1. Introduction
1. Since the beginning of the
“Dignity Revolution”,
the
Parliamentary Assembly has stood together with those in Tunisia
who have applied themselves to building a new society – a society
attached to democracy, good governance and respect for fundamental
rights. This was a major challenge and this is why the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy has followed developments in
this country closely and why the Assembly adopted three Resolutions
in 2011 (
1791 and
1819) and 2012 (
1893). In the latter text we noted that Tunisia was on the
right path and called on the National Constituent Assembly (NCA)
to give Tunisians “a constitution commensurate with the revolutionary
ideals and consistent with international constitutional standards
and practice”.
2. It was at the initiative of the committee that the President
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Mr Gianni Buquicchio, met representatives of Tunisian civil society
in 2011
and
offered to make this body’s constitutional expertise available to
them, and it was in the framework of a “post-observation” mission
of our Assembly that Mr Buquicchio and Ms Simona Granata-Menghini,
Deputy Secretary of the Venice Commission, travelled to Tunisia
on 16 and 17 January 2012, when the NCA was being set up. Our committee
followed the preparation of the new Tunisian Constitution step by
step, through exchanges of views with the Venice Commission Secretariat,
on 15 November 2012, and representatives of the NCA, at the April
2013 and April 2014 part-sessions – the latter attended by Mr Mohamed
El Arbi Abid, Deputy Speaker of the NCA.
3. Our committee also initiated the visit to the Assembly of
Mr Mustapha Ben Jaafar, who spoke about the situation in his country
when the third report by our colleague Ms Anne Brasseur was debated
in plenary sitting on 28 June 2012.
4. More recently, a delegation from the unicameral parliament
which succeeded the NCA in Tunisia attended the meeting of the Sub-Committee
on the Middle East and the Arab World on 21 April 2015, and I myself
had the opportunity to speak to three members of that parliament
last January.
5. Although we have been active since 2011, it has to be said
that the last situation report presented to our Assembly dates from
2012. Since then, the circumstances have, in part, changed. Tunisia
has moved beyond establishing a new institutional framework. It
adopted its new Constitution in January 2014 and has begun to apply
it: parliamentary and presidential elections were held the same
year, and Tunisia had a change of government in summer 2016.
6. The purpose of the present report is to present the main political
developments since our last resolution (June 2012), identify the
challenges which Tunisia faces and assess the extent of its co-operation
with the Council of Europe. It draws in particular on the fact-finding
visit which I made to Tunis from 27 to 30 March 2017.
2. The preparation of a new
Constitution
7. The drafting of the Constitution
of 27 January 2014 was not a sedate affair. In the summer of 2013, Tunisia
was on the brink of civil war, with fears of going the same way
as Egypt uppermost in the minds of all the political players. Yet
nothing of the sort happened: balancing on a knife edge, Tunisian
society was able to make the necessary compromises to maintain its
unity and turn the page of transition, establishing durable institutions.
2.1. The framework (2011-2012)
8. Elected on 23 October 2011,
in a vote winning praise from international observers and our Assembly,
the
NCA fulfilled the functions of a parliamentary assembly for just
over two years, passing laws and supervising the actions of the
government, as well as serving as a constituent assembly. On 10
December 2011, it passed the Law on the Provisional Organisation
of Public Authorities (POPA law), sometimes known as the “Little
Constitution”, providing Tunisia with a minimal constitutional framework,
creating
inter alia the institutions
of the Presidency of the Republic, the Government and the Prime
Minister. The POPA law applied until the entry into force of the
2014 Constitution.
9. Once this law was passed, the so-called “Troika parties” –
Ennahdha (moderate Islamic), the Congress for the Republic (CPR,
secularist and pan-Arabist nationalist) and Ettakatol (secular left-wing
and member of the Socialist International) – formed a governing
coalition, holding the majority in the NCA with 138 seats out of
217. Four months later, in mid-February 2012, work on the Constitution
began in earnest. It was divided between six constitutional drafting
committees, elected proportionally from the groups. Their role was
to draft the articles of the Constitution falling within their field
of competence and then forward their draft to a joint drafting and
co-ordination committee, which could refer texts back to them before
submitting a complete draft to the NCA meeting in plenary session.
The
draft was then to be adopted in two phases: firstly article by article, by
a two-thirds majority, then in a vote on the entire text, again
by a two-thirds majority. In the event of that majority not being
attained, the draft was to be put to a referendum, which did not
happen in the end.
2.2. Deterioration of the political
climate (2011-2013)
10. The NCA was challenged fairly
quickly by the opposition, and the political situation became ever
more tense, polarising Tunisian society between the supporters of
the Troika and its critics.
11. First and foremost, Ennahdha, with 37% of the vote and 89
seats out of 217, while the second-placed CPR held only 8.7% of
the vote, raised fears of hegemonic tendencies.
12. That fear was expressed as early as December 2011, during
the vote on the “Little Constitution”, with opposition criticism
focusing on the division of powers which it felt to be concentrated
in the hands of the Troika, and on the failure to set a duration
limiting the NCA's term of office.
13. One year later, the NCA had still not managed to adopt a draft
Constitution despite the political majority having pledged to do
so when election campaigning in 2011. Moreover, notwithstanding
the efforts made by part of the NCA’s administration, the Troika
members in that administration had not involved civil society in
their proceedings as much as they could have done.
14. But it was above all the committee debates that revealed the
fault lines between the Islamist party and the secular parties.
The two sticking points concerned the place of Islam in the Constitution
and, to a lesser extent, the nature of the regime, sometimes triggering
major street protests.
