See related documentsElection observation report
| Doc. 14896
| 23 May 2019
Observation of the presidential election in Ukraine (31 March and 21 April 2019)
Author(s): Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
Rapporteur : Ms Angela SMITH,
United Kingdom, SOC
1. Introduction
1. On 26 November 2018, the Parliament
of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) voted to schedule the presidential election
for 31 March 2019. On 14 December 2018, the Bureau of the Parliamentary
Assembly, subject to receiving an invitation, decided to observe
this election and constituted an ad hoc committee for this purpose composed
of 30 members (EPP/CD: 10; SOC: 9, EC: 4, ALDE: 4, UEL: 2, FDG:
1 – in accordance with the D’Hondt system) as well as of the co-rapporteurs
of the Monitoring Committee and authorised the conduct of a pre-electoral
mission. On 17 January 2019, Mr Andriy Parubiy, President of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, sent to the Assembly an official invitation
to observe the presidential election. On 25 January, the Bureau approved
the list of members of the ad hoc committee to observe this election
and appointed Ms Angela Smith (United Kingdom, SOC) as its Chairperson.
On 28 February, it approved the final list of members of the ad
hoc committee (Appendix 1). On 12 April, it approved the list of
members to observe the 2nd round of the election, scheduled for
21 April (Appendix 2).
2. In accordance with the co-operation agreement signed between
the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) on 4 October 2004, a representative from
the Venice Commission was invited to join the ad hoc committee as
an adviser.
3. A pre-electoral delegation went to Kyiv on 6 and 7 March 2019.
Its programme, statement and composition appear in Appendices 3
and 4.
4. The ad hoc committee (PACE delegation) went to Ukraine from
29 March to 1 April 2019. It operated as part of an International
Election Observation Mission (IEOM) together with delegations from
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE-PA), the European Parliament, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-PA) and
the electoral observation mission (EOM) of the OSCE’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). The programme
of the delegation’s meetings is set out in Appendix 5.
5. On polling day, the PACE delegation split into 16 teams which
observed the elections in Kyiv and the surrounding region, as well
as in the following areas: Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkov, Lviv and Odessa.
6. The PACE delegation concluded that the presidential election
in Ukraine was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned
out in high numbers. In the pre-electoral period, the law was often
not implemented in good faith by many stakeholders, which negatively
impacted the trust in the election administration, enforcement of
campaign finance rules, and the effectiveness of election dispute
resolution. Fundamental freedoms were generally respected and candidates
could campaign freely; however, numerous and credible indications
of misuse of State resources and vote-buying undermined the credibility
of the process. The media landscape is diverse in the country, but
campaign coverage lacked in-depth analysis and was often biased.
7. Election day (1st round) was assessed positively overall.
Still, some procedural problems were noted during the count, and
conditions for tabulation were at times inadequate. The press release
by the IEOM after the 1st round is set out in Appendix 6.
8. The 2nd round of the election took place on 21 April. The
programme of the PACE delegation present in Ukraine from 20 to 22
April is set out in Appendix 7 and the press release by the IEOM
after the 2nd round is set out in Appendix 8.
9. The PACE Delegation wishes to thank the heads and members
of the parliamentary delegations of the OSCE-PA, the European Parliament,
the NATO-PA and the OSCE/ODIHR EOM for their excellent co-operation
within the IEOM.
2. Political context
10. On 26 November 2018 and in line
with constitutional provisions, the Parliament of Ukraine scheduled the
presidential election for 31 March 2019. This presidential election
was perceived as an important test for the country’s democracy and
its ongoing reform and modernisation efforts, but also as part of
a larger electoral process culminating in parliamentary elections
to be held later in 2019.
11. The election took place in a challenging political, economic
and security environment, against the backdrop of continuous challenges
to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The overall context was characterised
by ongoing armed conflict and other hostilities in the east of the
country and the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the
Russian Federation, resulting in the continued control of certain
parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by illegal armed groups. As
in 2014 and 2015, the election could not be held in these territories. Although
a nominal ceasefire has been in effect for four years, the situation
in conflict-affected parts of eastern Ukraine remains tense and
volatile and is characterised by persistent attacks on fundamental
freedoms and a deteriorating humanitarian situation.
12. Widespread concerns about interference in the election by
the Russian Federation, including claims of cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure and disinformation campaigns in social networks,
were publicly raised by the authorities.
13. In the last presidential election held in May 2014, Mr Petro
Poroshenko won in the first round with 54.7%. Following the 2014
early parliamentary elections, eight political parties entered parliament,
and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB, 135 seats), People's Front (PF,
81 seats), Self-Reliance (Samopomich, 25 seats), the Radical Party
of Oleh Lyashko (RP, 21 seats) and Fatherland (Batkivshchyna, 20
seats) formed a coalition government. The remaining seats were distributed
among the Opposition Bloc (43 seats), Revival (24), People’s Will
(19) and non-affiliated members of parliament (60). The coalition
fell apart in 2016, leaving only the PPB and PF supporting the government.
3. Legal
framework and electoral system
14. The PACE delegation recalls that
Ukraine signed and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) and its Additional Protocol (ETS No.
9), which enshrine a number of principles crucial for an effective
and meaningful democracy, such as the right to free elections (Article
3 of the Additional Protocol), freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and association, as well as prohibition of discrimination
(Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention).
15. The Constitution guarantees rights and freedoms that underpin
democratic elections. The elections were further regulated by the
Law on Presidential Elections (“Election Law”), the Law on the Central
Election Commission, the Law on the State Voter Register, and the
Law on Political Parties. Provisions of the Code of Administrative
Procedure, the Criminal Code and Code of Administrative Offences
were also applicable. Regulations and decisions of the Central Election
Commission (CEC) supplemented the legislation.
16. The legal framework for presidential elections remained largely
unchanged since the last presidential election, despite attempts
at electoral reform that did not move beyond the initial vote in
the Verkhovna Rada and subsequent prolonged and inconclusive work
in the parliamentary committee. The legal framework offered a sound
basis for the holding of democratic elections, despite significant
shortcomings. It was, however, not fully implemented in good faith
by all stakeholders.
17. Most previous Venice Commission and ODIHR recommendations
that would bring the legal framework further into line with international
obligations and standards, as well as good practice, including for
the adoption of an election code that would consolidate and harmonise
the various election laws, remained unaddressed. Other legal framework
recommendations related to candidate eligibility and registration,
voter registration, appointment of election commissions, the complaints
and appeals process and electoral offences. As part of a broader
anticorruption initiative, new campaign finance regulations were
adopted in 2015, in line with past Venice Commission and ODIHR recommendations
to increase transparency and accountability.
18. The Law “On the condemnation of communist and national-socialist
(Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their
symbols” was adopted in 2015, and the election law was amended to
ban candidate nominations by political parties falling under provisions
of the law. This law was earlier assessed by the Venice Commission
and ODIHR as not being fully in line with regional and international
human rights instruments.
In
particular, the Venice Commission and ODIHR pointed out in their
joint opinion that “the banning of political parties from participation
in elections or their dissolution should be a measure of last resort in
exceptional cases. The Venice Commission and ODIHR would encourage
the Ukrainian authorities to follow a ‘multiperspective’ approach
to Ukraine’s history, that allows a shared vision of its past in
order to promote social cohesion, peace and democracy”.
19. In a positive development, the right of individuals to dispute
the constitutionality of legislation in the Constitutional Court
was introduced in 2016, allowing citizens and political parties
for the first time to challenge election-related laws. Applying
an overly formalistic approach, the Constitutional Court returned
or ruled inadmissible five cases lodged by rejected nominees that
challenged the constitutionality of the candidate deposit or its
amount.
20. The president of Ukraine is elected by popular vote for a
five-year term; the same person may not serve more than two consecutive
terms, but there is no overall term limit. If no candidate wins
the absolute majority of valid votes cast, a second round takes
place three weeks later, between the two frontrunners.
4. Election
administration
21. The election was administered
by the CEC, 199 district election commissions (DECs), and 29 989 precinct
election commissions (PECs). No election bodies could be formed
in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol
as well as in the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts beyond the
government’s control. Voters abroad could vote at 101 polling stations
established in diplomatic and consular representations in 72 countries.
