1. Introduction
1. Irregular migration to Europe
is facilitated and even promoted by the activities of a network
of migrant smugglers. The numbers of migrants arriving in Europe
as a result of these activities has increased dramatically in recent
years. For the European Union, the European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) reports
over 500 000 “illegal border-crossings” between January and August
2015, as compared to 280 000 in all of 2014, 107 000 in 2013 and
72 000 in 2012. One can safely assume that the great majority of
these have had recourse to migrant smugglers during their journeys.
Organised crime groups are now believed to make more money – in
the billions of euros – from smuggling migrants than from more traditional
contraband such as arms or drugs, and tens of thousands of smugglers
are believed to be involved in the European Union alone, forming
more or less loosely structured networks with connections across
the continent and beyond to countries of origin and transit.
2. The present report, in accordance with the original motion,
is intended to examine the involvement of organised crime in migrant
smuggling and exploitation and the means to fight against it, and
consider how to strengthen co-operation between judicial and police
services and information exchange among member States.
3. Recognition of the need for international efforts to combat
the role played by organised crime in migrant smuggling is reflected
in the adoption by the United Nations of a specific protocol to
its Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, namely the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. These
instruments are promoted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC); Interpol is also involved in combating migrant smuggling.
At a European level, a range of European Union agencies are active, notably
Europol, the European Commission and the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the latter being responsible
for the European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean
(EUNAVFOR MED) against migrant smugglers. Within the Council of
Europe, the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) is expected
to undertake an urgent analysis of the legal shortcomings presently
inhibiting prosecution of migrant smugglers, with a possible view
to drafting a new regional instrument reinforcing those of the United
Nations, intended to enhance practical co-operation amongst member
States of the Council of Europe and States in neighbouring regions.
4. Nevertheless, despite the various international instruments
and mechanisms and the efforts of national authorities, when compared
with the scale of migrant smuggling into Europe in recent years,
it is striking how difficult it has proved to prosecute and convict
migrant smugglers. That said, there have been significant successes,
notably in Italy, and additional resources are being made available
and new initiatives taken at both national and European levels.
5. Smuggling is not the only way in which organised crime groups
seek to profit from irregular migrants. Experience in Italy and
elsewhere shows that organised crime groups are also involved in,
for example, labour exploitation of irregular migrants and corruption
associated with national asylum systems. There have also been reports
of smuggled migrants being used as carriers for illegal drugs.
6. The present report will not address the question of trafficking
in human beings, which falls within the mandate of the Committee
on Equality and Non-Discrimination. (Migrant smuggling and human
trafficking are distinct on four main grounds: migrant smuggling
is voluntary and consensual, whereas human trafficking involves
coercion or deception; smuggling ends when the migrant reaches their
destination, whereas victims of trafficking continue to be exploited
after arrival; profits in smuggling derive from migrants’ payment
for transport, whereas those in trafficking derive from exploitation
of the victims; and migrant smuggling is always transnational, whereas
trafficking need not be. This does not mean that migrants may not
be exposed to abuse by smugglers during their journeys, or that
they may not find themselves subjected to exploitation at their destinations.)
7. During preparation of the report, the rapporteur visited Rome
(Italy), where he met representatives of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), the Italian Ministry of the Interior,
the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute,
the Italian parliamentary Anti-mafia Commission and the Italian
Anti-corruption Authority; and the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Displaced Persons held a hearing with the participation of representatives
of the European Union, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
Europol and the Council of Europe’s Information Society and Action
against Crime Directorate. The rapporteur would take this opportunity
to thank all those involved for their invaluable contributions.
2. Activities of organised
criminal groups relating to migration
8. The main area of activity concerning
migration in which organised crime groups are involved is smuggling
of migrants. Migrants are smuggled to Europe from around the world,
notably South-East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (especially Afghanistan,
and Afghan refugees from neighbouring countries such as Pakistan),
the Middle East (especially Syria and Iraq, and refugees leaving
neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan), the Horn of
Africa (especially Eritrea and Somalia) and West Africa (especially
Nigeria and Mali). With visa requirements and carrier liability
laws increasingly the norm, air transport has become increasingly
difficult as a means of irregular migration; instead, most smuggled
migrants travel by land and/or sea. Even migrants from South and
East Asia have been smuggled into Europe across the Mediterranean, having
first flown to West or North Africa, although their numbers have
fallen in recent years.
