1. Introduction
1. The terrorist group known as “IS” (“Da'ish” in Arabic)
has risen to prominence
in 2014 as they wreak death and destruction on anyone who goes against
them on their path throughout northern Iraq and eastern Syria. The
group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has declared an Islamic caliphate
and harbours desires of an ambitious
expansion across the Middle East and southern Mediterranean. All
this in a region which is already host to the Syrian conflict: one
of the most serious humanitarian crises in modern times. The threatening
rise of “IS” further compounds the humanitarian catastrophe there,
already affecting around 10.8 million people in Syria alone, with
many Christians and other religious or ethnic communities included
in the suffering there and in Iraq.
2. “IS”’s main advances have been made this year, with their
most notable conquest the capture of Iraq's second city, Mosul.
Their rapid and cruel advances in the Middle East have transformed
the serious issue of steadily increasing persecution of religious
communities into a full-scale lethal onslaught. If the thousands
of those targeted do not flee the oncoming jihadist militants, they
are forced to make a choice: convert, pay taxes or be killed.
3. The situation for religious and ethnic communities in the
region is dire, and they are in desperate need of greater support
– both on a humanitarian and security level – from the Governments
of Iraq and Syria, the region’s local powers, and the international
community at large.
4. The international community as a whole has struggled to respond
adequately to the humanitarian catastrophe, and the response to
the violence itself is proving even more of a challenge. Western
leaders were reluctant to involve their nations in another bloody
Middle Eastern war so soon after the 2003 Iraq war. However, the
“IS” advance has pushed the United States to lead a coalition of
over 40 countries to take action to prevent the group from making
further gains that completely destabilise Iraq and Syria. The involvement
of the semi-autonomous Kurds and Bashar al-Assad's government further
complicates an already delicate situation.
5. Presently, the international community is acting but must
do more to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in the region of
all those affected, especially religious and ethnic communities
as well as women and children. Thousands of people have been killed
and millions have been displaced in the collision zones between
the “IS” insurgency and the ongoing Syrian civil war. Immediate
humanitarian help is required on the ground, deployed as part of
a strategic, longer-term approach to foster plurality and human
rights, in recognition of the fact that a dissipation of this deeply
divisive crisis is not at all imminent.
6. What follows is an overview of a rapidly changing situation,
constructed around five main sections. The first accounts for the
recent existing efforts by the Parliamentary Assembly to raise awareness
of the plight of religious communities in the region, including
before “IS” appeared on European newsreels. The second section provides
some brief information on the terrorist group known as “IS”. The
third section assesses the political and humanitarian situation
in the region affected by “IS”, especially Iraq and Syria. The fourth documents
the international response to the emergence of “IS” since the summer
of 2014, with the fifth and final section proposing some recommendations
for action.
2. Previous work of
the Assembly
7. As early as 2011, the Assembly acknowledged the precarious
situation of religious communities – particularly Christians – in
the Middle East and South Mediterranean. On the basis of reports
by Mr Luca Volontè (EPP/CD), the Assembly adopted Recommendation
1957 (2011) on violence against Christians in the Middle East and,
two years later, Resolution
1928
(2013) on safeguarding human rights in relation to religion and
belief, and protecting religious communities from violence, which
highlighted a rise in attacks, death sentences and blasphemy trials
against Christians and other groups. The result has been an overall
decline in the Christian population of countries like Iraq, home
to Christian communities for the last 2 000 years. According to
the report from 2011, almost half of the 800 000 Christians there
in 2003 have been forced out. For example, in Iraq 58 Christians
were killed in October 2010 after an attack on the Syriac Catholic
Cathedral of Baghdad, and 21 were killed after a suicide bombing
in the Coptic Church of Alexandria, Egypt, in January 2011. According
to the 2013 report, violence was said to be now psychological as
well as physical, with public authorities rarely engaging in a way
to defuse tension with any particular group. Events in Iraq under
Nuri al-Maliki – documented later in this report – are a case in
point.
8. The advance of “IS” since last year has only served to push
more from their homelands; a dangerous development for the region
as “the loss of Christian communities in the Middle East would also
endanger Islam as it would signal the victory of fundamentalism”.