15. Regarding the first issue, Ennahdha tried, until 2013 and
often in the face of opposition from its Troika partners, to make
the Muslim faith a source of Tunisian law. It tried to secure the
adoption of a definition of the family based on the “complementarity”
of men and women and not on the principle of equality. It also proposed counterbalancing
the civil nature of the Tunisian State by the recognition, in the
draft Preamble to the Constitution, of “constants of Islam” to which
the Constitutional Court could refer, and wished that no revision of
the Constitution could “undermine Islam as the State religion”.
16. The differences were less pronounced over the nature of the
regime. The question of a mixed regime in which the Head of State
was assigned real prerogatives was swiftly settled, and the main
focus of discussions was on the sharing of powers between the Head
of State and the Head of Government.
17. The deterioration of the political climate and the gulf between
the positions of those drafting the Constitution, whose visions
of society were difficult to reconcile, explain why, by June 2013,
the NCA had examined four drafts of the Constitution
without
ultimately adopting any of them. At the same time, the security situation
was deteriorating.
2.3. A deteriorating security
situation and the crisis of summer 2013
18. As of 2012, law-enforcement
agencies violently repressed certain demonstrations of a political
or social
nature
but appeared to find it difficult to do likewise where the Salafists
or
pro-government militias
were involved.
19. The assassination of two opposition leaders within six months
of each other, Mr Chokri Belaïd, on 6 February 2013, then Mr Mohamed
Brahmi, on 25 July 2013, apparently by the same team of jihadists, triggered
waves of protest and the placing of blame on the Troika, criticised
either for its incompetence or its alleged indulgence of jihadists
and Salafists. Ennahdha was also accused of complicity with the
assassins.
20. Mr Mustapha Ben Jaafar, the leader of Ettakatol and former
Speaker of the NCA, described these weeks, when the country teetered
on the brink of civil war:
“The second assassination [that of Mohamed
Brahmi] brought the country to an outright halt, prompting the Errahil
(departure) sit-in on Bardo Square for around a month, which called
for the dissolution of the Assembly. A major crisis took hold of
the country and there was very real deadlock.
…
Debate in Tunisia at that time
was heavily influenced by events in Egypt [on 3 July, the Egyptian
army overthrew President Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood].
Some dreamt of recreating a Tunisian-style ‘Tamarod’ (Rebellion)
to drive the elected majority out of power, while others called
on the population to resist any attempted putsch or military coup
d’état.
The political scene was split
in two, and the channels of dialogue were cut off. Different blocks
began to form on either side of the dividing line between secularists
and Islamists, which I had always dreaded and condemned. Worse still,
most of the political, non-governmental organisations and trade
unions had abandoned their regular participation in institutions
in favour of ‘street politics’ and direct confrontation.
The opposition was laying claim
to a ‘new’ popular legitimacy acquired through power relations,
while the Islamists proclaimed that they had been legitimately elected.
The opposition had formed a National Salvation Front, demanding
the government's immediate resignation and the dissolution of the
NCA which, they said, was no longer representative.
Indeed, 50 or so members of
parliament decided to withdraw from the NCA and join the demonstrators on
Bardo square.
On the other side, the majority
was mobilising its supporters with a ‘call to the people’ to block
the counter-revolution under way. This intimidating climate was
further exacerbated by the deaths of eight national servicemen in
one week, all victims of terror attacks.”
21. On 6 August 2013, Mr Mustapha Ben Jaafar suspended the proceedings
of the NCA.
2.4. Defusing of the crisis and
speeding up of work on the Constitution (summer 2013-2014)
22. The crisis was resolved thanks
to civil society. A quartet made up of the Tunisian General Labour
Union, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts,
the Tunisian Order of Lawyers and the Tunisian Human Rights League
organised a National Dialogue open to the political groups agreeing
to sign a roadmap fixing a point to be reached at the end of the
NCA's work. Twenty-one of them did so, with the exception of the CPR,
a Troika member. The Dialogue sessions started up in mid-September.
23. They paved the way for the resumption of work on the Constitution
through the setting up of a body not provided for in the NCA’s rules
but desired by its Speaker, namely the Consensus Committee, which
made its final arbitrations and submitted its last report on 28
December 2013.
24. On 26 January 2014, the NCA adopted the Constitution of the
2nd Republic of Tunisia almost unanimously, with 200 votes for,
12 against and four abstentions. It was promulgated the following
day, on 27 January.
25. Different factors can explain this success.
26. They include the dynamism of civil society, which was capable
of acting as a last-resort mediator. Indeed, the Quartet was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 for its work during the National Dialogue.
27. The backing of the international community also played a role.
In this respect, co-operation between the Tunisian authorities and
the Venice Commission was excellent, with the latter monitoring
the process of preparation of the Constitution from the beginning,
providing expert drafting input and producing several opinions on
the drafts submitted to it, including the final draft. Indeed, its
role was recognised when its Deputy Secretary, Ms Simona Granata-Menghini,
participated as a guest in the signing ceremony for the new Constitution
on 24 January 2014 in Tunis. The then President of the Assembly,
Ms Anne Brasseur, was also invited to the ceremony but, as this
coincided with the Assembly’s January part-session, she could unfortunately
not attend.
28. The United Nations was also a factor, particularly via the
United Nations Development Programme, which provided support for
those drafting the Constitution throughout their work.
29. But it was above all the ability of the political stakeholders
to make major concessions, “where they believe that there is an
imminent threat to the country's security and unity”, as a member
of civil society, Mr Salah Eddine Al Jourchi, wrote,
which was decisive.
