1. Introduction
1. The Earth is heating up. At
the end of 2019 – beginning of 2020 we witnessed the mildest winter
on record since readings were first taken at the end of the 19th
century. There are more and more extreme climate events. Record
temperature readings have recently been taken on the Antarctic ice
pack, the largest terrestrial reserve of freshwater. If it melts,
sea levels would rise by dozens of meters.
2. Generally speaking, climate change is shifting the distribution
of world populations and the movement of people within and across
the borders of European countries are responses to slow-onset climate
phenomena. We are seeing an increase in the frequency of bushfires
in the southern parts of Spain, Portugal and France, sea level rises
risk affecting major cities (Hamburg, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, London,
Istanbul), and changes are taking place in the ecosystems in Northern
Europe (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia).
There are fears that environmental
phenomena could spark conflicts, as populations become increasingly
concentrated in certain areas, giving rise to competition for access
to resources.
3. As global warming continues, and the nature of the threats
become clear, the consequences are known: coastal areas and deltas
will become flooded, many islands and land masses will disappear,
there will be an increase in the number of areas hit by drought
and desertification, etc. The inhabitants of the regions where life will
become unviable will be the direct victims of these transformations
to their living environment. They will be driven to migrate to find
food and another place to live, in their own country or elsewhere.
Millions of people will be forced to migrate, and, in this context,
it has been estimated that climate change will force nearly 50 million people
to leave their homes in African countries by 2050.
This phenomenon will have destabilising
effects and could lead to tensions, conflicts and even war as people
struggle to secure scarce resources. Speaking on 27 February 2020
in Strasbourg as part of a conference organised by the Council of
Europe on climate issues, former French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius
said that "global warming is a story of war or peace! When a Nobel
Prize was awarded to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
, it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,
not the one for Physics or Chemistry. The Nobel Academy made no
mistake."
4. The impact of global warming on water-related issues will
be dramatic. The physical repercussions will follow two main scenarios
over time: there will be too much water in some areas and water
scarcity in others. According to successive reports of the IPCC,
by the end of the 21st century, the rise in sea level, in response to
the melting of the ice, in particular in Greenland, the Arctic and
the Antarctic, will increase dramatically in correlation to the
intensity of observed global warming. Experts refer to sea levels
rising by 50 centimetres at least, but the figures of 1 or 2 meters
are also advanced.
5. This will be a catastrophe for hundreds of millions of people
living on the immediate seashore, who will see the inexorable rise
in water flood their homes and push them to leave. For some, the
danger will be episodic massive flooding linked to an extreme climatic
event, such as the passage of Hurricane Katrina on the American
city of New Orleans in 2005. Seashores without sufficient gradient
along with deltas – especially the most populated – are under particular
threat. Bangladesh is the emblematic example of a region at risk:
a large area, highly populated and located in a developing country,
without the financial means to be able to withstand climatic hazards.
Islands and islets without a sharp coast drop risk being irreparably
submerged, a common situation in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
6. Conversely, the regions of the world, which already today
find themselves in a situation of water stress, will see their situation
worsen, such as the Near and Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa.
The latter region represents a programmed source of substantial
migration, because it combines the problems of poverty, an advance
of desertification and a demographic explosion. Indeed, the countries
that make up sub-Saharan Africa will see their populations double
by 2050. These forecasts take into account that the vast majority
of African countries have not yet completed their demographic transition.
By demographic transition, we mean a fairly general phenomenon of
demographic change which corresponds to the slow and delicate transition
from a so-called traditional regime characterised by a high birth
rate and mortality to a so-called modern system, where mortality
and birth rate are low, as in the western world today. Africa has
seen the overall mortality of its elders, and even more of new-borns,
decrease, in line with the progress of care and some improvement
in living conditions. A woman in Niger has an average of 6 or 7
children. From 3 million in 1960, this country now has 23 million
inhabitants and could number 65 million in 2050. All the countries
in the region are facing a comparable situation: growing population,
ever poorer, with land less able to feed its children – a sure way
to lead to mass migrations in the end.
2. Report’s aim and structure
7. Climate change will have serious
repercussions on migratory phenomena. The Parliamentary Assembly’s
study of the relationship between climate change and migration is
very timely, with a view to arriving at recommendations for mitigating
the fall-out and planning ahead for the political and practical developments
that will accompany this change. When the Assembly examines issues
related to climate change, chiefly from a human rights perspective,
it should keep in mind the impact this will have on migration, and
on migrants, their countries of origin, countries of transit and
countries of destination.
8. This report is part of a wider pan-European mobilisation to
limit the dramatic effects of climate change, protecting the environment,
on one hand, and the people living on this planet, on the other.
The Assembly President’s initiative to support the Europe-wide political
push in favour of a human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment will translate into an unprecedented Assembly joint
debate in 2021 to address climate change and its impact on our future
from all perspectives: political, legal, economic, social and –
most of all – the human rights perspective.
