1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. The motion for a resolution entitled “Access to nationality”
(Doc. 12414) was forwarded to the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights on 24 January 2011 for report. The committee appointed
me as rapporteur at its meeting in Strasbourg on 26 January 2011.
During its meeting in Paris, on 12 November 2012, the committee
held a hearing with three experts on the subject:
- Professor Gerard René de Groot,
Professor of Comparative Law and International Private Law, Maastricht
University, Netherlands
- Ms Ivanka Kostic, Representative of the European Network
on Statelessness, Executive Director, Praxis, Belgrade, Serbia
- Ms Inge Sturkenboom, Protection Officer (Statelessness),
UNHCR Bureau for Europe, Brussels, Belgium
2. At the same meeting, the committee also appointed me as rapporteur
on “The European Convention on Nationality: application and solution
proposals”
(Doc. 12696),
following the departure
of the previous rapporteur, Ms Elsa Papadimitriou (Greece, EPP/CD),
from the Assembly. The committee then decided to merge this reference
with that concerning “Access to nationality”, and informed the Bureau
accordingly. Subsequently, at its meeting on 11 December 2012, the
committee decided – upon my suggestion – that the new title for
the joint report should be “Access to nationality and the effective
implementation of the European Convention on Nationality”. Following
the merger of the two motions, on 19 March 2013, the committee held an
exchange of views with Professor Zdzisław Galicki, International
Law Institute, Faculty of Law and Administration, University of
Warsaw, Poland, formerly Chair of the Council of Europe’s Committee
of Experts on Nationality (CJ-S-NA).
1.2. The two motions
3. The motion for a resolution on “Access to nationality”
focuses on access to nationality for immigrants and their descendants
and the prevention of statelessness. In most European countries
naturalisation of first-generation immigrants faces legal and administrative
obstacles and their children do not automatically acquire the nationality
(citizenship) of the State of their birth. The trend in several
Council of Europe member States in recent years has been to make
it more difficult to acquire nationality. The eligibility criteria
have become more demanding, including comprehensive tests on language,
history and knowledge of the State institutions. Moreover, some
countries do not allow multiple nationality, so naturalised immigrants
cannot maintain their original nationality.
4. The motion for a resolution on “The European Convention on
Nationality: application and solution proposals” stresses the importance
of the Council of Europe Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166, hereinafter
“the ECN”) for the evolution of nationality legislation at the European
level. It calls for a “detailed and precise verification of the
ratification and implementation” of this convention in different
States Parties. The reason for this is that in certain States Parties
national legislation was not fully compatible with the provisions of
the convention – that is why States Parties either modified their
laws or made reservations to particular articles of the 1997 Convention.
The movers of the motion for a resolution
were also concerned about the denunciations or reservations made
by some States to some provisions of relevant Council of Europe conventions
on nationality matters.
5. Bearing in mind the provisions of the European Convention
on Nationality, signed on 6 November 1997, and the recent development
of the domestic and international legal instruments, I will strive
to remind member States of their duty to combat statelessness, which
is still a large-scale phenomenon in Europe, and will examine the
current trends concerning acceptance of multiple nationality, which
is closely related to naturalisation policies. Statelessness is
a cause for concern since it encroaches on human dignity and makes individuals
vulnerable by depriving them of the protection by any State. It
violates core principles of the Council of Europe such as human
rights and the rule of law. Therefore, statelessness should be eliminated
as soon as possible, emergence of new cases of statelessness should
be prevented and, in the meantime, stateless persons should be protected.
6. Multiple nationality is a constantly growing phenomenon due
to international mobility and migration, which has become a “total
social fact”.
It is disliked
by some States, which see it as an obstacle to full integration
of migrants and fear clashes between different States’ interests
in such areas as compulsory military service or diplomatic protection
and the possible manipulation of large groups of voters by foreign governments.
Although these concerns may appear valid in some cases, multiple
nationality does not appear to be as problematic as statelessness,
as appropriate co-ordination between States can minimise conflicting duties
stemming from multiple nationality.
7. The Council of Europe has developed regional instruments that
address these issues, and in particular the ECN, the first comprehensive
convention on matters on nationality in the world. Unfortunately,
the number of its States Parties as well as that of other Council
of Europe conventions on nationality matters is still very low.
That is why I consider that the committee’s decision to merge the
two motions was well-founded and I will give further thought to
the question of the convention’s implementation. Moreover, it will
also be useful to reflect upon whether the ECN would require further
amendments or whether it should be replaced by another convention.
2. The Assembly’s
previous work
8. The issue of statelessness has been raised in several
Parliamentary Assembly resolutions and reports. Already in the 1950s,
it noted the gravity of this problem from the human rights perspective
and adopted
Recommendation
87 (1955) on statelessness
and
Recommendation 194 (1959) on the nationality of children of stateless persons.
This issue was further raised in various
other texts of the Assembly, in particular in the context of reports
concerning certain minorities groups such as Roma, the Muslim population
in Western Thrace or national minorities in Latvia.
9. Moreover, already in 1978 the Assembly noted difficulties
for second generation migrants especially with regard to their legal
status in the immigration country.
Whilst they retain the nationality
of their parents, they acquire a dual socio-cultural identity.
The
Assembly called upon member States “to make it easier for young migrants
who so wish to acquire the nationality of the immigration country,
when they have either been born or completed most of their schooling
in it”.
The Assembly also addressed the
naturalisation of refugees in 1969
and
1984
.
In 1984, it deplored the lack of improvements in national legislation
to ensure that they could be naturalised within a reasonable period
of time and called on member States to make the naturalisation process
more flexible and speedy as well as to ensure that under-age children
of refugees acquire the nationality of the receiving country once
the parents have acquired it.
These principles
were later reflected in the ECN.
10. The Assembly has also dealt with the problem of multiple nationality
in the context of mixed marriages.
Although
it reaffirmed, at that time, that States’ policy to reduce the number
of cases of multiple nationality should continue,
it
found desirable that each spouse in a mixed marriage should have
the right to acquire the nationality of the other without losing
his or her own nationality of origin
and
that their children should be entitled to acquire and keep the nationality
of both of their parents.