Polling stations in the Russian Federation were abolished by the
CEC based on a request by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
on grounds of the presence of risks and threats to elections there
and the need to guarantee the security of Ukrainian citizens; four
claimants unsuccessfully challenged this in the court. Voters residing
in the Russian Federation were offered the opportunity to vote in Finland,
Georgia and Kazakhstan.
22. The CEC is a permanent body responsible for the overall planning
and conduct of national elections. Its current composition was increased
from 15 to 17 members and renewed by parliament in September 2018, following
political negotiations and subsequent amendments to the Law on the
CEC; one seat is currently vacant. Political actors and civil society
representatives criticised the hasty adoption of the amendments
and the circumvention of parliamentary rules of procedure, claiming
the change was intended to benefit the incumbent president and the
ruling coalition. This led to a certain lack of trust in the CEC
and in its impartiality.
23. Overall, the CEC operated collegially and met all legal deadlines.
It held regular open sessions attended by media, candidate representatives
and observers. Most CEC decisions were adopted unanimously, and
all were posted on its official website, enhancing transparency.
However, the CEC systematically held preliminary meetings before
its sessions to discuss its draft decisions, while limiting public
sessions to formal voting, a practice which decreased the transparency
of its work.
24. Shortly after the formation of PECs, the DECs replaced a significant
number of PEC members, many of whom were not aware that they had
been appointed as members. Many appointed in executive positions refused
to assume their posts, which increased the burden on DECs and delayed
the process as many PECs could not convene on time and hold their
inaugural session. Moreover, DECs faced difficulties to maintain proportionally
allocated quotas in view of the high number of replacements. Some
applications were submitted with falsified signatures or copies
of IDs without the nominee’s prior consent. All this raised serious
concerns regarding the PEC formation process.
25. Incessant replacements of DEC members, especially of executives,
diminished the value of the training received.
26. Women were well-represented at DECs, accounting for 57% of
all members. As at 30 March, 91 of 199 DECs were chaired by women,
while there were 111 female deputy chairpersons and 126 secretaries. Some
72% of PECs where voting was observed were chaired by women. Nine
of 16 CEC members are women, including the chairperson and the secretary.
27. While the law only provides for the production of official
election material in Ukrainian, minority communities or Russian-speaking
citizens did not report to the PACE delegation or to the IEOM that
any language barrier compromised their understanding of the ballot
paper and other election materials.
28. The CEC, with the support of international donors, upgraded
its information technology infrastructure to address a range of
cybersecurity threats that it expected to face on election day.
5. Voter
lists and candidate registration
29. A citizen who is 18 years by
election day has the right to vote, except if declared incapacitated
by a court decision. Deprivation of the right to vote on the basis
of intellectual disability is inconsistent with international obligations
and standards. Voter registration is passive and continuous. It
is based on the centralised State Voter Register (SVR) administered
by the CEC and updated monthly by register maintenance bodies. The
vast majority of such bodies met by the ODIHR EOM were highly experienced
and professional.
30. According to the SVR office, as at 28 February there were
35 560 427 registered voters, including 530 123 registered abroad.
Despite some concerns about difficulties to adequately capture data
on internally displaced persons (IDPs), internal labour migrants,
and citizens living abroad, including for the reasons of them not
registering their residence addresses, nearly all PACE delegation
and IEOM interlocutors expressed confidence in the accuracy of the
voter lists.
31. Voter lists are extracted from the SVR. They excluded over
5 million voters registered in areas where voting could not take
place and voters without a registered address. Voters could request
to temporarily change their polling station without changing their
voting address. The need to justify and renew such requests unnecessarily
constrains voters, particularly in presidential elections with a
single constituency. While the CEC simplified the procedure for
IDPs, fewer than 100 000 registered such a request. In addition,
improper application of this procedure occurred in some instances.
The procedure for a temporary transfer of the voting address was
particularly cumbersome for voters residing in territories outside
government control, who had to repeatedly cross checkpoints to register
and to vote.
32. There were 101 polling stations organised abroad for out-of-country
voting. However, their limited capacity, combined with excessive
administrative requirements for the registration of voters, meant
that only around 2% of the Ukrainians living abroad cast their vote,
which means that around 98% of almost 10 million Ukrainian citizens
abroad could not use their right to vote.
33. While the CEC and SVR websites provided comprehensive voter
information, voter education in general appeared insufficient, including
for IDPs and persons with disabilities.
34. The right to stand for president is granted to eligible voters
older than 35, who have resided in Ukraine for the past 10 years,
do not hold multiple citizenship, and have command of the State
language. The residency requirement is unreasonably restrictive
and runs counter to international obligations and good practice. Prospective
candidates must submit a set of documents, including a property
and income statement, and pay a deposit of UAH 2.5 million (around
€79 000). The deposit is substantial and as such represents a restriction on
candidacy, and there is no reasonable threshold of votes for its
return. The requirement that campaign platforms be vetted as part
of the candidate registration unnecessarily constrains candidates’
freedom of opinion and expression as well as political pluralism.
In addition, there are no objective or transparent criteria for
the vetting.
35. Candidate registration was conducted in a largely inclusive
manner. The CEC considered applications from 91 candidates and registered
44 of them. Nominees were given the opportunity to correct procedural
or technical deficiencies in their registration documents. The CEC
rejected 47 applicants, most of them based on multiple grounds,
the most common being non-compliance with the monetary deposit.
Six applications were denied on grounds related to the campaign
platform. After five candidates withdrew by the legal deadline of 8 March,
39 candidates appeared on the ballot, among them 4 women; 20 were
self-nominated, including the incumbent, and 19 party-nominated.
36. Women remain strongly under-represented in public life in
Ukraine. They hold five of 24 ministerial portfolios in the current
government, and their representation in the parliament stands at
12.3% (52 members). Only one of the 24 oblast governors is a woman.
6. Election
campaign, funding and the media
37. The campaign took place against
a backdrop of a lack of trust in State institutions and the justice
system, due to perceived widespread corruption and the poor economic
situation. Powerful economic interests of wealthy businessmen (known
as “oligarchs”) continue to impact on political and decision-making
processes and had a strong bearing on the dynamics of this election.
38. Overall, the campaign was largely peaceful and competitive,
and candidates were generally able to campaign freely and without
undue restrictions. The field of candidates offered voters a choice,
but there was limited debate among the contestants on policies.
The large majority of the 39 candidates did not conduct any campaign
activities, casting doubts on their intentions to genuinely compete
in the election.
39. One candidate and MP, Mr Yuriy Tymoshenko, was widely referred
to as a “clone” candidate solely running to take votes from Ms Yulia
Tymoshenko; the latter unsuccessfully lodged two court cases on
the matter aiming to avoid confusion between the two candidates.
40. Most candidates focused their platforms on the economy and
social protection, army and defence, the fight against corruption,
and resolution of the conflict in the east. Future relations with
the Russian Federation, the European Union and NATO also featured
in the campaign. The recent establishment of the independent Orthodox
Church of Ukraine featured prominently in the incumbent’s campaign,
being presented as one of the key achievements of his presidency.
Still, the campaign was focused on personalities of candidates rather
than their platforms.
41. Campaign activities started slowly but increased during the
second half of March, especially in the central and western parts
of the country. In the east, by contrast, the campaign remained
subdued. There was interference by third-party actors, in some cases
violent, in campaign activities. The campaign was mainly conducted
on television, in online media and social networks, as well as through
billboards and posters, and campaign tents. Door-to-door canvassing
was also observed, mostly in rural areas. Several candidates held campaign
rallies or closed meetings. The number of instances of negative
campaigning increased significantly in the second half of March.
In the days before campaign silence, new billboards appeared featuring
words associated with candidates’ key messages. They remained in
place during the silence period, effectively breaching campaign
silence.
42. Mr Poroshenko and Ms Tymoshenko campaigned most actively,
with the incumbent touring the country extensively in his official
capacity. The incumbent’s public appearances blurred the line between
his official position and his standing as a candidate. Volodymyr
Zelenskyi did not conduct a single traditional campaign rally, relying
instead on his appearances as a comedian and actor on television
and in his concerts as well as on his extensive presence on and
use of social media. By choosing this way of campaigning Mr Zelenskyi distanced
himself from the political establishment, building his support on
people’s fatigue and disillusionment.
43. The use of social assistance programmes, salary increases
and bonuses, and other financial incentives as campaign tools was
the subject of widespread criticism levelled against the incumbent.