In this report, I shall focus on migration-related
aspects, with the aim of responding to current and future challenges
of climate-change-induced migration.
9. For the purpose of this report, I refer to climate as encompassing
various related aspects: climate change, environment evolving without
human influence, as well as environment that is affected by human intervention,
and the effect that this has on migration.
10. The report presents the interconnections between climate change
and environment and migration. It highlights the challenges, starting
with demographic developments, and proposes ways of responding to current
and future challenges. The report will also widen the perspective.
Migration issues – especially those related to climate change –
cannot be resolved by acting only at national or European level.
We need to act globally.
3. The
demographic context
11. Despite the United Nations
studies
showing an increase in the world
population by 2100, some studies also show a sharp population decline,
in particular in certain countries of Europe. Population ageing
together with decreasing natality rates will have a major social
and economic impact in Europe.
A
sharp decline in the total number of working adults paying taxes
will put additional pressure on social security and health systems. The
risk of systemic failure of the social security, pensions and health
systems could bring further tensions and political unrest. Migration
– when it is managed well – can alleviate certain tensions brought
by population ageing and decreased natality. However, with climate-induced
migration increasing, there will be more people attempting to reach
Europe. Today’s political choices on whether to accept and embrace
migration as a global phenomenon and decisions on how best to manage
migration flows, or whether to reject migration, will determine
how Europe will evolve in the decades to come. As different studies
show, liberal immigration could help sustain population size and
economic growth.
12. One should also bear in mind that women are at a higher risk
of being affected by climate-related migration: in many countries
water shortages and severe desertification due to climate change
will force women to walk longer distances to find water in order
to prepare food, to have adequate conditions to give birth or to
take care of their children. The report will also, therefore, highlight
the gender impact of climate-induced migration and displacement.
4. The
United Nations framework on climate and migration
13. In migration management, the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) represents
a milestone in international policy for recognising and addressing
the links between population movements and climate change. The GCM
clearly identifies slow onset environmental degradation, natural disasters
and climate change as drivers of contemporary migration (objectives
2 and 5 of the GCM in particular). The GCM recognises that climate
change mitigation and adaptation measures in countries of origin need
to be prioritised to minimize drivers of migration. It also highlights
the need for States to design measures for strengthening regular
migration pathways, such as visa options and planned relocation,
in cases where adaptation to climate change is no longer possible.
This is also in accordance with
target 10.7 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which
calls on governments to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible
migration and mobility of people, including through implementation
of planned and well-managed migration policies”. The Global Compact
on Refugees (GCR) also includes references to mobility and environment.
14. Acting as the coordinator and secretariat of the UN Network
on Migration, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
is supporting countries to implement
the GCM recommendations at regional and national levels, and to
integrate climate and environmental considerations into their migration
policies. Several countries already refer to climate and environmental
considerations in their national laws, policies and strategies dealing
with migration and displacement, such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
or have drafted specialised policies, such as Vanuatu
or Fiji.
But in many countries, the attention
to environmental factors is not mainstreamed in migration policies
and more needs to be done in this regard.
15. The UN Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Desertification
(UNCCD) are also extremely relevant
to address human mobility in the context of climate change and important
developments have taken place in these global frameworks over the
last years, especially within the UNFCCC. The IOM has been actively
engaged in the UNFCCC discussions since 2008, advocating for the
recognition of human mobility dimensions in climate negotiations.
16. In 2015, the Paris Agreement adopted during COP21 established
the Task Force on Displacement (TFD)
to develop recommendations for integrated
approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement related to
the adverse impacts of climate change. The TFD recommendations were
endorsed at COP24 in 2018, and its mandate extended for another
2 years until 2021. These recommendations are consistent with the
GCM objectives, inviting Parties to the UNFCCC to facilitate safe
and orderly migration and enhance opportunities for regular migration
pathways in the context of climate change.
5. The
political and legal contexts: Council of Europe actions on environment
and human rights
17. On 27 February 2020, a High-level
Conference on Environmental Protection and Human Rights was held
in Strasbourg, highlighting the interconnection between the protection
of the environment and human rights and the importance of the law
in guaranteeing the respect of rights and the implementation of
political commitments States willingly accepted.
18. Mr Christos Giakoumopoulos, Director General of Human Rights
and Rule of Law (DGI Council of Europe), stressed that “environment
and human rights, by nature, transcend national borders and thus
lend themselves perfectly to international co-operation. The Council
of Europe clearly has a role to play in the development of this
co-operation, drawing on its standards and instruments, some without
equivalent at European and even international level, and taking
initiatives to adapt, strengthen or complement them. We have heard
voices in favour of an additional protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights; a legally binding instrument dedicated in its own
right to environmental protection; ratifications of existing sectoral
instruments; and guidelines and specific recommendations to be made
to the governments of our member States”.
