1. Origin
of the procedure and scope of the present report
1. The proposal to put into place
a complementary joint reaction procedure between the two statutory organs
in response to a serious violation by a member State of its statutory
obligations was raised during the Finnish Presidency of the Committee
of Ministers (November 2018-May 2019) and was endorsed by both the Assembly
and the Committee of Ministers in April and May 2019 respectively.
The main idea behind this initiative is that a joint action by the
two statutory organs and the Secretary General of the Organisation
will not only enhance the legitimacy and credibility of their action,
but also the impact and relevance of any measures to be taken, both
in relation to the member State concerned and the Council of Europe
as a whole, without prejudice to each organ’s existing separate
powers and responsibilities.
2. More specifically, the Assembly, with the adoption of
Resolution 2277 (2019) and
Recommendation 2153
(2019) “Role and Mission of the Parliamentary Assembly: main
challenges for the future”, on 10 April 2019, noted that there was
“urgent need to develop synergies and provide for joint action by
the two statutory organs in order to strengthen the Organisation’s
ability to react more effectively in situations where a member State
violates its statutory obligations or does not respect the fundamental
principles and values upheld by the Council of Europe.”
3. Thus the Assembly, welcoming the fact that contacts and dialogue
with the Committee of Ministers had intensified at different levels
and in different formats, proposed to the Committee of Ministers
to “put into place [in situations where a member State violates
its statutory obligations or does not respect the fundamental principles
and values upheld by the Council of Europe], in addition, a joint
response procedure which could be triggered by either the Parliamentary
Assembly, the Committee of Ministers or the Secretary General and
in which all three of them would participate”. The Assembly text
develops in more detail the proposed step-by-step process, within
strict timeframes.
4. One month later, meeting on 17 May 2019 in Helsinki, the Ministers,
in their
Decision “A shared responsibility for democratic security in
Europe – Ensuring respect for rights and obligations, principles, standards
and values” noted the same “urgent need” as the Assembly and, building
upon their 1994 “
Declaration
on compliance with commitments accepted by member States of the
Council of Europe”, instructed their Deputies “to develop – in co-operation
with the Parliamentary Assembly – a clearly defined complementary
procedure, which could be initiated by either the Parliamentary
Assembly, the Committee of Ministers or the Secretary General, and
in which all three of them would participate.”
5. The Ministers, taking into consideration Assembly
Recommendation 2153 (2019), “agreed further that such a co-ordinated response,
carried out in a constructive manner, encouraging member States,
through dialogue and co-operation, to take all appropriate measures
to conform with the principles of the Statute, will include a number
of concrete and well-defined steps, with a strict time frame fixed
for each step by common agreement of the three parties, and may
ultimately lead to a decision to act under Articles 8 or 9 of the
Statute, which lies with the Committee of Ministers.”
6. At its June 2019 part-session, the Assembly, in turn, welcomed
the positive reception by the Committee of Ministers of its call
for an enhanced political dialogue between the two statutory organs
and its encouraging support for the proposal to set up, in addition
to existing procedures, a joint procedure of reaction, resolved
to immediately start working on the establishment of such a joint
mechanism, which should be politically impartial and effective and
expressed its firm commitment to making this proposal operational
as soon as possible. It did so on two occasions: on 24 June, when
adopting
Resolution 2287
(2019) “Strengthening the decision-making process of the Parliamentary
Assembly concerning credentials and voting”, whereby it invited
the parliaments of Council of Europe member States which were not
represented by a delegation to the Assembly to present credentials
of their representatives and substitutes; and two days later, when
adopting
Resolution 2292
(2019) “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still ungratified
credentials of the parliamentary delegation of the Russian Federation”,
whereby it ratified the credentials of the Russian delegation expecting
that its clear offer of dialogue would be accepted and would lead
to concrete results.