In response to the aforementioned
2011 report and Recommendation
1957 (2011), the Committee of Ministers
did not see fit to establish a “permanent
capacity” to monitor the situation: a reply that Mr Volontè later
deemed “unsatisfactory”. The latest developments indicate that those
early concerns surrounding the rights of vulnerable groups were
well founded.
9. Whilst focusing on the plight of vulnerable communities, the
conflict in Syria has also received the attention of the Assembly.
In a motion I tabled together with other Assembly members in July
2013, we referred to developments in Syria which, “have ... exceeded
even the worst of fears: murders, internally displaced Christians,
sexual assaults, destruction of churches, murders and kidnappings
of priests”. The motion quoted as “an outrageous manifestation of
the above ... the kidnapping by Syrian armed militants of two Orthodox Bishops
of Aleppo, Boulos Yaziji, head of the Greek Orthodox Church, and
Yuhanna Ibrahim, head of the Syriac Orthodox Church, on 22 April
2013".
10. In August 2013, former Committee Chairpersons Mr Björn von
Sydow and Mr Pietro Marcenaro expressed deep concern about the disappearance
of Father Paolo Dall'Oglio, a prominent Italian Jesuit priest who
had been working in Syria and who had also taken part in the meeting
of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy in December
2012 in Turin.
It was suspected members of “IS”
abducted him; he is still missing.
11. In October 2013, a report on Syria by Mr Björn von Sydow (Sweden,
SOC)
found that “violence [had] escalated,
resulting in a full-fledged civil war and a humanitarian tragedy:
more than 100 000 people have died, 2 million have taken refuge
abroad, 4.25 million are internally displaced persons and a total
of 6.8 million are in need of humanitarian assistance”. The report
further documented the extensive focus the Parliamentary Assembly
has dedicated to the Syrian conflict, including the adoption of
Resolutions 1878 (2012), 1902 (2012) and 1940 (2013), which condemned
systematic human rights violations, discussed the European response
to the humanitarian crisis, and criticised Bashar al-Assad's hostility
towards neighbouring countries. In the past, religious communities
have been safeguarded by the existing order, but now that order
has been destabilised and those groups are in great peril because
none of the warring parties offer safe and credible protection of their
rights.
12. More recently, I pressed the issue of vulnerable religious
communities to the fore once more at a conference on “Freedom of
religion or belief in the Middle East and the South Mediterranean:
the situation and safety of Christian communities” in Athens in
May 2014. I reminded those in attendance – just before regular news
of “IS” emerged in the mainstream media – that the situation of
Christians in the Middle East and South Mediterranean has “dramatically
deteriorated”, with “one Christian suffering physical violence every
five seconds”. The conference acknowledged the “practical need for
respect of diversity”, and further recognised that economic development
and education will go some way to removing the influence of religious
fanaticism, providing alternatives for those considering joining
the fight.
13. In June 2014, the rise of “IS” was recognised by the Bureau
of the Parliamentary Assembly. On the basis of a draft I proposed,
the Bureau noted its concern about the reports of mass human rights
violations by “IS”, stating that “this is in total opposition to
the values upheld by the Council of Europe and cannot be tolerated”. Europe
was also reminded of its portion of responsibility for the situation
in Iraq and warned that it “cannot just stand by while this major
crisis unfolds”.
Furthermore, in a press statement
I issued on 19 August 2014, I condemned the violence and urged the
international community to do more in support of persecuted minorities.
14. On 4 September 2014, the committee supported my proposal to
request to the Bureau of the Assembly that my report on violence
against Christians and other religious communities be debated under
urgent procedure during the Assembly’s 4th part-session of 2014
and with a modified title to reflect the topicality and urgency
of the debate, namely: “Threats posed by the “Islamic State” (IS)
and violence against Christians and other religious communities”.
On 29 September 2014, the Assembly decided on a proposal by the
Bureau to hold an urgent debate with the title: “Threats posed by
the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) and violence against humanity”. In its
meeting on the same day, the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy decided to update the title of the report to reflect the
comments expressed by various members and myself: “Threats against
humanity posed by the terrorist group known as “IS”: violence against
Christians and other religious or ethnic communities”.
