Parliamentary Assembly
Assemblée parlementaire

Situation in Cyprus

Doc. 10028
12 January 2004

Report
Committee on Political Affairs
Rapporteur : Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Hungary, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers’ Group

Summary

Cyprus has now been divided for nearly thirty years. Despite the efforts of the international community and the rallying of Cypriot political forces, the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and the island’s people divided. The Rapporteur particularly deplores the failure, in March 2003, of negotiations on the Cyprus settlement on the basis of the plan presented by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

If no settlement is reached, a divided Cyprus will join the European Union on 1 May 2004.  The Rapporteur fears this may result in a hardening of the two communities’ leaders’ positions and perpetuate the current deadlock. In this respect, the Rapporteur stresses that if a de facto divided Cyprus joins the EU, this is likely to undermine the prospects for Turkey’s accession and consequently destabilise the situation throughout this region of Europe.

The report therefore calls on the leaders of the two communities to resume negotiations without delay on the basis of the Annan plan with a view to reaching a political settlement of the Cyprus problem by 1 May 2004; to make further efforts to build confidence between the two communities and to respond in a constructive manner to steps taken in that direction. Furthermore, it calls on Greece and Turkey to contribute to the resumption and smooth conduct of the negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan. Moreover, it calls on the European Union to encourage Turkey’s positive involvement in the search for a settlement of the Cyprus problem by giving the Turkish authorities a clearer prospect for the opening of accession negotiations, in compliance with the appropriate criteria.

I.                 Draft Resolution [Link to the adopted text]

1.         Cyprus has now been divided for nearly thirty years.  There have been some major developments in and around Cyprus since the adoption of Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1267 (2002).  The direct negotiations between the leaders of the Cypriot communities in the frameworkofthe good offices of Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,the magnet effect of the European Union’s enlargement, Turkey’s more constructive attitude and the changes in public opinion in the northern part of Cyprus have generated a positive momentum and led to hopes that a just and lasting solution will at last be found to the Cyprus problem.

2.         However, despite the efforts of the international community and the rallying of Cypriot political forces, the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and the island’s people divided.

3.         The Assembly particularly deplores the failure, in March 2003, of negotiations on the Cyprus settlement on the basis of the plan presented by Kofi Annan when Mr Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, rejected the plan while Mr Papadopoulos, President of the Republic of Cyprus, appeared willing to sign it.  The Assembly calls on all the parties concerned to resume negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan without delay in order to reach a settlement before the EU enlargement.

4.         If no settlement is reached, a divided Cyprus will join the European Union on 1 May 2004.  The Assembly fears this may result in a hardening of the two communities’ leaders’ positions and perpetuate the current deadlock.

5.         While the Greek Cypriots will benefit from the advantages attendant on Cyprus’ accession to the European Union, the Turkish Cypriots will be deprived of them.  There is a real danger that the Turkish Cypriot community will be increasingly sidelined, the economy will decline still further and tensions will increase.

6.         Furthermore, if a de facto divided Cyprus joins the EU, this is likely to undermine the prospects for Turkey’s accession and consequently destabilise the situation throughout this region of Europe.  In this respect, the Assembly stresses that Turkey has a key role to play in the search for a settlement leading to the reunification of Cyprus.  It welcomes the Turkish Government’s more open-minded and pragmatic approach to the Cyprus problem and invites it to exert all its influence in support of the United Nations Secretary-General’s efforts to achieve a settlement.  At the same time, the Assembly believes that a clearer European perspective on Turkey would facilitate a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

7.         The elections held in the northern part of Cyprus on 14 December 2003 have shown that the Turkish Cypriot community is very divided in regard to the choices concerning its future.

8.         The Assembly notes with satisfaction that a substantial proportion of the Turkish Cypriot community is now in favour of a settlement based on the Annan plan and of a reunified Cyprus joining the European Union.  Accession is seen increasingly as a source of hope rather than a threat, and division as an obstacle to the Turkish Cypriots’ future in Europe rather than a means of protecting their rights.