9. From West Africa, the main possible routes are either: to
the Canary Islands; through Mali to Algeria, Morocco and then Ceuta
or Melilla; through Niger to Libya and then Italy; and through Niger
or directly to Chad, Sudan, Egypt and then Greece, either by sea
or via Turkey. (Nationals of member States of the Economic Community
of West African States enjoy freedom of movement between them.)
From Syria, Iraq and neighbouring countries, the main routes are
either: west through Egypt, to reach Europe either directly to Greece
or via Libya to Italy; south as far as Sudan, before returning north
through Libya and then to Italy; and north through Turkey to Greece.
10. A key distinction is to be made between “pay-as-you-go” journeys
consisting of separate stages, arranged one after the other by the
migrant, sometimes with long intervals during which money is earned
to pay off debts or meet future expenses; and “full package” journeys
prepared in advance by a single smuggler, co-ordinating the activities
of others, and often not paid for in full until completion, from
money deposited with a trusted third-party. Cost may also depend
on the “quality of service”, for example the degree of overcrowding on
a boat or having a place on deck as opposed to in the hold: in both
instances, the key consideration is in reality the relative danger
involved. The different prices charged to migrants of different
nationalities – on the Central Mediterranean route, for example,
West Africans are reported to pay less than Syrians – often reflect this,
as well as their relative financial resources. Some migrants may
travel for free during parts of a journey in return for performing
certain functions, for example acting as pilot of a boat.
11. Although not the approach taken by the great majority of smuggled
migrants, a considerable number overcome administrative barriers
such as visa requirements by use of corruptly acquired, altered
or forged documents – a form of “full package”. The cost of such
documents and of airline tickets puts this approach beyond the financial
reach of most migrants. Those using this approach may be accompanied
on their journeys or met upon arrival by accomplices of the smugglers,
who retrieve valuable and potentially incriminating documents after
arrival.
12. A wide range of ancillary illegal activities is connected
to migrant smuggling, including document forging, corruption of
local or consulate officials to obtain documents, lorry drivers’
failure to declare concealed passengers when crossing borders, and
corruption of border- and coast-guards. Smugglers may also commit offences
in the way they treat migrants, for instance forced labour in order
to discharge debts, unlawful detention prior to embarkation, and
rape or other sexual and physical assaults; or in connection with
the dangerous, unseaworthy conditions of the vessels in which migrants
are abandoned at sea. Several smugglers arrested after being rescued
from their sinking vessels have been charged with homicide-related
offences in connection with the deaths of migrant passengers. Smuggled
migrants may be induced to carry illegal drugs, which are increasingly
smuggled into West Africa from South America. Organised crime groups
involved in migrant smuggling may also be involved in trafficking
of human beings. Money-laundering offences may be committed in connection
with the revenues generated by migrant smuggling.
13. The involvement of organised crime does not end upon arrival
in Europe. In addition to arranging further irregular movement from
the country of first arrival to the intended destination, it may
take other forms. The “mafia capitale” scandal in Rome involves,
amongst other things, corruption of public authorities by organised crime
groups in the award of contracts for constructing and administering
refugee reception centres. Active members of a migrant smuggling
network have been arrested from amongst the residents of one such
centre at Mineo in Sicily, where migrants, trapped by extremely
lengthy asylum procedures, are exploited by local agricultural businesses
and criminals. Exploitation of irregular migrant workers is widespread
in southern Italy, sometimes under the abusive caporalato system of intermediaries,
and may involve local organised crime groups. Italy is not, of course
the only country affected: for example, the 2004 “Morecombe Bay
cockling disaster” in the United Kingdom involved the deaths by
drowning of 21 Chinese illegal migrant labourers, unlawfully employed
by a local firm, who had been smuggled into Liverpool docks by Chinese
organised crime groups. These examples also illustrate the co-operation
between those smuggling migrants to Europe and those involved with
them within Europe thereafter.
