1. Introduction
1. The Russian Federation’s full-scale,
unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine
is causing incommensurate pain, loss and destruction throughout
the country; provoking ecocide and massive displacement of civilians;
disrupting the world economy; and destabilising the international
order which was established in the aftermath of the Second World
War.
2. As the 4th Council of Europe Summit of Heads of State and
Government recalled, the Council of Europe is a peace project, born
“out of the conviction that the pursuit of peace based upon justice
and international co-operation is vital for the preservation of
human society and civilisation”.
This conviction, which was enshrined in
the Statute of the Council of Europe in 1949,
is as strongly felt
nowadays, when a full-scale war of aggression has once again taken
centre stage in Europe.
3. As the full-scale invasion enters its 20th month, democracies
should not lose sight of their primary objective: stopping the aggression
and winning peace. A peace which is comprehensive, just and lasting. Without
full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, justice for
victims and accountability for the aggressor there can be no lasting
peace in Ukraine, and without a comprehensive, just and lasting
peace in Ukraine there cannot be durable security in Europe.
4. These concepts are central to the Resolution entitled “Principles
of the Charter of the United Nations underlining a comprehensive,
just and lasting peace in Ukraine”, which the General Assembly of
the United Nations symbolically adopted on the eve of the first
anniversary of the full-scale Russia’s invasion.
They have also
been reiterated by the Parliamentary Assembly in a host of texts
which it has adopted since the beginning of the full-scale invasion,
adding that any peace talks can only take place under the conditions
set out by Ukraine, and lending its full support to President Zelenskyy’s
peace formula.
5. At the time of writing, we are distraught to hear about yet
another Russian attack which has killed 52 civilians in the village
of Hroza. The horror of this violence is a reminder of the Great
Famine (the Holodomor), which was inflicted upon the Ukrainian people
by the Soviet Union, the 90th anniversary of which will be commemorated
in November 2023.
2. The situation on the ground
2.1. Military
developments
6. In June 2023, the Ukrainian
army started its counteroffensive, encountering resistance by entrenched Russian
forces, who are protected by multiple lines of defence composed
of anti-tank ditches, dragon’s teeth obstacles and fortifications.
The Ukrainian army has managed to break through the first line of
Russian fortified defences near the village of Verbove, in the Western
Zaporizhzhia region, and are advancing near the city of Bakhmut
in Donetsk region. On 22 September, the headquarters of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea were hit by a Ukrainian precision
strike, allegedly killing or wounding several Russian officers.
This might have an impact on the Russian naval superiority and capability
in the Black Sea.
7. On 23 and 24 June 2023, the Wagner Group, under the direct
command of their then leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, occupied the headquarters
of the Russian Southern Military District in the city of Rostov-on-Don,
and then attempted to advance towards Moscow, encountering and fighting
Russian regular army forces on their way.
8. Their march was stopped after an agreement between Prigozhin
and Vladimir Putin was reached, brokered by the latter’s ally Alexander
Lukashenka. According to this agreement, as Putin stated in the
media, Mr Prigozhin was a free man; the Wagner Group forces who
had until then fought in Ukraine were free to move to Belarus, join
the Russian regular army, or demobilise; the Wagner Group private
military company could continue to operate in other parts of the
world.
On 23 August 2023, Prigozhin and
other leading figures of the Wagner Group were killed in a private
jet crash in Russia. Reportedly, investigations are under way. The
mutiny indicates increasing tensions within the Russian elite and
a possible challenge to Putin’s leadership. It was followed by purges
in the military in the following weeks.
9. On 29 September 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a decree for the
conscription of 130 000 personnel between October and December 2023,
including Ukrainian citizens with Russian passports in the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine.
In addition, Russian
forces are currently building a new railway to connect the temporarily
occupied cities of Mariupol, Volnovakha and Donetsk to Russian territory,
a move that would provide them with an alternative route to the
Crimea bridge in order to transport military and civilian supplies
to temporarily occupied territories.
2.2. Illegal
elections organised in Ukraine by the Russian Federation
10. The use by the Russian Federation
of illegal fake elections and referendums in an attempt to legitimise its
illegal occupation is a travesty of democracy and a weaponisation
of political freedoms.
11. Since 2014, the Russian Federation has held illegal fake referendums
and elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine,
in flagrant violation of international law. The Assembly has previously recognised
that sham “referendums” organised by the Russian Federation in the
territory of Ukraine do not form the basis for any alteration of
the status of these regions of Ukraine, and are an escalation of
the aggression against Ukraine.
12. The Russian Federation’s latest illegal attempts to organise
so-called electoral processes in the temporarily occupied areas
of Ukraine from 8 to 10 September 2023 constituted a further violation
of universally recognised principles and norms of international
law. A Joint Statement by the President of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe, Krišjānis Kariņš, the President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tiny Kox, and the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Marija Pejčinović Burić made
it clear that these sham “elections” can only be considered as null
and void under international law, and condemned the organisation
of these elections as a further illustration of the denial of the
Russian Federation of the values of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law.