15. During the same meeting, the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy held a hearing with the participation of Mr Gert Westerveen,
representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
to the European Institutions in Strasbourg, and Mr Salih Muslim
Muhammad, Chairman of the Syrian Democratic Union Party. Mr Westerveen
provided an update on the humanitarian situation and shared the latest
figures on internally displaced persons (IDPs). Mr Muhammad reported
on the situation in northern Syria, with a focus on Kobanê.
3. The rise and threat
of the terrorist group known as “IS”
16. The terrorist group now known as “IS” (“Da'ish” in
Arabic)
emerged from al-Qaeda Iraq
(AQI) and has existed in its current structure since April 2013.
It has since been rejected by al-Qaeda. The group is led by the relatively
unknown Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – apparently descended from Muhammad's
Quraysh tribe – who claims to have established a caliphate.
17. The “IS” has quickly gained notoriety for their ostentatious
barbarity and seemingly indiscriminate killing of those who do not
side with them. The group adheres to a doctrine of total war without
limits or constraints, making them both difficult to deal with for
liberal western leaders and inspiring to those with sympathies for
their ideals. In fact, Amnesty International accuses the group of
carrying out “a wave of ethnic cleansing”, and the United Nations
said it was investigating “acts of inhumanity on an unimaginable
scale”.
18. There is much debate over where “IS” gleans its support. Earlier
in its existence, generous donations from individuals from Gulf
States were commonplace. Lately, it appears funds and weapons from
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, aided by questionable Turkish border enforcement,
originally intended for strongly Islamist groups in the region,
have inadvertently and indirectly found their way to “IS” as the
group advanced, subsuming the smaller original groups in its path.
19. Since advancing, “IS” now controls oilfields in Syria and
reportedly exports about 9 000 barrels of oil per day back to the
government and elsewhere.
In addition, there are claims that
it has been selling off antiquities from historical sites in the
region, including Christian artefacts. Latest reports suggest “IS”
has even put in place “the beginnings of quasi-State structures
– ministries, law courts and a rudimentary taxation system” meaning that
the group can more effectively sustain itself. The group could have
money and assets ranging anywhere from $900 million to $2 billion.
20. Perhaps of more concern is their claim to have at their disposal
aggressive young fighters from the United Kingdom, France, Germany
and other European countries, as well as the United States, the
Arab world and the Caucasus. Indeed, it is suspected that the murderer
of US journalist James Foley on 20 August 2014 could have been British.
The extremist ideological stance of “IS” seems to have had a marked
appeal in Turkey where as many as 1 000 Turks have joined up. “There
are clearly recruitment centres being set up in Ankara and elsewhere
in Turkey, but the government doesn't seem to care”, because of
its opposition to Assad, said Aaron Stein of UK think tank RUSI.
The CIA has now tripled its estimate of the number of “IS” fighters
to between 20 000 and 31 500.
21. “IS” has been making rapid advances, capturing the Syrian
city and provincial capital, Raqqa. In June 2014, they captured
Iraq's second city, Mosul, a move that caught the world's attention
because the city is the largest to fall to militants. It is a key
trading post close to the Syrian border and it is also home to the
Mosul Dam, which “IS” briefly had control of until it was recaptured
on 19 August. The dam is vital as it is responsible for much of
the country's water and power. “IS”' advance also trapped thousands
fleeing the violence in the Sinjar mountains in August. In early
September, joint forces of Iraqi militias and Kurdish forces – supported
by US air strikes and Iranian weapons – broke the two-month siege
of Amerli, where around 15 000 Shia Turkmen had been trapped without
water, food or medicine. On 7 September, US airstrikes had to force
“IS” militants away from another important dam at Haditha.
4. The region affected
4.1. Iraq
22. Iraq has been the most severely affected by the militancy
of “IS”, who has taken advantage of the war-torn country's weaknesses
and political mismanagement by ex-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
The country is home to 32 million people, with around 97-99% of
the population Muslim, 60-65% of whom are Shia.
The removal of Saddam Hussein's
regime caused the destruction of much of the country and ignited
a sectarian conflict between this main branch of Islam, and the
other, Sunni.
