1. Introduction
1. Racism, hatred and intolerance are long-standing
problems in Europe. Over the last decade, however, a combination
of circumstances have led to an upsurge in these phenomena and magnified
their scope.
2. Physical and verbal expressions of racism, hatred and intolerance
against individuals belonging to some groups are growing both in
gravity and number. They are becoming increasingly widespread in
all strata of society, including amongst law enforcement officials
and public authorities.
3. I am convinced of the urgency to address this state of affairs
through a strategic rather than a piecemeal approach. The urgency
becomes even more acute considering that racism, hatred and intolerance
have repercussions that go well beyond the single individuals that
are directly targeted: they affect entire groups, leading to group
victimisation; they create divides in society, affecting equality
and social cohesion; and they erode even further people’s trust
in the authorities and the rule of law.
4. I do not intend to duplicate the thorough monitoring, reporting
and data-collection work on racism, hatred and intolerance which
is carried out by bodies such as the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI),
the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD),
the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR)
and the Fundamental Rights Agency
of the European Union (FRA).
I would rather rely on these reliable
sources to highlight the main matters of concern from a political
point of view.
5. This report is the opportunity to recall that politicians
have a particular responsibility to reject racism, hatred and intolerance,
and to promote, through their behaviour and discourse, the equal
dignity of all human beings. Likewise, it is a call on the Council
of Europe to take up a leading role in this area through a systematic and
coherent action aimed at helping member States to come to grips
with these phenomena.
6. This report has a broad scope. It covers all forms of intolerance,
hatred and hostility, be it on the grounds of race, religion, migration
status, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or any other.
I have left the title of the original motion because it is meaningful
for most people. In reality this report is about preventing and combating
hatred, on all grounds and however it manifests itself.
2. Basic
terminology and legal aspects
2.1. Hate speech
7. In Europe, freedom of expression is not an absolute
right. As the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) has clearly
stated that “tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all
human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic
society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary
in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all
forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred
based on intolerance”.
8. There is no universally accepted definition of the expression
“hate speech”.
9. As far as the Council of Europe is concerned, in 1997 the
Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on this
matter, clarifying that it covered “all forms of expression which
spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism
or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance
expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination
and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant
origin”.
10. In 2008, the Council of Europe launched a Manual on hate speech
to clarify this concept on the basis of the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights.
Even if the Court has not given
a definition of hate speech, it has clarified that it is not protected
under Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of association
and assembly) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No.
5). As a result, expressions of hate speech can be restricted by
States in their national law, either because they negate the fundamental values
of the Convention (on the basis of Article 17) or because restrictions
are necessary in the interests of national security, public safety,
the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or
morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (on
the basis of paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11).
11. Council of Europe bodies recommend that hate speech should
be prohibited under national law. While the Committee of Ministers
has limited itself to saying that it should be prohibited through
civil, criminal or administrative law,
in its
Recommendation 1805 (2007) on blasphemy, religious insults and “hate speech” against
persons on grounds of their religion, the Parliamentary Assembly
has recommended the criminalisation of “statements that incite hate,
discrimination or violence against individuals or groups for religious
or other reasons”.
12. ECRI has also recommended criminalising “expressions which
can be considered racist speech, notably when they intentionally
and publicly incite to violence, hatred or discrimination on grounds
of race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or
ethnic origin”.
13. Council of Europe member States follow a variety of approaches:
in some jurisdictions speech that insults certain groups is criminalised;
other common limitations to freedom of speech include the prohibition
of Holocaust denial and the glorification of Nazi ideology. Incitement
to committing violence, however, is always criminalised.
14. Among EU member States, this disparity is in line with the
Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means
of criminal law. This text requires EU member States to criminalise
hate speech while leaving it to them to decide in what form.
