1. Introduction
1. The European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the member States of the
European Union, known as Frontex, was established in October 2004
by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 (Frontex Regulation).
It is based
in Warsaw, Poland, and became operational in May 2005. The Agency
is a major tool for implementing the European Union’s integrated
border management system which aims to manage migration by making
crossing the external EU borders safe and the subject of legal control.
2. The main tasks of Frontex are to facilitate and make more
effective EU measures relating to the management of external borders,
in particular the Schengen Borders Code. The Agency does this by
co-ordinating EU member States’ actions in order to improve efficiency,
uniformity and control of persons and surveillance of the European
Union’s external borders.
3. We are all well aware of the challenges the European Union
has to face in terms of managing migration. Frontex provides an
opportunity for EU member States to better co-ordinate their border
control activities, to learn from each other’s experience in this
respect and harmonise their practices at their external borders.
4. Admittedly, the balance between managing migration through
external border control measures and human rights may in some circumstances
be a delicate exercise for the authorities. The two have to go together,
however, and Frontex also represents a real opportunity to enhance
and promote the respect of human rights at the external borders
of the European Union. This opportunity should not be missed.
2. Frontex:
necessary but with a greater commitment to human rights
2.1. Structure and activities
5. Frontex is a European Union Agency with legal, administrative
and financial autonomy. It is governed by a Management Board consisting
of representatives of the heads of the border agencies of the 25
EU member States that are signatories of the
Schengen
acquis and two members of the European Commission.
The Agency
is managed by an Executive Director who is appointed by the Management
Board on the proposal of the European Commission for five years,
renewable once.
6. After two fact-finding missions (one to Brussels and one to
the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw), I became fully aware that Frontex
does not carry out its activities only on the ground. The Agency
is also active in developing and applying common integrated risk
analyses for the European Union’s external borders. Joint operations
at the external land, sea and air borders are launched based on
these risk analyses. Frontex can also assist member States in organising
joint return operations (JROs) for individuals staying illegally
in the European Union. Furthermore, the Agency supports the training
of national border guards and facilitates research and development
in the area of border security.
7. The Frontex budget has seen constant growth. In Frontex’s
first year, the budget was 6.2 million euros; in 2006 it reached
19.2 million euros. For 2012, the projected budget amounted to 84.96
million euros. This growth indicates that border security is one
of the top priorities for EU member States.
2.2. Frontex and human
rights
8. Frontex is a young Agency that has been criticised
for not carrying out its co-ordinated operations in full respect
of European human rights obligations. According to international
organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), concerns
about the human rights implications of Frontex’s activities appear
both at a structural and operational level.
In this report, I will address the main
concerns and how Frontex is facing them.
9. Indeed, there have been some serious shortcomings, based inter alia on a lack of transparency,
a lack of clarity in terms of responsibility and liability, and
a lack of democratic scrutiny, particularly of agreements with third
countries. This has prompted a welcome reaction both by Frontex
and by the EU institutions. In March 2011, the Agency endorsed a
Fundamental Rights Strategy and a Code of Conduct and, in June 2011,
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission
came to a political agreement on proposals to ensure the full respect
of fundamental rights during Frontex’s activities and to reinforce
its legal framework (see section 5 below).
3. Human rights concerns
at operational level
10. Operational activities of EU member States co-ordinated
by Frontex concern joint operations or pilot projects. They are
divided into four sectors: land, air and sea operations, and one
sector responsible for providing assistance to member States in
organising joint return operations (JROs). This part of the report
looks at sea operations co-ordinated by the Agency and joint return
operations, where human rights concerns are most obvious.
11. Joint operations, whether by land, air or sea or as JROs,
are performed under the authority of the host State. Other member
States and Schengen Associated Countries participate by deploying
their equipment and staff. While the latter remain under the authority
of the sending State and have to respect both the laws of the sending
and the host State, the role of Frontex in preparing and implementing
joint operations is nevertheless substantial.
3.1. Sea operations
co-ordinated by Frontex
12. Sea operations deal essentially with border surveillance
at sea. Almost two thirds of the total budget spent in joint operations
in 2011 concerned sea operations and between 2006 and 2012, Frontex
co-ordinated a total of 48 of these. I was informed that joint maritime
border surveillance operations co-ordinated by the Agency often
turn out to become so-called search and rescue operations (SAR operations).
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home of the European
Parliament (LIBE) has requested Frontex to improve its search and
rescue operations and has put almost 10 million euros of Frontex’s
2013 budget aside until practical steps are taken, and has requested
Frontex to report back on this. Frontex’s Executive Director addressed
the LIBE Committee on 11 October 2012 on this issue and stressed
that search and rescue activities are likely to happen during sea
operations, therefore they are considered a “starting point” rather
than an exception for planning Frontex activities at sea.
