See related documentsElection observation report
| Doc. 14325
| 29 May 2017
Observation of the parliamentary elections in Armenia (2 April 2017)
1. Introduction
1. On 23 January 2017, the Bureau
of the Assembly took note of the invitation letter sent on 12 January
by the President of the National Assembly of Armenia to observe
the parliamentary elections on 2 April 2017, decided to observe
these elections and constituted an ad hoc committee for this purpose
composed of 30 members (EPP/CD: 11; SOC: 10; EC: 4; ALDE: 4, UEL:
1 – in accordance with the D’Hondt system) as well as of the co-rapporteurs
of the Monitoring Committee, and authorised a pre-electoral mission.
2. On 27 January 2017, the Bureau approved the list of members
of the ad hoc committee (subject to receiving their declarations
on conflict of interest) and appointed Ms Liliane Maury Pasquier
(Switzerland, SOC) as its Chairperson. The list of members appears
in Appendix 1.
3. In line with the co-operation agreement signed between the
Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) on 4 October 2004, a representative
of the Venice Commission was invited to join the ad hoc committee
as a legal adviser.
4. A pre-electoral delegation visited Yerevan on 22 and 23 February
2017. Its programme, statement and composition appear in Appendices
2 and 3.
5. For the observation of the parliamentary elections, the ad
hoc committee operated in the framework of an International Election
Observation Mission (IEOM) together with delegations from the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
the European Parliament and with the election observation mission
(EOM) of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR).
6. The ad hoc committee (“PACE delegation”) met in Armenia from
31 March to 3 April 2017 to observe the parliamentary elections
on 2 April. The programme of the delegation’s meetings is set out
in Appendix 4.
7. On polling day, the PACE delegation split into 12 teams which
observed the elections in Yerevan and its surrounding areas as well
as in the following regions and municipalities: Kotayk, Gegharkunik,
Gyumri, Aragatsotn, Armavir, Tavush, Lori and Ararat.
8. The following day, the IEOM held a joint press conference
and issued a “Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions”
and a press release (Appendix 5).
2. Political
background
9. Following constitutional amendments,
approved in a referendum on 6 December 2015, Armenia is transitioning
from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary political system. The
amendments reduced the powers of the president in favour of the
prime minister and the parliament and changed the electoral system
from a majoritarian one to a largely proportional system, with 13
district lists. These were the first elections to be held under
the new political system.
10. At the last parliamentary elections in 2012, the Republican
Party of Armenia (RPA) won 69 seats out of 131 and formed the government.
In 2016, it entered a coalition with the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF), which held five seats. The parliamentary opposition
included Prosperous Armenia (PA) with 33 seats, the Armenian National
Congress (ANC) with 7 seats, Armenian Renaissance (AR) with 5 seats,
and Heritage with 4 seats.
3. Legal
framework
11. Parliamentary elections are
regulated by a comprehensive legal framework, primarily consisting
of the amended Constitution, the 2016 Electoral Code, and the regulations
and decisions of the Central Election Commission (CEC). The reform
process that led to the new Electoral Code was characterised as
inclusive and seen by most IEOM interlocutors as a step forward
in building overall confidence in the electoral process. Civil society
organisations were initially involved in the discussions on the
draft Electoral Code, but did not endorse the final text, as their
calls to ease restrictions on citizen observers were not addressed.
12. The new Electoral Code, which was adopted less than one year
before election day, addressed a significant number of previous
Venice Commission recommendations. It provides for improved voter identification,
measures to enhance the independence of election authorities, removal
of the mandatory test for citizen observers, and an increased gender
quota on candidate lists. Amendments also clarified important provisions
related to campaigning, campaign finance, candidate registration
and complaints and appeals. The Code additionally provided for publication
of the signed voters lists, the use of voter authentication devices (VADs)
as well as web cameras on election day to identify voters and prevent
multiple voting, impersonation and fraud.
13. However, some prior Venice Commission recommendations remain
unaddressed, including those related to narrow rules on legal standing
for submitting electoral complaints; citizenship and residency requirements
for candidates, as contained in the Constitution; electoral thresholds
for alliances to enter parliament; formation of candidate lists
for national minorities; and exclusion of organisational expenditures from
campaign finance reporting. A number of IEOM interlocutors also
expressed concerns about complicated voting procedures, limitations
on the number of citizen observers and journalists allowed in polling
stations, and criminal sanctions for negligent or intentional reporting
of incorrect information from the signed voters lists. Some of these
issues proved to be problematic during these elections.
14. The new electoral system is very complex. A minimum of 101
members of parliament are elected through a two-tier proportional
system, with candidates elected from a single national list and
13 district lists. To qualify for the distribution of seats, political
parties must pass a threshold of 5%, while alliances of parties must
pass 7%. The system also provides for a total of up to four reserved
seats for the largest national minorities (Yezidis, Russians, Assyrians
and Kurds). In line with the Electoral Code, a “stable parliamentary majority”
(defined as 54% of seats) must be achieved to form a government.
If a stable majority is not formed as a result of the elections,
or by forming a political coalition within six days of the finalisation
of the results, a second round is held between the top two candidate
lists 28 days after election day.
15. Some IEOM interlocutors criticised the complexity of the electoral
system and its deviations from a purely proportional system and
raised concerns that there was a lack of efforts to raise public
awareness as to how votes would transfer into seats.
16. The ballot paper includes one page with the national list
and one page with the district candidates. The district candidates
have to appear on the national list. The voter can, in addition
to choosing a ballot with the list of the party, also give a preference
vote to a district candidate. Some considered that the new electoral system,
with a preference vote to a district candidate, gave the opportunity
to local businessmen and wealthy candidates to use illegally important
administrative and finance resources, given the very weak control mechanisms
of the funding of election campaigns and political parties.
17. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has observed
all parliamentary and presidential elections in Armenia since 1995.
From 2000 to 2016, the Venice Commission adopted more than 20 opinions on
different aspects of the electoral legal framework of Armenia, mostly
further to requests from the authorities of Armenia.
18. Despite this considerable number of opinions and the subsequent
amendments of the electoral legal framework, many recurrent electoral
issues observed by international observation missions during previous elections
still remain unaddressed.
4. Electoral
administration, voters lists and registration of candidates
19. The elections were administered
by a three-tiered system, comprising the CEC, 38 territorial election commissions
(TECs), and 2 009 precinct election commissions (PECs). The CEC
is a permanent and professional body, composed of seven members
elected by parliament for a six-year term. All CEC members were
re-elected in October 2016 by a strong majority vote in parliament.