23. In the background to this conflict and the foreign military
intervention, there has been a mass exodus of Christians from Iraq,
mainly to the neighbouring countries of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.
Since 2003, the population has dropped by up to half and is now
thought to be around 400 000. In recent years, there has been growing
pressure from Islamic hardliners to “Islamise” the country and its
legal system – a trend crystallised in the 2005 constitution – putting
small religious communities at risk. There have been several attacks
on Christian leaders and communities in the last decade by Islamists.
For example, in October 2010, worshippers were attacked with random
gunfire and grenades at the Syriac Catholic Cathedral of Baghdad,
killing 58. In fact, since 2002 at least 73 churches have been attacked
and hundreds of Christians killed,
before the recent massacres of “IS”
are even taken into account.
4.1.1. The role of the
Iraqi Government
24. The actions of the government, led until recently
by Nuri al-Maliki, must be called into question when analysing the
current crisis in the north-west of Iraq. Over the past three years,
Mr al-Maliki, a Shi'ite, proved to be “sectarian-minded”,
appearing to give the Sunni population
an unfair deal. According to Human Rights Watch,
Iraqi security forces under Mr al-Maliki's
command, often alongside pro-government militias, carried out unlawful
abductions and killings of Sunni prisoners, along with indiscriminate
airstrikes in populated areas whilst attempting to fend off the
“IS”. The actions of the pro-Shia government have disenfranchised
much of the Sunni community, which has further exacerbated tensions
within the country as the Sunni “IS” advances. Further, because
al-Maliki could not meet the inclusive demands of the United States,
more assistance for his people was held back.
25. Mr al-Maliki has now resigned from the government after losing
support. On 11 August 2014, Haider al-Abadi, also a Shia, was nominated
as his successor. He could provide a more palatable moderate approach for
the Sunnis and also the wider international community. The European
Union has followed up early condemnation of the “IS” violence by
moving to support the nomination of Haider al-Abadi as the new Prime Minister
and has agreed to increase humanitarian aid to €17 million for this
year.
4.1.2. Humanitarian situation
26. The existing strife in Iraq is now compounded by
the violence of “IS”, which has forced thousands to flee their homes
in three waves, according to what Mr Westerveen from the UNHCR told
the committee on 29 September, leaving them in dire need of humanitarian
assistance. The first wave was at the beginning of 2014, when “IS”
seized Ramdi and Falluja. The second wave was the “IS”' assault
on Mosul; and the third was massive displacement in the Sinjar region
in August. Just over half of the newly displaced are Sunni Arabs
and over a quarter are Sunni Kurds.
27. For the period January to September 2014, the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) identified 1 725 432 internally
displaced individuals dispersed across 1 715 distinct locations
in Iraq. Amongst the displaced groups, the majority are Arab Sunni
Muslim followed by Kurd Yazidis and Shia Turkmen, with smaller groups
of Christians from Assyrian and Chaldean minorities.
The humanitarian
crisis in the country is putting enormous pressure on authorities
and host communities, particularly with regard to access to basic
services. One major challenge is to make shelter available for the
displaced people living in the open and in schools.
28. A UNHCR programme to deliver 2 410 tonnes of emergency aid
has been attempting to provide for 500 000 IDPs in the north of
Iraq. A further 700 000 reside in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan
region, where the authorities need encouragement and support to
provide the refugees with a safe haven.
At the moment, it is a struggle
to provide basic food and water in any of the refugee camps. According
to the UNHCR, 12 more camps are to open for another 140 000 people,
but this is still insufficient considering it is thought that 600
000 were displaced in the time between June and August alone, after
the attacks on Mosul and Sinjar respectively.
The United Nations now estimates
that 1.8 million Iraqis have been displaced in 2014, and that the
country is host to 215 000 Syrian refugees.
29. At the beginning of August 2014, “IS” captured Iraq's “Christian
capital” Qaraqosh, reportedly forcing up to a quarter (around 100
000) of Iraq's Christian community to flee as militants gave them
three choices if they stayed: convert, pay a tax or die. Eyewitnesses
in Qaraqosh said “IS” militants were taking down crosses in churches
and burning religious manuscripts. Some Christians and also Yazidis
remain trapped, unable to flee in time.