7. In the meantime, discussions on the complementary joint procedure
in and between the two statutory organs continued under the French
Presidency either in the format of the Joint Committee or as part
of informal exchanges of views between the Assembly Presidential
Committee and the Bureau of the Committee of Ministers, with the
participation of the former and current Secretary General. Implementation
of this procedure was a priority of the French Presidency as also
highlighted by the President of the French Republic in his address
to the Assembly on 1 October 2019 and in the context of the 70th anniversary
of the Organisation. Thus, contacts and dialogue between the two
statutory organs have continued to intensify over the last 6 months.
Furthermore, the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy has
discussed this issue in the context of the follow-up to
Resolution 2277 (2019) in each of its meetings held after its adoption.
8. The secretariats of the two statutory organs jointly prepared
a “non-paper” (dated 23 July 2019) with a view to defining the practical
modalities for the complementary joint procedure. This non-paper
was submitted to and discussed by the chairpersons of national delegations
and the Presidential Committee on 2 October 2019 and was subsequently
sent to national delegations for written comments by 25 October.
It was also submitted to and discussed by the Joint Committee on
3 October 2019. A further consultation with the chairpersons of
national delegations and the Presidential Committee was held on
28 November 2019 in Strasbourg.
9. For their part, the Ministers’ Deputies held several informal
meetings, under the French Presidency, to discuss the practical
modalities of the complementary joint procedure and an informal
exchange of views between the Bureau of the Committee of Ministers,
the Presidential Committee and the Secretary General of the Organisation
took place on 15 November 2019 in Berlin.
10. To reflect the political will to approve the complementary
joint procedure by January 2020 and make it operational as soon
as possible, the Bureau of the Assembly, when drawing up the preliminary
draft agenda for the January 2020 part-session of the Assembly at
its meeting on 4 October 2019, envisaged a possible debate on this
matter during that part-session.
11. To allow such a debate to take place, thus providing all Assembly
members the opportunity to discuss, in an open and transparent manner,
the modalities of the procedure, a motion for resolution and/or recommendation
was adopted by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
at its meeting on 14 November 2019 in Berlin. The committee agreed
to consider a draft report on the new motion for possible adoption
at its meeting on 9 December 2019 (subject to referral of this motion
to the committee by the Bureau of the Assembly) and appointed me
as rapporteur. The Bureau of the Assembly referred the motion to
the committee on 28 November 2019 and the following day this reference
was ratified by the Standing Committee. A debate on this matter
was included by the Bureau of the Assembly in the preliminary draft
agenda of the January 2020 part-session.
12. On 25 November 2019, with the French Presidency coming to
an end, Ms Amélie de Montchalin, French Secretary of State for European
Affairs, transmitted to the President of the Assembly, Ms Liliane
Maury Pasquier, a draft decision by the Ministers’ Deputies “which
enjoys a very broad support within the Committee of Ministers and
could serve as a basis for an agreement with the Parliamentary Assembly”.
Referring to the Committee of Ministers extensive work “to define
the principles and practical arrangements for the complementary
joint reaction procedure” and “the close dialogue with the Parliamentary
Assembly”, the French Secretary of State underlined that “the objective
is for us, working together, to be stronger and more effective in
ensuring that all member States fully honour their commitments and
duties”. The French Secretary of State, confirming the Committee
of Ministers’ readiness to continue the dialogue with the Parliamentary
Assembly as an essential precondition for the efficient functioning
of the Council of Europe, asked the President of the Assembly to
forward this draft decision to the members of the Assembly, including
myself as rapporteur of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy.
13. As the principled decision to set up a complementary joint
response procedure between the two statutory organs has already
been taken by the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, the present
report, including the draft resolution, primarily aims at proposing
practical modalities for the implementation of the procedure. Some
of them concern both statutory organs and the Secretary General,
others concern the internal functioning of the Assembly. It is understood
that any political decisions taken by the Assembly when debating
the present report will be translated into its Rules of Procedure
on the basis of a subsequent report and resolution to be prepared
by the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional
Affairs.
