1. Introduction
1. Albania joined the Council of Europe on 29 June 1995.
Upon its accession, Albania undertook to honour the obligations
incumbent on all member States under Article 3 of the Statue of
the Council of Europe with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule
of law and human rights. In addition, it undertook to honour a number
of specific commitments listed in
Opinion 189 (1995) on the application by Albania for membership of the
Council of Europe, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 June
1995.
2. In conformity with the monitoring procedure, as established
in
Resolution 1115 (1997), the Assembly has regularly assessed Albania’s progress
with regard to its honouring of obligations and commitments. The previous
report on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania
was discussed by the Assembly on
27 January 2007 and led to the adoption of
Resolution 1538 (2007). A subsequent report on the honouring of obligations
and commitments by Albania was foreseen to be debated at the Assembly’s
January 2010 part-session. For that purpose, a preliminary draft
report was discussed in the Monitoring Committee and the comments
of the Albania authorities on this text were examined by it. However,
as a result of the political crisis that ensued after the June 2009
elections, and specifically the boycott of the parliament by the
opposition – which paralysed major reforms and hampered the overall
functioning of the parliament –, this report was replaced by a report
on the functioning of democratic institutions in Albania.
This report was debated in the Assembly
on 28 January 2010 and resulted in the adoption of
Resolution 1709 (2010). This was followed by a visit of the Presidential Committee
and co-rapporteurs to Albania, on 22 and 23 February 2010, with
the objective of seeking a solution to the ongoing political crisis
with the parties concerned.
3. The political crisis was compounded by a new political standoff
that resulted from the controversy surrounding the outcome of the
mayoral elections in Tirana on 8 May 2011. It was finally overcome
in September 2011, when the Socialist Party (SP) ended its
de facto boycott of the work of
the parliament after coming to an agreement with the ruling Democratic
Party (DP). However, the political environment remained polarised
and acrimonious. The political situation changed drastically after
the parliamentary elections which resulted in a change of power
in Albania.
We
therefore consider this an opportune moment to take stock of Albania’s
progress in honouring its obligations and accession commitments
to the Council of Europe.
4. Since the joint mission with the Presidential Committee after
the 2009 elections, the co-rapporteurs made five fact-finding visits
to the country and participated
in the Assembly’s election observation and pre-electoral missions
for the 2013 parliamentary elections. The information notes
produced
on the basis of these fact-finding visits were declassified by the
committee.
5. On 24 January 2011, Mr Tomas Jirsa (Czech Republic, EDG) was
appointed as co-rapporteur to replace Mr David Wilshire (United
Kingdom, EDG). On 30 May 2011, Mr Grigore Petrenco replaced Mr Jaakko
Laakso as co-rapporteur. Mr Jirsa was subsequently replaced by Mr
Jonathan Evans (United Kingdom, EDG) on 23 January 2013.
2. Main
political developments
2.1. Aftermath of the
2009 parliamentary elections
6. As mentioned in the last report of the committee
to the Assembly (
Doc.
12113), parliamentary elections of June 2009 resulted in a
political standoff between the two main political parties in Albania,
the Democratic Party, until recently led by former Prime Minister
Sali Berisha, and the Socialist Party, led by Mr Edi Rama, at that
time Mayor of Tirana. This standoff threw the country into a deep
political crisis. The overt animosity existing between Mr Berisha
and Mr Rama strongly influenced inter-party relationships and strategies
and hampered efforts by the international community to overcome
the political crisis.
7. The parliamentary elections in 2009 were conducted on the
basis of a new Electoral Code that was drafted and adopted on the
basis of a consensus between the main political parties. It introduced
a variant of a regional proportional election system. These elections
were won by the Democratic Party (which gained 70 of the 140 parliamentary
seats. The Socialist Party won 66 seats and the Socialist Movement
for Integration (SMI) of former Prime Minister Ilir Meta won the
remaining four seats. A ruling coalition was formed between the
DP and SMI and Mr Berisha was appointed, for a second time, Prime
Minister of Albania.
8. Alleging that fraud had taken place in a number of districts,
the SP appealed against the results of the 2009 parliamentary elections
to the Central Election Commission (CEC), and later to the Electoral
College.
In both
instances, the appeals of the SP were dismissed. In protest against
the outcome of the elections, the SP decided to boycott the work
of the parliament, as well as of a number of State institutions.
Given that the governing majority lacked the two-thirds majority
to implement constitutional changes, this boycott negatively affected
the implementation of a number of important reforms needed to obtain
candidate status with the European Union, which is the professed
political priority for all parties.
9. The SP subsequently announced that it would return to the
parliament only if a number of conditions were met. The most important
were the establishment of a special inquiry committee into the alleged
election shortcomings and the opening of the ballot boxes in order
to establish proof of possible electoral fraud. In subsequent meetings
with the rapporteurs at that time, the SP leadership clarified that,
while they formally accepted the results of the elections, they
wished to open the ballot boxes in order to investigate, and collect evidence
of, the electoral fraud they alleged had taken place. While the
authorities were willing to establish a special inquiry commission,
they resolutely refused, with the backing of the courts, to allow
the re-opening of the ballot boxes on the grounds that the final
results had been announced in line with the existing legislation and
had been certified by the courts. The election process had therefore
legally ended and consequently the boxes could not legally be opened
again.
10. Most observers are of the opinion that internal politics and
power relations inside the SP also played a significant role in
the 2009 stand-off. According to the SP by-laws, introduced by Mr
Rama, a party leader must resign if the party loses an election
under his or her leadership. However, on the proposal of Mr Rama,
the SP adopted a resolution in which it stated that the party had
not lost the election, but that instead the election had been stolen
from it. As a consequence, Mr Rama was not obliged to give up his
post as party leader. It should be noted that this decision, as
well as the boycott strategy, was not unanimously supported among
the party membership. This was highlighted by the decision of a
number of SP MPs to enter the parliament despite their party’s boycott
of its work.
11. In mid-2010, the SP ended its formal boycott of the parliament
and replaced it by a “conditional relation with the parliament”.
This decision was partly guided by the wish not to lose its parliamentary
mandates, which it would have done if its members had not been sworn
in within six months after the new parliament was inaugurated. While
the SP formally returned to the parliament, its de facto boycott of the work of
the parliament continued until 5 September 2011, when an agreement
was reached between the SP and the DP on the direction of the reforms
crucial for the country, including electoral reform and reform of
the working methods of the parliament.
2.2. Local elections
12. On 8 May 2011, the elections of local councils and
mayors took place in Albania. Given the fact that Mr Rama was running
for re-election as Mayor of Tirana, these elections were seen by
many as a referendum on the SP’s political strategy of boycotting
the work of the parliament.
13. The 2011 local elections in Albania were observed by international
observers from,
inter alia,
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) and the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. The
Congress and the OSCE/ODIHR concluded that overall these elections,
despite the polarised and antagonistic political environment, were
conducted in a democratic manner, although a number of procedural
shortcomings were noted.
14. While many had hoped that the local elections would calm the
political environment in Albania, regrettably they were a source
of renewed tension and antagonism between the DP and the SP. When
the preliminary results were announced, the incumbent Mayor of Tirana,
Mr Rama of the SP, appeared to have won the elections with a 10
vote difference over his rival Mr Basha of the DP. However, several
complaints were filed with the Central Election Commission from
a number of polling stations in Tirana.
15. For each different election
(mayor,
city council, head of commune), ballots were supposed to be placed in
separate ballot boxes. The complaints that were filed alleged that
a considerable number of votes were declared invalid simply because
they had been “miscast” in the wrong ballot box. As a result, in
one district the district election commission had not being able
to agree on the results. In its decision on these complaints, the CEC
ruled that miscast, but otherwise valid ballots, should be considered
as valid votes. The CEC therefore ordered these votes to be counted
in the polling stations where complaints had been filed. After these
votes were counted, the winner of the elections turned out to be
Mr Basha, with 80 votes more than Mr Rama.
16. The CEC’s decisions were strongly disputed, especially given
the fact that the CEC was divided along party lines on this issue.
The SP appealed against the outcome of the results with the Electoral
College. The latter declared that miscast, but otherwise valid ballots
should indeed be considered as a valid vote and ordered the CEC
to open all the ballot boxes in Tirana – and not only in those polling
stations where complaints were filed – in order to count all miscast
votes. On 23 June 2011, Mr Basha was officially declared the winner
of the 2011 mayoral election for Tirana with a difference of 93
votes over his rival, incumbent mayor Rama. Appeals by the SP against
this outcome were rejected by the Electoral College and, on 1 August
2011, Mr Basha was installed as the new Mayor of Tirana.
