Report | Doc. 12276 | 04 June 2010
Legal remedies for human rights violations in the North-Caucasus Region
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Summary
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights notes that the situation in the North Caucasus region, particularly in the Chechen Republic, Ingushetia and Dagestan, constitutes the most serious situation in the entire geographical area encompassed by the Council of Europe in terms of human rights protection and the affirmation of the rule of law.
In the Chechen Republic, the current authorities continue to maintain a generalised climate of fear, notwithstanding the undeniable successes in the sphere of reconstruction and the distinct improvement of the region’s infrastructures, which had been laid to waste by two cruel and devastating wars. Nevertheless, the human rights situation and the functioning of justice and democratic institutions continue to give cause for the gravest concern: successive disappearances of the government’s opponents and human rights defenders still remain widely unpunished and are not elucidated with due diligence.
In Ingushetia, constructive dialogue has been forged between the authorities and civil society since the new president came to power. It must nevertheless be pointed out that there has been a worrying resurgence of violence since 2009, resulting in some cases in assassinations and disappearances of opponents to the government and journalists, without any prosecutions to date.
Dagestan has also recently experienced a resurgence of acts of terrorism, prompting responses from the security forces that, unfortunately, are not always lawful and productive. The admirable tradition of peaceful secular cohabitation between Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities founded on mutual tolerance could be jeopardised by the rise of extremism and inappropriate responses from the authorities.
The committee notes that the European Court of Human Rights has condemned the Russian Federation for serious human rights violations in the region in over 150 judgments and stresses the importance of the prompt and complete implementation of these judgments.
The committee is making a number of proposals aimed at putting a stop to the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of human rights violations and restoring the people’s trust in the law enforcement agencies, without which it will not be possible to defeat the rise of extremism and terrorism, which the Committee condemns in the most resolute terms, expressing its solidarity with the victims on all sides.
A.	Draft resolution 
(open)B.	Draft recommendation 
(open)C. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Marty, rapporteur
(open)1. Background
 and not for a normal report. The committee
initially appointed Mr Paschal Mooney (Ireland, ALDE) as rapporteur; following
Mr Mooney’s withdrawal, it appointed Mr Dick Marty (Switzerland,
ALDE) as rapporteur on 8 June 2007. On 12 March 2007 the committee
took note of an introductory memorandum
 and not for a normal report. The committee
initially appointed Mr Paschal Mooney (Ireland, ALDE) as rapporteur; following
Mr Mooney’s withdrawal, it appointed Mr Dick Marty (Switzerland,
ALDE) as rapporteur on 8 June 2007. On 12 March 2007 the committee
took note of an introductory memorandum  and decided to invite the Russian
delegation to submit to the rapporteur the comments of their country’s
authorities on the questions raised in the document.
 and decided to invite the Russian
delegation to submit to the rapporteur the comments of their country’s
authorities on the questions raised in the document.  On 26 June 2007, the committee heard
a statement by the rapporteur and authorised him to travel to Moscow
and, where applicable, the North Caucasus region by the end of 2007.
On 13 December 2007, the committee requested the Bureau to refer
the matter to it for a normal report. On 15 April 2008, the committee
approved and declassified a supplementary introductory memorandum
 On 26 June 2007, the committee heard
a statement by the rapporteur and authorised him to travel to Moscow
and, where applicable, the North Caucasus region by the end of 2007.
On 13 December 2007, the committee requested the Bureau to refer
the matter to it for a normal report. On 15 April 2008, the committee
approved and declassified a supplementary introductory memorandum  and decided to forward it to the
Bureau. On 23 June 2008, the Bureau referred the matter to the committee,
this time for a normal report, on the understanding that it would
adopt the report in time for the Monitoring Committee to be able
to take it into account for its forthcoming report on the Russian
Federation. On 25 June 2008, the committee held an exchange of views
with human rights defenders from the North Caucasus region and confirmed
Dick Marty’s appointment as rapporteur, authorising him anew to
make a fact-finding visit to the North Caucasus region. On 11 September
2009, the committee held an exchange of views on the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights relating to the region and the execution
of the Court’s respective judgments. On 30 September 2009, the committee
examined and declassified a second information report on security
and human rights in the region.
 and decided to forward it to the
Bureau. On 23 June 2008, the Bureau referred the matter to the committee,
this time for a normal report, on the understanding that it would
adopt the report in time for the Monitoring Committee to be able
to take it into account for its forthcoming report on the Russian
Federation. On 25 June 2008, the committee held an exchange of views
with human rights defenders from the North Caucasus region and confirmed
Dick Marty’s appointment as rapporteur, authorising him anew to
make a fact-finding visit to the North Caucasus region. On 11 September
2009, the committee held an exchange of views on the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights relating to the region and the execution
of the Court’s respective judgments. On 30 September 2009, the committee
examined and declassified a second information report on security
and human rights in the region.  After several postponements for various
reasons, the rapporteur managed to make a fact-finding visit to
Moscow and the North Caucasus region between 22 and 27 March 2010.
 After several postponements for various
reasons, the rapporteur managed to make a fact-finding visit to
Moscow and the North Caucasus region between 22 and 27 March 2010. 
2. Foreword
 and 20 September 2004
 and 20 September 2004  and “Human rights violations in
the Chechen Republic: the Committee of Ministers’ responsibility
vis-à-vis the Assembly’s concerns” of 4 January 2006.
 and “Human rights violations in
the Chechen Republic: the Committee of Ministers’ responsibility
vis-à-vis the Assembly’s concerns” of 4 January 2006.  We believe that these remarkable documents
are required reading for a better grasp of the complexity of the
current situation.
 We believe that these remarkable documents
are required reading for a better grasp of the complexity of the
current situation.3. General points
 Disappearances, torture and murder
continue with the utmost impunity. President Medvedev himself acknowledged
in November 2009 that the troubles in the Caucasus were Russia’s
number one domestic problem.
 Disappearances, torture and murder
continue with the utmost impunity. President Medvedev himself acknowledged
in November 2009 that the troubles in the Caucasus were Russia’s
number one domestic problem.  The
failure of the policy pursued in the region is rendered all the
more flagrant by the worrying resurgence of Muslim extremism. It
is true that outside influences have been, and still are, a factor
but it would be simplistic and dangerous to see this outside interference
as the main or even sole cause of the current situation. We feel
that there has been no real thought as to the reasons why extremism
has been able to gain a foothold in Caucasian society. Repression
alone, with no objective analysis of the deep-lying causes of disquiet,
will never resolve anything and will only serve to create further
radicalisation. It has to be said that what is happening today is
the result of endemic brutality and a climate of impunity and of
lack of justice.
 The
failure of the policy pursued in the region is rendered all the
more flagrant by the worrying resurgence of Muslim extremism. It
is true that outside influences have been, and still are, a factor
but it would be simplistic and dangerous to see this outside interference
as the main or even sole cause of the current situation. We feel
that there has been no real thought as to the reasons why extremism
has been able to gain a foothold in Caucasian society. Repression
alone, with no objective analysis of the deep-lying causes of disquiet,
will never resolve anything and will only serve to create further
radicalisation. It has to be said that what is happening today is
the result of endemic brutality and a climate of impunity and of
lack of justice. President
Medvedev considers that there are three main causes of the ills
of the Caucasus: the clan culture, corruption and the inefficiency
of the law enforcement agencies. His analysis rings true. An additional
factor to note is the cultural tradition which sets considerable
store by vengeance and the vow of silence and generates a fairly
unclear pattern of conduct that is difficult to eradicate. It fuels
a spiral of violence, rendered even more ruinous by the fact that
the judicial system is lamentably inefficient and totally lacking
in public credibility. On top of this, the region was particularly
badly hit by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Numerous industries
closed down, notably in the armaments sector, causing great upheaval
and robbing the population of some of its markers. Unemployment
has been very high for years, particularly among young people (the
rate quoted was around 50%). The authorities in Moscow appear to
have acknowledged the problem and substantial investments have been
promised (and already partly implemented in the Chechen Republic,
with the reconstruction effort). Another factor worth underlining
is the fundamentally conflictual relationship between Russians and Caucasians.
The traces of a long history of wars, never really elucidated, are
clearly apparent. We heard many claims of discrimination against
Caucasians elsewhere in the federation, particularly in prisons
and in the army. Caucasians stand accused of running mafia networks
 President
Medvedev considers that there are three main causes of the ills
of the Caucasus: the clan culture, corruption and the inefficiency
of the law enforcement agencies. His analysis rings true. An additional
factor to note is the cultural tradition which sets considerable
store by vengeance and the vow of silence and generates a fairly
unclear pattern of conduct that is difficult to eradicate. It fuels
a spiral of violence, rendered even more ruinous by the fact that
the judicial system is lamentably inefficient and totally lacking
in public credibility. On top of this, the region was particularly
badly hit by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Numerous industries
closed down, notably in the armaments sector, causing great upheaval
and robbing the population of some of its markers. Unemployment
has been very high for years, particularly among young people (the
rate quoted was around 50%). The authorities in Moscow appear to
have acknowledged the problem and substantial investments have been
promised (and already partly implemented in the Chechen Republic,
with the reconstruction effort). Another factor worth underlining
is the fundamentally conflictual relationship between Russians and Caucasians.