20. The CEC conducted its work in a transparent manner and generally
operated collegially and efficiently, meeting legal deadlines; however,
it did not pursue complaints rigorously. Its sessions were attended
by observers, media, and party representatives and were streamed
online. Decisions and agendas were published in a timely fashion
on the CEC website. The CEC approved rules of procedure for TECs
and PECs and guidelines for observers and proxies. The new Electoral
Code empowers the CEC to issue legally binding instructions to ensure
uniform implementation of the law. However, the CEC instead opted
to issue clarifications to lower-level commissions, which were not
regarded as legally binding, detracting from legal certainty.
21. The CEC developed and disseminated a wide variety of printed
and audiovisual voter education materials on new election day procedures.
However, the distribution of printed materials was not sufficiently wide
to reach voters in remote areas.
22. Materials were provided in accessible formats for people with
disabilities. No voter education material was produced in minority
languages.
23. The TECs, formed in 2016, are professional bodies composed
of seven members appointed by the CEC for six-year terms. The TECs
are responsible for supervising PECs, handling complaints against
PECs, recounts, and tabulating the results. The PECs were formed
on 11 March for the organisation of voting and counting. While many
IEOM interlocutors expressed confidence in the work of the TECs,
the impartiality of PECs was questioned due to the distribution
of leadership positions that favoured the governing parties. The quality
of training organised by the CEC for the PECs was generally evaluated
positively. However, the complexity of election day procedures prompted
concerns about the capacity of PECs to administer them.
24. Women are well represented in the election administration.
Three of the seven CEC members are women, including the deputy chairperson.
Women comprise 35% of TEC members, but with only 16% in leadership
positions. IEOM observers reported a higher proportion of women
in PEC compositions (some 57%, including 39% chairpersons in the
PECs observed).
25. All citizens over the age of 18 on election day are eligible
to vote, unless declared incompetent by a court decision. In line
with a prior OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendation, the
amended Constitution grants prisoners convicted for lesser offenses
the right to vote. Voter registration is passive and voters lists
are based on the State Population Register, which is maintained
by the Passport and Visa Department (PVD) of the police, and includes
all voters with an official permanent residence in Armenia. The voters
register, as at 28 March, contained a total of 2 654 195 voters,
including a significant number of voters who are residing abroad
and maintain an official residence in Armenia. In addition, special
lists are maintained for military voters and those imprisoned or
in temporary detention.
26. The improvement of inter-institutional collaboration, including
integration of computer systems and staff communication between
the PVD and the Ministry of Justice, led to enhanced accuracy and
inclusiveness of the voters lists, including the removal of deceased
voters. The Electoral Code provides sufficient mechanisms for voters
to request corrections to the PVD. However, voters lists continue
to include addresses where a high number of voters are still registered:
there are some 2 500 addresses where 15 or more voters are registered at
the same address. This requires further scrutiny by the authorities.
27. In response to long-standing requests of the opposition and
civil society, and in an effort to prevent voter impersonation on
election day, significant measures were implemented to enhance the
transparency of the registration process. The preliminary and final
voters lists were posted at polling stations for public scrutiny
on 21 February and on 30 March respectively. As required by law,
the PVD also published the entire preliminary and final voters lists
on its website. In addition, the CEC planned to publish scanned
copies of the signed voters lists from all PECs by 3 April, allowing
for public checks of those who voted but were allegedly abroad.
All IEOM interlocutors regarded this as an important deterrent to
potential fraud, despite concerns over the disclosure of voters’
private data. However, such measures should not substitute effective
action to be taken by authorities against those who engage in electoral
malfeasance.
28. In a step to facilitate the right to vote, voters had the
possibility to change their registration to a temporary residence
where they were physically located on election day. However, several
political parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) expressed
concerns that some district candidates pressured voters to change
their registration to districts where they were running. The PVD
officers reported that there were no organised efforts to transport
and re-register voters where they do not live.
29. In a further effort to prevent potential electoral fraud through
impersonation and misuse of voters list entries, voters were identified
on election day through the use of VADs, which contained an electronic
copy of the voters lists. Voters’ IDs were scanned to determine
if the voter was registered in that polling station and if the voter
had already been marked in the system as having voted. Voters’ fingerprints
were also scanned and the CEC reported to the IEOM that it planned
to conduct cross-checks to identify potential cases of multiple voting
in case of complaints. The introduction of the VADs was welcomed
by most IEOM interlocutors as a useful tool for building confidence
in the integrity of election day proceedings.
30. In an inclusive process, the CEC registered the candidate
lists of all five political parties and four party alliances that
applied, with a total of 1 558 candidates for these elections: Armenian
Renaissance (AR), Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), Communist
Party of Armenia (CPA), Congress-Armenian People’s Party Alliance
(CoAPP), Free Democrats (FD), Ohanyan-Raffi-Oskanian Alliance (ORO),
Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), Tsarukyan Alliance (TsA) and
Yelk Alliance.
31. Candidates were required to be an eligible voter, at least
25 years old, reside in and be a citizen of only Armenia for the
preceding four years, and have a command of the Armenian language.
Addressing a prior recommendation of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice
Commission, the language test administered by the Ministry of Education
and Science was based on reasonable and objective criteria.
32. However, candidacy restriction based on citizenship of another
State is at odds with international jurisprudence.
33. Candidate lists could be submitted by political parties and
party alliances. While a list may include non-party members, the
law does not provide a possibility for candidates to stand individually.
Each contending party submitted a single national list with a minimum
of 80 candidates and district lists corresponding to the 13 electoral
districts. Only the AR, CoAPP, RPA and TsA nominated candidates
for the national minority list. Some other parties which the IEOM
met reported difficulties in finding minority candidates that were
not loyal to the ruling party. Parties and alliances submitted a
financial deposit that is refunded if the list receives more than
4% of the valid vote.
34. All the contending parties complied with the Electoral Code
requirement that each gender must be represented by at least 25%
of candidates on the national lists, with each gender appearing
in each group of four candidates. In a positive development, the
gender quota applied also to the distribution of obtained and vacant
seats. Almost 30% of registered candidates were women.
5. Election
campaign and finance and media environment
35. The official electoral campaign
started on 5 March and ended on 1 April, 24 hours before election
day. The campaign started slowly and intensified as election day
approached. Depending on available resources, parties campaigned
through rallies, car parades, door-to-door canvassing, posters,
media advertisements and social media. Most campaigns focused on
individual candidates rather than political platforms or policies. Women
were active as candidates; however, party platforms did not directly
address issues related to gender equality. Contending parties and
candidates were largely able to campaign without restrictions, but
isolated incidents of violence were reported in some areas of the
country.