3. Nationality issues
in international legal instruments
3.1. The notion of nationality
11. Nationality is an institution of internal law, which
designates the legal bond between a person and a State. The ECN
stresses that nationality “does not indicate the person’s ethnic
origin” (Article 2.
a). Determining rules
on the acquisition of nationality at birth has traditionally been
the prerogative of States.
There are two main ways
of acquiring nationality: either through filiation, whereby children
acquire the citizenship of one or both of their parents (
ius sanguinis), or through birth
on a country’s territory (
ius soli).
Many countries combine both criteria. Moreover, individuals who
have resided legally in a country for a certain length of time and/or
who have established particular links, for example through marriage
with a national, may acquire citizenship through naturalisation.
12. Although rules on nationality belong to the domestic legal
order, several international legal instruments deal with certain
aspects, including statelessness and multiple nationality. However,
there is very little case law by international courts on nationality
matters.
The most oft-cited case is perhaps the
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) case,
in which the International Court
of Justice upheld the principle of “effective nationality”, according
to which it is the genuine and effective link between a State and
an individual which confers upon the State the opportunity to afford
diplomatic protection.
3.2. Is there a right
to a nationality?
13. An important issue is the right to a nationality
as such. It is called a “right to have rights”, while statelessness
means a negation of a person’s legal existence.
According to certain international
documents, the right to a nationality is a human right – that is
the case, in particular, of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,
Article 20 of the
American Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the European Convention
on Nationality. With special regard to children, Article 24 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Article
7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
describe
the right of every child to acquire a nationality and Article 8
of the latter stipulates that the child has a right to preserve
his or her nationality. In July 2012, the United Nations General
Assembly’s Human Rights Council adopted two resolutions – on “Human
rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality” (20/5) and on “The
right to a nationality: women and children” (20/4),
in which it reaffirmed its position
on the right to a nationality as a human right.
The same position
was taken by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (“HCNM”)
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Moreover, in the case of State
succession, the 2006 European Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness
in Relation to State Succession (CETS No. 200)
provides for the right to a nationality
of persons who, at the time of the State succession, had the nationality
of the predecessor State and who have or would become stateless
as a result of the State succession (Article 2); this convention
also stipulates that States shall take all appropriate measures
to prevent such persons from becoming stateless (Article 3).
14. While the European Convention on Human Rights does not expressly
refer to such a right, the European Court of Human Rights (“the
Court”) has found violations of this convention in several cases
concerning rights and freedoms of stateless persons.
In
its recent judgment
Kuric and others
v. Slovenia,
the Court considered the issue
of the so-called “erased people”, some of whom became stateless
following the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and whose records were removed from the civil registry,
losing their right to residence. The Court found, amongst others,
that the Slovenian authorities’ prolonged refusal to resolve the
applicants’ residence status constituted an interference with their
right to private and/or family life (violation of Article 8). Interestingly,
in another case –
Genovese v. Malta – concerning acquisition
of nationality by descent, the Court ruled that (access to) nationality
fell within the scope of protection of the Convention as part of
a person’s social identity, and therefore his or her private life (Article 8).
In
this case, the applicant, a British citizen, whose father is Maltese,
was prevented from obtaining Maltese citizenship because he had
been born out of wedlock. The Court found that there had been no reasonable
or objective grounds to justify such difference of treatment of
the applicant as a person born out of wedlock. Thus, it concluded
that he suffered from discrimination in the enjoyment of his right
to private life (violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article
8). This judgment opens the door to possible further case law relating
to the right to a nationality, prohibition of discrimination in
access to nationality, and safeguards against statelessness.
3.3. Statelessness
15. A stateless person is a person who is “not considered
as a national by any State under the operation of its law”
and
thus a person without any nationality (citizenship) anywhere. As
a corollary to the right to determine the conditions for the acquisition
of nationality, States are duty-bound to avoid statelessness through legislative,
administrative and other measures.
The main international legal
instruments against statelessness are the 1954 Convention relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons (hereinafter “the 1954 Convention”)
and
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (hereinafter
“the 1961 Convention”).
The 1954 Convention contains
a definition of a stateless person and establishes an international
protection regime for stateless persons – there is no equivalent
to it at the regional level. The 1961 Convention is important for
ensuring the application of common global standards to prevent conflicts
between different domestic nationality laws. However, only 78 States
(out of which 37 member States of the Council of Europe) are Party
to the 1954 Convention and 53 (out of which 28 member States of
the Council of Europe) to that of 1961.
Moreover, a series of international
human rights instruments affirm the right of access to nationality
without discrimination and the right of children to acquire a nationality:
the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
the 1989 Convention on the Rights
of the Child,
the 1990 International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families,
and the 2006 Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities.
16. The Council of Europe has a strong track record in this field,
in particular thanks to the European Convention on Nationality of
1997 (Articles 4 and 6) and the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness
in relation to State Succession of 2006 (see in particular its Articles
2 and 3), the only legally binding instrument, dealing with nationality
and succession of States. The Committee of Ministers has also adopted recommendations
dealing with this issue, such as Recommendation No. R (1999)18 on
the avoidance and reduction of statelessness
and
Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13 on the nationality of children.
3.4. The European Convention
on Nationality
17. The ECN was drafted following the democratic changes
that had taken place in central and eastern Europe since 1989 in
order to guide the new democracies in drafting new nationality and
aliens’ laws.
Unfortunately, this legal instrument
has only been ratified by 20 member States of the Council of Europe
.
18. The ECN regulated for the first time all aspects relating
to nationality at international level. Articles 4.a to 4.c of
the ECN repeats the message of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as follows: “The rules on nationality of each State Party
shall be based on the following principles: a. everyone has the
right to a nationality; b. statelessness shall be avoided; c. no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality”. It also
contains a principle, according to which “neither marriage nor the
dissolution of a marriage between a national of a State Party and
an alien, nor the change of nationality by one of the spouses during
marriage, shall automatically affect nationality of the other spouse”
(Article 4.d).