The traces of a long history of wars, never really elucidated, are
clearly apparent. We heard many claims of discrimination against
Caucasians elsewhere in the federation, particularly in prisons
and in the army. Caucasians stand accused of running mafia networks ![(15) 
			Long ago Mikhail Yurevich
Lermontov (1814-41), in his Cossack Lullaby,
spoke of the “Evil Chechen, crawling along the riverbank, sharpening
his knife”. It is alleged that this unflattering portrayal of the
“rebellious and thieving Chechen” has been perpetrated by presidents
Yeltsin and Putin, according to Grégoire Hervouet-Zeiber in a study
presented at Montreal University: “Articulation entre les guerres
tchétchènes et la politique étrangère russe dans les discours des présidents
Boris Eltsine (1994-96) et Vladimir Poutine (2000-03)” [Links between
the Chechen wars and Russian foreign policy in the statements of
presidents Boris Yeltsin (1994-96) and Vladimir Putin (2000-03)],
August 2008: <a href='http://www.archipel.uqam.ca/1132/1/M10544.pdf'>www.archipel.uqam.ca/1132/1/M10544.pdf</a>](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png) in many parts of the country. While
there are indeed indications that there may well be some truth to
those claims, it should be added that Caucasians certainly do not
have a monopoly where this kind of activity is concerned.
 in many parts of the country. While
there are indeed indications that there may well be some truth to
those claims, it should be added that Caucasians certainly do not
have a monopoly where this kind of activity is concerned. subjugated and
manipulated by fanatics who do not have the courage to risk their
own skins, is particularly repugnant and cowardly. There is absolutely
nothing that could justify horrors of this kind. Even so, one cannot
help wondering why such acts are committed in a given society. Not
to do so would not only be a refusal to understand but also hamper
our capacity to develop effective antidotes.
 subjugated and
manipulated by fanatics who do not have the courage to risk their
own skins, is particularly repugnant and cowardly. There is absolutely
nothing that could justify horrors of this kind. Even so, one cannot
help wondering why such acts are committed in a given society. Not
to do so would not only be a refusal to understand but also hamper
our capacity to develop effective antidotes. A
few weeks previously, the Chechen President in person stated in
an interview given to Komsomolskaya Pravda on
24 September 2008, that “a woman should be considered as property
owned by a man. Here, if a woman does not behave correctly, her
husband, her father and her brother are responsible. In our tradition,
if a woman is unfaithful, she is killed … It can happen that a brother
kills his sister or a husband kills his wife. Our boys go to prison
for that … as President, I cannot allow people to be killed. So
let us make sure that women do not wear shorts.”
 A
few weeks previously, the Chechen President in person stated in
an interview given to Komsomolskaya Pravda on
24 September 2008, that “a woman should be considered as property
owned by a man. Here, if a woman does not behave correctly, her
husband, her father and her brother are responsible. In our tradition,
if a woman is unfaithful, she is killed … It can happen that a brother
kills his sister or a husband kills his wife. Our boys go to prison
for that … as President, I cannot allow people to be killed. So
let us make sure that women do not wear shorts.”  Chechen exiles abroad have told us
that emissaries of the Chechen President trying to incite them to
return home said “that they could no longer consider themselves
real men since, in Europe, they were not entitled to punish their
wives and daughters as one should”. This attitude towards women
is intolerable and no supposed custom or religious rule can justify
it. Natalya Estemirova, assassinated in July 2009, had been expelled
from the Human Rights Council of the city of Grozny in 2008 after
stating in a television interview that she would not wear a headscarf
in public, since obliging women to do so did not lie within the
competence of the president of the republic. Her voice has been
extinguished; the example she set and the truth she courageously
expressed remain and must be acted upon by the authorities.
 Chechen exiles abroad have told us
that emissaries of the Chechen President trying to incite them to
return home said “that they could no longer consider themselves
real men since, in Europe, they were not entitled to punish their
wives and daughters as one should”. This attitude towards women
is intolerable and no supposed custom or religious rule can justify
it. Natalya Estemirova, assassinated in July 2009, had been expelled
from the Human Rights Council of the city of Grozny in 2008 after
stating in a television interview that she would not wear a headscarf
in public, since obliging women to do so did not lie within the
competence of the president of the republic. Her voice has been
extinguished; the example she set and the truth she courageously
expressed remain and must be acted upon by the authorities. These units travel around in cars
fitted with highly advanced technical equipment for recording evidence
and, at the request of families, rush to the scenes of abductions
or other alleged crimes. They then write to the competent authorities,
in the capacity of the legal representatives of the plaintiffs,
to ensure that they have carried out the investigative procedures
required by the law and prescribed by the directives of the prosecutor
general’s office, drawn up in co-operation with the Council of Europe,
within the framework of the execution of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments.
Once assigned a case, they hound the authorities to take action
and do their duty: have given witnesses been interviewed? If not,
when will they be interviewed? Why have they not been interviewed?
Why have the owners of the vehicles described by witnesses not yet
been identified? These young law specialists track the investigation
step by step and do not hesitate to address their concerns to the
highest levels of the hierarchy. The “mobile units” have observed
that as soon as investigations risked casting suspicion on security force
entities, either the investigation was suddenly curtailed or police
officers failed to carry out the investigators’ instructions regarding
those structures.
 These units travel around in cars
fitted with highly advanced technical equipment for recording evidence
and, at the request of families, rush to the scenes of abductions
or other alleged crimes. They then write to the competent authorities,
in the capacity of the legal representatives of the plaintiffs,
to ensure that they have carried out the investigative procedures
required by the law and prescribed by the directives of the prosecutor
general’s office, drawn up in co-operation with the Council of Europe,
within the framework of the execution of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments.
Once assigned a case, they hound the authorities to take action
and do their duty: have given witnesses been interviewed? If not,
when will they be interviewed? Why have they not been interviewed?
Why have the owners of the vehicles described by witnesses not yet
been identified? These young law specialists track the investigation
step by step and do not hesitate to address their concerns to the
highest levels of the hierarchy. The “mobile units” have observed
that as soon as investigations risked casting suspicion on security force
entities, either the investigation was suddenly curtailed or police
officers failed to carry out the investigators’ instructions regarding
those structures.  The work of these “mobile
units” is admirable, in helping victims exercise their procedural
rights to oblige the investigators to carry out their duty; however,
with the resources available to them, they can follow up only a
small number of cases. The anecdotes recounted by the heads of these
units were both amusing and interesting and sometimes very telling:
one very high-ranking representative of the Chechen Republic expressly
asked the head of this NGO if he was actually working for President
Medvedev; on another occasion, a patrol of the FSB (Federal Security
Service) was so impressed by the highly professional working methods
used by the NGO that it asked the unit’s operatives if they were
not “one of us”. It may be concluded that these episodes are both
an illustration of the good work carried out by these volunteers
and testimony to how President Medvedev is viewed in the region.
It is a compliment and, above all, a call for action.
 The work of these “mobile
units” is admirable, in helping victims exercise their procedural
rights to oblige the investigators to carry out their duty; however,
with the resources available to them, they can follow up only a
small number of cases. The anecdotes recounted by the heads of these
units were both amusing and interesting and sometimes very telling:
one very high-ranking representative of the Chechen Republic expressly
asked the head of this NGO if he was actually working for President
Medvedev; on another occasion, a patrol of the FSB (Federal Security
Service) was so impressed by the highly professional working methods
used by the NGO that it asked the unit’s operatives if they were
not “one of us”. It may be concluded that these episodes are both
an illustration of the good work carried out by these volunteers
and testimony to how President Medvedev is viewed in the region.
It is a compliment and, above all, a call for action. has made
the scourge of corruption one of his top targets and that does not
seem to have pleased everyone: eight months after taking office,
he was the victim of a bomb attack which left him seriously injured.
After a long stay in hospital, he has returned to his duties and
appears determined to pursue his drive for reform. Nevertheless,
the situation in the country remains delicately poised and security
is precarious. The witness statements on the atrocities committed
by the security forces are, alas, numerous and highly detailed.
Bringing the law enforcement agencies under control and setting
up a judicial system worthy of the name will require enormous efforts.
President Yevkurov seems to be aware of the challenge; he twice made
the point that he was fully answerable for the actions of all the
law enforcement agencies on the territory of his republic. This
is a challenge which is starkly apparent in all three republics.
 has made
the scourge of corruption one of his top targets and that does not
seem to have pleased everyone: eight months after taking office,
he was the victim of a bomb attack which left him seriously injured.
After a long stay in hospital, he has returned to his duties and
appears determined to pursue his drive for reform. Nevertheless,
the situation in the country remains delicately poised and security
is precarious. The witness statements on the atrocities committed
by the security forces are, alas, numerous and highly detailed.
Bringing the law enforcement agencies under control and setting
up a judicial system worthy of the name will require enormous efforts.
President Yevkurov seems to be aware of the challenge; he twice made
the point that he was fully answerable for the actions of all the
law enforcement agencies on the territory of his republic. This
is a challenge which is starkly apparent in all three republics. In Derbent, on the shore of the Caspian
Sea, we were able to observe for ourselves a reality which is both
noteworthy and praiseworthy: in the same street of this charming
town (declared a world heritage site by UNESCO), there is a mosque,
a synagogue and an orthodox church. The Jewish community seems comfortable
and optimistic, despite being in an environment where Muslims are
very much in the majority: it has invested heavily in the renovation
of its place of worship and the adjoining social centre. These are
very strong, positive signs. The contrast between this long and
peaceful cohabitation of different cultures and the violence which
has besieged the country is disconcerting and is an alarm signal
for the authorities and for us all.