13. Every year thousands of migrants and asylum seekers attempt
to reach the European Union by sea in terrible conditions. The recent
report of the Parliamentary Assembly on “Lives lost in the Mediterranean
Sea: who is responsible?” gives a tragic account of such attempts
(
Doc. 12895). According to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), around 90% of interceptions involving unsafe boats in recent
years occurred during joint sea operations co-ordinated by Frontex
and were conducted by vessels participating in these operations.
14. Although Frontex has no mandate to conduct SAR operations,
the Agency, through its deployed assets or staff, in practice facilitates
these activities and saves lives at sea while intercepting migrants,
asylum seekers and refugees, and the people who smuggle them. Nevertheless,
the Agency’s ability to assist member States in conducting SAR operations
(as foreseen in Article 2.1.da)
largely depends on whether the latter are willing to provide staff
and equipment.
15. I would like to give a concrete example of this sort of sea
border control. Operation Hermes, co-ordinated by Frontex, took
place from 20 February 2011 to 31 March 2012 with a budget of 12 158 959 euros.
This joint operation, requested by the host member State Italy,
aimed to implement co-ordinated sea border surveillance. The member
States participating in this operation
deployed
naval and aerial equipment – although these means remained limited
– in order to assist Italy in controlling irregular migration flows
from Tunisia towards the south of Italy, mainly Lampedusa and Sardinia.
16. The main focus of operation Hermes was,
however, to undertake a risk analysis on the possible migratory
scenarios linked to the Arab Spring in North Africa and thereby
increasing Italy’s reactivity. Therefore, member States also provided
screening and debriefing experts to gather information for analysing
migrants’ nationalities and routes upon arrival, and detecting and
preventing possible criminal activities.
– Issues of concern
17. The conduct of these sea operations poses a range of problems.
While member States are obliged to respect human rights when carrying
out maritime border surveillance activities within their own territorial waters,
the question is more complex on the high seas and in the territorial
waters of a third country.
18. Sea operations co-ordinated by Frontex most often take place
in the contiguous zones and on the high seas. Council Decision 2010/252/EU
sought to extend the territorial scope of the Schengen Borders Code
and allows maritime border surveillance activities in these areas.
This surveillance had to be in accordance with fundamental rights.
However,
in its judgment of 5 September 2012, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) annulled the decision on formal grounds, expressing
at the same time concerns about possible human rights implications
of such operations.
19. The European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), in its judgment
in the case of
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.
Italy, clarified the scope of member States’ responsibilities
regarding border management operations outside their own territorial
waters, when it had to deal with the issue of interceptions on the
high seas. The Court found that whenever a State exercised authority
over an individual outside its territory, it was required to guarantee the
human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) to that individual, in order
to avoid a lack of protection.
These
included both the prohibition to return an individual to a country
where he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment,
and the right to an effective remedy before the removal measure
is enforced.
On
the problem of collective expulsion, the Court held that the prohibition
of collective expulsion also applies to their extra-territorial
actions, even if it involves the removal of aliens to a third country
carried out outside their territorial waters.
20. Frontex’s involvement in interception operations and treatment
of individuals who may need international protection thus has human
rights implications. A major problem in this context is the need
to ensure that, in any interception during sea operations co-ordinated
by Frontex, the persons intercepted have access to international
protection in line with the principle of non-refoulement.
member States have to ensure disembarkation of those intercepted
at sea at a place where they are not only physically safe but where
their rights are respected. These include the right to an individual
and fair assessment of any asylum claim.
21. Indeed, no Frontex report refers to the presence of asylum
seekers or vulnerable individuals such as unaccompanied minors during
sea operations. According to Amnesty International and the European
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Frontex does not know whether
any asylum claims were made during interception operations as it
does not collect such data and does not receive such information
from member States.
This should be changed
and the Agency should be required to present a list of individuals
who were intercepted and in need of international protection during
its operations.
22. Nevertheless, Frontex officers who interview migrants after
disembarkation may receive requests for asylum or asylum-related
information. However, there is no obligation to pass this information
on to the competent national authorities and the Frontex operational
plans do not provide guidance in this respect to the deployed officers
and neither are the latter equipped with the required skills. In
addition, Human Rights Watch reported that Frontex activities may
also result in the migrants’ exposure to detention conditions that
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The EU Fundamental Rights
Agency’s (FRA) report stated that the risk of informal push backs
of third country nationals to Turkey decreased with the deployment
of Frontex operations in Greece.
23. Obligations as regards international protection and the respect
of the principle of non-refoulement can only
be ensured if operating procedures reflect these obligations in
practical, clear guidelines to border personnel (at land, sea and
air borders). As co-ordinator of joint operations, Frontex needs
to ensure that border guards possess specific and practical knowledge
and are equipped with skills to be able to identify those in need
of international protection, to respond effectively to any request
for asylum, and that relevant protection information is provided
to the national authorities. Therefore, the debriefings of migrants
should be standardised and deployed officers should receive prior
training on human rights standards and international protection
obligations, with the assistance of FRA, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant organisations.