For example, the monetisation of subsidies, indexation of pensions,
an extraordinary one-time payment to pensioners (to be paid in two
instalments in March and April), and monetary support of several
categories of soldiers (mostly those serving on the frontline) and
other programmes were launched between late December 2018 and March
2019. Misuse of State resources at national and local levels by
several candidates was observed by and reported to the PACE delegation
and to the IEOM. There was a systematic practice of involving public
institutions and public servants in the campaign, mostly by the
incumbent. One mayor said that there was pressure on local government
employees. In several instances, civil servants and voters were
instructed or induced to attend campaign events.
44. There were some indications of vote-buying and the IEOM received
a high number of allegations of vote-buying from across the country.
Hundreds of complaints related to vote-buying were lodged with law- enforcement
agencies, resulting in more than 80 criminal investigations being
opened. Two investigations were launched into nationwide vote-buying
schemes by the campaigns of the incumbent and Ms Tymoshenko. Charitable
activities were organised across the country, and used as a campaign
tool, by several charities and foundations affiliated with different
candidates and their proxies, or directly by political parties.
A mayor said that parties were distributing money and sugar to the
poor. Bags with gifts were handed out to participants at campaign
rallies.
45. The direct involvement of the prosecutor general in support
of the incumbent, contrary to the law, raised concerns. He appeared
at the incumbent’s campaign kick-off event and made a number of
statements, including on his personal Facebook page, which cast
doubts on his office’s independence. In addition, several candidates
were the subject of ongoing criminal investigations, with at least
three investigations launched after they announced their candidacy.
46. The new framework on campaign finance increased transparency,
but remaining shortcomings limited its effectiveness to regulate
the role of money in campaigns.
The CEC and the recently established
National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) did not sufficiently
co-ordinate their overlapping oversight authority. Insufficient
independence, capacity and resources of these bodies was a serious
concern.
47. Candidates and nominating parties can contribute to campaign
funds without limit. Citizens can donate up to the amount equal
to 400 times the minimum salary (around €56 000), and legal entities
double that amount. There is no limit on campaign spending. Due
to the excessive amount of money in campaigns, public calls and
draft laws for banning or limiting spending for broadcast advertising
have ensued. Consideration of spending limits is one of the key
recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
to the Ukrainian Government, intended to prevent excessive funding
of election campaigns.
48. All campaign donations and expenditures must pass through
dedicated bank accounts which are opened after candidate registration.
Interim campaign finance reports are to be filed not less than five
days before election day and published within one day with analyses.
Final reports are due within 15 days after election day, and the
analyses are to be published within 30 days of the election.
49. There were numerous claims that campaigns were largely funded
outside the campaign finance framework. For example, supporters
donated campaign offices, paid for fuel, printed campaign materials,
and funded giveaways. The widespread occurrences of campaign materials
missing required information on the issuer, publisher and circulation
was also indicative of third-party financing. According to the CEC,
some candidates were not paying for their YouTube ads from campaign
accounts. In addition, some candidates organised free concerts not
advertised as campaign events, compensated their DEC and PEC nominees
off the books, and paid media to show their unmarked promotional
material. However, both oversight bodies (the CEC and the NAPC)
refrained from accepting a mandate to determine any circumvention
of transparency rules, including a misuse of State resources, nor
did they have investigatory powers. Analysis of the finance reports is
mainly technical according to established procedures, and sanctions
for any violations are insufficient.
50. All candidates submitted interim finance reports by the legal
deadline. The CEC and NAPC analyses revealed that 15 candidates
received donations from unauthorised persons, but the police was
requested to investigate only Mr Zelenskyi and Mr Hrytsenko. The
reports filed by the three candidates widely considered the frontrunners
indicate that, on average, 70% of their expenditure was allocated
to media advertising, with the incumbent spending more than UAH
250 million (some €8.2 million) on media alone.
51. The Ukrainian media landscape is characterised by a wide range
of outlets at national and regional levels. The main source of political
information remains television, despite the significant growth of
news websites and social networks. The media market is largely divided
along political lines, and ownership is highly concentrated. The
editorial policy and political agenda promoted by private media
outlets exclusively serve the economic interests of their owners,
undermining media autonomy and public trust. The Ukrainian Public Broadcasting
Company (UA:PBC), established in 2017, is severely underfunded,
which affects its ability to fully perform its public-service role.
52. Media compliance with legal requirements is monitored by the
National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting (NCTRB). The
legislation does not give the regulator any effective sanctioning
powers to perform its mandate in a timely manner during an election
period, and specific mechanisms for dealing with media-related complaints
are not exercised, despite previous recommendations. Furthermore,
the council’s independence and impartiality are questionable since
its members are political appointees and often vote along the political
lines. Unlike in previous electoral cycles, parliament did not adopt
a moratorium on media inspections to ensure freedom of expression
and uninterrupted coverage of election-related events by media outlets.
53. The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits
censorship, and the legal framework provides for general media freedom.
Yet, to counter threats to national security, the government introduced
a number of severe measures affecting media and journalists. Since
2017, presidential decrees have imposed economic sanctions against
a number of television channels, social networks and search engines
from the Russian Federation. In addition, around 200 websites considered
to be anti-Ukrainian have been blocked by the authorities, with
legislative proposals for further restrictions pending. On the same
grounds, foreign journalists face temporary bans on entering Ukraine
if violations of procedures for entry and exit from occupied territories
are suspected. On 4 October 2018, parliament requested the National
Security and Defence Council to sanction two national television
channels, News One and 112 Ukraine, saying they were tools for spreading disinformation
and Russian propaganda. During the election period, the NCTRB sanctioned
News One for hate speech and anti-Ukrainian reporting. On 21 February,
an inspection of 112 Ukraine was initiated under similar accusations.
54. A high number of violations against journalists’ rights have
been recorded by national and international human rights organisations.
Journalists’ safety remains a major concern as they face the threat
of violence and intimidation, especially during the electoral process.
Although the law guarantees the protection of sources, a number
of investigative journalists have been ordered by courts to provide
access to their email and mobile phone correspondence.
55. The campaign was covered through various formats including
talk shows, current affairs programmes, political debates and free
and paid airtime. Candidates often used these platforms to discredit
their opponents rather than informing voters on their political
views. Moreover, legal provisions for balanced and unbiased coverage
were frequently violated by the monitored private television channels.
Overall, the campaign news coverage lacked in-depth analysis. Most
candidates were reluctant to participate in televised debates.
56. On the monitored television channels, campaign coverage focused
mainly on seven candidates: Mr Poroshenko, Mr Zelenskyi, Ms Tymoshenko,
Mr Boyko, Mr Lyashko, Mr Vilkul, and Mr Hrytsenko. However, in the
news programmes, broad coverage was given to President Poroshenko,
with no clear distinction between his institutional activities and
his political campaigning. Private channels favoured certain candidates in
terms of both amount and tone of editorial coverage. Inter and 112
Ukraina favoured Mr Boyko. 5 Channel and Ukraina gave most coverage
to Mr Poroshenko. Mr Zelenskyi dominated the coverage on 1+1. ICTV allocated
85% of its election coverage to four candidates, often through unmarked
promotional materials, and notably giving little coverage to Mr
Zelenskyi. Mr Zelenskyi was barely covered in his political capacity,
while 1+1 featured him extensively during entertainment programmes
in his capacity as an actor.
57. According to the election law, paid campaign advertising is
allowed on public and private media but has to be clearly marked.
Through the course of the campaign, paid advertisement was widely
used by those perceived to be the main candidates. President Poroshenko
was the only candidate who purchased airtime in all monitored media
outlets. Contrary to the election law, a high number of unmarked
promotional materials (known as “jeansa”) was noted in the prime-time
news of most of the monitored private television channels.
58. In line with legal requirements, UA:PBC provided all presidential
candidates with free airtime during prime time. All candidates used
this opportunity. The public broadcaster abstained from covering
candidate activities in the news, focusing instead on current affairs
programmes and debates with presidential candidates.
59. The right to seek effective legal remedy is guaranteed by
the election law. Participants in the electoral process can challenge
the decisions and (in)actions of election commissions, candidates
and other electoral actors. Most types of disputes can be filed
with the election administration and/or administrative courts, at
the complainants’ discretion; such overlapping jurisdiction is not
in line with international good practice.