2.3. Humanitarian
law and human rights violations
13. Russian forces are indiscriminately
bombing Ukrainian cities on a daily basis, with long-range missiles, drone
attacks, and other weapons, only partially deflected by Ukrainian
air defence systems, and as the war continues, the casualty figures
continue to rise.
14. The data collected by the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicate that the vast majority of casualties
are indeed caused by “explosive weapons with wide area effects”:
shelling from artillery, tanks and multiple launch rocket systems,
cruise and ballistic missiles, and air strikes.
15. Overall, the most recent estimates of the OHCHR indicate that
9 701 civilians were killed and 17 748 injured in Ukraine since
the beginning of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine.
The actual numbers are however probably much higher, as the OHCHR
declares that information might be missing or still being collected
and corroborated, in particular in areas where the fight is more
intense and which remain under Russia’s temporary occupation (such
as Mariupol, Lysychansk, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk).
16. The full-scale Russian military invasion has also caused an
unprecedented humanitarian crisis, triggering a massive displacement
of civilians fleeing the conflict, the largest seen in Europe since
the Second World War. According to the data collected by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 19 September
2023, around 6.2 million Ukrainians were abroad.
In addition, the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) estimates that, as of May 2023, 5.1 million
persons were internally displaced within Ukraine. Among them, 7%
had been displaced outside the country before returning, but were
still remaining in displacement.
17. In addition, the conflict is causing incalculable damages
to Ukraine’s environment to such an extent as to amount to an ecocide.
The most blatant example of this crime is the flooding caused by
the destruction by Russia of the Kakhovka dam. According to data
shared by the Ukrainian authorities with the Council of Europe,
there have been 2 534 cases of environmental
damage recorded since the beginning of the conflict. These amount
to increased pollution as well as damage to natural reserves and
protected ecosystems, biodiversity as well as freshwater resources,
which will take decades to recover and might even be irreparable. The
issue of nuclear security is also a major concern. In fact, the
very first point of President Zelenskyy’s peace formula calls for
the restoration of safety conditions around Europe’s largest nuclear
power plant, Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is currently
under Russian occupation.
18. The Russian forces in Ukraine have committed serious war crimes
and crimes against humanity in violation of international humanitarian
and human rights law, which have been reported since the very first
days of the invasion. Both the Independent International Commission
of Inquiry on Ukraine established by the UNHCR
and the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR)
have reported continuous
evidence of war crimes by the Russian forces, including several
indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas
affecting civilian infrastructure such as residential buildings
and medical facilities. The evidence also showed widespread and systematic
violations against personal integrity, including summary executions,
torture, ill-treatment of prisoners of war and sexual violence.
19. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
is also closely monitoring the situation in Ukraine, through regular
country visits and the preparation of reports on different issues.
In April 2023 she presented a report
on “Crimean Tatars’ struggle for human rights”,
which focuses on multiple
patterns of violations of human rights committed against the Crimean
Tatar people throughout their history, especially following the
illegal temporary occupation and attempted illegal annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014.
20. On 4 October 2023, the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe presented to the Committee of Ministers a report on the human
rights situation in Crimea since the beginning of the full-scale
invasion.
The report indicates
that, while the peninsula has not witnessed large-scale hostilities
during the last year, the Russian forces have extensively exploited
Crimea for their ground offensive and air attacks, including by
the Black Sea Fleet headquartered in Sevastopol. The Russian military
effort has also relied on unlawful conscription and military enlistment
of the peninsula’s population, logistics and healthcare capacities,
as well as the tapping of other resources of the temporarily occupied
territory. Many of these abusive human rights practices and violations
appear to have been replicated and scaled up in the illegally temporarily
occupied territories of the regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk
and Zaporizhzhia in 2022. The Committee of Ministers invited therefore
the Secretary General to further examine the human rights situation
in all territories of Ukraine temporarily controlled or occupied
by the Russian Federation, and encouraged the Commissioner for Human Rights
to do the same.
21. One of the most serious concerns revolves around the crime
of genocide. The UNHCR Commission of Inquiry has expressed concerns
about allegations of genocide in Ukraine, in particular in relation
to the official Russian rhetoric transmitted in Russian State and
other media, which may constitute incitement to genocide. A similar
concern was raised by the Assembly in its
Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”, which emphasised the fact that the
so-called “de-Ukrainianisation” process carries characteristics
of public incitement to genocide or reveals a genocidal intent to
destroy the Ukrainian national group as such or at least part of
it.
