Parliamentary Assembly

Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a particular honour and pleasure for me to be able to address the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe today.

Twenty years ago Austria became a full Member of the Council of Europe and I myself was privileged at the time to be a member of the Austrian delegation.

During these last twenty years, experienced Austrian parliamentarians have made the contribution you expected of them in the Consultative Assembly and its committees, as have members of the Federal Government in the Committee of Ministers.

We are proud in Austria of the fact that the day before yesterday the Parliamentary Assembly once more elected as its President the Chairman of our Foreign Affairs Committee, the Deputy in the National Council, Karl Czernetz, one of the most outstanding parliamentarians in the Second Republic. I should not like to miss this opportunity of thanking you.

The Austrian Federal Government recently gave expression to its close relations with the Council of Europe in a government declaration of 5 November 1975 which states among other things:

“The Federal Government will continue in future to give all possible support to European co-operation between states with pluralistic and democratic social systems.

Accordingly it will seek above all to ensure that the Council of Europe once again plays the part in the movement towards European unity which it had when it was founded.”

Ladies and Gentlemen, Austria is situated on the edge of that long demarcation line stretching from Lübeck to Trieste, the dividing line between the political systems in Europe. Today that line is more accurate than ever because Greece and Portugal have become democracies.

On our side of the dividing line, Spain alone has not yet completely developed a democratic system and we can only hope that the transition to democracy in that country will take place peacefully and that no human lives have to be sacrificed on the way. The great majority of the Spanish people want a democratic form of state as a political basis for their freedom. It should be the bounden duty of the Council of Europe to support those forces which are working to that end. (Applause)

Today, almost the same number of human beings live in the Western states as in the East. If we assume that Spain will become a fully fledged democracy, there will be 340 million human beings living in democratic Europe and about 375 million in communist Europe.

Whenever therefore we speak about Europe we must constantly remind ourselves of this situation, and the European task seems to me to be twofold. One aspect whose importance has been fully recognised in the Council of Europe is the need to achieve the greatest possible degree of integration; the second is equally fundamental for the survival of a peaceful continent, namely the achievement of peaceful coexistence between both parts of Europe.

I myself was aware of that situation when I spoke strongly in favour of a conference on security in my last speech before the Council of Europe on 25 January 1971. I said at the time:

“There are certain conferences which, in the long run, are by their very nature unavoidable. Which is why I do not think simply agreeing to such a conference should be made a far-reaching political issue.”

And I concluded by stating:

“The meaning of any European security conference must lie primarily in the confrontation of all viewpoints concerning European policy, though overshadowed at the same time by the problems of world policy.”

And indeed, before we came together for that conference in Helsinki this confrontation took place. The documents signed there are indeed the record and protocol of problems arising out of that confrontation.

My support for the holding of a security conference makes it my duty today to say something about the policy of détente.

I feel all the more compelled to do this because I have the feeling that in democratic states it is this problem which has become the subject of conflicting opinions.

I recently maintained that today – whatever we may think about détente – there is no acute danger of war in Europe, nor are there any areas of tension apart from Cyprus, and that problem concerns two member states of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The main need is to realise that détente exists and can exist only if a balance of military power between the super-powers has been achieved. The same cause which was once the prerequisite for the policy of coexistence is now the basic condition for a policy of détente.

And if it is true that the prerequisite for a policy of détente is military equilibrium in the world, then it must also be correct to say that any change in that equilibrium is bound to affect the prerequisite for the policy of détente.

I admit that I am making these statements very apodictically and that I am unlikely to give much pleasure to my interlocutors in Eastern Europe, but I should like to assert just as apodictically that there is no alternative to a policy of détente. I would go further and say that it has also produced obvious results.

I would ask you not to take it as an example of my own preoccupations if I prove what I have said by using the historical example of Austria. Although I must first add that the policy of détente, like any other policy, has repeatedly suffered setbacks and gone through relatively long periods of stagnation.