14. The title of the report and of the procedure it aims to regulate
reflects the title of the procedure as elaborated by the Ministers’
Deputies with one addition: the adjective “joint”, included in the
initial proposal by the Assembly in its
Resolution 2277 (2019) and
Recommendation
2153 (2019) and reiterated by the French Secretary State for European
Affairs, in her letter dated 25 November 2019, is an essential element
of the proposed procedure which aims at responding to the need for
synergy between the two statutory organs.
2. Basic principles
15. Following informal discussions
within the Ministers’ Deputies and between their Bureau, the Presidential Committee
of the Assembly and the former and current Secretary General of
the Council of Europe, a number of basic principles are included
in the draft decision by the Ministers’ Deputies transmitted to
the President of the Assembly by the French Secretary of State for
European Affairs. In my view, they should be supplemented by some
additional elements, mainly for reasons of clarity or institutional
balance, and then endorsed by the Assembly. More specifically:
i. the primary aim of the complementary
joint procedure is to bring a member State, through constructive dialogue
and co-operation, into compliance with the obligations and principles
of the Organisation, and avoid imposing sanctions;
ii. this procedure, of an exceptional nature, is complementary
to existing rules and regulations, building upon the 1994
Declaration on compliance with commitments accepted by member States
of the Council of Europe, and its implementation will not require
any changes to the Statute. It will not affect existing procedures
arising from statutory or conventional control mechanisms, neither
will it affect the existing Assembly’s monitoring procedure;
iii. an underlying requirement is the conformity with existing
roles and mandates of the two statutory organs, as well as the Secretary
General;
iv. the procedure will address only the most serious violations
of fundamental principles and values enshrined in the Statute of
the Council of Europe;
v. the procedure can be initiated by either the Committee
of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly or the Secretary General,
and all three parties will participate in it;
vi. the procedure will include a number of concrete and well-defined
steps, with a strict timeframe fixed for each step by common agreement
of the three parties;
vii. before taking any decision throughout the process, any
of the three parties will consult the other two. The active involvement
of the member State concerned in all stages of the process is necessary
as the aim of the procedure is to return, through constructive dialogue
and co-operation, to a situation in which the member State concerned
respects the obligations and principles of the Organisation;
viii. it is a primary responsibility of any member State having
violated the statutory obligations to take steps towards resolving
the situation;
ix. the procedure may ultimately lead to a decision to act
under Article 8 of the Statute, which in all aspects lies with the
Committee of Ministers, after prior consultation of the Parliamentary
Assembly, in line with Statutory Resolution (51)30. The
procedure does not preclude the direct implementation by the Committee
of Ministers of Article 8, as provided in the Statute. Neither
does it preclude the possibility for the Assembly to ask the Committee
of Ministers, through a recommendation, to directly act under Article
8 of the Statute.
16. It has also been suggested that the procedure will be:
- credible: it must be a useful
tool, that can be implemented in practice, and that is seen as a
relevant and credible response to the crisis that attempts are being
made to resolve;
- predictable: the various steps of the procedure need to
be sufficiently predictable and clear to allow the Committee of
Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary General
to follow concrete and well-defined steps, as stipulated by the
Helsinki Ministerial Decision. This is also of particular importance for
the member State concerned and will help make the procedure more
efficient;
- reactive: the procedure needs to provide enough time for
dialogue with the member State concerned on all necessary issues,
with due regard to the need to react quickly to events, and to avoid
inconclusive or indeterminate discussions;
- reversible: it will be important to develop a well-defined
exit-strategy, that also foresees how the procedure can be terminated
at each step of the procedure, if the member State concerned takes appropriate
steps to rectify the situation.
3. The
steps of the complementary joint procedure
3.1. The
procedure is initiated
17. As agreed in Assembly
Resolution 2277 (2019) and
Recommendation
2153 (2019) and in the Helsinki Ministerial Decision, and in line
with the above-mentioned basic principles, the complementary joint
procedure can be initiated by either the Committee of Ministers,
the Parliamentary Assembly or the Secretary General. Both statutory
organs thus obtain a right to decide autonomously to initiate the
procedure.