22. The methods used by the Russian military in the war of aggression
against Ukraine and the actions of the illegal Russian authorities
in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories show that the
Russian rhetoric is not empty threats. The massacres of Bucha and
Irpin and those discovered in other towns liberated from Russian
occupation, the use of powerful explosives and even thermobaric
and cluster munitions in heavily populated areas constitute war
crimes, as does the complete destruction of the city of Mariupol
and the heavy shelling of other Ukrainian cities and towns. The
methodical tracking down, “filtering out” and ill-treatment in makeshift
torture chambers of Ukrainian patriots by the illegal occupation
authorities and the forcible incorporation of men living in the
temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine into the Russian military
demonstrate the intention of the occupiers to destroy Ukrainian
nationhood wherever they can. The destruction of cultural heritage
has a special significance in this context: UNESCO has recorded,
as of September 2023, damages to at least 291 cultural sites.
23. Along these lines is the systematic targeting and destruction
of vital civilian infrastructures such as hospitals, markets, power
stations, district heating systems (which generate heat from centralised
facilities and distribute it to residential and commercial buildings),
food storage and processing facilities. The most recent example
is the brutal missile strike on a café and a grocery store in the
village of Hroza, in the Kharhiv region, on 5 October 2023, which
killed at least 51 people.
As estimated by the Kyiv School
of Economics, the total direct war damage in Ukraine as of June
2023 was estimated at US$150,5 billion, over half of which refers
to housing and infrastructure.
The actual figures,
however, might be higher.
24. Russia’s war of aggression is affecting Ukraine’s economy
at large: in 2022, its GDP suffered a sharp decline of 30%.
By impeding Ukraine’s access to
the international market, with the disruption of supply chains and
trade routes, Ukraine’s exports have been severely reduced, and
the implications have been felt on a global level, in particular
with regard to grain exports. The decision of the Russian Federation
to exit the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023,
which allowed for the safe transport
of grain from Ukraine, obliged the country to find alternative solutions,
and had an impact on its exports as well as on global access to
Ukraine’s grain stock. Furthermore, the Russian Federation has not
refrained from attacking grain stocking infrastructure in the port
of Odessa,
and
the Russian authorities have explicitly stated that they can substitute
Ukrainian grain in the global markets.
This indicates an attempt to weaponise
trade and food export – a vital threat to global security, against
which the second point of President Zelenskyy’s peace formula is
directed.
25. In its
Resolution
2482 (2023), the Assembly already noted that some of the acts committed
by Russian forces against Ukrainian civilians could fall under Article
II of the Genocide Convention (to which both the Russian Federation
and Ukraine are parties), such as the forcible transfer of children
for russification purposes. The abduction of tens of thousands of
Ukrainian children and their internment in faraway regions of Russia
is a crime against humanity and may indeed well amount to an element
of genocide.
26. Similarly, in its
Resolution
2495 (2023) “Deportations and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children
and other civilians to the Russian Federation or to temporarily
occupied Ukrainian territories: create conditions for their safe
return, stop these crimes and punish the perpetrators”, the Assembly
further emphasised this conclusion, supporting the need for thorough
recording, gathering and assessment of evidence of the crime of genocide.
In addition, the Assembly invited the International Criminal Court
to examine the possible prosecution of the crime of genocide as
regards the State policy of the Russian Federation towards Ukrainian children
currently within its hands.
27. It is worth recalling that the International Criminal Court
already issued arrest warrants against the Russian President Vladimir
Putin and the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, stating
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each suspect bears
responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population
and that of unlawful transfer of population from temporarily occupied
areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, in prejudice of Ukrainian
children.
2.4. Recognising
the Holodomor as a genocide
28. The genocidal policies of the
Russian Federation against Ukraine must be seen in the context of
an earlier attempt to wipe out the Ukrainian nationhood, namely
the Great Famine (the Holodomor), whose 90th anniversary will be
commemorated in November 2023.
29. The Holodomor killed anywhere between 4 and 8 million Ukrainians,
mostly in the countryside, away from foreign observers posted in
the cities. Secret documents published after the “Orange Revolution”
showed that the famine was intentional. It targeted mostly Ukrainians,
within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as well as Ukrainians
living in other regions of the Soviet Union.
30. The artificial famine was preceded by a campaign of show trials,
enforced disappearances and other forms of repression against the
Ukrainian intellectual elites – the cultural backbone of Ukrainian
nationhood. Genocide does not require the physical elimination of
all members of the target group: it is sufficient that the cultural
backbone of the group is broken by rendering living conditions so
impossible that the group as such is in fact destroyed.
31. While several Council of Europe member States already recognised
the Holodomor as a genocide,
and the European Parliament did
so in December 2022,
it is now time for the Assembly
to do the same, and call on national parliaments of member and non-member
States that have not yet done so to follow its example. This long-awaited
recognition would represent a symbolic yet powerful homage to the
Ukrainian people and in particular to the victims of this horrific
crime, which the Assembly had already examined in its
Resolution 1723 (2010) “Commemorating
the victims of the Great Famine (Holodomor) in the former USSR”.
