president, deputised
by the minister of justice, in the chair. After the entry into force
of the reform, the president, the speakers of the two houses and
the State Council will appoint two representatives each, whilst
the CSM will be chaired by the First President of the Court of Cassation
or the prosecutor general at the same court, so that there will
be seven judges or prosecutors and eight “political” appointees
instead of six versus five (counting the chairpersons). This reform,
which will also allow individual citizens to seize the CSM with
regard to alleged disciplinary offences by judges or prosecutors, is
intended to deflect the reproach of “corporatism” against judges
and prosecutors who are perceived as deciding among themselves on
each other’s promotions and disciplinary sanctions. The judges’
and prosecutors’ unions as well as the CSM itself are opposed to
this reform,
pointing
out that judicial independence is threatened when appointees of
the political majority of the day determine the careers and possible
disciplinary sanctions for judges and prosecutors. They also cite
“European standards” which require that there should at least be
parity between judges and prosecutors on the one side and “political”
appointees on the other.
They finally point
out that the ordinary courts (
juridictions
judiciaires) are treated less favourably than other tribunals
such as the administrative tribunals and the courts of accounts
whose superior councils have a majority of judges.
51. The Venice Commission, whose opinion the Assembly requested
upon my proposal, has taken the following view:
“To sum up, it is the Venice Commission’s view that at
least in new democracies it is an indispensable guarantee for the
independence of the judiciary that an independent judicial council
has decisive influence on decisions on the appointment and career
of judges. Owing to the richness of legal culture in Europe, which
is precious and should be safeguarded, there is no single model
which applies to all countries. While respecting this variety of
legal systems, the Venice Commission also recommends that old democracies
which have not yet done so consider the establishment of an independent
judicial council or similar body. In all cases the council should
have a pluralistic composition with a substantial part, if not the
majority, of members being judges elected by their peers.”
52. My own views on the various reform proposals are centred around
the need to safeguard the independence of the judiciary both in
actual fact and in appearance. If it is decided in France to abolish
the investigating judge and to transfer these functions to the prosecutor’s
office, some basic requirements should be met in order to avoid
any impression that the purpose is in reality the self-protection
of the political class from judicial scrutiny. These requirements
would include, in particular, a much larger degree of autonomy of the
prosecutor’s office in practice than what seems to be the case at
present.
Very importantly,
access of the defence counsel to the file of the prosecution and
to the questioning of suspects and witnesses should be extended
to the same level as is currently the case before the investigating
judge – in all cases, not just for the small number of files presently
managed by investigating judges. A higher dose of adversarial procedure
would also require a substantial increase in the resources available
for legal aid – otherwise, a two-tier criminal justice system risks
evolving, with equality of arms only for those who can afford it.
Finally, as far as the CSM is concerned, I am in favour of maintaining
at least parity between judges and prosecutors on the one hand and lay
appointees on the other. As far as the lay appointees are concerned,
it would seem reasonable that not all of them should be appointed
by the political majority, as is presently the case in France, but
that the political forces of the opposition should also be represented.
2.3. The German model
53. The investigation at the pre-trial stage in the German
system is carried out by the police under the supervision of the
prosecutors’ office. The law enforcement authorities have a duty
to look for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, but the defence
also plays an active role in the proceedings. Contrary to the present situation
in France, defence lawyers have full access to the suspect and to
the file of the prosecution even during the pre-trial procedure.
The “supervision” of the police by the prosecutor is intended to
ensure the respect of legal limits placed upon the police. Certain
investigative acts that are particularly sensitive with respect
to human rights (in particular, arrests, searches and seizures,
etc.) must be authorised by a judge, called
Ermittlungsrichter (investigation
judge – a concept that is close to that of the
juge de l’instruction who may take
the place of the French
juge d’instruction following
the reform proposals discussed above).
54. German prosecutors are not “independent” in that they are
part of an administrative hierarchy under the authority of the minister
of justice of their
Land (federal
state). The justice ministers have the possibility, as part of their
right of oversight over the prosecution, to give not only general
instructions to ensure equality of treatment in the administration
of justice, but also ones that concern individual cases. This possibility
foreseen by law
is
rarely used in practice, but it exists. Ministerial instructions
are limited by the requirement that they must not be in breach of
the law, in particular of the “principle of legality” (
Legalitätsprinzip),
according
to which, as a rule, all criminal acts that come to the attention
of the authorities must be investigated and prosecuted. The principle
of legality is in effect tempered by a number of exceptions laid
down in successive legislative reforms, which have introduced a
strong dose of the “principle of opportunity of prosecution” (
Opportunitätsprinzip) for trivial
or other offences where the public interest in prosecution is limited.
But a police officer, prosecutor or any other official who interferes
in the normal course of justice is liable to serious criminal sanctions.
The
issue of instructions to the prosecution concerning individual cases
is hotly contested in Germany. The defenders of the
status quo argue that the principle
of democratic control requires full ministerial responsibility for
any acts or omissions of the prosecution before parliament.
Proponents of reform, first and foremost
the German federation of judges and prosecutors, argue that the
very possibility of instructions on individual cases, however rarely
used in practice,
creates a public perception
that politicians manipulate the judicial process for their own purposes
and undermines public trust in the objectivity and independence
of the criminal justice system.
My
interlocutors in Berlin argued that it would even be in the best
interest of the ministers themselves not to have the instrument
of individual instructions at their disposal: depending on the perspective
of the commentator, ministers can become targets for criticism for
making use of this instrument, but also for failing to do so. Also,
the very possibility that, for example, a decision to terminate
proceedings against a politician accused of minor wrongdoings could
be based on such a “political” instruction undermines the intended
effect of such a decision to rehabilitate the accused.
55. At the trial stage, the court itself – which may have a lay
element – has the duty to establish the facts. The court, whose
judges enjoy full independence (including life tenure and immovability)
and to whom cases are allocated automatically, following objective
criteria that are fixed in advance (
Geschäftsverteilungsplan), can
and often does call evidence
ex officio;
but both the prosecution and the defence are entitled to make requests,
including the presentation of witnesses. The court can reject such
requests (
Beweisanträge) only
for limited reasons. The defence is able to participate actively
in the proceedings before the court, including participation in
the selection of experts and the questioning of witnesses. The German
system might thus be seen as starting from an inquisitorial premise,
focused on establishing
the material truth, but it is significantly tempered by adversarial
elements, in particular a strong role for the defence, from the
beginning of the proceedings. This is to some extent reflected in
the resources made available for legal aid: Germany spends considerably
more than France, which has a strongly inquisitorial system, but
still much less than the United Kingdom with its purely adversarial
system.
56. Regarding the issues of particular relevance to this report,
the German system is rather behind the British and French in that
it does not foresee an independent institution governing the appointment,
promotion and disciplinary measures concerning the members of the
judiciary such as the Judicial Appointments Commission or the Conseil
Supérieur de la Magistrature. The
Richterräte (judges’
councils) and the
Präsidialräte (presidents’
councils) foreseen in the federal and
Länder laws
on the status of judges (
Richtergesetze) do
not have a comparable role. The Deutscher Richterbund
(German Federation of Judges), the
most representative professional organisation of judges and prosecutors
in Germany, is lobbying for the introduction of a system of self-government
of the profession modelled on the judiciary councils that exist
in most other European countries.
Germany is the “odd man out” in
this respect: in the European network of chairpersons of high judicial
councils, Germany has only observer status, without the right to
vote, and was, significantly, represented until recently by an official
of the federal ministry of justice.
The German federation of judges
and prosecutors finds that the lack of judicial self-administration
in Germany may well be one of the reasons why the judiciary is so
underfunded in comparison with other European countries – a point
that recent comparative studies at the level of the Council of Europe
tend to underscore. Even such a “mundane” issue as the level of
remuneration of judges and prosecutors is seen as having an impact
on the independence of the judiciary from “undue outside influences”.
57. I should like to point out that the potential impact of issues
such as the independence of the prosecution from ministerial instructions
and the absence of judicial self-administration as regards recruitment
and promotion decisions is attenuated by the federal structure of
the German judiciary. The courts of first and second instance as
well as the prosecution services attached to them are under the
responsibility of the individual
Länder,
whereas the federal government is in charge of the federal courts
(including the Bundesgerichtshof
, the
Supreme Court for civil and criminal cases, and the Federal Constitutional
Court). The risk of one political faction taking control of the
judiciary and abusing it for purposes of cementing its hold on power
and undermining the opposition is not as high as it might be in
centralised countries with similar rules. The political responsibility
for, and potential influence on, the judiciary is divided between
the ministers or senators of justice of 16
Länder and
the federal minister of justice. The
Länder have
different traditions and legal rules governing the appointment and
promotion of judges and prosecutors, and different, and frequently changing,
political majorities. Some have already introduced progressive mechanisms
akin to judicial self-administration and placed limits on the powers
of the ministerial administration in personnel matters. Others have
already decided to do so, and others are still in the early stages
of reflection. The current federal minister of justice, Mrs Zypries,
stated publicly at a conference in May 2009
that she is not yet convinced of
the desirability of judicial self-administration in accordance with
“European standards”. She argues that Germany should export rather
than import standards in the judicial sphere, as its judiciary enjoys
an excellent reputation for quality, efficiency and integrity. This
said, she declared herself open to the arguments of the proponents
of reform.