18. Whereas the Secretary General can initiate the procedure on
the basis of a motivated decision, the Committee of Ministers and
the Assembly should follow pre-established rules and procedures
while relevant majorities have to be defined to exclude cases of
abuse and limit the use of the procedure to those cases which have
the genuine support of members.
3.1.1. Initiation
of the procedure by the Committee of Ministers
19. There seems to be agreement
within the Ministers’ Deputies that a decision by the Committee
of Ministers to initiate the procedure, as proposed by a member
State or a group of member States, will require a two thirds majority,
according to Article 20d of the Statute of the Council of Europe.
3.1.2. Initiation
of the procedure by the Assembly
20. If it is the Assembly which
initiates the procedure, the fact that, by doing so, the Assembly
engages the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General in
a joint action with respect to the situation in a member State,
which may lead to action under Article 8 of the Statute, implies
that this should be done with the relevant degree of rigour and
legitimacy. This requirement has also been confirmed in consultations
held with the chairpersons of national delegations and the Presidential
Committee. In this respect, four questions have to be considered:
Who can propose that the Assembly initiates the complementary joint
procedure? Which committee should be seized for report? Under what
voting modalities can the Assembly decide to initiate the complementary
joint procedure? On what grounds?
- Who can propose that the Assembly initiates
the complementary joint procedure?
21. In my view, and this seems to be confirmed in the consultations
with the chairpersons of national delegations and the Presidential
Committee, it is important to avoid any attempt to manipulate the
initiation of the complementary joint procedure on political grounds.
22. This is why I would draw analogy from the recently agreed
Rules of Procedure for the dismissal of the President of the Assembly,
which provide for the highest threshold foreseen at present in our
Rules of Procedure for signing a motion (see Rule 54.3). I would
therefore propose that, to initiate the complementary joint procedure
between the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly
in response to a serious violation by a member State of its statutory
obligations, we would need a motion signed by at least 1/5 of the component
members (representatives and substitutes) of the Assembly belonging
to at least 3 political groups and 15 national delegations. If we
take into consideration the statutory number of members of the Assembly, that
is 648 (324 representatives +324 substitutes),
this
means that such motion would need to be signed by at least 130 members
(whether representatives or substitutes) belonging to at least 3
political groups and 15 national delegations. If this requirement
is considered necessary for initiating a motion to dismiss the President
of the Assembly, we cannot require less for engaging the complementary
joint procedure with the other statutory organ and the Secretary
General vis-à-vis a member State. This should be the only means through
which the complementary joint procedure could be initiated by the
Assembly.
- Which committee should be seized for report?
23. Initiating the complementary joint procedure should be done
through a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers.
24. Once a motion to initiate the complementary joint procedure
is tabled under the above-mentioned conditions, a committee should
be seized to prepare and submit to the Assembly the relevant report,
including a draft recommendation in favour or against the initiation
of the procedure.
25. Following discussions in the Presidential Committee and with
the chairpersons of national delegations, my proposal would be that,
for reasons of clarity, transparency and equality, the committee
to be seized for report in such case should be decided by the Assembly
once and for all and not on an ad hoc basis, upon a proposal by
the Bureau, which could differ from one case to another. Then, the
question is of course which committee should be pre-determined to
deal with motions proposing the initiation of the complementary
joint procedure.
26. My proposal is that the Assembly should entrust this task
to the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy for two main
reasons, one with respect to its composition and one with respect
to its terms of reference. This committee is in fact composed of
representatives of all national delegations, including both the majority
and opposition, as well as ex officio all
group leaders. It is its task to report on urgent political situations and
crisis in Council of Europe member States and the circumstances
authorising the initiation of the complementary joint procedure
vis-à-vis a member State are surely close to what can be described
as a “crisis” (see also below under iv). It is also this committee
which is responsible for considering requests for accession of States
and preparing the relevant Assembly Opinion in response to the Committee
of Ministers, in line with Statutory Resolution (51)30. It should
therefore, by analogy, be the best placed committee to also liaise
with the Committee of Ministers in the context of the complementary
joint procedure.