17. Although the outcome of these elections increased the tensions
between the DP and the SP, they were generally accepted by the Albanian
population and the tensions soon subsided with the agreement between the
SP and the DP, which resulted in the SP fully returning to the work
of the parliament.
2.3. Presidential election
18. Albania holds indirect elections for the President,
who is elected by the parliament. The previous President of Albania,
Mr Bamir Topi, had been a candidate of the DP. However, the relations
between Mr Topi and Mr Berisha had become increasingly tense and
acrimonious and the DP therefore announced that it would not support
the candidature of Mr Topi for a second term. Elections for the
new President took place in the parliament on 30 May and 4, 8 and
11 June 2012. In order to be elected, a presidential candidate needs
a three-fifths majority in the first three rounds of voting. If,
after these three rounds, no candidate has been elected, a simple
majority is sufficient from the 4th round onwards. No candidate
received the required three-fifths majority in the first three rounds,
as the SP was boycotting the vote. Subsequently, Mr Bujar Nishani,
who was proposed by the DP, was elected, by simple majority, President
of Albania with 73 out of 76 votes in the 4th round of voting.
2.4. Protests of 21
January 2011
19. On 21 January 2011, during a protest march organised
by the opposition in front of the parliament and Prime Minister’s
Office that had turned violent, four demonstrators were shot dead
by security officers guarding the Office of the Prime Minister.
This raised questions with regard to the possible use of disproportionate
force by police officers.
Questions
were also raised about the organisers’ apparent inability to maintain
control over the participants in the demonstration. As a result,
allegations were made by both sides of malicious intent by the other.
In the tense political climate in Albania, the investigation into
these events was heavily politicised. Contributing to this was the
fact that the then Minister of the Interior, Mr Basha, was the DP
candidate in, and ultimate winner of, the elections for the Mayor
of Tirana.
20. The politicisation of the investigations negatively affected
the institutional independence of the judiciary and prosecution.
The Prosecutor General was accused of being partisan when she initiated
a criminal investigation into the January events and the Prime Minister
called on the police not to co-operate with her investigation. Equally
worrisome, evidence from CCTV cameras was illegally deleted by the
security detail of Prime Minister Berisha. A special parliamentary
committee to investigate these events was not able to come to any
conclusion due to the diametrically opposed views of the SP and
DP factions on these issues. The politicisation of the investigation
was condemned by the international community, which has asked all
parties to refrain from undermining the independence of the judiciary
and law-enforcement bodies.
21. Following her investigation into the events, the Prosecutor
General initiated criminal proceedings against a member of the Republican
Guard who allegedly shot the protesters, as well as against his
commanding officer. In addition, criminal charges were filed against
a member of the Republican Guard for allegedly wiping the hard disk
containing the video recordings of the 21 January events from the
CCTV cameras outside the Prime Minister’s Office. On 17 July 2012,
the Tirana District Court acquitted this policeman, who was accused of
hiding evidence and obstructing justice. On 7 February 2013, the
Tirana District Court acquitted the other two policemen from any
responsibility or wrongdoing in the death of the four demonstrators
on 21 January 2011. This decision by the Tirana District Court was
widely condemned in Albanian society, as well as by some international
actors, including by the Ambassador of the United States in Tirana.
The decision of the Tirana District Court was appealed by the Office
of the General Prosecutor. In September 2013, the Tirana Court of Appeals
annulled the acquittal and sentenced two of the three defendants
to prison sentences of respectively one and three years for manslaughter.
2.5. European Union
candidate status
22. On 28 April 2009, Albania applied for membership
of the European Union. Following a request by the European Council,
the European Commission prepared an opinion on Albania’s request
for membership that was submitted to the European Council in November
2010 and endorsed by the latter in December 2010. In this memorandum,
the Commission concluded that considerable efforts were needed by
the Albania authorities before candidate status could be considered,
especially in the fields of stability of institutions, democratic
governance and the rule of law. The Commission therefore recommended
opening accession negotiations with Albania only after Albania demonstrated
that it complied with the Copenhagen political criteria for European
Union membership in relation to the functioning of democratic institutions,
the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. For that
purpose, 12 priorities were formulated which needed to be implemented
by Albania before candidate status could be conferred.
23. On 8 November 2010, the European Council adopted a proposal
to introduce a visa-free regime for holders of Albanian passports.
This decision was implemented on 16 December 2010.
24. As a result of the ongoing political crisis, the government
lacked the necessary two-thirds majority to adopt crucial legislation
required to implement the 12 priorities set by the European Union.
Moreover, the ongoing political stand-off clearly showed that the
Albanian Parliament was not functioning “on the basis of a constructive
and sustained political dialogue among all political parties”, which
was one of the 12 requirements stipulated by the European Commission.
Therefore, not surprisingly, on 12 October 2011, the European Council,
on recommendation of the European Commission, declined to confer
candidate status on Albania and open accession negotiations.
25. Following the return to the parliament of the Socialist Party,
a number of reforms and laws were adopted that were necessary to
implement the 12 European Union priorities. However, questions remained
with regard to the functioning of democratic institutions and a
number of key reforms had not been implemented by the end of 2012.
On 10 October 2012, the European Commission, recognising the considerable
progress made by Albania with regard to implementing the key reforms
identified by the Commission, decided that candidate status could
be conferred as soon as Albania had adopted the Law on Civil Service,
the Law on the High Court, as well as the new rules of procedure
of the parliament. In addition, the Commission stated that Albania
needed to organise the 2013 parliamentary elections fully in line
with international standards before accession negotiations could
start.
26. On 31 May 2013, the Albanian Parliament, in an extraordinary
session, passed the Law on Civil Service, the Law on the High Court,
as well as the new rules of procedure of the parliament in a consorted
effort by the ruling majority and opposition. Following the adoption
of these laws, the organisation of genuinely democratic elections
in line with international standards was the last remaining condition
of the European Commission that the country needed to fulfil to
be granted candidate status.
27. On 16 October 2013, the European Commission adopted its 2013
progress report on Albania. In this progress report, the Commission
noted that, with the successful conduct of the parliamentary elections
on 23 June 2013, Albania had met the priorities set by the European
Commission in its 2012 decision and therefore recommended granting
candidate status to Albania. However, the Commission also emphasised
that additional steps and sustained efforts were needed to ensure
the independence and accountability of the judiciary, to ensure
effective investigations and prosecution of cases of corruption
at all levels and to maintain an inclusive dialogue between the
ruling majority and the opposition. The Commission therefore recommended opening
accession negotiations only after Albania had implemented the following
five priorities. Albania should:
- continue
to implement public administration reform with a view to enhancing
professionalism and depoliticisation of public administration;
- take further action to reinforce the independence, efficiency
and accountability of judicial institutions;
- make further determined efforts in the fight against corruption,
including towards establishing a solid track record of proactive
investigations, prosecutions and convictions;
- make further determined efforts in the fight against organised
crime, including towards establishing a solid track record of proactive
investigations, prosecutions and convictions;
- take effective measures to reinforce the protection of
human rights, including of Roma, and anti-discrimination policies,
as well as implement property rights.
28. Despite these preconditions, outlined in the recommendations
of the European Commission, several European Union member States
announced that they had doubts as to whether Albania would be ready
to meet the requirements of a candidate country. In addition, it
was felt that more time should be given to the newly elected government
to demonstrate that they had the capacity and commensurate political
will to implement the reforms required to start accession negotiations,
especially with regard to the fight against corruption and organised
crime and the independence of the judiciary. On 17 December 2013,
the European Council therefore decided to postpone its decision
on granting candidate status to Albania until June 2014, pending
a new report by the European Commission on the progress made by
the authorities in,
inter alia,
the implementation of anti-corruption and judicial reform strategies
and the relevant legislation that was adopted to this end. On 4
June 2014, the European Commission published its report to the European
Council and European Parliament on Albania’s progress in the fight
against corruption and organised crime and in judicial reform.
In
this report, the Commission confirms its previous recommendation
of granting candidate status to Albania, and urges Albania to focus
on implementing legislation to combat corruption, including deep
judicial reform and to increase inter-agency and international co-operation
with a view to combating organised crime and to enhancing the efficiency
of its proactive investigations. In addition, the Commission emphasised
that the authorities should “rigorously pursue” judicial reform,
especially with a view to ensuring the independence and accountability
of the judiciary.
29. We fully support the principle of Albania’s membership of
the European Union and consider that the implementation of the reforms
needed for European Union membership – including those underscored
by the European Commission in the above-mentioned five priorities
– will also result in the honouring of all the remaining accession
commitments and membership obligations. We understand the disappointment
of the authorities with the postponement of a decision on candidate
status by the European Council in December 2013. Both the authorities
and opposition have belatedly made great efforts to meet the conditions
for candidate status set by the European Commission, which should
be welcomed and acknowledged. However, in this context, we also
must emphasise our general concern that, while Albania has passed
many laws and strategies to address issues regarding its obligations
concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law, implementation
of the laws continues to be weak or lacking. We therefore urge the
authorities to pay special attention to the prompt and comprehensive
implementation of the strategies and legal reform packages that have
already been adopted.