 In Derbent, on the shore of the Caspian
Sea, we were able to observe for ourselves a reality which is both
noteworthy and praiseworthy: in the same street of this charming
town (declared a world heritage site by UNESCO), there is a mosque,
a synagogue and an orthodox church. The Jewish community seems comfortable
and optimistic, despite being in an environment where Muslims are
very much in the majority: it has invested heavily in the renovation
of its place of worship and the adjoining social centre. These are
very strong, positive signs. The contrast between this long and
peaceful cohabitation of different cultures and the violence which
has besieged the country is disconcerting and is an alarm signal
for the authorities and for us all.  imposed on the country,
which is not the case in the other two republics. It is likely that
a sizeable proportion of the Chechen population backs the president
out of gratitude for the distinct improvements in their material
living conditions. Will that support last? Several observers told
us that the president’s popularity had been waning for several months.
It is a fact that a society without justice ultimately has no chance
of survival.
 imposed on the country,
which is not the case in the other two republics. It is likely that
a sizeable proportion of the Chechen population backs the president
out of gratitude for the distinct improvements in their material
living conditions. Will that support last? Several observers told
us that the president’s popularity had been waning for several months.
It is a fact that a society without justice ultimately has no chance
of survival.4.	The judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights 
4.1. Key figures
4.2. Typical nature of the violations found
 and
the forced disappearances of applicants following their arrest by
federal forces (cases of Bazorkina, Imakayeva, Alikhadzhiyeva)
 and
the forced disappearances of applicants following their arrest by
federal forces (cases of Bazorkina, Imakayeva, Alikhadzhiyeva)  . In several
cases, the Court held that members of the law enforcement agencies
had been responsible for extrajudicial executions (cases of Khashiyev
and Akayeva, Estamirov, Luluyev, Musayev and others)
. In several
cases, the Court held that members of the law enforcement agencies
had been responsible for extrajudicial executions (cases of Khashiyev
and Akayeva, Estamirov, Luluyev, Musayev and others)  . In the Chitayev case,
. In the Chitayev case,  the Court found that the Russian authorities
had been responsible for acts of torture into which no investigations
took place following the victim’s complaint.
 the Court found that the Russian authorities
had been responsible for acts of torture into which no investigations
took place following the victim’s complaint.  that Russia was (at the
same time) in breach of its duty to furnish all necessary facilities
for the examination of individual applications (Article 38, paragraph
1). In cases where the authorities do not offer a substantial response
to the detailed allegations of the applicants, the Court is increasingly
inclined to use presumptions of fact, particularly in situations
where the authorities are in sole possession of evidence with which
to clarify the situation (such as detention and release registers,
autopsy reports, etc.).
 that Russia was (at the
same time) in breach of its duty to furnish all necessary facilities
for the examination of individual applications (Article 38, paragraph
1). In cases where the authorities do not offer a substantial response
to the detailed allegations of the applicants, the Court is increasingly
inclined to use presumptions of fact, particularly in situations
where the authorities are in sole possession of evidence with which
to clarify the situation (such as detention and release registers,
autopsy reports, etc.). 
 the authorities
had a video recording of the arrest of the applicant’s husband and
did not even manage to identify and question the officials appearing
on it. In the case of Isigova and others
v. Russia,
 the authorities
had a video recording of the arrest of the applicant’s husband and
did not even manage to identify and question the officials appearing
on it. In the case of Isigova and others
v. Russia,  
  the Court considered that, as the
identities of the detachments and their commanders involved in the
abduction of the applicants’ relatives were established by the investigation
at national level, the failure to bring charges may only be attributed
to the negligence of the prosecuting authorities in handling the
investigation and their reluctance to pursue it. The Court found
it appalling that even after the commander of the detachment that
had apprehended Apti Isigov and Zelimkhan Umkhanov had been identified,
the investigation was repeatedly suspended on the grounds of the
failure to identify the alleged perpetrator or to ensure the suspect’s
participation in the proceedings. In the case of Khatsiyeva and others v. Russia,
 the Court considered that, as the
identities of the detachments and their commanders involved in the
abduction of the applicants’ relatives were established by the investigation
at national level, the failure to bring charges may only be attributed
to the negligence of the prosecuting authorities in handling the
investigation and their reluctance to pursue it. The Court found
it appalling that even after the commander of the detachment that
had apprehended Apti Isigov and Zelimkhan Umkhanov had been identified,
the investigation was repeatedly suspended on the grounds of the
failure to identify the alleged perpetrator or to ensure the suspect’s
participation in the proceedings. In the case of Khatsiyeva and others v. Russia,  the Court considered
that “the investigation soon appeared to have become protracted
and plagued with inexplicable shortcomings and delays in taking the
most trivial steps. In particular, it did not appear that any ballistic
tests were ever performed. Moreover, no autopsy or any further medical
forensic examination of the corpses was ever carried out, apart
from the initial medical examination on 6 August 2000. It did not
appear that at the early stage of the investigation any meaningful
efforts were made to establish the identity of those who had given
the order to attack or those who had carried out the order. The
identity of those ordering the attack did not appear to have been
established at all. In particular, the decision of 15 December 2001
did not indicate whether the identity of the official concerned had
been established or make any assessment of the order to attack.
No further attempts to analyse the order were ever made. … Finally,
between August 2000 and April 2003 the investigation was adjourned
and reopened at least five times. Its ineffectiveness and the investigators’
failure to take practical measures aimed at resolving the crime
and to comply with prosecutors’ orders were even acknowledged by
senior prosecutors. The Court also noted numerous transfers of the
investigation file from one investigating authority to another without
any reasonable explanations being given”.
 the Court considered
that “the investigation soon appeared to have become protracted
and plagued with inexplicable shortcomings and delays in taking the
most trivial steps. In particular, it did not appear that any ballistic
tests were ever performed. Moreover, no autopsy or any further medical
forensic examination of the corpses was ever carried out, apart
from the initial medical examination on 6 August 2000. It did not
appear that at the early stage of the investigation any meaningful
efforts were made to establish the identity of those who had given
the order to attack or those who had carried out the order. The
identity of those ordering the attack did not appear to have been
established at all. In particular, the decision of 15 December 2001
did not indicate whether the identity of the official concerned had
been established or make any assessment of the order to attack.
No further attempts to analyse the order were ever made. … Finally,
between August 2000 and April 2003 the investigation was adjourned
and reopened at least five times. Its ineffectiveness and the investigators’
failure to take practical measures aimed at resolving the crime
and to comply with prosecutors’ orders were even acknowledged by
senior prosecutors. The Court also noted numerous transfers of the
investigation file from one investigating authority to another without
any reasonable explanations being given”.  In
the case of Aziyevy v. Russia,
 In
the case of Aziyevy v. Russia,  the Court sharply criticised the investigation,
in which there had been a patent lack of progress for more than
seven years. The investigators did not even identify and question
the soldiers posted nearby, or check whether any special operations
had taken place at the time of the disappearances, or carry out
questioning of any witnesses. The authorities’ response to the applicants’
well-substantiated complaints prompted the Court to presume that
the soldiers’ conduct had at least the authorities’ tacit assent,
giving grounds for the Court to have serious doubts as to the objective
nature of the investigation.
 the Court sharply criticised the investigation,
in which there had been a patent lack of progress for more than
seven years. The investigators did not even identify and question
the soldiers posted nearby, or check whether any special operations
had taken place at the time of the disappearances, or carry out
questioning of any witnesses. The authorities’ response to the applicants’
well-substantiated complaints prompted the Court to presume that
the soldiers’ conduct had at least the authorities’ tacit assent,
giving grounds for the Court to have serious doubts as to the objective
nature of the investigation. 
 the list of
convictions makes for surrealist reading: it almost exclusively
lists violations of the road traffic regulations, petty theft, drunk
and disorderly conduct, etc. In the rare cases listed where someone
has been killed, the perpetrator’s acts are described as accidental
or a failure to correctly handle their service weapon. Consequently,
the sentences handed down were mostly fines or very short and/or
suspended prison terms.
 the list of
convictions makes for surrealist reading: it almost exclusively
lists violations of the road traffic regulations, petty theft, drunk
and disorderly conduct, etc. In the rare cases listed where someone
has been killed, the perpetrator’s acts are described as accidental
or a failure to correctly handle their service weapon. Consequently,
the sentences handed down were mostly fines or very short and/or
suspended prison terms. 
 With one exception,
none of those cases – some of them already dating back several years
– has been elucidated to date. The exception mentioned concerns
the attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek
Yevkurov, in June 2009. We were told that the “liquidation” of the
Islamist leader Alexandr Tikhomirov (alias Said Buryatskiy), said
to have claimed responsibility for the attack, had resolved the case.