3. Structure and organisation
of migrant smuggling groups
14. The United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime defines an “organised criminal group”
as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing
one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly,
a financial or other material benefit”.
The
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
establishes three offences: the smuggling of migrants; producing or
procuring, providing or possessing a fraudulent travel or identity
document for the purpose of enabling migrant smuggling; and enabling
illegal over-staying through document fraud or “any other illegal
means”.
The protocol also provides that these
offences shall be considered as established in accordance with the
United Nations convention. As regards migrant smuggling, therefore,
criminal activity will fall within the scope of the United Nations
convention provided it is committed by a structured group of three
or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert.
15. Whilst a common public perception of organised crime groups
is of extensive, structured, centralised mafia-type organisations,
those involved in migrant smuggling are generally much smaller in
scale and more diffuse in nature. This does not mean, however, that
there are not continuous chains of activity leading from countries
of origin through transit countries to destination countries. Rather
than being “administered” by a single, over-arching “authority”,
however, more often there is ad hoc co-operation between otherwise
separate groups. Many smugglers have definite business models and
practices, even, for example, advertising their destinations and
prices on social media such as Facebook and making efforts to maintain
a good reputation for their “services”. Recent investigations, notably
by anti-mafia prosecutors in southern Italy, however, have revealed
more ambitious, structured and permanent networks. These include
that led by Ermias Ghermay, based in Libya, with an international
network of associates and able to offer a wide range of migrant-smuggling services,
who is suspected of being responsible for the Lampedusa disaster
of October 2013, in which some 366 migrants drowned.
16. There has been some disagreement as to the extent to which
migrant smuggling on certain routes, in particular from west Africa,
involves or should be categorised as organised crime. Given the
persistence and growing scale of irregular migration to Europe,
the sophistication of the methods employed and the cumulatively
enormous sums of money now at stake, however, there would seem today
to be little doubt that the definition in the United Nations convention
is generally satisfied. There may nevertheless be local opportunists
who occasionally, for example, transport migrants in addition to
their usual cargo, or who react to local circumstances such as the
unexpected closure of border crossing points that force migrants
to seek alternatives, as was the case in the western Balkans this
year: the activities of such individuals would probably not qualify
as “organised crime”. As one might expect, generally speaking, the
longer, more complicated and more regularly frequented the route
on which a particular migrant smuggling group operates, the more
likely its activity is to amount to “organised crime”.
17. In many countries of origin and transit, smugglers seem to
be able to operate more or less openly, advertising their “services”
publicly, operating from fixed premises and even having high standing
in the local community. They may have moved from legal activities,
such as travel agency, commercial transport or fishing, to related
migrant smuggling activities, or engage in both simultaneously.
Some may be former migrants themselves, who have gradually built
up their activities on the basis of their own experience and knowledge and
the networks of contacts they have developed in the course of their
travels. Smugglers may be either locals or of the same nationality
as those migrants passing through a particular location: shared
ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds may facilitate contacts
and trust between migrants and smugglers.
18. Certain organisational characteristics appear to be shared
by groups of migrant smugglers in different countries. Even at a
single location, different individuals may be responsible for specific
functions such as making initial contact with migrants and liaising
with those providing transport, providing accommodation, accompanying
migrants to this accommodation and subsequently to the point of
embarkation, and, in the case of maritime routes, transporting them
to the vessels on which they are expected to complete their journeys.
In the case of smugglers operating the central Mediterranean route,
for example, the aim is also to isolate the migrants from the principal
smugglers, in order to avoid their being able to identify them in
future.
19. Even if often lacking large-scale organisation or over-arching
structures, migrant smuggling is big business. Europol has estimated
that some 30 000 people are involved in migrant smuggling groups
across the European Union. The Austrian authorities estimate that
200 groups are active in Greece alone, and that smugglers have spread
throughout the western Balkans and into Hungary and beyond. Frontex
states that migrant smuggling and human trafficking now generate
more money for organised crime groups than the illicit weapons or
drugs trades.
