1. Introduction
1. The Baltic region occupies
a strategic location in the borderlands of north-eastern Europe,
making it historically attractive to powers with regional ambitions.
Estonia is the most northerly of the Baltic States. From the very
beginning, the Estonian nation has been either conquered or permanently
threatened by foreign powers. There have been attempts to dominate
the country by Sweden, Denmark, the Russian Empire, Germany and
the Soviet Union. Modern Estonia has been an independent State since
1918, interrupted by 50 years of Soviet occupation following the
Second World War. Estonia regained its independence in 1991. The
last Russian troops left in 1994. Since then, Estonia has promoted
economic and political ties with Western Europe. It became a member
of the European Union in May 2004 and a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 2004. Its currency is the euro.
2. In the last Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) study,

Estonia
was the best performing former Soviet republic, but also one of
top performers overall. In the
SGI’s
Policy Performance Index that captures the quality of economic, social and environmental
policies, Estonia ranks 7th, and is only outperformed by Sweden, Norway,
Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and Germany. This illustrates well
Estonia’s successful transformation from an autocracy with a centrally
controlled economy to a market-based democracy.
3. Estonia is a small country with an area of 45 228 km2,
a population of 1 317 800

and a density of 29 per km.
With a small population, Estonia took the political decision to
heavily invest in new information technologies to promote efficiency
and innovation. Estonia (“e-Estonia”) is a pioneer digital society.

4. In December 2014, Estonia launched an e-residency programme
– a secure digital identity to non-residents, allowing them access
to Estonian e-services from all over the world, such as for company
formation, banking, payment processing and taxation. E-residency
offers the possibility for every citizen in the world to obtain
a government-issued digital identity and the opportunity to run
a trusted company online. E-residency is not related to citizenship
and does not give the right to enter or reside in Estonia.
5. Estonia became the 27th member State of the Council of Europe
on 14 May 1993. Upon its accession to the Council of Europe, Estonia
committed itself to respect the obligations incumbent upon every
member State under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe
(ETS No. 1) with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law
and human rights. A monitoring procedure with regard to Estonia
was established according to
Order
488 (1993) and then under
Order
508 (1995). Estonia was the first country in central and eastern
Europe for which Parliamentary Assembly closed the monitoring procedure
on the honouring of obligations and commitments by
Resolution 1117 (1997). Monitoring was succeeded by post-monitoring
dialogue focusing on the following areas: the treatment of refugees
and asylum seekers, the “non-historic” Russian-speaking minority,
as well as conditions of custody and detention and the abolition
of the death penalty. The post-monitoring dialogue regarding Estonia
was ended in December 2000.
6. As at 23 October 2017, Estonia had ratified 101 Council of
Europe treaties and signed 12 additional treaties without ratification.
It ratified Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human
Rights (CETS No. 214) on 31 August 2017, the Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No. 197) on 5 February
2015 and the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201) on 22 November 2016.
It signed the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210) on 2 December 2014 and
the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism
(CETS No. 217) on 22 October 2015.
7. This periodic report was drafted in line with
Resolution 2018 (2014) and the explanatory memorandum approved by the committee
on 17 March 2015. This report is based on,
inter
alia, the most recent findings of the Council of Europe
monitoring mechanisms, the reports of the Parliamentary Assembly
and of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
and, when relevant, reports prepared by other international organisations
and civil society.
8. This periodic report is not an exhaustive research on the
country but an analysis of the country’s developments with regard
to Council of Europe standards. It more specifically focuses on
major issues identified by the rapporteur, based on geopolitical,
political and social developments as well as reports of the monitoring
bodies. After looking into the development of political institutions
in the country over recent years, the rapporteur has looked at the
relations between Estonia and the Russian Federation, which is a
prerequisite to the understanding of a number of issues in the country.
The rapporteur has paid special attention to the questions of citizenship
and statelessness, as well the situation of the Russian minority
in the country. As an ultra-digitalised country, Estonia represents
an example of e-democracy with specific mechanisms, challenges and
threats. Estonia is an overall functioning rule-of-law country with
a trusted efficient and independent judiciary. Although Estonia
is traditionally seen as being amongst the least corrupt countries
in central and eastern Europe, it has faced political corruption
cases in recent years. In the field of human rights, the rapporteur
has not identified systemic worrying human rights problems, as shown
by the limited number of violations of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 5) found in respect of Estonia. A number of specific
human rights questions are hereby under review.
9. I should like to thank the Estonian delegation to Parliamentary
Assembly and the Estonian authorities for their active and constructive
co-operation, and express my appreciation for the thorough comments provided
by a number of institutions in Estonia. While the preliminary review
report already acknowledged the positive trends in the country regarding
the implementation of Council of Europe standards, positive developments
have taken place since the preliminary review was discussed in the
Monitoring Committee in May 2017. These developments have been reflected
in this report.
2. Background
10. Based on the European Commission’s
Eurobarometer Survey 85 of 2016,

Estonians trust major institutions
more than Europeans on average. The trust that Estonians have in
the major public institutions remains high, with Estonians giving
higher scores to the trustworthiness of the legal system and the government
than the European Union average. Respectively 80% and 78% of Estonian
citizens trust the police and the armed forces, while 62% trust
the legal system, 53% the municipal authorities and 53% the public administration.
Trust in the government (43%), in parliament (33%) and in political
parties (14%) is also higher than the EU average.