2.6. 2013 parliamentary
elections
30. The parliamentary elections which took place in Albania
on 23 June 2013 were crucial for the country, also as their democratic
conduct, in line with international standards, was a main criteria
for European Union candidate status. Following an agreement on the
political priorities of the country between the DP and SP, a working
group on electoral reform was established by the parliament. This
working group proposed a series of amendments to the electoral code
that were adopted by the parliament on 19 July 2012. These amendments addressed
such issues as voter and candidate registration, campaign funding,
complaints and appeals procedures, composition of, and appointment
procedures for, the Central Election Commission and lower level election
commissions, as well as measures to strengthen the independence
of the Electoral College.
31. According to the Albanian Electoral Code, the election commissions
are composed on the basis of proposals by political parties on the
principle of a balance between the opposition and the ruling majority.
At the same time, the Electoral Code also specifies that the members
of the election commissions are institutionally independent and
impartial and should act accordingly.
32. Up until a few months before polling day, the governing coalition
of the DP and SMI was considered very stable, with the SMI faction
loyally supporting its senior coalition partner, the DP, on all
important votes in the parliament. However, on 1 April 2013, the
SMI and the SP announced that they would form an election coalition for
the next parliamentary elections. On 3 April, the SMI left the ruling
coalition and formed, together with the SP, the coalition “Alliance
for a European Albania”. In addition to the SP and SMI, 35 smaller
parties joined this Alliance.
33. This switch of allegiance of the SMI took place after the
formation of the election commissions in which the SMI had obtained
places as part of the quota reserved for the ruling coalition. Therefore,
as a result of the switch, the SMI–SP-led opposition alliance obtained
de facto control
over
the election administration, including the Central Election Commission.
This situation was considered unacceptable to the DP, which used, controversially
,
its parliamentary majority to remove the SMI-nominated member from
the CEC and appoint a new member nominated by another party in the
ruling coalition. In response, the CEC members nominated by the
opposition parties resigned from their posts. The opposition parties
subsequently refused to nominate any replacements for them. As a
result, the CEC functioned with only four members during the elections,
which raised questions with regard to the legality of a number of
its decisions. It is clear that the replacement of a CEC member
by the parliament and subsequent resignation and non-replacement
of the opposition-nominated members is questionable from the point
of view of the Election Code and contradicts and severely undermines the
notion of an impartial and institutionally independent election
administration.
34. The parliamentary elections were observed by an ad hoc committee
of the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly in the framework of
the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) that also
included the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR and
a delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The two co-rapporteurs
of the Monitoring Committee in respect of Albania were ex officio members of the ad hoc committee.
35. The IEOM concluded that the elections had generally been conducted
in line with international standards and that “the elections were
competitive with active citizen participation throughout the campaign
and genuine respect for fundamental freedoms”.
However,
the ad hoc committee of the Assembly, as well as the IEOM, also
stressed that the antagonism and mistrust between the two main parties
had tainted the electoral environment and negatively affected administration
of the elections.
36. On 26 June 2013, with 98% of the votes counted, Prime Minister
Berisha conceded the defeat of his coalition “Alliance for Employment,
Prosperity and Integration” to Mr Rama’s SP/SMI-led coalition, “the
Alliance for a European Albania”. The final results were announced
by the CEC on 6 August 2012. The Alliance for a European Albania
obtained 57.6% of the vote and received 83 seats in the new parliament.
The Alliance for Employment, Prosperity and Integration obtained
39.5% of the vote and received 57 seats in the new parliament. It
is important to note that of the 83 seats of the Alliance for a
European Albania, 16 were won by the SMI, which confirms its role
as kingmaker in these elections, as was the case during the 2009
elections.
37. On 10 September 2013, at the opening session of the new parliament,
Prime Minister Berisha formally tendered the resignation of his
Cabinet to President Nishani, who appointed Mr Rama as the new Prime Minister
on proposal of the SP and allied parties. Mr Ilir Meta, leader of
the SMI, was elected Speaker of the Parliament.
38. After the elections, a member of the opposition switched allegiance
and joined the ruling coalition. This gave the ruling majority the
84 seats necessary to pass legislation that needs a three-fifths
qualified majority without the consent of the opposition. This can
be important for overcoming a possible blockage of legislation and
reforms but should not be allowed to undermine dialogue and deliberation
between the opposition and ruling majority about the governance
of the country. We therefore call on the ruling majority to seek
consensus about the reforms needed whenever possible and not to
use their qualified majority to unnecessarily bypass the opposition.
39. Following the coming into power of the new government, considerable
personnel changes took place in the civil service including in the
police service, where in addition to the National Head of the Police
and his Deputy, also the directors and deputy directors of all 12
police districts were replaced. Similar reports were received about
prison and customs staff. The profound personnel changes in prison
staff raised concerns with, inter alia,
the OSCE mission in Tirana, regarding the continuity of their prison
reform programme and especially the training programmes for prison
staff organised in that framework. These changes underscore the politicisation
of the civil service, at all levels, by the main parties when they
are in power. This, in turn, undermines public trust in the impartiality
of the civil service and government institutions, which is an issue
of continuing concern.
3. Democratic institutions
3.1. Electoral reform
40. The conduct of elections has continued to be a major
point of contention between the main political parties. A new Election
Code, which introduced a new regional proportional voting system,
was adopted in December 2008, based on a consensus between the DP
and SP. The provisions in the code regarding the election system
and election administration are widely considered to be favourable
to the two larger parties to the detriment of smaller parties and
new entrants in the political arena.
41. In its opinion on the 2008 Electoral Code,
the
European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) concluded that it formed “a thorough
foundation for the conduct of democratic elections” if implemented
fully, properly and in good faith by all stakeholders. However,
the Venice Commission also noted that the Code had gaps, ambiguities
and provisions that needed to be addressed in order to ensure that it
fully meets international standards. To that end, we would like
to add that the ambiguities and gaps open a space for possible abuse
and contention, especially in the polarised political climate in
Albania. This vulnerability was confirmed during the 2011 local
elections.
42. The 2008 Election Code gives the largest opposition and the
largest governing party – in essence, given the political environment
of Albania, the DP and the SP – considerable responsibilities at
every step of the electoral process. The Venice Commission noted
that this resulted in an overly detailed and complex Code that “can
result in challenges in administering elections, as well as possible
obstruction of the electoral process by representatives of the two
largest parties”.
43. Following the contested local elections, especially in Tirana,
and the ensuing political stand-off, the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, Mr Thorbjørn Jagland, requested, on 24 August
2011, the opinion of the Venice Commissions on possible improvements
to the electoral legislation and electoral practice in the light
of the experiences of the 2009 parliamentary and 2011 local elections.
44. In its joint opinion with the OSCE/ODIHR,
adopted
on 16 and 17 December 2011, the Venice Commission recalled its previous
opinion on the law, which stated that the legal framework provided
a sound basis for democratic elections if implemented fully and
in good faith. However, it also noted several inconsistencies and
ambiguities that were left unaddressed and that could allow possible
misuse or obstruction by one of the two main parties if they so
wished. In that context, the Venice Commission noted that the election administration,
at all levels, is appointed on the basis of proposals of the largest
party in opposition and largest party in the ruling majority. While
this balance was meant to foster trust in the election administration,
in reality the administration remains divided among party lines,
which hinders the effective and impartial conduct of the elections.
Moreover, it also allows one of the two main parties to effectively
obstruct the work of the CEC – or the underlying election commissions
– by withdrawing from the election administration or boycotting
its decision-making process. This was exactly what happened during
the June 2013 parliamentary elections.
45. The 2008 Election Code introduced the establishment of special
centralised vote-counting centres, one in each election administration
zone.
The
use of this system has created long delays in counting votes. This potentially
allows for political influence over the counting process and politicised
decision-making by the election administration. This, in turn, negatively
affects the overall legitimacy of the outcome of the elections in the
eyes of the public.
46. Following the return of the SP to the parliament, a special
ad hoc parliamentary working group for electoral reform was set
up to prepare amendments to the election code with a view to addressing
the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, as well as
other shortcomings noted during the previous elections. In addition,
it drafted amendments to the criminal code, establishing a number
of election-related crimes. The amendments formulated by this working
group were unanimously adopted by the parliament. The amendments
to the electoral code addressed inter
alia the following issues: the selection process for
members of election commissions; they abolished the right of parties
to recall their members on the election commissions after they have
been appointed; they improved the procedure for the verification
of the voter lists; they improved the requirements for equal media
access for all parties; they clarified some issues with regard to
electoral complaints; and they simplified candidate registration.