4.1.3. Plight of the Yazidis
and role of the Kurds
30. The Yazidi population of Iraq has suffered similarly
to the Christians, but without as much of the western attention
that the Christians receive. There are about 600 000 Yazidis – who
are predominantly Kurds – living in northern Iraq. They follow an
ancient syncretistic religion, which, if a strict Islamic interpretation
of the Koran is taken, can draw persecution and even the mistaken
label “devil-worshippers”. The community is small and is closed
to conversion to people from outside. As a result of this, the Yazidis
lack any regional alliance or protection, making them especially
vulnerable to “IS”. Since 3 August 2014, roughly 130 000 Yazidi
residents of Sinjar have flooded into Iraqi Kurdistan after they
were trapped in the mountains when “IS” attacked, killing 500.
31. The flood of refugees into the Kurdish region in Northern
Iraq – approximately 860 000 – coupled with attacks on Kurds by
“IS” in the ancient holy area of Sinjar has led to the mobilisation
of the Kurdish Peshmerga force against the militants. The fighters
have been attempting to defend against “IS”, but with only limited
arms and technology, “IS” is too strong. Support for the Kurdish
fighters has not been immediately forthcoming from the central Iraqi
Government or the wider international community. Perhaps understandably,
relations between the central government and the Kurdistan region
have been strained due to the latter's desire for independence and
opportunistic seizure of parts of northern Iraq in the wake of the
crisis. However, before resigning, Prime Minister al-Maliki pragmatically
offered support for the Peshmerga forces to help push back “IS”
after they claimed several towns and oilfields. For the United States
and its allies, it is a challenge to explicitly support the Kurds
after several years of attempting to build and maintain a unified
Iraqi State. However, in August 2014 both the United States and
European governments decided to send help for the Kurds.
4.2. Syria
32. The other country in the region to experience the
worst effects of the “IS” advance is Syria, already suffering a
violent civil war as rebels try to oust embattled ruler Bashar al-Assad.
The country has around 18 million people, with Muslims comprising
87% of the population. In comparison to Iraq, the Christian community is
quite significant in size, making up the majority of the remaining
population.
33. Syria became part of the spread of the Arab Spring in 2011,
but unlike Tunisia and Egypt, protests and violence did not topple
the Assad regime. Instead, the conflict has continued, escalating
into a civil war with a death toll of over 140 000 people so far.
Recently,
militant groups such as “IS” and al-Nusra Front have started to
overrun the anti-government rebels, turning a revolt against the
Assad regime into a jihadist war on all non-Sunni populations. Before
the uprising in 2011, religious groups – particularly Christians
– were afforded equality, security and freedom, rare in the Middle
East. All this has come to an end and now Christians are seen by
Sunnis as too close to Assad's regime and by others as too close
to the West because of historical ties. The thin concentration of
Christians across Syria only serves to increase their vulnerability,
with the threat of “IS” becoming more prominent. Christians from
Iraq had fled to Syria in search of safety from “IS”, but in mid-2013 they
were forced in other directions such as the Kurdish region in Iraq
or Europe as Syria became more dangerous. It was at this time that
the use of chemical weapons on civilians by the Assad regime was confirmed,
notably on 21 August 2013, when sarin-filled rockets were fired
at suburbs in the Ghouta agricultural belt around Damascus. This
created – though scarcely possible – an even worse situation for
civilians.
34. With the introduction of “IS” into the maelstrom, Syria is
now host to the “world's largest humanitarian and security disaster”.
The assortment of reported statistics
is shocking. Since the start of the unrest in 2011, 2.5 million
people have fled the country, 6.4 million remain displaced inside
Syria, and 10.8 million in total need assistance. UNICEF reports
that as of March 2014, 3 million children are now displaced, and
at least 8 000 are leaving the country as orphans.
In addition, Turkey is already hosting
some 1.3 million Syrian refugees. Kobanê, though successful in repelling
“IS” thus far, has attracted significant attention from “IS” because
of its strategic location on the border with Turkey.
35. It is increasingly clear that the international community
must increase its action to respond to these figures. According
to the United Nations, more than $4 billion has been donated since
2012, but another $2 billion is needed as winter approaches.