Compared with the 2015 Eurobarometer
Survey 84,

while trust in the parliament (Riigikogu)
and political parties have somewhat declined, trust in municipal
governments and the European Union climbed in 2016 respectively
by 8% and 4%.
11. Estonia is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament.
The 101-member parliament, the Riigikogu, is elected by proportional
voting by district. The head of government is the Prime Minister,
usually the leader of the party that has gained the most seats in
parliament or enough to form a majority coalition. The President
is a ceremonial figurehead with no executive power and is elected
by the Riigikogu, or a special electoral body, for a five-year term.
The electoral body is convened if no candidate secures a two-thirds
majority in the Riigikogu after three rounds of voting. This electoral
body, which consists of all the members of the Riigikogu and elected
representatives of local governments, elects the President, choosing
between the two candidates with the largest percentage of votes
in the first rounds of voting.
12. Ms Kersti Kaljulaid, a former State official who was Estonia’s
representative in the European Court of Auditors from 2004 to 2016,
was elected President of Estonia in October 2016. She was elected
after no other candidate received the required majority of votes
in three rounds of parliamentary voting and two rounds of voting
by the electoral body. After the failure of the electoral body to
choose a President from the five candidates, the six parliamentary
parties agreed to propose a single candidate.
13. Estonia was hit hard by the 2008-9 world financial crisis.
The right-wing coalition government of the Reform Party and the
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union adopted strict austerity policies.
From 2005 to 2014, the Prime Minister, Mr Andrus Ansip, leader of
the liberal Reform Party, headed three government coalitions. The
coalition government faced declining favourability ratings as the
2015 national elections approached, in particular following prolonged
austerity policies and party finance scandals. Mr Ansip resigned
as Prime Minister in February 2014 to allow the Reform Party to
choose a new leader ahead of the 2015 national elections.
14. The 2015 parliamentary elections (Riigikogu elections) were
held in Estonia on 1 March 2015.

The election
was overshadowed by security concerns sparked by Russia's annexation
of Crimea. The elections were also marked by populism related to
social issues as well as the politicisation of the refugee question
and its sociocultural implications.
15. The ruling Reform Party, newly led by Mr Taavi Rõivas, secured
30 of the 101 seats in parliament. The Estonian Centre Party, led
by the mayor of Tallinn Mr Edgar Savisaar, popular among the sizeable
Russian minority, came in second with 27 seats. The Social Democratic
party came in third with 15 seats. The right-wing Union of Pro Patria
and Res Publica lost 6.8% of votes with only 14 seats. The national-conservative
anti-establishment Freedom Party (8 seats) and the populist far-right
anti-establishment Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (7 seats)
entered parliament for the first time.
16. Long negotiations led to the formation of a coalition composed
of the Reform Party together with the Social Democrats and the Pro
Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL). The Reform Party had already
headed previous governments with the Social Democrats and IRL as
successive governing partners.
17. On 9 November 2016, Estonia’s Government collapsed after two
junior coalition partners called on the Prime Minister to resign
and the opposition called for a vote of no confidence in parliament
which the Prime Minister, Mr Taavi Rõivas, lost. The government’s
work had been hampered by serious policy differences between the
Reform Party and its coalition partners – the left-leaning Social
Democrats and the conservative IRL party. Conflicting views over
taxation and improving the state of Estonia’s economy, which the
two junior coalition partners claimed was stagnant, were amongst
the causes for the break-up. Estonian President, Ms Kersti Kaljulaid,
called on the heads of the six parliamentary parties to form a new
government.
18. The replacement of Mr Edgar Savisaar by Mr Jüri Ratas at the
head of the Centre Party in November 2016 opened the way for political
parties that had previously said they would not work with the Centre
Party to enter discussions on forming a new government. Mr Jüri
Ratas distanced himself from Mr Edgar Savisaar’s policy and image
of pro-Russian and anti-NATO.
19. On 23 November 2016, the Estonian Parliament swore in a new
government consisting of the Centre Party, the Social Democratic
Party and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (totalling 56 out
of 101 seats). The Centre Party candidate, Mr Jüri Ratas, was named
Prime Minister, and each of the three parties took five ministerial
posts. The new coalition partners have stressed the continuity of
the country’s current defence and foreign policy, based on the alliance
with the NATO countries and Estonia’s activity in the European Union. Estonia
took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union from
1 July 2017 to 31 December 2017.
3. Relations
between Estonia and the Russian Federation
20. Estonia's international realignment
towards the West after the re-establishment of independence in 1991 has
been accompanied by tense relations with the Russian Federation.
Disputes have emerged over border treaties, transit arrangements,
differing official views of the Soviet annexation period, gas prices,
energy security, and the status of the Russian minority.
21. One of the legacies of the Soviet annexation is the large
Russian minority. The period between 1944 and 1991 in particular
was characterised by extensive immigration from various regions
of the Soviet Union into Estonia. One of the peculiarities of Estonia
is that a relatively large population of people whose mother tongue is
not Estonian was formed in a very short period of time. The status
of this Russian minority (about a quarter of the population based
on the 2011 census) has been a cause of controversy. On the one
hand, Russia has an official policy of responsibility towards these
minorities, who found themselves living outside of their nation-State
as the Soviet Union collapsed, and Russia accuses Estonia of discriminating
against them. On the other hand, Estonia denounces Russia’s foreign
policy, characterised by the notion of the “Near Abroad” aimed at securing
Russia's “sphere of influence” over countries that are strategically
vital for it. The Estonian authorities have accused Russia of using
the Russian minority for political purposes and as a pretext and
self-justification to gain more influence in the domestic affairs
of the country.

According to the Estonian Internal
Security Service:

“The main concern here is the attempts
made by agencies of Russia, including special services, to influence
the domestic policy of Estonia. In different times different agencies
of Russia have taken an active approach towards Estonia but mostly
it is conducted under the political pretext of Russian compatriots.” According
to the Estonian Internal Security Service, Russian influence activities
take place through its foreign policy tools in espionage and in
political, military and economic matters.
22. Relations between Estonia and Russia have indeed further deteriorated
because of the Ukrainian crisis and the Estonian authorities’ fears
about the security of its border with Russia. Estonia and other
Baltic countries have voiced alarm at the Russian Federation’s annexation
of Crimea, and its military support in the other eastern territories
of Ukraine, fearing for their own national security. There have
been several incidents involving intrusion of borders and arrests
of Baltic citizens by Russia. In September 2014, Russian forces abducted
an Estonian internal security officer, Mr Eston Kohver, who was
subsequently, on 26 September 2015, handed over to the Estonian
authorities through an exchange deal with Russian authorities. The Estonian
authorities consider that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
use of new forms of hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine raise difficult
questions for Estonia’s national security. “Propaganda wars”, disinformation, attacks
on information and communication systems, and psychological pressure
are allegedly the non-military tools used to exert pressure and
influence the country’s behaviour.
23. In response to requests from the Baltic States and Poland,
NATO has increased its defences by stationing rotating deployments
in these countries and increasing deliveries of defensive military
equipment. Russia denounces NATO’s increasing presence in the Baltic
States.