32. The Assembly will continue its work through its Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on the basis of the motion “Commemorating
the 90th anniversary of the Holodomor
of 1932-1933 in Ukraine” to establish the historical truth and explain
the legal arguments leading to the conclusion that the Holodomor
was a genocide.
3. Council
of Europe support to Ukraine
33. “
We
will stand with Ukraine, for as long as it takes.”
The
Reykjavík Declaration adopted at the 4th Summit of the Council of
Europe was a clear commitment and expression of full support to
Ukraine and its people by the member States of the Organisation.
Since the beginning of the full-scale war of aggression of the Russian
Federation, the Council of Europe has stood shoulder-to-shoulder
with Ukraine. The robust response of the Committee of Ministers
– with the unanimous push of the Assembly – to exclude the Russian Federation
from the Council of Europe was one of the first of these steps.
34. Concrete steps concerning the participation of the Russian
Federation in the open conventions of the Council of Europe (those
open to non-member States of the Organisation) have been taken,
with each treaty body deciding, on the basis of their respective
rules and procedure, the modalities for restricting the participation
of the Russian Federation in those treaty bodies.
35. The Council of Europe has mobilised its expertise and resources
in support of Ukraine. This has included providing expertise to
Ukraine’s Prosecutor General in investigations into human rights
violations, it has included expertise to Ukraine and neighbouring
countries to respond to the mass displacement of the country’s civilian
population, and it has seen the accession of Ukraine to the Council
of Europe Development Bank in June 2023. The first operation in
Ukraine since its accession to the Bank began in September 2023
to finance housing repairs for vulnerable households in conflict-affected
areas of Ukraine. The Bank has further approved €1.3 billion in
loans to meet the long-term needs of Ukrainian refugees and the
host countries.
36. The Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine “Resilience,
Recovery and Reconstruction” 2023-2026 was developed in particular
to accompany the reconstruction process and economic recovery in
Ukraine. Furthermore, it provides support to strengthen the resilience
of Ukrainian public institutions, enhance democratic governance
and the rule of law, and protect the fundamental rights of citizens.
This Action Plan adds the expertise of the Council of Europe to
Ukrainian efforts to recover from the devastation caused by the actions
of the Russian Federation, and also to support Ukraine’s European
perspective reform agenda, following the decision of the European
Council of 23 June 2022 to grant European Union candidate status
to Ukraine.
37. The funding needs for the four-year co-operation framework
of the Action Plan is estimated at €50 million. Contributions to
this have already met 39% of these funding needs by 28 September
2023.
This continued
support will be key for ensuring that projects can be launched in
priority areas and in responding to evolving needs and priorities
of the Ukrainian authorities.
38. The strong support of the member States of the Council of
Europe for Ukraine has also been clear in the Assembly, with national
delegations, political groups, and individual parliamentarians playing
their part in mobilising the support of parliaments, governments
and citizens for Ukraine.
39. The European Conference of Presidents of Parliament, held
in Dublin on 28-29 September 2023,
reaffirmed solidarity
with the Ukrainian people and an unwavering commitment to stand
with Ukraine for as long as it takes. The role of national parliaments
was emphasised as guardians of both democracy and the international
law-based order. In this respect, parliamentarians are well-placed
to show leadership, to continue to explain to their citizens the
real stakes of this war and to hold governments to account to avoid
any weakening of resolve. Using parliamentary diplomacy and inter-parliamentary
dialogue, parliamentarians can continue to rally allies in support
of Ukraine, and promote the multilateral system of global governance,
firmly rooted in the rule of law.
40. The role of parliaments is equally important in ensuring that
support at national level is secured for Ukraine to exercise its
right to self-defence, and to begin to mobilise the resources that
will be necessary to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, redress
environmental damage, and restore the rich cultural and religious
heritage of the country. Parliaments should also contribute by providing
expertise and advice, to ensure a greater institutional capacity
of the Verkhovna Rada, strengthen Ukraine’s democratic resilience,
and prepare the country for its accession to the European Union
as a fully-fledged member.
41. In Dublin, Presidents of parliament also confirmed commitment
to the principles included in President Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace
formula, and continued strong support for the establishment of a
compensation mechanism as well as for the creation of a special
international tribunal for the crime of aggression.
4. Supporting
Ukraine’s victory
4.1. Military
support
42. The Russian Federation is preparing
for multiple years of war: the Ministry of Finance declared that
the total volume of national defence spending will reach 10.8 trillion
roubles in 2024,
a 70% increase of its defence spending
budget compared to 2023, which would be equivalent to 30% of the
total public expenditure and to 6% of its GDP.
At the same time, Ukrainian officials
plan to continue operations through the winter. It will therefore
be even more important to ensure that Ukraine is provided with the
adequate means to keep advancing in the medium and long-term.