24. Importantly, joint border surveillance operations which are
executed in the territorial waters of a third country and involve
the interception of migrant boats may entail significant human rights
challenges. According to Migreurop, those operations co-ordinated
by Frontex may particularly be an obstacle to the right to leave one’s
country.
In
the context of joint operation Hera, for instance, Frontex boats
with third-country officers on- board were patrolling in the territorial
waters of Mauritania and Senegal and intercepted migrant boats in
order to prevent their departure towards the Canary Islands. Almost
6 000 people were thus returned to African shores in 2008 alone.
25. In its
Resolution
1821 (2011) on the interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers,
refugees and irregular migrants, the Assembly called on member States
to guarantee to all intercepted persons humane treatment and systematic
respect for their rights, including when
de
jure or
de facto jurisdiction
is exercised in intercepting migrant boats in the territorial waters
of another State on the basis of bilateral agreements.
26. Another serious issue is that of non-assistance to persons
in danger. The most recent alleged case concerns a Frontex airplane
which reportedly crossed a migrant boat in distress in October 2012
without assisting or initiating a SAR operation. At least 56 people
died in this incident.
If these allegations were to be true,
such a situation is unacceptable. Frontex has to ensure that its
staff or deployed officers inform without delay the competent authorities
and that the necessary follow-up steps to initiate a SAR operation
are taken.
3.2. Joint return operations
co-ordinated by Frontex
27. Joint return operations (JROs) co-ordinated by Frontex
concern third-country nationals who receive a return decision from
a respective court or an administrative body forcing them to return
to their country of origin. Some refuse to comply and are returned
by force. I will not go into detail about this practice as Ms Virolainen has
been appointed as rapporteur on “Effective and fair returns of irregular
migrants and failed asylum seekers” (
Doc. 12771) and she will deal with the issue extensively. However,
I would like to point out that the Agency can assist EU member States
in organising such JROs with the participation of national border
guards.
28. Frontex can co-ordinate returns by air when several third-country
nationals from several EU member States are put on a flight. According
to information provided by Frontex to FRA, in 2011 2 059 people
were returned by force in 42 JROs. I was informed that the Agency
is in the process of developing a specific code of conduct for return
operations, as laid down in the amended Frontex Regulation. Once
adopted, this should be applied and implemented without delay.
– Issues of concern
29. These JROs have raised many concerns among Human Rights organisations.
Ill-treatment has been alleged during return flights co-ordinated
by Frontex,
and
concerns have been raised that certain JROs might have amounted
to collective expulsions.
Where
these interventions target specific national groups, they have to
be handled sensitively as they raise potential questions of racial
discrimination in the Agency’s operation. In addition, the Agency’s
policy on not assessing the reasons for the return decision might
contradict the principle of
non-refoulement.
30. To date, there is no generalised and independent monitoring
of JROs by outside agents in place, although member States have
the legal obligation to provide a monitoring system in line with
the EU Return Directive
to ensure that
the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights is respected. According to
FRA, only four countries currently monitor Frontex co-ordinated
JROs.
A study
requested by the European Commission revealed that at least 13 member
States do not have an effective monitoring system in place.
31. Therefore, the Agency should only carry out JROs from those
member States that have established an effective monitoring mechanism.
The monitoring institutions and deployed officers should also report
to Frontex. Conversely, only those member States that have an effective
system of forced return monitoring in place should be able to benefit
from Frontex co-ordinated JROs and related funding.
32. In addition, there are many open questions about responsibilities
in the context of grouped return flights involving several countries
alongside Frontex. Frontex should therefore develop safeguards and
procedures to carry out JROs in full compliance with human rights
standards, including by training escort leaders, applying good practice
solutions and developing criteria for potential termination of an
operation. It is also crucial to establish a complaints mechanism
for returnees and include their accounts in reporting.
33. Another concern is the right to the protection of personal
data, included in Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights. Indeed, personal data is collected when organising JROs
for foreign nationals deported by air from EU territory, including
sensitive data relating to health and offences or criminal convictions of
the persons concerned. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)
gave an opinion on this practice in 2010 and noted that Frontex
has so far not foreseen specific procedures to grant the returnees
rights in terms of data protection and to inform them about their
personal data before the processing activity takes place.
In this
matter, transparency should be better respected. The organising
member State also transmits returnees’ names to the authorities
of third countries to check their right of entry. However, no safeguards
are in place for the returnees’ security, whereas some might risk
being arrested and detained upon return.