3. The Constitution of 27 January
2014
30. Stating its opinion on the
Preamble of Tunisia’s fundamental law, the Venice Commission noted
that “the principles of political and legal organisation asserted
therein are generally those on which democracies are founded: sovereignty
of the people, the rule of law, separation and balance of powers.
These tie in with the three pillars of the Statute of the Council
of Europe, namely human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The emphasis
placed in this Preamble on the principal values of a democratic
State is to be welcomed”.
31. This view is subsequently borne out by the Constitution’s
149 articles, divided into ten chapters.
3.1. The enshrining of rights
and freedoms
32. Chapter 2 is devoted entirely
to rights and freedoms, and those, together with the rights and
freedoms mentioned in the other chapters, particularly the first
chapter dealing with general principles, form a long list attesting
to the constitution-makers’ preoccupation with breaking with the
dictatorial regime in place before the Revolution.
33. This enshrining of rights and freedoms and the legal means
of ensuring respect for them through the challenge of unconstitutionality
provided for in Article 120 is also to be welcomed. It prompts only
one remark, one reservation and one suggestion.
34. My remark is to stress that this is a compromise text, particularly
as regards the question of the place of Islam. In this respect,
the civil nature of the State was ultimately confirmed by Article
2 of the Constitution, and the draft articles intended to restrict
its scope were discarded. That said, the Constitution still contains numerous
references to the Muslim religion,
one example being that only a Muslim
may stand as a candidate for the office of President of the Republic
(Article 74). The Venice Commission did not fail to point out the “tensions
between, on the one hand, the predominant position given to Islam,
and on the other hand, the civil nature of the Tunisian State and
the principles of plurality, impartiality and non-discrimination”
as well as the fact that
“the exclusion of any candidate (male or female) who is not of the
Muslim faith does not tie in well with those provisions”.
But
bearing in mind the prevailing context surrounding it, this compromise
is doubtless the best that could have been reached. As for the obligation
to be a Muslim in order to hold the office of Head of State, it
is regrettable but similar principles are followed in States generally
regarded as models of democracy, such as the United Kingdom, where
the monarch must be an Anglican, or Denmark (Article 6 of the Constitution of
5 June 1953) or Norway (Article 4 of the Constitution of 17 May
1814, in its version of 2013), where the monarch must be a Lutheran.
35. There is another provision stemming from this compromise which
is problematic: Article 22 authorises the application of the death
penalty “in extreme cases established by law”, which is deeply regrettable,
and all the more so as a de facto moratorium
has been in place since 1991.
36. Finally, I agree with the Venice Commission’s suggestion concerning
certain fundamental rights protected by international instruments
which
do not appear in the Constitution and could be included in it in the
future or be accommodated in the case law of the Constitutional
Court.
37. That said, I believe that our Assembly can concur with the
words of Mr Ben Jaafar, former Speaker of the NCA, when he addressed
his colleagues upon the adoption of the Constitution of 27 January:
“The Tunisian revolution is a revolution of freedom, and you today,
by passing your constitution, are giving tangible form to and symbolising
that success.”
That was very much the case.
3.2. A mixed parliamentary system
38. Emerging from a long period
under an undemocratic regime, the constitution-makers opted on the
one hand for a “power to be a check to power”, and on the other
hand for mechanisms that encourage the different players to strike
compromises. Any concentration of powers was studiously avoided,
which is without doubt a wise move for a fledgling parliamentary
democracy.
3.2.1. The Assembly of People’s
Representatives (APR)
39. Made up of 217 members, the
same number as the NCA, it is elected for a term of five years by
closed-list regional proportional representation using the largest
remainder method in 33 constituencies, 27 in Tunisia and 6 abroad.
It
has all the powers of a unicameral parliament, passing legislation
and supervising the action of the government, including through
votes of confidence or censure. The Constitution accords special
status to the opposition, granting it
inter
alia the Chairmanship of the Finance Committee and the
role of rapporteur of the Committee dealing with international relations
and authorising it to set up a committee of inquiry once a year.
40. The APR adopted its Rules of Procedure on 2 February 2015.
Among other things, they organise its proceedings through nine standing
committees
each with 22 members
and nine special committees.
3.2.2. Co-operation between authorities
41. The choice of a mixed regime
where the Head of State is also elected by direct universal suffrage
for a five-year term of office, which is renewable once, leaves
the bulk of executive power to the Head of Government but allows
the Head of State to influence the work of both the APR and the
government.
42. By way of example, the President has a suspensive veto which
may be lifted only by a vote supported by a two-thirds majority
of the APR, which is a truly effective weapon when faced with an
Assembly where majorities may not be clear owing to the voting method.
The President may also ask the APR to take a vote of confidence
in the government, with a maximum of two votes permitted during
the presidential mandate.
43. In other words, the President has powers enabling him to “force”
a consensus or establish that there is none.
44. This conciliatory approach can also be seen in the vote of
no-confidence against the government, which draws heavily on the
German constructive vote of no-confidence: the vote of no-confidence
can be adopted only if the APR, during the same vote, approves the
candidature of the person to replace the Head of Government, which
implies that the opposition parties must be capable of agreeing
on an alternative government.
3.2.3. Provision for independent
constitutional commissions acting as a counterweight
45. There are five independent
constitutional commissions, acting in support of democracy and enjoying legal
personality and financial and administrative independence, according
to Article 125. Within their field of competence, they have at least
a power of consultation (Commission for Sustainable Development
and the Rights of Future Generations) and may be tasked with the
regulation of their sector (Audiovisual Communication Commission),
the organisation and supervision of the various elections (Elections Commission)
or investigation (Human Rights Commission, Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission).