58. My own views, following the meetings with senior representatives
of the judiciary, the federation of bar associations and the federal
ministry of justice,
are in fact fairly close
to those of the German federation of judges and prosecutors.
59. As regards judicial self-administration, I take seriously
the arguments that such a reform could favour a “closed shop” mentality,
a corporatist attitude cutting the judiciary off from society at
large, and to a loss of democratic accountability. But these dangers
can be counteracted within a “judicial council” model that ensures the
representation of all sectors of society, as the United Kingdom
seems to have done with success. Contrary to Minister Zypries, I
also take seriously the argument that judicial self-administration
corresponds to European standards. While I agree with her that the
independence of the judiciary is presently fairly well respected
in practice in Germany, legal structures must be such that they
can prevent abuses even if the instruments in question fall once
again into “unsafe” hands. The so-called “old democracies” should
refrain from giving advice to “new democracies” that they are not
prepared to implement themselves. Such double standards are unacceptable
and
undermine the efforts of the Council of Europe to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary everywhere. I therefore sympathise
with the attitude of the United Kingdom that recently created the Judicial
Appointments Commission
not so much because the independence
of the British judiciary was in doubt but to avoid setting a bad
precedent that could be invoked by others.
60. As regards the right of individual instructions to prosecutors,
I fully support the proposal to abolish this possibility. In my
own experience as minister, I can only confirm that this instrument
is a double-edged sword that can do as much harm as good, both to
those who use it and those who are at the receiving end. This is particularly
true in view of the widespread and recently partly “legalised” practice
of “deal-making” between the prosecution, the court and the defence
– if the prosecution
has to follow “political” instructions, the whole procedure can
easily turn into a farce.
61. As regards remuneration, I agree with the judges and prosecutors’
representatives that decent pay is a necessary component of protection
from undue outside influences. When the level of remuneration is
allowed to drop too far, the danger of corruption looms – and corruption
is a disease that is much harder to cure than to prevent. Also,
without decent remuneration at all levels of the judiciary, junior
judges and prosecutors may feel economically pressured to jockey
for promotions by pleasing the powers that be.
62. A final recommendation that follows from my conversations
in Berlin is that the supervisory role of judges concerning investigative
measures that interfere with the fundamental rights (such as detention
on remand, the authorisation of searches and seizures, wire-tapping,
etc.) needs to be strengthened by providing additional resources
to courts in order to avoid that because of a lack of time, judges
are reduced to rubber-stamping such requests made by prosecutors.
This is particularly true in the framework of the fight against
terrorism, which has led to an increase in the powers and resources
of (de lege lata less independent)
prosecutors without a commensurate increase in the supervisory capacities
of judges.
2.4. Attributing states
to the first three models
63. A formal analysis of the different criminal justice
systems of member states might suggest that they can all be placed
in one of the foregoing three categories, albeit that each obviously
possesses specific distinctive features. Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Italy, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Portugal and Sweden might
best be regarded as falling within the German model, while Andorra,
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Monaco, San Marino, Spain,
Switzerland and Turkey as conforming more to the French one. Furthermore,
and subject to what has already been noted above, Cyprus, Malta,
Northern Ireland and Scotland can be attributed to the English one.
Among the central and eastern
European countries, the criminal justice systems of Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia
and Slovakia tend to follow the German model, while Croatia – with
provision for an investigating judge – ought to be regarded as following
the French one.
2.5. Still a system
sui generis: the criminal justice system of the Russian Federation
2.5.1. Historical roots
64. The Russian Federation appears to represent a distinct
fourth category of criminal justice system influenced in different
ways by the tradition that was forged during the existence of the
Soviet Union. This analysis seems appropriate for countries such
as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation
and Ukraine but less so for those member states that were at one
point communist but were not part of the Soviet Union or only part
of it after the Second World War as either elements of the former
tradition endured or were resurrected or changes made before and
since the communist period would appear to be more substantially
entrenched in practice.
65. During the Soviet period, the
Prokuratura was
the dominant force in the criminal justice system, with the courts
playing a subordinate and almost confirmatory role, and lawyers
for the defence virtually irrelevant.
Although considerable
efforts have been made in former Soviet countries to increase the
standing of the courts in the criminal process and to ensure that
defence lawyers can participate at both the investigation and trial stages,
the prosecutor continues to exert a very strong influence over the
process. This is a consequence not only of many of the personnel
continuing in the same organs in the criminal justice system (despite
the formal change in responsibilities) but also of the prosecutor’s
office retaining a formidable influence in the legal order generally,
with an extensive supervisory
role over many activities, including outside the realm of criminal justice
– a state of affairs that has repeatedly been criticised by the
Council of Europe.
66. During my visit to Moscow I was going to discuss structural
issues, such as the recent creation of the Investigative Committee,
“split off” from the prosecutor general’s office, as well as concrete
examples of the alleged dysfunctioning of the prosecutorial authorities
with senior representatives of these offices. Whilst meetings with
the deputy prosecutor general and the Deputy Head of the Investigative
Committee were scheduled in the last version of the official programme
of my visit that I was handed in Moscow, they were subsequently
cancelled at short notice. Upon my return from Moscow, I addressed
a letter to the prosecutor general and to the Head of the Investigative
Committee offering to meet them at another time and including a list
of questions that they could alternatively reply to in writing.
The written reply by the prosecutor general’s office
(PGO) stresses the PGO’s complete independence
from any political, administrative or other interferences or influences,
according to the constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation.
Any attempts to interfere with the prosecutors’ work would give
rise to criminal liability. As to the PGO’s relations with the newly
created Investigative Committee, there could be no talk of competition,
as the respective responsibilities were well defined and in case
of disagreement, the prosecutor general had the last word. This
was very instructive and gave rise to some additional questions,
which I asked in another letter that has so far remained without
reply.
67. Mr Pavel Krashenninikov, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee
on Civil, Criminal, Arbitration and Procedural Legislation, whom
I met for a very constructive discussion in Moscow, has reserved
his judgment as regards the practical effects of the creation of
the Investigative Committee. Whilst some competition between the
two offices could be healthy, good co-operation between the two
offices was vital for the efficiency of law enforcement. He also
considered it too early to be able to reply to my question whether
the possible weakening of the prosecutor general’s office could
improve the protection of the rights of citizens in the criminal justice
system. Mr Krashenninikov was well aware of key weaknesses of the
Russian criminal justice system, including judicial corruption,
overcrowding of prisons, and the all-too frequent recourse to pre-trial
detention instead of alternative measures of restraint.
68. Mr Krashenninikov also stressed his continuing support, and
that of his committee as a whole, for a legislative proposal he
had spearheaded, which aims at counting double the time spent in
pre-trial detention in consideration of the particularly difficult
situation in the remand prisons, and in response to criticism of
the European Court of Human Rights. This draft law has reportedly
also been welcomed by the presidential administration, the Supreme
Court and the Government of the Russian Federation. However, independent experts
told me in Moscow that the government had recently withdrawn its
support for the proposal, because it might benefit Mr Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
They predicted that the law, which shall benefit only prisoners sentenced
to less than ten years in prison,
will
only be allowed to enter into force after Mr Khodorkovsky is convicted
in his second trial, and presumably sentenced to a term of imprisonment
over ten years.
Mr Krashenninikov
confirmed that the draft law still had to clear some bureaucratic
hurdles, which may take some time.
2.5.2. Pressures on judges
– Pressure for conviction
69. In many instances the pressure for conviction seems
to be very great and, rather than acquit, courts tend to refer the
case back for further investigation. I raised the issue of pressure
for conviction in my talks that I held in Moscow in early April,
and I have come to accept that such pressures do exist, including
as a factor for the assessment of the “efficiency and effectiveness”
of judges for purposes of their promotion, or even removal from
office. I have met with a former judge, Mr Melichov (criminal court
judge at the Dogobomila District Court in Moscow), who explained
in a coherent and detailed way how he was put under strong pressure
to refrain from rejecting applications for pre-trial detention,
and
from “occasionally” pronouncing acquittals.
After many tribulations,
he ended up being dismissed – on the strength of complaints lodged
by the chair of the Moscow City Court (not his own court’s chair).