24. After more than 20 years of disagreements following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Baltic countries
in 1991, the Russian Federation and Estonia signed an agreement
on 18 February 2014 on the delimitation of their common land and
maritime borders.

During the signing of the border
agreement, it was agreed that their ratification by the parliaments
would be conducted in parallel. The Riigikogu completed the first
reading of the Bill on the Ratification of the State Border Treaty
between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation and the
Treaty on the Delimitation of Maritime Areas of Narva Bay and the
Gulf of Finland between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian
Federation on 25 November 2015. On the Russian side, the Duma has
yet to begin the ratification process.
25. As underlined by the Estonian authorities,

there has been cultural
co-operation between Estonia and Russia through projects in the
fields of education, science, youth and languages. Cross-border
co-operation between Estonia and Russia has developed, particularly
within the framework of co-operation programmes aimed at supporting
development and competitiveness of border regions and largely financed
by the European Union.
4. Democracy
4.1. E-democracy
26. By investing in the possibilities
opened up by internet and the value of innovation, Estonia has become one
of the most digitally advanced nations in the world. Estonia
has declared internet access a human right, and has digitally streamlined
an extraordinary high number of public services. The Estonian State
currently offers 600 e-services to its residents and 2 400 to businesses.
Estonia is recognised for its e-governance policy, and its considerable
achievements regarding transparency and accessibility in government.
Estonia conducts its nationwide elections online.

It was also the first country in
the world to have an “e-cabinet” (paperless government). Estonia
has an electronic identity (e-ID) system, with electronic cards
being the primary means for establishing proof of identity for Estonian
residents, both offline and online.
27. The rapid global development of information technology by
Estonia comes at the price of increased cyberthreats to the country’s
security. Being highly dependent on computers, it is indeed highly
vulnerable to cyberattacks. According to the Estonian Foreign Intelligence
Service,

Russia’s increased cyberattack capacity
is a major threat to Estonian cyberspace (see also section 3 above
and chapter 6.5 below).

4.2. Internet
voting (i-voting)
28. Estonia was the first country
to use internet voting,

for the municipal elections in 2005
and then for the general elections in 2007. Internet voting (i-voting
or online voting) – voting via internet – is one of the possibilities
to vote in addition to “classic” voting methods. So far, i-voting
with binding results has been carried out eight times in Estonia.

29. The question of the vulnerabilities of the Estonian i-voting
system was raised by researchers in May 2014 after performing a
security evaluation of Estonia’s internet-based voting system.

This security evaluation considered
that Estonia’s internet voting system could be an attractive target
for State-level attacks,

by Russia
for example. According to them, there were staggering gaps in procedural
and
operational
security, and the architecture of the system leaves it open to
cyberattacks
from foreign powers. These attacks could potentially alter votes or leave
election outcomes in dispute. The Estonian National Electoral Committee reportedly
published a response saying that the claims gave no reason to suspend
online balloting and the Estonian Information System Authority

described the claims as a political
rather than a technical attack on the i-voting system. According
to the authorities,

the
research study from 2014 no longer corresponds to the current Estonian
e-voting system. They refer to another study of 2016 by the Oxford
University

which highlights the impressive state
of the procedural and operational controls as well as the system’s
transparency measures. At the same time, problems in the system
still exist, in particular with regard to the increasing potential
for more highly sophisticated attacks and the need for the system
to adapt in order to accommodate this evolution.
30. In the general elections of 1 March 2015, internet voting
represented 30.5% of all votes cast. According to the report of
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR),

there was a high degree of trust
in the reliability and security of internet voting and it was administered
efficiently and in line with the legal framework, although additional measures
could be taken to enhance the transparency and accountability of
the process.
31. Several amendments have been adopted since the parliamentary
elections with regard to internet voting to address a number of
the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. A key development was the establishment
in 2012 of the Electronic Voting Committee (EVC), under the auspices
of the National Electoral Committee (NEC), to organise internet
voting and verify the electronic voting results. The NEC introduced
a verification process for voters to confirm that their online vote
was cast as intended and recorded on the ballot storage server,
which partially addressed a previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendation.
The Election Act does not require formal certification of the internet
voting system by an independent organisation, which somewhat limits
the transparency and accountability of the system. In the 2015 elections,
the NEC contracted an auditor to assess compliance of internet voting
with procedural requirements and published summaries of its audit
reports.
32. Amongst its priority recommendations,

the
OSCE/ODIHR recommended that the authorities should continue efforts
to include end-to-end verifiability in the internet voting system
to enhance system accountability by verifying that votes are counted
as recorded. According to the “General Framework of Electronic Voting
and Implementation thereof at National Elections in Estonia”

published by the State Electoral
Office of Estonia in June 2017, the i-voting system is end-to-end
verifiable as the input and output of all processes can be verified
mathematically. Another OSCE/ODIHR recommendation is that the authorities should
consider establishing a formal process for end-to-end certification
of the internet voting system by an independent body, in line with
the Council of Europe guidelines, which does not appear to have
been implemented to date.
4.3. Local
democracy
33. In general, the situation of
local democracy in Estonia is positive, even though the country
is currently facing specific challenges. On 29 March 2017, the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe adopted
Recommendation
401 (2017) on local democracy in Estonia welcoming the initiatives
of the Estonian institutions to start a territorial reform process
at the local and State levels and revision of the State Budget Law
with a view to strengthening the interaction between the State and
local authorities on budgetary items. The Congress nevertheless
recommends notably that the Estonian authorities clarify their legislation concerning
the distribution of functions between local and central government
and recommends that they change the domestic legislation in order
to give local authorities more financial autonomy.
5. Human
rights
5.1. Citizenship,
statelessness, minority protection
34. One of the legacies of Estonia’s
history is a large Russian minority – about a quarter of the population according
to the 2011 census. The Russian minority’s status has been a cause
of controversy. Some, including the Russian Government, criticise
the conditions for obtaining Estonian citizenship – especially the
need to show a proficiency in the Estonian language – that left
most Russians stateless after independence. In Estonia, stateless
persons are officially referred to as “persons with undetermined
citizenship”.