Limiting the
opportunity to seek effective redress are provisions that allow
for the rejection of complaints due to minor technical deficiencies
and a CEC procedure amended in December 2018 that deems complaints
submitted by email inadmissible.
60. The courts adhered to the two-day deadline for review of cases
and offered parties to the claim sufficient opportunity to present
their cases. However, some court judgments lacked a sound legal
basis, thereby limiting access to effective remedies for violations
of electoral rights and casting doubts on the independence of the judiciary.
This included several unsuccessful cases against the incumbent on
misuse of official position and State resources by mixing official
events with campaigning, and one case against Mr Zelenskyi on bypassing campaign
finance rules by directly campaigning in his professional performances.
In addition, some decisions of the same court conflicted with each
other, undermining the principle of legal certainty.
61. The CEC stated that it received more than 130 complaints.
As a general practice, it responded to these complaints by private
letter prepared by a single CEC member, rather than by determination
in open plenary sessions followed by published decisions as required
by law. This undermined the transparency and collegiality of the
established dispute resolution process. With complete disregard
for the law, the Supreme Court ruled that the CEC has full discretion
to decide whether to consider complaints in sessions. This decision
conflicted, in part, with an earlier decision of the same court.
7. Citizen
and international observers
62. The law provides for observation
of the electoral process by international observers and citizen observers
nominated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whose statute
includes election observation. However, in light of the designation
by parliament of the Russian Federation as an aggressor State, a
recent amendment to the election laws effectively prohibited citizens
of the Russian Federation from observing elections in Ukraine.
63. The CEC registered 139 NGOs, including 132 that applied to
observe nationwide. Most of these NGOs had no previous election
observation experience. Only a small number of NGOs that were active
throughout the country in the pre-election period, most notably
OPORA, and, to a lesser extent, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine
and the Leading Legal Initiatives. A number of PACE delegation and
IEOM interlocutors expressed concerns about the affiliation of some
NGOs to particular candidates. The names, slogans and symbols of some
NGOs directly relate to candidates’ campaigns or nominating parties.
Moreover, the youth branches of some parties were registered as
NGOs to observe.
64. The credibility of some NGOs appeared questionable; for example,
the Ukrainian Center for Democratic Society, which registered nearly
32 000 observers, was founded in December 2018, has no website,
and a single post on its Facebook page with 14 likes and 17 subscribers
(as at 29 March). On election day, several observers from this NGO
openly stated the organisation was affiliated to the incumbent.
65. The CEC registered over 2 300 international observers from
36 organisations or foreign States.
8. Voting
and counting
66. The election day (1st round)
was peaceful, with a voter turnout of 63.5% announced by the CEC.
The CEC started posting on its website detailed preliminary election
results by polling station at around 23:00 on election day.
67. Opening procedures were assessed positively in 246 of the
265 polling stations observed by the IEOM. With few exceptions,
established procedures were followed. However, IEOM observers noted
the presence of unauthorised persons in 26 polling stations, and
interference by candidate and party observers in 10 polling stations.
About a quarter of the polling stations observed opened with slight
delays.
68. Voting was assessed positively in 99% of polling stations
observed. The process was characterised as well organised, smooth,
transparent and efficient, with a high level of adherence to established
procedures. The few negative assessments were mainly due to overcrowding
and ballot boxes that had not been sealed properly (5% of observations),
often due to poor quality of the seals.
69. Procedures such as identity checks and the signing of voter
lists and ballot counterfoils were adhered to, with few exceptions.
Similarly, there were only a few cases of serious violations such
as attempts to influence voters (less than 1%), series of seemingly
identical signatures on voter lists (1%), and group (2%), proxy
or multiple voting (less than 1% each). There were problems with
the secrecy of the vote, including not all voters folding their
ballots to preserve the secrecy of their vote (6% of polling stations
observed), voters showing their marked ballots to others present
(8%), or indications of voters taking pictures of their ballots
(2%). All this could reflect concerns expressed in the pre-election
period with regard to possible vote-buying. In 7% of polling stations
observed, there were persons other than PEC members keeping track
of voters who had voted.
70. Candidate and party observers were present in 95% of polling
stations observed, and citizen observers in 57%. Given the high
number of citizen observers accredited, this was a surprisingly
low presence. They also often could not say which organisation they
represented. IEOM observers noted the presence of unauthorised persons,
in particular police, in 7% of polling stations observed. In 51
polling stations observed, persons other than PEC members interfered
in or directed the process; in 27 cases, they were candidate or
party observers. Written complaints were filed in 9% of polling
stations where voting was observed.
71. Some 58% of polling stations were not accessible for persons
with physical disabilities, and in 23%, the layout was not suitable
for them. IEOM observers reported overcrowding in 5% of polling
stations observed.
72. The vote count was assessed positively in 279 of the 331 polling
stations where it was observed. Counting was transparent, and candidate
and party observers were present at almost all counts observed,
and citizen observers at over one half. Isolated cases of unauthorised
persons or undue interference in the count were noted, usually by
candidate or party observers.
73. There were a few significant procedural errors and only a
few serious violations during the vote count. The observers did,
however, report that basic reconciliation procedures were often
not followed, including the PEC announcing the number of voters
on the voter list (39 cases), the number of voters’ signatures on
the main and housebound voter lists (67 and 65 cases, respectively),
or of used ballot counterfoils (41 cases). In 57 counts observed,
the figures established during reconciliation were not entered into
the protocol before the ballot boxes were opened. Counting procedures
were followed overall, although IEOM observers reported that 50 counts
were not performed in the prescribed sequence. This failure by PECs
to follow basic reconciliation procedures or to perform the count
in the prescribed order were main reasons for negative evaluations.
74. One PACE observer team in Lviv was not allowed to take photos
of the protocol (which had been filled in in a separate room by
the deputy chairperson of the PEC, the PACE observer team being
prevented from entering the room). The behaviour of the deputy chairperson
of that PEC gave the PACE team the feeling that she was falsifying
the results.
75. During 42 counts, the validity of contested ballots was not
determined by voting. IEOM observers also noted 24 cases where the
results protocol had been pre-signed by PEC members, but saw no
attempt to deliberately falsify the results. Forty-five PECs observed
had problems completing the results protocol.
76. The initial stages of the tabulation process were assessed
negatively in 47 of 259 observations. This was mainly due to inadequate
conditions at DECs, that caused overcrowding and limited transparency.
In 67 cases, conditions were inadequate for the tabulation of results,
mainly due to insufficient space and poor organisation. 45 DECs
were so overcrowded that it negatively affected the process, and
in 57 there was tension or unrest. In 85 cases, observers could
not fully observe the data entry of results, which limited transparency.
In 42 cases, not everyone present had a clear view of procedures,
and in 47 cases, IEOM observers were restricted in their observation.
More often than not, those entitled did not receive copies of the
intermediate tabulation protocols. IEOM observers reported cases
of PEC results protocols that had not been completely filled in
(12 cases) or did not reconcile (20 cases). They also reported from
39 DECs that PEC or DEC members were changing protocol figures at
the DEC, in violation of the law.
78. According to the results of the first round, Mr Zelenskyi
won in 20 of the 24 regions where elections were held, including
the city of Kyiv, with a total of 30.24% of the valid votes. Mr
Poroshenko won in two regions, Lviv and Ternopil, both in western
Ukraine, with a total of 15.95% of the votes, while Ms Tymoshenko (Batkivschyna)
won in one region (Ivano-Frankivsk also in Western Ukraine), with
a total of 13.40% of votes. Mr Boyko (independent) won the vote
in the non-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the
East with a total of 11.67%. The turnout was 62.65% with 1.18% of
invalid ballots. A total of 18 893 864 voters cast their ballots
on 31 March.
79. Since in the first round of the election none of the 39 candidates
received the absolute majority of votes required to be elected,
the CEC announced on 7 April that a second round would be held on
21 April between Volodymyr Zelenskyi and the incumbent President
Petro Poroshenko.