43. In this respect, the Assembly should encourage Council of
Europe member States to bolster their support, and prove wrong the
recurring voices spread by the Kremlin of a “war fatigue” among
Ukraine’s partners. On 2 October 2023, the European Union Foreign
Ministers held a meeting in Kyiv, the first time ever in a non-member
State, sending an important message of support to Ukraine. As stated
by the EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the military, civilian
and humanitarian support provided to date by the EU amounts to €85
billion,
which, together with commitments
from other member States, is the highest across the world.
Mr Borrell also confirmed the European
Union’s pledge to train up to 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers in the upcoming
months.
44. On the other hand, on 30 September 2023 a government shutdown
in the United States was avoided at the very last minute. The continuity
of US support is crucial to sustain Ukraine’s war effort, in particular considering
that the US is its largest provider of military aid: as of July
2023, it provided a total of US$46.6 billion in security assistance,
weapons, and loans and grants for the purchase of weapons and military
equipment.
45. The most recent developments in terms of military equipment
provided to Ukraine include the pledge made in August 2023 by Denmark,
the Netherlands and Norway to provide F-16 fighter jets, accompanied
by other countries that will ensure support to train Ukrainian pilots:
the first planes should be deployed in early 2024. In the meantime,
the first group of US-made M1 Abrams tanks have arrived in Ukraine
and should soon be used on the field. Both fighter jets and tanks
will hopefully provide a significant contribution to the counteroffensive,
but further support should be provided also in terms of ammunition
and artillery shells, by increasing their production, as requested
by President Zelenskyy during his meeting with the EU Foreign Ministers
in Kyiv.
4.2. Political
and diplomatic support
46. Russia’s war of aggression
against Ukraine is being fought in the battlefield as well as in
the court of public opinion. Supporting Ukraine’s victory, therefore,
entails deploying diplomatic efforts to maintain and raise support
for Ukraine among the international community as well as domestically,
ensuring that governments deliver on their promises and that the
public opinion is well informed of the stakes of this war.
47. Commitment to political and diplomatic support is important
for the defence of Ukraine and equally for the defence of the international
multilateral system. Bolstering diplomatic support, by calling on
all States wishing to uphold a rules-based international order of
peace to support Ukraine and isolate the Russian Federation, to
protect the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty,
remains crucial at bilateral level as well as in multilateral institutions.
48. The informal meeting of the European Union Foreign Ministers
in Kyiv in October 2023 was a sign of the resolve and unity of European
countries. The high-level open debate on effective multilateralism
and the maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine organised by
Albania holding of the rotating presidency of the United Nations
Security Council in September 2023 was also of importance in this
regard. The need for dialogue, diplomacy and a just peace is clear
among international leaders. However, the debate also reflected the
differing concerns among some States or groups.
49. The BRICS, for instance, have refrained from condemning the
Russian Federation’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
Through the BRICS
platform and by strengthening bilateral relations with countries
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the Russian Federation seeks
to dodge sanctions and boost trade. This approach is underscored
by efforts to expand the group, with the first wave of enlargement
announced during the XV BRICS Summit held in August 2023. This will
see Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates become full members of BRICS in January 2024.
50. Political support at national level is also crucial. The effects
of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression have clear implications
for the cost-of-living, energy markets, environment, and food security
in countries worldwide. Effective political messaging will continue
to be needed to maintain a broad front of solidarity with Ukraine
in the face of misinformation spread by the Russian Federation that
international sanctions imposed on Russia, and actions of supporters
of Ukraine, are to blame for domestic challenges. The Assembly has
previously noted that the responsibility lies with the aggressor
regime. Without its serious violations of international law there
would have been no need for sanctions.
5. A
comprehensive, just and lasting peace
5.1. Supporting
Ukraine’s reconstruction
51. The post-war reconstruction
effort in Ukraine might be the largest post-war rebuilding effort
in modern history. Ukraine has already shown that it is possible
to rebuild during an unfolding war, and it is vital that post-war
reconstruction planning starts as soon as possible. Ukraine’s reconstruction
can only be a success in the context of the country’s long-term
future at the heart of Europe, not only geographically but also
politically: European integration is crucial to Ukraine’s recovery.
52. A joint assessment released in March 2023 by the Government
of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the
United Nations, estimates that the cost of reconstruction and recovery
in Ukraine has grown to US$411 billion (equivalent of €383 billion).
The estimate covers the one-year period from Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine on 24 February 2022, to the first anniversary of the war
on 24 February 2023. The cost of reconstruction and recovery is
expected to stretch over 10 years and combines both needs for public and
private funds.
53. Lessons for a successful reconstruction process can be drawn
from the transformative reform and reconstruction efforts in Western
Europe following the Second World War, in Central and Eastern Europe following
the end of the Cold War, and the Western Balkans following the wars
in the former Yugoslavia. In all of these cases, the process of
European political integration played a key role in laying the ground
for greater stability and prosperity.