19. The major relevant treaties referred to at the conference
were the UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 1998),
which includes a specific reference to “the right of every person
of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate
to his or her health and well-being” (Article 1). The other treaties
include the following Council of Europe Conventions:
- Council of Europe Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5,
Rome, 1950);
- European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163, Strasbourg,
1996);
- Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and
Natural Habitats (ETS No. 104, Bern, 1979);
- Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment (ETS No. 150, Lugano, 1993);
- Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal
Law (ETS No. 172, Strasbourg,1998);
- European Landscape Convention (ETS No. 176, Florence,
2000); and
- Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents
(ETS No. 205, Tromsø, 2010).
20. It was decided, on that occasion, that the Manual on human
rights and the environment – Principles emerging from the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights, published by the Council
of Europe in 2006/2012, needed to be updated. Indeed, this would
be useful, given that there was no reference in that manual to protection
of rights of migrants whose migration had been triggered by climate
change-related disasters. The protection of the environment is key,
given the impact it has on our lives. Moreover, it cannot be underestimated,
bearing in mind that it is one of the “push” factors, triggering
migration and mass displacement all over the world.
21. The most developed countries should bear greater responsibility,
taking into account their ownership of major industries that challenge
the natural habitat – mining industries poisoning the soil and challenging
water supplies, intensive agriculture responsible for deforestation,
international trade that is not protective to the environment, etc.
Damaging the environment at local and regional level adds up to
have an impact on climate at global level. Things change when legal
actions are taken – and civil and/or criminal liability established
– to counter environmental damage. Such legal action will ultimately
lead to a greater protection of both people and the environment
and this will have a positive impact on climate-related migration.
22. The Georgian, Greek and German presidencies of the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, have issued, on 15 May 2020,
a Joint Declaration on human rights and the environment,
“bearing in mind that life and well-being
on our planet is contingent on humanity’s collective capacity to
guarantee both human rights and a healthy environment to future
generations”. The Declaration calls on the Committee of Ministers “to
invite its Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) to elaborate
a draft non-binding instrument on human rights and the environment
for possible adoption by the Committee of Ministers at the latest
by the end of next year”.
23. Adequate solutions to help meet the challenges related to
migration caused by climate change are needed. New human rights
protection instruments are necessary for an effective implementation
of a human right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment,
which could also protect migrants, who have to move for these reasons.
This “new generation” human right should also be embedded in international instruments
that have an effect on migration – from disaster preparedness and
climate adaptation instruments to economic development strategies,
energy production and trade agreements. Furthermore, actions taken must
ensure that a gender-responsive approach is fully integrated into
the design and implementation of all projects and programmes.
6. Parliamentary
Assembly’s recent work on environment and migration
24. Resolution 2307 (2019) “A legal status for ‘climate refugees’” highlighted
the need to take specific action to increase local communities’
thresholds of resilience, to improve the capacity to react and cope
with disasters at national level, and to enhance co-ordination,
mediation and funding. It is clearly stated in the report, that
the term “refugee” is in the remit of the Geneva Conventions. This
being said, as you can find it in the Resolution, the Assembly “considers
that the absence of a legally binding definition of “climate refugees”
does not preclude the possibility of developing specific policies
to protect people who are forced to move as a consequence of climate
change”. Based on this, this report will look into new developments
and possible solutions.
25. In addition, earlier resolutions
– Resolution 2115 (2016) “Forced migration: a new challenge” and
Resolution 1655 (2009) “Environmentally induced migration and displacement:
a 21st century challenge” – highlight the interaction between environmental
changes and migration.
7. Ways
of responding to current and future challenges
26. Following the call for action
the Assembly made in its
Resolution
2307 (2019), a series of additional measures should be introduced
aimed at alleviating the consequences of climate change on populations
at risk of being forced to migrate.
27. This report will contribute to the Assembly’s debate that
will shape its vision and engagement to finding adequate solutions.
After having focused on the challenges of migration triggered by
environment degradation due to climate change or man-made disasters,
I shall outline a series of measures that could be implemented at
national, European and world levels.
28. There are two types of solutions that need to be considered:
the first, solutions that protect people – including those who are
most vulnerable, such as children – from the devastating consequences
of climate change; the second, solutions that protect the environment
and the need to also consider human rights implications when taking
climate action.
7.1. Improving
communication on and predictability of migration trends
29. Mapping climate change and
comparing the results of mapping ongoing migration could improve predictability
of future migration trends. Climate change affects all regions of
the world, but regional and local impacts are uneven, and hard to
predict accurately. The local effects and vulnerability of populations
will depend greatly on local exposure, development and adaptive
capacity, future demographic and economic changes, as well as on
mitigation and adaptation policies that will or will not be undertaken
in the coming years. Disaster preparedness is a key issue, as noted
by the Assembly in its
Resolution
2307 (2019). Predictability of migration trends is another one.
The Environmental Migration Portal (by the IOM) is a tool that can
help predict environmental mobility in the future.