We would take the liberty of expressing some doubts as to whether
this affair has really been cleared up. If the suspect had not been ”liquidated”
 With one exception,
none of those cases – some of them already dating back several years
– has been elucidated to date. The exception mentioned concerns
the attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek
Yevkurov, in June 2009. We were told that the “liquidation” of the
Islamist leader Alexandr Tikhomirov (alias Said Buryatskiy), said
to have claimed responsibility for the attack, had resolved the case.
We would take the liberty of expressing some doubts as to whether
this affair has really been cleared up. If the suspect had not been ”liquidated”  with
such haste, it might have transpired that the president had other enemies
who were not necessarily Islamic fundamentalists, bearing in mind
his stand against corruption. There are doubts of this kind surrounding
other affairs too. One cannot help thinking of the hostage-takers
in the North-East theatre. We recall that all the terrorists were
finished off with a bullet in the head, despite the fact that they
were lying on the floor, unconscious after inhaling the gas used
during the law enforcement agencies’ intervention to free the hostages.
These were assassinations or extrajudicial executions (which are
the same thing) and a valuable opportunity was lost to obtain important
information on the criminal organisation that had ordered the terrorist
operation. The replies we received concerning the list of cases
submitted to the authorities are disappointing.
 with
such haste, it might have transpired that the president had other enemies
who were not necessarily Islamic fundamentalists, bearing in mind
his stand against corruption. There are doubts of this kind surrounding
other affairs too. One cannot help thinking of the hostage-takers
in the North-East theatre. We recall that all the terrorists were
finished off with a bullet in the head, despite the fact that they
were lying on the floor, unconscious after inhaling the gas used
during the law enforcement agencies’ intervention to free the hostages.
These were assassinations or extrajudicial executions (which are
the same thing) and a valuable opportunity was lost to obtain important
information on the criminal organisation that had ordered the terrorist
operation. The replies we received concerning the list of cases
submitted to the authorities are disappointing.  Beyond the extremely
formal nature of these replies there remains very little substance. The
investigative acts described mostly go no further than merely sending
letters to different public authorities, and the findings all too
often come down to the observation that “unidentified individuals
wearing uniforms and masks entered the victim’s home and took them
away to an unknown destination”, without further details. It is true
that for some cases their replies are more detailed and list the
names of the witnesses interviewed, the number of documents analysed,
the vehicle number plates noted and so on. The fact that the investigations have
gone into such detail is undoubtedly an improvement, especially
if we compare them with the information supplied to the previous
rapporteur, Mr Paschal Mooney, in reply to his introductory memorandum
of 9 March 2007.
 Beyond the extremely
formal nature of these replies there remains very little substance. The
investigative acts described mostly go no further than merely sending
letters to different public authorities, and the findings all too
often come down to the observation that “unidentified individuals
wearing uniforms and masks entered the victim’s home and took them
away to an unknown destination”, without further details. It is true
that for some cases their replies are more detailed and list the
names of the witnesses interviewed, the number of documents analysed,
the vehicle number plates noted and so on. The fact that the investigations have
gone into such detail is undoubtedly an improvement, especially
if we compare them with the information supplied to the previous
rapporteur, Mr Paschal Mooney, in reply to his introductory memorandum
of 9 March 2007.  But
this more detailed information still needs to be followed by tangible
results. That, sadly, is far from the case.
 But
this more detailed information still needs to be followed by tangible
results. That, sadly, is far from the case.4.3. Reprisals against applicants
 and in one case the applicant and her entire
family were massacred in their home (Bitiyeva case).
 and in one case the applicant and her entire
family were massacred in their home (Bitiyeva case).  Those cases were the subject
of the report by our colleague Christos Pourgourides (Cyprus, EPP/CD)
on “Member states’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of
Human Rights”,
 Those cases were the subject
of the report by our colleague Christos Pourgourides (Cyprus, EPP/CD)
on “Member states’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of
Human Rights”,  which also implies
the obligation to protect applicants, their families and their lawyers
when they receive threats. A more recent affair concerned the assassination,
on 19 January 2009 in Vienna, of Umar S. Israilov, who had publicly
accused Ramzan Kadyrov of personally participating in acts of torture
in a secret prison located in Tsentoroy, the Chechen President’s
native village.
 which also implies
the obligation to protect applicants, their families and their lawyers
when they receive threats. A more recent affair concerned the assassination,
on 19 January 2009 in Vienna, of Umar S. Israilov, who had publicly
accused Ramzan Kadyrov of personally participating in acts of torture
in a secret prison located in Tsentoroy, the Chechen President’s
native village. ![(46) 
			See Le Monde/AFP of 12 February 2009
“L’opposant tchétchène tué à Vienne devait témoigner contre Kadyrov” [Chechen
opposition politician killed in Vienna was to testify against Kadyrov];
and C. J. Chivers, “Slain exile detailed cruelty of the ruler of
Chechnya”, New York Times, 1
February 2009.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png) In fact, Mr Israilov’s application
to the Court, lodged in 2006, was nearly struck out owing to a failure
to reply to a communication from the Court which his lawyer had
mislaid. Although the Court has not often found a violation of the
exercise of the right of individual petition (Article 34) in such
cases, for lack of sufficient evidence, it has nevertheless decided
to treat them as a priority, pursuant to Rule 41 of its Rules of
Court. In the light of Mr Pourgourides’ report, the Assembly has
backed the Court in this approach and even encouraged it to open
up and go further, along the lines of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which had faced similar challenges, particularly in
cases concerning the death squads in a number of Latin American
countries; the Court might go so far as to order physical protection
measures, on the basis of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article
34 of the Convention. In the experience of the human rights protection
organisations which represent the vast majority of applicants in
cases concerning the North Caucasus before the Court,
 In fact, Mr Israilov’s application
to the Court, lodged in 2006, was nearly struck out owing to a failure
to reply to a communication from the Court which his lawyer had
mislaid. Although the Court has not often found a violation of the
exercise of the right of individual petition (Article 34) in such
cases, for lack of sufficient evidence, it has nevertheless decided
to treat them as a priority, pursuant to Rule 41 of its Rules of
Court. In the light of Mr Pourgourides’ report, the Assembly has
backed the Court in this approach and even encouraged it to open
up and go further, along the lines of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which had faced similar challenges, particularly in
cases concerning the death squads in a number of Latin American
countries; the Court might go so far as to order physical protection
measures, on the basis of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article
34 of the Convention. In the experience of the human rights protection
organisations which represent the vast majority of applicants in
cases concerning the North Caucasus before the Court,  the
best way of protecting applicants is to notify the Russian authorities
of each application of this type as quickly as possible; according
to the NGOs, in most cases the authorities assume their responsibilities
and do their utmost to provide the necessary protection.
 the
best way of protecting applicants is to notify the Russian authorities
of each application of this type as quickly as possible; according
to the NGOs, in most cases the authorities assume their responsibilities
and do their utmost to provide the necessary protection. 4.4. Implementation of the Court’s judgments
 At
the joint initiative of Mr Pourgourides, rapporteur for the implementation
of judgments of the Court,
 At
the joint initiative of Mr Pourgourides, rapporteur for the implementation
of judgments of the Court,  
  
  and myself, the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights held a hearing, on 11 September 2009, with
the participation of the Russian Federation’s representative to
the Court and Deputy Minister of Justice, Mr Matyushkin, Professor Philip
Leach and Mrs Gannushkina, representative of Memorial, replacing
Mrs Estemirova, head of the Memorial office in the Chechen Republic,
who had been murdered the day after confirming her attendance at the
meeting. The victims actively participate in the process of the
execution of judgments supervised by the Committee of Ministers,
through NGOs which previously assisted them during the proceedings
before the Court, proposing concrete measures for remedying the
violation found.
 and myself, the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights held a hearing, on 11 September 2009, with
the participation of the Russian Federation’s representative to
the Court and Deputy Minister of Justice, Mr Matyushkin, Professor Philip
Leach and Mrs Gannushkina, representative of Memorial, replacing
Mrs Estemirova, head of the Memorial office in the Chechen Republic,
who had been murdered the day after confirming her attendance at the
meeting. The victims actively participate in the process of the
execution of judgments supervised by the Committee of Ministers,
through NGOs which previously assisted them during the proceedings
before the Court, proposing concrete measures for remedying the
violation found. 
 
  Information in this area would gain
in transparency if the reports produced by the CPT after its visits to
the region were made public; however, the publication of those reports
requires the consent of the Russian authorities, which have not
yet granted it. The CPT has made 11 visits to the region, the last
one in April 2009. It has adopted three “public statements” concerning
the situation in places of detention in the Chechen Republic.
 Information in this area would gain
in transparency if the reports produced by the CPT after its visits to
the region were made public; however, the publication of those reports
requires the consent of the Russian authorities, which have not
yet granted it. The CPT has made 11 visits to the region, the last
one in April 2009. It has adopted three “public statements” concerning
the situation in places of detention in the Chechen Republic.  It should be pointed out that the
public statement is an instrument which is rarely used (five times in
the twenty years of existence of the CPT) and is reserved for situations
characterised by a manifest lack of co-operation on the part of
the authorities.
 It should be pointed out that the
public statement is an instrument which is rarely used (five times in
the twenty years of existence of the CPT) and is reserved for situations
characterised by a manifest lack of co-operation on the part of
the authorities.  As far as we know, the Committee
of Ministers has never put these statements on its agenda and, consequently,
has not stated its views on them. Why not?