70. A former judge at the Supreme Court, Mr S. A. Pashin, a renowned
legal expert who was in charge of judicial reform in the presidential
administration under President Boris Yeltsin, and who presented
me with insightful analysis during my visit in Moscow, was himself
fired and reinstated as a judge several times. Mr Pashin finds that
he owes his reinstatements to the fact that the then Russian state
agent before the European Court of Human Rights had warned the authorities
that an application to this Court by Mr Pashin may well succeed.
71. In this context, I should like to mention that I met again
with Judge Kudeshkina,
who was
in excellent spirits after her provisional court victory in Strasbourg.
She said that the Court’s judgment in her favour had given much
hope to other embattled judges. Mrs Kudeshkina also welcomed the
fact that the chamber judgment was referred to the Grand Chamber,
as this would give the Court an opportunity to address in even more
depth the problems of Russian judges’ lack of independence and their
ever closer control by the courts’ chairpersons.
72. Another former judge I met in Moscow is Mrs Gratchova. She
had worked as a judge for nineteen years and had always had excellent
professional assessments, which is why she was about to be promoted
to the rank of deputy chairperson of her court (in the town of Korolyov
in the Moscow region). She had declared a local election as void,
because of several violations of the law. During the hearing, she
had been threatened by a lawyer that she would have “great problems”.
A new chairman appointed to her court shortly thereafter began “harassing”
her and withdrew his predecessor’s support for Ms Gratchova’s promotion.
He also began to overburden her with criminal cases (in which she
had no experience), in addition to her existing load of civil cases.
Health problems ensued, as well as a trumped-up charge brought by
the lawyer who had threatened her, concerning a small compensation
received
for helping during her spare time in organising an election. She
felt that the procedure concerning her case in the Supreme Qualifications
Collegium was grossly manipulated, and that her court chairperson
had said in open court that she “ought to be shot”.
After
refusing a proposal to quit her job at her own request (thus maintaining
her pension rights), she was finally dismissed (implying the loss
of her rights). After she lost all her internal appeals against
the dismissal, the European Court is her last hope. Meanwhile, according
to Mrs Gratchova, the new chairperson of the district court appointed
in 2008 had severely criticised the methods used by the chairperson
of her former court.
73. Another illustration of the weakness of the protection afforded
to judges in the Russian Federation is that of Judge Vasiliy Petrovich
Savelyuk, who had worked for ten years at the Buterskiy court in
Moscow. Irina Kadyrova, his wife, who said she had become a lawyer
in order to save her husband, told me his story in much detail.
In essence, Judge Savelyuk had the bad luck of being accused of
having participated in a highly publicised property scam involving
several Muscovite judges at a time when the fight against judicial
corruption had publicly been given highest political priority. Shortly
after the President of the Moscow City Court
had publicly
taken credit for having solved this case and called the accused
judges fraudsters, Mr Savelyuk was sentenced to twelve years in
prison on the basis of very scant evidence
and following a highly
questionable procedure that lasted eight years.
The European Court, once again, is the
last hope for this former judge and his young family, who have already
suffered three and a half years of Mr Savelyuk’s imprisonment in
severe conditions.
74. Prior to my departure for Moscow, I was informed of two other
cases of judges allegedly having received “instructions”, both concerning
the ToAZ case. As reported by the
Moscow
Times,
Yelena Valyavina, First Deputy Chair of
the Higher Arbitrazh Court, gave startling evidence in defamation
proceedings against the well-known radio news host Vladimir Solovyov
before the Dorogomilovsky District Court in Moscow. During his radio show,
Mr Solovyov had directly accused senior Kremlin official Valery
Boyev of having given orders to the Higher Arbitrazh Court.
Mr Boyev sued him for defamation, and
Judge Valyavina confirmed as a witness in the defamation case that
Mr Boyev had indeed told her that she would not be returned to her
post after her initial term if she refused to change her position
in cases being heard by her.
75. The second case linked to ToAZ is that of Judge Nadezhda Kostyuchenko,
formerly of the Samara Oblast Arbitrazh Court, who has taken her
case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. She fell victim
to the authorities following her rulings in favour of ToAZ in 2005.
This case was first publicised in
2006, when Kostyuchenko’s dismissal was mostly presented as a result
of the fight against judicial corruption.
In more recent articles, the tone
is noticeably different. Anatoliy Ivanov, the Russian State Duma
Deputy for Togliatti (United Russia), stated in an article in the
Parliamentary Gazette that
Mrs Kostyuchenko was “unlawfully deprived of her appointment” in
March 2006 and regretted that she was forced to apply to the European
Court for the protection of her rights. Another State Duma Deputy,
Gennadiy Gudkov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on
Security, is quoted in an article in
Nezavisimaya
Gazeta as saying that Mrs Kostyuchenko’s
complaint to Strasbourg bears witness to serious problems in the
Russian judicial system. For Mr Gudkov, there is at the present
time a tendency to cut “inconvenient” judges out of court cases.
Journalist Vladimir Solovyov has commented on both cases extensively
and noted that no
criminal proceedings or any other official inquiry has yet started
vis-à-vis Mr Boyev despite the evidence Judge Valyavina had given
in court.
76. I did not have the opportunity during my stay in Moscow to
speak with Mr Solovyov, Mrs Valyavina or Mrs Kostyuchenko, nor with
the two Duma Deputies who reportedly supported them in public. Some independent
experts, whom I asked if this case could be a “swallow announcing
the spring” were sceptical, in view of Mr Solovyov’s usual strong
pro-government stance. I consider the very fact that a senior judge
dared to confirm in public that a Kremlin official had tried to
give her instructions as an encouraging sign for the increasing
assertiveness of Russian judges; and the fact that a “mainstream”
news programme host took up this case shows that there is some public,
if not “official” support for such judges. It will be up to the
Council of Europe to work with such forces in order to further strengthen
this trend, this “little swallow”, as one of my sceptical interlocutors
grudgingly agreed.
2.5.3. The views of the
leadership of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
77. During my meeting at the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, Chairman Lebedev eloquently presented the advances made
by the Russian judiciary during the past years. Considerable pay
increases, bringing Russian judges’ salaries up to almost triple
the French or German levels (compared to the mean income of workers
in the three countries),
have much reduced the
dependence of judges on “favours” by local authorities such as the
provision of apartments. I consider decent salaries as a necessary
(though not sufficient) contribution to the fight against corruption,
including in the judiciary.
78. The chairmen of the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation,
Mr Zedarenko, and of the Supreme Qualifications Collegium for judges,
Mr Kusznetsov, stressed the advances made in the functioning of
the bodies over which they preside, whose task it was to secure
the independence of the judiciary “not only in words, but also in
reality”. Supreme Court Chairman Lebedev stressed his court’s “sensitivity”
regarding independence and the importance of his court’s role in
advising the government and the State Duma on the further improvement
of procedural and substantive laws aimed at speeding up and further
“professionalising” the work of the courts, without violating any
rights. Chairman Lebedev also welcomed the move to self-administration
of the judiciary, since 1998, by shifting the competence for the
administration of the courts away from the ministry of justice towards
the “central directorate for the administration of justice” within
the Supreme Court itself. The general director of this department,
who has ministerial rank, is appointed by the Chair of the Supreme
Court, after consultation with the chair of the judges’ council.
The composition of the Supreme Qualifications Collegium (29 members)
includes nine judges of the civil and criminal courts, nine judges
of the arbitrazh courts, ten
members appointed by the Federation Council and one by the President
of the Russian Federation. Mr Kusznetsov mentioned that the Supreme
Qualifications Collegium had succeeded in fighting off attempts
to change its composition by invoking European standards, which
foresee that at least half the members must be judges. Candidatures
for vacant judgeships (including in higher courts, to be filled
by way of promotion) are invited through the media. Decisions and
recommendations of the collegium must be motivated, a requirement
recently stressed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
Chairman Lebedev also pointed out that he does not have a right
to vote in the Supreme Qualifications Collegium. He had declined
a proposal made by a group of judges to change this state of affairs
as he thought that the collegium could work in a more serene, flexible
way without him.
79. The institutional structure as summed up above looks fairly
progressive, also in direct comparison with the other countries
I have visited: the United Kingdom, France and especially Germany.
My interlocutors’ replies to my questions
aimed at assessing the actual functioning of these bodies have created
a slightly different impression.
80. In reply to questions as to the methods of ensuring the coherence
and unity of the judgments of different courts in the Russian Federation,
Chairman Lebedev explained eloquently the tradition followed “for
decades” in which each court’s chairperson, including himself at
the Supreme Court, held meetings and conferences with their judges,
collaborators and advisers during which topical cases were discussed.
Even video conferences were used to reach out to courts in other
republics and regions. They also served to disseminate the judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights concerning the Russian Federation.