These amendments are generally seen as an improvement of the electoral
legislation. However, a number of important recommendations of the
Venice Commission on crucial aspects such as independent candidate
rights, campaign financing, the electoral complaints process and
possible abuse of administrative resources, were left unaddressed.
47. While we welcome the improvements in the Electoral Code, it
should be emphasised that previous versions of the Election Code
were considered to be an adequate – or even a sound basis – for
the conduct of genuinely democratic elections in Albania, provided
the Election Code was implemented in its entirety, in good faith
and not only in letter, but also in spirit. Regrettably, the experience
of previous elections has shown that it was lack of political will
among the main political stakeholders to implement the Electoral
Code in good faith and to refrain from politicising the electoral
process that caused the shortcomings noted during the elections. Changes
to the Election Code alone are not sufficient to resolve the recurrent
shortcomings and to ensure the conduct of democratic elections in
line with international standards. Equally important are a change
in attitude and the practises of the main political stakeholders.
Such political will of all political stakeholders is essential for
the consolidation of a robust and genuinely democratic electoral
process in Albania.
48. We call on the Albanian Parliament to seek consensus between
all parties on further amendments to the Election Code that will
address the remaining recommendations of the Venice Commission and
reduce the vulnerability of the election administration and electoral
process from politicisation and possible obstruction by political
stakeholders. Similarly, we call on all political actors to show
the commensurate political will to implement an impartial and democratic
election process and to refrain from any actions that unnecessarily politicise
the conduct of the elections and ultimately undermine public trust
in the election process.
49. The Parliament of Albania had decided to implement, during
the 2013 parliamentary elections, two pilot projects to use new
technologies to increase the efficiency of, and public trust in,
the electoral process. One of the pilot projects, to take place
in Tirana, was to test electronic voter registration. The second
pilot project, to take place in Fier, was to test electronic vote
counting. Tirana and Fier are the two largest election districts
in Albania. However, preparations for these projects and their successful
testing could not be concluded within the legal deadlines. In addition,
a number of political decisions negatively affected the technical
implementation of these projects. On 17 and 18 June 2013, close
to the election date, the CEC therefore decided to cancel the implementation
of the pilot projects. While we welcome any mechanism to increase
the trust of voters in the electoral system and especially to speed
up the vote count, we call on the authorities to ensure that such technologies
are well tested and independently certified long before elections
take place. Moreover, even if these pilot projects are successfully
tested, due consideration should be given to the manner in which
they are deployed in the rest of the country, given the uneven technical
infrastructure in the different regions. Failure to do so could
undermine public trust in the electoral process as such.
3.2. Parliamentary reform
50. In the polarised political environment a “winner
takes all” climate often prevails within the parliament, which fails
to provide a proper place and role for the opposition in its work
and in the governance of the country and which prevents a constructive
dialogue between all the different political forces in the country.
The challenges to the proper functioning of the work of the parliament
were underscored when the SP boycotted the parliament after the
2009 elections. Therefore, in its opinion on Albania’s request for
membership of the European Union, the European Commission decided
that the “proper functioning of the parliament on the basis of a
constructive and sustained political dialogue among all political
parties”
was one of the
key priorities that Albania needed to fulfil before it could be
granted candidate status. This was underlined again in the Communication
of the European Commission
to the European
Parliament and European Council, which stated that Albania should
only be granted candidate status after adoption of new rules of
procedure of the parliament.
51. Following the return of the SP to the parliament, an ad hoc
Committee for Parliamentary Reform was established and tasked with
the drafting of a new set of rules of procedure for the Albanian
Parliament. The original rules of procedure of the Albanian Parliament,
drafted in co-operation with our Assembly, had been adopted by consensus
among all parties. However, subsequent amendments to the rules of
procedure were not consensual. It was therefore agreed between the
main parties to adopt an entirely new set of rules of procedure
that would have the consent of the two main political parties. The
rules of procedure of the European Parliament have reportedly been
the basis for the new rules of procedure of the Albanian Parliament.
52. The ad hoc committee agreed unanimously on most aspects of
the rules of procedure. However, two issues proved to be a stumbling
block. The first issue, requested by the SP, was the right of the
leader of the parliamentary opposition to speak directly, and with
equal time, after the Prime Minister’s weekly address to the parliament.
The second issue of contention was the possibility to have a secret
vote on the confirmation of presidential decrees. This is less benign
than it would seem at first sight. The Constitution gives the President the
prerogative of proposing candidates for high State offices, such
as for the High Council of Justice and the Head of the Secret Service.
His proposals to the parliament take the form of a decree. Appointments
of candidates proposed by the President would therefore be decided
by nominal vote instead of by secret vote as otherwise is the case
for appointments. The SP objected to this departure from normal
procedure and argued that this would give the parties undue control
over the individual votes of their MPs in relation to appointments.
53. The differences of opinion of the SP and the DP on these issues
precluded any agreement on the new rules of procedure until the
very last moment. On 31 May 2013, in an extraordinary session, the
Parliament of Albania adopted the rules of procedure of the parliament,
jointly with the other two remaining laws necessary to obtain European
Union candidate status. According to the new rules of procedure,
decrees containing nominations will only be voted upon by nominal
vote if the parliament agrees with that. If not, these will be adopted
by secret voting, either electronically or by ballot. Secret voting
by ballot will take place if requested in writing by at least 25%
of the MPs. According to the new rules of procedure, the speaking
time of individual ministers will count towards the total speaking
time of their political group. There are no restrictions on the speaking
time of the Prime Minister, who can speak whenever and for as long
as he wants. Although not foreseen in the rules of procedure, former
Prime Minister Berisha is given the same speaking prerogatives as the
Prime Minister. While this informal arrangement has removed a potential
obstacle to co-operation between the ruling majority and the government,
it depends on the benevolence of the ruling majority. We would recommend
that a proper institutional arrangement is agreed upon between the
opposition and the ruling majority that does not depend on either
the benevolence of the ruling majority or the personality of the
former Prime Minister.
54. We welcome the adoption of the new rules of procedure, but
wish to emphasise that constructive co-operation between the majority
and opposition, based on a mutual respect for their proper constitutional
role and place in a democratic system, cannot be legislated via
the rules of procedure alone. This also needs a change of attitude
and the fostering of a culture of co-operation and democratic values.
We express the hope that both the opposition and the ruling majority
will strive to create such a democratic culture and will work constructively
together, with due respect for each other’s proper role, in furthering
the democratic development and European integration of the country.
In this respect, we regret that the charged rhetoric that also characterised
the pre-electoral period seems to be continuing unabated.
3.3. Media pluralism
55. Overall, Albania has a diverse and pluralist media
environment.
However,
this environment is heavily politicised, with most, if not all,
media outlets serving and promoting the political interest of their
owners, including in their editorial policies. This trend of politicisation
of media outlets has steadily increased over recent years and has
raised questions with regard to the independence of the media.
In this respect, a number of interlocutors
expressed their concern that, in recent years, most public advertising
is channelled to media seen as supportive of the government, increasing
the pressure on journalist and editorial staff by the owners of media
outlets to avoid criticising the ruling majority.
56. The Albanian public broadcaster is considered to be under
the
de facto control of the
government, which reportedly regularly interferes in the management
of the public broadcaster.
57. A key aspect influencing the media environment is the switch
from analogue to digital broadcasting. This switchover is currently
being implemented on the basis of the national strategy for the
digital switchover that was adopted on 2 May 2012. A key aspect
of this strategy was the adoption of a new broadcasting law: the Law
on Media Services. The adoption of this law was delayed until early
September as a result of disagreements between the DP and the SP.
58. The main point of contention between the ruling majority and
the opposition with regard to the Law on Media Services was the
composition formula for the National Council of Radio and Television
(NCRT) (the licensing authority) and Albanian Radio and Television
Council (which oversees the public broadcaster). Regrettably, the
new media law does not contain adequate provisions for a proper
selection procedure for these two bodies that would ensure their
independence.
59. The adoption of a new composition formula for the NCRT is
essential for fostering an independent and pluralist media environment.
Currently, the NCRT is heavily politicised and seen as an instrument
for the authorities to exert control over the public broadcaster
and media environment in general. We expect the political forces
in Albania to now strive to reach consensus about the actual composition
of the NCRT that will guarantee its functioning independently of
the authorities and political forces and other interests. Furthermore, we
also urge them to reach a consensus on additional steps to be taken
with a view to strengthening the independence of the public broadcaster,
including – if need be – by further amendments to the broadcasting laws.