9.         At the same time the Assembly is aware that many Turkish Cypriots still perceive the Greek Cypriot community as a security threat and Turkey as the best guarantee that the tragic events of the past will not happen again.  Consequently, reunification of the two parts of Cyprus and accession to the European Union without Turkey being a member still inspire mistrust.  The Turkish Cypriot leaders use these feelings of mistrust to justify their uncompromising position.  Certain attitudes and statements on the part of the Greek Cypriot authorities would unfortunately seem to substantiate these feelings.

10.       It is for the leaders of the two communities to overcome the pattern of confrontation based on past fears and on efforts to secure unilateral advantages and to turn to the future of their communities, which form a single people with a shared destiny.

11.       In this connection the Assembly welcomes the steps taken by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, on the one hand, and the Turkish Cypriot administration, on the other, to build confidence between the two communities and encourages them to make further efforts and show greater openness in this respect.

12.       The Assembly therefore:

i.           calls on the leaders of the two communities

ii.          calls on the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus

iii.         calls on the Turkish Cypriot authorities

iv.         calls on Turkey

v.          calls on Greece

vi.         calls on the European Union

vii.        encourages the Secretary-General of the United Nations to resume his efforts as soon as an opportunity arises and urges him to pay special attention to security issues on the island, which are the main source of mutual mistrust, and to embark on negotiations with the flexibility required for the purpose;

viii.       decides to reconsider the issue after the enlargement of the European Union.

II.         Draft Recommendation [Link to the adopted text]

1.          The Parliamentary Assembly refers to Resolution … (2004) on the situation in Cyprus.

2.          It welcomes the initiatives of the Secretary General and the activities of the Council of Europe aimed at contributing to the reconciliation of the Cypriot communities and at facilitating, in the framework of the efforts of the international community, a fair and durable resolution to the Cyprus problem, in the respect of the principles and values of the Council of Europe.

3.          The Assembly recommends to the Committee of Ministers to envisage a more active contribution on behalf of the Council of Europe to the search for a settlement in Cyprus.

III.        Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur

I.          Introduction

1.         The two years that have passed since the Assembly adopted Resolution 1267 (2002) on the Situation in Cyprus have been characterised by several very important, and sometimes encouraging, developments with regard to Cyprus.

2.         At the domestic level, the Presidential elections in February 2003 brought to power a new President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos. In the northern part of the island, the question of the future of Cyprus became a subject of intense public debate, and general elections are scheduled for 14 December 2003. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot authorities began opening up crossing points between the two parts of the island in April 2003 and the ensuing contacts have been a success.

3.         At the international level, the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union by ten new members, including Cyprus, was decided at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. The coming to power in Turkey of a new majority after the general elections in November 2002, and the changing attitude of the Turkish government, is one of most important factors both in terms of the Cyprus issue and the future EU membership of Turkey. These developments have created a new situation with regard to the Cyprus issue. The international community has intensified its efforts to reach a negotiated settlement between the two parts of the island within the framework of the good offices mission of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4.         However, in spite of all these efforts and signs of a more open-minded approach, the Cyprus problem has still not been settled and, failing a last-minute breakthrough, the enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004 will only involve the Republic of Cyprus. The division of the island will thus be frozen, at least for the next few years.

5.         The Council of Europe has continued to keep a close eye on the various aspects of the Cyprus problem at several levels. For its part, the Assembly adopted in June 2003 Recommendation 1608 (2003) on Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus and Resolution 1333 (2003) on the Rights and fundamental freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of Cyprus. Personally, while I fully agreed to their substance, I have question marks as to whether the timing for presenting these two reports was well chosen and whether they have really contributed to reconciliation and brought a settlement in Cyprus closer.

6.         As your rapporteur, appointed in September 2002, my task is to keep a close eye on the political situation in Cyprus, bearing in mind that the key issue is the division of the island, and to report on it when I believe it is necessary in order to propose political action by the Assembly.

7.         For various reasons beyond my control, it has not yet been possible to organise a visit to Cyprus. I am aware that this is crucial for the objectivity of the report and the accuracy of its conclusions, and I have made plans to go there between 12 and 16 January 2004.