36. In an effort to prevent abuse of administrative resources,
the Electoral Code prohibits campaigning by government officials
while performing their activities and the use of public buildings
for campaigning. On a positive note, many government officials in
the regions involved in the campaign took leave for these purposes, while
central government officials, including the Prime Minister, campaigned
mostly on weekends.
37. Widespread allegations of vote buying to vote for certain
parties were reported throughout the country and the IEOM received
many credible reports directly from the public. Several interlocutors,
including some government officials, indicated that vote buying
had become an entrenched part of political culture stating that accepting
money or other benefits in exchange for votes was often justified
by extreme poverty and lack of economic opportunities. This created
an atmosphere in which overall public confidence in the electoral
process was diminished.
38. The IEOM also received credible reports of pressure and intimidation
on voters, especially on private and public sector employees. According
to information obtained by the Union of Informed Citizens, 114 school principals
admitted that they had collected lists of names of teachers and
parents of students who would support the RPA. These lists were
then submitted to local authorities. Two political parties filed
complaints with the CEC claiming that it was an abuse of administrative
resources. Although voters were generally free to obtain information
on all contending parties, some opposition parties informed the
IEOM that their supporters were put under pressure not to attend
their rallies.
39. Several public employees informed international observers
that, on 15 March, the Governor of the Syunik region instructed
them to vote for the RPA. The head of a cultural centre in Syunik
requested his staff to create lists of RPA supporters. Teachers
were threatened that they would be fired if they would not vote
for the RPA. Teachers, doctors and other public employees were asked
by their supervisors to attend meetings with an RPA candidate in
the city of Armavir. A private company owner in Yerevan threatened
his employees that they would be fired if they would not provide
him with a list of a sufficient number of potential RPA supporters.
40. Collectively, the widespread allegations of vote buying and
pressure on and intimidation of voters had a negative impact on
the campaign and raised concerns about voters’ ability to cast their
votes free of fear of retribution.
41. In line with the law, all the parties contesting the elections
opened a special bank account for their campaign finance transactions,
which could include contributions from voters, personal funds of
candidates and parties. Contributions from legal entities, as well
as from foreign and anonymous sources, were not allowed. The law
limited campaign expenses to AMD 500 million (approximatively €950 000)
per candidate for the first round.
42. Following prior recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR and
the Venice Commission, some legal provisions for campaign finance
reporting and oversight were strengthened. Under the Electoral Code,
the Oversight and Audit Service (OAS) should act independently from
the CEC; however, the CEC appoints the head of the OAS and the law
does not clearly set out its institutional status or working methods.
In addition, the OAS cannot initiate any administrative proceedings
on its own or challenge a CEC decision. Six auditors were appointed
by the parliamentary parties to work with the OAS, but their activities
were not sufficiently regulated or implemented consistently. Overall,
the OAS did not have a proactive approach to monitoring campaign finance.
43. All the contending parties submitted two financial reports
before election day, declaring donations and expenditures. The OAS
did not identify violations of campaign finance and published information
on total income and expenditures of candidates on the CEC’s website.
A list of donors was provided by the Central Bank to the OAS every
three days, but this information was not published. Despite a prior
OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendation, so-called organisational
expenditures such as for campaign offices, transport and communication
were excluded from campaign finance reporting. These factors diminished
the transparency and integrity of the campaign finance system.
44. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution and
was broadly exercised. Numerous media operate in Armenia, but the
media landscape is characterised by a limited and politically affiliated
advertising market which leaves room for only a few self-sustainable
media outlets. Major commercial television stations are reportedly
financed by businessmen in order to promote their political and
commercial interests, often perceived by IEOM interlocutors to be
affiliated with the government. The ultimate ownership of media
outlets is not transparent.
45. Journalists informed the IEOM that interference of media owners
in their editorial autonomy results in self-censorship and discourages
critical reporting of the government, including on public television.
News stories of public interest related to the elections, including
the publication of lists of supporters collected by principals of
schools and electoral complaints heard by the CEC, were not covered
by the public broadcaster H1 prime-time news but were covered in
other media. Journalists also reported that recent cases of violence against
journalists and insufficient prosecution undermine their safety
and hinder their work. On a positive note, there is no interference
in internet freedom, with online news sources contributing to increased
media pluralism and critical reporting of the government. In addition,
some online media outlets, financed by international donors, provide
space for in-depth and investigative journalism.
46. The Electoral Code stipulates that television and radio must
provide “impartial and non-judgmental” news coverage of candidates’
campaigns. This provision is vague and was not clarified by the
body which oversees implementation of media-related provisions during
the campaign, the National Commission for Television and Radio (NCTR).
Many TV journalists interpreted this provision to mean that they
must provide an equal amount of coverage to every candidate in each
programme and complained that this limited substantial campaign
reporting. The NCTR did not communicate any guidance on how inequality
of coverage would be assessed.
47. During the campaign, the public broadcaster H1 broadcast a
total of 60 minutes free airtime per contending party, in line with
the law. In addition, all contending parties purchased political
advertising on monitored TV stations under equal conditions. OSCE/ODIHR
election observation mission monitoring results showed that during
the campaign the public H1 devoted an equitable share of airtime
to all contending parties in its newscasts. Armenia TV devoted almost
double the news coverage to the RPA and CoAPP (21% and 19% respectively)
than to each of the other contending parties. Kentron TV devoted
significantly more news coverage (18%) to the TsA than to other
contending parties. Shant TV devoted 20% of the news to the RPA while
giving between 7% and 12% to the others. Yerkir Media favoured the
ARF with 25% of its news leaving the others with 6% to 13% of coverage.
The news coverage on all monitored TV stations was 98% neutral or positive
in tone. However, media monitoring results for the period from 24
February to 4 March, before the start of official campaign, revealed
a clear bias of monitored TV stations in favour of their publicly
perceived party affiliation.
48. Generally, the amount of campaign-related coverage on the
most popular TV stations Armenia TV, Shant TV, and the public H1
was limited and prime-time programming during the campaign was dominated
by entertainment programmes. Kentron TV and Yerkir Media provided
more election-related coverage, including interviews and discussion
programmes. They have, however, less audience share. There were
no televised candidate debates on major TV stations, including H1,
which could have enhanced the opportunity of voters to compare electoral
programmes of the contending parties and allowed opposition parties
to challenge the ruling parties in live public broadcasts.
6. Complaints
and appeals
49. Under the Electoral Code, decisions,
actions and inactions of election commissions can be appealed to the
superior commission, while complaints against the CEC are under
the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court. Complaints against
election results are solely under the Constitutional Court’s purview.
