1. Introduction
1. More than eight years ago,
on 10 April 2010, a Tupolev Tu-154M aircraft was carrying the Polish
State delegation, led by President Lech Kaczyński, from Warsaw to
Smolensk, in the Russian Federation, to attend a ceremony marking
the 70th anniversary of the Katyń Massacre. The plane crashed at
Smolensk Severny aerodrome, killing all 96 persons on board (eight
crew members and 88 passengers). The victims included President
Lech Kaczyński, his wife Maria and many dignitaries and high-ranking
Polish officials, including military chiefs of staff (army, air
force and navy), numerous parliamentarians and the President of
the National Bank of Poland.
2. A number of investigations were commenced immediately after
the crash in order to determine the factors that led to this tragic
event. By common agreement between Poland and Russia, the safety
investigation was to be carried out following the standards of Annex
13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention),
despite the fact that the plane was a State aircraft on an official
mission. The Russian Federation therefore had the primary responsibility
for the safety investigation. Poland set up its own committee to
investigate the crash, and prosecutors commenced criminal investigations
in both countries.
3. The report of the investigation team of the Russian Inter-State
Aviation Committee (Air Accident Aviation Commission), published
on 12 January 2011, concluded that
“[t]he immediate cause of the accident
was the failure of the crew to take a timely decision to proceed
to an alternate airdrome although they were numerous times timely
informed on the actual weather conditions at Smolensk “Severny”
Airdrome that were significantly lower than the established airdrome
minima; descent without visual contact with ground references to
an altitude much lower than minimum descent altitude for go-around
(100 m) in order to establish visual flight as well as no reaction
to the numerous TAWS warnings [Terrain Awareness and Warning System]
which led to controlled flight into terrain, aircraft destruction
and death of the crew and passengers. According to the conclusion
made by the pilot-experts and aviation psychologists, the presence
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Forces in the cockpit
until collision exposed psychological pressure on the PIC’s [Pilot-in-Command]
decision to continue descent in conditions of unjustified risk with
the dominating aim of landing at any means”.
4. In the final report of the Polish Committee for Investigation
of National Aviation Accidents, issued on 29 July 2011, it is stipulated
that “[t]he immediate cause of the accident was the descent below
the minimum descent altitude at an excessive rate of descent in
weather conditions which prevented visual contact with the ground,
as well as a delayed execution of the go-around procedure. Those
circumstances led to an impact on a terrain obstacle resulting in
separation of a part of the left wing with aileron and consequently
to the loss of aircraft control and eventual ground impact”.
5. On 11 April 2018, the Committee for Re-Investigation of the
Crash of Tu-154M in Smolensk, Russia at the Ministry of Defence
of the Republic of Poland
concluded
that the aircraft was “destroyed in the air as a result of several
explosions”.
6. Now, over eight years since the accident, the Russian Federation
still maintains possession of the plane wreckage, the black boxes
with original flight data recordings and other material evidence.
This is the principal concern expressed by the signatories of the
motion on the basis of which the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights has been seized for report.
That
said, copies of flight data recordings and some material evidence
have been transmitted to the Polish authorities already. Also, to
the best of my knowledge, neither the Russian nor the Polish criminal
investigation has yet been formally concluded.
2. Focus of the rapporteur’s mandate and
fact-finding activities carried out
7. The previous rapporteurs and
I focused on the legal context of the investigations into the crash
carried out by the competent authorities and in particular the right
of Poland to the return of the wreckage. The rapporteur mandate
underlying this report
did not allow for carrying out our
own investigation into the causes of and responsibility for this
terrible disaster, let alone taking position on this issue – a task
which would have been impossible in any case, given the technical
complexity of such an investigation.
8. The successive rapporteurs were duly authorised by the committee
to carry out certain fact-finding activities, including addressing
the competent authorities, including:
- requesting from both the Polish and Russian authorities
explanations as to why the wreckage of the aircraft, as well as
the original flight data recordings and other material evidence
relating to the crash has not been returned to Poland and as to
why the criminal investigations have still not been concluded;
- holding an exchange of views with two legal experts;
- carrying out information visits to Warsaw and Moscow.
9. Regarding the request for explanations, the then Prosecutor
General of the Republic of Poland, Mr Andrzej Seremet, replied to
one of my predecessors, Mr Robert Neill, by a letter dated 22 October
2015. By contrast, the Russian side did not provide any explanations,
despite a reminder sent by Mr Neill’s successor, Mr Michael McNamara.