According to the authorities,
long-term Estonian residents with undetermined citizenship enjoy
all social, economic and cultural rights on an equal footing with
the citizens of Estonia. They have travel documents, residence permits,
the right to equal treatment, access to social services. They have
the status of third country nationals who are long-term residents
in the European Union, which also ensures extensive rights of movement
and access to employment throughout the European Union. Persons
with undetermined citizenship can travel visa-free in both the European
Union and to Russia. “Persons of undetermined citizenship” have
the right to vote in local elections but not to vote or stand as
candidates in parliamentary elections. While “persons with undetermined
citizenship” can participate in party activities and donate to parties
or candidates, they do not have the right to join political parties,
despite an OSCE/ODIHR recommendation to the contrary.

35. In their comments,

the authorities recall that although
over twenty years have passed since the Soviet Union ceased to exist,
members of the various nationalities in Estonia still have many
unhealed wounds, and in this context, a compromise had to be found
regarding the status of the Russian minority: All Estonian residents
who were citizens of the Soviet Union have a right to register themselves
as citizens of the Russian Federation, the Successor State of the
USSR, or as citizen of any other previous member republic of the
USSR. “Persons with undetermined citizenship” who live in Estonia
on the basis of a long-term residence permit have a right to apply
for Estonian citizenship. The Estonian authorities

assert
that persons with “undetermined citizenship” do not apply for Estonian
citizenship because the absence of citizenship does not prevent
them from living in Estonia. The number of “persons with undetermined
citizenship” has steadily decreased from approximately 500 000 in
1992 (or 32% of the population of Estonia) to 78 107 (or about 6%
of the population) by 1 August 2017,

the
majority of whom are Russians.
36. Ordinary naturalisation requirements

are the following: the applicant
has lived in Estonia for eight years on the grounds of a residence
permit or by right of residence, of which the last five years permanently (following
an amendment to the Citizenship Act of January 2016, these five
years of permanent residency do not need to be consecutive); has
a permanent legal income; knows the language and the Constitution
and the Citizenship Act of Estonia (citizenship test); pledges loyalty
to the country; and renounces the citizenship of any other country.
37. In recent years, the Estonian authorities have indeed taken
significant steps to reduce statelessness. On 21 January 2015, the
Citizenship Law was amended to simplify naturalisation requirements
for several categories of people, including children. The new amendments
entered into force on 1 January 2016. In particular, the changes
abolished (in respect of newborn babies) the principle of
jus sanguinis and retrospectively
granted citizenship to stateless children under the age of 15 born
in Estonia; they scrapped the written language exam for persons
older than 65; they allowed for the double citizenship of minors
who would then be obliged to choose their single country of citizenship
within three years of reaching the age of 18. The amendments do
not affect adolescents between the ages of 16 and 18, and children
born outside Estonia to stateless residents of Estonia still cannot
automatically obtain citizenship. According to the authorities,

while minors between
the ages of 15 and 18 cannot get Estonian citizenship automatically,
they can apply for it if they so wish.
38. In its last
opinion on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
minorities (ETS No. 157),

the Advisory Committee notes
that notwithstanding the authorities’ efforts to facilitate the
acquisition of citizenship by stateless persons, and noting that
such persons have mostly the same rights as citizens, except the
right to stand in any election, vote in parliamentary elections,
establish or join a political party and work in public service,
over 6% of the population still cannot participate fully in the
democratic life of the country, on account of their lack of citizenship.
In its last resolution

on
the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities by Estonia, the Committee of Ministers recommended
further reducing the number of persons without citizenship by facilitating
access to citizenship for long-term residents.
39. According to Human Rights Watch,

there
can be far-reaching repercussions for children who are not covered
by the recent amendments (namely adolescents between the ages of
16 and 18 and children born outside Estonia to stateless residents
of Estonia who still cannot automatically obtain citizenship). While acknowledging
that stateless persons in Estonia hold a special legal status and
that the children can access
education and
healthcare on an almost equal basis, Human Rights Watch refers
to a report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) showing that a lack of citizenship and identity
can expose children to discrimination and can
affect them psychologically: the UNHCR report says that “[s]tateless children across
the world share similar feelings of discrimination, frustration
and despair, creating problems that can endure into adulthood”.

40. In January 2017, the Prime Minister of Estonia and Chair of
the Centre Party said that granting citizenship to everyone who
has lived in Estonia for at least 25 years, or since 1991, would
be one of the primary campaign promises for the Centre Party in
the next elections as it would increase cohesion in Estonian society.
This proposal led to criticism and of accusations of it being a
pro-Kremlin measure.
41. The rapporteur fully understands the specific historical context
surrounding the issue of naturalisation in Estonia and the concerns
expressed by the authorities in this regard. He nevertheless encourages
the authorities to explore all possible options to put an end to
the troubling situation of stateless persons.
42. Estonia ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities (FCNM) in 1997 but has neither signed nor
ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
(ETS No. 148).
43. In its last
opinion on the FCNM, the Advisory Committee notes that strong
legislative provisions and policies are designed to protect the
Estonian language and to guarantee its pre-eminence in all areas
of public life. The Language Inspectorate has broad competences,
including checking the level of language proficiency of employees,
requiring that persons take the Estonian language proficiency examination,
recommending termination of employment contracts of employees or
civil servants whose Estonian language proficiency does not meet
the required standard and issuing fines for breaches of the provisions
of the Language Act. In the last seven years, Estonian has become
the main language of instruction in upper-secondary Russian-language schools
with 60% of the curriculum taught in that language. As a consequence,
some schools had to sacrifice their specific profile and adapt their
curricula to the availability of qualified teachers able to teach
in Estonian.