19. The convention contains safeguards against statelessness:
Article 6.1.b of the ECN prescribes
the acquisition of nationality to “foundlings found in its territory
who would otherwise be stateless” and regulates the access to nationality
for stateless children born on their territory (Article 6.2).
20. Moreover, the ECN covers such issues as discrimination in
nationality matters (Article 5), acquisition of nationality (Article
6) and recovery of a former one (Article 9), an exhaustive list
of the grounds for its loss (Article 7),
procedures governing applications
for nationality (Articles 10-13), the legal situation of persons
at risk of statelessness as a result of State succession (Articles
18-20),
multiple nationality (Articles 14-17), military
obligations (Articles 21-22) and co-operation between States Parties
(Articles 23 and 24).
21. So far, the ECN has been ratified by only 20 member States
of the Council of Europe, most of which made reservations and declarations
when adhering to it. Nine other member States have signed but not
yet ratified it.
4. Statelessness in
the world
4.1. Some figures
22. As the former Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mr Thomas Hammarberg, stressed in August 2011, “stateless
persons are often marginalised. When they lack birth certificates,
identity cards, passports and other documents, they risk being excluded
from education, healthcare, social assistance and the right to vote.
A stateless person may not be able to travel or work legally. As
a result, the stateless have to grapple with inequality and discrimination
– and with a heightened risk of being perceived as irregular”.
His successor, Mr Nils Muižnieks,
recently pointed out that statelessness was being transmitted over
generations and called on European Governments to end this phenomenon,
especially with respect to children.
23. Statelessness exists on a very large scale; according to the
United Nations, statelessness is estimated to affect at least 12
million people worldwide.
Even in
Europe, the number of persons under the UNHCR’s statelessness mandate
reached over 680 000 in 2012.
Media reports abound on the discrimination
of groups of stateless persons – for instance many members of the
Russian-speaking communities in Latvia
and Estonia,
as well as Roma groups, particularly in the countries of the former
Yugoslavia
and in Italy.
These problems result mainly from the
political upheavals in many parts of Europe after 1989, such as
the break-up of the Soviet Union, of Yugoslavia and of Czechoslovakia.
According to UNHCR estimates, the number of stateless persons in
Latvia in 2012 amounted to 280 584; in the Russian Federation to
178 000,
in Estonia to 94 235, in Ukraine
to 35 000, in Poland to 10 825, in Sweden to 9 596 and in Serbia
to 8 500.
4.2. Example of groups
of stateless persons in Europe
4.2.1. The situation of
the Roma
24. Many Roma are stateless, although there are no precise
statistics.
In 2009, estimates
in south-eastern Europe indicated that 10 000 stateless Roma lived
in Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 500 in Montenegro, 17 000 in Serbia
and 4 090 in Slovenia.
There are also stateless Roma in
western Europe.
They often live in very poor conditions,
including in substandard housing.
This
phenomenon is related to the fact that many Roma have never obtained
a birth certificate and have difficulties in obtaining proof of
their nationality.
25. A flagrant example of depriving Roma of citizenship could
be that of the Czech Republic, which made thousands of Roma stateless
following the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic and
the adoption in 1992 of the citizenship law, containing stringent
requirements for the acquisition of Czech nationality. As a consequence,
approximately 10 000 to 25 000 Roma considered as Slovaks by the
Czech Republic and as Czechs by the Slovak Republic, became stateless.
The main
part of the problem was apparently solved in 1999 following amendments
to the Czech citizenship law.
4.2.2. Meshketian Turks
26. The situation of Meshketian Turks is another example
of how deportations and changes in the State structure may cause
statelessness. Meshketian Turks, who originally inhabited south-west
Georgia, were deported in 1944 to Central Asia by the Soviet regime.
After an outbreak of violence in 1989, most of them left Uzbekistan
and moved to other Soviet republics.
Nowadays they
are scattered over several countries, mainly Azerbaijan, the Russian
Federation, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. Some 5 000 of them returned to
Georgia, which initiated the process of granting them citizenship.
However,
despite a clearly expressed political will of the Georgian authorities,
the process of repatriation and restoration of citizenship remains
very slow.
In practice, repatriates
face administrative obstacles. By August 2013, 1 058 repatriation
statuses and only seven citizenships have been granted.
27. For a number of years the situation of Meshketian Turks living
in the Russian Federation, and especially in the Krasnodar region,
gave rise to concern, as, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
they were not recognised as Russian citizens and remained in a legal
limbo, being deprived of basic civil, political, economic and social
rights,
due
to the authorities’ persistent refusal to register them in their
place of residence. According to the Moscow Helsinki Group, their
number in the Krasnodar region amounted to between 11 000 and 13 000.
The Assembly dealt with this issue,
in particular, in the report by Ms Ruth-Gaby Vermot-Mangold on “The
situation of the deported Meskhetian population”.
The
problem was largely resolved after the United States decided to
grant asylum to the Meskhetians from Krasnodar, which resulted in
the resettlement of over 9 000 persons in the United States.
Unfortunately, one cannot but admit
that the European mechanisms appeared incapable of effectively handling
this problem.
4.2.3. Persons deprived
of Greek citizenship
28. As it has already been pointed out in one of my previous
reports,
a significant
number of persons of “non-Greek descent” living in Greece or abroad
were deprived of their Greek citizenship on the basis of former Article
19 of the Greek Citizenship Code. As a consequence of this provision,
between 1995 and 1998, around 60 000 Greek citizens, including those
of ethnic Macedonian or Turkish descent, lost their Greek citizenship.
Although
the above-mentioned provision has been repealed, the repeal has
no retroactive effect and a small number of Muslims living in Western
Thrace still remain stateless,
pending
lengthy naturalisation procedures.
According
to UNHCR estimates, 154 persons under the organisation’s statelessness
mandate were living in Greece in 2012.
4.2.4. The Russian-speaking
population in Estonia and Latvia
29. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant
number of residents, mainly Russian speakers, became stateless in
Estonia and Latvia. Although many were born in these countries and
a vast majority of them have a status as legal residents, they are
still deprived of political rights, such as the right to vote in national
elections (in Latvia – also in municipal elections), the right to
occupy certain positions in the public and also private sector,
as well as some other rights, such as the right to legally possess
firearms.