15. I must say that, even though I do not disagree that hate speech
should be criminalised, I do not think that criminalisation is the
ultimate solution to the problem. I feel that even greater emphasis
should be placed on prevention, awareness-raising, education, teaching
of human rights and respect for equality and diversity. I am afraid
that legitimate restrictions to freedom of expression implemented
through criminal law may be perceived as “censorship” attempts and
that, unchallenged on its foundations outside courts of law, hate speech
may nest and flourish where it is more difficult to detect – in
cyberspace, for instance, as is already the case.
16. Today, in Europe, hate speech is well established in the public
space, including on the Internet and in the political arena. Tackling
it on a case-by-case basis through judicial decisions is crucial
to avoid impunity of the perpetrators and increase the trust in
the authorities; however, even if it is necessary, this course of
action is not sufficient because it does address the root causes.
Moreover, considering the extent of under-reporting, it will only
affect the tip of the iceberg.
2.2. Hate crime
17. Hate crime is not a legal definition. It is rather
a concept describing a criminal offence which is motivated by hostility
or prejudice against a certain group on the basis of certain grounds.
Every hate crime therefore includes two elements:
- the act which is committed constitutes
an offence under criminal law (the base crime), for instance an act
of intimidation, threat, property damage, assault, murder;
- the offender has intentionally chosen a target because
of his or her characteristic (the biased motive), which can be real
or perceived.
18. A hate incident is an act committed with a biased motive which
either does not reach the threshold of gravity to be a crime, or
has not proved to be one.
19. Hate speech must be distinguished from hate crime because,
although resting on a biased motive, it does not have a base crime
(speech per se is not a crime).
Speech that incites to performing criminal acts can be a hate crime
when it has a bias motive, because this kind of speech is per se a criminal offence.
20. In addition to differing from ordinary crimes on account of
the biased motivation of the offender; hate crimes have also a different
impact on the victims. As the OSCE/ODIHR Practical Guide on Hate
Laws explains well, “the perpetrator selects the victim because
of his or her membership of a group; this suggests that one member
of such a group is interchangeable with any other. Unlike victims
of many other criminal acts, hate crime victims are selected on
the basis of what they represent rather than who they are. The message
that is conveyed is intended to reach not just the immediate victim
but also the larger community of which that victim is a member”.
21. In the last decade, Council of Europe member States have strengthened
their legal framework against hate crime, even if they have tackled
it in different ways. The most common solution is through penalty enhancements
(often referred to as aggravating circumstances), which can be general
(applying to any crime, like in Andorra and the United Kingdom)
or specific (applying to specific crimes, like in Belgium and Bosnia
and Herzegovina). On occasions, the degree of penalty enhancement
is also established by law. Some countries also require the courts
to state explicitly the reasons for applying or failing to apply
the penalty enhancement. Others have set up special prosecutors
on hate crimes (Greece and Spain).
2.3. Biased motives
22. In the introduction to this report, I mentioned that
it is time to abandon a piecemeal approach to racism, hatred and
intolerance. I think that this should apply also to the grounds
motivating hate speech and hate crimes.
23. National and international legal instruments refer to a limited
number of different biased motives. For instance, the EU Council
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia is limited
to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.
Many EU member States, however, have decided to include other biased
motives, drawing on their national list of prohibited discrimination
grounds. This list differs from one country to another.
24. At the moment, all Council of Europe member States include
race as a biased motive; many include religion, sometimes with further
specifications; fewer include gender, disability, sexual orientation
and gender identity.
25. In my opinion, overcoming a piecemeal approach implies extending
the list of biased motives as broadly as possible. Such motives
should at least be those that are covered by Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (on non-discrimination), as interpreted
by the Court in its evolving jurisprudence.
26. I also see an advantage in explicitly mentioning as many biased
motives as possible, including gender, disability, sexual orientation,
gender identity and multiple grounds. The reason for explicitly
listing the grounds is threefold:
- it
makes the vulnerability of people from these groups visible and
is a sign of awareness on the part of the authorities;
- it will shape the processes of data classification and
collection, investigation and prosecution, making them more coherent
and systematic;
- it makes it clear that all grounds are equally valid,
thus preventing people belonging to some groups from being treated
differently from others.