 As far as we know, the Committee
of Ministers has never put these statements on its agenda and, consequently,
has not stated its views on them. Why not?Khalid Khatsiyev and Kazbek Akiyev were killed on 6 August 2000, when a Russian military helicopter opened fire, without apparent reason, on a group of men who were cutting grass near the village of Arshty in Ingushetia, near the Chechen border. In its judgment in 2008, the Court saw no plausible justification for the use of firearms in the circumstances and, accordingly, ruled that Russia had violated the victims’ right to life.The military prosecutor’s office established the identity of the pilots only after a year-long investigation but did not identify the superiors who ordered the attack. The Court strongly criticised the lack of an effective investigation. Within the framework of the execution of this judgment, the military prosecutor’s office re-opened the investigation, only to suspend it one month later, on the day when the victims’ families received the letter notifying them of the reopening of the procedure. They are still waiting for justice to be done.
In the Bazorkina case,Russian television showed video footage on 2 February 2000 of the federal forces arresting a young man, Khadzi-Murat Yandiyev, whose mother, Fatima Bazorkina, instantly recognised him. General Baranov is seen and clearly heard to say to the soldiers: “Go on, go on, take him away, finish him off, shoot him, damn it”. The Russian soldiers are then seen to take Yandiyev away; he has never been seen since. Despite the Court judgment, finding a violation of Article 2 and strongly condemning the lack of an effective investigation, the Russian authorities have refused to open an investigation concerning General Baranov. In a letter of 24 March 2008 sent to Mrs Bazorkina’s representatives, the military prosecutor’s office stated, with no further explanation, that in the course of the “preliminary” investigation into Yandiyev’s disappearance “all the violations of the European Convention pointed out in the Court’s judgment have been rectified.” In another letter dated 3 April 2009 (in reply to Mrs Bazorkina’s request on 20 February 2009 to open a criminal investigation concerning General Baranov’s actions) the military prosecutor’s office replied that “no evidence has been established during the investigation of potential involvement of Major-General A. I. Baranov in the abduction and killing of Kh-M. A. Yandiyev. In this connection, the request to launch a criminal investigation [in relation to Baranov] has been denied.”
 who had asked
the Chechen Ministry of the Interior for the names of the soldiers
assigned to a given checkpoint on the night of their abduction:
their request was refused by order of the Ministry of the Interior
of 25 August 2007 prohibiting access to the personal data of operatives
taking part in counter-terrorist or “special” operations.
 who had asked
the Chechen Ministry of the Interior for the names of the soldiers
assigned to a given checkpoint on the night of their abduction:
their request was refused by order of the Ministry of the Interior
of 25 August 2007 prohibiting access to the personal data of operatives
taking part in counter-terrorist or “special” operations.  This
stipulation has the effect of preventing the identification of law
enforcement agency staff who may be involved in criminal acts. There
is an extensive network of checkpoints, as we could see for ourselves
on the spot. When a person’s body is found far from the place where
they were abducted, the perpetrators must have passed through or
close to checkpoints. This immunity granted to the staff manning
checkpoints can only nurture suspicion. It should be remembered
that Natalya Estemirova was abducted in the Chechen Republic and
her body was found in Ingushetia. Her assassins must have felt very
sure of themselves to travel around with an abducted person or a
dead body.
 This
stipulation has the effect of preventing the identification of law
enforcement agency staff who may be involved in criminal acts. There
is an extensive network of checkpoints, as we could see for ourselves
on the spot. When a person’s body is found far from the place where
they were abducted, the perpetrators must have passed through or
close to checkpoints. This immunity granted to the staff manning
checkpoints can only nurture suspicion. It should be remembered
that Natalya Estemirova was abducted in the Chechen Republic and
her body was found in Ingushetia. Her assassins must have felt very
sure of themselves to travel around with an abducted person or a
dead body.5. Some frightening figures
6. The problem of missing persons – A role for the Red Cross
 The
total number of missing persons for the Chechen Republic alone is
estimated at between 3 000
 The
total number of missing persons for the Chechen Republic alone is
estimated at between 3 000  and
5 000.
 and
5 000.  The
families’ suffering and distress, strikingly described by the ICRC,
demonstrate, were it still necessary, that if there is to be reconciliation
and lasting peace, the issue of missing persons must be resolved.
In keeping with its statute and long experience, the ICRC does not
seek to attach blame but calls for practical assistance for the
victims. As the Assembly has forcefully spelt out on several occasions,
 The
families’ suffering and distress, strikingly described by the ICRC,
demonstrate, were it still necessary, that if there is to be reconciliation
and lasting peace, the issue of missing persons must be resolved.
In keeping with its statute and long experience, the ICRC does not
seek to attach blame but calls for practical assistance for the
victims. As the Assembly has forcefully spelt out on several occasions,  and as proclaimed in
the convention for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance
recently adopted by the United Nations,
 and as proclaimed in
the convention for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance
recently adopted by the United Nations,  relatives have the right to
know, and the competent authorities have a duty to muster their
forces to resolve as many cases as possible. Russia could greatly
benefit from the experience acquired by the Red Cross in other countries, such
as Cyprus, in Africa or in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
The ICRC concludes its report by setting out recommendations that
are practical, concrete and very much to the point, which we can
only endorse and strongly recommend to the Russian authorities.
 relatives have the right to
know, and the competent authorities have a duty to muster their
forces to resolve as many cases as possible. Russia could greatly
benefit from the experience acquired by the Red Cross in other countries, such
as Cyprus, in Africa or in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
The ICRC concludes its report by setting out recommendations that
are practical, concrete and very much to the point, which we can
only endorse and strongly recommend to the Russian authorities.7. Some exemplary cases
 some of which were related to us and directly
confirmed by the victims’ relatives.
 some of which were related to us and directly
confirmed by the victims’ relatives.![(66) 
			See Le Monde of 12 February 2009, “L’opposant
tchétchène tué à Vienne devait témoigner contre Kadyrov” [Chechen
opposition politician killed in Vienna was to have testified against
Kadyrov]; New York Times of
1 February 2009, C. J. Chivers: “Slain exile detailed cruelty of
the ruler of Chechnya”.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png) Artur Kurmakayev, a Chechen,
had reportedly informed the Austrian Constitutional Security Department in
May 2008 that he had been ordered to execute Israilov but that he
would disobey the order, and was consequently requesting special
protection. The Austrian authorities apparently failed to take this
information seriously, dismissing it as pure fabrication. Kurmakayev
had been sent back to Russia, with his ostensible consent, as shown
by a document which he had allegedly signed in the presence of Austrian
officials. Nothing has been heard of Kurmakayev since. Shortly after
Israilov’s assassination, the Austrian police arrested a number
of suspects of Chechen origin. According to leaks from generally
reliable sources, the police has evidence linking the crime to the
immediate entourage of the Chechen President.
 Artur Kurmakayev, a Chechen,
had reportedly informed the Austrian Constitutional Security Department in
May 2008 that he had been ordered to execute Israilov but that he
would disobey the order, and was consequently requesting special
protection. The Austrian authorities apparently failed to take this
information seriously, dismissing it as pure fabrication. Kurmakayev
had been sent back to Russia, with his ostensible consent, as shown
by a document which he had allegedly signed in the presence of Austrian
officials. Nothing has been heard of Kurmakayev since. Shortly after
Israilov’s assassination, the Austrian police arrested a number
of suspects of Chechen origin. According to leaks from generally
reliable sources, the police has evidence linking the crime to the
immediate entourage of the Chechen President. ![(67) 
			See Sonja Zekri, “Tschetscheniens
Machthaber soll Mord Befohlen haben – Österreichs Verfassungsschutz beschuldigt
Präsident Ramsan Kadyrov – doch es fehlen stichhaltige Beweise”
[Chechen leader alleged to have ordered assassination – Austrian
Constitutional Security Department accuses President Ramsan Kadyrov,
despite lack of firm evidence], Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 28 April 2010; Joëlle Stolz, “La police autrichienne
relie le president tchétchène au meurtre d’un opposant” [Austrian
police link Chechen President to murder of political foe], Le Monde, 30 April 2010.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
 Threats have
been issued against other exiles, including, most recently, regime
opponents enjoying political asylum in Strasbourg with whom we have
spoken.
 Threats have
been issued against other exiles, including, most recently, regime
opponents enjoying political asylum in Strasbourg with whom we have
spoken. in which he accused Mr Kadyrov of
having tortured him in 2006 and 2007 in a secret prison in Tsentoroy,
the Chechen President’s home village. We wrote to the Chechen President
on 12 August 2008 asking him to intervene and take all the necessary
steps to trace Mr Masayev. There was no reply. And there is still
no trace of Mr Masayev.
 in which he accused Mr Kadyrov of
having tortured him in 2006 and 2007 in a secret prison in Tsentoroy,
the Chechen President’s home village. We wrote to the Chechen President
on 12 August 2008 asking him to intervene and take all the necessary
steps to trace Mr Masayev. There was no reply. And there is still
no trace of Mr Masayev.8. Additional considerations
 We have collected witness statements
on explicit or implicit threats from police circles against judges
who have attempted to investigate cases liable to implicate police
officers or soldiers. We were also informed that the police simply
reject requests from the investigating authorities for investigative
measures in cases involving the police services. Organised crime
and terrorism can never be properly tackled without the support
of the population and without public trust in the institutions.