In
some cases, the non-citizens are entitled to a lower old-age pension
than citizens. In Estonia, they are officially referred to as “persons
with undetermined citizenship”. Latvia granted them a special “non-citizen”
status, along with special passports allowing them to travel abroad
and benefit from its diplomatic protection; it considers that they have
a status which is different from that of stateless persons. Despite
the interventions of various international bodies,
the situation still remains unresolved.
According to the UNHCR, in 2012,
Latvia and Estonia had the highest numbers of stateless people in
Europe.
Although statelessness in the Baltic
States is gradually decreasing (according to the latest data the
number for Latvia was 290 510 in July 2013,
and for Estonia 90 014 in June 2013),
these numbers are even more appalling
when we compare them with the size of the total population of these
countries (nearly 2 004 000 in Latvia and nearly 1 340 000 in Estonia).
In its last report on Latvia,
the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) criticised the difficulties for “non-citizens”
to pass the naturalisation tests, including to pay the fees related
to them, and the lack of measures to facilitate naturalisation of
children born in Latvia after 1991 from “non-citizen parents”. While recently
adopted amendments to the Latvian Citizenship law somewhat liberalised
registration as nationals of children whose both parents have the
status of “non-citizens”, the law still permits a possibility that,
following the parents’ refusal to make use of this option, these
children may be left without any nationality. Similar provisions
still exist in Estonia, where the number of stateless children amounts
to nearly 1 200. During his March 2013 visit, the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Nils Muižnieks, called on the Estonian
authorities to grant citizenship at birth to children who would
otherwise be stateless.
4.2.5. Stateless persons
in the western Balkans
30. Following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in
the 1990s, many people were displaced and became stateless due to
the failure to register as nationals in the successor State, although
the successor States avoided large-scale statelessness through the
application of the principle of continuity of former republican citizenship
and by facilitating access to nationality during a transitional
period to former Yugoslav citizens who had permanent residence in
the State for a prescribed period of time. According to the UNHCR,
there are over 20 000 stateless people or of undetermined nationality
in this region – mainly members of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian
minorities.
31. As stressed at the November 2012 hearing by Ms Kostic, the
most vulnerable and socially marginalised minority groups were not
able to benefit from the facilitated procedures to obtain citizenship,
as they were not able to prove their former republican nationality
and/or their permanent residence in the State. Some of them missed
the deadline to apply for nationality through a facilitated procedure,
not being aware of that opportunity, while others experienced serious
difficulties with reconstructing their personal records due to destroyed
and missing registers. Moreover, without valid personal records
regarding their birth and nationality, registered residence and
identification documents, they are not able to register the birth
of their own children. In Serbia, although it is now possible, following
legislative amendments in 2012, to initiate a court procedure for
the determination of the date and place of birth of persons who
are not registered in the birth registry, the Ministry of the Interior,
which is competent for nationality matters, is not bound by such
court decisions.
4.2.6. The “erased” in
Slovenia
32. The problem of the “erased” (
izbrisani),
that is aliens or stateless persons illegally residing in Slovenia, was
dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Kuric and others v. Slovenia. Although the
judgment concerns only a few applicants, it reveals a structural
problem affecting many residents of Slovenia. According to the official
data from 2002 cited in the judgment,
the number of former citizens of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who lost their permanent residence
status in February 1992, after an amendment to the Aliens Act became
applicable, amounted to 18 305, of whom nearly 2 400 had been refused citizenship.
According to updated information of January 2009, the number of
persons removed from the Register amounted to 25 671, of whom 7 899
had subsequently acquired Slovenian citizenship and a further 3 630
a residence permit. However, at the same time, 13 426 “erased” persons
did not have any regulated status in Slovenia.
Further
concerns about the lack of visible progress in the re-inclusion
into Slovenian society of the “erased” persons have been expressed
by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Nils Muižnieks.
The Committee of Ministers is now
supervising the implementation of the
Kuric
and others judgment and has recently noted that the Slovenian
Parliament is examining a special law setting up a compensation
scheme for the “erased”.
4.3. The role of UNHCR
33. Since 1974, the mandate entrusted to the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by the United
Nations General Assembly has evolved to where it is today: a global
mandate relating to the identification, prevention and reduction
of statelessness and the protection of stateless people. Combating statelessness
is indispensable to ensure the rule of law, since it often arises
from discrimination and arbitrary laws and practices. Considering
the relatively low number of accessions to the 1954 Convention relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, the UNCHR has used the 50th anniversary
of the 1961 Convention in August 2011 to launch a special campaign
urging States to accede to these conventions.
In Europe, the campaign has resulted
in the accession to one or both conventions by Lithuania, Ukraine,
Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria and Georgia.
4.4. Measures to avoid
statelessness
34. Stateless people remain in legal limbo – they cannot
enjoy full equality with citizens in any country, may be subject
to arbitrary and prolonged detention and face additional difficulties
in enjoying basic human rights such as access to health care and
education, and are deprived of political rights. The need to avoid statelessness
seems to be generally recognised. This is reflected in national
legislations by an extended application of
ius
soli or by less restrictive provisions on the requirement
to renounce the nationality of origin in case of naturalisation,
although some of them make exceptions in cases of fraud or other
criminal behaviour;
Article 7.3 of the ECN allows
the deprivation of citizenship in case of fraud committed during
the naturalisation procedure. However, as Ms Sturkenboom from the
UNHCR stressed at the November 2012 hearing, safeguards for children
born in the territory of a State who are otherwise stateless are
still lacking in some European countries (for instance Malta, Norway
and Romania) or do not cover all situations where a child is born
stateless in the territory of a State (for instance Armenia, Croatia,
Lithuania and Slovenia). The UNHCR is helping States to introduce
formal statelessness determination procedures in line with its guidelines.
Such procedures
existed already in France, Hungary and Spain and have recently been
established, in particular, in Georgia, the Republic of Moldova
and the United Kingdom.
35. According to a EUDO CITIZENSHIP study,
much
progress has been achieved in the last few decades, by granting
political priority to measures to fight statelessness. Concerning
the safeguards against statelessness, there is “significant variation
in the extents to which States comply with international standards in
their nationality legislation”.