4. Activities of international
organisations involved in the fight against migrant smuggling
20. As noted above, the UNODC is
guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised
Crime and its Protocols, including that against smuggling of migrants
by land, sea and air. The UNODC’s activities aim at assisting States
in bringing their legislation into line with the protocol and developing an
effective criminal justice response to migrant smuggling. This includes,
for example, a Model Law against the Smuggling of Migrants, training
for national officials, a Toolkit to Combat Smuggling of Migrants,
and publication of research and policy documents.
21. Europol provides support to major international investigations
by co-ordinating operational activities, providing forensic and
technical expertise, and access to criminal intelligence and analysis.
It works to strengthen co-operation with countries of transit and
origin, including under the EU enlargement process with countries
in the western Balkans and Turkey. Its activities may also involve
non-law enforcement actors such as judicial authorities, customs
and border authorities, NGOs, academia and the private sector. One
of its objectives is to reduce information gaps by delivering strategic
analyses and specialised reports. Specific activities include “Joint
Operational Team (JOT) Mare”, launched in March 2015 to ensure an
intensified exchange of intelligence with Frontex and close co-operation
with Interpol, with seconded national experts facilitating co-operation
between Europol and the services of the participating EU member
States. Europol (along with Frontex) is also involved in debriefing
newly arrived migrants and refugees, in particular at the European
Union’s “hotspots” in Italy and Greece, with a view to obtaining
intelligence on migrant smuggling operations.
22. On 27 May 2015, the European Commission published an “EU Action
Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020)”. This contains four
chapters: 1) enhanced police and judicial response to disrupt smugglers’ business
models, including the EUNAVFOR MED “Operation Sophia” (see below)
and asset seizure; 2) improved information sharing and gathering,
including by strengthening the roles of Europol, EU delegations and
the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community, using the “hotspots”
proposed for reception and processing of asylum applicants as information
sources, and Internet monitoring; 3) enhanced prevention of smuggling
and assistance to vulnerable migrants, including public awareness
campaigns for example concerning risks, working with business operators
in at-risk areas such as transport and shipping, enhancing the effectiveness of
returns as a deterrent, technical support to countries of origin
and transit; and 4) stronger action against employment of irregular
migrants; and stronger co-operation with third countries to address
root causes of migration, promote accession to the United Nations
migrant smuggling protocol and improve capacity of third countries.
5. Successes in the fight against
migrant smuggling and related organised crime activities
23. In Europe, it is perhaps not
surprising that Italy, given its disproportionate exposure to irregular
migration and hard-won expertise in the fight against organised
crime, leads the way in the combat against migrant smuggling. Recent
successes include the following:
- in
December 2014, a joint operation involving Italian and German police
led to the arrest of ten Eritrean suspected migrant smugglers, part
of a highly active network smuggling migrants from Libya to Italy
and onwards to other European countries. Amongst those arrested
was the man allegedly responsible for the journey that resulted
in the deaths of some 244 people off the coast of Libya in June
that year. As well as Italy and Germany, the group was alleged to
have cells in several other European countries;
- in April 2015, two alleged smugglers – the captain and
a crewman – were arrested from amongst the survivors of a shipwreck
off the coast of Libya in which some 800 or more migrants had drowned;
- during the same period, Italian police issued warrants
for 24 alleged members, of various non-European nationalities, of
a wider group of migrant smugglers. 15 of them were arrested in
Sicily (including at the Mineo reception centre – see above), Milan
and Rome, but not the two alleged ringleaders (who include Ermias
Ghermay – see above), said to live in Libya;
- in August 2015, Italian police arrested five alleged migrant
smugglers, again from amongst rescued survivors of a shipwreck off
the Libyan coast;
- later that month, a further ten were arrested in connection
with the wreck of two boats off the Libyan coast in which at least
84 people died. The UNHCR hoped that “this incident will result
in strong co-operation among European police forces, intelligence
agencies and international organisations to crack down on the smuggling
trade while putting in place measures to protect and care for victims”.