Today it maps:
- the key climatic risks and impacts (increased or decreased
precipitation, increased monsoon precipitation extremes, increasing
frequency of cyclones, desertification, increased frequency of wildfires,
melting of glaciers and permafrost, coral bleaching);
- the main consequences (depletion of fisheries and biodiversity
loss, negative agricultural changes, reduced water availability;
- changes in ecosystems (including in mountain regions);
- related social challenges (vulnerable indigenous populations,
major cities, and densely populated areas affected by sea-level
rise and other hazards).
30. The maps also identify climate change “hotspots” – areas which
experience a combination of several extreme climatic risks, and
which are expected to be affected particularly severely.
31. Merging dynamic mapping of climate change with dynamic mapping
of migration would help determine migration trends and build reliable
predictions. Policy makers could have a clearer picture of where
the people are likely to move from (regions/countries), where they
are likely to go, in what numbers and when. Such early warning systems
are crucial for protecting the lives of those who risk being forced
to embark on perilous journeys.
32. Dynamic mapping of climate change is already done through
various programmes, for example the Copernicus Climate Change Service
(C3S).
The modelling of climate change
is also often used in modern business analysis.
33. The current mapping of migration by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (International migration database
) is also a valuable tool, but it
is mainly based on post-factum reporting and does not allow for
the predicted likelihood of mass movements of people driven by climate change.
The IOM's Missing Migrants Project, even though it is also based
on post-factum reporting, includes dynamic mapping tools which are
important for emergency response actions.
34. Finally, predicting mass displacements following conflicts
is possible. Predicting such movements due to climate change with
sufficient accuracy, however, is not yet possible. There is an urgent
need, therefore, for greater intersectoral co-operation and access
to a high degree of technological advancements, bringing them to
the service of human rights protection.
7.2. Acting
on “migration drivers” in climate migration
35. More needs to be done to structure
policy responses around the main “migration drivers”,
especially regarding climate migration.
This requires reflection based on accurate research data and comparative analysis
of both climate change and migration trends. Countries could up-date
their response by:
- acting positively
on mobility drivers, which are determined by individual’s feelings
of security: food security, water security, economic security, personal
and political security, energy security and global and environmental
security;
- preventing mass displacements due to environmental events
by improving responses to major hazards: hydrological hazards (floods,
landslides), geophysical hazards (earthquakes), meteorological hazards (extreme
temperatures, heat waves, climatological hazards (droughts, forest
fires), coastal processes (sea level rises, coastal erosion), ecosystem
change (deforestation, land degradation, ocean acidification, overfishing),
and environment degradation by infrastructure projects (roads, dams,
mining);
- acting to improve ecosystem services: provisioning services
(food, fresh water, raw materials), regulating services (climate
regulation, water purification, disease regulation), and cultural
and economic services (for example tourism to ensure protection
against job losses).
36. To act on “migration drivers”, some countries develop structured
programmes in geographical areas most affected by climate change.
This is the case, for example, in the Republic of Moldova in the
Southern part of the country, where the frequency of droughts is
higher, and the desertification is becoming more intense in comparison
with other regions.
A
series of infrastructure adjustment projects to enhance adaptation
to climate change and improve access to water have been implemented
through development co-operation programmes.
Access
to water has become an even greater issue in the country since a
major industrial project developed by Ukraine in Novodnestrovsk
– a cascade of six hydropower plants at the top of the Nistru/Dniester
River – had led to a substantive decrease in water supply to the
Republic of Moldova. This has reportedly also changed water quality
and temperature, affecting the ecosystem, and endangering the overall water
supply for people living in the Nistru/Dniester River basin. As
with other problems of this nature, the best solution is to deal
with it through a negotiated settlement with the involvement of
international observers.
37. The Council of Europe had stressed, in the past, the importance
of access to quality drinking water, as an intrinsic part of a healthy
and sustainable environment and a basic human right. Environment
degradation or other deliberate actions that lead to water scarcity
are extremely dangerous. These matters were raised in its
Resolution 1809 (2011) “Water – a source of conflict”,
Resolution 1940 (2013) “The situation in the Middle East” calling to ensure
access to water for the Arab population in Palestine,
Resolution 2085 (2016) “Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately
deprived of water” about the Sarsang and Madagiz dams, and
Resolution 2142 (2017) “The humanitarian crisis in Gaza”, warning about deficiencies
in water supply to Gaza. The Assembly would need to prepare a new
report on access to water, from the perspective of the new human
right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, since
this issue remains critical in several countries.
38. Man-made environmental alterations will add to the challenges
related to climate change, multiplying its negative effects. Specific
measures should be taken to prevent environment alterations that
could limit access to water. When issues related to access to water
arise between neighbouring countries or regions, international negotiations
should lead to finding appropriate solutions in accordance with
international human rights standards and practices. These measures
should be guided by the international obligations on environmental matters
set by the United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment
in transboundary context (Espoo Convention, 1991).