Violations
of these standards are often due to the fact the States do not carefully
interpret their nationality laws.
I agree
with our expert Professor Galicki that the issue of statelessness
in Europe should be solved through political action rather than
legal changes at international level, since a legal basis has already
been established.
5. Multiple nationality
36. Multiple nationality, namely simultaneous possession
of two or more nationalities by the same person,
can
arise automatically at birth, when the child acquires a different
nationality from each parent by the application of
ius sanguinis (on the side of the
parents’ countries)
or when
ius sanguinis and
ius soli (on the side of the country
of birth) apply simultaneously. Later in life, multiple nationalities
may arise where a person acquires a nationality by naturalisation
without simultaneously giving up his or her existing nationality.
In order
to avoid conflicting obligations especially in the area of diplomatic
protection or military service, States have concluded bilateral
or multilateral agreements, but these specific problems have not
been solved universally.
In
practice, States treat persons having several nationalities as their
own citizens; such a person cannot therefore refuse to meet his
or her obligations vis-à-vis the State of his or her nationality
by invoking his or her obligations vis-à-vis another State whose
nationality he or she also holds.
37. The Council of Europe’s 1963 Convention on the Reduction of
Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases
of Multiple Nationality (ETS No. 43, hereinafter “the 1963 Convention”)
and the 1997 European
Convention on Nationality deal with the issue of multiple nationality.
The 1963 Convention aims to reduce as far as possible the number
of cases of multiple nationalities and stipulates that the loss
of a former nationality is automatic in case of the acquisition
of a new nationality by an adult.
So far it has been ratified by 13 member
States, but six of them have denounced it either entirely (Germany
and Switzerland) or partially (Chapter 1 – Belgium, France, Italy
and Luxembourg). Moreover, the 1993 second protocol amending this convention
added three new situations in which persons can be allowed to retain
their nationality of origin: second-generation migrants, spouses
of different nationalities and children whose parents have different nationalities.
Despite
the importance of these amendments, which were aimed at reflecting
the evolution of society, only France, Italy and the Netherlands
have signed and ratified the second protocol. France, however, denounced
it in 2009.
38. Although the 1963 Convention was initially aimed at preventing
multiple nationality, the ECN seems to be much less restrictive
in this respect.
It
accepts, in principle, multiple nationality in the case of children who
acquired it at birth and in case of a spouse acquiring a second
nationality by marriage (Article 14). It also allows a State Party
to determine in its internal law whether its nationals who acquire
the nationality of another State retain or lose their nationality
and whether the acquisition or retention of a State’s nationality
shall be subjected to the renunciation or loss of another nationality
(Article 15). The ECN neither modifies nor is incompatible with
the 1963 Convention and the two conventions can co-exist (see in
particular Article 26 of the ECN).
However, their effects may be different
according to the domestic law of the State concerned. This concerns
especially multiple nationality – a State, whose internal law allows
it in cases other than those mentioned in Article 14 of the ECN
and the 1963 Convention, might not wish to be bound by Chapter 1
of the latter (concerning reduction of cases of multiple nationality)
but could accept the ECN.
39. Research has shown a global and European trend of allowing
multiple nationality in nationality legislation.
This
trend has also been confirmed by denunciation of the 1963 Convention
by many States Parties. Only two countries (Denmark and Norway)
are bound by it without exceptions. A study conducted at the beginning
of 2012 shows that in 21 States out of 31 (the European Economic
Area (EEA) plus Switzerland), voluntary acquisition of another nationality
does not entail an automatic loss of the nationality of origin.
The same trend was
observed in non-EEA European States and worldwide, with respectively
22 and 127 States accepting voluntary acquisition of another nationality
without loss of the other nationality. As stressed by our experts
at the November 2012 hearing, this trend has the positive effect
of limiting statelessness.
6. Acquisition of
nationality by migrants and their descendants: naturalisation and
application of ius soli
40. Naturalisation is “the most debated and densely regulated
form of access to citizenship” and can be defined as “any acquisition
after birth of a citizenship not previously held by the person concerned
that requires application to public authorities and a decision by
these”.
One
can distinguish between ordinary naturalisation and special naturalisation
procedures. As regards ordinary naturalisation, the main criteria
used by States are: renunciation of the original nationality (which
is, however, less often required in most western European countries),
civic knowledge,
economic resources, residence and language conditions, as well as a
clean criminal record. Special naturalisation procedures apply mainly
in case of recovery of previous citizenship, transfer of nationality
between spouses, refugees and stateless persons.
41. According to Article 6.3 of the ECN, States Parties shall
provide in their internal law for the possibility of naturalisation
of persons “lawfully and habitually” resident on their territory.
The required period of residence shall not exceed 10 years before
the lodging of an application. According to Article 6.4, a State
Party shall facilitate the acquisition of its nationality by some
categories of persons, inter alia spouses
of its nationals, children of one of its nationals, “persons who
were born on its territory and reside there lawfully and habitually” and
those who resided there for some period of time before the age of
18, stateless persons and refugees “lawfully and habitually resident
on its territory”. Naturalisation procedures and other procedures
related to nationality matters shall be conducted according to the
rules established in Articles 10 to 13 of the ECN: decisions should
contain reasons in writing (Article 11), there should be a right
to a review (Article 12) and fees shall be “reasonable” (Article
13).