4. Human rights concerns
of a structural nature
4.1. Lack of transparency
34. Many NGOs underline the lack of transparency regarding
the nature of the operations carried out on the ground and their
impact on human rights as a real threat for the respect of fundamental
rights. A study by the European Parliament on the implementation
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights points out that Frontex’s “coercive
policy linked with a culture of secrecy and lack of transparency
exacerbates the vulnerable status of the individuals” who try to
cross the European frontiers in order to get a better life in Europe.
This
study clearly talks about a “profound knowledge gap” regarding the
nature of the operations, their impact on the ground and their compatibility
with the EU legal framework.
35. This lack of transparency leads to a lack of democratic and
public accountability. Therefore, improvements in terms of transparency
and communication are needed, particularly on the side of member States,
and the Agency needs to comply fully with its obligations in this
respect under the Frontex Regulation (Article 28).
36. It is therefore important that the European Parliament exercises
its power of control over Frontex and calls on member States to
work with the Agency to ensure that fundamental rights are protected.
37. In addition, independent monitoring and public reporting on
findings is of the utmost importance to ensure public accountability
and credibility. Until now there has not been an independent monitoring mechanism
in place to assist Frontex in assessing the human rights impact
of these operations. The Agency has, however, appointed a Fundamental
Rights Officer who started her work in December 2012. Her main tasks
are to put in place a monitoring system and to report on every possible
infringement of fundamental rights to the Frontex Management Board
and the Consultative Forum. The recommendations of the recently established
Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights will also contribute to
increasing the transparency of Frontex’s activities.
38. When it comes to transparency, not only procedures must change
but mentalities must evolve. Having myself been a police officer
for 25 years, I am well placed to know that there is a risk of sub-cultures
of secrecy developing in law-enforcement institutions.
4.2. Lack of clarity
in terms of responsibility and liability
39. While the staff and equipment deployed to joint operations
and pilot projects remain under the authority of the sending State
and the host State, the role of Frontex in preparing and implementing
these joint operations and pilot projects is nevertheless substantial,
as demonstrated above. However, the legal framework is unclear about
the Agency’s responsibility and accountability.
40. Given that the amended Frontex Regulation (Article 3.1) allows
the Agency to “initiate and carry out joint operations and pilot
projects”, one may therefore consider that Frontex could be held
responsible, at least in part, for the way these activities are
carried out in practice, when initiated by Frontex.
The same text provides, however,
that “the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external
borders lies with the member States” (Article 1.2).
41. While the Frontex Regulation also attributes civil and criminal
liability to member States regarding the deployment of guest officers
to a host member State (Articles 10.
b and
10.
c), there is no clear rule
relating to Frontex’s liability when damage occurs due to the Agency’s
action. Human Rights Watch underlines the failure of the Regulation
to create a mechanism to hold the Agency accountable for human rights
violations.
42. It is thus necessary to establish a complaints mechanism for
persons affected by Frontex’s activities. During my fact-finding
mission, Frontex expressed its reservations regarding the inclusion
of such a complaints mechanism. Frontex regularly claims to “only”
co-ordinate member States’ and Schengen Associated Countries’ activities,
and therefore not be in charge or responsible. According to this
reasoning, activities that can affect a person’s rights can only
be performed by the authorities of member States hosting or participating in
the operation.
43. I have doubts about this restrictive interpretation, which,
in my view, is a shortcut and would not stand up under a Court’s
assessment. For instance, the Agency’s co-ordination duties involve
preparing and implementing joint operations and pilot projects and
thus have an impact on the way these activities are carried out.
Frontex needs to recognise its responsibility as owner of the projects
it co-ordinates and finances.
44. For Frontex, persons who consider their rights have been violated
should use both national and EU mechanisms to file complaints.
Pursuant to the provisions of the
Frontex Code of Conduct, all participants in Frontex activities
who have reason to believe that a violation of the Code, including
violations of fundamental rights, has occurred or is about to occur,
should report the matter to Frontex via the appropriate channels.
However, this reporting is not
obligatory and the Agency does not have the right to investigate
cases and can only transfer a matter of concern to the respective
national authorities.
45. Regarding complaints mechanisms at EU level, since the adoption
of the Lisbon Treaty, the “CJEU is fully competent to revise the
legality or provide interpretation to guide the acts of the EU Agencies
(Articles 263, 265 and 267 TFEU)”.
Frontex is thus
accountable for certain kinds of behaviour before the Court, including actions
for failure to act and preliminary rulings concerning the validity
of acts. However, compensation for damage that occurs during operations
due to the Agency’s action is not addressed. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty
does not extend the jurisdiction of the CJEU to cover the responsibility
of agencies.
46. However, Article 19 of the Frontex Regulation provides that
Frontex should assume its non-contractual responsibility before
the CJEU for all disputes concerning damage caused by the Agency’s
departments or their staff in the performance of their duties. In
such circumstances, the CJEU has jurisdiction over disputes concerning
damages.