7.3. Assisting
those who are “on the move” to prevent loss of lives
39. In 2018, the Task Force on
Displacement (TFD) acting at world level, had formulated a series
of recommendations to countries with a view to assisting climate
migrants who were forced to leave their homes. It “emphasized the
need for collective measures that reach across policy areas to i)
minimize forced and poorly managed forms of human mobility, ii)
provide assistance and protection to migrants moving in the context
of climate change, iii) facilitate migration in the context of climate
and environmental changes; iv) foster regular pathways for migration
taking into account labour market needs; and v) promote decent work
and job creation, including creation of green job opportunities.”
40. In 2019, the Assembly also decided that the absence of a legally
binding definition of “climate refugees” did not preclude the possibility
of developing specific policies to protect people who are forced
to move as a consequence of climate change.
Member
States were called upon to take a more proactive approach to the protection
of victims of natural and man-made disasters.
Resolution 2307 (2019) mentions a series of specific actions in this respect:
- “5.3.1. […] implementation of
mechanisms such as the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)
should be promoted through European development co-operation programmes;
- 5.3.2. the obligation to protect internally displaced
persons (IDPs) for environmental reasons must be considered as the
first level of legal protection in the legislation of each member
State. The reception of natural disaster victims in the territory
of member States should be foreseen in domestic law, inter alia by
the granting of temporary residence status;
- 5.3.3. consideration should be given to the establishment
of an international solidarity fund to provide protection to people
forced to migrate due to climate disasters. Co-operation with the
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) could be considered, in
accordance with the Declaration on European Principles for the Environment
signed by the CEB on 30 May 2006 together with the European Commission
and several other international financial organisations (the European
Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, the Nordic Investment
Bank) in a joint effort to implement the fundamental right of present
and future generations to live in a healthy environment.”
41. To meet the challenges posed by climate-induced migration
in Europe, the member States can already now use the two trust funds
managed by the Council of Europe Development Bank: the Migrant and
Refugee Fund (MRF)
established in 2015 and the Green
Social Investment Fund (GSIF)
established in March 2020.
42. Migrants in Europe are also at a greater risk of being exposed
to environmental stressors, such as poor indoor air quality, heat
and cold stress or air pollution, because they are usually socially
disadvantaged and live in deprived neighbourhoods.
This should not be overlooked in
the current policy-making aimed at promoting a “human right to a
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment”. It should be
taken into account in future Council of Europe actions, including
in any new Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights or
a new Convention establishing this right and the conditions to be
met for it to be effective.
43. The UN Human Rights Council had forewarned the world community
about the slow onset effects of climate change and human rights
protection needs for cross-border migrants.
It stressed that climate change and
migration policies and programmes should meet the different needs
of vulnerable groups, taking into account the protection of all
people, without any discrimination on the grounds of migration status
and nationality. Some groups are particularly vulnerable, given
that they are disproportionally affected by climate change, such
as persons living in coastal areas, indigenous people, minorities,
older persons, women and girls, children and persons with disabilities.
7.4. Developing
a people-centred, human rights-based, systemic approach
44. Climate change must be tackled
by entire systems, through viable platforms bringing together businesses,
cities and other non-State actors, who are rallying together and
collaborating to support governments and accelerate the systemic
change required to reduce emissions and build populations’ resilience.
45. Migration and remittances can positively contribute to climate
change adaptation in countries of origin. It could therefore be
of interest to explore the impact of migration management policy
decisions in the international climate negotiations.
47. The human-rights-based approach requires also an active participation
of those affected by climate-change-induced migration. Civil society
should be able to convey the voice of these migrants. The UN Secretary
General’s Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (2011-2017),
Mr François Crépeau, noted that a striking feature of the contemporary
debate on climate-change-induced migration is the absence of a voice
from migrants themselves. In part, this comes from the lack of self-awareness:
climate-change-induced migrants rarely consider themselves as such
(and many of them have simply never heard about the notion). In
part, this also comes from the general reluctance of migrants (especially
if they are irregular or vulnerable migrants) to voice their concerns
or to denounce the human right violations that they suffer. It is, therefore,
highly desirable that States actively support the development and
sustainability of organisations representing migrants and giving
them a voice, at the earliest opportunity, including by providing
training and capacity-building at the local level.
7.5. Enhancing
corporate responsibility and participation of businesses in displacement prevention
48. The role of businesses is crucial:
they lead development and technological innovation. Since migration flows
are heading towards the stable sources of income, the roles of businesses
should be acknowledged as they provide that stable income. Businesses
– including those, which are most technologically advanced – should
participate in displacement prevention. The expectations are that
on one hand, the businesses should use environment-friendly approaches
and on the other hand, they should bear in mind the impact of their
work on migration. This issue may need to be further investigated
in one of the Assembly’s future reports.