80. The two candidates chose not to conduct large-scale campaign
rallies between the two rounds. Campaign activities were predominantly
conducted on television, in online media and social networks, as
well as through billboards and posters. At the same time, campaign
activities at national level intensified and increased tensions
between the two sides were reflected by massive and systematic negative
campaigning and harsh mutual accusations. The increase in negative
campaigning, in particular on social networks, to the detriment
of the presentation of structured election programmes and the conduct
of an issue-oriented debate, diminished voters’ ability to make
an informed choice. There was a marked asymmetry between Mr Poroshenko’s
conventional campaign and Mr Zelenskyi’s campaign, which to a large
extent was conducted by proxies rather than by the candidate himself
and put little emphasis on his campaign platform. The format of
the much-anticipated public debate that took place on 19 April at
the Kyiv Olympic Stadium offered only a limited opportunity for
voters to acquaint themselves with the candidates’ programmes.
81. For the second round, voter lists were updated to reflect
changes to civil registration data, recently deceased voters, those
who had turned 18, and corrections requested by voters. Voters who
needed to temporarily change their voting location or who had applied
for housebound voting were required by the CEC to submit a new request
to the relevant register maintenance bodies between 7 and 15 April,
even if they had already done so for the first round. The need for
voters to renew such requests represents an unnecessary burden,
especially for IDPs, voters abroad, and people with disabilities.
Despite the short time frame and long queues witnessed in some register
maintenance bodies, a total of 325 604 temporary changes of voting
place were registered, including 75 607 IDPs.
82. On 30 April, the CEC announced the official results of the
election: the voter turnout in the second round was 61.37% (18 491837 votes).
Volodymyr Zelenskiy received 73.22% (13 541 528 votes) and Petro Poroshenko
received 24.45% (4 522 450 votes).
9. Conclusions
and recommendations
83. The PACE delegation concluded
that the presidential election in Ukraine was competitive, voters
had a broad choice and turned out in high numbers. In the pre-electoral
period, the law was often not implemented in good faith by many
stakeholders, which negatively impacted trust in the election administration,
enforcement of campaign finance rules, and the effectiveness of
election dispute resolution. Fundamental freedoms were generally
respected and candidates could campaign freely; however, numerous
and credible indications of misuse of State resources and vote-buying
undermined the credibility of the electoral process. The media landscape
is diverse, but campaign coverage in the monitored media lacked
in-depth analysis and was often biased. The PACE delegation recalls
that the election took place in the context of ongoing armed conflict
and other hostilities in the east of the country and the illegal
annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation. As
a consequence, the election could not be organised in Crimea and
certain parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are controlled
by illegal armed groups.
84. The Constitution guarantees rights and freedoms that underpin
democratic elections. The legal framework remains largely unchanged
since the 2014 presidential election, despite some inconclusive
efforts for electoral reform, and most previous recommendations
of the Venice Commission and ODIHR, including the crucial need to
codify the electoral legislation, remain unaddressed. The existing
legal framework offers a sound basis for the holding of democratic
elections, despite significant shortcomings.
85. The PACE delegation noted that the CEC operated collegially
overall and met all legal deadlines. It held regular open sessions
but also systematically conducted preliminary meetings before sessions,
a practice which decreased the transparency of its work. Political
actors and civil society representatives criticised the hasty adoption
of the amendments to the Law on the CEC, claiming the change was
intended to benefit the incumbent. This led to many interlocutors
of the IEOM voicing a lack of trust in the CEC and questioning its impartiality.
86. Candidate registration was largely inclusive but, as the large
majority of the 39 candidates did not conduct any campaign activities,
this gave the impression that they were so-called “technical” candidates affiliated
to the leading ones.
87. The PACE delegation found that there was general confidence
in the accuracy of the voter lists. Nevertheless, every effort should
be made to facilitate in the future the voting of those Ukrainian
citizens living abroad, as their constitutional right to vote was
seriously compromised by excessive administrative requirements.
Out-of-country election procedures could include in the future voting
by post
88. The PACE delegation considered that the election campaign
was generally peaceful and competitive, and candidates could campaign
freely and without undue restrictions. The field of candidates offered
voters a choice, but there was a lack of genuine political debate
among the candidates.
89. The use of social assistance programmes, salary increases
and bonuses, and other financial incentives as campaign tools was
the subject of widespread criticism levelled against the incumbent
president. There was misuse of State resources at national and local
levels by several candidates. A systematic practice of involving public
institutions and public servants in the campaign (mostly by the
incumbent) was noted by the PACE delegation, along with indications
of vote-buying.
90. The PACE delegation noted that the new campaign finance regulations
adopted in 2015 are in line with past Venice Commission and ODIHR
recommendations to increase transparency and accountability. However, key
remaining shortcomings and inadequate oversight limit their effectiveness.
There is no limit on campaign spending, but there have been public
calls and draft laws to ban or limit spending for broadcast advertising. There
were widespread credible claims that campaigns were largely funded
outside of the campaign finance framework.
91. Provisions for balanced and unbiased coverage of the campaign
and candidates were frequently violated by the monitored private
television channels. Overall, the campaign news coverage lacked
in-depth analysis. Several journalists and hosts showed a clear
bias in favour of certain candidates. The incumbent received broad
coverage in news programmes, with no clear distinction between his
institutional activities and political campaigning. Mr Zelenskyi
was barely covered in his political capacity while he featured extensively
in his role as actor and comedian. Paid advertising was widely used
by the main candidates. There was a high number of unmarked promotional
materials in the prime-time news of most monitored private television channels,
a practice that violates the law, misleads voters and does not provide
genuine information. Candidates were generally reluctant to participate
in televised debates.
92. The PACE delegation recalls that the report on the observation
of the early presidential election in Ukraine on 25 May 2014 included
an invitation to Ukrainian authorities to guarantee media pluralism
during electoral campaigns and the independence of journalists with
regard to the financial oligarchic groups; and to reinforce the
transparency of media ownership. It appears, however, that there
still is a long way to go in this direction.
93. The PACE delegation qualified the election day (1st round)
as peaceful. Opening and voting were assessed positively in the
overwhelming majority of polling stations observed. Voting was well
organised, smooth, transparent and efficient, and procedures were
generally adhered to. However, problems with the secrecy of the
vote were noted and observers saw persons other than PEC members
keeping track of people who had voted. Some people were not allowed
to vote because they were not on the voter list. There were a few
procedural errors and very few serious violations during the vote
count. The early stages of tabulation were assessed negatively in
about one sixth of DECs, mainly due to inadequate conditions at
DECs that caused overcrowding and limited transparency, as well
as restrictions on observers’ access. Throughout election day, candidate
and party observers were seen in almost all polling stations, and
citizen observers in around half.
94. The second round was well organised, despite operational challenges
and a limited time frame. The legal framework still contains shortcomings,
and there was little will to resolve electoral complaints in a way
that guaranteed effective remedy. Election day (2nd round) was assessed
positively and, despite a few procedural problems, there was a marked
improvement in the conduct of the vote count and tabulation compared
to the first round. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, in close co-operation with the Venice Commission, will continue
to co-operate with Ukraine to consolidate the democratic process
in the country.
