1. Introduction
1. On 27 January 2020, with the
support of more than 30 members of the Parliamentary Assembly present in
the Chamber belonging to at least five national delegations, Mr Emmanuelis
Zingeris (Lithuania, EPP/CD) challenged the still unratified credentials
of the Russian delegation on substantive grounds on the basis of Article
8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly. Later,
Ms Marija Golubeva (Latvia, ALDE) challenged the credentials of
the Russian delegation on procedural grounds on the basis of Article
7 of the Rules of Procedure with the support of more than 10 members
present in the Chamber belonging to at least five national delegations.
2. The substantive grounds on which the credentials were challenged
refer to the ongoing legislative process in the Russian Federation
with regard to the proposed constitutional amendments and its possible impact
on the compliance of the Russian Federation with its commitments
and obligations in the Council of Europe and with recommendations
included in Assembly
Resolution
1990 (2014),
Resolution
2034 (2015),
Resolution
2063 (2015) and
Resolution
2292 (2019).
3. In line with Article 8.3 of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee
on the honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) was seized for a
report on substantial grounds and the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs for opinion as well as for
a separate report on procedural grounds.
4. At its meeting on 27 January 2020, the Monitoring Committee
appointed me rapporteur of the present report.
2. Background
5. In June 2019, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2292
(2019), on the challenge, on substantive grounds of the still
unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of the Russian
Federation in which it resolved to ratify the credentials of the
Russian delegation. It highlighted its support for political meaningful
dialogue and expressed expectation that its clear offer of dialogue
would be reciprocal and would lead to concrete results. It invited
the Monitoring Committee to present a report on the honouring of
commitments and obligations by the Russian Federation at its earliest
convenience but no later than in April 2020.
6. The Monitoring Committee immediately resumed its work with
regard to the Russian Federation. At its meeting on 10 September
2019, in the wake of the local elections to the Moscow City Duma,
it held an exchange of views with Mr Jakob Wienen, co-rapporteur
on local and regional democracy in the Russian Federation of the
Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities. On 1 October 2019, it organised a hearing
on civil society and democratic participation in the Russian Federation
with the participation of Mr Vladimir Kara-Murza, Chairperson of
the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, Ms Emiliya Slabunova,
President of the Yabloko Party, Mr Leonid Volkov, Campaign Manager
of Mr Alexei Navalny and Ms Tatiana Glushkova, representative of
Memorial. Furthermore, it held an exchange of views with Mr Fredrik
Sundberg, Head of Department for the Execution of judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights on the implementation of the Court`s
decisions by the Russian Federation.
7. As no members of the Russian delegation were members of the
Monitoring Committee in 2019, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure,
representatives from both the majority and opposition in the Russian Parliament
were invited and took active part in the discussions in all above
mentioned events.
8. Regrettably, no monitoring visit could be organised because
of the unavailability of the then co-rapporteurs. It has to be acknowledged,
however, that the chairperson of the Russian delegation made it
clear during one of the meetings that, should the co-rapporteurs
express their wish to carry out a visit, they will be well received.
Hopefully, newly appointed co-rapporteurs will fix the dates for
the visit as soon as possible.
9. The Committee followed and paid particular attention to the
developments with regard to the implementation of recommendations
to the Russian Federation included in
Resolution 2292 (2019) and it has to be acknowledged that some progress may
be recorded.
10. On 7 September 2019, all 24 sailors captured illegally by
the Russian Federation in the Kerch Strait in Crimea were returned
to Ukraine in the framework of a broader exchange of prisoners,
which included 35 prisoners on each side. On 18 November 2019, the
captured ships were returned to Ukraine.
11. More generally, some progress has been made with regard to
the implementation of the Minsk agreements with the Russian Federation
and following the election of President Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine.
12. The aforementioned swap of prisoners – which also included
the Ukrainian filmmaker Mr Sentsov, was widely seen as a perquisite
for the summit of the so-called Normandie group (France, Germany,
Ukraine and the Russian Federation) that took place on 9 December
2019 in Paris.
13. During the summit of the Minsk Group, the leaders agreed to
stabilise the situation in the conflict area and to take measures
to implement the Minsk agreements. As part of this agreement, President
Zelensky agreed with Russia and the Russian backed rebels to organise
local elections in the Donbas area, under the condition that they,
inter alia, would be organised on the basis of Ukrainian legislation,
with the participation of all Ukrainian political parties, and after
Ukraine has regained full control over its borders with the Russian Federation.