27. As regards this last point, I would like to recall that in
its recent
Resolution
1948 (2013) on tackling discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation and gender identity, the Assembly asked member States
to “introduce binding guidelines for law-enforcement officials to
ensure that any alleged hate motive associated with a crime, including
hate motives on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity,
is promptly, impartially, effectively and thoroughly investigated
and duly taken into account in the prosecution and sentencing of
those crimes”.
28. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly said that
States have a positive obligation to investigate the motivation
of crimes. In its decision
on Nachova
and Others v. Bulgaria,
the Court held that Bulgaria’s
failure to investigate possible racist motives behind acts of violence
by State authorities constituted a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention.
29. In its judgment
Šečić v. Croatia,
the Court has affirmed that the State’s duty to investigate equally
applies when racist crimes are committed by individuals: “… when
investigating violent incidents, State authorities have the additional
duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and
to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have
played a role in the events. ... treating racially induced violence
and brutality on an equal footing with cases that have no racist
overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the specific nature of
acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights.”
3. The reality on
the ground
3.1. Data collection
30. It is not possible to present a comprehensive overview
of racism, hatred and intolerance in Europe from a statistical point
of view. This is primarily because States use different systems
of data classification (biased motives, types of crimes and incidents)
and collection (bodies involved, cross-checking of data, periodicity).
In addition, they are not all equally systematic in publishing it.
31. The Fundamental Rights Agency divides EU member States into
three categories:
- Finland,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom operate comprehensive
mechanisms of data collection, covering a wide range of bias motives,
types of crimes and incidents; the data is regularly published;
- Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Spain operate good mechanisms,
with a range of bias motives being recorded; data is generally published;
- Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia operate
limited mechanisms of data collection, with few incidents and a
narrow range of bias motives being recorded; data is not always
published.
32. Other valuable information sources include:
- surveys published by the Fundamental
Rights Agency, based on information collected through replies to
questionnaires;
- annual reports published by the OSCE/ODIHR, which since
2006 has been given the task of serving as a collection point for
information and statistics on hate crimes, and
which does so on the basis of the replies to a questionnaire sent
to the participating States.
33. Reports describing and analysing the situation on a country-by-country
basis are also particularly important, especially those by ECRI,
the CERD and, among non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Human Rights
Watch, the European Network against Racism (ENAR) and Human Rights
First. Recently, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Greece started to monitor and collect information
on racist and xenophobic crimes against people seeking asylum in
this country. All these reports indicate an increase in the gravity
of incidents and crimes motivated by hatred.
3.2. Main features
3.2.1. Data
35. In my country, Sweden, according to official statistics,
the police recorded 5 518 reports
with an identified hate crime motive in 2012. The breakdown as regards
the motive was:
- 72% (almost
3 980 reports) were motivated by xenophobia/racism (of which 940
were Afrophobic and almost 220 anti-Roma);
- 13% (over 710 reports) were motivated by homophobia, biphobia
and heterophobia;
- 6% (almost 310 reports) were motivated by Islamophobia;
- 5% (almost 260 reports) were motivated by Christianophobia
or were otherwise anti-religious;
- 4% (just over 220 reports) were motivated by anti-Semitism;
- 1% (just over 40 reports) was motivated by transphobia.
3.2.2. Under-reporting
36. The FRA surveys also shed light on the extent and
the reasons for under-reporting:
- between 57% and 74% of incidents
of assault or threat suffered by members of minority or migrant groups
in the European Union were not reported to the police by their victims;
- between 75% and 90% of incidents of serious harassment
were not reported to the police;
- eight out of ten LGBT persons in the European Union who
were victims of crimes motivated by bias or prejudice did not report
them to the police;
- three quarters of those Jewish people who said they were
victims of anti-Semitic harassment did not report this to the police
or any other organisation.