The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Council
of Europe merely expressed, in a letter dated 19 February 2016,
his “regrets on temporary suspension of interaction between the
Russian parliamentary delegation and the [Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe], which does not permit to use the Assembly’s
channels of cooperation”.
10. At its meeting on 7 March 2016, the committee held a hearing
with the participation of two aviation law experts, namely:
- Mr Timothy Brymer, Attorney,
Specialist in Aviation and Aerospace Law, Murray, Morin & Herman
P.A., London, United Kingdom;
- Mr Pablo Mendes de Leon, Head of Department, Executive
Chair of the Department of Air and Space Law, Leiden University,
Netherlands.
11. The information visits authorised by the committee could not,
however, take place. The Russian authorities did not co-operate
in the organisation of a visit to Moscow for the same reason that
they did not respond to the written request for information. In
view of this refusal, I did not consider it appropriate to travel to
Warsaw only. This would have created the wrong impression that the
report was unbalanced because of a reliance on partial information
from only one side. I also did not and do not wish to be drawn into
the highly politicised struggle between representatives of the current
and previous governments regarding the causes and manner of investigation
of this tragedy
. As my mandate would in any case
not allow me to take position on any such allegations, I preferred
not to carry out such a visit.
3. The
choice of the juridical regime covering the investigations
12. According to the experts who
testified before the committee on 7 March 2016, the choice of juridical regime
covering the investigations was complex and has given rise to different
interpretations. One possibility might have been the 1993 Polish–Russian
Agreement,
regulating
military flights in the two States concerned and which would have
provided for the possibility of joint investigations. Nevertheless,
as the 1993 Agreement did not regulate in detail the procedure to
be followed in a situation of a “joint” air safety investigation,
it was agreed by both sides that the conduct of the investigation
would be carried out in accordance with the principles laid down
in Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago
Convention”, 7 December 1944), in force since 1947 and ratified
by both Poland, in 1945, and the Russian Federation (Soviet Union),
in 1970.
More specifically, the experience
encountered during on-site work in the first few days after the accident
prompted the Russian authorities – despite the fact that the Tu-154M
was a military aircraft – to propose conducting the air safety investigation
according to Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, a proposal which
the Polish government accepted.
13. One point of potential controversy arising from the decision
to proceed under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention was that Article
3 of the Chicago Convention stipulates that “this Convention shall
be applicable only to civil aircraft and shall not be applicable
to State aircraft”.
Although there is no strict definition
of a State or civil flight, a legal study conducted by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Secretariat in 1994 identified
criteria to distinguish between the two. It noted that the Chicago
Convention utilises a functional approach to distinguish between
State and civilian flights in which they examine the totality of
the circumstances, particularly “taking into account a number of
factors, which should include … the ownership of the aircraft (Is
it privately or publicly owned?), … the passengers or personnel
carried (Are they State officials or members of the public at large?
Is the flight open for use by members of the public?), aircraft
registration and nationality markings (Is it registered in a civil
or State aircraft registry?), … the nature of the crew (Are the crew
members civilians or employed by military, customs, or police services?),
the operator (Is the operator a military, customs, or police agency?)
…”.
14. Nevertheless, despite the fact that, in accordance with the
above definition, this was a State aircraft transporting high-level
government officials, including the President of Poland, operated
by military staff and registered as a military aircraft, both States
agreed that the main technical investigation be conducted according
to the International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
specified in Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, which normally
apply to civil aviation.
15. This choice, agreed to by its predecessors, was not compelling,
given the official nature of the plane and the flight in question,
and it has been strongly criticised by the current Polish Government,
as having unnecessarily given Russia the dominant role in investigating
the crash. The Polish Government of the day had every right to insist
that the investigation should be led by the competent Polish authorities.
But I cannot see how this choice can now be reversed – the procedure
under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention was chosen by common agreement
of the governments in place at the time, and they were, and must
remain, the basis of the investigation procedure followed
4. Relevant
aspects of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention
16. From the detailed list of International
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) set out in Annex 13
of the Chicago Convention, the following air safety investigation
principles merit specific mention:
16.1. It is up to the State of Occurrence (i.e. Russia in the
case at hand) to institute an investigation into the circumstances
of the accident and be responsible for the conduct of the investigation
(Standard 5.1).
16.2. The accident investigation authority shall have independence
in the conduct of the investigation and have unrestricted authority
over its conduct (Standard 5.4).
16.3. Any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion
blame or liability should be separate from any investigation conducted
under the provisions of Annex 13 (Standard 5.4.1).
16.4. It is also for the State of Occurrence to ensure co-ordination
between the investigator-in-charge and the judicial authorities
regarding any criminal investigations (Standard 5.10).