60. After coming into power, the ruling majority proposed a series
of amendments to the Law on media services. These amendments foresee, inter alia, a reshuffle of the NCRT.
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, in January 2014,
offered to provide the authorities with a legal analysis of these amendments.
However, these amendments were later withdrawn by their initiator.
The authorities informed us that currently no changes to the Law
on Media Services are envisaged by the ruling majority.
61. In a positive development, the establishment of a National
Business Registration Centre has notably increased the transparency
of media ownership in Albania. In addition, recent amendments to
the civil and criminal codes have abolished prison sentences for
defamation as well as abolished special protection against defamation
of special categories of persons. However, defamation is not decriminalised
and journalists found guilty of defamation can still face heavy
fines, although they need to be proportionate and cannot jeopardise the
financial survivability of the media outlet in question
. That notwithstanding, the continued
criminalisation can still have a chilling effect on journalists
and be an incentive for self-censorship. We therefore call on the newly
elected parliament to adopt amendments that would decriminalise
defamation, and bring any provisions in the civil code into line
with generally accepted Council of Europe standards in this respect.
3.4. Law on the civil
service
62. The functioning of the democratic institutions in
Albania is negatively affected by partisan State institutions and
a highly politicised civil service. The appointment procedure of
civil servants lacks transparency and civil servants at all levels
are often appointed, and dismissed, on the basis of party affiliation.
This results, inter alia,
in a high turnover of staff and loss of experience and professional
capacity. In addition, public trust in the civil administration
is undermined by its lack of impartiality.
63. The reform of the public administration with a view to strengthening
its independence and impartiality has been a recurrent recommendation
of the Parliamentary Assembly as well as one of the conditions set
by the European Commission that needs to be fulfilled before candidate
status can be granted to Albania.
64. In this respect, progress was achieved with the adoption of
the Law on the Administrative Courts on 3 May 2012, as well as the
election of a new Ombudsperson on 22 December 2011, after the post
had been vacant for over two years as a result of the political
crisis following the 2009 parliamentary elections. Furthermore,
the parliament, after considerable delay, adopted two key pieces
of legislation for the reform of the public administration: on 27
September 2012, the parliament adopted the Law on the Organisation
and Functioning of Public Administration and, on 31 May 2012, the
Law on the Civil Service.
65. According to its provisions, the Law on the Civil Service,
which, inter alia, governs
the dismissal and hiring procedures for civil servants, was to come
into effect on 1 October 2013. However, on 26 September 2013, the
new Minister of the Interior announced that the new law, in the
view of the authorities, was unimplementable and that the government
would therefore seek to delay its implementation in order to allow
it to be amended. A normative act to this extent was tabled by the
authorities with the Albanian Parliament.
66. The DP-led coalition strongly opposed the draft normative
act tabled by the ruling majority. It dismissed claims that this
act would be unimplementable and, pointing at the high level of
dismissals and appointments effectuated by the new authorities,
alleged that the real reason for the delay was the authorities’
wish to circumvent the impartial and merit-based dismissal and appointment
procedures proscribed by the law, with the objective of filling
the civil service with SP sympathisers before the new law came into
effect. The government expressed its willingness to engage in a
dialogue with the opposition regarding the normative act, but threatened
to use its majority in the parliament to adopt the act without the
support of the opposition if need be.
67. In its communication accompanying the 2013 progress report
on Albania, the European Commission stressed the need for swift
implementation of the Law on the Civil Service and underscored that
accession negotiations were conditional on the continuation of public
service reform with a view to depoliticising the civil service and
strengthening its independence. The controversy regarding the implementation
of the Law on the Civil Service runs counter to this.
68. The DP challenged the adoption of the Normative Act of the
Council of Ministers with the Constitutional Court of Albania. On
5 February 2014, the Constitutional Court published its decision
in which it declared the adoption of the Normative Act unconstitutional
and annulled it. The implications of this ruling and especially
the status of those civil servants dismissed or hired between 1
October 2013 – the date in which the Law on the Civil Service was
supposed to come into force – and the date of formal enactment of
the law, is unclear at the time of writing. Following the Constitutional
Court’s decision, the Law on Civil Service came into force on 26 February
2014. Implementing legislation was adopted and came into force on
1 April 2014. Since then, the legal provisions on hiring and dismissal
of civil service employees are fully in effect.
69. These developments regarding the Law on the Civil Service
underscore the importance of the issue of the politicisation of
the civil service in the political environment of Albania. The large
number of personnel changes at all levels of the civil service initiated
by the incoming government, in combination with the controversial
decision to postpone the enactment of the Law on the Civil Service,
gives credence to allegations that the new ruling majority wishes
to stack the civil service with party loyalists. We urge the authorities
to ensure that all personal changes take place in full compliance
with the relevant merit-based provisions for the dismissal and hiring
of civil servants, as foreseen in the Law on the Civil Service.
3.5. Local self-government
70. In line with its accession commitments, Albania
signed the European Charter for Local Self-Government (ETS No. 122)
on 27 May 1998, and ratified it on 4 April 2000. The Charter came
into force on 1 August 2000. Albania did not sign the additional
protocol to the European Charter for Local Self-Government on the
right to participate in the affairs of a local authority (CETS No.
207). Given the importance of the principle of the right for all
citizens, and indeed residents, to participate in local government,
we recommend that the Albanian authorities sign and ratify this
protocol.
71. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council
of Europe adopted, at its October 2013 plenary session in Strasbourg,
a report on local and regional democracy in Albania. The two previous
reports of the Congress on this subject were adopted in 1997 and
2006. In its present report, the Congress noted that the decentralisation
of State power to the local level has been a “major component of
democratisation in Albania”. It considers that the system of local
and regional democracy in general is in line with the European Charter
for Local Self-Government, but that a number of critical shortcomings
remain, some of them in apparent contradiction to the provisions
of the Charter.
Moreover, the Congress recommended that the Albanian
authorities “intensify the decentralisation process in the light
of the Charter and the recommendations provided by the Congress,
and begin a reform of the territorial system that will allow communes
and municipalities to carry out their responsibilities, particularly
in the area of the spatial development of their territories and
urban planning”.
72. There are today two levels of administration in Albania: there
are 373 Local Government Units
(LGUs) and a second level of
local government consisting of 12 regions or “
qarks”.
Due to the large number of LGUs, several of them are too small to
effectively manage their local affairs and lack the resources and
capacity to be financially and politically viable institutions.
The Congress, as well as other international institutions, has recommended
that the Albanian authorities consider reducing the number of local
authorities with a view to creating larger and stronger municipalities
that are viable units of local democracy. Similarly, there seems
to be widespread agreement that the number of regions (12) is too
high for a country the size of Albania, with six to seven regions
being recommended as the optimal number for the development of strong
self-governing regions.
73. Regrettably, the above-mentioned polarisation between the
main political parties at the national level seems also to have
percolated to the local level. As a result, local authorities of
a different political colour are unable to find common ground and
defend their common interest vis-à-vis the
central government. This weakens local self-government and hinders
the development in Albania of strong local authority associations, which
could represent general local authority interests to the central
government.
74. Mayors and local councils are directly elected and regional
councils are composed of ex officio members delegated
by each local community in that region. Each local authority must
include the elected mayor in its delegation. A weakness of the law
on the Organisation and Functioning of Local Government is that
it does not grant the city council any authority over the elected
mayor, which can potentially lead to conflicts. The regions are
headed by a prefect, who is appointed by the Council of Ministers.
The prefect is the representative of the central government at the
regional level and is tasked with ensuring that national policies
are followed at the local level. However, it was reported to us
than in many cases ministries maintain their own direct representatives
at the regional level. The prefecture and ministerial representatives
at the regional level are jointly seen by a number of interlocutors
as a mechanism of the central authorities to exercise direct control over
local and regional authorities. This is compounded by the fact that
regional councils are generally weak and that regional structures
are dominated by the prefecture.
75. It is recommended that the functioning and competences of
regional structures as a second level of local government on the
one hand, and as administrative units of the central government
on the other, be clarified and clearly delimited by law. In order
to be fully compliant with the Charter, it is recommended that the authorities
consider regional councils being directly elected in the future.
76. While the share of own revenue of local authority budgets
has increased considerably over the last years, local authorities
are still overly dependent on central government financing, especially
as local authorities cannot collect their own local taxes. The local
authorities should be provided with the means for own financing
commensurate to their competencies in order to reduce their dependency
on the central government.
77. The new authorities have announced administrative and territorial
reform, with a view to making local governments politically, administratively
and financially independent, to be one of their policy priorities.
This is to be welcomed. It is important that this reform is inclusive
and consensual not only between the ruling majority and opposition
but also between central government and the local authorities concerned.
We urge the authorities to elaborate and implement this reform in
close consultation with the relevant Council of Europe departments
and institutions including the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.