Security is also essential to create
a solid ground for Ukraine's reconstruction. Moreover, successful
reconstruction will require strong links in the filed of international
trade and investment, as well as a welcoming environment for international
business.
54. The National Recovery Council adopted its Recovery Plan in
July 2022, with the aim of finding efficient solutions for a fast
recovery of the crucial economic and social processes and natural
ecosystems, and developing a modernisation plan to ensure expedited
sustainable economic growth and the wellbeing of people.
55. The Ukraine Recovery Conference 2023 held in London from 21
to 22 June 2023, co-hosted by the United Kingdom and Ukraine, strengthened
commitments of international support for Ukraine and worked towards
attracting international investment to rebuild Ukraine, focusing
on how best to enable private sector to invest in Ukraine’s own
transformation and reform program.
The Ukraine Recovery Conference in
2024 will be hosted by Germany, and it will be important to keep
the momentum of the previous conferences.
56. The Ukrainian people are the most important asset in this
process, and their well-being should be prioritised. Local actors
are the best judges of their community’s needs and can bring in
networks and expertise to facilitate access to essential services.
Donors, governments, and institutions should therefore pledge resources
that enable municipalities to take the lead where they are the best
positioned to act.
5.2. Supporting
Ukraine’s democratic resilience
57. Ukraine’s democratic institutions
at all levels are put to a test by the Russian aggression, and they
have proven to be strong notwithstanding the related difficulties.
Making them even more resilient will be essential for the development
of a prosperous society once the aggression is over, and to secure
Ukraine’s path towards integration in the European Union.
58. The Council of Europe has affirmed its role as one of the
main partners of Ukraine, through its multifaceted co-operation
activities. The Action Plan for Ukraine 2023-2026
aims at strengthening
the protection of human rights, the reform and effectiveness of
the justice system and the promotion of good democratic governance.
59. One of the main challenges involves the organisation of free
and fair elections when conditions are met. The Council of Europe
is already supporting the Ukrainian authorities by providing its
expertise on the legislative reforms that will be necessary to ensure
that elections are held according to international standards and
truly reflect the will of the electorate.
60. In order to ensure security, resilience, and accountability,
the good democratic governance of public institutions at all levels
must be strengthened. The decentralisation reform that Ukraine embarked
upon more than a decade ago, with the assistance of the Council
of Europe,
has helped local self-governments
to cope with the extraordinary challenges provoked by the full-scale
invasion. Even during war times, it remains one of the most popular
reforms among Ukrainian citizens,
and this momentum should not be
lost. The creation of the Ukrainian Congress, a body which will
allow the government to consult with the local and regional authorities,
is a welcome development in this direction.
61. Democratic institutions can function properly only in a framework
based on the protection of human rights and the rule of law. The
development of transitional justice measures, aimed at addressing
the multiple crimes and violations of human rights caused by the
full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, will be a first step
in this direction. These will have to include accountability for
the perpetrators of crimes and mechanisms to ensure reparations
for the victims. The Commissioner for Human Rights as well as the
Venice Commission can provide guidance in this regard.
62. The Ministers of Justice of the G7 countries gathered in Tokyo
on 7 July 2023 also declared their commitment to support Ukraine
in ensuring accountability and investigating and prosecuting crimes
committed during the war of aggression, as well as in undertaking
reforms of the justice system, with a specific focus on anti-corruption
measures.
63. All these aspects will be even more important in the context
of the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, with a view to applying
the “Building Back Better Principles” to all domains. Council of
Europe member States should make sure that funding is available
to cover all the initiatives foreseen in the Action Plan 2023-2026,
as already recommended by Resolution 2506 (2023) of the Assembly.
5.3. Supporting
Ukraine’s further European and Euro-Atlantic integration
64. Immediately after the beginning
of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine sent its formal application
for EU membership. On 23 June 2022, by unanimous agreement between
the leaders of the 27 EU member States, Ukraine was granted candidate
status.
65. During the highly-symbolic meeting of European Union Foreign
Ministers in Kyiv, in October 2023, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister,
Dmytro Kuleba expressed his expectation to be able “to open accession
talks by the end of the year”. High Representative Josep Borrell
also highlighted that, by the end of the year, the European Council
will receive the report of the European Commission on the Enlargement
package, to be presented by Mr Borrell himself and the Commissioner
for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi.
66. The Council of Europe with its monitoring and co-operation
bodies will be a close partner of Ukraine on its steps towards the
alignment with the EU acquis,
which are crucial to the path of accession. The Assembly can play
an active role in this process, monitoring that the effort is sustained
by all parties.