16.5. The State of Registry (i.e. Poland in the case at hand)
shall be entitled to appoint an accredited representative to participate
in the investigation, as well as one or more advisers to assist
the accredited representative in the investigation (Standards 5.18
and 5.19).
16.6. These persons have substantial participation rights spelt
out in Standard 5.25, in particular to visit the scene of the crime,
examine the wreckage, obtain witness information and suggest areas
of questioning, have full access to all relevant evidence as soon
as possible, receive copies of all pertinent documents, participate
in read-outs of recorded media, participate in off-scene investigative
activities such as component examinations, technical briefings,
tests and simulations, participate in investigation progress meetings
and make submissions in respect of the various elements of the investigation.
16.7. The State conducting the investigation shall send a copy
of the draft Final Report to all States that participated in the
investigation (including the State of Registry), inviting their
significant and substantiated comments on the report as soon as
possible. If the State conducting the investigation receives comments
(within 60 days), it shall either amend the draft Final Report to
include the substance of the comments received or, if desired by
the State that provided comments, append the comments to the Final
Report. Comments to be appended to the final report shall deal with
those aspects upon which no agreement could be reached (Standard
6.3 and Note 2).
16.8. The sole objective of an investigation of an accident
or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents.
Its purpose is not to apportion blame or liability (Standard 3.1).
16.9. If in the course of an investigation it becomes known,
or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference was involved,
the investigator in charge shall immediately initiate action to
ensure that the aviation security authorities of the State(s) concerned
are so informed (Standard 5.11).
16.10. Exceptions to the protection (i.e. confidentiality) of
safety information should only be granted when “there is evidence
that the occurrence was caused by an act considered, in accordance
with the law, to be conduct with intent to cause damage, or conduct
with knowledge that damage would probably result, equivalent to
reckless conduct, gross negligence or wilful misconduct;” when “an
appropriate authority considers that circumstances reasonably indicate”
that this may have been the case; or when an appropriate authority
determines that the release of the safety information is necessary
for the proper administration of justice and that its release outweighs
the adverse impact such release may have on the future availability
of safety information (Attachment E to Annex 13, paragraphs 4.a, b and c).
16.11. The State conducting the investigation of an accident
or incident should not make specified records collected in the course
of the safety investigation available for other purposes unless
the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that
State determines that the disclosure of such records outweighs the
adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on
that or any future investigations (Standard 5.12).
16.12. The State of Occurrence shall release custody of the aircraft,
its contents or any parts thereof as soon as they are no longer
required in the investigation to any person or persons duly designated
by the State of Registry or the State of the Operator, as applicable
(Standard 3.4).
17. I am not in a position to comment exhaustively on the question
whether Russia as State of Occurrence has complied with all the
above Standards as listed in Annex 13, as the Russian authorities
did not co-operate with the Assembly’s rapporteurs in any way. The
following can however be inferred from the reply received from the
Polish side: clearly, Polish experts were allowed to participate
in the investigation by the Russian Inter-State Aviation Committee,
they were granted access to the wreckage, allowed to participate
in the read-outs of the flight recorders, etc.:
“Nevertheless it should be
underlined here that Polish prosecutors and experts were granted
unlimited access to the remains of the fuselage and were given the
opportunity to take part in all necessary examinations during their
numerous visits on the site of the crash. In the course of these
visits, visual inspections of the wreckage were carried out, including
taking samples for examination and making copies of the records
from the flight data recorders. The above-mentioned exercises were
performed on numerous occasions, according to the needs of the Polish
investigation.” (Extract from the reply of the Prosecutor General
of the Republic of Poland to Mr Robert Neill )
18. But the “Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final
Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident of the Tu-154M
tail number 101 aircraft”, which the Polish Government requested
to be taken into account or attached to the Russian IAC’s draft
final report also includes a lengthy list of materials and information
requested from the Russian IAC but not received.
19. Thus, as pointed out in a letter by the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
“Poland and Russia did not attain consensus
as to the content of the document prepared by the Russian side”.
The Russian Inter-State Aviation Committee (IAC)’s final report
published on the IAC’s website
does not reflect the dissenting
views of the Polish experts, nor does it present any such dissenting
views as an attachment, as foreseen in Standard 6.3 following the
above-mentioned request made by the Polish side.
20. The special circumstances and ramifications of this crash
as well as the differences of opinion and practical problems of
co-operation noted in the above-mentioned “Remarks of the Republic
of Poland” may well have been the reason why the Polish Committee
for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents (SICSA) published
a separate report.