27. I could not agree with those who suggest that the pre-determined
committee to prepare the report to initiate the complementary joint
procedure should be the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations
and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee), not only because of its composition and special rules
of its functioning (the Monitoring Committee is composed of representatives
of political groups with no guarantee that all national delegations
will be represented, its meetings are held in camera,
reports are prepared by two co-rapporteurs etc.) but mainly because
the procedure the present report is envisaging is a “complementary”
one, of an “exceptional nature”, aimed at bringing together the
two statutory organs and the Secretary General “to address only
the most serious violations”. It should thus not affect existing
procedures, such as the Assembly’s monitoring procedure. It would
be confusing and could endanger the existing monitoring procedure
of the Assembly if the decision to initiate the “complementary”
procedure was entrusted to the committee which is competent for
the Assembly’s monitoring procedure.
28. If it is agreed by the Assembly that the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy will be automatically seized for report on
motions proposing to initiate the complementary joint procedure,
then, once such a motion is tabled, the Table Office, after verifying
that the motion is signed by 1/5 of members (representatives or
substitutes) representing at least 3 political groups and 15 national
delegations, will send it directly to the chairperson of this committee
who will then have to place the item on the agenda of the next committee
meeting for the appointment of rapporteur. There will thus be no
need to wait for this motion to be considered by the Presidential
Committee, the Bureau and the Assembly or the Standing Committee.
29. The rapporteur will have to prepare a draft report, including
a preliminary draft recommendation on whether or not to initiate
the complementary joint procedure, for the next meeting of the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy following the appointment. Once
the report is adopted by the committee, the Assembly will have to
debate it at its following part-session. If the Assembly sets these
rules, there will be no risk that the consideration of whether to
propose to the Assembly to initiate the complementary joint procedure
will last unnecessarily long. Of course, the above-mentioned decisions,
if taken, will have to be translated into the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly.
- Under what voting modalities can the Assembly
decide to initiate the complementary joint procedure?
30. As said above, the Assembly will decide to initiate the complementary
joint procedure by way of a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers.
As for the adoption of any recommendation, this decision will thus
require the majority of two thirds of the votes cast (see Rule 41.a).
31. To ensure a higher threshold for such a politically important
decision, both for the member State concerned and the Organisation
as a whole and, as also said above, to enhance the legitimacy and
credibility of this decision, I would propose a double majority
condition, namely: the relevant recommendation should be adopted
with a two thirds majority of the votes cast (total of “yes” or
“no” votes as in the calculation of votes cast only affirmative
and negative votes count) and with no less than one third of the
total number of members entitled to vote (108 voting in favour out
of a total number of 324 members of the Assembly authorised to vote if
we take into consideration the statutory number of members of the
Assembly). This means that a decision to initiate the complementary
joint procedure, with all the consequences that this implies for
the member State concerned and the Organisation, will under no circumstances
be taken with less than 108 votes in favour. At the same time, if
a higher number of members participate in the vote, a two thirds
majority will require a higher number of votes in favour. For instance,
if 210 members cast their vote (total of “yes” or “no” votes), at
least 140 members have to vote in favour to initiate the complementary
joint procedure.
32. Moreover, with the addition of this double majority condition,
there is no need to discuss the quorum condition. In fact, the requirement
of a quorum plays into the hands of those who do not show up in
the Chamber or decide (even at the last moment) not to participate
in the vote. What we want to achieve with the double majority condition
is, on the contrary, to encourage participation as the ultimate
aim is to enhance legitimacy and credibility of the Assembly decision
on whether or not to initiate the complementary joint procedure.