67. In response to Ukraine’s aspirations for membership to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its member States agreed
already at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine would become a
member of NATO. From 2010 to 2014, Ukraine pursued a non-block policy,
which it terminated in response to Russia’s aggression. In June
2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted legislation reinstating membership
in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective. In
2019, a corresponding amendment to Ukraine's Constitution entered
into force. In September 2022, following Russia’s illegal attempt
to annex a part of the territories of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk,
Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine reiterated its request
for NATO membership.
At the Vilnius Summit held on 11
July 2023, member States reaffirmed their commitment that Ukraine
will become a member of NATO, recognising Ukraine’s increased interoperability
and substantial progress with reforms. The final statement says
that NATO member States will continue to support and review Ukraine’s
progress on interoperability as well as additional democratic and
security sector reforms. NATO will be in a position to extend an
invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and
conditions are met.
68. On the margins of NATO's Vilnius Summit, G7 Leaders declared
that they would launch bilateral negotiations with Ukraine to formalise
long-term security commitments. Additionally, several national parliaments’
resolutions are calling for Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In May
2023, for instance, the Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia) passed
a Statement in Support of Ukraine’s NATO Membership, as the only
way to ensure a rules-based world order, lasting peace and the security
of the democratic countries of Europe.
The Saeima (Parliament of Latvia)
issued a statement, ahead of the NATO Vilnius Summit, stressing
that Ukraine has permanently taken a move towards Euro-Atlantic
integration, and that it supports Ukraine's full-fledged inclusion
in the North Atlantic Alliance as soon as conditions allow it.
More recently, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted
on 19 September 2023 a resolution expressing support for Ukraine’s
NATO membership and calling on the member States to invite Ukraine
to join the alliance at its next summit in Washington D.C.
69. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Kyiv on 28
September 2023 – for the second time since the beginning of the
full-scale invasion – to underscore NATO’s powerful support for
Ukraine in talks with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his government.
He underlined that NATO Allies continue to provide high-end capabilities
to help push back the invasion, including modern tanks, sophisticated
missile systems, and air defences, as well as training for F-16
pilots.
6. A
just peace
70. The horrors of the Russian
war of aggression against Ukraine require full accountability of
the Russian Federation and, in particular, its political and military
leadership. This is a matter not only of ensuring justice for Ukraine
and its people, but also of upholding the rules-based international
order based on the prohibition of the use of force set out in Article
2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. The international
community cannot accept this blatant violation of international
law, or else the world will be once again dominated by powerful States
starting wars and changing borders at will.
71. As the Reykjavík Declaration points out, there cannot be peace
without accountability. The Assembly therefore has welcomed the
establishment of the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register
of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against
Ukraine (Register of Damage). As an Enlarged Partial Agreement,
it is open to any country in the world, adding to its political
relevance. The Register of Damage now has 44 members from across
three continents (Europe, North America, and Asia). Efforts to continue
to promote participation of the largest possible number of States
and other international organisations are desirable for enhancing
the functioning of the Register of Damage as well as serving as
a strong message of solidarity and support for Ukraine and for international
justice.
72. Since the establishment of the Register of Damage, the Conference
of Participants has met twice. In June 2023, a Host State Agreement
between the Council of Europe and the Netherlands establishing The Hague
as the seat of the Register of Damage was signed and has come into
force. The second meeting of the Conference of Participants focused
on financial issues and the procedure for the appointment of the
Board. The Executive Director of the Register of Damage, Markiyan
Kliuchkovskyi, has set the goal of the Register of Damage becoming
fully operational and ready to start taking claims in the first
quarter of 2024.
73. During their Informal Conference held in Riga on 11 September
2023, the ministers of Justice of the Council of Europe adopted
a declaration that outlined the principles (Riga principles) for
member States to the Register of Damage to consider in order to
achieve comprehensive accountability for the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine.
These included:
- victim-centred approach;
- firm legal basis;
- authority and legitimacy;
- support to Ukrainian national authorities;
- coherence, complementarity and interoperability;
- civil society engagement;
- work towards an effective reparation.
74. In the Resolution establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement
on the Register of Damage the participants to the Register agree
to continue working in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations
and bodies towards the establishment, by a separate international
instrument, of a future international compensation mechanism. The
Register of Damage, including its digital platform with all data about
claims and evidence, is an integral initial step towards the realisation
of this.
75. There remains the need to work swiftly on the future steps,
namely the establishment of an international commission for the
adjudication of claims for damages established by the Register of
Damage, and the establishment of a compensation mechanism to pay
out the claims for damages established by the Register and adjudicated
by the commission. The Assembly has already said that the compensation
mechanism should make use of confiscated assets to pay for war damages
in Ukraine without delay.
76. Further steps beyond a functioning compensation mechanism
should also be pursued in efforts to respond to the gravity of the
crimes committed by the Russian Federation and to ensure full accountability
of the aggressor. For this reason, the Assembly has consistently
called for the establishment of a special international tribunal
for the crime of aggression to prosecute the political and military
leadership of the Russian Federation, most recently through
Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”.