But any such contacts with judges concerning pending cases would
be “wrong”. Mr Lebedev referred to a television programme, years
ago, in which a Duma Deputy said that he had asked him (Mr Lebedev)
to influence a particular judgment. He had replied that he must
not do such a thing, having had to “control his anger”. In response
to my question concerning the Kudeshkina case, he refused to pre-empt
the final decision of the European Court.
81. The answers to my questions regarding the criteria for assessing
judges’ competences for purposes of promotion or, possibly, dismissal
remained somewhat unclear. Reference was made to the collegium taking into
account whether judges have “taken the right decisions”, and “legal
violations” committed by judges that could lead to disciplinary
consequences seemed to include cases in which judgments were invalidated
upon appeal – but not “mechanically”, but following the analysis
of the judgments in question. Mr Kusznetsov, in response to a request
for clarification, stated that the collegium did not assess the
fairness or legitimacy of a judgment, but only legal mistakes committed
by the judge, such as overlooking a change in the law, or passing openly
unlawful judgments. Chairman Lebedev added that the work of judges
is assessed at half-yearly or yearly intervals. If it turns out
that a judge is not apt to exercise this function, the chairperson
of the court can request disciplinary measures to be taken by the
Supreme Qualifications Collegium. Problems of delays can lead to
dismissals, as well as insufficient quality (such as several judgments
having been quashed by a higher court). It was not necessary that
a violation of the law was committed intentionally. Sometimes judges
had to be made to understand that they had chosen the wrong profession.
82. In reply to my question, Mr Kusznetsov said that the dismissal
of judges is “extremely rare” – he gave the figure of 56 “early
termination of judges’ powers” (dismissals). I find this number
quite high, given the utter stability of employment (life tenure)
that judges normally enjoy. In view of the testimony of former judges presented
above, the number of judges who resign “voluntarily” after such
a proposal is made to them (in order to save their pension rights)
could well be even higher.
83. In the light of the meetings with senior representatives of
the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and leading independent experts,
former judges and lawyers, on the other, my impression is that Russian
judges are – still, and maybe even increasingly so – under serious
pressure to “function” as expected by the powers that be. Several
independent observers told me that the practice of “telephone justice”
– a term reportedly used in late 2008 by the minister of the interior,
Mr Rashid Nurgaliev,
to describe instances in which judges
receive calls telling them how to decide in individual cases – has
indeed evolved, but not in the sense of greater independence: judges
desperate to correctly anticipate the wishes of their “superiors”
increasingly tend to pick up the phone themselves in order to ask
for instructions rather than suffer the consequences of a wrong
guess. My own impression, also in view of the sizeable number of
judges removed from office in agreement with the Supreme Qualifications
Collegium and the strong weight attached to the content of the judgments
in the process of the assessment of judges’ performance, is that
Russian judges continue to work in an atmosphere akin to that of
a lifelong “probation period” and that the Supreme Qualifications
Collegium has yet to find its rightful role of protecting the independence
of all judges, including those who dare to take decisions that may displease
the powers that be. Judges who in this climate play their role in
full independence still run a serious risk of losing their jobs
and deserve all the support they can get from within Russian society
as well as from the Council of Europe.
2.5.4. Jury trials – A
key reform under threat?
84. The introduction of jury trials in some instances
may have led to a more critical approach to the evaluation of evidence
– with a corresponding rise in acquittals – but most cases continue
to be dealt with by career judges and lay assessors. Recent legislative
proposals aim at further reducing the possibility for defendants
to request a jury trial – by excluding them in cases involving terrorism,
treason, violations of state security and secrecy, and “extremism”.
This proposal is seen by reformists as a step in the wrong direction,
in particular in conjunction with concurrent legislative proposals
to further widen the scope of relevant provisions in the Criminal
Code.
2.5.5. Defence lawyers
– A high-risk profession?
85. Although defence lawyers formally have been given
a greater role in the criminal justice system, problems remain in
practice to ensure that they are of sufficient quality and standing.
86. Moreover, in “sensitive” cases, they are also frequently victims
of intimidation and reprisals.
I have already described the tribulations
of the lawyers representing Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev during
their first trial.
Unfortunately,
the pressure on them is continuing unabated during their new trial.
In particular, Mr Khodorkovsky’s lawyer, Karinna Moskalenko, found
a small amount of liquid mercury in her car in Strasbourg, in November
2008,
a dose
that was not meant to be lethal, but that put her own health and
that of her family, including two young children she had recently
adopted, at serious risk.
Lev
Ponomarev, a leading Russian human rights activist, outspoken defender
of Mr Khodorkovsky, and father of lawyer Elena Liptser, another
key member of Mr Khodorkovsky’s legal team, was severely beaten
on the way home from a meeting he had with me in Moscow in his NGO
office.
These attacks are indeed perceived
by those concerned as warnings and acts of intimidation aimed at
weakening their resolve to defend their clients. I cannot help sharing
their interpretation, and I am shocked that the authorities are
either unwilling or unable to protect these courageous lawyers and
their relatives.
87. During my visit to London and again Berlin, before my departure
to Moscow, I was briefed in much detail by the United Kingdom-based
lawyers of the Hermitage Fund/HSBC on the almost unbelievable (but
well-documented) story of the attack, apparently implicating senior
officials, on what was until 2006 the largest foreign investor in
the Russian stock market. In particular, all lawyers acting for
HSBC/Hermitage in the Russian Federation have been intimidated and
targeted by police with searches and questioning as witnesses –
in violation of the lawyer-client privilege. On 20 August 2008,
police raided the Moscow offices of all law firms representing HSBC
and Hermitage, in particular those of the Moscow-based United States
firm Firestone Duncan, and those of independent lawyers, Eduard
Khairetdinov, Vladimir Pastukhov and Vadim Gorfel.
During the searches, powers of
attorney authorising the lawyers to represent HSBC in court hearings scheduled
for that week were seized by police in what appeared to be an attempt
to obstruct HSBC’s efforts to frustrate ongoing frauds.
88. At the end of August 2008, all lawyers independently representing
HSBC/Hermitage – Mr Khairetdinov, Mr Pastukhov and Mr Gorfel, who
had succeeded in uncovering fraudulent claims against the HSBC companies
and who were in the process of challenging false bankruptcy proceedings
– received summonses from the Kazan police to appear for questioning
as witnesses – in violation of Article 8 of the Russian Law on Lawyers
which prohibits the questioning of lawyers regarding cases in which
they provide legal assistance.
89. On 24 November 2008, independent lawyer Sergei Magnitskey,
who had helped HSBC/Hermitage to expose frauds and abuses of office,
was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. On the same day,
his law office was searched by police, and, in breach of Russian
procedural law, the firm’s lawyer was allegedly not allowed to be
present during the search. According to Mr Magnitskey’s lawyers,
he has not been questioned even once during the four months since
his detention was sanctioned by the court on 26 November 2008; the detention,
in inhuman and degrading conditions,
was
extended for another three months on 13 March 2009 on the basis
of the need to carry out the same pre-trial investigative actions
that were given as a reason to detain him in the first place.
Against
another lawyer working for Hermitage/HSBC, Mr Eduard Khairetdinov, a
criminal case was opened at the end of November 2008 for allegedly
using an invalid power of attorney, disregarding earlier judgments
and testimony from HSBC directors that recognised his power of attorney.
On 2 April 2009, a criminal case on the same grounds was opened
against Mr Pastukhov.
90. I had included questions on the alleged harassment of HSBC/Hermitage
lawyers and the detention of Sergei Magnitskey in my letters to
the head of the Investigative Committee and to the prosecutor general.
The
reply from the Investigative Committee confirmed that Mr Magnitskey
was heard as a witness in one particular criminal case
but
insisted that no coercive measures had been taken against him and,
in particular, that he was “not detained”. Having checked this reply
with Mr Magnitskey’s lawyers, who had provided me with documentary
evidence proving the fact of his detention, it turned out that Mr
Magnitskey was detained under another case number
also
concerning the Hermitage complex. The Investigative Committee’s
answer was, to say the least, easily prone to being misunderstood.
In view of this reply, and of the precise indications (dates, places
and persons involved, including on the side of the law enforcement bodies)
received from the lawyers acting on behalf of HSBC/Hermitage, I
am not convinced that I can accept without further questions the
additional statement in the reply that “lawyers working for the
HSBC/Hermitage company have not been questioned”, which may once
again have been limited to a particular case number. The answer
received from the prosecutor general’s office regarding this case
is more precise in that it recognises the fact of Mr Magnitskey’s
detention and indicates on what charges he is being held – a criminal case
lodged on 4 October 2004 by investigators of the ministry of internal
affairs of the Kalmykh Republic for tax evasion. But it does not
explain why he was arrested in November 2008 and was not interrogated
once for several months. Contrary to the Investigative Committee’s
reply, the PGO acknowledges that criminal cases were opened against
lawyers working for HSBC/Hermitage, including Mr Magnitskey, Mr
Khairetdinov and Mr Pastukhov (the latter also for “use of forged
documents”).