33. According to the wording of the earlier Assembly decisions
(
Resolution 2277 (2019) and
Recommendation
2153 (2019)) and the Helsinki Ministerial Decision, the complementary
joint procedure is to be initiated as a response to situations where
a member State “violates its statutory obligations or does not respect
the standards, fundamental principles and values upheld by the Council
of Europe”.
34. Taking into account that such procedure may ultimately lead
to a decision to act under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council
of Europe, which requires a “serious violation of Article 3 of the
Statute” and in light of its complementary and exceptional nature,
it has already been suggested in the above mentioned “basic principles”
that “only the most serious violations of fundamental principles
and values enshrined in the Statute of the Council of Europe” can
justify the decision to initiate the complementary joint procedure
by either of the two statutory organs or the Secretary General.
Rule 8.2 of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure also refers to a “serious
violation of the basic principles of the Council of Europe mentioned
in Article 3 of, and the Preamble to, the Statute.”
35. Each statutory organ or the Secretary General, before deciding
to initiate the complementary joint procedure, will have to assess
the seriousness of the violations of fundamental principles and
values. I would be against the idea of trying to provide a detailed
or exhaustive list of possible violations or more precise definitions.
The majorities needed to initiate the procedure by either statutory
organ, as described above, provide enough safeguards against misuse
and attempts to overregulate could eventually make it impossible to
initiate the procedure.
3.2. The
first step: a joint high-level mission to the member State in question
36. Immediately after any of the
parties has initiated the procedure, a meeting of the Chairperson
of the Committee of Ministers, the President of the Parliamentary
Assembly and the Secretary General will take place, followed by
a joint high-level mission to the member State in question to discuss
the concerns that led to the initiation of the procedure and to
seek clarification of the situation. They will thereafter report
back on the outcome of the mission to the two statutory organs.
37. As mentioned above, it is clear that, in line with the letter
and spirit of both the decisions adopted by the Assembly and the
Helsinki Ministerial Decision, if either of the two statutory organs
or the Secretary General initiates the complementary joint procedure,
this decision will automatically engage the other two parties in
this first step of the complementary joint procedure, that is the
organisation of a joint high-level mission to the member State concerned.
38. At the same time, it is suggested as part of the “basic principles”
governing the complementary joint procedure (see above), that the
procedure should be “reversible” in the sense that there is a need
to develop a well-defined exit-strategy, that also foresees how
the procedure can be terminated at each step, if the member State
concerned takes appropriate steps to rectify the situation.
39. Following discussions between the Bureau of the Committee
of Ministers, the Presidential Committee and the Secretary General,
and in conformity with existing roles and mandates of the two statutory
organs and the Secretary General, it is suggested that the decision
to terminate the complementary joint procedure, once the first step
– that is the joint high-level mission to the member State in question
– has taken place and if the member State concerned takes appropriate
steps to rectify the situation, lies with the Committee of Ministers, which
will have first to consult the Assembly and the Secretary General.
40. However, in the draft decision as discussed by the Ministers’
Deputies and transmitted to the President of the Assembly by the
French Secretary of State for European Affairs, it is provided that,
on the basis of the outcome of the joint high-level mission, the
Committee of Ministers, having consulted the Assembly and the Secretary
General, will decide, by a two-thirds majority according to Article
20d of the Statute, “on moving to the second step of the procedure”.