Contrary to a previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendation, the Electoral
Code limits the right to file complaints to those whose personal
electoral rights are at stake. Only candidates, not voters, can
appeal the final election results, contrary to international standards
and good practice. Overall, the new timelines for filing and resolving
complaints are reasonable.
50. Despite a substantial number of allegations raised throughout
the process, a limited amount of complaints were filed with the
election administration and courts. The CEC received 15 complaints,
including four from candidates. The other nine complaints came from
NGOs and were subsequently denied for lack of standing; however
the CEC took up the issues ex officio.
51. All complaints related to campaign violations, including allegations
related to campaign offices located in State-owned buildings, promising
goods and services to voters, abuse of administrative resources,
and campaigning while performing official functions.
52. The CEC rejected two complaints in which parties requested
de-registration of the RPA for abuse of administrative resources
for engaging schools principals and teachers in the collection of
lists of supporters. The CEC found that there was no evidence that
principals and teachers were collecting the signatures while performing
their official duties or during the campaign period. Although the
CEC examined some of the alleged facts, they were reluctant to thoroughly
consider contentious issues, including possible pressure on and intimidation
of teachers to collect the signatures.
53. TECs received no official complaints but proactively initiated
administrative proceedings in relation to campaign violations, including
destruction of campaign materials, in some 50 cases. The Administrative
Court received two complaints from two prospective candidates who
were refused residency certificates and six appeals against CEC
decisions, including on campaign issues and denial of accreditation
of media representatives. All were rejected.
54. The Prosecutor General’s working group on election-related
offences has identified some 225 cases from media sources, mostly
related to vote buying and obstruction of voting rights; 57 cases,
including 46 about vote buying, were investigated by the police.
The vast majority of cases were dismissed due to lack of evidence. While
the 2016 amendments to the Criminal Code decriminalised the receiving
of a bribe, if reported, public reluctance to report vote buying
persisted. Additionally, the Ombudsperson reviewed 148 allegations,
mostly related to campaign violations, and referred five cases to
the law-enforcement bodies.
55. Most IEOM interlocutors stated that there is a public reluctance
to report electoral offences due to lack of confidence in the effectiveness
of the complaint adjudication system. The lack of independence of
the judiciary, election administration and law-enforcement bodies,
the limited right to file complaints, and the manner in which election
administration dealt with complaints undermined the credibility
of electoral dispute resolution and the effectiveness of legal redress,
at odds with Council of Europe and other international standards.
7. Citizen
and international observers
56. The law provides for international
and citizen observation and entitles party proxies to be present
at polling stations. In order to be accredited, citizen observer
groups are required to adopt an internal code of conduct for their
observers and to hold their own training courses. Despite prior
OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations, the new Electoral
Code requires citizen observer groups to include in their charter
explicit aims related to democracy and human rights protection for
at least one year preceding the call of elections, thereby narrowing
the opportunity to observe. Due to non-compliance with this requirement,
the CEC refused accreditation of two citizen organisations.
57. Some NGOs informed the IEOM that the 15-day deadline for applications
for observer’s accreditation also created hurdles in mobilising
observers.
58. The CEC accredited 49 citizen organisations with a total of
28 021 observers as well as 640 international observers. Some IEOM
interlocutors regarded a number of citizen organisations as being
affiliated with some district candidates. All international NGOs
were officially refused an invitation to observe the elections with
a formal explanation that there was already a high number of observers
accredited. Media and civil society criticised the Electoral Code
provisions, which introduced the possibility to selectively limit
the number of citizen observers and media representatives at polling
stations, but this was not an issue on election day.
8. Polling
day
59. Election day was generally
calm and peaceful, with no serious incidents reported anywhere in
the country. However, IEOM observers noted tension (6% of observations)
and intimidation of voters (3%) taking place inside and outside
the polling stations. This was generally as a result of large numbers
of party proxies and others who were present around polling stations
throughout the day (as had happened in the past and as was already
mentioned in previous Parliamentary Assembly election observation
reports). The police did not consistently enforce the law prohibiting
crowds from gathering in front of polling stations.
60. The opening of polling stations was assessed positively in
95% of observations. The procedures were generally followed and
polling stations opened on time. However, ballots boxes were not
shown to be empty and then sealed in 5% of polling stations observed.
61. The voting process was assessed negatively in 12% of observations.
This was primarily due to overcrowding, poor queue control and voters
having difficulties in understanding voting procedures. Although procedures
were generally followed, voters did not always vote in secret and
group voting, including family voting, was noted in 10% of observations.
IEOM observers saw voters deliberately showing their ballot to party proxies
before sliding them in the ballot boxes. TV crews, some allegedly
sent by the CEC, were observed filming closely the IDs of the voters.
Cameras were seen behind the voting booths in a number of polling stations,
and IEOM observers were told that those cameras were not working;
however, voters could not know this.
62. IEOM observers noted some cases of serious violations, including
attempts to influence the voters’ choice, proxy voting, and the
same person accompanying multiple voters into voting booths. A significant number
of polling stations (69%) were not accessible to persons with disabilities.
63. Party proxies were present in 97% of polling stations observed
and citizen observers in 94%, contributing to the transparency of
the process. However, in 12% of observations proxies, citizen observers,
local officials or police were seen to be interfering in the conduct
of the elections, sometimes assuming the leading role in the polling
station. In addition, large groups of people were present in the
immediate vicinity of polling stations in 30% of cases, with tensions
and direct intimidation of voters seen in a number of cases.
64. Many citizen observers whom the IEOM observers met in polling
stations clearly had no idea about the goal or activities of the
NGOs they were claiming to belong to, which led to the conclusion
that many of the domestic NGOs observing elections were in fact
fake NGOs.
65. The process of voter identification by means of voter authentication
devices was conducted efficiently and without significant issues.
There were some problems with scanning of ID documents and fingerprints; however,
this did not lead to significant disruptions of voting. IEOM observers
noted nine cases of voters attempting multiple voting that were
captured by the voter authentication devices. The devices provided
the possibility for voters to be redirected if they were registered
in another polling station in the same TEC.
66. For the first time, web cameras were installed in the 1 499
largest polling stations in these elections, so that election day
procedures could be recorded and observed via the internet. Due
to technical issues, the public online streaming was not available
for all polling stations, especially in the morning on election
day; however, the contending parties and the CEC had uninterrupted
access to all cameras through direct connection to servers throughout
the day. After closing, a number of polling stations were set up
by PECs in such a way that the counting procedures could not be
followed via the web cameras in a meaningful manner.