37. “The main reason for non-reporting among Jews, Roma, persons
of African origin or LGBT persons include that ‘nothing would change’
as a result of reporting incidents, that ‘such incidents happen
all the time’ or that ‘they did not trust the police’”.
38. The effectiveness of the criminal justice system depends on
the victims being encouraged to report hate speech and hate crimes
to the police and later co-operate with the prosecution. Unfortunately,
as Mr David Davies describes well in his report on “Tackling racism
in the police” (
Doc.
13384), all too often the police condone hate crimes, failing
to investigate them or to identify the biased motives, and sometimes
are even directly responsible for hate speech and violence.
39. A comprehensive strategy against racism, hatred and intolerance
should therefore include, as key priorities: the provision of human
rights and diversity training to the police; ensuring that police
procedures are not inherently racist, biased or discriminatory on
any grounds; setting up mechanisms to ascertain individual responsibilities
of police officers for hate speech and/or hate crime; and ensuring
that sanctions against them are effectively applied.
40. At the same time, it is important to introduce policies and
practices that facilitate reporting of hate speech and violence,
for instance by setting up easily accessible reporting mechanisms
on the Internet, waiving any fees for reporting or lodging a complaint,
and ensuring that migrants who co-operate with the authorities in
the course of judicial proceedings cannot be expelled.
3.2.3. Everyday hatred
41. Hardly a day goes by without an act of racism, hatred
and intolerance being reported in the media. Even worse, hardly
a day goes by without such acts taking place. Not all these expressions
of hatred reach the gravity of a hate crime; and yet, the psychological
impact on the targeted group is enormous: people are afraid of going
out – the majority of the attacks take place in public areas – and
they are afraid of ordinary people, as the majority of the attacks
come from them and not from organised extremist groups. It is urgent
to reverse this dangerous trend of trivialising hatred.
3.3. ECRI country-specific
recommendations
42. In the country reports that it published during its
4th monitoring cycle, ECRI made recommendations in the area of hate
speech and hate crime to a number of countries, including Andorra,
Croatia, Denmark, Ireland, Liechtenstein and Sweden. It is of great
importance that, for its next monitoring cycle, which started in
2013 and will last five years, ECRI will focus on hate speech and
hate crime, amongst other concerns, including those with sexual
orientation and gender identity as biased motives.
43. I believe that, although the Assembly is represented ECRI
as an observer, there is room for improving co-operation and exchange
of information. Even if ECRI meetings are held in camera and confidentiality is
an essential feature of the monitoring procedure, it would be advisable
to enhance the interaction between the Committee on Equality and
Non-Discrimination and ECRI, and ensure that ECRI’s monitoring visits
always include exchanges with the Parliamentary Assembly delegation
of the country concerned. The members of the committee should also
contribute to giving visibility to ECRI’s reports and inform the
committee on the follow-up which has been given.
4. Internet
44. Internet and social media have given racism, hatred
and intolerance a new dimension. As underlined in the final report
of the Conference “Tackling hate speech – Living together online”,
organised by the Council of Europe in 2012: according to Frank La
Rue, United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression,
Globalisation, “While in principle there is no distinction between
hate speech on- and offline, the Internet makes hate speech go faster
and further, facilitated by the Internet, makes possible ‘action
at a distance’ and the fact that the victim of hate speech is not
in the same physical space as the perpetrator, who may moreover
be anonymised, facilitates the dehumanisation of the former by the
latter”.
45. To these important considerations, it should be added that:
- it is almost impossible to have
control over what is put on the Internet: hence, the uncontrolled proliferation
of hate speech, intolerant comments and incitement to hatred and
violence;
- Internet has an outreach capacity which is unprecedented
compared to other forms of communication;
- Internet particularly appeals to young people, who are
the main users of social media.