8.         However, I consider it absolutely essential that not only the Assembly but also the parties directly or indirectly involved, and especially the guarantor powers, should use their influence to contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of the island before the date for EU enlargement.

9.         For this reason, and in view of time constraints and the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure, I have decided to present my report before the visit and then finalise it on the basis of its results.

II.         Resolution 1267 (2002): brief recapitulation and review

10.       When Resolution 1267 was adopted in January 2002, developments in Cyprus gave rise to cautious optimism regarding the prospects for a solution to the Cyprus conflict. Noting that the future enlargement of the European Union would create a new situation, the Assembly expressed its clear preference for a political agreement between the two sides on the island’s future prior to enlargement to enable the entire population of Cyprus to benefit.

11.       The Assembly thus declared its support for the intensification of the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to reach a political solution in Cyprus and called on the leaders of the two communities, the guarantor powers and the European Union to contribute to a settlement through practical measures.

12.       Today, the assessment of the resolution’s implementation is, on the whole, negative. It is, of course, possible to detect some limited progress in regard, for example, to contacts between the Turkish Cypriots and people living in the Republic of Cyprus, dialogue between the political parties and more active and positive involvement of the guarantor powers, but most of the measures proposed by the Assembly, although they remain as relevant as ever, have not been implemented.

III.        Crucial developments in Cyprus 2002-2003

A.         Republic of Cyprus

-          Presidential elections (February 2003)

13.       The outgoing President, Mr Glafcos Clerides (DISY, Democratic Rally), had long indicated that he would not stand for re-election but finally decided to seek a new mandate, announcing his intention that, if he was elected, he would resign on Cyprus’ accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004. During the election campaign, he set himself up as the guarantor of success in the negotiations on the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

14.       His main rival, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos (DIKO, Democratic Party), had often criticised the government for its stances in the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. For their part, the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community had indicated that they were pessimistic about the prospects for a solution if Mr Papadopoulos were elected.

15.       In the elections of 16 February 2003, Mr Papadopoulos obtained 51.5%, compared with 38.8% for Mr Clerides. The new President, who took up office on 1 March 2003, has confirmed his intention to ensure the continuity of his predecessor’s policy regarding a settlement of the Cyprus issue.

B.         Northern part of the island

-          Demonstrations in favour of reunification

16.       Political life in the Northern part of the island was characterised in late 2002 and early 2003 by a series of large-scale demonstrations in favour of the reunification of the island and democratic reforms. This campaign was an indication of the population’s growing discontent, to which my predecessor, Mr Bársony, referred in his report in January 2002.

17.       The demonstrations reached a peak in January 2003 with the participation of an estimated 70,000 people, ie a third of the population. Their organisers, including the opposition parties and the NGOs forming the This Country is Ours Platform, demanded the acceptance of the Annan Plan, the resignation of the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and the holding of early elections.

-          Opening of the “green line” and other initiatives by the Turkish Cypriot authorities

18.       After the failure of the negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and in an effort to contribute to confidence building between the two communities, the Turkish Cypriot authorities decided on 21 April 2003 to permit, under certain conditions, the crossing of the “green line” separating the two parts of the island. This step was welcomed by the citizens of the two communities and by the entire international community. According to UN information, some 2 million one-day crossings were recorded between 23 April and 2 November 2003.

19.       The Turkish Cypriot authorities also made a series of proposals in April and July 2003 aimed at restoring trust between the two communities and providing for the elimination of restrictions on trade, transport and international tourism, as well as on cultural and sports exchanges; the reopening under United Nations administration of Nicosia international airport for use by both parts of the island and the beginning of talks on the de-mining of Nicosia and the surrounding area.

-          Economic situation

20.       The economy of the Northern part of the island continues to pay a high price for the division of the island, and the situation of the Turkish Cypriots is constantly deteriorating owing to the embargo. The growing gap between the standard of living in the two parts is a serious threat to the island’s stability.

21.       The whole of public opinion in the Northern part of the island considers that the embargo is having absolutely disastrous effects on both the economy and political and social life. The opposition parties believe Mr Denktash is the sole beneficiary of this because it supports his arguments against the reconciliation of the two communities.