The best way to contend with the threat of terrorism is to have
a competent, efficient and adequate police force and an independent,
respected judiciary. Investment in this field is manifestly insufficient.
 We have collected witness statements
on explicit or implicit threats from police circles against judges
who have attempted to investigate cases liable to implicate police
officers or soldiers. We were also informed that the police simply
reject requests from the investigating authorities for investigative
measures in cases involving the police services. Organised crime
and terrorism can never be properly tackled without the support
of the population and without public trust in the institutions.
The best way to contend with the threat of terrorism is to have
a competent, efficient and adequate police force and an independent,
respected judiciary. Investment in this field is manifestly insufficient. is to play along with the criminals
and fuel the spiral of atrocities. Even after the 1999 terrorist
attacks, the then Russian President pledged to “wipe the terrorists
out in their outhouse”. Let me remind you of two examples of a different approach
to similar tragic events. In 1978, in the midst of “The Leaden Years”,
the abduction and murder of Aldo Moro not only marked the climax
of the terrorist violence raging through Italy during these years
but also, and above all, were a direct attack on the heart of the
state. Many people at the time advocated the adoption of extraordinary
measures which would be incompatible with fundamental human rights.
General Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, who was responsible for co-ordinating
the fight against terrorism, was very straightforward: “Italy will
survive the death of Aldo Moro, but it will never survive the introduction
of torture”.
 is to play along with the criminals
and fuel the spiral of atrocities. Even after the 1999 terrorist
attacks, the then Russian President pledged to “wipe the terrorists
out in their outhouse”. Let me remind you of two examples of a different approach
to similar tragic events. In 1978, in the midst of “The Leaden Years”,
the abduction and murder of Aldo Moro not only marked the climax
of the terrorist violence raging through Italy during these years
but also, and above all, were a direct attack on the heart of the
state. Many people at the time advocated the adoption of extraordinary
measures which would be incompatible with fundamental human rights.
General Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, who was responsible for co-ordinating
the fight against terrorism, was very straightforward: “Italy will
survive the death of Aldo Moro, but it will never survive the introduction
of torture”.  This was an impressive position for
a military man involved on the ground, in a period of extreme tension
such as the country had seldom seen in its history. On 11 March
2004, bombs on a train and in two Madrid railway stations killed
191 people. King Juan Carlos reacted the same day with a televised
speech to the nation, a passage of which would be worth quoting
here: “A country which is well aware that the only possible reaction
to injustice and barbarity is unity, firmness and serenity. Unity,
firmness and serenity in combating terrorism, with all the instruments provided
by the law-based state, intensifying our joint efforts to eliminate
this scourge and relying on the work of the police, our justice
system and international co-operation.”
 This was an impressive position for
a military man involved on the ground, in a period of extreme tension
such as the country had seldom seen in its history. On 11 March
2004, bombs on a train and in two Madrid railway stations killed
191 people. King Juan Carlos reacted the same day with a televised
speech to the nation, a passage of which would be worth quoting
here: “A country which is well aware that the only possible reaction
to injustice and barbarity is unity, firmness and serenity. Unity,
firmness and serenity in combating terrorism, with all the instruments provided
by the law-based state, intensifying our joint efforts to eliminate
this scourge and relying on the work of the police, our justice
system and international co-operation.”  Italy overcame terrorism without
renouncing its values and principles as a law-based state. The Spanish
judges managed to identify the criminals
 Italy overcame terrorism without
renouncing its values and principles as a law-based state. The Spanish
judges managed to identify the criminals  who had committed these
dastardly attacks, to arrest them and to convict them by means of
judicial proceedings conducted in strict compliance with the rule
of law.
 who had committed these
dastardly attacks, to arrest them and to convict them by means of
judicial proceedings conducted in strict compliance with the rule
of law. It would also be useful to quote
a lengthy passage from the report drawn up at the time by Mr Bindig, given
the continuing relevance of his assertions in the light of current
events: “This lack of consistency, not to say the use of double
standards, on the part of the Committee of Ministers is deeply regrettable
as the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers share the common
objective to improve the human rights situation in Chechnya. By
petitioning the Committee of Ministers to use its own monitoring
mechanism and thereby demonstrate its own effectiveness, the Assembly
has shown its readiness to create synergies with the Council’s executive
organ. However, the Committee of Ministers seems no longer interested
in monitoring the human rights situation in Chechnya within the
framework of its Declaration on compliance with commitments or,
indeed, within any other framework. It seems that a decision of
some kind, explicit or implicit, has been taken by the Committee
of Ministers, and by two successive Secretaries General, to stop
monitoring the human rights situation in Chechnya, without informing
the Assembly. Responsibility for so doing has, in effect, been placed on
the European Court of Human Rights the Committee for the Prevention
of Tortureand, to a lesser extent, the
Council’s Human Rights Commissioner”.
 It would also be useful to quote
a lengthy passage from the report drawn up at the time by Mr Bindig, given
the continuing relevance of his assertions in the light of current
events: “This lack of consistency, not to say the use of double
standards, on the part of the Committee of Ministers is deeply regrettable
as the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers share the common
objective to improve the human rights situation in Chechnya. By
petitioning the Committee of Ministers to use its own monitoring
mechanism and thereby demonstrate its own effectiveness, the Assembly
has shown its readiness to create synergies with the Council’s executive
organ. However, the Committee of Ministers seems no longer interested
in monitoring the human rights situation in Chechnya within the
framework of its Declaration on compliance with commitments or,
indeed, within any other framework. It seems that a decision of
some kind, explicit or implicit, has been taken by the Committee
of Ministers, and by two successive Secretaries General, to stop
monitoring the human rights situation in Chechnya, without informing
the Assembly. Responsibility for so doing has, in effect, been placed on
the European Court of Human Rights the Committee for the Prevention
of Tortureand, to a lesser extent, the
Council’s Human Rights Commissioner”.  What can we add, other
than an expression of our puzzlement and dismay at such an attitude?
According to Article 46 (2) ECHR, the Committee of Ministers is
responsible for supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments.
Such execution obviously cannot be confined to matters of payment
of compensation to applicant parties. There are more than 150
 What can we add, other
than an expression of our puzzlement and dismay at such an attitude?
According to Article 46 (2) ECHR, the Committee of Ministers is
responsible for supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments.
Such execution obviously cannot be confined to matters of payment
of compensation to applicant parties. There are more than 150  judgments finding extremely serious
violations of the fundamental rights in the same region, without
any genuine action being taken on the root causes of this situation.
 judgments finding extremely serious
violations of the fundamental rights in the same region, without
any genuine action being taken on the root causes of this situation. in order to send
out a strong signal, in the full awareness that the United Nations
Security Council would never take such a decision. Although the
idea is far from inappropriate, we would prefer to continue to believe
in the will and capacity of the Russian authorities to deal with
the problem in the North Caucasus, to restore justice and ensure
a climate of peace. We realise that this is an enormous challenge.
As stated above, lasting peace presupposes a duty to tell the truth.
For many years, non-governmental organisations
 in order to send
out a strong signal, in the full awareness that the United Nations
Security Council would never take such a decision. Although the
idea is far from inappropriate, we would prefer to continue to believe
in the will and capacity of the Russian authorities to deal with
the problem in the North Caucasus, to restore justice and ensure
a climate of peace. We realise that this is an enormous challenge.
As stated above, lasting peace presupposes a duty to tell the truth.
For many years, non-governmental organisations  have
been collating impressive documentation (in the form of personal testimonies,
films, videos and documents) on the events in the region. These
archives have an historic value and could certainly help promote
this work of remembrance and truth. The Council of Europe might
co-operate with the Russian authorities in this endeavour.
 have
been collating impressive documentation (in the form of personal testimonies,
films, videos and documents) on the events in the region. These
archives have an historic value and could certainly help promote
this work of remembrance and truth. The Council of Europe might
co-operate with the Russian authorities in this endeavour. We read his speech just as we were
finalising this report. The president’s contribution is particularly
noteworthy, because, in our view, the tone is changing, and we consider
this approach, which is very different from what we have seen in
the past, as a positive sign, even if there are still many outstanding problems.
 We read his speech just as we were
finalising this report. The president’s contribution is particularly
noteworthy, because, in our view, the tone is changing, and we consider
this approach, which is very different from what we have seen in
the past, as a positive sign, even if there are still many outstanding problems. This is no way to encourage terrorists
to discontinue their activities, which would not only prevent terrorist
attacks but also help dismantle the terrorist networks.
 This is no way to encourage terrorists
to discontinue their activities, which would not only prevent terrorist
attacks but also help dismantle the terrorist networks.