47. While currently there are only limited means to file complaints
against Frontex or the European Union on a European level, this
might change in the future. The main consequence of a future EU
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights would be the
possibility for an individual to lodge a complaint to the European
Court of Human Rights against the European Union. It would therefore
be up to the Strasbourg Court to define a potential EU responsibility
linked to an operation co-ordinated by Frontex.
48. The problem is to know who should answer for actions on a
case-by-case basis, and where are the limits of the Agency’s accountability.
What about cases involving other people whose responsibility is
not covered by the provisions in the Frontex Regulation? At what
point should responsibility be shared by the host country, the participating
country and Frontex? Today, all these questions remain unanswered.
49. This lack of clarity regarding responsibility and liability
is not acceptable. In case of alleged problems, it leaves the door
wide open to a “blame game” between the European Union (its Agency)
and its member States, and vice versa. Not only does it dent Frontex’s
credibility, but it also contradicts the basic principles of rule
of law.
4.3. Lack of democratic
scrutiny of agreements with third countries
50. The amended Frontex Regulation gives the Agency a
legal personality and allows it to enter into co-operation with
the authorities of third countries or international organisations.
I was told in Warsaw that Frontex’s main interest in concluding
agreements with third countries lies with accession or pre-accession countries,
as well as with countries of transit and of origin. So far, Frontex
has concluded working arrangements with 17 countries.
Negotiations
are ongoing with eight other third countries.
51. Co-operation is supposed to be practical and operational.
The amended Frontex Regulation allows the Agency to launch and finance
technical assistance projects in third countries regarding matters
covered by the Frontex Regulation. These include capacity-building
activities in third countries and consist in giving money and materials,
but also in providing training. Such agreements can contain provisions
on returns. There is generally a certain lack of clarity on the
scope of such agreements, as they are not in the public domain.
52. These working arrangements with third countries may have human
rights consequences and could even lead to human rights violations.
Co-operation with certain countries raises serious concerns about
the way migrants will be treated when returned to these countries
or when intercepted based on intelligence provided by the partner
country. Given the treatment reserved to migrants, refugees and
asylum seekers in Libya and the fact that the country has not ratified
the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, returns to
that country, for instance, risk not being in compliance with obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights.
53. It is also my understanding that, although the European Parliament
has a right to see such agreements and is kept informed of all relations
between Frontex and third parties, thus far none have been submitted.
In view of the human rights implications of these documents, it
may be appropriate for the European Parliament to be requested to
give its prior consent to these.
5. The European Union’s
answer to these concerns: inclusion of a greater human rights perspective
54. There have been two main reactions by Frontex and
by the EU institutions to these concerns. The first was to endorse
a Fundamental Rights Strategy on 31 March 2011 and the second to
include the protection of fundamental rights in the legal framework
by amending the Frontex Regulation on 25 October 2011
to ensure that
Frontex fully complies with its fundamental rights obligations during
all its activities. In addition, the Agency also endorsed a Code
of Conduct for all participants in its activities on 21 March 2011.
The latter contains provisions on the respect of fundamental rights
and international protection.
55. Despite these important changes, which show that Frontex has
undergone profound changes over the past years, the main challenge
is to fully implement these human rights provisions in practice
and in the context of all Frontex activities.
56. As a follow-up, the European Ombudsman launched, on 6 March
2012, an own-initiative inquiry into how Frontex implements its
fundamental rights obligations in relation to this Fundamental Rights
Strategy. According to what the European Ombudsman told me at our
meeting on 26 June 2012, this initiative is not the result of any
specific suspicion of wrongdoing. I would like to thank Frontex
for having shared with me a copy of its opinion to the European
Ombudsman, prior to its publication, as it gives a detailed insight
into the Agency’s position on fundamental rights.
5.1. The need for implementation
of the Fundamental Rights Strategy
57. According to Article 26.a of
the Frontex Regulation, “the Agency shall draw up and further develop
and implement its Fundamental Rights Strategy” and “put in place
an effective mechanism to monitor the respect for fundamental rights
in all [its] activities”.
58. Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Strategy was elaborated following
a consultative process which involved representatives of member
States, the European Commission, Frontex, and international organisations
– such as FRA, the UNHCR and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM).
59. The strategy provides that “[r]espect for fundamental rights
is an essential part of integrated border management” (Article 1).
The document sets out the objectives and measures to be taken in
order to achieve human rights compliance. It also underlines the
need for its proper implementation.
60. However, it does not clarify the circumstances under which
Frontex is accountable. According to Article 13 of the Strategy,
the Agency does not assume any responsibility in this area, as “member
States remain primarily responsible” for the implementation of the
relevant legal obligations and therefore also “for the respect of
fundamental rights during these activities” (Article 13). This,
however, does “not relieve Frontex of its responsibilities as the
co-ordinator and it remains fully accountable for all actions and
decisions under its mandate. Frontex must particularly focus on
creating the conditions for ensuring compliance with fundamental rights
obligations in all activities”.