78. On 24 January 2014, the parliament established a bipartisan
ad hoc committee on administrative territorial reform. Regrettably,
the opposition has, until now, declined to take part in this ad
hoc committee, despite offers by the ruling majority of parity of
members in the committee and a right to veto committee decisions.
79. On 16 May 2014, the Minister for Local Government Issues,
Mr Bledar Çuçi, presented five versions of the planned administrative
division of the country, which foresees the reduction of the current
385 Local Government Units to 30, 39, 47, 57 or 63 Units. Originally,
it was suggested that the number of regions would be reduced to
six. However, following allegations that the planned territorial
reform would have an impact on the composition of the parliament,
it was decided to keep the number of regions unaltered. Some interlocutors have
expressed their concern that the planned reform seems, at this moment,
to be mostly focused on the administrative division of the country
and less on the functional aspects of local self-government, and
especially the manner in which local authorities would obtain the
necessary resources to implement the services that the law, and
citizens, are expecting from them. This mirrors criticism made by
the opposition on the planned administrative territorial reform.
4. Rule of law
4.1. Independence of
the judiciary and administration of justice
80. The independence and impartiality of the judiciary
is not sufficiently ensured and the judiciary continues to suffer
from political pressure and interference.
The lack of independence
of the judiciary
and efficient administration of
justice continue to be points of concern with regard to Albania.
This lack of independence, compounded by endemic corruption among
the judiciary and lack of resources undermine the public trust in the
justice system as such. Continuation of the reform of the judiciary,
especially with a view to guaranteeing its independence and combating
corruption, is therefore a priority.
81. In that respect, some welcome progress has been made in the
reporting period. A strategy for judicial reform in 2011-2013 was
adopted and is being implemented, albeit incompletely and with delays.
It is important to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the strategy
and its implementation, in order to create a proper basis for further
reforms in the judicial sector.
82. A number of important laws have been adopted, such as the
law on the High Court, the Law on the Administrative Courts and
the Law on the Judicial Administration. In addition, the Criminal
Code, the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code were thoroughly
amended. A review of the Criminal Procedure Code is foreseen, as
are amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court and the Law
on the High Council of Justice, with a view to bringing them into
line with European standards and best practices. To our satisfaction,
the Albanian authorities have established close co-operation with
the relevant Council of Europe departments, and particularly the
Venice Commission, on the changes to these laws.
83. Until now, the reform of the judiciary has focused on the
adoption and changing of legislation. However, the implementation
of this new legislation is lagging behind, also as the result of
a lack of resources – both human and financial – and deficient inter-institutional
co-operation.
It
is important that all the main political forces in Albania show
the commensurate political will and allocate the necessary resources
to ensure the efficient implementation of the reform of the judiciary
and justice system.
84. The margin of discretion of the High Council of Justice in
the appointment, transfer and promotion of judges is too large,
and the decision to open and close a disciplinary procedure against
a judge is still fully a prerogative of the Minister of Justice.
The appointment process of judges to the Constitutional and Supreme Courts,
as well as to the High Council of Justice, is vulnerable to politicisation,
undermining the independence and impartiality of these institutions
and, through them, the justice system as such. Changing this would
imply the adoption of constitutional amendments for which, until
now, the necessary political will and consensus has been lacking
among the main political forces in the country. We call on the current
authorities to adopt, without delay and in close consultation with
the opposition, the amendments to the Constitution, and the related implementing
legislation needed to strengthen the independence and impartiality
of the judiciary. We expect the authorities to continue their close
co-operation with the Venice Commission in the drafting of these amendments.
85. Two controversial replacements of prominent members of the
judiciary strengthened the perception of politicisation of the judiciary.
The Vice-President of the High Council of Justice, Mr Kreshnik Spahiu,
resigned when he was accused of abuse of office – and when a parliamentary
inquiry committee was established to investigate illegal political
activities – for his involvement in the nationalist Red and Black
Alliance. The General Prosecutor, Ms Ina Rama, who had initiated
a number of investigations into alleged corruption of senior government
officials, as well as into the events of 21 January 2010, was replaced
after a controversial interpretation of the length of her term of
her office.
86. As mentioned, corruption among the judiciary continues to
be a cause for serious concern and the main obstacle in the fight
against corruption in general. In a welcome development, the Parliament
of Albania adopted, after a long delay, a series of amendments to
the Constitution that limit the immunity of members of government,
MPs, judges and high-level State officials and allow for their investigation
and prosecution without prior authorisation. These amendments had
long been called for by the Assembly.
87. In March 2014, amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code were
adopted implementing these constitutional amendments. According
to these amendments, personal and house searches, as well as the arrest
of members of the government, MPs, judges and high-level State officials
still need to be organised by the competent authorities, which is
the High Council of Justice in the case of ordinary judges and the
Supreme Court for Constitutional and Supreme Court judges. In addition,
in a welcome development, corruption offences by State officials
are now covered by the Serious Crimes Prosecution Office and Serious
Crimes Court. According to some interlocutors, some of these provisions
would benefit from further clarification to address some ambiguities
that could affect their efficient implementation. In addition changes
to other laws, such as the Law on the High Council of Justice, are
necessary to ensure the full implementation of the constitutional amendments.
4.2. Fight against corruption
88. The persistent and endemic corruption in Albania
hampers the country’s democratic and socio-economic development.
In its 2012 Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International
ranks Albania 133th out of 176 countries with a score of 33 out
of 100.
In
its 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International
reported that 40% of the population felt that corruption had increased
a lot in the past two years and an additional 26% said corruption
had increased a little. Moreover, 50% of the Albanian population considers
corruption to be a serious problem and 30% a problem; 66% of the
population thinks the government is entirely or to a large extent
run by a few big entities working in their own best interests; and
58% of the population feel that the actions of the government against
corruption have been ineffective. The spread of corruption to practically
all levels of society is also clear from the fact that 72% of the
respondents felt that political parties were corrupt or very corrupt,
66% the parliament, 81% the judiciary, 58% the police and 52% government
officials and civil servants.
Similarly,
in its 2013 Nations in Transit report, Freedom House gave Albania
a score of 5.25, down from 5.0, with 1 being best and 7 being worst.
The high level of corruption was confirmed by,
inter alia, high-level police and
justice officials.
89. The Albanian Government adopted an Anticorruption Action Plan
for 2011-2013, and adopted in March 2014 an anti-corruption package.
In addition, in November 2013, a National Anti-Corruption Coordinator
was appointed and focal points in the relevant ministries and State
institutions established. As mentioned in the section on the independence
of the judiciary, constitutional amendments and changes to the Criminal Procedure
Code were adopted that limit the immunity of State officials and
facilitate their prosecution in case of corruption. An evaluation
of the anti-corruption strategy is planned for January 2015. While
the number of cases successfully prosecuted has gone up in recent
years,
and reportedly
continues to rise, the authority’s anticorruption efforts have unfortunately
yielded limited results, especially in comparison to the size of
the problem. Many interlocutors blamed insufficient institutional
enforcement, and occasional lack of political will, for these weak
results.
90. In two high profile cases involving ministers, all charges
were dropped after the Supreme Court ruled that the authenticity
of video recordings allegedly showing acts of corruption could not
be verified, despite reports to the contrary by international experts.
Without wishing to discuss the merits of these court decisions, we
are concerned that these two highly publicised cases have contributed
to the public perception of impunity for corruption of high-level
State officials. In a welcome development, a small number of investigations
into, and prosecution of, high-level corruption cases were initiated
in the first half of 2014.
91. As mentioned in the previous section, in a welcome development,
constitutional amendments were adopted that limit the immunity of
public officials, including MPs and judges. The manner in which
the members of the Supreme Court are appointed should change as
– in addition to risking the politicisation of the court – the current
appointment procedure is seen as abetting the perception of impunity
for corruption. Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the
parliament upon proposal of the President. The Supreme Court is
the court of first instance for cases involving corruption of high-level
State officials, including ministers and MPs, and, in the view of
many, is unlikely to rule against members of the government and
of the ruling majority.
92. The High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets (HIDAA)
is a key instrument in the fight against corruption. All elected
officials, judges and high-level civil servants must declare their
assets, as well as those of their spouses, children and cohabitating
persons to the HIDAA, which is an independent institution. This currently
concerns around 6 000 people. In April 2014, amendments were adopted
to the Law on Asset Declarations. As a result, all declarations
will from now on be audited and the random selection of declarations to
be audited has been abolished. In addition, all judges and prosecutors
are now included in the category of people that need to file yearly
asset declarations under this law. They need to be audited at least
every four years. It is unclear how the HIDDAA will be able to handle
this increased workload.
Regrettably the HIDDA is understaffed
and under-resourced
in comparison with its workload and the importance of its task.