The United States has been the largest
single donor to the crisis, with Secretary of State John Kerry announcing
additions to existing aid, making a total of $2.4 billion split
evenly for Syrians inside and outside the country.
The European Union has also contributed
significantly to the aid efforts, having provided €100 million in
assistance in 2014 alone.
4.3. Egypt
36. As yet, Egypt remains out of the reach of the terror
of “IS”. However, vulnerable communities remain under threat in
the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolution in 2011. Egypt's population
stands at around 87 million people, with a 90% Muslim majority.
The Christian population makes up the remaining 10% of a country
with a history of violent Islamism.
37. After the removal of Mubarak from power in 2011, there was
a significant rise in violent attacks and persecution against Coptic
communities, and under the presidency of Muhammad Morsi, churches
were attacked, priests killed and Copts taken to court over blasphemy.
One of the most serious incidents was the Maspero massacre on 9
October 2011 that left 28 Coptic protesters dead after a heavy-handed
response from the Egyptian Government. They were demonstrating against
the burning of a church.
38. In June 2012, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto (Monaco, EPP/CD) presented
to the Assembly a report
highlighting serious questions over
the role of Sharia law in Egypt's future constitutional arrangements.
Its use would be a threat to equality between men and women, and
Muslims and non-Muslim minorities, particularly Christians. The
report stated that 100 000 Christians were driven from Egypt in
2012.
39. However, the situation for the Christian community did worsen
under Morsi's rule when he controversially announced a constitution
in which Islamic Sharia law featured heavily. This was a clear political assault
on the rights of non-Muslim communities in Egypt. Moreover, violence
against Christians continued. For example, on 7 April 2013 a Muslim
mob firebombed the Coptic cathedral in Cairo, the first attack on
the cathedral in modern history. As the building was destroyed,
Egyptian police were passive.
40. In July 2013, Morsi was overthrown by the army, led by General
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and attacks on Christian communities rose
sharply in the disorder. Christians were kidnapped and killed, along
with the destruction of churches. In 2013, thousands of homes and
businesses, as well as 47 churches were attacked.
41. In the spring of 2014, al-Sisi was elected as the new president
of Egypt, but has already displayed authoritarian tendencies in
his arrest of up to 40 000 Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers, severe
abuse in police custody, the stifling of popular descent, and the
excessive terrorism charges forced upon three western journalists.
4.4. Israel/Palestine
42. The overall situation and the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict is one that has continued for decades, and is thus too
extensive to document in this report. However, the persecution of
Christian communities remains a serious concern.
43. There has been an increase in the number of violent attacks
by Israeli settlers on Christian Palestinians, churches and monasteries.
For instance, a Palestinian monastery was firebombed in August 2013,
and there were several accounts of vandalism, including abusive
graffiti, on churches and cemeteries in both 2012 and 2013.
44. In Israel, the State has been attempting to integrate Christian
Palestinians into civil or military service. However, the community
has found this difficult to accept because of the violent nature
of the actions of Israel's armed forces in Palestine. A more pressing
concern in the area is the proposed extension of the Israeli security barrier
through areas like the Bethlehem hills. There are plans to extend
the wall and cut off Palestinians living in Battir from their famously
fertile terraced hillsides using Roman irrigation systems, an act
which would remove citizens' freedoms and their ability to support
themselves.
5. International action
and developments
45. The international community was relatively slow to
react to voracious “IS” advances, and there was a reluctance to
intervene in a region which has caused such well-documented recent
controversy. The presence of “IS” in Syria adds further complications
for any potential international actors because of the recent open desire
from most western governments – in the face of Russian opposition
– for the Assad regime to end; yet now those very same governments
may be left with little choice but to support Assad – however indirectly
– in fighting “IS”. That said, late August and early September 2014
has seen an increase in international efforts to contain a situation
that is spiralling out of control.
46. In July 2014, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 2169, which condemned the violence and encouraged member
States to support the humanitarian missions in the region.
By
15 August, the Security Council had passed another resolution (Resolution
2170) admitting that parts of Iraq and Syria were now under the
control of “IS”.