22.       The European Commission’s recent proposals on easing the restrictions on exports of farm produce from the Northern part of the island to the countries of the European Union have not yielded any significant results since this produce is still required to have a certificate issued by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and to be exported via a port in the South.

-          Elections in the Northern part of the island (14 December 2003)

23.       The elections to the “parliament” planned for 14 December 2003 are considered a key test for the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community. Mr Denktash is using them to try to gain approval for his position vis-ŕ-vis the Greek Cypriots and the United Nations as far as the rejection of the Annan Plan is concerned. The opposition parties in favour of settling the Cyprus problem on the basis of this plan and of the reunited island’s accession to the EU hope their success in the elections might make it possible to relieve Mr Denktash of his position as chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot community.

24.       According to statements by certain representatives of the opposition, the Turkish Cypriot authorities, fearing rejection of their stance in the elections, are in the process of granting “citizenship” and the right to vote to large numbers of immigrants from Turkey, which would affect the composition of the electorate. In this context, Mr Akinci, the leader of the “Peace and Democracy Movement” has asked for the Council of Europe to organise a census of the population in the two parts of Cyprus without delay, as the Assembly proposed in Recommendations 1197 (1992) and 1608 (2003).

24.bis   As Rapporteur I believe that the outcome of these elections is of great importance for the future of Cyprus. They must be held in accordance with international standards for free and fair elections, and provide for the Turkish Cypriot community an opportunity to express its genuine will. It is even more important that Turkish Cypriot leaders respect that will.

IV.        International context

A.         EU enlargement

-          The European Union’s position on a Cyprus settlement

25.       Throughout the enlargement process, the European Union has declared its support for the United Nations’ efforts to settle the Cyprus problem and has said it would prefer to reach a settlement before enlargement.

26.       However, at the Helsinki European Council (December 1999), the EU declared that a political settlement in Cyprus would facilitate its accession but was not a precondition.

27.       At the same time, in view of the misgivings and, indeed, the hostility of the Turkish Cypriot administration to EU enlargement before the Cyprus problem is solved, the EU decision-makers clearly stated at the Seville Summit (June 2002) that the Union, with its acquis communautaire, would never be an obstacle to a political solution and would take into consideration any agreement reached by the two parts in the context of a political settlement.

28.       The accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus, which were opened in 1998, ended on 13 December 2002 and the accession treaty was signed on 16 April 2003. Cyprus will join the European Union on 1 May 2004, after ratification of the accession treaty.

29.       In its report on the accession of Cyprus, the European Commission said it “strongly believes that a solution to the Cyprus problem can still be found before 1 May 2004 in order to allow the accession of a united Cyprus. However, in case a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem is not reached before the date of accession, Protocol No 10 annexed to the Accession Treaty envisages the suspension of the acquis in the areas of the country which are not under the effective control of the Government of Cyprus”.

30.       The European Union also said it was ready to make a substantial financial contribution to support the development of the northern part of the reunited island.

-          Positions of the Turkish Cypriot community

31.       The traditional leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially Mr Denktash, have long been openly hostile to enlargement. Their position, based on the 1960 treaties and the Cyprus Constitution and supported by Turkey, was that Cyprus’ accession to the European Union would be illegal unless and until Turkey was a member of the Union and the Turkish Cypriots had accepted it. My predecessor, Mr Bársony, explained this position in detail in his report (Doc. 9302 rev., para. 53).

32.       However, this stance underwent an important change in December 2001, when Mr Denktash took note of the EU’s statement that it would take into consideration the terms of a political settlement and declared that the Turkish Cypriot side would be in favour of the accession of a future Cyprus reunited in the context of a settlement, subject to the maintenance of the balance between Turkey and Greece established by the 1960 Cyprus treaties.

33.       Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “(Mr Denktash) seemed to perceive the approaching date of European Union accession and the European Union’s strong preference for welcoming a united Cyprus not as an opportunity to achieve a settlement on a favourable basis that would pave the way for Turkey’s aspirations regarding the European Union, but as a trap and a threat”.