24. Other European countries have also achieved results in combating
smuggling, including, recently, the following:
- in February 2015, the Spanish
authorities, supported by Europol, arrested five alleged members
of a network active in several European countries and in Pakistan,
engaged in migrant smuggling, document forging and labour exploitation;
- in March 2015, the Greek authorities, supported by Europol,
arrested 16 suspects, of seven different nationalities, in connection
with smuggling of mainly Syrian migrants by sea from Turkey, and
onwards to other EU countries using forged documents. The group
was suspected of having made up to €7 500 000 in profits;
- in May 2015, Spanish police arrested the leader and 12
members of a group allegedly responsible for smuggling migrants
from Afghanistan to Europe; a further 11 were arrested in the United
Kingdom. Upon arrival in Spain and Italy, the migrants had been
dispersed to other European countries, including Germany and Sweden;
- also in May, German police, supported by Europol, arrested
three key members of a group that smuggled migrants by various routes
between Africa and southern Europe; these arrests followed an earlier
five, which had led to the existence of a second group becoming
apparent;
- in June 2015, four men (three British and one of Kurdish
origin) went on trial in the United Kingdom, charged with offences
connected to a “large and organised” smuggling group;
- in late August 2015, Hungarian police arrested three Bulgarians
and an Afghan in connection with the earlier discovery of the bodies
of 71 presumably smuggled migrants in the back of a refrigerated
lorry in Austria. They were expected to be extradited to Austria.
A fifth suspect, also Bulgarian, was arrested in Bulgaria;
- in early September 2015, four Syrians were arrested in
Turkey, suspected of being involved in the migrant smuggling operation
that led to the death of 3-year old Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi;
- in October 2015, the Europol-supported, Franco-Portuguese
“Operation Bouquet”, initiated in December 2013, culminated in the
arrest of nine key members of a criminal network transporting irregular
migrants within the European Union;
- between 15 and 23 September 2014, Europol acted as the
co-ordination centre for Operation Archimedes, the largest police
operation ever conducted against organised crime in Europe. Amongst other
results, the operation led to 170 arrests for “facilitation of illegal
immigration”.
25. Although only partial information, these arrests and prosecutions
illustrate certain key issues in the fight against migrant smuggling.
Encouragingly, they show that effective co-operation between European
police forces is already taking place, and that co-ordinated efforts
to dismantle international smuggling networks have met with success,
at least as regards their European elements. On the other hand,
this means that only one “end” of the smuggling pipelines is being
disrupted, and, given their nature, not in a way that could definitively close
them or even necessarily cause serious, long-standing damage. In
every case, albeit for understandable reasons, only persons physically
in Europe were arrested or prosecuted. From what is known about
the working methods of migrant smuggling groups, those arrested
after rescue from shipwrecks would presumably have been low-level
associates and certainly not the central, leading figures, who would
have remained safely in Libya; they may even have been basically
migrants themselves who had agreed, for example, to pilot a boat.
26. The examples also show that organised crime groups composed
of non-Europeans operate not only to smuggle migrants to Europe,
but also within Europe. It is highly unlikely that such groups operate
without being known to and, in one way or another, associated with
local organised crime groups, especially in places such as southern
Italy where such groups are particularly powerful and territorial.
27. It should be noted that in early September, the Italian authorities,
citing intercepted telephone conversations between suspected migrant
smugglers, claimed that the relative switch in emphasis from the central
Mediterranean to the eastern Mediterranean route this summer was
partly due to the increasing number of arrests in Italy – over 100
between June and August in Italy alone. If true, this again shows
the flexibility and responsiveness of migrant smugglers in the face
of efforts to halt their activities. (This can be seen alongside Frontex’s
view of the possible displacement effect of EUNAVFOR MED operations.)
28. Efforts to prevent migrant smuggling based primarily on strict
border control may have local effects but do not necessarily address
the broader phenomenon. Irregular migration from west Africa to
the Spanish Canary Islands (the “Western African route”), for example,
has greatly reduced in recent years because of enhanced co-operation
with and co-ordination of the activities of national authorities
in the region. On the other hand, despite the efforts of the Moroccan
authorities and the erection of a high-security fence and maritime surveillance
systems around Spain’s north African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla,
irregular migration increased dramatically in 2011 and, following
a decrease in 2012, rose again in 2013 and 2014. Migrants from the
west African countries of origin most represented along these routes
are also being smuggled in huge numbers along the central Mediterranean
route, which saw an increase of over 970% between 2012 and 2014.