41. It could be a misunderstanding, but such wording seems to
fail to reflect earlier discussions between the Bureau of the Committee
of Ministers and the Presidential Committee and does not seem to
be in line with the above-mentioned “basic principle” on the reversibility
of the procedure because the decision that the Committee of Ministers
is called upon to take, following the joint high-level mission,
with a two thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote
(and a majority of the representatives entitled to sit in the Committee
of Ministers, see Article 20d of the Statute), is no longer about
the termination of the procedure (the so-called “exit-strategy”),
but on whether the procedure can “move on to the second step”. This
means that one third of the representatives of the member States
casting a vote plus one (for instance 16 out of 47 representatives
in case there are no abstentions) can block the decision to move
on to the second step and thus “terminate” the complementary joint
procedure. Whereas it is not for the Assembly to express any position
on the majorities by which the Committee of Ministers will take
its decisions, what is put into question here is the content of
the decision on which the Committee of Ministers is called upon
to vote. I therefore propose a wording in the preliminary draft
resolution which I think reflects better the letter and spirit of
earlier decisions by the Assembly as well as the Helsinki Ministerial
Decision. The proposed wording also covers the situation in which
there is simply no decision at all by the Committee of Ministers.
42. As regards the Assembly’s “consultation” by the Committee
of Ministers following the joint high-level mission, it can take
place through the debate and adoption of the Bureau’s progress report.
It is suggested in particular that, following this mission to the
member State concerned, the President of the Assembly will report to
the Bureau on the outcome of the mission. On the basis of the President’s
report, the Bureau will decide what opinion to give to the Committee
of Ministers on whether the procedure can be terminated, in case
the State takes appropriate steps to rectify the situation, or,
in the absence of any significant positive progress, move on to
the second step of the procedure, namely the elaboration and adoption
of a joint Roadmap with respect to the State concerned.
43. In the latter case, the report by the President of the Assembly
to the Bureau on the outcome of the joint mission may also include
proposals for the Roadmap to be subsequently developed by the Secretary
General.
44. The President’s report on the outcome of the joint mission,
including any proposals for the Roadmap, will be appended to the
Bureau’s progress report and debated by the Assembly in the context
of the debate and vote on the Bureau’s progress report.
45. It is proposed that the joint high-level mission to the member
State in question is concluded within 4 weeks of the decision of
any of the three parties to initiate the procedure.
3.3. The
second step: adoption and implementation of the joint Roadmap
3.3.1. Adoption
of the Roadmap
46. Upon proposals by the Committee
of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, and after consultations with
the member State concerned, the Secretary General will prepare and
submit to the two statutory organs a Roadmap, co-ordinating the
various proposed measures. The Roadmap will contain concrete actions,
with strict time frames, which the member State concerned should
take, and it will list initiatives and activities proposed and planned
by the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the
Secretary General respectively. Initiatives and activities proposed
and planned by different Assembly committees, by monitoring or advisory
bodies of the Organisation or by the Office of the Human Rights
Commissioner, that would help bringing the member State concerned
into compliance with the obligations and principles of the Organisation, could
be integrated in the Roadmap.
47. Following the submission of the Roadmap by the Secretary General,
the Parliamentary Assembly and, finally, the Committee of Ministers
will examine and adopt the Roadmap, according to their respective
rules of procedure.
48. The consideration and approval of the Roadmap by the Assembly
can take place through the debate and adoption of its Bureau’s progress
report. The Secretary General will present the Roadmap to the Bureau of
the Assembly as soon as it is prepared and will seek its approval.
It is understood that it is not up to the Bureau to modify the Roadmap
but to propose to the Assembly to either approve it or reject it.
Its proposal will be included, together with the Roadmap, in its
progress report and the Assembly will have the opportunity to approve
or reject it when adopting its Bureau’s progress report.
49. If approved by the Assembly, the Roadmap will be examined
and adopted by the Committee of Ministers; if rejected, there should
be new consultations to revise it.
50. It is proposed that the Roadmap is prepared and submitted
to the Bureau of the Assembly by the Secretary General within 8
weeks of the start of the second step of the procedure. The Bureau
of the Assembly will have to consider the Roadmap at its next meeting
following the submission of the text by the Secretary General.
3.3.2. Implementation
of the Roadmap
51. After the adoption of the Roadmap,
the procedure will continue with the implementation of the Roadmap, which
will be conducted in close co-operation with the member State concerned
and will be co-ordinated by the Secretary General.