42. According to EUDO CITIZENSHIP, which conducted research in
33 European countries (all European Union member States, Iceland,
the Republic of Moldova, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey), the following
trends can be observed as regards naturalisation procedures in these
countries:
- residence conditions vary between three years (Belgium)
and 12 years (Switzerland, which has not signed the ECN), although
most often this requirement amounts to five years. The 10-year condition
in a few countries in southern and eastern Europe may be excessive. Many countries require
applicants for citizenship to fulfil additional conditions, such
as the requirement of uninterrupted residence or by counting only
years with a permanent residence permit;
- 15 States out of 33 still require renunciation of a previously
held citizenship (for instance, Bulgaria and the three Baltic States
– however, recent amendments to the Latvian legislation allow a
previous nationality to be retained provided that it is a nationality
of a European Union or NATO member State, Australia, New Zealand
or Brazil). Some of these States do not enforce this rule in practice
(like Spain) or make many exceptions (for instance, Germany or the
Netherlands);
- there is a trend towards introducing formal tests of language
skills and civic knowledge (in 18 States in October 2010): the number
of countries testing the applicant’s language skills and knowledge
of the country’s history, constitution, public values and social
customs has increased since 2000. Interestingly,
there has been very little research on the efficiency of such tests,
which might be considered, on one hand, as incentives for acquiring
language and civic skills, and, on the other hand, as deterrents
from applying for naturalisation, as, inter
alia, they often imply additional costs or, depending on the level of their difficulty,
might be aimed at or having the effect of slowing down the naturalisation
of some minority groups (like ethnic Russians in Latvia or Estonia);
- naturalisation is still considered as a discretionary
decision of public authorities (only five States out of 33 – Croatia,
Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – define it as a legal
entitlement, if all conditions are met);
- many States (16 out of 33) offer facilitated naturalisation
not only to close relatives of citizens, but also to persons who
are perceived as ethnically or linguistically related to the majority
of the population (for example, Denmark for South Schleswig Danes
or Hungary for members of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries). Some
of them also give priority access to citizenship for citizens from countries
with which they are linked by a political union (like the Nordic
countries on the basis of the Agreement on the Implementation of
Certain Provisions Concerning Nationality; however, the number of
European Union member States facilitating naturalisation for citizens
of other European Union member States is small – these are Austria,
Greece and Italy).
43. According to the latest EUDO CITIZENSHIP data, several countries
still do little to facilitate the naturalisation of spouses of citizens
(for instance, certain central European States, Denmark, Finland,
Greece or Luxembourg). Furthermore, as regards general conditions
for naturalisation, nearly half of them make naturalisation conditional
on having a job or regular income (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy and Switzerland).
44. As noted by the EUDO CITIZENSHIP study, the rule of law in
naturalisation procedures needs to be strengthened, as some States
do not foresee written justification for negative decisions (Belgium,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Poland), while others
do not provide avenues for appealing against such decisions (for
instance Croatia, Hungary and the United Kingdom).
The procedure itself is often costly for applicants,
who may have to pay fees for processing applications (such fees
are extremely high in Austria, Greece and Switzerland), languages
courses, and official translations of documents.
45. Depending on the State, naturalisation is handled by various
bodies – very often it is a specialised administrative body, but
in some States, central State authorities, including the government
as a whole (Estonia, Latvia and Turkey), the Head of State (Bulgaria,
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania and the Republic of Moldova) or even parliament
(Belgium and Denmark) are involved in the decision-making process.
This demonstrates that naturalisation is still perceived “as an
exceptional privilege granted only if it is in the general interest
of the state”.
Public
ceremonies with newly naturalised citizens are meant to highlight
the value of the newly acquired citizenship.
46. According to EUDO CITIZENSHIP experts,
the
ius sanguinis principle is still
prevailing in most European countries. There is a strong variation
in inclusiveness of citizenship laws in Europe, especially with regard
to
ius soli for 2nd and 3rd
generations of immigrants and conditions for ordinary naturalisation.
There is no common model for making citizenship accessible to second-generation
immigrants in western Europe: while some countries
like
Belgium and Germany have introduced
ius
soli provisions at birth for the second generation, in
the case of Germany combined with a requirement to make a definitive
choice upon reaching the age of majority; others have only introduced
provisions for the attribution of nationality based on the
ius soli principle after birth,
usually from the age of 18. With regard to the descent-based transmission
of nationality, one can notice a trend towards the equal treatment
of men and women.
47. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13 on the
nationality of children contains a Principle 17 on access to nationality
of children born on the territory of a State to a foreign parent.
According to this principle, member States of the Council of Europe
should facilitate the acquisition of nationality by such children,
before the age of majority, if their parent was lawfully and habitually
residing there. Enhanced facilitation should be offered if that
parent was also born on their territory.
7. Possible discrimination
on the grounds of the way in which nationality has been acquired
and in granting nationality
48. According to Article 5.
d.iii
of the 1965 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination,
States
should guarantee “the right of everyone, without distinction as
to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before
the law” in the enjoyment of the right to a nationality.
49. Similarly, Article 5 of the ECN provides that States’ rules
on nationality “shall not contain distinctions or include any practice
which amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion,
race, colour or national or ethnic origin” (paragraph 1) and that
States Parties “shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between
its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired
its nationality subsequently” (paragraph 2). As stressed by the
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, “multiple citizenships,
per se, should not be considered an obstacle to integration”
and States should not discriminate against
persons with dual citizenship
If
there might be a conflict of loyalties, especially in case of taking
up high political positions, States can legitimately ask to relinquish
other citizenship(s).
50. Conferring nationality on the basis of different criteria
depending on the characteristics of the individual concerned or
on those of the group to which he or she belongs might also amount
to discrimination. It is worth recalling in this context the “Ljubljana
Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies” (the “Ljubljana Guidelines”)
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities of 7 November
2012, based on the experience of the HCNM and the advice of internationally
recognised experts.
The Ljubljana Guidelines stress that
whilst States have a wide margin of appreciation in granting citizenship,
this discretion is subject to some limitations. The conferral of
citizenship should be based on the “genuine link” criterion and
should neither violate the principles of sovereignty and friendly,
including good neighbourly, relations nor amount to discrimination.
Discrimination
includes any “differential treatment that directly or indirectly
excludes specific groups from access to citizenship due to their
characteristics and does not pursue a legitimate aim or is not proportional
to such an aim”;
it should be distinguished from “justified
distinctions” (such as a language requirement for naturalisation
or facilitated acquisition of citizenship due to descent or place
of birth) or “preferential treatment” in conferring citizenship
by so-called “kin-States”.
However, as stressed
by the HCNM in the Bolzano Recommendations, granting citizenship
to persons living abroad on preferred linguistic competencies, cultural,
historical or familial ties, can be a highly sensitive issue, especially
when it is done
en masse. It can also lead to differential treatment
for these persons as compared with other residents who may be denied
access to citizenship.