44. In its last resolution

on
the implementation of the FCNM by Estonia, the Committee of Ministers
made a recommendation concerning the effective implementation of
the requirement of teaching of 60% of the study workload in Russian-language
secondary schools in Estonian. It recommended that efforts be increased
to ensure that the Language Act is implemented in a flexible way
and with a policy of positive incentives.
45. The authorities claim

that
Estonia provides free education in languages other than the official
State language. In particular, Russian-language education is available
in public and private schools at all levels – pre-school, basic,
and secondary – as well as in vocational schools and in some higher
education institutions.
46. The authorities should consider signing and ratifying the
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
47. According to the Advisory Committee, conditions required for
the display of topographical indications intended for the public
in minority languages alongside Estonian should be reviewed. Despite
the existing legislative provisions regarding the display of traditional
local names, street names and other topographical indications as
mentioned by the authorities,

no signs in
Russian have been used in practice in villages that would have been
entitled to do so (while signs in Swedish are used in certain areas),
and the legal framework only limits the possibility to display signs
in languages of national minorities to small settlements or villages.
48. In areas where persons belonging to national minorities reside
traditionally or in substantial numbers, persons belonging to national
minorities should have the effective possibility to use their minority
language in relations with local authorities. The rapporteur takes
note of the explanation provided by the authorities regarding the
right to use a national minority language in contacts with local
public administration. Yet, according to the Advisory Committee
of the FCNM, the threshold of 50% of residents required is prohibitively high
and is not compatible with the FCNM and should be decreased. It
is to be welcomed that in oral communication, “foreign languages”,
including national minority languages, may be used with the agreement of
both parties of the conversation. For example, as noted by the Advisory
Committee, in municipalities located in the Ida-Virumaa County inhabited
by a large number of persons belonging to the Russian minority,
municipal employees and officials, who are often themselves Russian
speakers, communicate with persons belonging to national minorities
in that language. The authorities argue that complains have even
been lodged to the Language Inspectorate about the difficulties
to communicate in Estonian in this area.
49. Here again, the rapporteur understands the specific context
of the country and the concerns expressed by the authorities in
this regard, and he encourages the authorities to do the maximum
to implement the recommendations mentioned above.
50. Concerning elections, the OSCE/ODIHR report on the March 2015
elections

noted a positive trend of parties
across the political spectrum placing candidates belonging to national
minorities on party lists, in some cases in prominent positions,
and greater efforts by parties and candidates to reach out to Russian
voters, including with campaign information in Russian. The National
Electoral Committee website featured detailed election information
only in Estonian, with only some general information also available
in English. Voting instructions sent to voters, as well as information
in polling stations and ballots, were only in Estonian. Some information
about internet voting was available in Russian and English. The
authorities argue that only citizens (who by definition speak Estonian)
can vote at the parliamentary elections, and that information on
elections is published in local Russian-speaking media. The rapporteur
welcomes the positive trend regarding national minorities in the
electoral process. He considers that making election information
available in Russian would help increase trust in elections in a
more inclusive manner.
5.2. Anti-discrimination
51. Estonia has signed Protocol
No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 177)
but has not ratified it.
52. As mentioned in the last report

by
the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in
its evaluation of the 2008-2013 integration policy, Estonia acknowledged
the difficulties inherent in the transition to 60% of subjects to
be taught in Estonian in upper secondary schools, the wage gaps
between Estonians and other ethnic groups,

the slowing
down of the process for acquiring Estonian nationality and the need
to take into account the specific features of the different target
groups. Accordingly, in December 2014, Estonia adopted a new integration
policy for the period up to 2020, which aims to address the main shortcomings
referred to above.
53. Similarly, in his last report, the Commissioner for Human
Rights

deplored the increased socio-economic
gap between ethnic minorities and the majority population, which
is perpetuated among young people. According to him, effective measures
should be taken to curb long-term unemployment and social exclusion
of ethnic minorities in the country, and the labour inclusion of
minority youth should be among the priorities. Human Rights Watch,
in its recent submission

to the United Nations Committee
on the Rights of the Child concerning Estonia, considered that language
is a primary human rights concern for the Russian minority whose
children are discriminated against on the basis of language, particularly
with regard to access to education.
54. According to ECRI, despite the authorities’ efforts to integrate
the Russian minority, concerns remain, such as higher unemployment
in regions which are predominantly Russian. In its last opinion,
the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities indeed noted that although the unemployment
rate had almost halved in the years 2010-2013 in Estonia in general,
in areas inhabited by a large number of persons belonging to national
minorities, such as in Ida-Viru County, it was still significantly higher
than the State average. Language proficiency requirements continue
to be an obstacle to employment for the still considerable, albeit
decreasing, number of people whose first language is not Estonian.
According to the authorities, there is an increased acceptance amongst
ethnic minorities of the need to learn Estonian to increase competitiveness
on the labour market. They report that in 2016 the rate of unemployment
in the country was 6.8% while it reached 13.5% in Ida-Viru County
due to changes in the oil shale industry, and they insist that this
county in under special focus by the government in order to create
new jobs.
55. The rapporteur welcomes the measures taken by the authorities
in the framework of the integration policy, and encourages them
to intensify their efforts. He takes note in particular of the information
provided by the authorities

regarding: the measures taken to prepare
young people for working life and the labour market; the Unemployment
Insurance Fund (Eesti Töötukassa); the special (temporary) regional
measures applied in Ida-Viru County; the European Globalisation
Adjustment Fund providing active labour market measures for the north-east
of Estonia.
56. Across Europe, Roma, are still being stigmatised, despite
efforts to change that, and Estonia is not spared by the issue of
Roma discrimination. In its last opinion, the Advisory Committee
on the FCNM referred to the European Commission’s 2014 assessment

of Estonia’s National Action Plan
for Roma Inclusion. Although some progress has been achieved in
all the four key areas of education, employment, health care and
housing, as well as in the fight against discrimination, the Commission
pointed out that in every area measures needed to be reinforced
using a systematic approach. According to Amnesty International’s
2016/2017 report,

Roma suffer discrimination across
a range of economic and social rights, including lack of equal access
to education, adequate housing and health care.