77. Considerable progress has been made in the creation of an ad
hoc international tribunal for the crime of aggression
since the Assembly first made this proposal in April 2022. A “core
group” of 37 States willing to set up such a tribunal has been constituted,
and an International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression
(ICPA) has been set up in The Hague with the support of the Netherlands
and the European Union. The Assembly stresses that the legal form
chosen for this tribunal – a fully international or an internationalised (hybrid)
Ukrainian tribunal – should ensure the highest international legitimacy
and the lowest legal risks, in particular as regards the possibility
for suspects to rely on personal or functional immunity.
78. At the same time, Ukrainian prosecutors and investigators
have registered over 100 000 war crimes perpetrated by Russian troops
on Ukrainian soil.
The continued support for investigations
and evidence-gathering efforts conducted by the Ukrainian authorities,
other national authorities, and the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court remains of the utmost importance. The beginning of
operations of the International Criminal Court’s field office in
Kyiv in September 2023 was a further step in enhancing the effectiveness
and efficiency of responding to the crimes that Russia continues
to commit against Ukraine and Ukrainians every day.
7. Democratic
security and rules-based multilateralism
79. The pursuit of democratic security
was central to the Vienna Declaration which was adopted by the Heads
of State and Government of the Council of Europe at their first
Summit in Vienna in 1993.
This declaration acknowledged
the historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability, underwritten
by a commitment to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility
and universality of human rights, the rule of law, and common cultural
heritage enriched by its diversity. The compliance of each member
State with Council of Europe standards in the areas of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law would be also a guarantee of security
for the others, as democracies do not wage war.
80. There are abundant examples of the promise of this declaration
being met. In October 2023 the 30-year anniversary of Romania’s
accession to the Council of Europe is celebrated. This is one of
the many examples across the continent where the commitment to the
common values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is
the foundation of a successful process of European integration.
The same path has been followed by many countries which joined the
Organisation following the fall of the Berlin wall, which, together,
have built not only a shared legal space but also a community of
values.
81. The Russian Federation provides a clear example of the opposite
path, and of the direct link between the rejection of Council of
Europe values and standards at domestic level and an aggressive
posture in international relations. In addition, it would be useful
to enrich the political debate with a historical analysis of the
trajectory of Russia’s imperialism in central and eastern Europe
over the years, as the denial of Ukraine’s separate nationhood has
deep roots in Russia’s discourse.
82. The Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine
flouts the principles of respect for territorial integrity and political
independence of States, while its malign interference in elections
and political processes aims to weaken and destabilise democracies.
This pattern of behaviour is a direct threat to the fundamentals of
global governance, and is even more serious as it is carried out
by a State occupying a permanent seat of the United Nations Security
Council, the body which should be in charge of maintaining international
peace and security.
83. If there is a lesson for Europeans to learn from the course
of history is that firmness is indispensable to deter an aggressor
and that greater investment is needed to enhance democratic security
in Europe, through the mission of the Council of Europe.
8. Conclusions
84. Ukrainians are fighting for
their future. They are also fighting for the future of all Europeans
and for the respect of the founding principles of the international
order as it was established in the aftermath of the Second World
War and enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.
85. A disturbing parallelism can be drawn between the current
genocidal policies of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the
Holodomor, the genocide by famine perpetrated by the Soviet authorities
against Ukrainians in the 1930s. The recognition of the Holodomor
as a genocide by the Assembly and by parliaments which have not
yet done so would be a due act of homage to the Ukrainian people
and in particular to the victims.
86. As the Russian Federation is preparing for a protracted conflict,
the call to keep a united front in supporting Ukraine to win a comprehensive,
just and lasting peace should be more powerful than ever. The Assembly
has already expressed its support for President Zelenskyy’s peace
formula, as have done the Presidents of Parliaments of Council of
Europe member States in their recent conference (Dublin, 28-29 September
2023). The Assembly should call on national parliaments to express
their formal endorsement.
87. Peace can be just only if a comprehensive system of accountability
is put in place and implemented to hold to account the Russian aggressors
and the perpetrators. The launch of the Register of Damage is a
very significant step forward in this direction and testifies to
the profound commitment of many countries around the world for justice
to be delivered. On the strength of this momentum, the push for
setting up an international compensation mechanism for the victims
and a Special International Tribunal to investigate and prosecute
the crime of aggression committed by the Russian political and military
leadership should continue.
88. Peace can only be lasting if the territorial integrity of
Ukraine is fully restored, its infrastructure is rebuilt, its economy
is helped to recover, and its democracy is robust and resilient.
Finally, peace can only be lasting if the multilateral system is
strongly anchored in international law and has the means and authority
to curb malign destabilisation attempts and prevent war from happening
again in the future.