61. The implementation of this Strategy should be possible in
part through the Fundamental Rights Action Plan drafted by the same
actors and adopted by the Frontex Management Board on 29 September
2011.
The Action Plan presents, in 20 points, how
Frontex can implement this Strategy regarding operational activities
(risk analysis, joint operations and joint return operations), capacity
building (training, research and development) and horizontal activities
(such as external relations, communication and dissemination). I
was told that an annual progress report on the implementation of
this Strategy would be presented to the Frontex Management Board
and made public.
62. Despite the good intentions contained in the Fundamental Rights
Strategy, most provisions have not yet been put into practice. For
instance, the Strategy foresees fundamental rights training for
all Frontex staff – a project jointly prepared by FRA, the UNHCR
and Frontex. Although the concept, the training content and the trainers
have been ready for over a year, the implementation has not yet
started. In order to ensure an efficient democratic scrutiny, a
monitoring process should be set up to control the implementation
of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, to measure its impact
and to potentially provide further recommendations for change indicators.
This mechanism should be external, transparent and independent.
5.2. Human rights provisions
included in the amended Frontex Regulation
63. In line with the amended Frontex Regulation, the
Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights was established
in October 2012 to assist and advise the Executive Director and
the Management Board on how the Agency should structurally improve
the promotion and respect of fundamental rights in all Frontex activities.
64. It brings together key European institutions, experts and
civil society organisations, including the Council of Europe, the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), the UNHCR,
FRA, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the IOM and nine
civil society organisations.
In September 2012,
the Frontex Management Board adopted working methods for the Consultative
Forum. In January 2013, the Consultative Forum adopted its work
programme for 2013.
65. While the Consultative Forum has been tasked with preparing
a publicly available annual report of its activities, it remains
to be seen whether the report can have an impact. The Consultative
Forum will not have a monitoring role, only an advisory function
– allowing it to make recommendations and provide opinions. Therefore,
an impact assessment on whether the recommendations of the Consultative
Forum have been taken into account should be considered in 2014-2015.
66. On 27 September 2012, the Frontex Management Board designated
Ms Inmaculada Arnáez Fernández as Frontex’s first Fundamental Rights
Officer with the task of monitoring the respect of fundamental rights
and reporting on a regular basis to the Management Board, the Consultative
Forum and the Executive Director.
67. The Fundamental Rights Officer has access to all information
concerning respect of fundamental rights in relation to all activities
of Frontex. It is, however, unclear in the Regulation as to what
exactly her competences are and whether she will be able to receive
complaints from individuals and if this information will be made
public.
68. Importantly, the Fundamental Rights Officer is supposed to
be an independent staff member. I would like to underline several
weaknesses of this process. The objective of independence cannot
be reached if the person is an ordinary staff member and, therefore,
has to report to his or her line manager (Frontex’s Executive Director)
and if he or she does not have a team with which to monitor the
Agency’s activities. Indeed, an individual (and an assistant) alone
will not be able to do this complex task effectively. According
to Article 26.a.3 of the Regulation,
the Fundamental Rights Officer reports to Frontex’s Management Board
and to the Consultative Forum. In addition, he or she should also
be encouraged to report directly to the European Parliament on human
rights concerns in the context of all Frontex activities and on
steps taken to address these concerns. Furthermore, the terms of
reference requiring the incumbent to commit him or herself “to act independently
in Frontex’s interest” appears to be contradictory: if the Fundamental
Rights Officer is supposed to act independently, it might not always
be in Frontex’s direct interest.
69. Another provision included in the amended Frontex Regulation
(Article 2, paragraph 1.a)
envisages that Frontex’s risk analyses and joint operations co-ordinated
by the Agency have to take into account the particular situation
of persons seeking international protection in line with the principle
of non-refoulement, and the particular
circumstances of vulnerable individuals or groups in need of protection
or special care (separated and unaccompanied children, women, victims
of trafficking and persons with medical needs). Frontex assured me
that this would be done.
70. Moreover, Frontex should seek advice from its external partners
on the relevant instructions or guidelines for deployed officers
taking part in the Agency’s activities. These instructions should
be integrated into each operational plan in order to identify people
in need of international protection, including potential victims
of trafficking. Frontex should also respect the principles of non-discrimination
and effective data protection.
71. In addition, the amended Frontex rules require the Agency
to put in place an effective reporting system to ensure that any
incidents or suspected violations of fundamental rights are immediately
reported by participating officers or Frontex staff members, and
can thus be acted upon. It is interesting to note that the Agency
already has a standard reporting system for each operation and a
standard operating procedure to ensure respect of fundamental rights
in joint operations and pilot projects (Decision by the Executive
Director of 19 July 2012).