In the last twenty years many have asked me how I could explain the fact that the Soviet Union agreed to conclude the State Treaty at that time. How it was possible that at that time the Soviet army could withdraw about 50 000 soldiers from the heart of Europe, i.e. from Austria.

Polite but critical observers always linked these questions with the remark that naturally they had the greatest respect for the ability of the government of the day and considerable admiration for the skill of Austrian diplomacy, but nevertheless they were unable to accept those two facts as an adequate explanation for this particular development.

Indeed, whilst acknowledging the tribute paid to us, I must admit that the full explanation is that the Soviet Union, led by Nikita Khrushchev,

was anxious at the time to give concrete proof that it was once more worth while sitting down with her at the negotiating table.

Khrushchev was unable to embark upon that course without overcoming considerable internal resistance. He writes about this in his memoirs, which I regard as authentic, as follows:

“The Austrians paid me the tribute of ascribing to me a leading part in the decision to withdraw from Austria, and they are quite right.

They had no idea of the bitterness of the internal struggles which took place before we were able to sign the State Treaty and I do not deny the fact that it was on my initiative that this correct decision was finally taken.”

Furthermore, this statement by Khrushchev reveals that before the implementation stage is reached, Soviet policy is also subject to differences of opinion and clarification. I myself was a member of the delegation which went to Moscow to pave the way for the treaty.

At the time many people throught that this was a trick – that the Soviet Union had decided to take this step in order to force the other occupation powers to withdraw from Austria likewise. These observers thought that in this way the whole of Austria would more easily fall victim to domination by the Soviet Union.

As you see, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am speaking very candidly. But I should like to say just as candidly here that in the twenty-one years since the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty – that is a long time, almost a quarter of a century – there has not been one single attempt by the Soviet Union to exert any form of pressure on the Austrian Government, nor has Austrian sovereignty been threatened at any time.

Admittedly, the Soviet Union held that unduly close relations with the European Economic Community would not be compatible with Austrian neutrality. But the agreement finally achieved was scarcely the subject of conversations between the two governments.

And in view of this, I believe that I am right in saying that an area of détente came into being in the middle of Europe which constituted the most important condition for the remarkable prosperity of our Republic and the growing well-being of our people.

Austria’s State Treaty did not mean the end of the cold war but it was the beginning of a new phase. Several other examples could also be given:

Were we not repeatedly deeply anxious about the fate of Berlin? How often was that divided town threatened and endangered by a renewed blockade? Admittedly, we cannot close our eyes to the barbaric reality of the Berlin Wall, but nevertheless things have become quieter around Berlin.

Another very recent example: during the upheavals in Portugal there were fears on more than one occasion of foreign intervention. The situation would have been a delicate one because the fleets of the two super-powers sail the Mediterranean and movements of warships off Portugal’s coasts might undoubtedly have had a considerable influence on the train of events in that country. But that did not happen, and less than fifteen days ago the Portuguese people were able to elect their parliament freely after fifty years of dictatorship.

Angola will be cited as an objection. I can answer that by saying that I am speaking of what is happening in Europe. The other continents – and this is indeed a characteristic feature of our time – have not experienced the same degree of relative détente.

I should particularly like to stress that if we were still in the cold war era, many events in recent years would have taken a more dramatic turn. Détente, like coexistence, is not a state of true peace.

In my view it cannot be denied that this continent has reached a high degree of relative détente and it seems to me that the European democracies are duty bound to pursue the policy of détente constructively, and critically, if you wish. Because only the progress of that détente can guarantee their existence, and I believe it is high time to practise that policy because the next conference is not far off; as you know it will take place in Belgrade in 1977.

To repeat what I have said clearly and frankly: it seems to me that it is the duty of the European democratic states not to adopt a constantly defensive attitude towards this question of détente but to decide upon a more imaginative policy. (Applause)

In what fields can the policy of détente be effective in the future? Since the war, the economy of democratic Europe has developed in an astonishing manner. The progress made is beyond all imagination. Admittedly, the movement towards European integration, the European Economic Community, the Coal and Steel Community, and EFTA acted as a catalyst. But the fact remains that one of the great weaknesses of the economy of the democratic states is that they possess scarcely any raw materials.