46. The Council of Europe has kept up with these developments.
In 2000, ECRI adopted General Policy Recommendation No. 6 on “Combating
the dissemination of racist, xenophobic and antisemitic material
via the Internet”.
In 2003, the Additional Protocol
to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer
systems (ETS No. 189) was opened for signature.
It entered into force three years
later. To date, it has been ratified by 20 Council of Europe member States.
47. The Additional Protocol extends the scope of the Convention
on Cybercrime so as to cover also offences of racist or xenophobic
propaganda. It applies to the distribution via a computer system
of “any written material, any image or any other representation
of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination
or violence, against any individual or group of individuals, based
on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as
religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors”.
It
applies also to the diffusion of racist or xenophobic motivated
insults and to the denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of
genocide or crimes against humanity.
48. The Assembly has repeatedly called on Council of Europe member
States to sign and ratify this Protocol.
I give my support
to this call, also considering that international co-operation is
indispensable in order to have a meaningful impact on hate crimes
committed in cyberspace.
49. The Internet is not only a vehicle for hate speech and incitement
to violence. It can also be a very useful tool to promote human
rights and the respect of diversity and equality. This is why I
find the “No Hate Speech Movement” initiative extremely interesting
and I think that its potential should be further explored.
50. As explained by its secretariat,
the campaign is part of a larger
project called “Young People Combating Hate Speech Online”, aimed
at combating racism and discrimination online. It was launched on
22 March 2013 and will run until April 2014. So far, 34 national
campaigns have been established. The campaign has been designed
to ensure that it is by and with young people. Young people aged
between 13 and 30 will play a leading role by taking part in online
and offline activities. The goals of the campaign are to raise awareness
about hate speech and its risks for democracy, to mobilise, train
and network online youth activists for human rights and to develop
policy and tools for constructive responses to hate speech.
51. Further to an exchange of views with Ms Snežana Samardžić-Marković,
Director General of Democracy of the Council of Europe, in October
2013 the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination adopted a declaration
condemning racism and xenophobia and calling on national parliamentarians
to join the national campaigns of the “No Hate Speech Movement”.
52. I would like to recommend that the “No Hate Speech Movement”
not only continues after April 2014 but is also expanded so as to
become a large-scale Council of Europe campaign, involving all the
different parts of the Organisation. I also see a major role for
Assembly members, and in particular for the members of the Committee
on Equality and Non-Discrimination, who could be involved in campaigning
and awareness-raising activities in their countries. Thanks to their
dual mandate, Assembly members are in an ideal position to promote
legislative changes in the area of hate speech and promote the ratification
of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime.
53. I believe that racism, hatred and intolerance are such widespread
and pressing problems today in Europe that the Council of Europe
should devise a comprehensive strategy on this matter, an Action
Plan focusing on:
- prevention
(through awareness raising, education and training);
- legal advice on hate speech and hate crime legislation;
- promotion of Council of Europe instruments;
- monitoring (through ECRI but also other bodies and institutions,
including the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights).
5. The economic crisis
54. The economic crisis is increasing poverty, frustration
and social tensions.
55. At the same time, the crisis has a negative impact on the
effectiveness of anti-discrimination and equality measures. Horizontal
cuts on public spending have affected groups that are more dependent
than others on social assistance and benefits. Some of them are
the most affected by hate speech and hate crime. In addition, cuts
have affected equality bodies, which in several Council of Europe
member States have been merged with other structures (in Ireland,
for instance),
while the introduction of new anti-discrimination
measures has been postponed for budgetary reasons (this is the case
in the Netherlands and Spain).
56. In a nutshell, the economic crisis has amplified racism, hatred
and intolerance while reducing the capacity of its victims to seek
assistance and redress.