47. In the meantime, States from the international community displayed
a reluctance to re-engage in the complicated web of conflicts in
the region, for varying reasons. The mood in the United States was
still against another foreign intervention after the scarring experiences
of previous interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Russia
maintained its steadfast stance for the explicit respect of sovereignty
of the particular States concerned. However, both America and Russia
used their position in the region to provide support for the Iraqi Government.
The United States provided surveillance information from drones
to help Iraqi forces locate “IS” fighters and Russia delivered 12
Sukhoi SU-15 fighter jets for the Iraqi forces.
48. By mid-August, the United States and its European allies started
to conduct air strikes with F/A-18 fighter jets and sent 1 000 military
advisors to help run Iraqi operations. By 23 August 2014, the United
States had carried out at least 60 air raids against “IS”, and the
United Kingdom and Australia sent Chinook helicopters and two C130
planes respectively. It was around this time that countries such
as the United Kingdom, France and Germany started to supply the
Kurdish Peshmerga forces with military hardware ranging from hi-tech goggles
to ammunition after the Kurds requested international assistance.
This was a significant step which highlighted the real threat “IS”
poses because supporting the Kurdish forces so visibly is in opposition
to the efforts over the last decade to establish a strong government
and a unified Iraqi State.
49. In response to these increasing interventions, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov recalled on 25 August 2014 that, at first,
the Americans and some Europeans had supported the “IS” because
it was fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia
was ready to work together with the international community and
co-ordinate actions with the countries that have been directly subjected
to the terrorist threat, Iraq and Syria, in respect for their sovereignty.
50. However, the beheadings of US journalists James Foley on 20
August and Steven Sotloff on 3 September 2014 caused international
outrage, and turned the tide of US public opinion towards a greater
role in the conflict. The United States intensified its air strikes
to 143, as of 8 September, and extended the remit of involvement
from the original goals protecting vulnerable communities such as
the Kurds and Yazidis, to defending Iraqi infrastructure and “supporting
Iraqi and Kurdish defence forces”.
By 11 September 2014, President
Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had explicitly threatened
more American action against “IS” and outlined a strategy for doing
so. “Our objective is clear” declared Obama, “we will degrade and ultimately
destroy [“IS”] through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism
strategy”.
That strategy will entail: air strikes
against “IS”, even in Syria; support for allied ground forces, but
not Assad's forces; 475 non-combatant US military personnel; counterterrorism
measures to restrict “IS” funding and recruitment; and further humanitarian
assistance. The broad response to “IS” envisaged by the United States
was coming to fruition by 15 September 2014. Secretary of State
John Kerry secured the support of 10 nations in the region, along
with many European countries, including France, the United Kingdom
and Turkey to a limited extent because of 49 hostages held by the
militants at the time.
51. On 24 September 2014, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted a landmark resolution (S/RES/2178 (2014)),
on “Threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts”, to compel States to prevent
their citizens from joining the jihadists. Specifically, signatory
States must “prevent and suppress recruiting, organising, transporting,
and equipping” Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs).
52. By 25 September, the US-led anti-“IS” coalition was fully
in action, with three nights of air strikes having already taken
place. US, Saudi and UAE aircraft bombed 12 Syrian oil refineries
controlled by “IS”, killing 14 “IS” militants in the process, and
regrettably five civilians. The aim is to reduce the extent to which
“IS” is able to sustain itself through the illegal sale of oil from
these refineries on the black market. According to the United States,
they provide $2 million per day in revenue. More than 40 countries
are now part of the US-led anti-“IS” coalition, including the United
Kingdom, Denmark and Australia. The Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, David Cameron, told the United Nations that “IS” is an
“evil against which the whole world must unite”,
but he represents one of many governments
that remain mindful of the 2003 Iraq war and remain against sending in
ground troops.
53. In the meantime, the Muslim community in Europe has mobilised
to reject the actions of “IS”, denouncing their actions as not being
representative of Islam as a whole. A British community organisation,
Active Change Foundation (ACF), has set up a “Not In My Name” campaign,
which has gained attention online and received remarks at the United
Nations. There have also been rallies attended by hundreds of Muslims
across France as a reaction against the tragic murder of French
national Hervé Gourdel in Algeria
.