67. The vote count was conducted largely in a transparent manner,
with those present generally having a clear view of counting procedures
and the possibility to examine ballots on request. The process was
assessed negatively in some 20% of observations, mostly due to interference
of party proxies and observers who directly participated in the
counting of votes. Procedures were generally followed; however,
the PECs did not determine the validity of ballots in a consistent
and reasonable manner and transparency was, at times, undermined
by not showing ballot papers to all present and counting ballots
for district candidates one by one.
68. The tabulation process started immediately after the results
protocols were delivered from the PECs to the TECs. IEOM observers
assessed the tabulation process positively in 33 of the 38 TECs
observed. The processing of PEC results protocols in the TECs was
generally well organised. The observers noted some cases of changing
of protocol figures due to mathematical errors; however, no deliberate
falsification was observed. The CEC started publishing the preliminary
results online shortly after midnight, broken down by polling station,
providing for transparency of election results.
69. The official results of the parliamentary elections, according
to the CEC, are as follows:
- Yelk
(Way out) Alliance – 122 065 (9 seats)
- Free Democrats Party – 14 739
- Armenian Renaissance Party – 58 265
- Tsarukyan Alliance – 428 836 (31 seats)
- Armenian National Congress–Armenian People’s Party Alliance
– 25 950
- Republican Party of Armenia – 770 441 (58 seats)
- Communist Party of Armenia – 11 741
- Ohanyan-Raffi-Oskanian Alliance – 32 508
- Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party – 103 048 (7 seats)
The
total number of voters was 1 575 786.
70. On 14 April, the alliance Armenian National Congress–Armenian
People’s Party appealed to the Constitutional Court of Armenia to
cancel the official results of the 2 April 2017 parliamentary elections
because of alleged serious electoral irregularities. The opposition
alliance presented the court with more than 40 pages of different
documents as well as video and audio records concerning the irregularities.
The CEC rejected the demand and on 28 April the Constitutional Court
rejected it as well.
9. Conclusions
71. The parliamentary elections
of 2 April 2017 were well administered and fundamental freedoms
were generally respected. Despite welcomed reforms of the legal
framework and the introduction of new technologies to reduce the
incidents of electoral irregularities, the elections were tainted
by credible information about vote buying, and pressure on civil
servants and employees of private companies. This contributed to maintaining
an overall lack of public confidence and trust in the elections.
72. Election day was generally calm and peaceful but marked by
organisational problems and undue interference in the process, mostly
by party representatives.
73. The legal framework for elections is comprehensive but complex.
The new Electoral Code was adopted less than one year before the
elections in a reform process that was characterised as inclusive
and seen by most IEOM interlocutors as a step forward in building
overall confidence in the electoral process. A number of previous
Venice Commission recommendations were addressed, although some
areas merit further attention. Some IEOM interlocutors criticised
the complexity of the new electoral system. Civil society organisations
did not endorse the final text because of restrictions on citizen
observers.
74. The CEC met all legal deadlines and conducted its work in
a transparent manner while operating collegially and efficiently.
However, the CEC did not pursue complaints rigorously.
75. Many IEOM interlocutors expressed confidence in the work of
the territorial election commissions. The impartiality of precinct
election commissions was questioned due to the distribution of leadership
positions favouring the ruling party. The quality of training sessions
organised by the CEC for lower-level commissions and voter education
materials was, overall, evaluated positively, but the printed materials
did not always reach their target audience.
76. The accuracy of the voters lists was improved as a result
of enhanced inter-institutional collaboration. Although the law
provides sufficient mechanisms for voters to request corrections,
the voters lists continue to include addresses where a high number
of voters are registered; there is a need for further scrutiny of
the lists by the authorities.
77. Voters were identified on election day through the use of
voter authentication devices, which contained an electronic copy
of the voters lists. Voters’ fingerprints were also scanned and
the CEC informed the IEOM that it would conduct cross-checks to
identify potential cases of multiple voting in case of complaints.
For the first time, scanned copies of signed voters lists from PECs
will be published, which is regarded as an important deterrent to
voter impersonation despite the disclosure of voters’ private data.
78. In an inclusive process, the CEC registered candidate lists
of five political parties and four party alliances. For the first
time, the system provided for four reserve seats for minorities;
however, some parties reported difficulties in finding minority
candidates. All the contending parties complied with the requirement
that each gender must appear in each group of four candidates and,
out of a total of 1 558 candidates 30% were women. In a positive
development, the gender quota applied also to the distribution of
obtained and vacant seats.
79. Most campaigns focused on individual candidates rather than
party platforms or policies. Candidates were largely able to campaign
without restrictions, but isolated incidents of violence were reported
in some areas of the country. It should be noted that many government
officials took leave for campaign purposes.
80. Some legal provisions for campaign finance reporting and oversight
were strengthened, but so-called organisational expenditures, such
as for campaign offices, transport and communication are excluded
from reporting, which diminished transparency. Before election day,
all contending parties submitted to the CEC’s Oversight and Audit
Service (OAS) reports on campaign income and expenditure, which
were published online. While no violations of campaign finance were
identified by the OAS, it did not proactively examine the accuracy of
the reports.
81. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution and
broadly exercised. However, the freedom of broadcast media is limited
by the interference of owners in editorial autonomy. This results
in self-censorship of journalists and discouragement of critical
reporting of the government, including on public television. Journalists
stated that recent cases of violence and lack of prosecution hamper
journalists’ work and undermine their safety. There is, however,
no interference in internet freedom, with online news sources contributing
to increased political pluralism in the media. Media monitoring
of the campaign period showed that the public channel H1 devoted
equitable coverage to each contending party in its newscasts.
82. Most IEOM interlocutors stated that there is a continuing
public reluctance to report electoral offences due to lack of confidence
in the effectiveness of the complaint adjudication system. The lack
of independence of the judiciary, election administration and law-enforcement
bodies, and the manner in which they dealt with complaints undermined
the effectiveness of legal redress, in contradiction with Council
of Europe standards.
83. Election day was generally calm and peaceful. Voting procedures
were generally followed and the voter authentication devices functioned
effectively. However, the voting process was marked by overcrowding,
long queues and interference by party representatives and police.
Crowds were allowed to gather outside polling stations, contrary
to the law. Voters had difficulties understanding the voting process
in 35% of observations and instances of group voting and attempts
to influence voters were observed. The vote count was conducted in
a transparent manner. IEOM observers assessed the tabulation process
positively in 33 of the 38 TECs observed.