Appendix 1 – List of cases transmitted to the Russian authorities
(open)Appendix 2 – Presentation of cases illustrating the malfunctioning of the judicial system
(open)Abduction and disappearance of Zarema Gaisanova who worked for the Danish Refugee Council, a humanitarian NGO
1.	At around 3 p.m. on 31 October 2009 in Grozny, a “special
operation” was carried out by unidentified officers of units of
the law enforcement agencies, during which Ali Hasanov, a member
of an illegal armed faction, was killed. While searching the house
next to Zarema Gaisanova’s, the officers opened fire on Ms Gaisanova’s
house, killing Ali Hasanov. During the shooting exchange, a fire
broke out in Ms Gaisanova’s house, a large part of which burned
down. At around 5.30 p.m., Ms Gaisanova was taken from her home, apparently
by the law enforcement officers carrying out the operation. Criminal
proceedings were initiated following this abduction. On the official
website of the Chechen Republic Interior Ministry, the Minister
of the Interior said that the special operation in Grozny on 31
October 2009, during which Mr Hasanov had died, had been carried
out on the orders of the Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov. Witnesses
of the incident said that they had seen the President and the Interior
Minister at the site of the operation, the former giving an interview on
the “liquidation” of the outlawed rebel fighter, Hasanov. Ms Gaisanova’s
mother then approached the President of Ingushetia, the Investigation
Committee and the Chechen prosecution service to assist her in finding
her daughter. In November 2009, during a conversation with Ms Gaisanova’s
mother, the investigator in charge of the case said that he had
learned that her daughter was alive but that the investigators had
no access to her. According to human rights activists and those
close to Ms Gaisanova, officials of the Leninski district internal
affairs department in Grozny (suspected of having carried out the
special operation in question) repeatedly ignored the orders of
the investigator in charge of the case, sabotaging the investigation
process. The non-governmental “mobile human rights defence units”,
whose remarkable work we have already commended,  have taken an interest
in this case. According to correspondence provided to us, the investigator
in charge, Mr Tamayev, on three occasions
 have taken an interest
in this case. According to correspondence provided to us, the investigator
in charge, Mr Tamayev, on three occasions  ordered the internal affairs
department to take a number of specific procedural measures (identification
and summoning of witnesses, identification and summoning of officers
who took part in the special operation, etc.). These orders were
ignored, in blatant violation of Russian legislation.
 ordered the internal affairs
department to take a number of specific procedural measures (identification
and summoning of witnesses, identification and summoning of officers
who took part in the special operation, etc.). These orders were
ignored, in blatant violation of Russian legislation.  The investigator
subsequently sent a “protest” to the internal affairs department,
also informing, in two reports, the acting head of the Grozny Department
of Investigation. Igor Kaliapin, head of the Committee against Torture’s
“mobile units”, acting as the victims’ legal representative, wrote
to the Chechen Minister of the Interior to inform him of the police’s
failure to comply with the prosecution service’s instructions in
this case.
 The investigator
subsequently sent a “protest” to the internal affairs department,
also informing, in two reports, the acting head of the Grozny Department
of Investigation. Igor Kaliapin, head of the Committee against Torture’s
“mobile units”, acting as the victims’ legal representative, wrote
to the Chechen Minister of the Interior to inform him of the police’s
failure to comply with the prosecution service’s instructions in
this case.  The
Minister, in his reply to Mr Kaliapin, promised to take this information into
account and said that tangible measures would be taken in connection
with this case. Meanwhile, Ms Gaisanova’s family has referred the
matter to the European Court of Human Rights. To date, Zarema Gaisanova
has not been found.
 The
Minister, in his reply to Mr Kaliapin, promised to take this information into
account and said that tangible measures would be taken in connection
with this case. Meanwhile, Ms Gaisanova’s family has referred the
matter to the European Court of Human Rights. To date, Zarema Gaisanova
has not been found.
2. In the course of the meetings we have had with the Chechen Prosecutor, the Director of the Investigation Committee and with the Minister of the Interior, I was assured that the police and the prosecution investigators co-operated very well. Nonetheless, the minister did eventually acknowledge the problems raised in Mr Kaliapin’s letter.
3. The written comments sent to us by the Chechen Prosecution Department regarding this case (No. 66094) confirm that a “special operation” targeting a certain A. A. Hasanov, member of an illegal armed faction, had indeed been carried out on the date and at the location indicated. It appears from the replies from the Minister of the Interior and the director of the regional FSB that “the abduction of Z. I. Gaisanova by law enforcement officers has not been confirmed”. Seven officers from the Argun police station who took part in the operation apparently saw nobody other than A. A. Hasanov.
4. On 16 April 2010, Memorial published a document on the shortcomings of the investigation into the disappearance of Ms Gaisanova. Drawing on the various statements made by those in charge of the investigation and on the material provided by the Russian authorities under the urgent procedure initiated before the European Court of Human Rights, this document shows, in a very convincing way, the clear contradictions in this case and the authorities’ prevarication.
Abduction and disappearance of Abdul-Yezit Askhabov, Chechen Republic
5. In the middle of the night, around 3 a.m., on 5 August 2009 in Shali, three armed individuals wearing masks and camouflage clothing, broke into the Askhabovs’ house. Without giving any explanation, they took Abdul-Yezit Askhabov to an undisclosed destination. According to the neighbours’ statements, the abductors used three vehicles. Mr Askhabov’s family members immediately informed the police and the head of the regional administration and that same morning filed a complaint with the regional internal affairs department, the prosecution service and the local FSB (federal security services).
6. In the morning of 7 August 2009, while outside the building of the Shali regional internal affairs department awaiting news of the whereabouts of her son, the victim’s mother Tamara Askhabova, together with other women from the Askhabov family, were removed by police officers, on the pretext of avoiding any “trouble” in the official building. Members of Mr Askhabov’s family then went to Grozny, to the prosecution authorities. They were received by Umarpasha Hakimov, a co-worker with the Chechen Republic ombudsman, who in the presence of Tamara Askhabova called the Shali regional internal affairs department and was told that the head of department was not there at that time. He was given another number (probably that of the deputy head) which he immediately dialled. Mr Hakimov then spoke to someone who told him that Mr Askhabov was being held and that he was the brother of an “emir” (in the Chechen Republic, this term refers to the leaders of illegal armed factions). Mr Hakimov insisted that he should be released and added that “even if he is the brother of an emir, you have no right to detain him beyond the legal time limit”. He assured Mr Askhabov’s family that he would provide them with all the necessary assistance.
7. On 16 or 17 August (Mr Askhabov’s mother is not sure of the precise date), at around 11 p.m., armed men in camouflage clothing but not masked, broke into the Askhabovs’ house to carry out a search. They said that they had come from Khankala (where the largest federal military base in the Chechen Republic is located). However, according to the victim’s mother, they were all Chechens. In one of the bathrooms in the house, they very quickly found a hiding place, the existence of which they could not have been aware of unless Abdul-Yezit Askhabov had previously spoken to them about it. Eventually, criminal investigations were initiated following the abduction of Abdul-Yezit Askhabov. It was only one month after his abduction that the investigator in charge of the case went to the Askhabovs’ house for the first time. The whereabouts of Mr Askhabov are still unknown. According to his mother, Abdul-Yezit Askhabov has been visually impaired since childhood and would be unable to use a weapon of any sort.
8. Abdul-Yezit Askhabov’s brother, Yusup Askhabov, had been a member of the illegal armed factions, but had left them. According to his family, the hiding place referred to above was used to hide Yusup Askhabov who feared reprisals from the law enforcement agencies. It is claimed that he was killed in the centre of Shali on 28 May 2009 by officers of the town’s regional internal affairs department. That same day, when identifying Yusup’s body, his father was violently beaten by police officers after expressing the wish that Allah would take him into His care. According to Yusup’s father, the head of the Shali regional internal affairs department, Magomed Daudov (also known as “Lord”), took an active part in this beating. Yusup’s father subsequently said that he had had to spend two weeks in hospital. This case is also described in the correspondence handed to us by the Committee against Torture’s “mobile units” and also illustrates the lack of police co-operation with the prosecution investigators.
Abduction of Apti Zainalov, Chechen Republic
9. This was one of the last cases on which Natalya Estemirova from Memorial was working before her murder. Apti Zainalov, a resident of the Chechen Republic, convicted and imprisoned for membership of an illegal armed faction in 2005 then released in 2006, disappeared on 26 June 2009. On 2 July 2009, an individual (who preferred to remain anonymous) told the Memorial human rights defence centre that a young man named Apti, who was wounded and showed signs of having been tortured, was to be found in the Achkhoy-Martan hospital. On 3 July 2009, a representative of Memorial went to the hospital. Through a half-open door in the hospital ward, he saw four armed men in uniform, belonging in all probability to the Ministry of the Interior. A young man was lying in bed, with a bandage round his head and bruising to the face. Subsequently, a nurse told him that the patient’s name was Apti Zainalov. It is claimed that the nurse added that it was forbidden to speak to this patient, that he had been taken away from the hospital on several occasions and that he had obvious signs of having been tortured. The Memorial representative who had seen Apti Zainalov in the hospital recognised him from a photograph provided by his mother. The following day, Apti’s father, accompanied by a Memorial representative, once again tried to visit him in hospital, but the guards posted at the entrance to the ward prevented them from going in.
10. On 7 July 2009, the victim’s mother, Aima Zainalova, accompanied by Natalya Estemirova, was received by the prosecutor of the Achkhoy-Martan region. She filed a complaint and asked him to help her get her son back. The prosecutor passed Aima Zainalova and Natalya Estemirova on to two prosecution officials, asking them to “clarify the situation”. After waiting for the head of the Achkhoy-Martan internal affairs department for one and a half hours in the prosecutor’s office, the two officials finally agreed to go themselves to the internal affairs department. Once there, they left Aima Zainalova and Natalya Estemirova outside the department building, never reappearing. Aima Zainalova eventually returned to the hospital where she saw her son being taken away by two armed guards and put into a vehicle.
