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Resolution 2241 (2018)
Nuclear safety and security in Europe
1. Many States in Europe produce nuclear
energy: with 184 reactors in operation in 2018, 17 European countries
are home to 41% of the world’s nuclear “fleet”. An additional 15
reactors are under construction, including the first-ever floating
nuclear power plant. This energy choice has been polarising public
opinion for decades, given the secrecy surrounding the operation
of nuclear facilities and the risk of dramatic consequences in case
of accidents.
2. Nuclear safety concerns have been looming ever since the Chernobyl
accident in 1986 and further escalated as a result of the Fukushima
accident in 2011. Moreover, due to recent terrorist attacks in France and
Belgium, greater attention is being paid to the security of nuclear
infrastructure, given that nearly all nuclear plants currently in
operation were designed and built in an era when security concerns
were of a different nature. Because the consequences of a nuclear
accident – be it due to a malevolent act or a system failure – can
be so widespread and very serious, the European public needs reassurance
that the authorities in charge of nuclear safety and security are
protecting the population effectively.
3. The Parliamentary Assembly welcomes the efforts of its member
States and of the competent international organisations towards
the continuous strengthening of reference standards for nuclear
safety and security through technical, regulatory and legal frameworks.
It believes that greater harmonisation of these standards to upgrade
the overall nuclear safety and security levels across Europe is
necessary and should involve all States, including those that are
phasing out nuclear energy and those that are building new nuclear facilities.
4. The Assembly notes that many of Europe’s nuclear facilities
are rapidly ageing: in 2018, 82 out of 184 reactors had been in
operation for thirty-five years or more, and roughly one in six
reactors is more than forty years old. Even when the facilities
are properly maintained, the overall condition of these reactors
is gradually deteriorating, increasing the probability of serious
incidents and accidents. The Assembly views independent oversight
and periodic safety reviews as crucial to maintaining public trust
in nuclear safety and believes that the frequency of safety reassessment
should be increased for reactors which are more than forty years
old.
5. The Assembly is concerned about the fact that there was no
meaningful public consultation prior to the construction of the
bulk of the European nuclear “fleet”. It also points out that present
generations have to bear the brunt in terms of operational safety
and security risks, as well as the cost of decommissioning, nuclear waste
processing and long-term waste disposal. The Assembly is convinced
that the key challenge from a political angle is to provide adequate
information to the public without undermining security and to achieve
a democratic consensus over the strategic orientations and the desired
level of nuclear safety and security. European countries should
work together to ensure greater transparency and improved communication concerning
the nuclear energy challenge.
6. As many nuclear power plants in Europe operate in close proximity
to large cities and densely populated areas, including those beyond
national borders, the Assembly considers that European States should
provide unquestionable and “reasonably achievable” protection to
these strategic objects, where appropriate in close co-operation
with the neighbouring countries concerned, especially for old and
dilapidated plants. It believes that emergency preparedness capacity
and contingency plans should be enhanced across Europe, in particular
in cross-border situations; they should be based not only on minimalistic
technical considerations but also on socio-economic imperatives,
realistic scenarios of meteorological conditions, local specificities
and lessons drawn from recent major nuclear accidents (such as Chernobyl
and Fukushima).
7. Regarding the construction of new nuclear power plants in
Europe, the Assembly urges the States concerned to ensure that heightened
safety and security requirements are fully taken into account regarding design,
operational principles, regulatory measures, external protection
arrangements and emergency preparedness plans. Regarding the nuclear
power plant in Ostrovets (Belarus), under construction just 45 kilometres
from Vilnius, the capital city of the neighbouring State of Lithuania,
the Assembly recalls its Resolution
2172 (2017) on the situation in Belarus, in which it
deplores the lack of respect for international nuclear safety standards
and major incidents on the construction site. In light of the latest
developments, notably the national stress test report (comprehensive
risk and safety assessment) and the related peer review mission,
the Assembly urges the nuclear regulatory authorities of Belarus
not to issue an operational license for the Ostrovets plant before:
7.1. the recommendations of the European
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) peer-review report on the
Belarus stress test (adopted by ENSREG on 2 July 2018) are fully
implemented;
7.2. seismic resistance of the nuclear power plant, in particular
as regards systemic safety functions and the spent fuel pool, is
reinforced;
7.3. the Ostrovets reactors’ protections against a crash of
a heavy commercial airplane are enhanced (as has been done for the
same reactor design in Finland);
7.4. incident notification measures in respect of neighbouring
communities and countries are improved, and emergency management
agreements with the neighbouring countries, in particular Lithuania,
are concluded, such as on the basis of the Melk protocol regarding
the nuclear power plant in Temelín, on the border between Austria
and the Czech Republic;
7.5. the assessment of the Ostrovets site is fully completed
in line with international requirements, including the Convention
on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment
in a Transboundary Context (“Espoo Convention”) of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters (“Aarhus Convention”), and a
full scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) site-evaluation
mission (Site and External Events Design Review Service, SEED) has
been carried out for the nuclear power plant site in a comprehensive
manner.
8. Regarding the proposed plans by Turkey and the Russian Federation
for the construction of the nuclear power plant of Akkuyu in the
province of Mersin (Turkey), situated just 85 kilometres from the
border with Cyprus and in very close proximity to other neighbouring
countries, the Assembly expresses its deep concern regarding the
construction of this nuclear power plant in an earthquake-prone
region of Turkey, in accordance with European Parliament Resolution
(2016/2308(INI) of 6 July 2017. It therefore asks the Turkish Government to
join the Espoo Convention and to take into account all concerns
expressed also by its own citizens asking it to consult with neighbouring
countries according to the International Convention on Nuclear Safety.
9. The Assembly recommends that the competent authorities of
all Council of Europe member States with nuclear facilities on their
territory:
9.1. enhance the frequency
and transparency of periodic safety reviews for nuclear installations,
in particular as regards reactors which are more than forty years
old;
9.2. strengthen the independence and capacity of national nuclear
regulators;
9.3. reassess, and where necessary reinforce, the physical
protection of reactors and spent nuclear fuel pools;
9.4. investigate the cases of drone overflights above nuclear
infrastructures and take measures to prevent such overflights from
reoccurring;
9.5. extend the safety perimeter and reinforce protections
against unauthorised access to nuclear plants;
9.6. provide adequate information to and ensure transparency
towards the local population, including in cross-border areas, about
the relevant nuclear safety and security guarantees, radiological emergency
management plans and any new measures taken in that respect;
9.7. consider early decommissioning for the potentially most
vulnerable nuclear plants where investment in safety and security
upgrades would, in view of the risk analysis, exceed reasonable amounts;
9.8. improve and consider unifying the nuclear liability regime
to increase the coherence of applicable international legal norms
and enhance financial security limits for cross-border compensation
of damages in case of nuclear accident.
10. The Assembly also invites the European Commission to extend
the safety perimeter requirements beyond five kilometres around
nuclear power plants, where evacuation, sheltering or iodine prophylaxis
may be required in case of nuclear accidents, so as to better take
into account the experience of the Fukushima accident and public
expectations in terms of radiological protection.
11. Finally, the Assembly calls on the International Atomic Energy
Agency to show greater openness to developing contacts and providing
essential information to the representatives of national parliaments
and regional parliamentary assemblies on the various aspects of
the nuclear energy sector that fall within its competence.