84. As a conclusion, after observing the parliamentary elections
of 2 April 2017, the PACE delegation reiterates the declaration
of the pre-electoral delegation, which stated that the electoral
legislation allows for the organisation of free and democratic elections,
if it is applied in good faith and if there is a political will. However,
the PACE delegation still feels that the legislation is too complicated
and believes that this contributes to the maintaining of the existing
distrust in electoral processes in Armenia.
85. The PACE delegation stresses that, in previous observations
of elections in Armenia, the PACE, ODIHR and other international
observers criticised the country for cases of misuse of administrative
resources, allegations of vote buying and intimidation or even physical
violence towards voters. The delegation noticed that these concerns
are still widespread. It stresses also that new technologies are
welcome in electoral processes, but that they must never be considered
as a substitute for trust.
86. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the
Venice Commission will continue to work alongside the authorities
of Armenia in the field of elections and more generally on the reinforcement
of democratic institutions through co-operation activities.
Appendix 1 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee
(open)
Based on the proposals by the political groups
of the Assembly, the ad hoc committee was composed as follows:
Chairperson: Liliane
MAURY PASQUIER, Switzerland (SOC)*
Group of the European People’s
Party (EPP/CD)
- Boriana
ÅBERG, Sweden
- Luís LEITE RAMOS, Portugal
- Aleksander POCIEJ, Poland
- Volkmar VOGEL, Germany
- Maura HOPKINS, Ireland
Socialist Group
(SOC)
- René ROUQUET,
France
- Stefan SCHENNACH, Austria
- Angela SMITH, United Kingdom
- Pascale CROZON, France
- Pierre-Alain FRIDEZ, Switzerland
- Petra De SUTTER, Belgium
- Liliane MAURY PASQUIER, Switzerland
- Claude ADAM, Luxembourg
- Zviad KVATCHANTIRADZE, Georgia
European Conservatives Group (EC)
- Richard BALFE, United Kingdom
- Józef LEŚNIAK, Poland
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Nellija KLEINBERGA, Latvia
- Adele GAMBARO, Italy*
- Anne KALMARI, Finland
- Dovilė ŠAKALIENĖ, Lithuania
Venice Commission
- Richard BARRETT, Ireland, Member
- Simona GRANATA-MENGHINI, Deputy Secretary of the Venice
Commission
Secretariat
- Bogdan TORCĂTORIU, Administrator,
Election Observation and Interparliamentary Co-operation Division
- Franck DAESCHLER, Principal Administrative Assistant,
Election Observation and Interparliamentary Co-operation Division
* members of the pre-election delegation
Appendix 2 – Programme
of the pre-electoral mission (22-23 February 2017)
(open)
Wednesday 22 February
2017
09:15-09:45 Delegation meeting:
- briefing by Ms Natalia Voutova,
Head of the Council of Europe Office in Yerevan, on the latest developments
in the field of elections
09:45-10:30 Meeting with Ms Andrea Chalupova, Political Officer,
European Union Delegation to Armenia
- discussion on the EU projects in the field of elections
10:30-11:15 Meeting with Mr Bradley Busetto, United Nations
Resident Co-ordinator and representative of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)
- discussion
on the UN projects in the field of elections
11:15-12:15 Meeting with members of the diplomatic corps
in Yerevan:
- Ambassador Lukas
Gasser (Switzerland)
- Ambassador Giovanni Ricciulli (Italy)
- Ambassador Judith Farnworth (United Kingdom)
12:15-13:15 Meeting with Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Mr Donald Bisson, Deputy
Head of Mission, and Mr Alexey Gromov, ODIHR Election Adviser
14:30-15:45 Round table with representatives of NGOs:
- Armenian Helsinki Committee:
Mr Avetik Ishkhanyan (Chair)
- Helsinki Citizens' Assembly: Mr Arthur Sakunts (Chair)
- Transparency International: Ms Heriknaz Tigranyan (Legal
Advisor)
- Open Society Institute: Ms Larisa Minasyan (Executive
Director)
- Regional Studies Center: Mr David Shahnazaryan
15:45-17:00 Round table with media representatives:
- Yerevan Press Club: Ms Arevhat
Grigoryan, Mr Mikayel Zolyan
- RFE/RL (Radio Liberty): Ms Siranush Gevorgyan
- A1 Plus: Ms Karine Asatryan
- Aravot: Ms Nelli
Grigoryan
17:00-18:00 Meetings with leaders and representatives of
non-parliamentary parties and/or blocs running in the elections:
17:00-17:30 The Unity bloc (including the following parties:
“Heritage”, “Unity”):
- Mr Seyran
Ohanyan, former Minister of Defence, member of the bloc
- Mr Vardan Oskanyan, Chairperson of the “Unity” Party,
former Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Mr Armen Martirosyan, Vice-Chairperson of the “Heritage”
Party
17:30-18:00 The “Yelk” (Way Out) bloc (including the following
parties: “Civil Contract”, “Bright Armenia”, “Republic”)
- Mr Aram Sargsyan, Chairperson
of the Republic Party
Thursday 23 February
2017
10:00-10:50 Meeting with the Delegation of Armenia
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (members
present: Ms Hermine Naghdalyan, Mr Samvel Farmanyan, Ms Naira Zohrabyan,
Mr Mikayel Melkumyan)
11:00-11:50 Meeting with Mr Tigran Mukuchyan, Chairperson
of the Central Electoral Commission
12:00-12:25 Meeting with Mr Galust Sahakyan, President of
the National Assembly of Armenia
14:00-14:30 Meeting with leaders and representatives of the
“Armenian Revolutionary Federation” Faction: Mr Armen Rustamyan
14:35-15:05 Meeting with leaders and representatives of the
“Rule of Law” Faction: Mr Mher Shahgeldyan
15:10-15:40 Meeting with leaders and representatives of the
“Armenian National Congress” Faction: Mr Levon Zourabian
15:45-16:15 Meeting with leaders and representatives of the
“Prosperous Armenia” Faction: Ms Naira Zohrabyan
16:20-16:50 Meeting with leaders and representatives of the
“Republican” (RPA) Faction: Mr Gagik Melikyan, Ms Hermine Naghdalyan,
Ms Margarit Yesayan, Ms Naira Karapetyan, Ms Ruzanna Muradyan, Mr Gagik
Minasyan, Mr Samvel Farmanyan, Mr Vahram Mkrtchyan
17:00-19:00 Preparation and adoption of a statement
Appendix 3 – Statement
by the pre-electoral delegation
(open)
Armenia: PACE delegation
told about transparency of electoral process but also about widespread fears
that past irregularities could recur
Strasbourg, 23.02.2017 – The pre-electoral delegation of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) supports
the opinion of the Venice Commission, adopted in 2016, which concluded
that the electoral legislation in Armenia allows for the organisation
of free and democratic elections, if it is applied in good faith and
if there is a political will. However, after having heard detailed
explanations of the new electoral code, the delegation still felt
that it was too complicated to be understood by the general public
and believes that this may lead to confusion and add to existing
distrust in the electoral process.