8. Final remarks and
proposals
8.1. Statelessness
51. The prevention and elimination of statelessness is
crucial for the strengthening of the concept of the right to a nationality
as a human right. Very often, and especially in the case of recently
emerged States in Europe, this problem should be treated jointly
with the issue of State succession. In such a case, statelessness
occurs mainly due to the failure to include all residents in the
body of citizens when a State becomes independent, and not only
because of discrimination or conflict of laws.
52. All States should foresee statelessness determination procedures.
In some States (like in the western Balkans), it is particularly
important to amend the administrative birth registration procedures
in order to ensure that all children are registered immediately
upon birth, regardless of the status of their parents, and to raise awareness
about the importance of birth registration among socially vulnerable
groups. Moreover, a person who has not been registered in the birth
registry should be able to initiate an administrative or court procedure “for
proving the fact and place of birth” for the purpose of a subsequent
registration of birth; a court decision on the date and place of
birth should be binding on the administration. States with a high
number of stateless people, people of undetermined nationality or
people at risk of statelessness due to lack of civil registration should
make efforts to reconstitute destroyed civil registries and to ensure
the registration and documentation of these populations. Stateless
persons should be granted effective access to justice, including
with free legal aid.
53. Safeguards against statelessness should be provided in case
of a change of nationality, as withdrawal of nationality may lead
to statelessness. Involuntary loss of nationality should be avoided.
I agree with Professor de Groot that in case of multiple nationality
some of the controversial issues touching upon the interest of the
State, like multiple voting rights, may be regulated through co-ordination
between the States in question (as is the case with multiple military
obligations). Naturalisation of stateless persons should be facilitated
through, for example, waiving language proficiency requirements
and reducing the number of years of lawful residence required for
applying for naturalisation.
54. Children born in the territory of a State, who do not acquire
at birth another nationality, should be granted citizenship in line
with international legal instruments, including the 1961 Convention,
the ECN and Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13. But I agree with our
experts that the ECN is not perfect in this respect. Although it
requires granting nationality to such children, it also accepts
the condition of “lawful and habitual residence” for a period not
exceeding five years in case the State does not provide for the
acquisition of nationality at birth
ex
lege and an application has to be lodged on behalf of
the child with the appropriate authority (Article 6.2.
b). The cases of Estonia and Latvia,
as explained above, show that the procedure for granting nationality
to stateless children upon application does not necessarily lead
to the prevention of statelessness and, thus, granting nationality
at birth
ex lege appears to
be the only effective tool to achieve this goal. Moreover, as noted
by Ms Sturkenboom at the November 2012 hearing, the requirement
of “lawful residence” is not in line with the 1961 Convention.
In countries that impose a lawful
or permanent residence requirement, children in an irregular migration
situation remain stateless, even if they have resided habitually in
the country where they were born for an extended period of time
and have no relevant link to any other country. The parents’ wish
not to register their children, who are otherwise stateless, as
citizens of the State of birth could be respected only if they provide
proof that the children will immediately obtain nationality of another State,
since under no circumstances can an option of remaining stateless
be in the best interest of the child.
55. In this context, we as parliamentarians have a key role to
play, by persuading our fellow parliamentarians to adopt laws in
line with the above-mentioned principles, and holding our governments
accountable for implementing them. Therefore, I call on national
parliaments to adopt legislation that would allow acquisition of citizenship
by stateless persons without undue obstacles and that would prevent
children from being stateless at birth. But it is not enough to
have good laws in line with international standards; what is important
is to implement them so as to guarantee genuine protection against
statelessness. I also invite all national authorities to define
and implement policies that would address the lack of civil registration
and/or documentation or any other circumstances which may contribute
to statelessness, by removing obstacles.
8.2. Long-term migrants’
access to citizenship
56. As stressed by the HCNM in his Ljubljana Guidelines,
“an inclusive and non-discriminatory citizenship policy is an important
aspect of integration policy” and access to nationality is an “essential
element of integration”.
The trend towards
excluding long-term immigrants from access to the nationality of
the country of residence hinders their full integration in that
country. In particular, it prevents them from enjoying full political rights,
as they depend traditionally on nationality. It also generates discrimination
in different walks of life. Long- term immigrants may often feel
treated as second-class individuals. The situation of their children
is even more worrying: they may become stateless (in cases where
they acquire neither the nationality of their parents nor that of
their country of birth) or face disadvantages in the country of
their birth and residence because they only have the nationality
of their parents’ country, with which they may not have any genuine
link. Sometimes, the only reason why children have not acquired
the nationality of the country where they were born and where they live
is their parents’ omission to fulfil the complex requirements of
applying for citizenship within the prescribed deadline. In view
of the increasing numbers of immigrants in recent decades, this
is worrying.
57. Multiple nationality is becoming an undeniable fact in many
European societies, due to increasing movement of persons across
borders, intra-family diversity across generations and States’ efforts
to retain legal ties with emigrant populations abroad. Therefore,
I consider that for long-term immigrants and their descendants one
should not impede their access to the nationality of the host country,
at least in cases in which relinquishing the nationality of origin
is not feasible, which is also reflected in Article 16 of the 1997
European Convention on Nationality concerning the conservation of
previous nationality.
Granting citizenship to long-terms
residents without requiring the renunciation of a previous nationality
may only encourage their integration with the country of their residence.
As regards naturalisation procedures, States (at least those which
adhered to the ECN) should implement the principles stemming from
the ECN: the period of residence required for naturalisation should
under no circumstances exceed ten years, and desirably five years.
The procedural requirements should be observed and there should
be no discrimination of naturalised citizens. Rules on nationality
matters should not contain distinctions leading to discrimination.
8.3. Towards a new convention?
58. Taking into account the current tendencies concerning
naturalisation of migrants, the acceptance of multiple nationality,
the number of existing international legal instruments and the low
number of ratifications of the main ones, such as the ECN, one could
wonder whether a new convention is needed. One could also argue
that the ECN could be enhanced, for example by defining the criterion
of “legal and habitual residence” or dealing specifically with the
nationality of children born out of wedlock abroad.