We must remember that, for the time being at least, 98 % of our oil supplies still come from the outside world, mainly the Middle East. Eastern Europe, at least for the time being, has more energy resources than the West. The reserves of energy in the European East, particularly in a number of important countries of the European East, are indeed considerable.

And it seems to me by no means unrealistic for the West to take the initiative in calling for an all-European project for the use of energy. This will by no means be able to solve our problems but it will be a considerable contribution. I have good reasons for saying that. A start has been made between Austria and Poland and I think it has been an exemplary start.

Another problem of considerable pan-European importance, and I have been raising this matter for more than twenty-five years, is the development of a European network of waterways. On my way here I believe I passed over three canals, a remarkable experience for a Central European.

I admit that this problem is particularly urgent for European states with no coastline, but it is equally so for regions in other states far removed from ports, for example southern Germany.

This is a very special problem for Austria because it is a heavy burden for an industrial state if large machines weighing between 150 and 300 tons cannot be transported in one piece as could naturally be done by water. In this connection the “Europa Canal” has a vital part to play. It is of economic importance for at least nine European countries in Western, Central and Eastern Europe.

Another example is the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal which is the Eastern counterpart of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, the so-called “Europa Canal”. This gigantic project is economically and financially feasible only by means of a project going far beyond the sphere of the states immediately concerned. I would even say that much could be done to implement this important project, which is important for Europe as a whole, if, in particular, the financial power of the European West could be placed at its disposal.

Lastly, I should like to put forward an idea in this connection and formulate it in a way which may seem surprising to some. I maintain that the policy of détente mainly serves the cause of democracy, for only if there is détente in Europe can there be liberalisation, although I am under no illusions as to its extent. Hitherto, liberalisation policy has always come to an end when it began to turn into democratisation. Then the tanks promptly stopped the process.

And much of what is happening in the countries of the Eastern bloc today, spiritual resistance and the possibility at least to emigrate, can be understood only by the efforts of the governments of the East not to appear too visibly to distort the Helsinki conclusions.

In that connection I should like to warn you against the idea that it will be possible to overcome communism with the help of a policy of détente. That would be a tragic illusion; but nevertheless is would be wrong to underestimate the trends towards liberalisation.

Admittedly, the Western world, the democratic world, has almost forgotten what happened in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. At best, those events have become a chapter in the martyrology of mankind. But the whole development in European communism, these critical trends, that urge towards independence from the central power of the movement have given polycentrism a new lease of life.

I said that just now that, as some critics of the policy of détente in the West repeatedly say, we cannot expect it to change the internal system. Moreover, we undertook in Helsinki not to interfere in each other’s affairs. That task can be left to no one but the peoples who are themselves concerned.

Ota Sik, the former Czech Minister for Economic Affairs and one of the initiators of the Prague Spring who is now Professor at the College for Economic and Social Sciences in St Gallen, upholds the – what seems to me somewhat optimistic – view that in the long run the progressive forces will win through. He even maintains that liberalisation might mean the abolition of “state-controlled planning, the independence of firms, the reintroduction of market relationships, and the linking of those relationships with modern industrial macroeconomic planning”.

Accordingly I should like to conclude this part of my statement by saying that I by no means share the pessimism and doubts about the future of European democracy which are sometimes expressed. On the contrary I believe that it is surely more than a prestige victory for democracy if Communist Parties cast aside communist slogans and their favourite texts and say that they wish to support democracy more strongly than hitherto.

As an aside, I would add that in my view concrete policy is what matters rather than what is sacrificed. In any case one of the many crucial questions repeatedly facing these parties is their attitude towards European integration.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in this connection I should like to discuss in more detail an idea to which I gave expression some time ago.