While Amnesty International deplores
the failure of the government to collect and monitor disaggregated
socio-economic data on Roma, thus hindering its ability to effectively
address their situation, the authorities claim that local governments
have made considerable efforts to ensure primary and secondary education
for Roma and that health care services are accessible for all.
57. Estonia has not been spared by the increase of racist speech
in Europe, although it is still a relatively marginal problem there.
ECRI noted with concern the prevalence of racist remarks on internet
news portals and the failure to take action in response to homo-
and transphobic speech by politicians. Incitement to racial hatred
and violence as well as racial discrimination are punishable only
in cases where the victim’s health, life or property are at stake.
Discrimination on the grounds of citizenship, language and gender
identity is not explicitly prohibited in all relevant legislative
provisions. While there are two national authorities entrusted with combating
sexism, racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance and racial
discrimination, only the Chancellor of Justice can be considered
an independent institution.
58. On 1 January 2016, the Registered Partnership Act

came into force, allowing unmarried,
including same-sex, couples to register their cohabitation and have
access to State benefits. The implementation of the Registered Partnership
Act has met some difficulties because the Estonian Parliament has
not yet adopted the implementing provisions of the act.

The Supreme
Court of Estonia has clearly acknowledged the constitutional rights
of same-sex couples as a family.
5.3. Domestic
violence, trafficking in human beings, children’s rights
59. Estonia signed the Council
of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women
and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) in December
2014. The rapporteur welcomes the ratification of the Istanbul Convention
on 26 October 2017.
60. The 2014 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

“Violence against women: an EU-wide survey”
showed that since the age of 15, 33% of women in Estonia had experienced
physical and/or sexual violence and approximately 44% of women experienced
some form of “threatening” sexual harassment.
61. A comprehensive Development Strategy for Reducing Violence
2015-2020 laid out concrete activities on reducing and preventing
violence in its various forms, including domestic violence, sexual
violence, violence against minors, and trafficking in human beings,
including prostitution.

62. The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking
in Human Beings (CETS No. 197) was ratified by Estonia on 5 February
2015. The first evaluation visit of the Group of Experts on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) to Estonia took place
in May 2017. The report has not yet been issued.
63. The rapporteur welcomes the ratification, in 2016, of the
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201, “Lanzarote Convention”).
He is, however, concerned by the findings of the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child

regarding the high prevalence of
sexual abuse of children in Estonia, while the level of detection
is low and the existence and accessibility of support services is
insufficient. At the same time, he welcomed the launching of the
first Estonian Barnahus-type of multidisciplinary and interagency
Children´s House launched in January 2017; the State-funded awareness
materials on abuse published recently, as well as the measures taken
jointly by the Social Insurance Board and Children´s House notably
concerning data collection and co-ordination with the police allowing
more underage victims of sexual abuse to receive State-funded help.

5.4. Freedom
of expression online
64. Estonia’s advanced internet
freedom environment has continued to make progress thanks to increased internet
access and online participation among citizens.

Being a digitally advanced country,
Estonia has faced new challenges involving new internet elements,
which have led the European Court of Human Rights to decide on these
novel issues. The references to judgments in Estonian cases have
thus become general principles in the constant case law of the Court.
65. With regard to freedom of expression online, the Grand Chamber
case
Delfi AS v. Estonia 
was the first case in which
the European Court of Human Rights was called upon to examine a
complaint about liability for user-generated comments on an internet
news portal.

The
Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom
of expression) of the Convention, finding that the Estonian courts’
finding of liability against the applicant company had been a justified
and proportionate restriction on the portal’s freedom of expression, in
particular because the comments in question had been extreme and
had been posted in reaction to an article published by the applicant
on its professionally managed news portal run on a commercial basis.

66. Although this judgment applies strictly to professionally
managed internet news portals run on a commercial basis (and not
to social media platforms or discussion fora) it can have implications
in case of online hate speech with regard to the responsibilities
of specific websites over user-generated content.
67. Since this judgement was issued, several major media companies
have removed the anonymous comments functions from their online
portals.

68. In the case of Kalda v. Estonia pending
execution before the Committee of Ministers, the Court found a violation
of the right to receive information on account of the refusal by
the authorities to grant the applicant access to the websites of
the Chancellor of Justice, the Estonian Parliament and the Council
of Europe Information Office in Tallinn (Article 10). The Court
found that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the interference
with the applicant’s right could not be regarded as having been
necessary in a democratic society. In the meantime, the Ministry
of Justice reportedly started the process of amending paragraph
31 of the Imprisonment Act to at least enable prisoners’ access
to the websites in question.
6. Rule
of law
69. The European Court of Human
Rights dealt with 215 applications concerning Estonia in 2016, of
which 210 were declared inadmissible or struck out. It delivered
five judgments, three of which found at least one violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights.

There are a small number of cases
pending execution before the Committee of Ministers, none of which
is under enhanced supervision.There is generally no particular problem
with the execution of the Court judgments under Article 46.1 of
the Convention. These figures clearly underscore the adherence of
Estonia to the principles of rule of law.
6.1. Judiciary
70. The efficiency, effectiveness
and independence of Estonia’s judiciary are generally assessed positively. The
independence of the Estonian justice system is ranked 21st out of
140 countries.

71. In its 2013 report,

the Commissioner for Human Rights
welcomed the measures taken to improve access to justice, in particular
the reduction of court fees, the establishment of remedies for excessively
lengthy proceedings and the reform of the system of legal aid. A
further step was required: the adoption of the new State Liability
Act to ensure compensation for those court cases which are delayed
for years without a valid reason. In 2015, the Compensation for
Damage Caused in Offence Proceedings Act came into force, providing a
legal remedy in cases where the State Liability Act has proved insufficient.
On the basis of paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the Compensation for Damage
Caused in Offence Proceedings Act, a person may demand compensation
for damage caused by unreasonable length of criminal proceedings
both in the case of acquittal and of conviction. The Compensation
for Damage Caused in Offence Proceedings Act has thus complemented the
State Liability Act, providing a legal remedy for compensation for
unreasonably lengthy criminal proceedings. The legislation is under
preparation in the Ministry of Justice regarding civil and administrative court
proceedings. The rapporteur welcomes these promising legislative
developments described by the authorities.