34.       Most of the political opposition forces support the accession of a reunited Cyprus to the European Union. According to some surveys, this view is shared by a big majority (up to 90% according to some sources) of the population in the northern part of the island.

35.       The EU has launched a campaign in the Northern part of the island to inform the population about the EU. In March 2002, Commissioner Verheugen opened an information centre at the offices of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce.

-          Turkey’s position and its European prospects

36.       Turkey is a key player both de jure (as a guarantor power under the 1960 treaties) and de facto in the settlement process.

37.       It remains the only state to have recognised the “TurkishRepublic of Northern Cyprus” proclaimed in 1983 and to guarantee its existence. For this reason, the Turkish authorities have real leverage with regard to the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Turkey is responsible for the acts of the administration in the northern part of Cyprus[1].

38.       At the same time, the Cyprus problem continues to occupy an important position in Turkey’s strategic options.

39.       On the one hand, Turkey has kept its troops in Northern part of the island since its military intervention in 1974, and the Turkish military authorities continue to claim that their presence on the island is of strategic importance.

40.       On the other hand, by joining the Council of Europe and declaring its intention to join the European Union, Turkey clearly made a choice in favour of European integration. In view of the positive development of its relations with Greece, the prospects for Turkey to join the EU in a foreseeable future now seem realistic and will be even better if it is able to contribute to a Cyprus settlement.

41.       However, these prospects risk being seriously jeopardised if the Cyprus issue is not resolved before enlargement and if the Republic of Cyprus, having joined the EU, is hostile to Turkey’s membership.

42.       In this context, the new majority in Turkey following the November 2002 general elections seems to have adopted a more open-minded and constructive approach to the Cyprus issue than its predecessors by making more overtures to the Republic of Cyprus and reducing its support for the traditional leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community.

B.         Negotiations and the Annan Plan

-          Direct negotiations

43.       Direct negotiations between Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash, in the presence of the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, began on 16 January 2002 in Nicosia and continued, with a few interruptions, until February 2003.

44.       The initial positions of the two sides differed fundamentally from one another on all the settlement principles.

45.       Referring to the Security Council resolutions, Mr Clerides favoured a solution based on a Cypriot state with a single sovereignty, a single international personality and a single citizenship and made up of two politically equal communities within a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.

46.       Mr Denktash favoured a solution in accordance with what he regarded were the realities and would consist of a Confederation of Cyprus founded by two pre-existing sovereign states. This confederation would have a single international personality but would be sovereign only to the extent that sovereignty was given to it by the founding states. Mr Denktash then put the term “confederation” to one side, preferring to speak of a “PartnershipState of Cyprus”.

47.       The views of the two delegations were just as far apart on such key issues as the structure and powers of the future central state, security aspects, territorial arrangements, the principles concerning the resettlement of displaced persons, etc.

-          Annan Plan

48.       When it became clear that the two parties would not be able to reach agreement, the Secretary-General of the United Nations presented a plan entitled ”Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” on 11 November 2002. The two sides were to undertake to complete the negotiations on the basis of the plan’s substantive proposals before 28 February 2003 and then hold simultaneous referenda to approve the plan on 30 March 2003,. This would have enabled a reunited Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession to the European Union on 16 April 2003.

49.       The Rapporteur does not intend to present a detailed synopsis of the Annan Plan here. This document has been published and is available from a number of sources, including the internet. In the Rapporteur’s opinion, the Annan Plan constitutes the best genuine basis for a compromise between all sides involved in Cyprus problem and contains viable proposals based on experience and international guarantees aimed at creating a “United Republic of Cyprus” with a federal government and made up of two “constituent states”. The plan includes detailed proposals for all aspects of a settlement to the Cyprus problem and for the structure and functioning of the future united state.

50.       Certain elements of the initial plan seemed to give rise to a few questions regarding compatibility with the Council of Europe’s principles and basic texts and with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. However, most of these questions were resolved in the course of the two revisions of the Annan Plan.

51.       Following the two sides’ reactions concerning the substance of the document, Mr Annan presented a second version of the plan on 10 December 2002. Finally, after intensive negotiations with the two sides and with senior Greek and Turkish officials, Mr Annan presented the third and last version of his plan on 26 February 2003 and invited Mr Papadopoulos (elected on 16 February 2003 to succeed Mr Clerides) and Mr Denktash to a meeting in The Hague on 10 March 2003.