6. Conclusions
54. In conclusion, I wish first of all to underline the
obvious: neither the “IS” nor any other similar terrorist group
active in the Middle East act in the name of Islam or represent
a majority of Muslims. I therefore welcome the mobilisation of the
Muslim community in Europe against the actions of “IS”. In this
respect, I see the need for the Muslim societies to rediscover their
great Islamic heritage. The heritage that endowed the Baghdad of the
10th century with 860 licensed pharmacies and street lighting when
Paris had none; the heritage of philosophy and of promoting Aristotle
to the West; the heritage of compassion and benevolence so prominent in
the Koran; and, above all the tradition of peaceful and fruitful
co-existence with the other religions “of the book'', Christians
and Jews, but also with believers of any other faith; the tradition
which helped the great Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria
to survive to this day; the tradition which Muhammad Himself inaugurated
by personally safeguarding St Catherine's monastery in the Sinai
peninsula.
55. That said, the immediate priority today is to stop the ongoing
massacre and the international community should do its utmost to
contribute to bringing peace to the region.
56. All States in the Middle East and the wider international
community must condemn together the violent actions and ethnic cleansing
by “IS” and join forces to face the current crisis and prevent similar
ones in the future. The international community should help ensure
that those responsible for gross human rights violations are brought
to justice, without impunity, and the States in the region should
fully co-operate towards this end.
57. Council of Europe member States, observer States, and partners
for democracy must recognise that current humanitarian missions
are woefully insufficient given the unprecedented humanitarian crisis
we are now facing. Therefore together they should increase humanitarian
aid supplies to existing camps across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon
and Turkey, and expand aid programmes further. Nothing diffuses
tension and historical suspicion so much as a helping hand in one's
most tragic hour; we saw that following the earthquakes in Greece
and Turkey when the two nations rushed to help each other. Then
we need a globally organised and well-funded programme of reconstruction
for the affected areas, supervised by the United Nations.
58. It has been reported that around 3 000 young Europeans are
fighting for “IS” in Iraq and Syria. Member States of the Council
of Europe should increase efforts to identify and dismantle recruitment
channels and to prosecute those responsible. In addition, “IS” sources
of funds should also be identified and, whenever possible, neutralised.
59. The government of Iraq must be supported in its attempts to
provide a credible alternative for Muslims away from the draws of
“IS”. Contrary to what was the case in recent years, universal inclusivity
must be promoted at all levels. The Iraqi government and the Iraqi
security forces have a responsibility to ensure reported incidents
of excessive force and discrimination against religious and ethnic
minorities under Nuri al-Maliki are not repeated.
60. While respecting the freedom and independence of the media,
the international community should strongly encourage the region's
media sources to engage in and uphold standards of 'good practice',
and therefore refrain from inciting religious or ethnic hatred.
61. Christian communities and other religious and ethnic communities,
in particular the Yazidis and the Kurds, should be encouraged to
actively participate in ongoing discussions on the future of Iraq
and Syria.
62. Regional co-operation should be strengthened among all countries
in the Middle East, with a view to creating diversity in understanding
and empowering minorities. The work of the Council of Europe on intercultural
dialogue, including its religious dimension, is worth recalling
in this regard.
63. Member States of the Council of Europe should use their bilateral
relations with States affected by “IS” to encourage them to maintain
the development of human rights and civil liberties.
64. The international community should encourage the upholding
of fair and equitable status for all citizens irrespective of their
religious or ethnic origin. All should be equal before the law,
with no religious law beyond appeal to civil courts.
65. Countries in the region must be encouraged to recognise that
democracy alone is not enough and to ensure that respect for human
rights, which are components of their own civilisation, is constitutionally guaranteed.
66. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should
develop the political aspect of its annual “Exchanges on the Religious
Dimension of Intercultural Dialogue” and consider discussing the
different religious perspectives of human dignity.
67. Finally, as already requested in Recommendation
1957 (2011), the Council of Europe should envisage possible ways
to monitor the situation of governmental and societal restrictions
on religious freedom and related rights in Council of Europe member
States and in States in the Council of Europe's neighbourhood, and report
periodically to the Assembly.