7.6. Improving
migration management
49. Developing a systemic approach
means also rethinking migration management to bring it in line with
new objectives. Migration, if properly managed, can play a positive
role to support climate action in Europe, notably through remittances
and technical knowledge transfer. Well managed migration can also
help address some of Europe’s future challenges, including sustaining
its population size and economic growth and bringing new resources
and added value in labour intensive agricultural projects.
50. Migrations management could also benefit from an improved
integration of gender equality in all its aspects taking inspiration
from the UN Security Council
Resolution
1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Members of Parliaments
should remain vigilant to ensure that a gender-responsive approach
is integrated into the design and implementation of projects and
programmes on climate-change-induced migration. In doing so, they
could initiate a series of specific measures, such as those put
forward by the Green Climate Fund (GCF).
They
decided to condition access to funding for climate adaptation and
mitigation projects, making it dependent on the availability of
specific gender action plans. Furthermore, the practical manual
on “Mainstreaming Gender in Green Climate Fund Projects” helps applicants
integrate gender equality in climate change interventions and climate
finance, overall. As a result, Gender Action Plans have been established
with specific goals and benchmarks for each request for funding
for all projects.
7.7. Strengthening
development co-operation and emergency support
51. Council of Europe member States
should work globally to limit climate change and its consequences. As
I mentioned in my earlier report on “Development co-operation: a
tool for preventing migration crises”, development co-operation
reduces inequalities, but it could also help prevent a sharp increase
in migration flows in the future.
Investing in protecting those who
have not yet left their country, but who are “about to move”, would
help prevent brain-drain and loss of labour in the countries of
origin, which ultimately could lead to better development prospects
and sustainability of economic reforms in these countries. Subsequent
Resolution 2268 (2019) underscores that European governments should continue
and step up their development co-operation and diversify funding,
“putting emphasis on sustainable programmes for education, health
services and infrastructure”.
52. In addition, emergency support should be provided in a timely
manner. Such support should not be limited to food supplies. Sometimes,
other types of support may be necessary. I refer here to the recent
episode that plunged some regions of Ethiopia into dramatic loss
of crops. This comes in addition to the conflict in Northern Ethiopia
and Tigray region.
A million people face food shortage
due to an extreme proliferation of locusts as a result of rising
temperature.
Nearly 200 000 hectares of cropland
were damaged by insects, leading to the loss of over 356 000 tons
of grain including sorghum, maize and wheat. The reports show that the
proliferation of locusts could be stopped if there were enough pesticides
used. To compare with European norms, they used only 10% of the
necessary dose. As a result, new displacements are likely to occur
in the near future, pushing more people away from their homeland
if States do not have the resources to deal with these issues. Overall,
the World Bank has estimated that 500 million dollars would be necessary
for the fight against the proliferation of locusts in Africa and
the Middle East and has now initiated a new programme for dealing
with this.
7.8. Prosecuting
those responsible for major environmental degradation
53. Environmental degradation may
trigger migration. Prosecuting those responsible for major environmental
degradation is important for preventing similar cases in the future.
There is a need for both civil and criminal liability. Moreover,
it helps raise awareness and strengthen the responsibility of decision-makers. To
cite a recent example, as a result of a decision of the French Conseil
d’Etat
measures have been ordered to reduce
air pollution.
54. The issues of criminal and civil liability with regard to
environment degradation will be addressed by the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights.
A
pan-European Study has been initiated through the European Centre
for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD) to assess the
current situation in Council of Europe member States.
7.9. Protecting
whistle-blowers and environmental rights defenders
55. One could ask why we speak
about environmental rights defenders in a report on migration. The
link is, however, strong. Every time there is a major environmental
or man-made disaster, evidence exists that warning signals were
there, often coming from civil society organisations or individuals
concerned, which the authorities chose to ignore. Mass displacements
that occur, could have been avoided if actions were taken to respond
to those early warning signals. Deforestation in the Amazon region
was raised by local civil society organisations, who were silenced
by the authorities, often due to high levels of corruption. This
has often been the case in Asia, Africa, Latin America but also
to an extent in Europe. As a result, mass movements of people in
search of a place to live become inevitable.
56. The civil society organisations or citizens raising public
attention to climate-change and environment protection should have
adequate channels of communication to formulate their concerns before
it is too late. Moreover, attempts to silence environmental rights
defenders should be punished, and measures of redress should be
taken as soon as possible.
57. I, therefore, welcome the adoption of the European Union Directive
on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (Directive
EU 2019/1937 of 23 October 2019), that covers those who alert against wrongdoing
that can harm the public interest, for instance by damaging the
environment, public health and consumer safety and public finances.
I hope that non-EU countries could implement similar instruments
at national level to ensure the highest possible protection for
those, who often risk their lives for public good.
7.10. Integrating
migration considerations into the European Green Deal
58. While migration matters for
European climate action in different ways, it does not feature significantly
in the European Green Deal (EGD) documents released so far. Migrants
are not recognised as potential stakeholders, beneficiaries or facilitators
of the EGD achievements. Including migration in the EGD would ensure
consistency with global commitments made under the Paris Agreement,
the Global Compact for Migration or the Sendai Framework.