11. On 8 and 9 July 2009, Aima Zainalova brought the matter to the Chechen Prosecutor, the head of the Achkhoy-Martan Department of Inter-district Investigations and the head of the Investigation Department of the Russian Federation’s Investigative Committee for the Chechen Republic, asking them to initiate criminal proceedings following the abduction of her son and to take the necessary steps to find him. Subsequent to 9 July 2009, unidentified vehicles began following Natalya Estemirova and Ahmed Gisayev, the two Memorial workers looking into this case.
12. On 15 July 2009, Natalya Estemirova was abducted in Grozny and her body was found in Ingushetia. On 15 July 2009, Memorial filed an application before the European Court of Human Rights, complaining of a violation of Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Makayeva v. Russia, Application No. 37287/09). The application was notified to the Russian Federation authorities on 20 July 2009. In August 2009, Ahmed Gisayev was subject to pressure and threats from unidentified law enforcement officers. He reported this to the investigator in charge of the case, who, however, took no action to offer him protection. Memorial then decided to move Mr Gisayev away from the Chechen Republic in order to guarantee his safety.
13. The comments on this case (File No. 74032) by the Chechen Prosecutor General’s office are very detailed. They include lists of witnesses questioned, requests for information addressed to various security service agencies, places inspected, etc. The specific and precise observations by members of Mr Zainalov’s family, submitted by Memorial, are neither refuted nor confirmed; in fact they are not commented on at all. All the same, given the large number of witnesses and the long list of investigation activities the authorities say they have undertaken, there is some room for optimism and hope that the case will be clarified, if the authorities are willing to do so, in the near future.
Abduction of Idris Tsizdoyev, Republic of Ingushetia
14. On 26 May 2009, at around 4 a.m. in Malogbek in Ingushetia, Idris Tsizdoyev (born in 1981), while preparing for morning prayers with his brother Adam Tsizdoyev (born in 1979), was forcibly removed from his home by several individuals. When Adam Tsizdoyev asked them where they were taking his brother, they replied that they simply wanted to talk to him and would release him within a few minutes. Adam could hear the cries of his brother being beaten in the street. Ten or so minutes later, the abductors left taking Idris Tsizdoyev in their vehicle. Adam Tsizdoyev immediately informed the Malogbek regional internal affairs department.
15.	he information on the abduction was immediately notified
to all police stations. A vehicle fitting the description given
by Adam Tsizdoyev was stopped by police officers. At an ID check,
the head of the Malogbek regional internal affairs department identified
one of the abductors as Lieutenant-colonel Adlan Akhmetov from ORB-2.  The latter claimed to have arrested
and then taken Mr Tsizdoyev to the town of Magas. It would appear
that the head of the Internal Affairs Department received a telephone
call ordering him to allow the abductors to pass. The matter was
brought to the attention of the Investigation Department of the
Investigation Committee for Chechnya, the Malogbek regional internal
affairs department, the Ingush Ministry of the Interior, the public
prosecutors of the Chechen Republic and Ingushetia and the Prosecutor
General of the Russian Federation in order to shed light on what
had happened to Idris Tsizdoyev. Several human rights defence organisations,
and the Chechen, Ingush and federal ombudsmen were informed of the
matter.
 The latter claimed to have arrested
and then taken Mr Tsizdoyev to the town of Magas. It would appear
that the head of the Internal Affairs Department received a telephone
call ordering him to allow the abductors to pass. The matter was
brought to the attention of the Investigation Department of the
Investigation Committee for Chechnya, the Malogbek regional internal
affairs department, the Ingush Ministry of the Interior, the public
prosecutors of the Chechen Republic and Ingushetia and the Prosecutor
General of the Russian Federation in order to shed light on what
had happened to Idris Tsizdoyev. Several human rights defence organisations,
and the Chechen, Ingush and federal ombudsmen were informed of the
matter. 
16. However, to date, nobody has been able to find Idris Tsizdoyev. Officers from ORB-2 officially informed the Investigation Committee that on 26 May 2009 no operation had been carried out in Ingushetia and nobody had been arrested. A criminal investigation has been initiated into the facts as described. In August 2009, the case was transferred to the General Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation prosecution service for the southern federal district. However, none of the abductors has been identified in the investigation and no action has been taken against Adlan Akhmetov.
17. In our view, once again, the precise facts available to the investigators should make it possible to solve this case and prosecute those responsible, if the authorities so wish.
Abduction of Alikhan Markuyev, Chechen Republic
18. Svetlana Gannushkina, from Memorial, told us about a letter she had sent to President Medvedev on 12 January 2010, in which she described a particularly odious case relating to the abduction on 28 July 2009 of Alikhan Markuyev, who nonetheless had been granted an amnesty after voluntarily handing himself over to the authorities and leaving the illegal armed factions. What distinguishes this case is that an anonymous person in the police had sounded the alarm even before the crime took place: on 19 October 2009, this person informed the Memorial office in Moscow that Mr Markuyev and three others reported missing in the Chechen Republic (including Rasukhan Elpiev, a 15-year old boy) were in fact being held by the police in a detention facility in Gudermes. The person said that it was planned to dress the detainees in camouflage clothing and then kill them, stating afterwards that they were members of a rebel armed faction killed during a special operation. Memorial immediately informed the offices of the Chechen Prosecutor General and Minister of the Interior. The reply came on 22 October 2009 to the effect that “the information could not be confirmed”. However, on 27 November 2009, the body of a man who had been shot was found on the outskirts of Serzhen-Yurt, with a submachine gun lying by his side. His family were told that he had been killed during a “special operation”. Ms Gannushkina told President Medvedev that Memorial was aware of a series of similar abductions, in which the victims’ parents had even refused to report the matter to the authorities and make public what had happened, out of fear for their own lives and those of other family members.
Appendix 3 – Programme of the rapporteur’s visit to the Russian Federation (22-27 March 2010)
(open)Moscow
Monday 22 March 2010
9.30 a.m.-10.30 a.m. Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Mr V. Grin
(with the participation of representatives of the Military Prosecution and the Investigative Committee under the Prosecution Service of the Russian Federation)
12 noon-12.45 p.m. Deputies of the State Duma for the Republics within the North-Caucasian Federal District (NCFD)
1 p.m.-2.30 p.m. Working lunch with the members of the Russian delegation to the PACE and deputies of the State Duma and members of the Federation Council for the Chechen Republic, Dagestan and Ingushetia
3 p.m.-4 p.m. Deputy Director of the Russian Federation Federal Service for Execution of Sentences, Mr A. Smirnov
4.30 p.m.-5.30 p.m. Chairperson of the Council on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation, Mrs E. Pamfilova
6 p.m.-8 p.m. Representatives of Memorial
Tuesday 23 March 2010
9 a.m. Representative of the Red Cross
11 a.m. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Federation Government, and the Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation President in the North-Caucasian Federal District (NCFD), M. A. Khloponin
Ingushetia (Nazran and Magas)
Wednesday 24 March 2010
9.30 a.m.-10.30 a.m. Prosecutor of the republic, Mr Y. Turygin
11 a.m.-12 noon Minister of the Interior ad interim, Mr M. Gudiev
12 noon-12.30 p.m. Representatives of Ingush civil society
12.30 p.m.-1.30 p.m. President of the Republic, Mr Y.-B. Evkurov
3.45 p.m.-4.45 p.m. Head of the Regional Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Mr H. Ilyasov, and the Head of the Penitentiary Department, Mr M. Gagiev
5 p.m.-7 p.m. NGO representatives
Chechen Republic (Grozny and Gudermes)
Thursday 25 March 2010
11 a.m.-12.00 noon President of the republic, Mr R. Kadyrov
12.15 p.m.-1.45 p.m. Ombudsperson of the republic, Mr N. Nukhazhiev
2 p.m.-3 p.m. Lunch hosted by the President of the Chechen Republic
3.20 p.m.-4.20 p.m. Minister of the Interior, Mr R. Alkhanov
Head of the Penitentiary Department, Mr A. Iriskhanov
Representative of the Ministry of the Interior in the federal district of the North Caucasus, Colonel-General E. Lasebin
4.30 p.m.-5.45 p.m. Prosecutor of the republic, Mr M. Savtchin
Military prosecutor, Mr M. Toporikov
Head of the Investigations Department, Mr V. Ledenev
6 p.m. NGO representatives
Dagestan (Makhachkala)
Friday 26 March 2010
12.30 p.m.-2.30 p.m. Ministry of the Interior, Investigations Committee, Prosecutor, Penitentiary Department
3.45 p.m.-4.45 p.m. NGO representatives
4.45 p.m.-5.45 p.m. Representatives of civil society in Dagestan
5.45 p.m.-6.30 p.m. Ombudsperson of the republic, Ms Uma Omarova
6.30 p.m.-8 p.m. NGO representatives
Saturday 27 March 2010
9 a.m.-9.45 a.m. President of the Republic of Dagestan, Mr Magomedov
9.45 a.m.-11.15 a.m. Transfer to Derbent
11.15 a.m.-3 p.m. Representatives of civil society in Derbent