52. The aim will be to engage with the member State concerned
in a constructive and co-operative dialogue to help remedy the situation.
53. In the course of the implementation of the Roadmap, the three
parties may agree to make joint public statements.
54. Regular dialogue will take place with the member State concerned,
as well as between the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary
Assembly and the Secretary General in a format to be defined in
the Roadmap, including the Joint Committee.
55. In the draft decision as discussed by the Ministers’ Deputies
and transmitted to the Assembly, it is provided that, “if the situation
were to be remedied, or positive progress made, the Committee of
Ministers may decide, by a two-thirds majority according to Article
20d, to pause or terminate the procedure without undue delay.” If
the “exit” decision lies rightly with the Committee of Ministers,
it should be taken “after consultations with the Parliamentary Assembly
and the Secretary General”. I also suggest adding the word “significant” before
the word “positive progress”. Moreover, the decision to take is
whether or not to “terminate” the procedure and not to “pause” it.
56. The Assembly could regularly assess the implementation of
the Roadmap through the debate on its Bureau’s progress report.
57. While the details will be agreed in the Roadmap, it is proposed
that the implementation of the Roadmap should be foreseen within
a total of 9 months of its adoption by the Committee of Ministers.
3.4. The
third and final step: possible decision on the suspension of a member
State’s right of representation in the Committee of Ministers and/or
the Parliamentary Assembly, or to request a member State to withdraw
58. If the Committee of Ministers
through a decision, by a two thirds majority according to Article
20d, after consultations with the Parliamentary Assembly and the
Secretary General, concludes that there has been no improvement
of the situation, and a serious violation of Article 3 by the member
State concerned continues to exist, it will move to the third and
final stage of the process.
59. A decision by the Committee of Ministers based on Article
8 of the Statute will follow. The prior consultation of the Assembly,
provided in Statutory Resolution (51)30, would require the preparation
of a report and an Assembly debate with a view to providing the
Committee of Ministers with an Opinion on the application of Article
8 of the Statute.
60. Should the member State concerned eventually remedy the situation,
bringing it into compliance with the Statute, the Committee of Ministers
may, after consultations with the Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary
General, revoke its decision under Article 8. In case of exclusion,
the State concerned will have to reapply for membership.
4. Conclusions
61. The complementary joint procedure
between the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly
in response to a serious violation by a member State of its statutory
obligations, in which the Secretary General also plays a significant
role, is meant to enhance the credibility of the Organisation and
the impact of any measures to be taken with respect to the State
in question. Its political importance has been highlighted by its
endorsement at ministerial level and the commitment shown by both
the Finnish and French presidencies of the Committee of Ministers,
at the highest political level, to allow for approval by January
2020. The Secretary General elected in June 2019 has also shown
her commitment to achieve this goal.
62. Although the principled decisions have been taken and no changes
to the Statute are necessary, the task is still particularly challenging
as the practical modalities have to be agreed by the Ministers’
Deputies of 47 member States and by the Assembly following discussions
within each statutory organ and between the two of them.
63. The present report aims at offering a basis for an open and
transparent discussion first in the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy and ultimately in the Assembly, taking into consideration
the modalities as discussed and broadly agreed within the Ministers
Deputies and between the Bureau of the Committee of Ministers, the
Presidential Committee and the Secretary General. On a few points,
it suggests changes or improvements, inviting the Ministers’ Deputies
to take these suggestions into consideration with a view to reaching
an agreement between the two statutory organs.
64. All changes required in the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure
to implement the decisions the Assembly will take on the basis of
the present report will be introduced, in a subsequent resolution,
on the basis of a report by the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs. The complementary joint procedure
will enter into force with the adoption by the Assembly of the latter
resolution, hopefully at the Assembly April 2020 part-session, and
the adoption of a decision by the Committees of Ministers along
the same lines. The political message will however be already given
with the debate of the present report in January 2020.