6. The failure of
migration and integration policies
57. In Europe, migration and integration remain unresolved
challenges. For years, especially in some Council of Europe member
States, they have been tackled as emergencies, in the worst cases
as an invasion or a threat to security. I believe that issues which
have been on the political agenda for decades cannot be an emergency
to be addressed with a string of successive patchy measures lasting
the duration of a legislature. They are crucial political issues
which must be addressed seriously, long-term, and taking into account
the broader picture. Without considering that only in this way can
it be possible to cope with real, unexpected emergencies, such as
the inflow resulting from the Arab Spring and the humanitarian tragedy
of people fleeing the conflict in Syria.
58. The failure of many governments to find a satisfactory political
response to migration and integration are amongst the main causes
for the upsurge in intolerance that Europe is witnessing.
59. At the same time, there is a problem of communication on the
part of politicians, on several levels:
- the demonisation of migration for political purposes,
as underlined by the Assembly in its Resolution 1889 (2012) on the image of refugees and migrants during electoral
campaigns;
- the lack of distinction between people who are in need
of international protection and those who migrate in search for
economic betterment – or merely for a chance of survival;
- a failure to make it clear that the respect for human
rights and dignity does not depend on the legal status of the people
concerned, be they citizens, foreigners, refugees or migrants without
a regular residence permit.
60. This kind of deliberate misrepresentation, or in any case
inaccurate communication, creates a fertile ground for racism, hatred
and intolerance, not only against migrants but also other groups.
7. The hate factor
in political discourse
61. In the current political landscape in Europe, a number
of political parties and groups put forward ideas which, if they
cannot be labelled as racist, nevertheless create a climate of intolerance
towards certain groups.
62. The case of Golden Dawn in Greece is particularly worrying
because this is a neo-Nazi party, whose members are engaged in violent
actions against people from minorities and which also has 18 representatives who
have been elected to sit in the national parliament following a
democratic vote.
63. In September 2013, the murder of the rapper Pavlos Fyssas
was the last in a string of violent attacks carried out by members
or sympathisers of Golden Dawn. This case made it into the international
media but many others in the past did not. The murder led to the
arrest of a number of members of Golden Dawn, including members
of parliament, on account of their belonging to a “criminal organisation”.
64. While these developments were unfolding, in October 2013,
the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination discussed the legal
and political viability of prohibiting political parties promoting
hatred and hostility against certain groups. Mr Thomas Markert,
Director and Secretary to the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), clarified that not all Council
of Europe member States allow for the option of banning.
Moreover, even in those countries
that allow it, prohibition is a measure of last resort, and has
been applied only in very exceptional circumstances. This does not
exclude the criminal responsibility of party members who use hate
speech or commit hate crimes.
65. I continued this discussion in a bilateral meeting with Mr
Nils Muižnieks, the Commissioner on Human Rights. He told me that
he considers the situation in Greece so serious that he felt it
appropriate to recommend that the law be reviewed so as to allow
for the prohibition of political parties, which is not the case
at the moment.
66. The situation in Greece has indeed reached an unprecedented
level of gravity as regards the upsurge of racism, hatred and intolerance,
and the election to parliament of a political party using symbols
inspired by Nazism and whose members talk about the superiority
and inferiority of people is extremely worrying.
However, in my view, it is important
to keep in mind a basic question: why did the electorate vote for
Golden Dawn? What is really important is addressing the root causes
which fuel racism, and challenging ideologies of this kind openly
and with resolve.
67. Politicians bear a special responsibility to remain vigilant
in the face of these phenomena and firmly reject racism, hatred
and violence. Unfortunately, all too often, politicians indulge
in populist and intolerant discourse, even when they are from mainstream
parties. This, of course, does not mean that they are not free to
hold different positions as regards migration and integration policies,
but they should avoid stigmatising people.
68. It has come as a shock to many of us that, since taking up
her functions in April 2013, the Italian Minister for Integration,
Ms Cécile Kyenge, has been the victim of insults and racist verbal
attacks, including by other politicians. This led 17 ministers of
European Union member States to react, by adopting a Declaration reiterating
the special responsibility of politicians to fight against racism.