Appendix 1 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee (1st round)
(open)
Based on the proposals by the political groups
of the Assembly:
Chairperson: Ms Angela
SMITH, United Kingdom (SOC)
Group of the European
People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Ms Boriana ÅBERG, Sweden
- Ms Ann-Brit ÅSEBOL, Sweden
- Mr Corneliu Mugurel COZMANCIUC, Romania
- Ms Nicole DURANTON, France
- Mr Aleksander POCIEJ, Poland
- Mr Vetle Wang SOLEIM, Norway
- Mr Birgir THÓRARINSSON, Iceland
- Mr Egidijus VAREIKIS, Lithuania*
- Mr Matern von MARSCHALL, Germany
Socialists, Democrats
and Greens Group (SOC)
- Mr Pierre-Alain FRIDEZ,
Switzerland
- Mr Stefan SCHENNACH, Austria
- Ms Angela SMITH, United Kingdom*
- Mr Roberto RAMPI, Italy
- Ms Tabea RÖSSNER, Germany
- Mr Andrea ORLANDO, Italy
- Mr André VALLINI, France
European Conservatives
Group (EC)
- Lord David BLENCATHRA,
United Kingdom
- Lord Simon RUSSELL, United Kingdom*
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Ms Emilie Enger MEHL,
Norway*
- Mr Jacques LE NAY, France
- Ms Alexandra LOUIS, France
- Mr Mart van de VEN, Netherlands
Group of the Unified
European Left (UEL)
- Mr Momodou Malcolm JALLOW,
Sweden
- Mr Tiny KOX, Netherlands
Free Democrats Group
(FDG)
- Mr Nagif HAMZAYEV, Azerbaijan*
Co-rapporteurs AS/Mon
(ex officio)
- Mr Alfred HEER, Switzerland
Venice Commission
- Mr Rafael RUBIO, Member
of the Venice Commission
- Mr Serguei KOUZNETSOV, Head of Division, Neighbourhood
Co-operation
Secretariat
- Mr Bogdan TORCĂTORIU,
Administrator, Election Observation and Interparliamentary Co-operation Division
- Ms Danièle GASTL, Assistant
- Ms Anne GODFREY, Assistant
* Member of the pre-electoral mission
Appendix 2 – List of
the members of the ad hoc committee (2nd round)
(open)
Based on the proposals by the political groups
of the Assembly:
Chairperson: Ms Angela
SMITH, United Kingdom (SOC)
Group of the European
People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Mr Andres HERKEL, Estonia
- Mr Emanuelis ZINGERIS, Lithuania
Socialists, Democrats
and Greens Group (SOC)
- Mr Ervin BUSHATI, Albania
- Mr Pierre-Alain FRIDEZ, Switzerland
- Mr Ian MURRAY, United Kingdom
- Mr Stefan SCHENNACH, Austria
- Ms Angela SMITH, United Kingdom*
- Mr Gheorghe-Dinu SOCOTAR, Romania
- Mr André VALLINI, France
European Conservatives
Group (EC)
- Lord Simon RUSSELL,
United Kingdom*
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Ms Emilie Enger MEHL,
Norway*
- Mr Jacques LE NAY, France
- Ms Alexandra LOUIS, France
- Mr Edmon MARUKYAN, Armenia
Group of the Unified
European Left (UEL)
Free Democrats Group
(FDG)
- Mr Nagif HAMZAYEV, Azerbaijan*
Co-rapporteurs AS/Mon
(ex officio)
- Mr Alfred HEER, Switzerland
Secretariat
- Mr Bogdan TORCĂTORIU,
Administrator, Election Observation and Interparliamentary Co-operation Division
- Ms Anne GODFREY, Assistant
* Member of the pre-electoral mission
Appendix 3 – Programme
of the pre-electoral delegation
(open)
Wednesday 6 March
2019
08:30-09:30 Meeting of the delegation:
- opening of the meeting by Ms Angela
Smith, Head of the delegation
- intervention by Mr Alfred Heer co-rapporteur of the Monitoring
Committee
- briefing by Mr Marten Ehnberg, Head of the Council of
Europe Office
- briefing by the secretariat
9:45-10:45 Meeting with ambassadors of countries represented
in the pre-electoral mission:
- H.E.
Ms Judith Gough, Ambassador of the United Kingdom
- H.E. Mr Marius Janukonis, Ambassador of Lithuania and
Minister Counsellor of the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania
- H.E. Ms Stoyana Rusinova, Ambassador of Bulgaria
- H.E. Mr Ole T. Horpestad, Ambassador of Norway
11:00-12:30 Meeting with Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, and members of his
team
14:15-15:15 Meeting with representatives of NGOs:
- Ms Tetiana Durneva, NGO “Public
holding”, Group of Influence
- Mr Olekiy Koshel, Head of Committee of Voters of Ukraine
- Ms Alina Popsuy, Committee of Voters of Ukraine
15:30-16:30 Meeting with representatives of the media:
- Ms Olga Yurkova, co-founder
of Stopfake.org
- Mr Oleksandr Burmagin, HR Platform
- Ms Diana Dutsyk, Executive Director, Detector Media
- Mr Igor Rozkladay, Centre of Democracy and Rule of Law
Thursday 7 March 2019
10:30-13:30 Consecutive meetings with representatives
of presidential candidates:
– Ms Yuliya Lovochkina, representing Mr Yuriy Boyko
– Mr Viktor Vovk, representing Mr Oleh Lyashko
– Ms Svitlana Zalishchuk, representing Mr Anatoliy Hrytsenko
15:00-15:45 Meeting with Mr Volodymyr Philenko, Adviser to
the Minister of the Interior of Ukraine, with the participation
of persons responsible for security during the campaign and on election
day
16:15-17:00 Meeting with Ms Tetiana Slipachuk, Chairperson
of the Central Election Commission (CEC), with the participation
of members of the CEC
18:00-19:00 Preparation of a statement
Appendix 4 – Statement
of the pre-electoral delegation
(open)
“General environment
in Ukraine should allow for the holding of democratic elections”
says PACE pre-electoral delegation in Kyiv
Strasbourg, 08.03.2019 – A delegation of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) was in Kyiv on 6 and 7
March to assess the pre-electoral climate ahead of the presidential
election in Ukraine, scheduled for 31 March.
The delegation,* led by Angela Smith (United Kingdom, SOC),
felt that the general environment was appropriate for the holding
of democratic elections. However, following discussions with various
interlocutors, it considered it necessary to stress that there was
still room for improvement and that the period of time left until
election day should allow for some progress to be made.
The delegation felt that the Central Election Committee (CEC)
acted professionally and was preparing the election well. However,
it considered that the unprecedentedly large number of presidential
candidates and domestic observers might impede the smooth conduct
of polling and raise a challenge on election day. Indeed, the right
for candidates to be represented on polling boards and for domestic
observers to be present within the polling stations could lead to
logistical difficulties on election day.
The delegation regrets that freedom of speech in Ukraine is
limited by the fact that the media, being mainly owned by oligarchs,
instead of presenting the pre-electoral environment in a balanced
manner, tend to function as public relation channels for individual
candidates.
Some of the candidates’ campaign rhetoric seems to lack references
to genuine political programmes, making it difficult for voters
to make an informed choice.
The delegation welcomed the active role played by civil society
during the pre-election period and recalled that civil society is
one of the main players in a true democracy and should be respected
as such. However, it expressed concern that a number of NGOs seem
to be affiliated to parties and/or candidates. It was also alarmed
to hear that known paramilitary entities have been registered as
domestic observers and have allegedly threatened to use force against
perceived infractions on election day.
The delegation heard allegations about the misuse of administrative
resources during the election campaign, in particular about the
blurring of the lines between presidential and campaign activities.
The delegation heard allegations of illegal expenditure during the
election campaign and underlined the need for complete transparency
concerning the campaign financing of all candidates.
It was also very concerned to hear allegations of intensive
efforts on the part of some candidates to establish vote-buying
systems.
The delegation also noted with regret the low number of women
candidates.
It acknowledged the efforts made by the Ukrainian authorities
to have a genuine election process and urged them to continue to
operate in accordance with European standards and best practices.
The legislative framework for the presidential elections is good
and, if applied in good faith, should lead to democratic elections.
It also hopes that the authorities will have sufficient means to
protect the electoral process against abuses and interferences of
any kind.
The PACE delegation was in Kyiv at the invitation of the Speaker
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It met with representatives of
presidential candidates, the Chair and members of the CEC, representatives
of the Minister of Internal Affairs, civil society and the media,
the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, and diplomats
based in Kyiv.
A 33-member delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe will arrive in Ukraine prior to the presidential
election to observe the vote.