91. Mr Genri Markovich Rezhnik, the Chairman of the Moscow Bar
Association, informed me that he had written to the Head of the
Investigative Committee to demand that those responsible for the
persecution of the Hermitage lawyers shall be held to account. A
committee for the protection of lawyers was recently set up within the
Moscow Bar Association in order to fight against the unlawful persecution
of lawyers. Several prominent human rights lawyers spoke very highly
of Mr Rezhnik and his track record of actively protecting lawyers,
for example by refusing to support accusations of the prosecutor
general’s office before the Bar Association’s Qualification Board
for lawyers.
92. Another well-publicised case of retaliation against a lawyer
is the murder of Mr Markelov on 19 January 2009, which had given
rise to a public statement by the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights adopted on 27 January 2009.
Mr Markelov had just left a press
conference in which he announced that he would appeal on behalf
of the victim’s family against the early release from prison of
Colonel Budanov, who had been convicted of the rape and murder of
a young girl in Chechnya. Colonel Budanov has reportedly become
a hero figure to militant fascist groups in the Russian Federation.
93. Lawyer Boris Kuznetsov had,
inter
alia, discovered that his client, a member of the Federation
Council, had been unlawfully wire-tapped. His first complaint to
the Supreme Court was not even treated. He then appealed to the
Constitutional Court, attaching copy of a memorandum showing that
the eavesdropping had indeed taken place. As the memorandum was
classified as secret, Mr Kuznetsov was prosecuted for the violation
of a state secret, and forced to flee abroad. The lawyer informing
me of this case stressed that Mr Kuznetsov did not make the memorandum
public – he had merely submitted it to the Constitutional Court
as evidence for a violation he complained against on behalf of a
client.
The
prosecutor general’s reply to my questions in this regard is limited
to quoting legislation according to which lawyers, too, must respect
official secrets they come in contact with in the course of their
work, and insisting that such secrets are “divulged” if that information
enters the domain of “other people” – which, by implication, include
the members of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
2.5.6. Lack of safeguards
during the trial against irregularities at the investigative stage
94. The trial process may still not provide appropriate
safeguards with respect to irregularities at the investigative stage.
The defence
lawyers’ lack of access during pre-trial investigations can have
serious repercussions on the fairness of the trial itself. I came
across a concrete example in the courtroom at the first trial against
Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev in 2004. I personally observed how
a witness of the prosecution, who was about to change his deposition
in the courtroom compared to the one he had made in the absence
of the defence lawyers during the investigative stage, was intimidated
by the prosecutor into agreeing to have his oral testimony replaced
by a reading of the minutes of his pre-trial interrogation.
95. Also, the prosecution tactics consisting of the artificial
separation of cases against different persons accused of being involved
in the same incriminated acts are still very much in use, including
in the new trial against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. These tactics
are designed to circumvent the privilege against self-incrimination
as well as the protection afforded by law to the communication between
lawyers and their clients and finally to create facts or “precedents”
that can be “imported” into later trials against other alleged participants
without proper participation of the defence in the later trial.
Such tactics appear to undermine the right to a fair trial (Article
6 ECHR).
2.5.7. “Legal nihilism”
– Two emblematic cases
96. Recently, the new President of the Russian Federation,
Mr Medvedev, has acknowledged that the Russian criminal justice
system, and the
Prokuratura in
particular, still has structural defects that lead to the accusation
and conviction of many innocent persons.
The term of “legal nihilism” used
by the president struck a cord with all my interlocutors in Moscow.
97. The term of “legal nihilism” also came to my mind when I was
briefed, in much detail, about two emblematic cases: the second
trial of Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev, and the tribulations of
the Hermitage Fund.
2.5.7.1. The Yukos-related
cases – Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and others
98. I had the opportunity to attend the opening of the
new trial against Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev at the Khamovniki
Court in Moscow on 31 March 2009.
The
courtroom was very small – there was really only room for 23 members
of the public, whilst many others were waiting on the staircase.
I felt slightly embarrassed for being given privileged access, at
the insistence of the defence lawyers. But a number of journalists
were allowed to cram in at the beginning of the session, even some
carrying cameras (I was later told that this may have been linked
to my presence, as this was no longer allowed in later sessions).
As in the first trial, the atmosphere was rather tense, and the
accused were still kept in a sort of “cage” (made of Plexiglass
instead of the steel rods of the cage used in the first trial in
2003). But contrary to 2003, the judge allowed me to speak with
the accused, for ten minutes at the beginning of the lunch break
– at the request of the defence lawyers and upon verification of
my mandate as rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly. My impression
was that the two accused are in good spirits. They expressed their
gratitude for the attention their case has received from the Parliamentary
Assembly, and their sorrow about the suffering of many of their
former collaborators and lawyers, including Mr Aleksanyan
and
Mrs Bakhmina.
I assured them that in the framework
of my mandate, I would continue to observe carefully the observance
of European human rights standards also in these cases.
99. The legal justification of the new criminal cases against
Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev has me perplexed. I should like to
stress from the start that I am not trying to play the role of a
judge – but I am trying to understand the reasoning behind the accusations.
As a matter of fair trial, any accusation must fulfil minimum standards
of logic in order for a meaningful defence to be at all possible.
It is of course up to the courts to establish the underlying facts
and to apply the law to these facts, as the prosecutor general’s
office rightly pointed out in its reply to my written questions.
But the facts, whatever
they may be, must, at least arguably, constitute a criminal offence
in order for a criminal trial to make any legal sense at all. I
consider that my mandate as parliamentary rapporteur covers the
possibility of making such an abstract assessment. The defence lawyers
have stressed the fundamentally illogical nature of the new charges
and the failure of the prosecution, so far, to even identify any
specific acts or omissions of the accused to which the charges shall be
attached. The trial itself, so far, consists in reading out, apparently
at random, short passages of corporate and other documents without
any discussion of their significance, even from the point of view
of the accusation. The demand of Mr Lebedev “that the prosecutors
explain which evidence corresponded to which episode and charge”
seems reasonable to me, as does the insistence of the defence lawyers
that “the documents should be not only read out but also examined”.
To
me, this should go without saying in any trial.
100. To the extent that it is at all clear what the new charges
imply,
they
would appear to be in contradiction of Mr Khodorkovsky’s and Mr
Lebedev’s first conviction. The first judgment, in essence, found
the two former Yukos executives criminally guilty of fraud and tax
evasion, based on the following facts: according to the court, they
artificially inflated the profits of the trading companies domiciled
in low-tax areas of the Russian Federation that were not affiliated
with Yukos but were said to be “dummy companies” controlled by Khodorkovsky
and Lebedev. This was said to be at the expense of the parent company
domiciled in higher-taxed Moscow and occurred by making the production
subsidiaries sell the oil at a low price to the trading companies,
which re-sold it at (higher) world market prices. I do not wish
to comment on the legal issues raised by this conviction, including
the fact that all resource-based companies had reportedly used the
same tax “loophole”, which had been closed – with retroactive effect
–
many years after the transactions in question, or the selective
nature of the prosecution against the former Yukos executives.
But
it is clear that the first judgment did not even question the legality
of the extraction and sale of the oil and the disposal of the proceeds,
which were in part reinvested in the company, and in part distributed
to the shareholders – the dispute was about whether Yukos had legally
avoided (“optimised”) its taxes or committed criminal tax evasion.
101. Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev complained during their first
trial of a parallel investigation taking place by the general prosecutor’s
office. They complained that they should have been notified of all
charges against them at the very latest at the start of the first
trial in 2004 in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR. Some three
years later, just as they were becoming eligible for parole, they
were charged as a consequence of that parallel investigation. The
parallel investigation concerning related allegations of impropriety
should have been concluded, disclosure made and a decision reached
as to whether further charges could or should be brought, before
the start of the first trial. Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev argue
that it was an intolerable abuse of process that the prosecution
should seek to conduct more than one investigation into essentially
the same alleged misconduct.
102. The new charges accuse Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev of embezzling
all oil produced by the three Yukos production subsidiaries for
six years; embezzling shares held by a Yukos subsidiary in one of
the production companies and five other companies, and “laundering”
the proceeds of the sale of the allegedly embezzled oil and the
shares in the indirect subsidiaries. The “oil theft” count seems
bizarre: it would imply the criminalisation of the openly and generally
followed business practice described above – the “losses” suffered by
the production subsidiaries being the difference between the Rotterdam
spot market prices perceived by the trading subsidiary and the lower
price paid to the production company; and the criminalisation as
“money laundering” of the disposal of all the regular company revenue
for regular company purposes (investment and payment of dividends,
in accordance with transparent, audited financial statements).