3.3. A living framework that
is proving its worth
46. The parliamentary elections
held on 26 October 2014, which were praised by our Assembly,
were marked
by a polarisation of the political landscape: Nidaa Tounes (37%
of votes cast and 86 seats), a secularist movement which positioned
itself as an adversary to Ennahdha, became the main political movement
in the APR, followed by Ennahdha (27% and 69 seats). The four parties
following them took less than 5% of the vote. With the exception
of Ennahdha, the parties making up the old Troika lost over 50%
of the votes they obtained in October 2011. Mr Mohammed Ennaceur,
a member de Nidaa Tounes, became the first Speaker of the APR.
47. On 21 December 2014, Mr Beji Caid Essbsi, leader of the Nidaa
Tounes party and Prime Minister during the transition period, was
elected President of the Republic with over 55% of the vote in an
exemplary election.
48. The formation of the government led by Mr Habib Essid, an
independent, showed that the incentive mechanisms incorporated in
the Constitution worked: when at risk of failing to win the confidence
vote of the APR, he had to extend the composition of his government
and include Ennahdha and Afek Tounes, a social-liberal party, alongside
Nidaa Tounes.
49. Similarly, in 2015, the Head of Government dismissed the Minister
of Justice and the State Secretary for Security Matters under the
Minister of the Interior prior to a ministerial reshuffle, at the
beginning of January 2016, with the APR passing a vote of confidence
in the individual ministers.
50. Finally, after the President of the Republic had expressed
the wish for a national unity government and secured the agreement
of the political parties and trade unions in June 2016, Mr Essid
did not wish to resign but instead asked the APR for another vote
of confidence, which it refused on 30 July 2016.
51. A new government formed by Mr Youssef Chahed, more broadly
based than the previous one, gained the confidence of the Assembly
on 26 August 2016. It underwent a minor reshuffle in February 2017
during which the Prime Minister appears to have reinforced his authority
over the parties supporting him, having failed to consult them in
advance of the appointment of three ministers.
52. It is noteworthy that this functioning of the country's institutions
was not disrupted by a split within Nidaa Tounes, resulting in the
departure of 32 MPs from its parliamentary group in November 2015
and the creation of a new party, Machrou Tounes. This schism made
Ennahdha the leading political force in the APR, which is still
the case today.
4. The building of a State
ruled by law: a work in progress
53. In order to fully and effectively
implement the rights and freedoms set forth in the Constitution,
Tunisia is having to overcome certain practices, cultural habits
and areas of resistance.
4.1. Independent constitutional
commissions and those established by law
54. So far the constitutional commissions
do not have their own legal framework. The draft organic law on common
provisions for the independent constitutional commissions was adopted
by the Council of Ministers on 15 March 2016, but has not been examined
by the APR. Only one out of the five commissions provided for under
the Constitution is operating in accordance with its own organic
law, which moreover needs to be amended. This is the Independent
High Commission for Elections. Three other commissions are still
governed by provisional legislation (those responsible respectively
for human rights, audiovisual media and the fight against corruption)
and are awaiting the enactment of their own organic laws, while
the last Commission, responsible for sustainable development, does
not exist as a legal entity.
55. During my meeting with the chairpersons of these commissions,
who were joined by the chairpersons of the commissions established
under ordinary legislation rather than constitutional law, such
as the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture or the
National Commission for Personal Data Protection, it became clear
that efforts need to be made in order to enable all of the commissions
to become operational.
In this regard, the
situation of the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture
is telling: this body is not operational due to a lack of staff
and the failure to adopt a decree concerning the remuneration of
its members.
56. The feeling amongst my interlocutors was that the political
institutions and senior officials serving them had not made it a
priority to enable these commissions to function effectively, with
the exception of the Independent High Commission for Elections.
Of course, there are considerable budgetary constraints in Tunisia.
It is true that the concept of “independent commissions” is new
in Tunisia. It is understandable that granting powers to them will
arouse fears that certain ministerial departments may lose their
prerogatives. However, these commissions do not represent a dismembering
of the State but constitute a recognised and desirable safeguard
in the area of the promotion of human rights, if only in relation
to the “Paris Principles”.
This
is all the more true in a State which is undergoing reform and whose
history up until the recent past has been highly authoritarian.
The French State, which is Jacobin par excellence, has not been
undermined by the creation of independent administrative commissions,
the operation of which is very similar to that of the Tunisian commissions.
The Tunisian Government and Parliament should be reassured: the
same will be the case in their country.
4.2. Justice
57. The setting up of the Supreme
Judicial Council, a symbol of the independence of general civil
and criminal, administrative and financial courts, has been eventful:
the law instituting it has been criticised both by members of the
judiciary and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and associations
believing that it could have done more to reinforce guarantees of
independence. The election of its members in October 2016 did not
enable the Council to meet in its definitive composition, and the
decisions it took in December 2016 were challenged before the Administrative
Tribunal by the Association of Tunisian Magistrates, which appears to
be at loggerheads with a rival union, the Tunisian Magistrates Trade
Union.
58. These impediments were circumvented only by the urgent adoption,
on 28 March 2017, of a law amending the rules governing the functioning
of the Supreme Judicial Council. The Association of Tunisian Magistrates
has criticised its content and called for strike action. In addition,
a collective of civil society organisations has branded the government’s
initiative as interference in the judiciary.