Of concern are the indications that the findings of the HIDAA are
not followed up by the Prosecutor General’s Office. In 2012, 14
cases were sent to the Prosecutor with a request to start criminal
investigations. All of them were suspended by the prosecution, despite
the reported seriousness of the charges filed by the HIDAA. We urge
the authorities to ensure that all findings of wrongdoing and requests
for criminal investigation by the HIDAA are properly and promptly
followed up by the prosecution services. In that respect, we welcome
the fact that, in the first half of 2014, seven cases
have
been opened by the Prosecution Service against erroneous asset declarations.
93. In general, the State institutions that are responsible for
the fight against corruption are vulnerable to political pressure
and interests. This underscores the need for the prompt implementation
of the Law on the Civil Service, which aims to reduce political
influence and pressure by, inter alia,
introducing merit-based appointment and dismissal procedures.
94. The number of investigations started by the Department of
Internal Control and Anti-Corruption (DIACA) and the High Inspectorate
for the Declaration and Audit of Assets has gone up. The authorities
should ensure that sufficient resources are made available to these
two bodies to strengthen their investigative and audit capacity.
We welcome the fact that, since April 2014, judges and prosecutors
are now effectively covered by the Law on Asset Declarations, This
is important as it is clear that eliminating corruption among the
judiciary is a key to the success of the overall fight against corruption.
95. On 11 November 2013, a memorandum of understanding was signed
between the Albanian State Police, the General Prosecution Office,
and the State Informative Service (SHISH), with the aim of improving the
fight against organised crime and corruption.
96. At its 60th plenary meeting, which took place from 17 to 21
June 2013, GRECO adopted its second compliance report
on
Albania in its third evaluation round. The third evaluation round
focuses on the criminalisation of corruption in Albanian legislation
and on the transparency of party funding. This compliance report
concludes that Albania has satisfactorily implemented all 12 recommendations
contained in the Third Round Evaluation Report of GRECO. It is now
important, as noted by GRECO, that all legal provisions now be efficiently
implemented in practice. The 4th Round of GRECO evaluations indicates
several areas where there is need for improvement for Albania.
Albania
received 10 recommendations, focusing on increasing transparency
in the legislative process, improving the process of declarations
of assets, and improving the evaluation of judges and prosecutors.
97. On 16 January 2014, the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mr Nils Muižnieks, published a report
in
which he expressed his concern that the high level of corruption
in the judiciary “seriously impedes the proper functioning of the
judiciary and undermines public trust in justice and in the rule of
law”.
4.3. Execution of judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights
98. As at 17 January 2014,
478 complaints were pending against
Albania, 424 of which have already been declared admissible. The
majority of the cases that have been declared admissible concern
claims regarding violations of the right to a fair trial and the
right to an effective remedy
99. The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights (“the Court”) against Albania is pending in 32 cases. The
majority of these judgments concern the non-execution of domestic
judicial and administrative decisions regarding the restitution
of, or compensation for, properties nationalised under the communist
regime, in violation
of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS Nos. 5 and 9) (right to property). These cases have
revealed such a persistent structural deficiency with regard to
the enforcement of domestic court decisions, and such a lack of
effective remedy, that they are followed by the Committee of Ministers
under an enhanced supervision procedure.
In view of the scale of the problem,
the Court delivered a pilot judgment in the case of
Manushaqe Puto and Others v. Albania.
100. In this pilot judgement, the Court requested the setting up
of an effective compensation mechanism within 18 months of the date
on which the judgment became final (namely before 17 June 2014).
In addition, the Court suggested the compilation of a database on
the basis of which an estimate could be made of the global compensation
bill; it also suggested the revision and update of valuation maps
reflecting market prices, and the establishment of realistic and
binding time limits. Pending the adoption by the Albania authorities
of the general measures ordered by the Court, the latter adjourned,
until 17 June 2014, all similar cases lodged after the adoption
of the pilot judgment. However, it will continue to consider similar
cases lodged before the pilot judgment came into force. The Registry
of the Court estimates that there are 83 pending
cases
that would fall in this category.
101. In its resolution
regarding
the execution of the pilot judgment, adopted during its 1 172nd
sitting on 6 June 2013, the Committee of Ministers noted “with great
concern that to date, only one of the measures identified has been
finalised, namely the land valuation map, and that no action plan
demonstrating the ability of the Albanian authorities to establish
an effective compensation mechanism within the deadline set by the Court,
has been submitted”. Given that the high number of similar cases
pending and being lodged with the Court is having a serious negative
impact on the efficient working of the Court, we welcome that there
has been some progress in addressing this issue by the Albanian
authorities.
102. On the basis of consultations between the authorities and
the Department for the execution of decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights, in February 2014, an action plan was submitted
by the authorities to the Committee of Ministers that outlined a
comprehensive set of measures aimed at introducing an effective mechanism
by June 2015. While regretting that the deadline fixed by the pilot
judgement would not be met, the Committee of Ministers, at its 1 193rd
meeting in March 2014, noted with satisfaction the priority given
by the authorities to this issue. The action plan was adopted by
the Council of Ministers of Albania on 24 April 2014, and updated
when it entered into force on 15 May 2014, which gives this plan
a legally binding nature. During its 1 201st meeting, from 3 to
5 June 2014, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
welcomed the adoption of the action plan by the Albanian authorities
but, in view of the deadline for the implementation of this plan,
urged the authorities to intensify their efforts with a view to
reducing this time frame as much as possible. Reportedly, the Albanian
authorities have requested the Court for an extension of the original
deadline given in the Manushaqe Puto
and Others judgment.
5. Human rights
5.1. Human rights protection
103. Progress has been made with regard to strengthening
the human rights protection mechanisms in Albania. Freedom of assembly,
association, thought, conscience and religion are generally respected
in Albania. The concerns with regard to freedom of expression have
already been outlined in the section on media freedom and pluralism.
Concerns with regard to the right to a free trial have been outlined
in the section on the rule of law.
104. In the reporting period, Albania signed and ratified a number
of important Council of Europe conventions, including the Council
of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210).
105. As already outlined above, concerns exist with regard to the
number of cases lodged with the European Court of Human Rights and
the delay in the execution of the judgements of the Court. In this
context, the respect for property rights remains a point of concern
that is now being tackled by the Albanian authorities.
106. Blood feuds and revenge killings are a matter of concern in
Albania. The 2012 Human Rights Report of the US State Department
reports an increase in such killings and notes that in several cases
minors and women were targeted, contrary to the traditions surrounding
this practice. The Albanian National Reconciliation Committee reported
152 blood feud killings in 2012. Blood feuds or revenge are aggravated
circumstances for premeditated murder. The Albanian authorities
have indicated that they recognise the importance of this issue. Amendments
to the Criminal Code increased the maximum punishment for Blood
Feud killings from 20 to 30 years or life imprisonment. The Ombudsperson’s
Office has prepared a special report on blood feuds that was presented
to the parliament and in which he concluded that the 2005 Law on
Blood Feuds was still to be implemented by the authorities. Regrettably
this report, like the others produced by his office, has not (yet) been
discussed by parliament.
5.2. Torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment
107. On 20 March 2012, the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT) made public its report on its visit to Albania from 10 to
21 May 2010. The CPT noted that it had received very good co-operation
from the authorities.
108. With regard to pre-trail detention, the CPT noted that pre-trail
detention facilities fall under the responsibility of the Ministry
of Justice, in line with European standards, but that no proper
procedure exists for the transfer of detainees from police cells
to pre-trail facilities. As a result, people remained detained in
police cells – which are not equipped for long periods of detention
– far beyond the statutory limit.
109. Regrettably, despite some progress in this area since previous
visits, the CPT continued to receive a significant number of allegations
of ill-treatment of detained persons by the police, especially during questioning,
with the aim of extracting confessions or proof. This is of serious
concern, especially taking into account that no independent enquiries
were started after complaints were formally received. The authorities need
to take urgent steps to remedy this situation.
110. Proper access to a lawyer while in police custody, as well
as to a doctor, are important mechanisms to prevent ill treatment.
Considerable improvements have been made with regard to ensuring
access of detainees to lawyers and doctors, but delays often occur.
This undermines the effectiveness of those mechanisms.
In addition, it is recommended that the
systematic recording of police interviews is introduced as a mechanism for
safeguarding against possible ill treatment while in police custody.
The April 2014 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code reportedly
included provisions that strengthen the rights of prisoners and
detainees.
111. In its report, the CPT regrets that, at the time of their
2012 visit, hardly any of their previous recommendations with regard
to the conditions of detention in police establishments had been
implemented by the Albanian authorities. Holding cells (for detention
of up to 10 hours) in general lacked any possibility to rest, such
as chairs and benches, while in custody cells (for detention up
to 96 hours) the conditions were described by the CPT as “appalling”:
generally lacking ventilation and natural light and with minimum
conditions of hygiene.