The charge that Mr Khodorkovsky
and Mr Lebedev could have “stolen” the oil or otherwise misappropriated
assets of Yukos for their personal profit also seems to be contradicted
from the outset by a comparison of the following numbers:
between
1998 and 2003, Yukos booked operational revenues of US$55.2 billion;
during the same period, it paid,
inter
alia, US$21.8 billion in operating expenses (including
at the exploration and production company level), US$16.9 billion
in taxes, and US$9 billion in capital expenditures. The differences
between revenues and expenditures being less than US$8 billion,
how can the accused have “embezzled” for their personal benefit
US$25.3 billion?
Where
would this money have come from?
103. In response to my sceptical question whether there could not
be an issue of minority shareholders having been placed at an unlawful
disadvantage, I was informed that all minority shareholder disputes
had been settled many years ago and that even the prosecution does
not allege any violations of minority shareholder rights. In essence,
Yukos, in effect its senior executives, is therefore accused of
stealing its own oil and of committing the crime of money laundering
by selling it on the world market and using the proceeds for normal company
purposes.
104. The second new charge – embezzlement of shares and laundering
of the proceeds – is slightly more complicated, but appears to be
equally contradictory to the previous attitude of the authorities.
The prosecution alleges that the accused embezzled the shares held
by a Yukos subsidiary (VNK), a holding company that owned a controlling
interest in six operating companies. The prosecution alleges that
the accused embezzled shares in these operating companies by improperly
causing VNK to enter into agreements with Yukos to exchange Yukos’
shares for VNK’s shares in its operating subsidiaries.
The
defence stresses that the share swap agreements were a means of
lawful protection of VNK’s assets (threatened by then ongoing litigation triggered
by fraudulent actions of VNK’s previous management), thus benefiting
also the Russian Federation, which at the time held 37% of the shares
of VNK. The minister for state property was aware of and approved the
share swap. After the dispute in question was resolved, and after
intensive investigations of the Yukos/VNK share swap agreements
between 1999 and 2001, the Russian Federation decided in 2002 to
sell Yukos its remaining shares in VNK. The defence argues that
the authorities cannot now argue that Yukos had improperly attempted
to gain control of VNK’s assets through the swaps in question.
105. In addition, and in apparent contradiction of the first judgment
against Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev, the new charges of oil embezzlement
and money laundering appear to be based on the very same facts –
the extraction of oil by Yukos’ wholly owned subsidiaries and its
sale on the world market through the parent company run by the accused.
The
ne bis in idem rule (Article
4, paragraph 1, of Protocol 7 to the ECHR) obviously comes to mind,
as the new charges apparently amount to attaching a different legal
qualification to the same facts rather than prosecuting the accused
for a different set of facts.
106. Another Yukos-related prosecution ended in a life sentence,
almost completely unnoticed by the general public: that of Mr Alexey
Pichugin, a head of division in Yukos’ internal security service,
formerly a career KGB/FSB officer. In my 2005 report on “the circumstances
surrounding the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos officials”,
I described some apparent anomalies in the pre-trial proceedings
against Mr Pichugin, which had then just begun.
I was
particularly worried about information according to which Mr Pichugin
had been threatened with retaliation for refusing to give false
testimony against senior Yukos executives, and that his trial would
be held in total secrecy. I also reported on the testimony given
by a lawyer acting on behalf of a man named Reshetnikov who, according
to his lawyer, had been wrongfully convicted of the attempted murder,
on behalf of Yukos, of a businessman named Rybin, who had in reality
fabricated the assassination attempt for the purposes of promoting
his interests in a lawsuit against Yukos in Austria. Mr Reshetnikov
had at the time been transferred to Lefortovo prison, where he was
reportedly offered a “deal” of freedom against false testimony against
Yukos officials. On the advice of his lawyer, who also described
to me the difficulties he had had to gain access to his client,
Mr Reshetnikov, at the time, he refused to accept this “deal”.
During
my recent visit to Moscow, a young woman introducing herself as
Mr Pichugin’s “public defender” handed me a paper summing up the
case of her client. I was rather taken aback when I saw that, according
to this paper, Mr Pichugin was sentenced for,
inter
alia, the attempted murder of Mr Rybin on the strength
of two pieces of evidence: the testimony of Mr Reshetnikov, and
a handwritten note found in Mr Pichugin’s apartment with Mr Rybin’s
address (Mr Pichugin denied that the note had been written by him,
and the defence's request for a graphological expertise had been
denied by the court). Another troublesome element in Mr Pichugin’s
trial is the way in which witness testimony was “completed” in the
second attempt to overcome the doubts which led the Supreme Court
to quash the first guilty verdict of 17 August 2006. In fact, in
the first trial, Mr Reshetnikov had testified that he received the
murder commission from Mr Pichugin and Mr Nevzlin via a (deceased) middleman.
The defence had protested against the use of such “hearsay” evidence.
In the second trial, the witnesses suddenly remembered that Mr Pichugin
and Mr Nevzlin were themselves present at this conversation. Also,
in the first trial, contradictions reportedly remained unresolved
between the appearance of the (dark-haired) Mr Reshetnikov, accused
of carrying out the murder in question, and numerous witnesses who
had seen a blonde person at the crime scene. In the second trial,
Mr Reshetnikov and the other crown witness remembered for the first
time that they were wearing blonde wigs at the time.
107. These elements, which I came across more or less by coincidence,
make me fear that Mr Pichugin may have also fallen victim to the
unrelenting campaign against all those related to Yukos and its
leading executives.
2.5.7.2. HSBC/Hermitage
Capital
108. The second emblematic case is that of Hermitage Capital,
an investment company specialising in equity investments in Russian
businesses. Before the events described below, Hermitage Capital
was the biggest foreign investor in the Russian stock market, and
one of the biggest taxpayers in the Russian Federation. Its strategy
– adopted purely on business grounds, without any ideological or
political agenda – included the introduction of western-style accounting
methods in the companies in which Hermitage invested and thus the fight
against corruption. The Hermitage Fund has become the victim of
the corruption and collusion of senior police officials and organised
criminals, which resulted in the misappropriation (“company theft”)
of its three investment companies owned by HSBC Bank (Rilend, Mahaon
and Parfenion), the fabrication of the equivalent of US$1.26 billion
in false liabilities against them and the fraudulently obtained
reimbursement by the Russian fiscal services of US$230 million in
taxes that the three companies had paid. The “theft” of the companies
took place with the help of original statutory corporate documents
which were seized without legal justification by Moscow police officers
during a search of the company premises. With their help, new directors
were appointed, who quickly
“recognised” the above-mentioned fabricated claims
–
but the legitimate directors had already succeeded in taking the
stolen companies’ assets out of the Russian Federation. The false directors
then made money from this corporate raid by demanding the reimbursement
of taxes paid on profits which they told the tax office were retroactively
wiped out by the newly surfaced claims against the companies. They
obtained from the fiscal services decisions to reimburse the equivalent
of US$230 million within twenty-four to seventy-two hours.
I
dare not speculate how long a claim for the reimbursement of overpaid
taxes, even for a much more modest amount, normally takes in the
Russian Federation, but in Germany, this would be a matter of months,
not hours.
110. Mr William Browder, a British citizen, Chief Executive Officer
of Hermitage Capital, was suddenly refused the renewal of his entry
visa to the Russian Federation, despite interventions in his favour
at the highest political level.
The
frauds against Hermitage Capital were documented in complaints addressed
to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation on 3 December
2007, 23 July 2008 and 27 October 2008. According to the lawyers
acting on behalf of Hermitage, there has been no substantive response
to these complaints. A key official who was the subject of the complaints
was assigned to the investigation against himself, and the Southern
District of Moscow division of the Investigative Committee of the
prosecutor’s office quickly dismissed the case that had been opened
in response to the HSBC/Hermitage complaints. Instead of taking
action against the corporate “raiders”, the authorities began intimidating
all lawyers acting for HSBC/Hermitage in the Russian Federation
and targeting them through police searches and questioning as witnesses.
In particular, independent lawyer Sergei Magnitskey, who had helped
to expose the frauds and the abuses of office, was arrested on 24
November 2008 and has since been detained,
others have been forced to seek refuge
in the United Kingdom. The same law enforcement officials accused
in the HSBC/Hermitage complaints of being involved in these massive
frauds are now involved in persecuting its executives and lawyers
through charges that seem far-fetched and in contradiction of the
authorities’ previous actions. Essentially, the authorities now appear
to accuse the legitimate directors of the HSBC/Hermitage companies
of having themselves masterminded the “theft” of their own companies
and the recognition of the fabricated claims in order to defraud the
Russian State. I have spent many hours being briefed by the lawyers
acting on behalf of HSBC/Hermitage and questioning them. I have
also written to the Russian prosecutor general and the Head of the
Investigative Committee in order to be informed of their points
of view.