Furthermore, members of the APR have
challenged the constitutionality of this law before the Provisional
Commission for the Review of the Constitutionality of Draft Laws.
Leaving aside the role played by the Supreme Judicial Council in
the life of judges and the courts, its establishment is all the
more important in that it has the power to appoint constitutional
judges. The blocking of the Supreme Judicial Council has resulted
in the postponement of the establishment of the Constitutional Court,
that is to say one of the guarantors of the rule of law.
59. The developments regarding the Supreme Judicial Council must
not overshadow the significant advances made by Tunisia in the area
of justice system reform. The Minister of Justice confirmed to me
that vacancies have been advertised in order to recruit 500 new
judges in 2017-2018 and provided details concerning the establishment
of specialist financial divisions in which the judges specialise
exclusively in this type of litigation. He also indicated that,
in the area of criminal law, his ministry is working to reduce case processing
times.
60. In parallel to the reform of the court apparatus, Tunisia
has instituted what is known as “transitional” justice intended
to reveal violations of the most fundamental human rights committed
during the period leading up to the Revolution to the whole of society
in order to placate it and promote reconciliation. In this connection, the
Truth and Dignity Commission, which is the cornerstone of transitional
justice, has enjoyed mixed fortunes: the hearings of the victims
of the regimes established since independence commenced in November
2016 and triggered real awareness in society of the scale of human
rights violations, which is a welcome development. On the other
hand, it is regrettable that, for a topic of such key importance,
the workings of the Truth and Dignity Commission have not been harmonious,
as demonstrated by the resignation of some of its members and the sharp
criticism of its Chairperson, Sihem Ben Sédrine.
61. In addition, President Béji Caïd Essebsi is behind a draft
law giving transitional justice jurisdiction to deal with economic
and financial crimes and offences committed under the Ben Ali regime.
The President wishes to avoid judicialising the procedure, in particular
in order to keep the timescales under control, and to incorporate
it into the process of national reconciliation. An initial version
of this draft law, which gave the competence to hear these cases
to a Commission separate from the Truth and Dignity Commission,
resulted in a highly critical opinion from the Venice Commission
in 2015.
I can but endorse
the Venice Commission’s viewpoint: although the Truth and Dignity
Commission does not have a monopoly over transitional justice, the key
point is that the new body competent to hear cases concerning corruption
or the misappropriation of public funds should offer the same guarantees
of independence as the Truth and Dignity Commission and that the procedure
followed should be equivalent in terms of the establishment of facts
by this new body and the publication of its decisions.
4.3. Combating torture and ill-treatment
62. Torture was widely practised
within the security forces under Ben Ali, and still goes on, according
to the concluding observations of the United Nations Committee against
Torture (CAT) published in May 2016.
In particular, CAT recommends amending
Article 101
bis of the Criminal
Code to bring it into line with the definition of torture set out
in Article 1 of the Convention against torture and ensure that those
committing acts of torture and ill-treatment do not go unpunished.
63. The context of combating terrorism makes it more difficult
to eradicate torture within law-enforcement agencies, as CAT pointed
out in its observations.
The
visit by Mr Ben Emmerson, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism, in early February 2017, provided a reminder
that counter-terrorism efforts should be grounded in human rights.
Among other things, he was concerned by the high number of imprisoned
terror suspects awaiting trial and the use of the counter-terrorism
law and other legislative acts against journalists.
64. This view concurs with those expressed by certain NGOs and
civil society with regard to the adoption of the organic law on
combating terrorism and money laundering, known as “Law 26”,
which gave the security forces increased
powers.
65. Finally, it is important to point out that, while Tunisia
has not applied the death penalty since 1991, the courts continue
to pronounce it, for example for crimes against children
or
terror crimes, such as those committed against officers of the security
forces,
as
authorised by Law 26. It should be noted that our colleague Ms Marietta
Karamanli, General Rapporteur on the death penalty, strenuously
objected to the adoption of this law in July 2015.
4.4. Combating discrimination
4.4.1. Discrimination against women:
significant progress
66. Already a pioneer in this area
in North Africa and the Arab world, Tunisia has continued to progress
along the path to equality. In its
Resolution 1873 (2012), adopted during a debate on equality between women and men:
a condition for the success of the Arab Spring, the Assembly had
listed several recommendations for Tunisia.
It must
be pointed out that most of them have been acted upon.
67. On 23 April 2014, the United Nations confirmed receipt of
the notification by Tunisia of the official withdrawal of its specific
reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
On 10 November 2015, an amendment
to the draft law on passports and travel documents enabled women
to travel with their underage children without having to seek prior
authorisation from their father. Finally, in the area of representation,
Tunisian women benefit from positive discrimination for both legislative
elections (they account for more than 30% of the members of the
APR) and municipal elections. For the next local elections in December
2017, the legislature has thus obliged political parties to present alternating
male-female lists and to ensure that half of the lead candidates
in lists are women.
68. In addition, since the end of March 2017, the APR has been
discussing a draft organic law to combat violence against women.
This text represents the first attempt to deal with this type of
violence overall and provides for a mix of criminal, social and
financial responses. After some initial hesitancy, the repeal of
Article 227
bis of the Criminal
Code, the application of which had caused a major outcry in Tunisia,
was reincorporated into this draft, despite previous plans to repeal
it separately.