This again underlines the flexibility of migrant smuggling networks
and the desperation and determination of the migrants, willing to
risk ever more dangerous journeys even across deserts and seas.
Furthermore, the longer, more difficult and/or complicated the journey
a migrant faces, the greater the likelihood that he or she will
be forced to have recourse to migrant smugglers. Other things being
equal, border control is likely to have a proportionately greater
“positive” effect on levels of recourse to migrant smugglers than
a “negative” effect on irregular migration. In this respect, resettlement
programmes for refugees in over-burdened countries of first asylum
and safe and legal channels for regular migration can offer alternatives
to irregular migration facilitated by migrant smugglers, reducing
demand and thereby the potential revenues available to organised
criminal groups.
6. Additional approaches to
combating organised crime related to migration
6.1. EUNAVFOR MED “Operation
Sophia”
29. The European Union’s EUNAVFOR
MED “Operation Sophia” was established to disrupt the business model
of migrant smuggling networks in the Mediterranean, first and foremost
those operating from Libya, and contribute to reducing the loss
of life at sea. Inspired by the successful operation against pirates
off the Horn of Africa, it consists of three phases: surveillance
and assessment; boarding, search and, if necessary, seizure and
diversion of suspicious vessels; and disposal of vessels and related
assets, “preferably before use”, and apprehension of smugglers.
The EU Council Decision establishing the operation contains numerous references
to international law, including United Nations conventions such
as that on the law of the sea, the Protocol against smuggling of
migrants by land, sea and air and the Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees. On 14 September, the EU Council decided that
the phase 1 objectives and the conditions necessary to launch phase
2 were met; on 7 October, with the required assets available and
rules of engagement agreed, the European Union launched phase 2,
involving six naval units and seven planes and helicopters, and
three more vessels expected.
30. On 9 October 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 2240 (2015). Expressed in precise and restrictive terms,
this resolution inter alia authorises,
for a period of one year, member States to: i) inspect on the high
seas off the coast of Libya (not in Libyan territorial waters) vessels
that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for
migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, provided good
faith efforts have been made to obtain prior consent from the vessel’s
flag State; ii) seize such vessels if confirmed as being used for
such purpose; and iii) take further action, including disposal,
in accordance with applicable international law and with due consideration
to the interests of third parties acting in good faith. The resolution
is expressly intended not to undermine individuals’ human rights
or prevent them from seeking international protection; it requires
that all migrants, including asylum seekers, be treated with humanity
and dignity and that their rights be fully respected, with all States
urged to comply with their obligations under international law,
including international human rights and international refugee law.
31. Given that the smugglers themselves probably do not leave
shore, let alone territorial waters, and often use vessels they
consider as disposable – in the expectation that if and when intercepted
or rescued by European authorities, those vessels’ passengers will
be transported to European ports –, it is unclear how fundamentally
disruptive the operation’s methods will be. The European Union has
recognised that military action alone cannot achieve a lasting solution
and may lead to a shift in departure sites. In this respect, the Executive
Director of Frontex has also commented that “[i]f there is a military
operation in the vicinity of Libya, that could change migration
routes and shift them towards the eastern route. We are already
seeing people from Africa arriving in Greece … We may see striking
changes”. Indeed, the hugely increased use in 2015 of the route
from Turkey to the Greek Aegean islands for smuggling migrants of
various origins is fully in line with this prediction.
6.2. Combating money laundering
32. One area in which organised
crime groups may be vulnerable to investigation and prosecution
is the laundering of the proceeds of their criminal activity, which
often takes place through “underground banking systems”. Indeed,
this is recognised in the United Nations convention, which contains
provisions to criminalise and combat money laundering that, for
those States that have ratified it, would extend also to the proceeds
of offences under the migrant-smuggling protocol. At the European
level, the Council of Europe has elaborated two conventions in this
area, most recently the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and
on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198). Regrettably, the 2005
convention, which is open to non-member States, has been ratified
by only 26 member States (the earlier, 1990 convention, still in
force but felt to be in need of updating, has however been ratified by
all 47) and no non-members.