The answers that I have received from
the Investigative Committee have not been satisfactory. In particular,
the statement that a reply to the complaint introduced on behalf
of Hermitage/HSBC could not be sent because the lawyer introducing
the complaint had not given his address does not seem to be credible
in view of the high stakes and the professionalism of the lawyers
involved, many of whom I have met personally. The denial of the
involvement of a particular official in the investigation of complaints
in which he is designated as one of the suspects is contradicted
by a long list of correspondence concerning this case signed by
the self-same official, copies of which were put at my disposal
by the Hermitage/HSBC lawyers. The answer received from the prosecutor
general’s office that the official in question (a lieutenant-colonel)
has “no supervisory functions whatsoever” is not helpful; and the PGO’s
denial of having received the complaints from HSBC “dated 3 December
2007, 27 October 2008 or any other date” has me wonder whether there
has been a breakdown in internal communication or mail delivery
at some point – accidental or not.
111. Of course I am still not in any position to “judge” on who
is right or wrong, and such is not the purpose of this report. But
in the light of the numerous strange coincidences and contradictions,
in particular regarding the chronology of the events in relation
to the defensive actions taken by HSBC/Hermitage and to retaliatory measures
taken against its executives and lawyers, and finally in the light
of the complete failure, for many months, of the law enforcement
authorities to react even to such massive frauds, whose victims
include the Russian State itself, I cannot help suspecting that
this co-ordinated attack must have the support of senior officials.
These appear to make use, for their own purposes, of the persisting
systemic weaknesses of the criminal justice system in the Russian
Federation.
112. In my view, a proper investigation of this emblematic affair,
holding to account the perpetrators of the frauds as well as the
law enforcement officials who appear to have helped them, is indispensable.
It may also be a good test for the new structures involving a separation
and division of labour between the services of the prosecutor general’s
office and those of the Investigative Committee, which should facilitate
the investigation of suspected abuses committed by elements of one
structure performed by members of the other.
2.5.7.3. Other cases of
suspected political interference in the criminal justice process
113. During my meeting with Lev Ponomarev,
I was informed about several other
cases in which political interferences in the criminal justice process
seem very likely. For reasons of space, I can only touch upon them very
briefly.
114. The case of the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya,
according to the victim’s family’s lawyer, is an example of the
professional ineptitude of the prosecution authorities, which had
grown used to obtaining condemnations practically at will, without
the need to properly investigate a case and put strong evidence before
the court. This case, according to the lawyers, is a textbook example
of the lack of support by the prosecutor general’s office, in court,
of cases investigated by the Investigative Committee, which is widely regarded
as a shameful defeat for both structures. Valuable time had been
lost in the search for the real perpetrators and instigators of
the crime. The lawyers of the victim's relatives had requested on
an almost weekly basis that concrete investigative steps be undertaken
in order to avoid the loss of evidence, but to no avail. They also
found it strange that one of the accused, FSB Colonel Ryagusov,
had not been accused of participation in the murder, but only for
passing on Mrs Politkovskaya’s address. The question arises as to
why the case against Mr Ryagusov was separated from that against
the other participants and then suspended, despite the strong evidence
against him. An important victory of the lawyers on both sides was
the public character of the trial, which, in their view, enabled
all to see how badly the investigative authorities had worked. The
lawyers now fear that without continued pressure from the international
community, the actual perpetrators of the crime will never be found,
let alone the instigators and organisers.
115. In their replies to my questions on this case, both the Investigative
Committee and the PGO insisted that they had collected enough evidence
to convict the accused and stressed that during the court proceedings (including
the appeals proceedings), they are precluded by law from continuing
their investigations in order to strengthen their case. The PGO
therefore found my question “highly inappropriate”. I beg to differ:
I did not ask them what they were doing to collect more evidence
against those presently accused of the crime (and who may well be
innocent), but what they were doing to find the real killer(s) and,
more importantly, the instigators and organisers of this crime.
116. As former rapporteur on the Gongadze case in Ukraine,
I cannot but agree with the
lawyers of the victim's family that time is of the essence. It will
be up to the Assembly to continue to pay close attention to this case,
too.
117. The case of Yuri Samodurov, the director of the Sacharov Museum,
shows how the abuse of the criminal justice system can pose a threat
to the freedom of expression. Mr Samodurov was already convicted
once for an art exhibition vandalised by angry Orthodox believers,
upset by some of the works of art exposed – it should be noted that
the organiser of the exhibition, not the vandals, were sanctioned.
A new exhibition at the Sacharov Museum entitled “Forbidden Art
2006” shows works dating back to the Soviet era depicting religious symbols
as “anti-Soviet”. The Sacharov Museum exhibition mocks Soviet reality
by depicting Soviet symbols being “adored” as if they were religious
ones. In order to avoid any risk of offending anyone’s religious
feelings, the works of art were shielded from view by a wall and
could be viewed through holes in that wall that could only be reached
by climbing up a ladder, past a warning sign – in my view a humorous
way to heed the age-old saying volenti
non fit inuria. Nevertheless, some Orthodox believers
climbed up the steps, peaked through the hole and felt “insulted”
– and put pressure on the prosecutor’s office to prosecute Mr Samodurov.
In the new trial, which began on 3 April 2009, Mr Samodurov is accused
of “extremism”, which means that he had to resign from his job running
the Sacharov Museum in order to avoid it being closed down in case
of a conviction. The maximum penalty is five years in prison, and
the trial alone casts a dark shadow over freedom of (artistic) expression.
118. In his reply to my questions on this case, the Head of the
Investigative Committee stated that “citizens abiding by the traditional
cultural values of the Russian people and particularly those professing
the Orthodox faith or expressing a preference for Orthodox Christianity
and most of all the visitors to the exhibition were subjected to
the most severe mental trauma at the sight of the exhibits directly
undermining their personal integrity and their established view
of the world, which constituted a traumatic event and powerful stress
factor, causing them moral suffering and stress, as well as a feeling
that their personal dignity had been degraded”.
119. For me, “undermining the established view of the world” is
part of the very definition of art. The law enforcement authorities
in the Russian Federation seem to see it as an aggravating factor
justifying the criminalisation of artistic expression. In response
to the volenti non fit injuria point,
the Investigative Committee argued that the organisers of the exhibition
maliciously exploited human curiosity, as they “were aware that
the visitors would look through the opening in the shielding wall
not because they agreed with or approved of the views of the artists
and exhibition organisers but merely because they had come to the
exhibition for the fundamental purpose of seeing what was exhibited”.
120. The prosecutor general's office noted that the principle of volenti non fit injuria does not
constitute in Russian law a ground for ruling out the criminality
of an act. While it is certainly true in all legal systems that some
legally protected interests (such as life and health) are not even
at the disposal of the protected persons themselves, other interests
clearly are. If I give away a piece of my property, the recipient
of the gift is not a thief. And if I knowingly choose to expose
myself to artworks that may shock me or even undermine my established
view of the world, I cannot complain if precisely that happens.
121. The cases of the two scientists condemned to long prison sentences
for violations of state secrets following obviously flawed proceedings,
Mr Sutyagin and Mr Danilov, were the subject of Christos Pourgourides’
report on fair trial issues in espionage cases.
My NGO interlocutors in Moscow urged
me to recall that, despite the Assembly’s appeal to free the two
men, they are still in prison, and their health is deteriorating
rapidly. I should like to reiterate the Assembly’s appeal to free
the two men as soon as possible, as a matter of justice as well
as on humanitarian grounds.
3. The notion of “politically
motivated abuses” of the criminal justice system and the results
of the four fact-finding visits
122. The notion of “politically motivated abuse” of the
criminal justice system is central to this report. Whilst it is
clear that any politically motivated manipulation of a criminal
case must be considered as an abuse, the difficulty lies in establishing
the manipulation as such (that is, as a deviation from the normal
procedure due to an outside intervention), and the “political” motivation
of such a manipulation.
123. In order to go beyond mere speculation and supposition, it
will be necessary to develop objective criteria and indications
allowing us to draw conclusions as to the presence, or absence,
of politically motivated abuses. Here are some possible criteria
or indications:
3.1. Discrimination
124. An important indicator for the presence of a politically
motivated abuse can be that a given person (political opponent,
competitor) is treated significantly more harshly than others who
have acted in a similar way. The harshness of treatment can be reflected
in the outcome, that is, in the punishment meted out by the court,
or in the procedure itself, that is, the (length of) pre-trial detention,
(lack of) respect for the rights of the defence, pressure on defence
lawyers, etc., or even in both.