69. While this progress must be welcomed, some advances still
remain to be made, for example in the area of inheritance – where
women are at a disadvantage compared to men – or custodial rights
– regarding which Article 58 of the Personal Status Code clearly
discriminates against women. These are sensitive issues in Tunisia
and, as I was told by one of our colleagues from the APR in relation
to inheritance, are perceived by one segment of society to be associated
with a question of identity. Aside from the identity-based argument, other
current issues concern the application of this progressive legislation
to all women, irrespective of their social or geographical origin,
the prevention of financial insecurity to which they are particularly
exposed and more generally all forms of “economic violence” to which
they are subject, namely the pay gap and access to positions of
responsibility.
4.4.2. Combating racism: spontaneous
draft legislation
70. In the area of combating discrimination,
Tunisia is about to adopt a law dealing specifically with racism, which
represents a first. The draft legislation was tabled before the
APR in March. It came in the wake of a knife attack against three
people of Congolese origin.
4.4.3. Combating homophobia: progress
still to be made
71. While Tunisia is taking the
lead in combating discrimination in important areas, this is less
the case in relation to homophobia. Article 230 of the Criminal
Code criminalises homosexual relations and is applied by the courts.
The Minister of Justice called for it to
be repealed in 2015, which was refused by the President of the Republic.
The principle of
non-discrimination guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution
is clearly being disregarded. There does not appear to be any let
up in prosecutions
and this criminalisation certainly does not
help in reducing the number of homophobic attacks in Tunisia.
72. This work in progress must not overshadow the general advances
made in the area of public freedoms since 2011. When questioned
concerning the objectives achieved six years after the Revolution,
Tunisians placed freedom in first position with 60% of respondents
considering that it had been attained.
5. Major challenges facing
Tunisian society
73. There seem to be two main challenges
on which the success of Tunisia’s democratic transition depends.
5.1. The economic challenge
74. As Ms Anne Brasseur pointed
out in her report of 2012, the Revolution has not improved the economic situation.
Even so, Tunisia's production has not collapsed.
75. Although growth in gross domestic product (GDP) was less than
1% in 2015, it stood at 3.9% in 2012, 2.3% in 2013 and 2.4% in 2014.
It was forecast as slightly below 2% in 2016 and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) projections put it at 3% in 2017. Even though
security issues have wrecked tourism (receipts down by 35% in 2015),
a sector which accounted for 7% of GDP before the Revolution, Tunisia
has not experienced a recession.
76. However, GDP growth is currently too weak to reduce unemployment,
which stands at 15% of the working population, with women (23%),
university graduates (31%) and young people (32%) particularly affected.
77. Although the annual rate of inflation has remained below 6%
since 2012 and is falling – it should be 3.6% in 2016 – “households
are feeling the effects of inflation more strongly, resulting in
a widely shared impression of reduced purchasing power, further
reinforced by the falling dinar”,
the national
currency (11% down against the euro between 2015 and 2016).
78. These two factors partly explain the social movement of January
2016, triggered by the death of an unemployed man in Kasserine and
reaching a scale not seen in Tunisia since 2011. In April 2016,
the Tunisian Forum for economic and social rights inventoried 987
collective social movements!
79. A total of 2.9 billion dollars’ worth of loans were granted
to Tunisia by the IMF for the period 2016-2020, and 5 billion by
the World Bank. But these loans are contingent on structural reforms,
one of these being to improve the make-up of public spending, i.e.
by cutting the share allocated to paying public officials’ salaries in
relation to investment expenditure. The aim is to reduce the proportion
of spending on State administration and reorient the export sectors
of the Tunisian economy towards products and services with higher
added value than, for example, olive oil or phosphate, two major
resources for exports.
80. In parallel to the undertakings made, Tunisia organised a
“Tunisia 2020” conference for institutional investors in November
2016: 14 billion euros were pledged for the period 2017-2020, in
the form of donations, investments and debt for investment swaps.
81. One of the challenges for economic recovery is the introduction
of tools for combating corruption. With the support of the Council
of Europe, the Chairperson of the Anti-corruption Commission submitted
a report at the beginning of February 2017 stressing inter alia the need to increase
the transparency of the administration for the benefit of Tunisian
and foreign investors. He proposed the periodic publication of all
the information, indicators and data relating to corruption and
its effects on the national economy and citizens. The government also
signed a pact, with the Anti-corruption Commission, establishing
a national anti-corruption strategy in December 2016 and on 22 February
2017 held a vote on a law establishing mechanisms for reporting corruption
and protecting whistle blowers.
82. The other economic challenge is to redress the major imbalances
within the country, between the relatively wealthy coastal regions
and those of the more neglected west and south, where the Revolution
took root. The holding of the first municipal and regional elections,
which are scheduled for December 2017, along with the implementation
of territorial reform, should contribute to this rebalancing between
the coast and the interior of the country. In order to implement
this reform successfully, the Tunisian authorities have called in particular
on the expertise of France, according to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Contacts were also made with the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities on 28, 29 and 30 March 2017 in order to determine
the support that it could provide within the framework of its South-Med
Partnership.
5.2. The challenge of security:
from combating terrorists to managing “returning fighters”
83. The period of threats to public
order by the Salafist groups, criticised in
Resolution 1893 (2012), is over, and a new period of terrorism by Ansar Al-Charia,
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Daesh has begun. Tunisia
is on the front line, having not only to counter terror attacks,
such as those in 2015 against the Bardo museum, a beach resort in
Sousse or a bus full of presidential guards in Tunis,
but also to defend itself against
infiltrations of jihadists across its borders. Mount Chaambi, in
the west of the country on the border with Algeria, was the scene
of the first armed clashes between the Tunisian forces and AQIM
groups in 2013, and these are still going on today. Elsewhere, in
March 2016, Daesh fighters crossed the Libyan border and tried to
take the town of Ben Guerdane.