72. Indeed, operational plans adopted by Frontex for joint operations,
pilot projects and rapid interventions stipulate standard operating
procedures for Serious Incident Reporting. This mechanism provides
for the relevant steps that should be taken in case of serious or
persistent violations of fundamental rights or international protection
obligations that occur in the course of activities co-ordinated
by the Agency. It consists of an online reporting form that is sent
via national validation directly to the Frontex incident centre.
73. Overall, it seems that the procedure is not sufficiently applied,
given the low number of reports that have been recorded so far.
I was also informed about cases where deployed officers reported
incidents to their authorities, but not to Frontex. In addition,
there is no encouragement or incentive to report such incidents
or provide an individual evaluation of operations from a human rights
point of view, and there are no consequences if human rights violations
are not reported. Therefore, a new transparent and public reporting system
should be put in place.
74. In theory, the Executive Director should – based on these
reports and as a last resort – suspend or terminate joint operations
or pilot projects, if he or she considers that violations of fundamental
rights or of international protection obligations have occurred.
He can also reduce the financing
for an operation. To date, this procedure has not been activated.
In the reply to the European Ombudsman, Frontex States that no criteria
have been developed as “violations of human rights cannot be predicted
before they actually happen”. Here again, a clear mechanism with
criteria or risk assessment indicators should be established to
guide deployed officers on the ground.
75. Frontex will face a dilemma in using the Serious Incident
Reporting mechanism. In certain countries it is common knowledge
that human rights are not always respected at the borders. How will
Frontex react to a serious incident report? According to Frontex,
the Agency has no power to improve the situation, which is in the
competence of the national sovereign powers of the member States.
Frontex therefore risks becoming a tacit witness of human rights
violations, as it may only inform the relevant authorities accordingly,
formulate recommendations and give advice. This dilemma is reflected
in the Agency’s reply to the European Ombudsman: “Due to the complexity
of the operations which largely involve member States and are linked
to significant political and operational issues, it shall not be
always appropriate to suspend or terminate the operation.”
76. Finally, Frontex is also required to establish an effective
monitoring system on the impact of Frontex’s operational activities
on human rights, which is particularly needed for JROs. However,
monitoring is only going to be credible and useful if it is independent.
To monitor effectively, one has to know who is responsible and have
access to information on the operations, including by choosing which
operations to monitor. In addition, reporting on the findings of
monitoring activities should be public. It all starts and ends with
transparency.
77. The institution of the Fundamental Rights Officer, the setting
up of the Consultative Forum, as well as the current design of the
Serious Incident Reporting, are all steps in the right direction.
However, contrary to what I was told by Frontex, they cannot be
considered sufficient to constitute an effective monitoring system as
foreseen in the Frontex Regulation (Article 26.a). The lack of independence and
of means, and the extremely vague mandate of the Fundamental Rights
Officer, and the purely advisory capacity of the Consultative Forum
are shortcomings in systematically monitoring fundamental rights
compliance of all Frontex activities and in its potential for organisational
change of processes and procedures. The effectiveness of both mechanisms
remains to be seen in practice.
5.3. Co-operation agreements
with external partners
78. To ensure the identification of vulnerable people
by border guards, co-operation agreements were signed with UNHCR
on 13 June 2008, with FRA on 26 May 2010, and with EASO on 26 September
2012. Frontex also co-operates with the International Organization
for Migration (IOM). Another working arrangement is under negotiation
with the Joint Research Centre.
79. The working agreement signed with UNHCR consists of providing
regular consultation, exchange of information and input into the
training of border officials on international human rights and refugee
law. UNHCR has posted a liaison officer in Warsaw in order to work
closely with the Agency and has been able to participate in two
joint operations in an effort to help identify vulnerable children.
This is considered a breakthrough in co-operation. Hopefully, Frontex
will increasingly accept the presence during its joint operations
of external partners in an advisory but also in an observer capacity.
80. The co-operation arrangement with FRA focuses on the comprehensive
integration of fundamental rights into key areas of Frontex’s mandate
such as training, joint operations, data collection and a tailored training
programme on fundamental rights for Frontex staff.
81. The recently signed agreement with EASO provides for co-operation
on operational response and capacity building, including training
and research, and exchanging information. The two Agencies will
in particular step up co-operation in the field of reception and
care of migrants, as well as the identification process of those
requiring international protection. In addition, they will improve
their co-ordination with regard to the assistance provided to countries
experiencing difficulties (setting up expert teams, risk analysis
and providing statistics).
82. Despite these promising steps, some obstacles remain. There
is no evaluation of the impact of advice and recommendations, or
of training activities and a formal mechanism to assess the impact
of the co-operation would be helpful.
5.4. Frontex – a greater
potential for training national border guards?