52.       Mr Papadopoulos informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he was prepared to undertake to submit the plan to the referendum on condition that the population were aware of the issue on which they were to take a decision. Accordingly, he wanted to be sure that the problems concerning federal legislation and the constitutions of the constituent states would be resolved. He stressed that Greece and Turkey had to accept the plan’s proposals with regard to security and undertake to implement them.

53.       On the other hand, Mr Denktash stated that he could not submit the plan to a referendum owing to fundamental objections concerning certain key aspects. He considered that new negotiations were only likely to be successful if they began from a new starting point and if the parties agreed on basic principles. He added that Turkey was in any case not in a position to sign the statement requested of the guarantors.

54.       Turkey confirmed that, for constitutional reasons, it could not enter into the commitment demanded of the guarantor under the Annan Plan. For his part, Mr Papadopoulos maintained that such a commitment was necessary before it would be possible to organise the referenda.

55.       Mr Denktash also turned down Mr Annan’s proposals for saving the process and rejected his suggestion that the deadline for finishing the negotiations be put back to 28 March.

56.       As a consequence, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced that the process was deadlocked and that he had no intention of proposing fresh initiatives, pointing out that his plan was still on the table and that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could take it up again at any time and start new negotiations if they wished to do so.

57.       In his report to the Security Council on 1 April 2002, Mr Annan said that, while the two sides in Cyprus bore a share of the blame for the failure of the various stages and for the missed opportunities in the process of finding settlement opened in 1999, it was Mr Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, who bore prime responsibility for the failure of the latest effort.

V.         Recent Council of Europe activities relating to Cyprus

-          Visit by the Secretary General

58.       In January 2003, Mr Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, undertook an official visit to the Republic of Cyprus to offer his support for Mr Annan’s draft plan for solving the Cyprus problem while ensuring respect in a reunited Cyprus for the human rights guaranteed by the Council of Europe’s fundamental texts.

59.       In the context of a future settlement, the Council of Europe’s experience could be particularly useful for the establishment of confidence-building measures between the two Cypriot communities and with regard to the media, the teaching of history, language learning, the protection of the cultural heritage and the strengthening of civil society.

-          Dialogue between Cypriot political leaders

60.       At the invitation of the Secretary General, the leaders of the political parties of the two Cypriot communities met in Strasbourg on 7 July 2003 to discuss the Council of Europe’s contribution to a Cyprus settlement, especially with regard to the role of civil society, youth initiatives and the teaching of history.

-          Recent decisions by the Committee of Ministers on the subject of Cyprus

61.       On 12 November 2003, the Committee of Ministers adopted its 4th Interim Resolution concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey. Having established that Turkey had not met its obligation to comply with this judgment, the Committee of Ministers gave the Turkish authorities one week to do so. On 19 November, this deadline was extended by a further week. On 2 December, the Committee of Ministers announced that Turkey executed the judgment of 28 July 1998 in the Loizidou case by paying to Mrs Titina Loizidou the sum which had been awarded to her by the European Court of Human Rights in respect of just satisfaction.

-          Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights

62.       In response to an application declared admissible by the European Court of Human Rights, a law adopted in the Republic of Cyprus In May 2002 abolished restrictions on the right to marry for Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island.

-          Recent Assembly texts

63.       The Assembly adopted two texts on Cyprus in June 2003. Recommendation 1608 (2003) on Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus, drawn up by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography (Rapporteur Mr Laakso), concluded that the island’s demographic structure had constantly changed since Cyprus’ de facto partition in 1974 as a result of the deliberate policies of the Turkish Cypriot administration and Turkey, and condemned the policy of "naturalisation" designed to encourage new arrivals and introduced by the Turkish Cypriot administration with the full support of the Turkish Government.