59. In this context national parliaments of the Council of Europe
member States that are EU members could contribute to facilitating
the integration of migration policies in the EGD, notably in the
three following areas:
- Safe,
orderly and regular migration could be a useful mechanism to support
the green transition and to address climate drivers of migration.
Remittances can support adaptation and build resilience in communities
of origin. Circular or seasonal migration can be used as a risk
management strategy for households exposed to climate change but
also to fill labour market gaps.
- The Just Transition Mechanism and Just Transition Fund
should acknowledge the role of migrants, their families and communities
in the workforce and supply chain and ensure that migrants have
access to adequate social protection and opportunities for reskilling.
60. The European Union could promote the principles and practices
of the EGD in its external action, including those pertaining to
the nexus between migration, climate change and the green transition.
7.11. Supporting
the relevant world programmes
61. The Platform on Disaster Displacement
(PDD), a state-led initiative established in 2016 to follow-up on the
work initiated by the Nansen initiative, had launched a series of
actions to offer better protection for people displaced across borders
in the context of disasters and climate change.
With the IOM and the UNHCR as key
partners, the PDD has worked since its creation with interested
States to implement the recommendations of the Nansen Agenda for
the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context
of Disasters and Climate Change. This Agenda offers States a toolbox
to better prevent and prepare for displacement before a disaster
strikes. The European Union is one of the most active members of
the Steering Group of the PDD. All Council of Europe member States
should be encouraged to take an active part in its work.
62. Relevant developments also exist in the field of disaster
management and most of the disaster risk reduction strategies developed
to implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, refer
to human mobility issues (displacement, migration, evacuation, relocation).
The IOM, in co-operation with several
international partner, developed the “Words into Action” guidelines
on Disaster Displacement,
to help governments integrate disaster
displacement and other related forms of human mobility into regional, national,
sub-national and local disaster risk reduction strategies, in accordance
with the Sendai Framework.
63. Some regional policy frameworks are also relevant to human
mobility in the context of climate change and disasters. This is
the case of the Kampala Convention that includes climate change
as a cause of displacement in the regional definition of an Internally
Displaced Person, or the aforementioned IGAD 2020 Protocol on Free
Movement. The South American Conference on Migration and the Regional
Conference on Migration have developed a non-binding regional instrument
on the protection of people displaced across borders and on migrants
in countries affected by disasters.
Important regional efforts are ongoing
in the Pacific region to reduce the risk and impact of disaster
on persons at risk of being displaced in developing small islands
States,
empower communities affected by climate
change through training and skills development activities, and increase
the capacity of governments to promote labour mobility in the context
of climate change.
64. The IOM, however, had called for more coherence and consistency
between these different global policy frameworks, in particular
the Paris Agreement, the Global Compact for Migration and the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The Council of Europe should,
therefore, ensure that its work is consistent with the relevant
associated working processes, such as the work of the TFD under
UNFCCC and the operationalisation of the “Words into Action” Guidelines
on Disaster Displacement. Moreover, with slow-onset effects of environmental
change expected to further drive global urbanisation trends, the
IOM also encourages the development of migrant-inclusive urban policies
to prevent the creation of future risks and build more sustainable
societies.
65. The need to act promptly was once more underscored by the
Climate Ambition Summit 2020
held on 12 December, co-convened
by the United Nations, the United Kingdom and France in partnership
with Chile and Italy. Leaders across government, business and civil
society gathered online to call for action to limit the rise in
global temperature to 1.5C degrees. Countries set out new and ambitious
commitments under the three pillars of the Paris Agreement: mitigation,
adaptation and finance commitments, including new nationally determined
contributions, long-term strategies setting out a pathway to net
zero emissions; climate finance commitments to support the most
vulnerable; and ambitious adaptation plans. The Summit provided
also a platform for civil society, young people and indigenous peoples
representatives, many of whom disproportionately experience the
impacts of climate change.
66. Overall, member States should provide greater support to the
relevant world programmes, such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction 2015-2030, and those implemented under the UNFCCC,
the GCM and the GCR, and pay particular attention to the work of
the UN SG Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment.
7.12. Securing
funding for Europe-led development co-operation
67. Council of Europe member States
should be able to set up specific programmes to help meet the challenges
related to climate-induced migration. A World Solidarity Fund for
Climate Migration should be created to assist countries concerned.
The international community should step-up development co-operation with
the countries that are most at risk of being affected by climate
change phenomena, such as the countries of the Sahel region, to
improve the living conditions of people living there so that they
do not feel forced to migrate. Those who will have to migrate, given
that they have no other choice, will need to be assisted to prevent
loss of life. Safe migration routes will need to be available so
that these people be properly welcomed. Europe must be prepared
to play its part in dealing with this phenomenon.