84. The measures taken by the authorities have entailed arresting
a thousand or so people and banning 15 000 others from leaving the
country, declaring a state of emergency, still in place, reorganising
the security forces, notably by setting up the Defence Intelligence
and Security Agency and doubling the defence budget (1.2 billion
euros in 2016), closing 24 mosques and building a protective wall
along part of the border with Libya.
It is in
this context that the APR adopted Organic Law No. 26.
85. At the same time, the Tunisian State has forged closer co-operation
with the Algerian army,
the United States,
Great Britain and France
to secure its western and southern
borders.
86. These efforts appear to be paying off: no large-scale terrorist
attacks have been committed in Tunisia since March 2016, and the
jihadists are a less potent force in the Mount Chaambi area than
in 2012.
87. Beyond the Libyan question, the challenge of the future will
be managing the return of the Tunisian jihadists who went to fight
in “conflict zones”, to use the expression of the authorities, i.e.
in Syria, Iraq, Yemen or Libya, estimated at 6 000 in 2015 by the
United Nations.
The political community and civil
society are divided, firstly regarding the possibility of preventing
the jihadists from re-entering the country – with the Head of Government
coming out against this, with the support of some 6 000 demonstrators,
and the President of the Republic pointing out that a “return to
one's homeland” is a constitutional right (Article 25 of the Constitution) –
and then regarding the treatment to be reserved for them,
including in connection with acts
of “repentance”.
88. In addition, despite breaking off diplomatic relations with
Syria since 2012, Tunisia has maintained a presence in Damascus
in the interests of “close co-ordination in the matter of Tunisian
terrorists and prisoners”.
89. According to the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior, 800 returnees
have been imprisoned or placed under surveillance since 2007.
90. A study published in October 2016 by the Tunisian Centre for
Research and Studies on Terrorism, set up within the Tunisian Forum
for economic and social rights, profiles Tunisian jihadists through
1 000 individual court files,
which should help the Tunisian Government
to implement the national counter-terrorism strategy adopted in
November of the same year.
91. Finally, the APR voted to set up a committee of inquiry into
the channels recruiting Tunisians into jihadist organisations at
the end of January 2017.
6. Co-operation with Europe
and the role of the Assembly
6.1. The European Union, an indispensable
partner
92. Co-operation with Tunisia,
as the first southern Mediterranean country to sign a European Union Association
Agreement, which entered into force in 1998, became an integral
part of the European neighbourhood policy launched in 2004. In November
2012, after the Revolution, Tunisia was granted a Privileged partnership
with the set objective of strengthening bilateral economic relations, inter alia by concluding a Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).
93. This new agreement is intended to go beyond the liberalisation
of trade initiated by the Association Agreement and more closely
integrate Tunisia's economy in the European single market. The DCFTA
should supplement and develop the free trade area for manufactured
products, expanding it to new sectors such as services and agriculture.
The first round of negotiations was held in April 2016. It was pointed
out at that time that the opening up of markets would be asymmetrical,
to take account of the differences in development, and would be
progressive and accompanied by the necessary support measures to
help make Tunisia’s economy more competitive.
94. The negotiations on the DCFTA are of key importance, as the
European Union is by far Tunisia's leading trade partner, absorbing
71% of its exports.
95. Beyond trade relations, between 2011 and 2015 the European
Union provided 2.8 billion euros’ worth of support to Tunisia, all
types of mechanisms included (donations, macro-financial assistance,
loans).
96. Technical and financial co-operation form part of a Single
support framework, including its 2014-2016 version, defining three
priority sectors of intervention: support for socio-economic reforms
and backing for more balanced and sustainable development in all
the regions; strengthening of the rule of law and governance; support
for civil society organisations.
6.2. Highly satisfactory co-operation
with the Council of Europe that could be more dynamic at parliamentary
level
97. On 4 February 2015, the Committee
of Ministers approved the Neighbourhood Partnership with Tunisia 2015-2017.
This followed on from the Partnership
covering the period 2012-2014 and focused chiefly on facilitating
the country's political transition via support for the preparation
of the Constitution and assistance for the electoral process.
98. There are two aspects to the Partnership: on the one hand,
enhanced political dialogue ranging from high-level strategic dialogue
with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the Committee
of Ministers on topics on the bilateral agenda and political issues
of common interest, to more technical consultations relevant to
the implementation of the Partnership; and on the other hand, co-operation
activities in the fields of human rights, the rule of law and democracy.
99. The Partnership is largely funded by a joint European Union/Council
of Europe regional programme (69%), supplemented by voluntary contributions
(31%). Funding for 2015-2017 should be 5.4 million euros.
100. The Interim progress report of the Rapporteur Group on External
Relations (GR-EXT) of 16 August 2016 stated that co-operation with
Tunisia in 2015 and for the first six months of 2016 could be seen
as very positive and the Council of Europe had received increased
demand from Tunisia, including in areas in which co-operation had
not been initially foreseen, such as the national mechanism for
the prevention of torture, the prevention of terrorism, legislation
against trafficking in human beings, violence against women and
sexual abuse of children.
101. One of the highlights of that period was the granting of observer
status with the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
(CEPEJ) to Tunisia, which now has no longer four but ten pilot courts
involved in the judicial reform process. On 1 February 2017, in
Tunis, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) presented
its assessment of Tunisian institutional and legislative anti-corruption
framework, making 69 recommendations. In August 2015, the APR requested
an opinion from the Venice Commission on the draft Organic Law on
the Constitutional Court, which was provided in October that year.