The status of this report is unclear:
while Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention clearly attributes the
competence and the responsibility for carrying out the safety investigation
to the State of Occurrence, namely Russia, it neither expressly
foresees nor excludes that the State of Registration also carries
out such an investigation.
21. As already indicated above, the final reports of both the
Russian Inter-State Aviation Committee (IAC) and of the Polish Committee
for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents (SICSA) were issued
back in 2011, whilst the criminal investigations in both countries
have apparently still not been finalised. The juxtaposition of the
two national safety investigation reports and the two – still ongoing
– national criminal investigations raises three concerns.
22. The first relates to the causes of the crash itself, such
as the fact that the 2011 Polish report concluded that Russian air
traffic control also played a part in the accident by passing incorrect
information to the crew regarding the aircraft’s position and that
there existed deficiencies with respect to Smolensk airport which contributed
to the crash.
The new
report published by the Polish Government in April 2018 (paragraph 8 above)
makes even stronger allegations. But as explained above (paragraph
6), my mandate as rapporteur does not include investigating the
causes of the crash or taking position in this respect.
23. The second concern relates to the conflicting purposes of
the safety investigation on the one hand and the criminal investigations
on the other. As explained by our experts, the sole purpose of the
safety investigation is to identify the causes of an accident in
order to draw lessons to improve future air traffic safety – not
to apportion blame. Criminal investigations, to the contrary, aim
to establish the personal responsibility of individuals involved
in an accident – sometimes in response to popular demand that “justice
must be done” when so many people have perished. Annex 13 clearly
gives priority to the aim of improving air traffic safety (see Standards
3.1 and 5.12, paragraph 16 above). In order not to deter holders
of relevant information from sharing it with investigators, also
in future cases, information collected in the safety investigation
may only be used for penal purposes if there are reasons to believe
that intentional misconduct, recklessness or gross negligence were
involved (see Attachment E, paragraph 4 (paragraph 16 above)). But
the “General Principles” laid down in Attachment E also state that
it is not the purpose of protecting safety information to interfere
with the proper administration of justice in States, and that national
laws should ensure that a balance is struck between the need for
the protection of safety information in order to improve aviation
safety, and the need for the proper administration of justice (Attachment
E, General Principles 2.2 and 2.3). The need to strike such a delicate
balance does not allow for the kind of blame game which the Russian
and Polish authorities have entered into. For our experts, this
is “yet another sad example of the general conflict which commonly
exists between the aim to establish cause and the demand to hold
individuals accountable”.
24. The third concern relates to the release, from Russian custody,
of the wreckage of the aircraft. Article 3.4 of Annex 13 of the
Chicago Convention (paragraph 16 above) stipulates that the wreckage
and other materials shall be returned when they are no longer needed
for the purposes of the “investigation”. The extent to which this
provision has been complied with is at the origin of the main “concerns”
expressed by the signatories of the motion on the basis of which
our committee has been asked to prepare a report.
This will be the subject of the
final chapter of this report.
5. Russia’s
duty to return the wreckage to Poland
25. The duty of Russia (as country
of occurrence) to Poland (country of registration of the aircraft)
to return the wreckage depends on the relationship between the safety
investigation under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, which was
completed in 2011, and the still ongoing criminal investigations
in Poland and Russia.
26. According to the additional answers received from the two
aviation law experts,
the investigation conducted
pursuant to Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention is defined as a safety
investigation, designed to lead to a full understanding of the causes
of the accident with a view to making recommendations aimed at improving
future air safety. The safety investigation is entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal investigation. Whilst the safety
investigation is regulated under Annex 13, the criminal investigation
is generally subject to national law, and on some occasions international
law (in particular when international legal co-operation is required
subject to relevant conventions, or when there is an international
duty to prosecute, for example under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court).
27. I can only agree with our aviation law experts that the term
“investigation” in Standard 3.4 of Annex 13 after the completion
of which the wreckage shall be returned to the country of registry
refers to the safety investigation carried out pursuant to Annex
13. As this investigation was completed upon publication of the
final report by the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee on 12
January 2011, it follows that under Annex 13, upon which the two
States agreed to base the proceedings, Russia must return the wreckage
to Poland.
28. The only remaining question is whether Russian national law
(in the present case, criminal procedure law) can be invoked to
justify that Russia holds on to the wreckage and other material
(in particular the original flight recorders) as “evidence” in the
still ongoing criminal procedure. Despite the failure of Russia
to provide an answer to my predecessor’s questions in this regard,
I take it for granted that Russian law does foresee the securing
of relevant evidence materials for as long as a criminal investigation
is still open, and that a criminal investigation regarding the crash
of Polish Air Force Tu-154M is indeed still ongoing.