The delegation recalls that, in previous observations of elections
in Armenia, the Parliamentary Assembly, ODIHR and other international
observers criticised the country for cases of misuse of administrative
resources, allegations of vote buying, intimidation or even physical
violence towards electors during election campaigns. The delegation
noted that concerns about potential abuse of State resources, organised
vote buying, pressure on candidates and unbalanced media coverage
are still widespread. It was told that new technologies would be
used to prevent irregularities on election day. However, the delegation
stressed that they must not be considered as a substitute for trust.
In this regard, concerning the elections scheduled for 2 April
2017, the pre-electoral delegation asks the relevant authorities
to take all necessary measures, at all hierarchical levels and throughout
the entire country, in order to prevent such practices in the period
preceding polling day, as well as on polling day itself.
The delegation hopes, among other things, that on polling
day both domestic and international observers will be allowed to
observe freely, without fear of being expelled from polling stations
if they point out irregularities. Retaliation for “false reporting”
and official demands to the media for the disclosure of their sources
are practices that must disappear. On the other hand, those responsible
for any kind of irregularities, either during the campaign or on
election day, must expect severe punishment.
The delegation felt that Armenia’s political culture still
needs to be developed, as politics is linked to personalities rather
than ideologies and political programmes with concrete proposals
to address the numerous political, economic and sociological issues
confronting the country. It heard that financing of certain opposition parties
was strongly discouraged by intimidation, and that businessmen were
at risk of seeing their businesses endangered, should they decide
to sponsor those parties. The delegation was told about the danger
of social resignation and passivity, and therefore underlines that,
for the benefit of Armenian society, it is crucial that public confidence
in the democratic electoral process be restored.
The PACE pre-electoral delegation* was in Yerevan at the invitation
of the President of the National Assembly of Armenia. It met with
the President of the National Assembly, the Chairman of the Central
Electoral Commission, representatives of the main parliamentary
and non-parliamentary political parties, NGO and media representatives,
the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, representatives
of international organisations and members of the diplomatic corps
in Yerevan.
A full-fledged, 32-member team of PACE observers will arrive
in Yerevan at the end of March to observe the vote.
* Liliane Maury Pasquier (Switzerland, SOC), Head of the Delegation,
Ingebjørg Godskesen (Norway, EC), Adele Gambaro, (Italy, ALDE).
Appendix 4 – Programme
of the International Election Observation Mission (31 March-3 April
2017)
(open)
Friday, 31 March 2017
10.30- 11.30 Meeting of the ad hoc committee:
- Opening by Ms Liliane Maury
Pasquier, Head of Delegation
- Comments by the members of the pre-electoral mission
- Briefing by the Venice Commission on legal issues
- Briefing by the Secretariat on operational issues
12:00-12:15 – Mr Ignacio Sánchez Amor, Special Co-ordinator
of the OSCE Short-Term Observers
- Mr Geir
Bekkevold, Head of Delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
- Ms Liliane Maury Pasquier, Head of Delegation of the PACE
- Ms Heidi Hautala, Head of Delegation of the European Parliament
12:15-12:45 – Ambassador Argo Avakov, Head of the OSCE
Office in Yerevan
- Ms Loreta
Vioiu, Deputy Head of the Council of Europe Office in Yerevan
- Mr Dirk Lorenz, Acting Head of the European Union Delegation
to Armenia
12:45-14:45 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission:
- Welcome – Ambassador
Jan Petersen, Head of Mission
- Political overview and candidates – Ms Dana Diacinu, Political
Analyst
- Legal framework and complaints – Ms Kseniya Dashutina,
Legal Analyst
- Election administration and candidate registration – Ms Svetlana
Chetaikina, Election Analyst
- Voter registration – Mr Goran Petrov, Voter Registration
Analyst
- Media environment – Ms Elma Šehalić, Media Analyst
- Citizen observer groups – Ms Svetlana Chetaikina, Election
Analyst
- Security – Mr Davor Ćorluka, Security Expert
15:30-16:15 Ms Arpine Hovhannisyan, Minister
of Justice
16:15-17:00 Mr Tigran Mukuchyan, Chair
of the Central Electoral Commission
17:00-18:00 Round table with media representatives:
- Mr Tigran Hakobyan, member of
the National Commission on TV and Radio
- Mr Boris Navasardyan, Chair, Yerevan Press Club
- Ms Siranush Gevorgyan, Editor-in-Chief, Radio Free Europe/RL
(Radio Liberty)
- Ms Karine Asatryan, Editor-in-Chief, A1 Plus
- Ms Nelli Grigoryan, Journalist, Aravot
- Mr Harutyun Harutyunyan, Director of Information and Analytical
Programs, Public Service TV
18:00-19:00 Round table with representatives of NGOs:
- Mr Avetik Ishkhanyan, Chair,
Armenian Helsinki Committee
- Mr Artur Sakunts (Chair), Helsinki Citizens' Assembly
- Ms Sona Aivazyan, Vice-Director, Transparency International
- Ms Larisa Minasyan, Executive Director, Open Society Institute
- Mr Richard Giragosian, Director, Regional Studies Center
- Mr Daniel Ioanissyan, Programme Director, Union of Informed
Citizens
Saturday 1 April 2017
09:30-12:30 Briefing by the Political parties
09:30-09:50 Republican Party of Armenia (RPA):
- Mr Vigen Sargsyan, Member of
the Executive Body
- Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Member of the Executive Body
09:50-10:10 Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) – Mr Aghvan
Vardanyan, Head of Campaign
10:10-10:30 Tsarukyan Alliance (Prosperous Armenia, Alliance
Party, Mission Party):
- Ms Naira
Zohrabyan, Deputy Head of “Prosperous Armenia” Fraction
- Mr Mikayel Melkumyan, MP
10:30-10:50 Armenian Renaissance – Mr Artur Baghdasaryan,
Chair
10:50-11:10 Free Democrats (FD) – Mr Khachatur Kokobelyan,
Chair
11:10-11:30 Congress Armenian People’s Party (CoAPP) – Mr Levon
Zurabian, Vice-Chairperson
11:30-11:50 Communist Party of Armenia – Mr Boris Gyurjyan,
Organisation Unit Head
11:50-12:10 Yelk Alliance (Bright Armenia, Republic Party,
Civil Treaty) – Mr Nikol Pashinyan, Leader of the Yelk Alliance
12:10-12:30 Hanyan-Rafi-Oskanyan (ORO) Alliance
- Mr Raffi Hovhannisian, Chair
of the Heritage Party
- Mr Hovsep Khurshudyan, Spokesperson
12:45-13:50 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission
- Observation forms –
Mr Anders Eriksson, Statistics Analyst
- Election day procedures – Ms Svetlana Chetaikina, Election
Analyst and Mr. Goran Petrov, Voter Registration Analyst
- Code of conduct – Mr Donald Bisson, Deputy Head of Mission
- Presentation of EOM Long-Term Observers – Mr Marcell Nagy,
Long-Term Observers Co-ordinator of Yerevan-based LTO teams
14:00 Meeting with drivers and interpreters
Sunday 2 April 2017
All day : Observation of the opening, voting, closing and
counting
Monday 3 April 2017
08:00-09:00 Internal debriefing of the ad hoc
committee
14:30 Press conference
16:00-17:00 Meeting with heads of delegations at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
Appendix 5 – Statement
by the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM)
(open)
Legal and technical
reforms bring improvements in well administered Armenian elections,
but process tainted by credible information of vote buying and pressure
on voters, international observers say
Strasbourg, 03.04.2017 – The 2 April parliamentary elections
in Armenia were well administered and fundamental freedoms were
generally respected. Despite welcomed reforms of the legal framework
and the introduction of new technologies to reduce electoral irregularities,
the elections were tainted by credible information about vote buying,
and pressure on civil servants and employees of private companies, international
observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. This
contributed to an overall lack of public confidence and trust in
the elections, the statement says.