125. Examples of such discrimination (unjustified difference in
treatment) unfortunately abound among the cases I have looked into
in the Russian Federation: the behaviour of the prosecution authorities
described in my earlier report on the prosecution of former senior
Yukos officials
is continuing in the new trial against
Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev:
no other oil industry executive in the
Russian Federation has been accused of embezzling all the oil produced
by his company and laundering the proceeds of the sale for having
made use of the same vertically -integrated business structure that
is the standard of the industry. The harshness of the treatment
of the young mother working for the Yukos legal department, Mrs
Bakhmina,
and of the terminally
ill lawyer, Mr Aleksanyan,
in the latter case
even ignoring several injunctions of the European Court of Human
Rights, far exceeds normal law enforcement practices. The case of
Mr Pichugin, first convicted to eighteen years in prison, then to
life imprisonment after the first judgment had been quashed following
his appeal based on serious flaws of the investigation and of the
court proceedings, also fits into this category.
All
Yukos-related cases are also characterised by excessive length of
proceedings and of pre-trial detention, and the systematic intimidation
and persecution of the lawyers and human rights activists that dare
to stand in the way of the authorities.
126. The tribulations of the executives and lawyers of HSBC/Hermitage
provide additional examples. The prolonged
pre-trial detention, in abject prison conditions, of a senior independent
lawyer, Mr Magnitskey, and the opening of a criminal case against
two others, Mr Khareytdinov and Mr Pastukhov – both accused of using false
powers of attorney for continuing to work on behalf of HSBC/Hermitage
and refusing to recognise the “authority” of the new directors appointed
by those against whom they have lodged criminal complaints for having
“stolen” the companies in question – speak for themselves.
127. I have found no comparable abuses in any of the three other
countries that I have visited.
3.2. Public statements
of senior representatives of the executive on the guilt of the accused
128. Whilst this method of influencing an ongoing criminal
procedure is rather crude and easily detectable, it still occurs
surprisingly often.
129. Several examples for this are presented in the report by Christos
Pourgourides on fair trial issues in cases involving the violation
of state secrets or espionage.
The prosecution of judge Savelyuk
is another blatant example.
3.3. Poorly specified
or constantly changing charges
130. Unclear charges, either in terms of the legal classification
of the crime of which a person is accused or in terms of the acts
or other facts which a person has allegedly committed, or else frequently
changing charges – after the original accusations reveal themselves
as untenable – are typical indications of motivations on the side
of the prosecution that go beyond neutral enforcement of criminal
justice.
131. The report of Rudolf Bindig on the case of environmental whistle-blower
Grigory Pasko
is a striking case in point, as
are those of MM. Sutyagin, Danilov, Trepashkin and Moiyseev covered
in Mr Pourgourides’ report on “Fair trial issues in cases involving
espionage and violations of state secrecy”.
132. The new charges against Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev are
also poorly specified: despite the constant exhortations of the
defence, the prosecution has so far failed to set out which facts
it intends to prove by which evidence, and what their significance
shall be in terms of criminal responsibility. Stating that Mr Khodorkovsky
and Mr Lebedev embezzled all the oil produced by Yukos over a given
period and randomly designating huge volumes of company documentation
as “evidence” does not seem to be sufficient. The new charges, concerning
essentially the same business transactions as those covered by the
first judgment, also seem to reflect a considerable change in the
legal assessment by the prosecution – from evasion of taxes on otherwise
legal sales of oil to the embezzlement of the same oil. In addition,
the prosecution seems to be intent on accumulating the two apparently
contradictory and mutually exclusive assessments, in an attempt
to keep the accused in prison beyond the term to which they were
already convicted on the basis of the tax evasion charges.
3.4. Lack of independence
of the court or prosecution
133. Whilst specific instructions (the infamous “telephone
call”) are difficult to prove in individual cases, certain structural
problems of the criminal justice system relating to a lack of independence
of judges and prosecutors have been proved, by way of comparison
among legal systems. Such lack of independence is a necessary, albeit
not sufficient, condition for politically motivated abuses in individual
cases.
134. The comparison between the British, French, German and Russian
models has yielded several conclusions.
135. The first is that the actual independence of the criminal
justice system depends not only on the legal and administrative
structures, but also – and to a large extent – on the personalities
of individual judges and prosecutors, at all levels, and on their
personal stature, courage and determination to ward off any politically motivated
interferences. The United Kingdom, for instance, has only recently
set up an independent judicial appointments board, and Germany so
far – though I am proposing some improvements – has a comparable mechanism
only for the highest judicial appointments at federal level. The
“climate” of independence among judges, supported by public opinion
in both countries, is nevertheless very sound in both countries,
and also in France. The Russian Federation, by contrast, seems to
have all the right legal structures in place, but my impression,
based on the cases examined above,
is that judges are still subjected to fairly
strong pressures compromising their independence in deciding individual
cases and contributing to the maintenance of a work climate that
could be compared to a permanent “probation period” – judges’ careers
and even their continued employment depending on “functioning as
expected”. If criminal procedures must almost always end in conviction,
as is still the case in the Russian Federation, the power of prosecutors
– who enjoy far less independence from the political authorities
– to put people behind bars is in reality almost unchecked.
136. In France, the balance between fiercely independent judges,
prosecutors submitted to a strict hierarchy, and defence lawyers
whose role is very limited at the investigative stage is very fragile.
Whilst I was impressed by the stature of the senior prosecutors
I met and their esprit de corps as
an integral part of an independent criminal justice system, it may
indeed be necessary to strengthen the independence of the prosecution
as part of the general reform package currently under preparation
following which important functions currently exercised by the juge d’instruction may be transferred
to the prosecution. An equally important part of this package should
be the strengthening of the role of the defence lawyers, by providing
them with greater access to the file during the investigative stage
and increasing the resources available for legal aid. This is the
path that Germany has taken when more adversarial elements were
introduced into the criminal procedure – though the limited legal
aid funds are still an unresolved problem.
4. Consequences for
the implementation of the Council of Europe’s conventions on mutual
assistance in criminal matters and extradition
137. As mentioned in the motion underlying this report,
judicial co-operation between Council of Europe member states, including
in matters of extradition, evidence, etc., as foreseen in the relevant
Council of Europe conventions, requires a high level of mutual trust.
Effective co-operation requires the existence of a comparable level
of legal guarantees of independence and professionalism in all the
countries concerned.
138. The conventions on mutual assistance in criminal matters and
extradition stipulate that assistance shall be refused when the
underlying prosecution is for the purpose of punishing someone on
account of their “race, religion, nationality or political opinion,
or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons”.
139. As we have seen in the concrete examples examined in this
report, this is not merely a hypothetical possibility. I am convinced
that, in such cases, for example, those concerning current and former
employees and lawyers working for Yukos or HSBC/Hermitage, it would
be wrong to extradite a person who has succeeded in leaving the
country in time. I have much respect for Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr
Lebedev, who refused to leave the Russian Federation when they still
could and accepted to stand trial in order to prove their innocence,
despite the risk of unfair treatment that they were aware of. But
the same courage and readiness for sacrifice cannot be expected
from everyone.
140. The forum for arguing whether a reason for denying international
co-operation exists are courts outside of the state in which the
alleged manipulation of the criminal justice system is thought to
have taken place. While there is a presumption among member states
that signatories to the convention have acted in good faith according
to its terms, the very existence of exclusionary clauses such as
the one quoted above shows that this presumption is rebuttable.
141. Over the past years, courts in many member states of the Council
of Europe have refused to extradite persons sought by the Russian
authorities – in addition to numerous Yukos-related cases,
refugees from Chechnya have also benefited
from doubts – which are in my view still well-founded – as to the
fairness of their intended trials in the Russian Federation. The
very real possibility that a certain number of persons guilty of serious
crimes may escape their just punishment because of the continuing
distrust of Western courts vis-à-vis the Russian criminal justice
system
should
be a strong incentive to ensure that the root causes for this distrust
are eliminated by a genuine “climate change” throughout the Russian
judiciary – and not by the construction of “Potemkin villages” imitating
the shape and form of the European standards on judicial independence
aptly summed up by the Venice Commission at our request,
but without implementing their spirit.
142. The relevant Council of Europe conventions date back to a
period in which there was a much greater degree of uniformity between
the member states’ political and judicial systems. They may require
updating in order to ensure their efficacy in present-day conditions.
The same applies to the existing Europol and Interpol mechanisms,
which may need to be overhauled in order to make sure that they
cannot be abused for politically motivated persecution.
5. Conclusions
143. My conclusions are summed up in the text of the draft
resolution (Part A above). Beginning with an unequivocal condemnation
of all politically motivated abuses of the criminal justice system,
the text sets out that judicial independence is the key to preventing
undue influences. Addressing all member states, the text recalls
the relevant European standards, as presented by the Venice Commission.
The draft resolution then sums up the situation in the four countries
examined as examples (United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Russian
Federation) and addresses specific recommendations to these countries
to remedy the shortcomings identified. Finally, the draft resolution
addresses recommendations to other Council of Europe bodies, as
well as the European Court of Human Rights, to prevent politically
motivated abuses of the criminal justice system and to enhance the
independence of the judiciary.