I believe that the Assembly should support
this declaration. I also believe that the Committee on Equality
and Non-Discrimination should strengthen its work by establishing
a mandate of General Rapporteur against racism, hatred and intolerance. It
is of the utmost importance to have the committee speak with a single
voice when it comes to these matters, to have a focal point to act
as an interlocutor with Council of Europe and external bodies and
someone who follows the issue systematically.
69. As a body reflecting the composition of national parliaments,
the Assembly is directly concerned by the issue of the political
representation of parties which stigmatise certain groups. In January
2013, the credentials of two members of the Assembly – Ms Eleni
Zaroulia and Mr Tamás Gaudi Nagy – were challenged on account of
their membership respectively of Golden Dawn and Jobbik and of statements
they had made in their respective countries. Ms Fiamma Nirenstein,
who moved the challenge of the credentials, said: “I think that their
political parties are racist and anti-Semitic, and this clashes
with Article 3 of our Statute, according to which every member of
the Council of Europe must accept the principle of the rule of law
and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human
rights and fundamental freedom. Looking at the record, whether personal
or political, of these two members of our Council of Europe, we
see that what they say is not compatible with that.”
70. In addition, Ms Zaroulia and Mr Gaudi Nagy’s membership in
committees was also contested.
71. The Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional
Affairs was given the task of examining the challenge of the credentials.
The committee clarified that according to the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure,
the credentials of individual members can be challenged only on
procedural grounds. As all the procedures had been respected in
the two cases, the credentials should be ratified. As regards membership of
committees, Mr Gaudi Nagy’s membership was confirmed by the Hungarian
delegation and then approved by the Assembly, while Ms Zaroulia’s
membership was withdrawn by the Greek delegation.
72. I think that what happened on this occasion should invite
the Assembly to think about whether the safeguards it has in place
against racism and intolerance are sufficient. I have already said
that I am not in favour of the prohibition of political parties.
In the same way, I do not think that the Assembly should introduce a
filter against some political parties: as long as they are represented
in national parliaments, they should be also represented in the
Assembly, consistent with Rule 6.2.
a of
the Rules of Procedure. However, it should be possible to sanction
the non-respect of the commitment undertaken in the written declaration
laid down in Rule 6.2.
b, which
every member must sign:
“I, the
undersigned ... hereby affirm and state that I will subscribe to
the aims and basic principles of the Council of Europe, mentioned
in the Preamble, in Article 1.a and
in Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.”
73. I would like to invite the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs to look into this issue and
invite the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination to take
part in an exchange of views.
8. Conclusions
74. Racism, hatred and intolerance run counter to Council
of Europe values and deny the equality of human beings. They are
a serious threat to democracy and human rights, irrespective of
the groups they target. And yet, despite their heinous character,
they are so widespread in today’s Europe that they have become banal, an
everyday occurrence.
75. Introducing a comprehensive legal framework to tackle racism,
hatred and intolerance is essential, provided that a greater effort
is made to ensure its effective implementation, including by addressing
under-reporting, training law-enforcement officials and combating
impunity.
76. Laws, however, are only part of the solution. A comprehensive
strategy to tackle racism, hatred and intolerance should put emphasis
on prevention, awareness-raising and human rights education. It
should rely on the Internet and social media as precious allies
to reach out to a wider public.
77. Politicians should lead the efforts to eliminate racism, hatred
and intolerance with resolve and by their example, challenging,
rejecting and condemning expressions of hatred, from whatever quarters
they come. They should also make sure that the economic crisis does
not deprive people from those groups that are more vulnerable to
intolerance of their chance to seek assistance and obtain redress.
Likewise, politicians should devise viable migration and integration
policies and communicate responsibly on them.
78. I do not see a role for the Council of Europe in tackling
racism, hatred and intolerance; I see a statutory mission. It is
necessary for the Council of Europe to take up a leadership role
in this area, and contribute to help its member States in “realising
the ideals and principles which are their common heritage”.