59. According to Professor de Groot, a new comprehensive convention
on nationality matters or a protocol to the ECN based on Recommendation
CM/Rec(2009)13 would be desirable, but its elaboration could entail some
risks, as some of the existing acquis could
be called into question in the negotiation process. Moreover, such
a new convention/protocol could meet the same ratification problems
as the ECN. Thus, I tend to agree with Professor Galicki that the
existing legal framework is sufficient, but its implementation should
be enhanced.
8.4. A new expert body?
60. The ECN and the 2006 Convention on the Avoidance
of Statelessness in relation to State Succession were drafted by
the Committee of Experts on Nationality, which was established in
1995 and suddenly ended its activities in 2005, having finalised
its work on the latter convention. Subsequently, there was an attempt
to continue its activities in the form of the Group of Specialists
on Nationality (CJ-S-NA), which after three meetings in 2008 ceased
its activities in 2009 with the adoption of its final report.
The
latter contained a recommendation to the CDCJ to reinstate as soon
as possible the Committee of Experts on Nationality, composed of
representatives of all member States and mandated,
inter alia, with:
- regularly reviewing and promoting
adherence to the Council of Europe conventions and other instruments
in the field of nationality;
- examining issues of relevance in the field of nationality
where future Council of Europe work – not limited to standard-setting
–, if necessary;
- proposing and undertaking relevant activities in the field
of nationality, also in co-operation with partner institutions;
- preparing, promoting and following up of the European
Conferences on Nationality.
61. Although a (fourth) European Conference on Nationality took
place in December 2010, the above recommendation to reactivate the
Committee of Experts on Nationality has never been put into practice.
I am of the opinion that in view of the importance of nationality
matters in contemporary societies due to international mobility
and the scale of statelessness in Europe, the reactivation of that
committee would be very useful, as such a body could regularly follow
the implementation of the ECN and other conventions on nationality, promote
adherence to these instruments and propose new standards, if need
be.
62. As rightly pointed out by an expert, for the last 15 years,
the Council of Europe “mostly dealt with the development of legal
standards, while other areas, with the exception of promotion of
accession to the European Convention on Nationality and to the Convention
on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession,
have not been explored and developed”.
It would therefore
be useful to explore other legal issues related to the increase
of cases of multiple nationality, such as the acquisition of nationality
at birth, by naturalisation or recovery.
Especially
in the context of naturalisation, one could carry out further reflection work
on the concepts of “residence”
for
naturalisation or recovery or, more precisely, of the “habitual residence”
of the parents of a child born on the territory of a State, if the
acquisition of nationality is acquired by
ius
soli (see Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13).
A 2012 expert study proposed that such issues (including how to
qualify discontinuity of residence or how to prove actual presence)
be elaborated in a new recommendation of the Committee of Ministers.
8.5. Conclusion
63. Although for a long time the question of granting
nationality has been seen as the prerogative of States, nowadays
nationality is increasingly seen as a human rights issue. These
two tendencies have to be harmonised. There is a now a compromise
that the right to a nationality is an individual right, but the
conditions for granting it are established by States. However, three
key principles should be observed by States: i) everyone has the
right to a nationality; ii) statelessness shall be avoided; and
iii) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality.
64. The ECN and the 2006 Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness
in Relation to State Succession contain some core provisions, the
implementation of which is of utmost importance for the effective
enjoyment of the right to nationality in the Council of Europe area.
These are:
i. the principle of non-discrimination,
in law and practice;
ii. the special protection that must be provided by States
to children born on their territories and who do not acquire another
nationality at birth;
iii. restrictive conditions under which individuals may lose
their nationality ex lege;
iv. the duty of States to provide written reasons for their
nationality-related decisions.
65. However, practice shows (and, in particular, the above-mentioned
research conducted in European Union and EFTA countries) that the
implementation of these norms encounters obstacles in many Council
of Europe member States. Moreover, the ECN and other Council of
Europe instruments on nationality matters have only been ratified
by a minority of its member States and the United Nations 1954 and
1961 Conventions aimed at preventing statelessness are still missing
ratifications from some Council of Europe member States.
66. Thus, more emphasis should be placed on the need to ratify
and implement these instruments to ensure that the “right to have
rights” is guaranteed in the whole Council of Europe area. The ECN
should be ratified by all member States and implemented, because
it is the principal document capable of filling the lacuna stemming
from the absence of the right to a nationality in the European Convention
on Human Rights. As mentioned above, the ECN is neutral towards
multiple nationality and its ratification would not automatically entail
full acceptance of this phenomenon. Neither would it give unlimited
access to nationality to long-term immigrants, as it allows member
States to naturalise them after a maximum period of 10 years of
“lawful and habitual” residence and States still have a wide margin
of appreciation in implementing this criterion in practice.
67. Nationality matters have always stood at the centre of interest
of the Council of Europe. They were even placed on the list of its
priorities during the 2005 Summit of Heads of the State and Government
in Warsaw.
Therefore, work on nationality issues
should be resumed, possibly through an expert body which could promote accession
to the ECN and reflect on further ways to improve it.
68. Avoiding statelessness in general, and granting access to
nationality for long-term legal residents, is certainly a political
issue as well as a legal one, since both issues fall within the
competence of States. The scale of immigration in many (western)
European countries has led to an instrumentalisation of citizenship attribution
as a part of integration policies and the importance of citizenship
as an identity status has increased in the last few years.
States
have to find ways to use naturalisation as an integration measure
in a non-discriminatory manner in order to improve the integration
of large groups of non-citizen long-term residents. When such groups
are stateless, legally or
de facto,
their long-term presence “runs counter to the integration of society
and potentially poses risks to cohesion and social stability”.
69. Without political will, progress is impossible. Thus, these
problems should be given higher priority and further action should
be taken at the governmental level, by ombudspersons, national human
rights institutions and civil society. Moreover, governments should
step up co-operation with international expert bodies in order to
provide a framework to resolve problems concerning nationality matters
and also improve inter-State exchange of information on nationality
matters.