64.       In Resolution 1333 (2003) on the Rights and fundamental freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of Cyprus, drawn up by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Rapporteur Mr Marty), the Assembly stated it was “extremely concerned by the status imposed upon the Greek Cypriot and Maronite communities that have remained north of the demarcation line and by the resulting violations of human rights. It called on “all the representatives of the civil society of Cyprus, independently of the community to which they belong, to do their utmost to bring about a climate of mutual understanding, of dialogue and of tolerance between the different social, political, religious, cultural and linguistic constituents present on the island, who, as history has shown, are perfectly capable of living together in peace and harmony”.

VI.        Conclusions

65.       The failure of the negotiations on a Cyprus settlement under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations was met with considerable disappointment by both the international community and a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community.

66.       EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 threatens to close the “window of opportunity” for dealing with the Cyprus issue. In the new situation that will ensue, there will be winners – real or false - and losers.

67.       Among the “winners”, there will be those who have adapted to the division of Cyprus - and are benefiting from it. It remains to be seen whether this will be a lasting victory.

68.       Among the real losers, the first will be the people of Cyprus as a whole, which will remain divided.

69.       Turkey’s European prospects will be more uncertain, as will the stability of the Aegean Sea region, and this will doubtless have an impact on the whole of South-East Europe.

70.       It is not yet too late to prevent this scenario, but this requires the political leaders of the two Cypriot communities to be fully aware of their responsibilities to their people and to act in the interests of their future. They must make new and substantial efforts to reach a compromise acceptable to both sides.

71.       It seems unlikely that a new draft settlement plan can be quickly drawn up. The Annan Plan, modified if necessary, must therefore remain the basis for a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

72.       Turkey’s positive commitment remains key to the success of efforts to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to accept a compromise and reach a settlement.

73.       Both Greece and the European Union as a whole must continue to encourage the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, which have said they are ready to compromise, to continue to pursue their open-minded approach.

74.       The Council of Europe must increase its activities with the aim of restoring confidence and dialogue between the two communities and contributing to the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Reporting Committee: Political Affairs Committee

Reference to committee : Resolution 1267 (2002)

Draft Resolution unanimously adopted by the Committee on 8 January 2004

Draft Recommendation unanimously adopted by the Committee on 8 January 2004

Members of the Committee : Jakic (Chairman), Rogozin (Vice-Chairman), Feric-Vac (Vice-Chairperson), Spindelegger (Vice-Chairman), Aguiar (alternate: Seyidov), Aliyev, de Aristegi (alternate: Lopez Gonzalez), Ates, Atkinson,  Azzolini (altenate: Provera), Banáš, Berceanu, Bianco, Blankenborg, Van der Brande, Cekuolis, Davern, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Druviete, Duivesteijn, Durrieu, Elo, Frey, Glesener, Goulet, Gross, Hedrich, Henry, Hörster, Iwinski, Judd, Karpov, Kirilov, Klich, Koçi, Kostenko, van der Linden, Lloyd (alternate: Chapman), Loutfi, Magnusson, Margelov, Martinez-Casan, Medeiros Ferreira, Mercan, Micunovic, Mignon, Mihkelson, Muratovic, Neguta, Nemcova, Nemeth, Oliynyk, Ouzky, Pangalos, Petrova-Mitevska, Petursdottir,  Pintat Rossel, Pourgourides, Prentice, Prica, Prisacaru, de Puig, Pullicino Orlando, Ranieru (alternate: de Zulueta), Roth, Severin, Severinsen, Tabajdi, Tekelioglu, Torosyan, Tritz (alternate: Bindig), Vakilov (alternate: Mollazade), Volpinari, Voulgarakis, Westerberg, Wielowieyski, Wohlwend, Wurm, Yarygina, Zacchera, Zhvania, Ziuganov (alternate: Slutzky).

Ex-officio: Davis, Eörsi, Einarsson, Russell-Johnston

N.B. : The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics

Secretariat of the Committee : Mr Perin, Mrs Ruotanen, Mr Chevtchenko, Mr Dossow

[1] In a judgment of 10 May 2001, the European Court of Human Rights, highlighting the situation between 1974 and 1994, established inter alia that Turkey was obliged to guarantee in northern Cyprus all the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court found that "having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, its (Turkey's) responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support”.