33. The Council of Europe also conducts ongoing activities against
money laundering in the form of MONEYVAL, the Committee of experts
on the evaluation of anti-money laundering measures and the financing of
terrorism. In 2005, MONEYVAL published a report entitled “Proceeds
from trafficking in human beings and illegal migration/human smuggling”.
More
recently, in 2011, the international Financial Action Task Force,
the implementation of whose standards by certain Council of Europe
member States is monitored by MONEYVAL, issued a report entitled
“Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings
and Smuggling of Migrants”. Between them, these reports make the
following recommendations of particular relevance to combating money
laundering associated with migrant smuggling:
i. rapid implementation of the FATF recommendations on alternative
remittance and wire transfers, given the importance of money remittance
services in offences of migrant smuggling, and on cash couriers;
ii. criminalisation of “self-laundering” (or “own laundering”,
as distinct from recourse to professional launderers);
iii. requiring those convicted of migrant smuggling offences
to demonstrate the origin of alleged proceeds or other property
liable to confiscation (in effect, shifting the burden of proof);
iv. special attention to identification of beneficial ownership
of companies (customer due diligence requirements and transparency
and beneficial ownership of legal persons);
v. ensuring good quality suspicious transaction reporting
obligations, effective financial intelligence units and competent
law-enforcement and investigative authorities;
vi. reinforcing international co-operation, including through
international instruments, mutual legal assistance and extradition.
6.3. Fighting corruption of public
officials
34. Another area where efforts
can be made to combat the activities of organised criminal groups
relating to migration is corruption of public officials, which,
as noted above, may occur in relation not only to e.g. irregular border
crossing or the obtaining of travel documents, but also to activities
of public authorities dealing with migrants after their arrival
(e.g. the “mafia capitale” scandal in Italy). The United Nations
convention contains provisions to criminalise and combat corruption.
At the European level, the Council of Europe has elaborated the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 173), the preamble
to which recognises the links between organised crime and corruption,
and which is open to non-member States: 44 member States have ratified
and
one non-member State has acceded to this convention (Belarus). GRECO
(Group of States against Corruption), an inter-governmental body
specialising in the fight against corruption which monitors implementation
of the convention, has not specifically addressed corruption in
the context of migrant smuggling. Nevertheless, more effective implementation
of the United Nations and Council of Europe conventions and, potentially,
targeted activities by GRECO should also contribute to combating
the activities of migrant smugglers.
6.4. Countering cybercrime/criminal
misuse of the Internet
35. The use of Internet-based social
media by migrant smugglers to attract custom may also represent
an area of vulnerability. The rapporteur notes the existence of
Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre and the Council of Europe’s
Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185). It is unclear, however,
to what extent these could be used to suppress, possibly through
criminal prosecution, the use of social media as an element of criminal
activity such as migrant smuggling. Nevertheless, the rapporteur
believes that this is an aspect of the migrant smuggling business
model that may be susceptible to greater pressure from law-enforcement
bodies, and thus merit further examination.
7. Conclusions
and recommendations
36. It is clear that international
co-operation, through an inter-agency, multisectoral approach, will
be essential to enhance efforts to disrupt migrant smugglers’ activities.
The rapporteur believes that every effort should be made to enhance
co-operation between the various European and international bodies,
bringing the widest range of expertise and resources to bear, with
a view to developing innovative, holistic responses to migrant smuggling
and related criminal activities.
37. As regards the efforts of national authorities, these should
be based on harmonisation of legal standards and reinforcement of
mechanisms to ensure effective information sharing and practical
co-operation. To this end, all Council of Europe member States,
as well as those non-member States that are the principle countries of
origin and transit for smuggled migrants, should ratify and effectively
implement relevant legal instruments such as the United Nations
convention and protocol and the above-mentioned Council of Europe
conventions on money laundering and corruption, and should engage
fully with the relevant co-operation and monitoring bodies.
38. The aim must be to use all possible means to transform migrant
smuggling, and the various offences often associated with it, from
low-risk, high-return to high-risk, low-return activities.