“Yesterday’s elections marked a first step towards establishing
a new political system in Armenia, but change cannot happen overnight”,
said Ignacio Sanchez Amor, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the
short-term OSCE observer mission. “Reform is a never-ending process,
and I encourage the parliamentary majority and the new government
to continue their efforts to transform the country’s political culture,
in partnership with the opposition, civil society and the international
community.”
A new Electoral Code was adopted less than one year before
elections, in an inclusive process that was seen by most as a step
forward in building confidence in the process, the observers said.
The legal framework for elections is comprehensive, but was criticised
by some as overly complex. The reforms to the Code addressed a number
of previous OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe Venice Commission recommendations,
although some areas merit further attention.
“There is little doubt that, since the last time the citizens
of Armenia voted, efforts have been made, including through logistical
improvements, to raise the quality of the electoral process. The
authorities should be praised for working to inform the electorate
of this new, quite complex, electoral legislation. It is a pity
that, despite all of the legal and organisational changes, these
elections did not remove long-standing doubts about the reliability
and integrity of electoral processes in the country,” said Liliane
Maury Pasquier, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe. “The use of new voting technologies cannot
alone restore confidence in elections – crucial in a genuine democracy
– just the same as better legislation is only effective if applied
in good faith.”
“The new electoral law provides for greater representation
of women and minorities,” said Geir Jorgen Bekkevold, Head of the
delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. “I am glad to note
that a greater number of our colleagues in the National Assembly
will be women, and I encourage political parties to empower them
to bring about transformative change.”
“The new electoral procedure was complex and not always understood
by the voters. Nevertheless, polling station staff made strong efforts
to ensure a smooth process. Regrettably, the process was undermined
by credible, recurring information of vote buying, intimidation
of voters notably civil servants in schools and hospitals and employees
of private companies as well as abuse of administrative positions,”
said Heidi Hautala, Head of the delegation from the European Parliament.
“The European Parliament will work closely with the future Armenian
National Assembly to support reforms and democratisation, in line
with our commitments as part of the deepening EU-Armenia relations.”
The Central Election Commission (CEC) operated efficiently
and conducted its work in a transparent manner. It did not, however,
pursue complaints rigorously, the statement says.
The campaign started slowly and intensified as election day
approached, and most campaigns focused on individual candidates
rather than party platforms or policies. Candidates were largely
able to campaign without restrictions, but isolated incidents of
violence were reported in some areas of the country. There was credible information
of vote buying, of pressure on public servants, including in schools
and hospitals, and of intimidation of voters. This contributed to
an overall lack of public confidence in the electoral process, the observers
said.
Election day was generally calm and peaceful, but observers
noted tension and the intimidation of voters in some polling stations
visited. This was generally as a result of large numbers of party
proxies and others present around polling stations throughout the
day. Voters were identified on election day using voter authentication
devices containing electronic copies of the voters lists, their
fingerprints were also scanned, and the CEC said that it will conduct
cross-checks to identify potential cases of multiple voting in the
event of complaints. For the first time, scanned copies of signed
voters lists from polling stations will be published, which the
observers’ interlocutors deemed an important deterrent of voter
impersonation, despite the disclosure of voter’s private data.
“The measures introduced ahead of these elections have improved
the situation regarding the secrecy of the vote, which is an important
step towards improving confidence in the process, but more clearly
needs to be done to address long-standing practices like vote buying
and pressure on voters”, said Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of the
election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights. “Moving forward, our mission will
remain here through this week and the next, allowing us to follow
post-election developments, including the finalisation of results
and the handling of any possible complaints and appeals.”
There is a public reluctance to report electoral offences,
due to a lack of confidence in the system for adjudicating complaints.
The lack of independence on the part of judicial, election administration
and law enforcement bodies, and the manner in which they dealt with
complaints, undermined the effectiveness of providing legal redress,
the statement says.
Enhanced inter-institutional collaboration led to improved
accuracy in the voters lists. Although the law provides sufficient
mechanisms for voters to request corrections, the lists continue
to include addresses at which a large number of voters are registered,
which requires further scrutiny by the authorities.
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution and
broadly exercised. The freedom of broadcast media is limited by
interference by owners in editorial policy. This results in self-censorship
by journalists and discourages reporting critical of the government,
including on public television, the observers said. Journalists stated
that recent cases of violence and the lack of prosecution of those
responsible hamper their work and undermine their safety. There
are no restrictions on online news sources, contributing to increased
pluralism in the media. OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring showed that
the public broadcaster devoted equitable coverage to the candidates
in its newscasts.
International and citizen observation is permitted, and party
representatives are entitled to be present in polling stations.
The CEC accredited a total of 28 021 citizen observers, but media
and civil society criticised the legal provisions on observation
as making it possible for polling officials to selectively limit
the number of citizen observers and media representatives in stations.
International NGOs were refused an invitation to observe the
elections, which is at odds with OSCE commitments.