*Members of the delegation: Angela Smith (United Kingdom,
SOC), Head of the Delegation; Egidijus Vareikis (Lithuania, EPP/CD);
Lord Simon Russell (United Kingdom, EC); Emilie Enger Mehl (Norway,
ALDE); Nagif Hamzayev (Azerbaijan, FDG); Alfred Heer (Switzerland,
ALDE), co-rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee
Appendix 5 – Programme
of the ad hoc committee – 1st round (29 March-1 April 2019)
(open)
Friday 29 March 2019
09:00-10:00 Meeting of the PACE delegation
Joint parliamentary briefings
10:30-10:45 Opening by the Heads of Parliamentary Delegations
- Mr Ilkka Kanerva Special Co-ordinator
and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, OSCE PA President
Emeritus
- Mr Stefan Schennach on behalf of Ms Angela Smith, Head
of the PACE Delegation
- Ms Doris Barnett, Head of the OSCE PA Delegation
- Mr Dariusz Rosati, Head of the European Parliament Delegation
- Mr Michal Szczerba, Head of the NATO PA Delegation
10:45-11:15 Introduction by local offices
- Ambassador Henrik Villadsen,
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine
- Mr Marten Ehnberg, Head of the Council of Europe Office
in Ukraine
- Ambassador Hugues Mingarelli, Head of the EU Delegation
to Ukraine
- Mr Alexander Vinnikov, Head of the NATO Representation
to Ukraine
11:15-13:00 Briefing by the ODIHR Election Observation Mission
- Welcome and overview of the
EOM's work – Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of Mission
- Political overview, the Contestants and the Election Campaign
– Mr Jarek Domański, Political Analyst
- Media Monitoring – Ms Francesca Boggeri, Media Analyst
- Legal Framework, Campaign Finance, Complaints and Appeals
– Ms Marla Morry, Legal Analyst
- Election Administration, Candidate Registration and Voter
Registration – Mr Kakha Inaishvili and Ms Caroline Gonthier, Election
Analysts
- Security – Mr László Belágyi, Security Expert
14:00-16:45 Consecutive meetings with representatives of presidential
candidates
– Mr Rostyslav Pavlenko, Deputy Campaign Director for presidential
candidate Petro Poroshenko
– Mr Hryhoriy Nemyria, MP, Chairperson of the Parliamentary
Committee on Human Rights, Deputy Head of All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”
(“Batkivshchyna”)
– Ms Zhanna Usenko-Chernata, Representative of Yulia Timoshenko’s
Campaign
– Mr Vadym Galaichuk, Representative in the nationwide election
district for Volodymyr Zelenskyi Campaign, People’s Servant
– Mr Oleksandr Korniyenko, Coordinator of the ZeTeam, Volodymyr
Zelenskyi Campaign
– Ms Yuliya Lovochkina and Mr Yuriy Myroshnychenko, MPs,
representatives of the Yuriy Boyko Campaign (self-nominated)
16:05-16:30 Mr Viktor Halasiuk, MP, Chairman of the Parliamentary
Committee on Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship, Deputy Leader
of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko on Economic Policy
17:00-17:45 Meeting with representatives of the Central Election
Commission of Ukraine
- Ms Tetiana
Slipachuk, Chairperson
18:00-19:00 Panel with representatives of civil society:
- Ms Natalia Novykova, Project
Manager, NGO “Civil Holding “Group of Influence”
- Mr Denys Rybachok, Analyst, Committee of Voters of Ukraine
- Mr Ihor Rozkladaj, Lawyer from the Media Law Institute,
Centre of Democracy and Rule of Law
- Ms Anastasiya Kozlovtseva, Head of International Relations,
Transparency International Ukraine
Saturday 30 March
2019
09:30-10:30 Panel with media representatives:
- Mr Yuriy Makarov, Member
of the Managing Board, National Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine
- Ms Angelina Kariakina, Editor-in-Chief, Hromadske TV
- Ms Olha Herasymiuk, First Deputy Chair, National Council of
Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine
- Ms Diana Dutsyk, Executive Director, Ukrainian Media and
Communication Institute
- Ms Natalia Ligachova, Head, Detector Media
10:30-11:30 Briefing by the ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Election day procedures and Statistical Analysis
- Mr Kakha Inaishvili and Ms Caroline
Gonthier, Election Analysts
STO Reporting
- Mr Anders Eriksson and Ms Karolina
Riedel, Statistical Analysts,
11:30-12:30 For members observing in and around Kyiv
- Area specific briefings by
the ODIHR Long-Term Observers for Kyiv and Kyiv Region
14:00-17:00 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the IEOM
Sunday 31 March 2019
All day: observation of the opening of the polling stations,
of the voting, of the counting and of the tabulation
21:00-23:00 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations
of the IEOM
Monday 1 April 2019
08:00-09:00 Debriefing meeting of the PACE delegation
09:30-11:30 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the IEOM
15:00 Press conference
Appendix 6 – Press release
of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) (1st round)
(open)
Ukraine election competitive,
but legal issues remain, international observers say
Strasbourg, 01.04.2019 – Sunday’s presidential election in
Ukraine was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned out
in large numbers. While the existing legal framework offers a sound
basis for holding democratic elections, it was often not implemented
in good faith by many stakeholders in the run-up to election day.
This negatively impacted trust in the election administration, the
enforcement of campaign finance rules, and the effective resolution
of election disputes, the international observers concluded in a
preliminary statement released today.
Fundamental freedoms were generally respected, and candidates
could campaign freely, but numerous indications of vote-buying and
the misuse of State resources undermined the credibility of the
process. The media landscape is diverse, but campaign coverage lacked
in-depth analysis and was often biased, the observers said.
“This competitive election has laid the groundwork for a vibrant
second round,” said Ilkka Kanerva, Special Co-ordinator and leader
of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “I hope that this will
encourage Ukraine to continue on its path of democratic development,
at peace and secure within its internationally recognized borders
in our community of European values.”
Election day was assessed positively overall, and paves the
way to the second round. Still, some procedural problems were noted
during the count, and conditions for tabulation were at times inadequate,
the statement says.
“We were pleased to see that the campaign was competitive
but believe, nevertheless, that there are key legal issues that
should be addressed as a matter of priority,” said Angela Smith
(United Kingdom, SOC), head of the delegation from the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). “PACE and the Council
of Europe’s Venice Commission hope to continue their close co-operation
with Ukraine in the field of democratic development.”
Doris Barnett, head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly, said: “Despite earlier concerns, election day was well
administered and without disturbances. The Ukrainian people deserve
praise for the conduct of these elections” she said. “I have high
expectations that the results, once confirmed, will be recognised,
and that the second round will be just as peaceful, orderly and
efficient.”
The election is taking place in the context of ongoing armed
conflict and other hostilities in the east of the country and the
illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation.
As a consequence, the election could not be organised in Crimea
and certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are controlled
by illegal armed groups.
“What I observed was a free choice by free people. Ukrainians
demonstrated their strong commitment to democratic and Euro-Atlantic
values. I saw the enthusiasm of citizens of all ages participating
in the election process in impressive numbers,” said Michal Szczerba,
Head of the delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. “However, I
sincerely regret that not all could vote because Russia has illegally
annexed Crimea and continues its military aggression in eastern
Ukraine. The NATO PA will continue to assist Ukraine’s path of reforms
and support its aspiration to join our Alliance.”
The election campaign was competitive and generally peaceful.
However, there was lack of genuine political debate among the contestants.
The overwhelming majority of the 39 candidates did not conduct any
campaign activities, casting doubt on their intention to genuinely
compete in the election.
Several candidates, on the other hand, campaigned throughout
the country. Incumbent President Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko
were most active, with Poroshenko’s extensive tours around the country blurring
the line between his official position and campaign activities.
Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who received the most votes in the first round,
did not hold a single traditional campaign rally.
There was widespread criticism that the incumbent president
used social assistance programmes, salary increases and other financial
incentives as campaign tools. At the same time, ODIHR election monitors observed
the abuse of State resources at the national and local levels by
several candidates. More than 80 criminal investigations into alleged
vote-buying have been launched, including two alleged nationwide schemes
focusing on the campaigns of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, respectively.
Rights and freedoms that underpin democratic elections are
guaranteed in the constitution. The legal framework remains largely
unchanged since the 2014 presidential election. Efforts at electoral
reform were inconclusive, and most previous recommendations by ODIHR
and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, including the crucial
need to codify electoral legislation, remain unaddressed. Positively,
the right of individuals to lodge constitutional complaints, introduced
in 2016, allowed citizens and political parties for the first time
to challenge election-related legislation.
“We have been here for eight weeks now, looking at all aspects
of the election. There are loopholes in the laws, and these should
not be abused,” said Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the election
observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights. “It is important that stakeholders now implement
the law in good faith. This will help build trust in the election
administration and help to ensure a fair campaign.”
The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits
censorship. Nevertheless, the government has introduced a number
of restrictive measures affecting the activities of the media and
journalists, citing threats to national security. The media landscape
is diverse but largely divided along political lines. The business
and political interests of the owners affect the autonomy of private
media outlets and the general trust in them. The public broadcaster
is severely underfunded, which affects its ability to fully perform
its public-service role.
There was also criticism of hastily adopted changes to the
law on the Central Election Commission, particularly from civil
society, which claimed that the amendments exclusively benefited
the current president. This led to doubts from many sides about
the Commission’s impartiality.
The State Voter Register contains the records of some 35.6
million voters. Despite some concerns about difficulties to adequately
capture data on internally displaced persons (IDPs), internal labour
migrants and citizens living abroad, there was general confidence
in the accuracy of the voter lists.