According to the GR-EXT, its representatives have also participated
in inter-parliamentary activities on the Council of Europe's conventions
and played a major role in setting up the national prevention mechanism
on torture. In addition, Tunisia is a member of the Venice Commission
and of the European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity
(North-South Centre) based in Lisbon and recently expressed its
interest in the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of
Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No.
201, “Lanzarote Convention”).
102. This dynamism of the APR in co-operating with Council of Europe
bodies would benefit from being extended to the parliamentary sphere.
Although our Tunisian counterparts are systematically invited to
attend all part-sessions of our Assembly and, indeed, sometimes
do attend part-sessions of the Assembly or meetings of the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy, their presence is not regular.
Moreover, the objective set in the Neighbourhood Partnership of
discussing, as of 2015, the granting of partnership for democracy
status is yet to be followed up.
7. Conclusions
103. At the end of the fact-finding
visit which I made to Tunis from 27 to 30 March 2017, there appeared
to me to be contrasting trends in the country.
104. Tunisia has made enormous progress in the area of democracy,
human rights and the establishment of the rule of law, which is
without equivalent in North Africa or the Arab World. It has a first
rate political and administrative elite, which is motivated, capable
of compromise and genuinely committed to reform. Its civil society
is extremely dynamic, whether it proposes, controls or criticises
action on the part of the public authorities.
105. At the same time, Tunisia has entered a delicate phase of
its transition. The enthusiasm triggered by the Revolution, and
following the adoption of the “Constitution of freedom”, has given
way to a form of disillusionment expressed by members of civil society
or journalists whom I met.
106. In part, this disillusionment can be ascribed to “normalisation”
for Tunisia and to the procedural aspects of the democratic process,
which does not always permit a response to the impatience of a people
calling for the swift implementation of change. It also reflects
a range of concerns: for example, that the fight against terrorism
might limit the reconsideration of police practices; that the leaders
of the previous regime might interfere with public affairs
(and, in this regard,
the draft law on national reconciliation in the economic and financial
fields is not the best signal to be sending to the Tunisian people);
and finally that certain economic actors could disrupt the democratic
process by fostering a wheeler-dealer climate that is conducive
to corruption or by gaining a hold over the media so as to be able
to propagate their interests and influence elections.
107. This is in addition to the fact that the material circumstances
of journalists, in particular those working for groups placed under
State protection, are not always optimal. Moreover, the press release
issued by the National Union of Tunisian Journalists
following the Minister of the Interior’s
decision of 3 April 2017, taken under the state of emergency to
ban the publishing of a controversial media outlet, should lead
us to encourage the Tunisian authorities to preserve the genuine
independence of journalists, which is an achievement of the Revolution,
to guarantee that all media groups behave in an ethical manner and
to favour civil and criminal procedures to deal with infringements
which do not endanger national security. In order to do so, the
High Independent Authority For Audiovisual Communication should
be supported in its regulation task and the independent Constitutional
Commission in charge of the audiovisual sector should be established
as soon as possible. Finally, the settlement as soon as possible
of the issue of the media outlets confiscated and run by the public
administration after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, including the
situation of the journalists concerned, should help to stabilise
the audiovisual sector.
108. For their part, the representatives of civil society and the
chairpersons of independent commissions whom I met agreed that they
would have to be particularly vigilant in relation to future developments.
109. However, the fear that surpasses all others, and which is
shared by a large number of actors from Tunisian life, concerns
the geopolitical context. On one hand, the Tunisian Initiative launched
by President Béji Caïd Essebsi for Libya, which seeks to find a
negotiated solution within the framework defined by the United Nations,
as set forth in the Skhirat Agreement, and which is supported by
Algeria and Egypt, is currently deadlocked due to the refusal on
the part of the authorities in Tripoli and Tobruk to negotiate.
On the other hand, the uncertainties relating to the succession
of Algerian President Mr Abdelaziz Bouteflika may considerably destabilise
the regions of southern and western Tunisia bordering with Algeria.
110. Within this changing context, Europe must not forget that
Tunisia is not a simple next-door neighbour situated 75 km from
its borders. Tunisia is a close relative with limited resources
which, within an uncertain geopolitical framework, finds itself
on the front line in terms of both democracy and security.
111. The Council of Europe and the European Union are providing
considerable assistance to Tunisia. However, Tunisia expects recognition
of its special circumstances and the risks it is facing. If Tunisia
is a model for the region and for the Arab World, as Europeans repeatedly
assert, then it deserves that Europe does more than negotiate a
“complete and comprehensive free trade agreement” with it.
112. Europe must reassure Tunisia that it will not let it be destabilised
by its surroundings. Europe must also acknowledge that its destiny
and that of Tunisia are closely interlinked as it is by far its
first economic and commercial partner and above all because, if
the situation in Tunisia deteriorates, aside from the negative symbolic
impact on the rest of the Arab World, Europe will directly suffer
the consequences in terms of security and migration.
113. It should be remembered that in 2012 more than one million
people crossed the border with Libya and, in 2011 alone, the Tunisian
Forum for Economic and Social Rights estimated that almost 40 000
Tunisian migrants crossed the Strait of Sicily towards Italy.
114. Of all the countries where the Arab Spring took root, Tunisia
has been the only one to have experienced a successful transition
to democracy. It is now establishing the rule of law, experiencing
confrontation, compromise, demonstrations and strikes… It is of
the utmost importance that the Council of Europe and the European
Union stand alongside it in order to enable it to experiment with
pluralism with the full vigour of youth without having to suffer
from regional instability.