14. In preparation for the elections, the Ukrainian authorities
and the Russian backed rebel forces agreed to initially disengage
in two areas in Luhansk and Donetsk before the end of 2019, a process
that was monitored by the OSCE. An additional three areas in which
disengagement would be completed by March 2020 were also agreed
upon. While these disengagements have reduced tensions along the
territories, frequent cease fire violations from all sides are still
recorded on a daily basis by OSCE Monitoring bodies.
15. Furthermore, during the Normandie Group summit, President
Putin and President Zelensky agreed to an “all-for all” prisoner
swap between the Ukrainian authorities and the Russian backed de
facto authorities in the Lugansk and Donetsk areas that are not
under the control of Kiev. This prisoner swap took place on 29 December
and involved 200 prisoners, 74 released by the pro-Russian rebel
forces and 124 by the authorities in Kiyv.
16. With regard to the financial obligations towards the Council
of Europe, the Russian Federation has paid all due contributions
to the ordinary budget and partial agreements for the second part
of 2017, 2018 and 2019. At present, the only payment that remains
due, are unpaid interests amounting to 8,8 million euros. The Russian
Federation has blocked their reimbursement following disputes within
the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on their status and
enduing allocation.
17. With regard to other recommendations, the co-rapporteurs on
the Russian Federation of the Monitoring Committee are in the process
of the preparation of their report and we can expect that their
findings and conclusions will be submitted to the Assembly later
this year.
18. On 15 January 2020, in a new
development, President Vladimir Putin announced in his annual state-of-nation
address, his intention to propose changes to the Constitution. Already
on 20 January 2020, he submitted draft amendments to the State Duma.
19. The proposed amendments refer to 14 articles of the Constitution
and include, inter alia, provisions on the precedence of the Russian
Constitution over international law; increased powers for the State
Duma in the procedure of appointment of the Prime Minister, Deputy
Prime Ministers and Federal Ministers; incompatibility of foreign
citizenship or residence permit with being candidate for senior
posts in the State (President, Ministers, judges, heads of regions);
an increased role for the Federation Council in the procedure of
dismissal and removal of judges and in the appointment of heads
of law enforcement agencies; consolidation of the status and role
of the State Council (at present it is only an advisory body not
mentioned in the Constitution); removal of the “in a row” clause
from the article regulating the maximum number of presidential terms;
a minimum wage; regular indexation of pensions
20. While the revision of the Constitution does not require a
referendum, the President announced that the package will be submitted
to a consultative “All-Russian vote” foreseen in the Federal Constitutional
Law on the Referendum in order to gain more legitimacy. Unlike in
a referendum, voters will be asked whether they approve the entire
revised constitution as a whole, rather than approving each amendment
separately. The exact date of the vote has not yet been announced,
but it is known that it will take place before 1 May.
21. The State Duma held its first reading on the proposed amendments
and approved them in the unanimous vote on 23 January, fewer than
ten days after the first announcement of the proposed changes to the
Constitution. The changes to the Russian State system are taking
place with unprecedented speed without, until now, any meaningful
public debate or consultations.
22. While it would be certainly premature and inappropriate for
me to assess the impact of the constitutional changes in terms of
standards for the functioning of democratic institutions, I can
certainly express my concern with regard to the amendment on the
supremacy of the Russian Constitution over international law, which
is a potential threat to the obligation on the part of every Council
of Europe Member State to abide by the European Court of Human Rights’
judgments.
23. For that reason, the Monitoring Committee should certainly
closely follow further developments and consider a possible request
to the Venice Commission for an opinion on the amendments.
4. Conclusions
24. In June 2019, when the Assembly
adopted Resolution 2287 (2019) on Strengthening the decision-making
process of the Parliamentary Assembly concerning credentials and
voting, which paved the way for the Russian delegation’s return
to the Assembly, its intention was clear. The reason why the majority
of members voted in favour of this text and then following the challenge
of the Russian Delegation`s credentials in favour of resolution
2292 (2019) was to relaunch a political and meaningful dialogue.
25. The dialogue has been relaunched – we can see it at all levels
of the Assembly, and indeed in the Monitoring Committee, where the
Russian representatives take active part. It is, in my opinion,
too early to assess to what extent this dialogue will be meaningful
and whether it will result in any progress in the fulfilment of
the obligations and commitments.
26. I think that the Monitoring Committee should continue its
work with regard to the Russian Federation. The co-rapporteurs should
carry out a fact-finding visit and prepare a substantial report
at the earliest convenience. We should carefully follow developments
in the Russian Federation, with a view to assessing whether the
new constitutional amendments are in compliance with democratic
standards and the Russian Federation’s commitments and obligations.
27. I therefore propose that the Assembly ratifies the credentials
of the Russian Federation and returns to the assessment of the progress
made when a monitoring report is submitted later this year.