Just as democratic states come together periodically to consider not only the economic problems which they have in common but also those they share with the third and fourth worlds, I think it should be possible, when the President of the United States has been elected, to meet to consider the problems of a strategy for détente, for political co-operation; perhaps from the point of view of developing states. What I have in mind is certainly not an extension of systems of alliance or military questions, but what the democratic world could do to develop the infrastructure of Africa more rapidly than is the case today.

I have discussed this problem on a number of occasions. This strengthening of links with the African states seems to me essential, if only because I do not see how otherwise it will be possible to prevent the further polarisation of the United Nations and thereby its paralysis.

The North-South dialogue which has begun in Paris and which, as is known, is aimed at organising international economic co-operation in the four key sectors of energy, raw materials, development questions and financial and monetary problems between the industrial states on the one hand and the developing countries and oil-producing countries on the other, would have a better chance of succeeding if the partners in OECD already had clearer political ideas of the objectives to be achieved.

I would go so far as to say that in my view there should be at political level an institution comparable to OECD in which exchanges of political views could take place similar to those held by the member states of OECD in the economic field.

I know that this idea of a group comparable to OECD in the political field may well be difficult to put into practice and that doubtless we shall remain at the stage where private institutions seek to fill that gap.

Nevertheless I felt that the Council of Europe might well consider that idea and that such a body might meet under its auspices.

It will be objected that this is already taking place in the Communities. But I am not satisfied, because the community of democracies is much larger than the existing European organisations. Furthermore, the voices of the United States and Canada and those of the neutral states of Europe should also be heard in this connection.

I am not anxious that we should find a common line, that does not seem to me the most important thing – what is more, the Communist Parties of Europe are unable to do so –- but rather we should have a genuine exchange of views which would in itself be creative.

I know that it is sometimes said that the Council of Europe has increasingly lost its tasks, that it cannot solve them and that other organisations are beginning to take them over and that accordingly much of what it plans to do is bound to founder on the rocks of harsh political reality.

I do not share that view. Much as I respect all that is happening in the European Communities and although I fully realise the great things that are being done there, they do after all represent only nine European states and democratic Europe today consists of twenty states.

Thus about 100 million people from eleven states still live outside the Community. They find a framework for their European solidarity only in the Council of Europe and, to adapt the well-known words uttered by a Czech historian about old Austria, if the Council of Europe did not exist it would have to be created.

And among the questions to be debated here is that concerning the way in which the states outside the Community can be enabled to strengthen their links with the Community; for when all is said and done, who can deny that an important part of Europe remains outside the Community?

As far as Austria is concerned, I am only too ready to say what we think about the matter: namely that there should first be discussions in the European Free Trade Association on the possibilities in this field. That debate should take the form of those held in earlier years in EFTA on co-operation with the member states of the European Economic Community which led in 1972 to the conclusion of the eight agreements on free trade, in Brussels.

I can already hear your objection to that proposal.

In view of the meagre results obtained in the field of a joint monetary and economic policy, we should not aggravate the situation yet further.

My answer to that is that this argument was always put forward to delay negotiations with EFTA. I maintain that the 1972 agreements could have been concluded some years earlier.

To facilitate developments, the Council of Europe should devote a debate to that subject.

Originally the Council of Europe gave concrete expression to a vision and it was set up to keep that vision alive. It seems that at present we are passing through a crisis in European integration. It is undoubtedly true that it has been impossible in recent weeks and months to reach agreement on many things and the existing institutions of European integration were not able to master the crisis-ridden developments in the economy and currency system.

And yet, however sceptical I may be about the new economic revival and its duration, I do believe that we were able to avoid a serious crisis similar to that in the thirties because the European economy has become much more resistant in many respects. It is more resistant above all because of the degree of integration already achieved which, in my view, is irreversible.

Anybody who realises what effect a long economic crisis might have had on the social system and the stability of democracy as a whole and what an obstacle it would be to progress will appreciate particularly the relative shortness of the latest crisis.

In recent decades the European idea has been one of the pillars of European democracy. Its success remains one of the most essential guarantees of its creative force. The Council of Europe is its conscience. (Applause)