The law provides for election observation by international
and citizen observers: candidate and party observers were seen in
almost all polling stations, and citizen observers in around one
half. However, in light of the designation by parliament of the
Russian Federation as an aggressor State, a recent amendment to
the election laws effectively prohibited citizens of the Russian
Federation and/or people whose nomination was initiated or submitted
by the Russian Federation from observing elections in Ukraine. This
is at odds with OSCE commitments.
Appendix 7 – Programme
of the ad hoc committee – 2nd round (20-22
April 2019)
(open)
Saturday 20 April
2019
11:00-12:00 Internal briefing for the PACE ad hoc
committee
Joint parliamentary briefings
12:30-14:00 Briefing by the ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Welcome – Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of Mission
Post-Election Political Developments, the Election Campaign
and Media Environment for the second round – Mr Jarek Domański,
Political Analyst, and Ms Francesca Boggeri, Media Analyst
Election Administration preparations for the second round
and Election day procedures – Mr Kakha Inaishvili and Ms Caroline
Gonthier, Election Analysts
STO Reporting – Mr Anders Eriksson and Ms Karolina Riedel,
Statistical Analysts
14:00-15:00 Meeting with Ms Natalia Bernatska, Secretary of
the Central Election Commission of Ukraine
15:00-16:00 Meetings with representatives of presidential
candidates:
15:00-15:30 Petro Poroshenko campaign representatives:
- Mr Sergiy Berezenko,
MP, Deputy Campaign Director
- Mr Maksym Savrasov, MP, Deputy Campaign Director
- Mr Sergiy Alekseev, MP, Campaign Legal Advisor
15:30-16:00 Mr Vadym Galaichuk, Lawyer, representative in
the nationwide election district for the Volodymyr Zelenskiy campaign,
People’s Servant
16:00-17:00 Meeting with media representatives
- Ms Olha Herasymiuk,
First Deputy Chair, National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council
- Mr Yuriy Makarov, Member of the Managing Board, UA: Public
Broadcasting Company
- Ms Angelina Kariakina, Editor-in-Chief, Hromadske TV
- Ms Diana Dutsyk, Executive Director, Ukrainian Media and
Communication Institute
- Ms Olha Yurkova, Cofounder, Stopfake.org
- Ms Natalia Ligachova, Head, Detector Media
17:00-18:00 Panel with Representatives of civil society:
- Ms Natalia Novykova,
Project manager, NGO “Civil Holding Group of Influence”
- Ms Alina Popsui, Expert, Committee of voters of Ukraine
- Mr Taras Shevchenko, Director, Centre for Democracy and
Rule of Law
- Dr Violeta Moskalu, Founder, Head of Board, Global Ukraine
Foundation
18:00 Kyiv and Kyiv region long-term observer teams available
to answer questions
Meetings with drivers and interpreters
19:00-20:30 Meeting of the heads of delegation of the IEOM
Sunday 21 April 2019
07:30-08:00 Observation of the opening of the polling
stations
08:00-20:00 Observation of the voting process
20:00 onwards Observation of the counting
Monday 22 April 2019
08:00-09:00 PACE delegation internal debriefing
09:30-11:30 Meeting of the Heads of Delegation of the IEOM
15:00-16:30 Press conference
Appendix 8 – Press release
of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) (2nd round)
(open)
Fundamental freedoms
respected in competitive Ukraine election, though campaign lacked
genuine discussion of issues, international observers say
Kyiv, 22.04.2019 – The presidential election in Ukraine was
competitive and held with respect for fundamental freedoms, the
international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released
today. The orderly transfer of power should offer the opportunity
for strengthening democratic institutions and their accountability, although
the campaign for both rounds lacked genuine discussion of issues
of public concern, the statement says.
The media landscape and campaign coverage reflected the dominance
of economic interests in public and political life, the observers
said. The runoff was well-organized, despite operational challenges
and a limited time frame. The legal framework still contains shortcomings,
and there was little will to resolve electoral complaints in a way
that would guarantee effective remedy. Election day was assessed
positively by the observers and, despite a few procedural problems,
there was a marked improvement in the conduct of the counting and
tabulation over the first round, the statement says. The incumbent
conceded defeat shortly after the polls closed.
“The democratic and
orderly transfer of power we witnessed yesterday is a great achievement
by the Ukrainian people and paves the way for renewed efforts to
advance necessary reforms to address burning issues and provide
good governance. I thank my colleagues from different international
institutions for their readiness to support this process,” said
George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term
OSCE observer mission. “The authorities now have to seize the opportunity
the citizens have offered them to provide the economic and security
conditions in which to realize their aspirations.”
The election took place in the context of ongoing armed conflict
and other hostilities in the east of the country and the illegal
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. As
a consequence, the election could not be organised in Crimea and
certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are controlled
by illegal armed groups.
“The Ukrainian people demonstrated very clearly yesterday
their commitment to securing change through the democratic process,”
said Angela Smith, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. “Every effort should be made
to facilitate in the future the voting rights of those Ukrainian citizens
whose ability to cast their vote was seriously compromised by excessive
administrative requirements.”
Doris Barnett, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly, said: “I am pleased that free elections are becoming the
norm in Ukraine and that the people are making use of their right
to vote. This election demonstrates that democracy in Ukraine has
become more stable. I trust that the new political dynamics in the
country can fulfil the high expectations of the voters. Now the
country needs to focus on further economic development.”
Rebecca Harms, Head of the delegation from the European Parliament,
said: “I would like to congratulate the citizens of Ukraine for
their deep commitment to democracy, demonstrated in competitive
elections in which they had a free choice. We also welcome the statesmanship
demonstrated by the incumbent in accepting the democratic choice
of Ukrainians on election night, even after the heated campaign.
I sincerely regret that many Ukrainians could not vote because Russia
has illegally annexed Crimea and the aggression continues in Eastern
Ukraine. The European Parliament encourages and supports the incoming
president in continuing, and even strengthening reform efforts,
mainly in fighting corruption and poverty.”
The candidates did not conduct large-scale campaign rallies
between the rounds, and campaigning was predominantly conducted
on television, in online media and social networks, and through
billboards and posters. Increased tensions between the two sides
were reflected in massive and systematic negative campaigning and
harsh mutual accusations, the statement says. There was a marked
difference in the character of the conventional campaign of the
incumbent, Petro Poroshenko, and that of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, which
was conducted to a large extent by proxies and put little emphasis
on his campaign platform.
Overall, the private television channels monitored provided
imbalanced and biased coverage. The public broadcaster divided its
prime-time news coverage equally between the two contestants. Zelenskyi
largely avoided participating in campaign-related programming and
coverage.
The misuse of State resources, both at the national and local
levels, continued during the second round, the observers said. There
remain a number of ongoing investigations into alleged vote-buying
by Poroshenko’s campaign.
Despite time constraints, the Central Election Commission
(CEC) handled preparations efficiently and met legal deadlines.
The election laws regulate some but not all aspects of a second
round, and the remaining gaps were not addressed by the CEC. It
continued to hold regular open sessions, but also went on holding preliminary
meetings before the sessions, which decreased transparency, the
statement says.
“The runoff was organized well, but there is still a need
to enhance the electoral legislation and practice,” said Ambassador
Peter Tejler, Head of the election observation mission from the
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “A genuine
political debate and concrete steps to further improve elections
will strengthen accountability of democratic institutions.”
Voter lists were updated to reflect changes between the rounds,
and voters had a brief window to check their data online and to
request corrections. Those who needed to temporarily change their
place of voting had to submit new requests, even if they had already
done so for the first round. This represents an unnecessary burden,
especially for internally displaced persons, voters abroad and persons
with disabilities, the observers said.
The CEC received seven complaints during the second-round
period, all of which were denied consideration on technical grounds.
All 11 cases lodged against the CEC and candidates in administrative
court between the rounds were ruled inadmissible or dismissed, depriving
complainants of access to effective remedy and undermining the transparency
of the dispute resolution process.
All candidates eliminated in the first round submitted their
final campaign finance reports by the legal deadline, and the two
runoff candidates submitted their interim finance reports. No violations
have been identified on the basis of these interim reports, and
the official analyses of all final reports will be published at
a later date. Both second-round campaigns were partly financed from
sources other than the candidates’ legal campaign fund accounts.