6.2. Prisons
72. Overall, there have been improvements
in the conditions in Estonian prisons and there is a functioning system
of State responsibility. Construction of a new Tallinn Prison is
underway and is scheduled to be completed at the end of 2018.

The last country report by the Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CPT) relates to a visit in 2012. The CPT’s sixth
visit to Estonia was carried out from 27 September to 5 October
2017 and focused in particular on the treatment and safeguard afforded
to persons deprived of their liberty by the police and the conditions
of detention in a number of police establishments. The report on
the visit has not yet been published.
6.3. Fight
against corruption
73. Estonia is considered to have
a low level of corruption. According to the 2016 Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index, Estonia is doing very well, ranking 22nd out
of 176 countries with a score of 70 out of 100. Estonia steadily
improved its score over the years leading up to 2015 – 64 in 2012,
68 in 2013, 69 in 2014 and 70 in 2015.
74. According to the 2016 periodical survey organised by the Ministry
of Justice of Estonia,

corruption is not considered the
main social concern in the country but is regarded as a widespread
worrying phenomenon by 57% of the population (against 61% in 2010).
Bribery is considered quite common (although it is said to have decreased
over the last six years), mostly to speed up processes and avoid
punishments, notably regarding legislation and public tenders.
75. In 2015 and 2016, there were several reports of political
corruption. As mentioned in the US Department of State Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 2016,

in October 2015 the Viru County
Court found the mayor of the north-east Estonian city of Kohtla-Jarve
guilty of corruption, including such specific charges as embezzlement,
competition-related offences, counterfeiting and misuse of trust.
The court sentenced him conditionally to a five-year prison sentence
and a probation period of five years. On 1 September 2016, the Supreme
Court upheld the corruption conviction. Recent investigations by
the Internal Security Service also revealed two major corruption
cases concerning, on the one hand, the Board of the State-owned
Port of Tallinn, accused of taking bribes, and, on the other, Mr Edgar
Savisaar, the former head of the Centre Party, who was suspended
from his post as Mayor of Tallinn on allegations of bribery. These
high-profile cases are still ongoing.
76. Insofar as the transparency of political funding is concerned,
GRECO

considered that Estonia had shown
remarkable progress with its substantial reform process, through
the enactment of significant amendments to the Political Parties
Act, which responded positively to the requirements of almost all
the recommendations issued in the Evaluation Report. GRECO acknowledged
that a solid legal framework for both regular party financing and
election campaign financing had thus been established and that improvements
to the transparency regulations, the establishment of a new monitoring
mechanism and the further development of the regime of sanctions
had been accomplished. The only recommendation which had not yet
been implemented satisfactorily concerned the disclosure of donations
to independent candidates for election and GRECO noted that an initiative
was ongoing at that time to address this issue.
77. Similarly, in its report on the 2015 general elections, the
OSCE/ODIHR

acknowledged a generally solid legal
framework for regulating political party and campaign finance. It
nevertheless reported allegations of misuse of public resources,
specifically by local government authorities, for campaigning.
78. According to GRECO,

Estonia initiated an ambitious reform
process in 2015 in respect of a number of the pending recommendations.
Concerning members of parliament, some important developments were already
noted in the first Compliance Report including the introduction
of a series of reforms and new integrity standards, such as the
adoption in December 2014 of a code of conduct for MPs and a guidance
document as well as rules on the way they should engage with lobbyists
and other third parties and rules on gifts and other benefits. In
its 2nd compliance report

published in June 2017,

GRECO welcomed
the further progress achieved, for example by strengthening the
supervision of declarations of assets and interests by the Anti-Corruption
Select Committee of the parliament and by putting in place adequate
awareness-raising measures for members of parliament. That said,
GRECO deplored that other measures were still not implemented, such as
clarifying the rules on gifts and other benefits and providing for
guidance in this area. More determined action was also needed to
improve the supervision of the Code of conduct for MPs. Finally,
the development by the Select Committee of recommendations on MPs’
contacts with lobbyists was a welcome development, but those recommendations
were not yet endorsed by parliament as a whole.
79. As far as judges and prosecutors are concerned, Estonia has
taken measures to make them more familiar with integrity standards
and to increase the objectivity of decisions on the promotion of
prosecutors and for the objectivity of criteria for the advancement
of judges (concerning the appointments to appellate courts). A new
code of ethics and an Ethics Council have been introduced for prosecutors
and appraisal systems were introduced for judges and prosecutors.
Finally, Estonia has taken steps to foster the supervision of judges’ declarations
of assets and interests and changed the supervisory arrangements
applicable to prosecutors. In its 2nd Compliance report, GRECO welcomed
the further steps taken to foster the supervision of the judges’ declarations
of assets and interests and to provide prosecutors with training
on professional ethics. On the other hand, the adoption of objective
criteria for the advancement of judges only concerned the appointments to
appellate courts, and GRECO recommended continuing the reform also
with respect to other promotions within the judiciary.
80. The rapporteur welcomes the recent reforms carried out by
the Estonian authorities towards more integrity and transparency
and calls on the authorities to implement the outstanding GRECO recommendations.
6.4. Fight
against money laundering
81. In its last report,