83. According to the Frontex regulations, Frontex officers
and border guards deployed in joint operations should all be trained
in human rights matters. While many efforts have been made to develop
training courses and tools, human rights training activities for
Frontex staff members are still not implemented. The pre-deployment
briefing that deployed officers receive is not sufficient to equip
them with the necessary human rights skills when confronted with
serious incidents during operations. More efforts are therefore
needed to mainstream and integrate human rights, international protection,
victim protection and identification into operational training and
training sessions.
84. I believe that Frontex officers have knowledge to share with
national staff. It is a good start that Frontex officers are to
be trained, but it is far too little. Every member of staff and
the border guards deployed by the member States (not only those
on the ground) should benefit from training activities on the protection
of human rights and international protection obligations in co-operation
with external partners, including notably FRA and the UNHCR.
85. Nevertheless, Frontex officers are not numerous, and often
there is only one Frontex officer present on the ground. More training
sessions therefore need to be organised on the ground for national
staff, who need to be made more aware of their human rights obligations.
The Agency’s work on establishing a core curriculum is a step in
the right direction, as are the training sessions and the training
of trainers already organised in co-operation with the UNHCR. However,
there is still a long way to go in this respect. Therefore, evaluation
reports on the outcome of the training delivered by international
organisations such as the UNHCR and FRA should be drawn up and made
public.
86. When I visited the Greek border with a delegation from the
Swedish Parliament in 2011, I had the opportunity to speak to both
local border guards and the Frontex officer on the spot. It became
clear to me that the only one person with a knowledge of human rights
was the Frontex officer. I am sure that local staff could improve
their human rights knowledge. I was told in Warsaw that Frontex’s
good influence on the practice in Greece is starting to become visible.
However, I was also told that progress is slower than expected.
6. Conclusion:
How to make Frontex a more effective tool for the protection of
human rights?
87. I stated at the beginning of this report that Frontex
has an important role to play to better co-ordinate EU member States’
activities in the field of external border control. Frontex operations
can also serve as an opportunity to harmonise practices on the European
Union’s external borders and to familiarise the national border
guards with their human rights obligations.
88. I have sincere respect and am grateful for the commitment
of Frontex staff members in ensuring the protection and surveillance
of our borders. They are currently under great pressure and they
are making efforts to respect fundamental rights on the ground.
I am aware of these efforts. Frontex feels uneasy about the attention
given to its activities and their compliance with human rights by
a growing number of actors, including the European Ombudsman and
the Council of Europe.
89. Frontex has to face the difficulty of having two masters:
the European Union and its member States. In Brussels, the latter
might be very keen on respecting human rights. However, back in
their capitals and at the borders, they may see the priority more
in terms of migration management. Furthermore, member States never like
being monitored. Frontex is in an uneasy situation and I can sympathise
with this.
90. The situation on the ground is not easy either, as the member
States have quite different laws and procedures. More harmonisation
is needed. Communication between Frontex co-ordination officers
and those of the host countries can be difficult. This may be because
of language (English being the common language) or it may be cultural.
91. It is unfortunately not sufficient to elaborate a Fundamental
Rights Strategy and to include in the Frontex rules the overall
obligation that fundamental rights must be respected. It is necessary
to provide the legal means and democratic safeguards to achieve
these goals. This report tries to give some recommendations to help
the Agency improve the respect and protection of human rights at
European borders.
92. These recommendations seek to address human rights concerns
at operational level, notably in respect of joint return and border
surveillance operations. While border guards deployed to these operations
remain under the authority of the sending State and have to respect
both the laws of the sending and the host country, the role of Frontex
in preparing and implementing a joint operation is nevertheless
substantial. Human rights can easily come to the forefront during
interception operations, in particular where there are persons who
may need international protection.
93. The recommendations also aim to address human rights concerns
of a structural nature, including the lack of transparency of the
Agency’s activities, the lack of clarity regarding its responsibility
and liability, and the lack of democratic scrutiny of some of its
activities, particularly agreements negotiated with third countries. Frontex
and the European Union have taken a number of important steps to
tackle some of the human rights criticisms made, but what is now
needed is implementation, in particular of the provisions contained
in the amended Frontex Regulation and in the Fundamental Rights
Strategy.
94. Furthermore, there is a need to enhance democratic scrutiny
by the European Parliament and to ensure public accountability and
credibility of the Agency, by putting in place an independent monitoring
system and an effective complaints mechanism. It is also necessary
to address the current shortcomings at operational and structural
level.
95. Finally, I would like to recall that, although managing migration
through external border control measures remains one of Europe’s
key challenges today, the need to respect and protect human rights
in all Frontex activities is not an option – it is an obligation.
Frontex’s commitment in this respect will be all the more important, as
the Agency will in the future be in charge of managing and implementing
the European border surveillance system, called “Eurosur”, which
should become effective in October 2013.