112. On the other hand, the CPT acknowledged the progress made
by the Albanian authorities in reducing prison overcrowding and
improving the conditions in prisons, although the latter remains
of concern, especially as a result of limited funding. We welcome
that virtually no allegations of ill treatment in prisons were received by
the CPT, while supporting the CPT’s view that continuous vigilance
by the authorities is necessary in this respect.
113. The findings of the last CPT visit underscore that prison
health care is still a point of concern that, given the potential
impact on public health in general, needs the full attention of
the authorities.
114. The National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, functioning
under the Ombudsperson’s Office has become increasingly active in
inspecting prisons and other places of detention.
5.3. Minorities and
discrimination
115. The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities adopted its third opinion
on Albania on 23 November 2011.
The
most recent report
of
the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) was
adopted on 15 December 2009 in the framework of the fourth monitoring
cycle.
116. Albanian legislation only recognises as distinct legal entities
three national minorities (Greek, Macedonian and Serbo-Montenegrin)
and two ethno-linguistic minorities (Roma and Vlach/Aromanian). People
belonging to other groups, such as Bosniacs and Egyptians for example,
are not recognised as belonging to national minorities and therefore
do not benefit from national and international instruments for the protection
of the rights of minorities, such as the Council of Europe Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157).
In addition, also as a result of this limited recognition, several
minorities are not represented on the official bodies established
to represent minority interests vis-à-vis the
authorities. The current system of recognition of minorities is
inadequate and too limited and should be changed to ensure flexibility.
117. The legislative framework for the protection of minorities
has been improved over the reporting period. However, a comprehensive
law on minorities that would address all recommendations of the
framework convention is still lacking. We hope that the new parliament
will adopt such a law, in close consultation with the relevant Council
of Europe bodies, without further delay.
118. A population census was conducted in Albania in October 2011.
The Law on the Census was amended several times before the census
took place. A fine was initially introduced for incorrectly replying
to the question on ethnic origin. This provision was reportedly
withdrawn only three months before the census took place. The answers
given were going to be cross-checked with the civil registry, which
is notoriously inaccurate on such data. This not only raised questions
with regard to compatibility of these provisions with the principles
of the framework convention, but also with regard to the accuracy
of the census data on ethnicity and nationality.
119. One issue that has created some controversy is the draft for
a parliamentary resolution on the Cham
issue, which is circulating
in the parliament. This draft resolution addresses several issues
that are important for the Cham community in Albania, including
the repeal of the 1940 law on the war between Greece and Albania
and restitution of property left behind when the Muslim Chams were
forced to flee Greece. The value of the contested property is estimated
to be around 10 billion euros. Not unexpectedly, this draft resolution
is negatively affecting relations with Greece, which has indicated
that they find the text to be “unacceptable” in its current form.
All the main political forces in Albania have underscored that they
do not wish that the discussions on this issue should undermine
friendly relations with Greece, and the initiative for this draft
resolution should possibly be seen in the context of an increased
nationalist discourse in the run up to the 2013 parliamentary elections.
120. The teaching of minority languages (recognised and other)
remains inadequate. In special minority areas schools providing
education in Greek and Macedonian are functioning, but outside these
areas requests for education in these languages are generally rejected.
No education is provided in the Roma, Serbo-Montenegrin or Vlach
languages. Regrettably, Albania has neither signed nor ratified
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ETS No.
148), despite this being an explicit accession commitment.
We call on the
authorities to honour this accession commitment without further
delay.
121. Important progress has been made in combating discrimination.
The Criminal Code has been amended to introduce as an aggravated
circumstance offences committed on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity,
gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, political beliefs
or health. In addition, an Anti-Discriminations Commissioner was
established by law. The establishment, and appointment, of such
a commissioner was a long standing ECRI recommendation and should
be welcomed. However, several interlocutors emphasised that the
roles of the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner and the Ombudsperson
need to be clarified and clearly delineated in order to avoid overlap
and possible interference. On 4 February 2010, the Parliament of
Albania adopted a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, in line
with recommendations from, inter alia,
ECRI and the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention. The
authorities should make every effort to ensure that this law is
now fully and efficiently implemented.
122. Marked progress was made with regard to fighting discrimination
against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people (LGBT). A
working group on LGTB rights was established within the Ministry
of Social Affairs and both main parties have manifested clear support
for enhancing LGTB rights.
123. While Albania is generally a tolerant society towards minorities,
discrimination of Roma remains a point of concern. In its recent
reports, both ECRI and the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention
have called on the authorities to develop and implement an action
plan – and in general step up their efforts – with a view to combating
discrimination of Roma and to ensure their proper integration into
society. The Albanian Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth has initiated
the drafting of a concrete action plan to improve the situation of
the Roma community.
124. Highlighting some of the problems faced by Roma in Albania,
in February 2012, the Albanian Ombudsperson allowed the temporary
settlement of 37 Roma families on the land of his Office, after
these families were evicted from the land they were occupying without
being given alternative shelter.
5.4. Ombudsperson
125. We welcome the fact that the Ombudsperson has been
increasingly active in the protection of human rights and helping
citizens to assert their rights vis-à-vis the government. In this
context, we regret the delay in his appointment during the political
stand-off between the ruling majority and the opposition following
the 2009 parliamentary elections.
126. While the recommendations of the Ombudsperson are increasingly
acted upon, his reports to the parliament until now have not been
included in the parliamentary agenda and therefore are not debated
in parliament. We call on the Albanian Parliament to systematically
place the reports – both special and statutory – of the Ombudsperson
on the parliamentary agenda for debate. We welcome the marked improvement
in co-operation between the Ombudsperson and the Speaker of the
Parliament and the latter’s promise that the reports of the Ombudsperson
would soon be discussed in the plenary sessions of the parliament.
127. As mentioned above, the Ombudsperson also acts as the National
Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture. In total, 5 200 complaints
were received in 2012. However, the Ombudsperson has only limited financial
and human resources – he has a total staff of 48 persons at his
disposal to properly execute all the functions placed on him by
law. We call on the authorities to make sufficient resources available
to enable his Office to properly carry out his duties, including
for the establishment of professionally staffed regional offices, which
are at this moment staffed by volunteers from civil society organisations.
5.5. Follow-up to the
Assembly’s report on the inhuman treatment of people and illicit
trafficking in human organs in Kosovo
128. On 25 January 2011, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1782 (2011) on the investigation of allegations of inhuman treatment
of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, based
on a report
prepared by Mr Dick Marty. In this
report, Mr Marty outlined credible indications that Serbian prisoners
of war in Kosovo, as well as some Kosovar Albanians, were murdered
for their organs, which were subsequently traded on the black market.
While the report did not place any responsibility or allege any
complicity of Albania, these crimes were alleged to have taken place
in secret detention places under the control of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) in Northern Albania. In
Resolution 1782 (2011), the Assembly therefore invited the Albanian authorities to
co-operate unreservedly with the European Union Rule of Law Mission
to Kosovo (EULEX), as well as with the Serbian authorities, in their
investigations into these crimes and to start a serious and credible
investigation of their own into the allegations that several of
these crimes were committed on Albanian territory.
129. We welcome the fact that the Albanian authorities have given
full and unhindered co-operation to the EULEX investigators of these
alleged crimes on Albanian territory. Considering it of utmost importance
that the allegations raised in this report are investigated fully
and in a transparent manner, the Albanian Parliament adopted the
law “on jurisdictional relations in criminal matters with the EULEX
special investigation unit” in May 2012. Based on this law, EULEX
prosecutors are allowed to investigate within Albanian territory
on the alleged implications of Albania in the illicit trafficking
in human organs on Albanian territory. They have had the full support
of all competent institutions. With regard to the independent and
separate investigation by the Albanian authorities, as requested
by the Assembly, the authorities stated that their investigations
have until now not confirmed Mr Marty’s findings.
6. Conclusions
130. The preliminary draft report was sent to the Albanian
authorities for comments on 11 March 2014. Their comments were received
on 30 May 2014, and have been taken into account in the finalisation
of the report.
131. During the reporting period, Albania has, albeit belatedly,
made marked progress in honouring is obligations and commitments
to the Council of Europe. However, in several areas, most notably
with regard to the impartiality of democratic institutions and the
civil service, the independence of the judiciary and the fight against
corruption, serious concerns remain, especially with regard to the
actual implementation of the many reforms and legislative packages
that have been adopted. Against this background, we therefore recommend that
the Assembly continues to monitor the honouring of obligations and
commitments by Albania until these concerns have been satisfactorily
addressed.