29. The question is thus whether national law prevails over Annex
13 of the Chicago Convention. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention
provides that a State in which an accident to an aircraft occurs
within the terms of the Article, “will institute an inquiry into
the circumstances of the accident in accordance, in so far as its
laws permit, with the procedure which may be recommended by the
International Civil Aviation Organization”.
30. Article 26 thus gives precedence to national laws over the
procedure recommended by the ICAO (i.e. the SARPs laid down in Annex
13). But it should be recalled that the two States agreed to apply
Annex 13 to this case, but not the Chicago Convention itself. In
the absence of a specific agreement to apply (also) the Convention
itself, the normal rules governing the application of the Convention
remain valid; and according to these rules, the Chicago Convention
does not apply to State aircraft on an official mission (paragraph
13 above). By consequence, the Standards laid down in Annex 13 (including
the duty to return the wreckage and other materials after the end
of the safety investigation) must be respected in their entirety
and without restrictions based on the national law of the two States.
31. If one were to assume – contrary to the conclusion reached
above – that national law prevails over Annex 13 despite the non-applicability
of Article 26, Russia’s duty to return the wreckage to Poland can
be based on the general legal principle that rights may not be abused.
Keeping the wreckage for more than seven years after the completion
of the safety investigation is clearly abusive. The duration of
the criminal investigation in Russia is excessive. More than eight
years after the crash, it would be an abuse of rights for Russia
to continue relying on the fact that a criminal case is still open
in order to refuse to return the wreckage. It is true that in some
cases criminal investigations into air disasters have lasted even
longer than eight years; and the Polish criminal investigations
into the Smolensk crash are also still ongoing. But the Russian
authorities have had full and immediate access to all the physical
evidence for all this time – contrary to the Polish prosecutors,
whose investigations are complicated by the fact that they are obliged
to pass through cumbersome Mutual Legal Assistance procedures.
Finally, any evidence, which may
still be required for purposes of the ongoing criminal procedure
can be secured in other ways than by physically holding onto the wreckage
itself, in particular by using formal judicial evidence preservation
procedures. I therefore consider that the threshold after which
refusing to return the wreckage ostensibly because of the still-open
criminal case becomes abusive has long been passed.
32. In the same way, the disrespectful treatment of the wreckage,
which was cut into pieces to facilitate transport, and of the bodies
of the victims, with body parts mixed up and misplaced, as reported
in the Polish media,
is unacceptable
and must be stopped.
6. Conclusion
33. This report, in view of the
limitations of my mandate and of available resources, and of the
Russian side’s failure to co-operate, can only deal with a small
number of the questions raised by this crash, namely the legal issues
surrounding the application of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation, and in particular its Standard
3.4 requiring the return of the wreckage by the State of Occurrence
to the State of Registry as soon as the safety investigation under
Annex 13 is completed. We have seen that the ongoing criminal investigations
in Russia do not justify withholding the wreckage any longer from
its rightful owners – ultimately the Polish people. The draft resolution
therefore calls on Russia to return the wreckage and other materials
belonging to the Polish State without further delay. Holding back
on returning these emblematic objects to Poland without a legal
justification is akin to an abuse of rights which is perceived by
many as a provocation.
34. Last but not least, we should not lose sight of the historical
context of this disaster. The crash of the Polish Air Force Tupolev
on 10 April 2010, when it attempted to land at the military airfield
in Smolensk (Russia), wiped out 96 lives, including those of Polish
President Lech Kaczyński, his wife, and dozens of Poland’s top political
and military leaders. These high representatives of the Polish State
were on their way to an event marking the 70th anniversary of the
Katyń massacre – an emblematic crime committed by Stalin’s secret
police, the NKVD, in the spring of 1940. The massacre, which the
Soviet Union long blamed on Nazi Germany, wiped out thousands of
Polish military officers and other Polish patriots. It took the
Soviet Union until 1990, under President Gorbatchev’s “Glasnost”
policy, to recognise the historical truth – which must remain the basis
of true reconciliation between the Russian and Polish people. This
historical context must be borne in mind when assessing the impact
of the tragedy at Smolensk, which came as a stunning blow to the
Polish nation. This historical context, and the respect owed to
the victims both of the Smolensk air crash and of the Katyń massacre
should forbid any kind of abusive, provocative behaviour, from either
side, in the process of determining the causes of this catastrophe.