68. Several initiatives were launched in recent years to help
States introduce changes to support green transition. The Green
Cities Facility of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) – with a total of 87 million Euros agreed in 2019 – is an
example of this. The Facility is financed by the GCF. The EBRD project
is an excellent example, but it does not cover the costs necessary
to meet the needs of climate migrants reaching Europe, nor the projects
in their countries of origin that might allow them to live decently
in their respective countries.
69. The GCF has financed projects that assist countries in Asia
and Africa, Eastern Europe, but not all Council of Europe member
States have a say in the negotiations held in Incheon. We could
learn a lot from some of the projects financed by the GCF. Some
are designed to assist countries to improve resilience to climate
change, which might prevent disaster-driven migration. The GCF 2021
work programme targets the goal of USD 1,78 billion to USD 2,26
billion in programming.
This being said, there is a need
for a European body to deal with these issues, bearing in mind the
geo-strategic importance for Europe of certain programmes implemented
in other parts of the world – especially as regard their impact
on migration into Europe.
70. A Europe-based World Solidarity Fund for Climate Migration
– which could cooperate with the Green Climate Fund, following accreditation
– would be a major step forward in
meeting international commitments of “leaving no one behind”, including
migrants, in a world affected by climate change. Specific programmes could
be implemented, engaging experts from all Council of Europe member
States driving forward technological developments in countries receiving
development assistance and countries providing assistance. The World
Solidarity Fund for Climate Migration could also support migrants
themselves, in addition to projects designed to improve living conditions
in countries of origin. Mechanism to protect the people, who were
forced to move due to climate change, should be available. This
will be, indeed, a truly European contribution to protecting human
rights and dignity of the most vulnerable populations worldwide.
8. A
case study: the Kiribati case
71. The UN Human Rights Committee
published in January 2020 (a few months after the adoption of Assembly
Resolution 2307 (2019)) its decision on a case that will pave the way for future
climate-related claims. The ruling marks the first decision by a
UN human rights treaty body on a complaint by an individual seeking
“asylum” protection from the effects of climate change.
I should like to stress the importance
of this decision, notwithstanding that I would have preferred a
different outcome.
72. The Committee – rightly so – noted that “environmental degradation,
climate change and unsustainable development constitute some of
the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present
and future generations to enjoy the right to life”; it “can compromise
effective enjoyment of the right to life, and … can adversely affect
an individual’s well-being and lead to a violation of the right
to life”. [paragraphs 9.4 and 9.5]. The Committee admitted that
in Kiribati, the applicant’s homeland, “freshwater lenses had been
depleted due to saltwater contamination produced by sea level rise
and recognized the hardship that may be caused by water rationing”
[paragraphs 9.8.]. It also admitted that “both sudden-onset events
(such as intense storms and flooding) and slow-onset processes (such
as sea level rise, salinisation, and land degradation) can propel cross-border
movement of individuals seeking protection from climate change-related
harm” [paragraphs 9.11].
73. The Committee, decided, however, that in Mr Teitiota's specific
case, New Zealand's courts did not violate his right to life at
the time of the facts, and therefore, he and his family could be
sent back to Kiribati. Despite accepting the author’s claim that
sea level rise is likely to render the Republic of Kiribati uninhabitable, the
Committee noted that the timeframe of 10 to 15 years, as suggested
by Mr Teitiota, could allow for intervening acts by the Republic
of Kiribati, with the assistance of the international community,
to take affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate
its population. Moreover, the Committee also notes the New Zealand’s
Tribunal’s statement that the author appeared to accept that he
was alleging not a risk of harm specific to him, but rather a general
risk faced by all individuals in Kiribati.
74. I regret that Mr Teitiota and his family were not given the
opportunity to choose whether to stay in New Zealand or return to
Kiribati. I am positive better solutions could have been found.
In my opinion, Mr Teitiota acted more as whistle-blower attempting
to alert the international community about the imminent danger and risks
to the right to life for the indigenous populations on the Pacific
Ocean islands.
75. The dissenting opinions expressed by two Committee members
are good indicators of the fact that the current lack of legal protection
for climate refugees under the Refugee Convention and the UN Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights should be overcome. As stated by the
Committee member Duncan Laki Muhumuza in his individual (dissenting)
opinion, “while it is laudable that Kiribati is taking adaptive
measures to reduce the existing vulnerabilities and address the
evils of climate change, it is clear that the situation of life
continues to be inconsistent with the standards of dignity for the
author, as required under the Covenant. The fact that this is a
reality for many others in the country, does not make it any more
dignified for the persons living in such conditions. New Zealand’s
action is more like forcing a drowning person back into a sinking
vessel, with the “justification” that after all there are other
voyagers on board. Even as Kiribati does what it takes to address
the conditions; for as long as they remain dire, the life and dignity
of persons remains at risk”.
76. I should like, therefore, to call for a more positive approach
and forward-looking climate-change policies and disaster preparedness
strategies that could protect people in future.