the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation
of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(MONEYVAL) called on Estonia to strengthen the sanctioning framework
for breaches of anti-money laundering/combating financing of terrorism
(AML/CFT) requirements and to apply a broader range of dissuasive
and effective sanctions.
82. Based on an analysis of the implementation of international
and European standards on AML/CFT, MONEYVAL notes that confiscation
measures, while to some extent applied effectively to money laundering and
drug-trafficking offences, are not used as a central tool with respect
to other serious proceeds-generating offences. Although the money
laundering offence is broadly in line with international standards
and a number of money laundering convictions have been achieved,
some issues remain regarding the level of proof required by the
courts to establish the criminal origin of property where the underlying
crime has not been identified. In addition, the financing of terrorism
offence does not cover all the important elements required under international
standards. The Financial Intelligence Unit performs its analytical
functions effectively. Legislation providing for preventive measures
concerning customer due diligence, record-keeping and reporting
of suspicious transactions is sound, as is its implementation. While
the supervision of credit, insurance and investment institutions
for AML/CFT purposes is to a large extent conducted effectively,
further efforts are needed in relation to supervision of other financial
institutions. Although the non-financial sector demonstrated a satisfactory
level of understanding and awareness of preventive requirements,
further improvements are needed with regard to implementation. The
supervision of the non-financial sector is weak due to insufficient human
resources. There is still no system in place to ensure that information
on ownership and control submitted by legal persons is up-to-date.
6.5. Fight
against cybercrime
83. The Government of Estonia is
one of the most cybersecurity-aware governments in the world. Estonia was
among the countries which initiated the development of the Council
of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185), and its Additional
Protocol (CETS No. 189). In 2008, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia to improve cyberdefence
interoperability and provide security support for all NATO members.
This multinational and interdisciplinary hub of cyberdefence expertise
focuses on technology, strategy, operations and law.
84. Awareness of the importance of the security of information
and communications technology (ICT) in both private and business
use has increased significantly following the series of cyberattacks
in April 2007 against Estonian websites and government organisations,
including the Estonian Parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers
and broadcasters. The Estonian authorities accused the Kremlin of
direct involvement in these cyberattacks. A number of Estonian State
agencies were again the target of waves of ransomware campaigns in
2015.
85. Three civilian and intelligence agencies responsible for cybersecurity
— the Estonian Information System Authority,

the Internal Security Service

and the Information Board

— consider that in cyberspace, Russia
is a source of the greatest threat to Estonia, the European Union
and NATO. The Estonian Information Board report

refers to the exploitation by foreign
States mainly of the cyberenvironment for cyberintelligence, and
states that potential threats in the Baltic region include cybersabotage
and influence operations through cyberattacks. The Estonian Information
System’s report

also notes that Estonia is exposed
to specific cyberthreats, being located next to Russia, “which uses
aggressive rhetoric, is constantly developing its cyberattack capabilities,
and for whom activities directed against other States in cyberspace
are merely an instrument to increase its influence and accomplish
its objectives”.
86. The Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017 was adopted as part
of Estonia’s broader security strategy.

The main cybersecurity risks for
Estonia arise from the extensive and growing dependence on ICT infrastructure
and e-services by the State, the economy and the population.
6.6. Fight
against terrorism
87. The authorities

have provided extensive
information on the fight against terrorism, and in particular on its
legal and institutional framework, which is a high priority for
the country. According to the Estonian Internal Security Service,
the threat of terrorism in Estonia is considered low. Estonia mostly
focuses its counterterrorism policy on prevention.
88. Estonia has ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196). It has signed but not ratified
the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing
of Terrorism (CETS No. 198) and the Additional Protocol to the Council
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 217).
7. Conclusions
and recommendations
89. Overall, the functioning of
democratic institutions in Estonia complies with Council of Europe
standards. Estonia globally honours its membership obligations to
the Council of Europe.
90. Estonia is a well-functioning democracy, in which Estonians
trust public institutions and the electoral processes and where,
overall, the principles of local democracy are respected. The rapporteur
encourages the authorities to implement the remaining recommendations
of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, in particular
regarding financial autonomy of local authorities. The OSCE/ODIHR’s
outstanding recommendations concerning the transparency and accountability
of the i-voting system should be implemented, notably regarding
formal certification by an independent organisation.
91. Estonia is widely recognised for its e-governance policy as
it has digitally streamlined an extraordinarily high number of public
services. In this regard, the country has made considerable achievements
regarding transparency and accessibility in government. The rapid
global development of information technology by Estonia comes at
the price of increased cyberthreats to the country’s security. Estonia
has become the multinational and interdisciplinary hub of cyberdefence
expertise.
92. Freedom expression is generally guaranteed in Estonia, in
legislation as well as in practice, and the country enjoys an advanced
internet freedom environment, which has led the authorities to address
new challenges.
93. The present report clearly shows the adherence of Estonia
to the principles of the rule of law. Estonians generally trust
their legal system and the efficiency, effectiveness and independence
of Estonia’s judiciary is assessed positively
94. Although Estonia is considered to have a low level of corruption,
there have been several political corruption cases in recent years.
While welcoming the progress marked by the reforms regarding transparency of
political funding and new integrity standards for MPs, judges and
prosecutors, the rapporteur calls on the authorities to implement
the outstanding GRECO recommendations.
95. Relations between Estonia and the Russian Federation have
a strong impact on a number of issues in the country. The rapporteur
has paid special attention to the questions of citizenship and statelessness,
as well the situation of the Russian minority in the country, keeping
in mind the specific context of the legacies of Estonia’s history.
The rapporteur welcomes the significant steps taken by the Estonian
authorities concerning the situation of “persons with undetermined
citizenship”, and recommends further reducing their number by further
facilitating access to citizenship for long-term residents.
96. While understanding the specificity of the country and taking
into account the difficulties faced by the country in dealing with
the controversial issue of minorities’ rights, the rapporteur recommends
that the authorities should do their maximum to ensure:
- that in areas where they reside
traditionally or in substantial numbers, people belonging to national minorities
really do have the possibility to use their minority language in
relations with local authorities;
- that the opportunities to introduce minority language
place names are expanded and that topographical indications in minority
languages are allowed, alongside Estonian;
- that steps are taken towards the signature and ratification
of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
97. While commending the efforts made by the authorities to integrate
the Russian minority, the rapporteur remains concerned by the socio-economic
gap between ethnic minorities and the majority population, and the difficulties
of integration faced by the young people in particular in relation
to language proficiency requirements. Further measures should be
taken to reduce unemployment and social exclusion of ethnic minorities
in the country.
98. Estonia should ratify Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention
on Human Rights. The country has not been spared by the increase
of racist speech in Europe, although it is still a relatively marginal
problem there. Roma are still being stigmatised, despite efforts
to fight against Roma discrimination. The authorities should implement
ECRI’s outstanding recommendations in this regard.
99. The committee will evaluate the implementation of these recommendations
on the occasion of its next periodic evaluation cycle of member
States that are not under a monitoring procedure in sensu stricto or engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue.