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   <b> 
  <p align="justify">Population trends in Europe and their sensitivity to policy
    measures</p>
  </b>
   <p align="justify"><b>Doc. 10182<br>
  </b></font>14 May 2004</font></p>
  <p align="justify">  <b>Report<br>
    </b></font>Committee on Migration, Refugees
    and Population<br>
  Rapporteur: Mr Christian Brunhart, Liechtenstein, European People's Party</font></p>
  
  
  <hr size="1">
  
  <p align="justify"><i>Summary</i></p>
  <p align="justify">Europe's population is expected to decline in the near future.
    This is already the case in most Eastern European countries and will soon
    also affect Western Europe. In addition, Europe will experience further population
    ageing. This process consists of population &#147;greying&#148; (increase
    of the older age groups) due to improved mortality control at higher ages
    and population dejuvenation due to fertility that lies below the level required
    to assure long-term generational replacement. Moreover, the coming decades
    will be characterised by a strong ageing wave because the post-war baby-boom
    generations will reach old age and are followed by the baby-bust generations
    that succeeded them.</p>
  <p align="justify">Both population decline and population ageing require adaptive
    population-related policy measures in many domains of social and economic
    life. Prolonged population decline and population dejuvenation are thought
    to induce many unfavourable social, cultural, economic and political consequences
    and will, at some point of time, also require population-related policies
    aimed at changing the current demographic trends.</p>
  <p align="justify">The population challenges with respect to population decline
    and population ageing can, in principle, be addressed via three different
    demographic mechanisms: fertility, mortality, migration, but they can not
    be resolved by simple or single measures or by short-term policies. Population-related
    policies have to address the complexity of demographic-societal interactions
    and interdependencies and have to have a long-term view.</p>
  <p align="justify">Whereas ongoing modernisation in recent decades has produced
    beneficial results in many domains of social life, it has not succeeded in
    dealing adequately with some societal-demographic interactions which will,
    in the present cultural, economic and policy context, result in a forthcoming
    population decline and further population dejuvenation. The current &#147;toolbox&#148; of
    population- and family-related policies has in most countries proven to be
    either insufficient or/and inadequate to address those problems.</p>
  <p align="justify">Therefore, this report aims at presenting a comprehensive
    set of policy recommendations to address adequately future population decline
    and population ageing. </p>
  <p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Draft
      recommendation</b></p>
  <p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Europe
    stands on a demographic threshold. After a century of natural population
    increase, the outlook for this century is rather natural decrease and excessive
    population ageing. A large part of Eastern European countries are already
    facing population decline and many of the Western countries are expected
    to experience the same phenomenon in the near future. Migration pressures
    from surrounding developing countries will, for a long time, continue to
    persist.Notwithstanding cross-country differences in intensity and pace of
    the demographic changes that will continue to persist, all European societies
    are or will be facing essentially the same trends with respect to population
    decline and population ageing. </p>
  <p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Regarding
    parenthood, individuals may be happy with having no children or one or two
    only. Society by contrast needs to ensure intergenerational solidarity and
    continuity and this requires a substantial proportion of larger families.
    As far as longevity is concerned, people aspire for a long and healthy life
    but society needs to provide an age-friendly environment while maintaining
    intergenerational equity in all domains of social life.</p>
  <p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is
    likely that the recent, current and possible future changes in relational
    and reproductive behaviour are due to complex interrelations of accelerated
    changes in economic, cultural, ideological, social and technological features
    of advanced societies and cannot be resolved by simple or single and short-term
    policy measures. </p>
  <p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A special
    case forms the recent fast and steep fertility decline in Eastern Europe,
    where the economic and political changes after the collapse of the communist
    regimes were accompanied by the abolishment or weakening of the social situation
    of women and the social protection system in general. </p>
  <p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The effects
    of the recent social, cultural, economic and technological progresses are
    beneficial in many domains: for most people quality of life has increased,
    individual emancipation and development have progressed and in particular
    the social position of women has improved, leisure activities have increased
    and diversified, the health situation has improved and longevity has increased.
    On the other hand, recent modernisation and change in the socio-economic
    sphere have in most countries not achieved a harmonious relation between
    work and family life, have not yet fully realised equal opportunities for
    women and men, have not been able to maintain or to create a really child-friendly
    environment and have not offered long-term labour security, nor succeeded
    in offering healthy older citizens adequate access to employment. </p>
  <p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The demographic
    challenges in the fields of population decline and excessive population ageing
    need to be addressed without endangering the fundamental human and societal
    goals and acquisitions of European democracies, including, inter alia, further
    improving the quality of life, further increasing participation rates in
    higher levels of education, further increasing the labour participation of
    women, young adults and younger elderly and offering long-term work opportunities,
    further increasing longevity, providing a generous and just social protection
    system.</p>
  <p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In general,
    demographic problems cannot be resolved by quick-fix solutions, short term-policies
    or simple or single measures. The current &#147;toolbox&#148; of population-
    and family-related policies has in most countries proven to be either insufficient
    or/and inadequate to address properly challenging population issues in Europe.
    Policies have to address the complexity of demographic-societal interactions
    and interdependencies. The complexity of demographic processes and their
    interaction with virtually all social domains requires in most areas both
    adaptive and modifying policies.</p>
  <p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Without
    some considerable changing of present cultural values, socio-economic living
    conditions and policy context, it is unlikely that the coming decades will
    see a substantial and durable recovery of present fertility rates. </p>
  <p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Parliamentary
    Assembly, therefore, recommends that the Committee of Ministers:</p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; stimulate
      the emergence of common European policies in the domains of demographic
      developments and population-related issues;</p>
    <p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; promote
      policies for a better harmonisation of family and working life, in particular
      in favour of women, including the creation of necessary child-care facilities;</p>
    <p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; consider
      population impact of envisaged policy measures and recommendations in all
      domains of social life;</p>
    <p align="justify">iv.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; encourage
      closer co-operation among the dispersed international research instruments
      in Europe for analysing and monitoring population developments and population
      related policies; </p>
    <p align="justify">v.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; strengthen,
      in anticipation of a major reorganisation and broadening of the international
      comparative population research in Europe, the European Population Committee
      (CAHP) of the Council of Europe;</p>
    <p align="justify">vi.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; include
      in the terms of reference of the European Population Committee (CAHP) that
      it may be called upon by the Parliamentary Assembly or one of its Committees
      to produce a short policy paper as a background document to be used in
      drawing up an Assembly report or as a contribution to an Assembly debate
      or hearing;</p>
    <p align="justify">vii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; call on
      member states to: </p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify"><i>a</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; address
        the major demographic challenges in Europe;</p>
      <p align="justify"><i>b</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; pursue
        a general societal consensus on population goals and population-related
        policies;</p>
      <p align="justify"><i>c</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; deal
        with the problems of population decline and excessive population ageing
        without endangering the fundamental human and societal goals and acquisitions
        in Europe;</p>
      <p align="justify"><i>d</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; develop
        long-term population-related policies that take adequately into account
        the generational and intergenerational dimensions of demographic processes;</p>
      <p align="justify"><i>e</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; address
        the fundamental causes of demographic trends which are considered as
        challenges for social cohesion, intergenerational solidarity and continuity;</p>
      <p align="justify"><i>f</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; on
        the hypothesis that it is considered desirable to redress below-replacement
        fertility around replacement level:</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; further
          pursue vigorously gender equality and emancipatory policies, not only
          to facilitate the combina�tion of motherhood with other activities,
          in particular participation in the labour force, but also to involve
          fathers in child caring and rearing and household tasks, so that they
          can fully share family responsibilities with their partners;</p>
        <p align="justify">B.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; more
          strongly eliminate existing parenthood-linked financial inequities
          in society; </p>
        <p align="justify">C.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; creating
          a more child-friendly environment, more particularly in urban areas,
          and providing more childminding facilities in all domains of social
          life &#150; work, leisure, gatherings &#150; so that children again
          appear as a welcome constituent in society;</p>
        <p align="justify">D.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; promoting
          child- and family-oriented values<i>, </i>inter alia, by introducing
          family and population issues in the educational system;</p>
        <p align="justify">E.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; rethink
          the organisation of the entire life-course perspective of work, parenthood
          and retirement.</p>
      </blockquote>
      <p align="justify"><i>g</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; in
        the domain of population ageing:</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; adapt
          the social protection system &#150; pension system, health care and
          other public funded care &#150; to the new demographic regime to keep
          it sustainable in a long-term perspective;</p>
        <p align="justify">B.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; activate
          the younger elderly, especially by making pre-pension schemes and retirement
          age more diversified, so as to keep older workers, albeit in a variable
          and flexible way, in the work force;</p>
        <p align="justify">C.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; strengthen
          intergenerational solidarity with a view to maintaining or redressing
          intergenerational equity in life opportunities and options;</p>
      </blockquote>
      <p align="justify"><i>h.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; in
        the domain of immigration:</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; develop
          comprehensive integration policies adjusted to the specific labour
          needs and reception capacity of the host country, including measures
          to give immigrants opportunities to participate in and contribute to
          the life of their host society<del cite="mailto:Council%20of%20Europe" datetime="2004-04-19T09:25">; </del> <ins cite="mailto:Council%20of%20Europe" datetime="2004-04-19T09:25">. </ins></p>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify"><b>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Explanatory
      memorandum by Mr Brunhart</b></p>
  <p align="justify"><b><u>CONTENTS</u></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="1" href="#1t">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</a></b></p>
  
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="2" href="#2t">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Recent
          and expected population trends in Europe</a></b></p>
  
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="21" href="#21t">2.1. Population size</a></i></p>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="22" href="#22t">2.2. Population age structure</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">2.2.1. Trends</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">2.2.1.1. The oldest old (80+)</p>
        <p align="justify">2.2.1.2. Working age population (15-64)</p>
        <p align="justify">2.2.1.3. Age at retirement</p>
      </blockquote>
      <p align="justify">2.2.2. Future perspectives for population ageing</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">2.2.2.1. Future expectations for the oldest old</p>
        <p align="justify">2.2.2.2. Future expectations for the population of
          working age</p>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="3t" href="#3">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Background
        factors of recent and expected population changes in population size
        and age structure</a></b></p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="31" href="#31t">3.1. Demographic determinants</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">3.1.1. Partnership</p>
      <p align="justify">3.1.2. Fertility</p>
      <p align="justify">3.1.3. Life expectancy</p>
      <p align="justify">3.1.4. Migration movements</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="32" href="#32t">3.2. Underlying social determinants</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">3.2.1. Family building</p>
      <p align="justify">3.2.2. Health </p>
      <p align="justify">3.2.3. Potential for migration from developing countries </p>
    </blockquote>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="4" href="#4t">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Population
        challenges for the future</a></b></p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="41" href="#41t">4.1. Context</a></i></p>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="42" href="#42t">4.2. Challenges with respect
          to population size</a></i></p>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="43" href="#43t">4.3. Challenges with respect
          to population age structure</a></i></p>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="44" href="#44t">4.4. Challenges with respect
          to immigration</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">4.4.1. Immigration or no immigration</p>
    </blockquote>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="5t" href="#5">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options </a></b></p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="51" href="#51t">5.1. Policy options with respect
          to fertility</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">5.1.1.&nbsp; Context</p>
      <p align="justify">5.1.2. Policy options based on the hypothesis that it
        is desirable to redress fertility at or around replacement level</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">5.1.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Gender equality and emancipatory
          policies</p>
        <p align="justify">5.1.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Family and child-friendly policies</p>
        <p align="justify">5.1.2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Creation of a more child-friendly
          environment </p>
        <p align="justify">5.1.2.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Promoting child and family
          oriented values</p>
        <p align="justify">5.1.2.5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Rethinking the life course
          perspective of work, parenthood and retirement</p>
      </blockquote>
      <p align="justify">5.1.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based
        on the hypothesis that it is undesirable or unfeasible to influence fertility </p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">5.1.3.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Activating the inactive</p>
        <p align="justify">5.1.3.2.&nbsp; &nbsp;Increasing productivity </p>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="52" href="#52t">5.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options
          with respect to longevity</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">5.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Context</p>
      <p align="justify">5.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Policy options
        based on the hypothesis that it is desirable to deal with population
        'greying'</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">5.2.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Active ageing</p>
        <p align="justify">5.2.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Adapting the social protection
          system</p>
        <p align="justify">5.2.2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Intergenerational solidarity</p>
      </blockquote>
      <p align="justify">5.2.3. Policy options based on the hypothesis that it
        is undesirable to activate the older adults</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="justify"><i><a name="53" href="#53t">5.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options
          with respect to immigration</a></i></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">5.3.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Context</p>
      <p align="justify">5.3.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based
        on the hypothesis that immigration is a desirable instrument to compensate
        perceived deficiencies in population size and age structure in Europe</p>
      <blockquote>
        <p align="justify">5.3.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Selective immigration</p>
        <p align="justify">5.3.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigrant integration</p>
        <p align="justify">5.3.2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Illegal migration</p>
        <p align="justify">5.3.2.4.&nbsp;&nbsp; Compensating for brain drain</p>
        <p align="justify">5.3.2.5.&nbsp;&nbsp; Development cooperation</p>
      </blockquote>
      <p align="justify">5.3.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy
        options based on the hypothesis that immigration is not a desirable instrument
        to compensate perceived deficiencies in population size and age structure
        in Europe</p>
    </blockquote>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="6" href="#6t">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="1t" href="#1">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The report
    has been drawn up in response to the &#147;Motion for a recommendation&#148; presented
    by Mr Tk�c and others of 13 May 2003 to the Parliamentary Assembly<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title>[1]</a> and
    has been drafted in interaction and consultation with the Committee on Migration,
    Refugees and Population and its Sub-Committee on Population.</p>
  <p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The motion
    for a recommendation concentrates on the societal and policy implications
    of population decline and population ageing in Europe. These issues are related,
    in complex interaction and feedback relations, to many other phenomena such
    as family life, health, education, employment, leisure. In order to avoid
    that the discourse deviates from its primary aim of identifying the societal
    and policy implications of population decline and population ageing, this
    report will be limited to these issues. This implies that this document is
    not an all-embracing overview of population trends and population (related)
    policies, but a focused topical report. In particular it is limited to Europe
    whose demographic challenges are different from those of the developing world.
    This limitation does not imply that the world population problems would be
    of lesser importance, on the contrary, but they require in many respects
    a very different policy approach.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title><sup>[2]</sup></a></p>
  <p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The central
    thesis is that patterns of individual behaviour and the current societal
    strategies to deal with the outcomes of individual choices regarding family
    building and increasing longevity, risk perpetuating population decline and
    further accelerate population ageing. Regarding parenthood, individuals may
    be happy with having no children or one or two only. Society by contrast
    needs to ensure intergenerational solidarity and continuity and this requires
    a substantial proportion of larger families. Regarding longevity people aspire
    for a long and healthy life and society needs to provide an age-friendly
    environment while maintaining intergenerational equity in all domains of
    social life.</p>
  <p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The effects
    of the recent technological, economic, and cultural progress and social policies
    in Europe are beneficial in many domains: for most people quality of life
    has raised, individual emancipation and development have progressed and in
    particular the social position of women has improved, leisure activities
    have increased and diversified, and health and longevity have increased.
    However, recent progress in modernisation and change in the socio-economic
    climate have not succeeded in most countries to harmonise the partial incompatibility
    between work and family life in the life course perspective, have not yet
    fully enhanced equal opportunities for women and men, have not yet created
    a really child-friendly environment, have not offered long-term labour security,
    and have not succeeded sufficiently in maintaining healthy older citizens
    socially active and well integrated in society. Last but not least, the evolving
    political-economic climate, with its increasing pressures for competition
    in all spheres of life, is unlikely to lead to a spontaneous fertility recovery.
    Many of these factors contribute, <i> inter alia</i>, to keep fertility below
    the level necessary for long-term intergenerational continuity. The demographic
    consequences are the fast and continuous population decline and excessive
    population ageing.</p>
  <p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since
    population and family issues are strongly subjected to sensitive ideological
    divergence and controversy, the sections on population policy challenges
    and policy options are drafted in alternative, though not necessarily mutually
    exclusive proposals with an explanation of their possible implications, and
    respective advantages and disadvantages. In a knowledge-based society, all
    relevant actors have an input in the identification of the problems, their
    interpretation and the conceptualisation of policy responses to societal
    challenges. The significant contribution scholars can give to population
    policy building is to provide sound analysis of problems, identify underlying
    causes and options for overcoming negative social consequences of demographic
    disbalances.</p>
  <p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This
    report builds on the existing scientific literature. In particular use has
    been made of the recent population studies of the European Population Committee
    of the Council of Europe<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title>[3]</a> and
    the results of the Network for Integrated European Population Studies (NIEPS)
    of eleven national population institutes in Eastern and Western Europe.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title>[4]</a> </p>
  <p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The rapporteur
    on behalf of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population wants to
    thank Professor Robert Cliquet, Population and Social Policy Consultants,
    and former Chairman of the European Population Committee of the Council of
    Europe, for his work for the drawing up of this report and for his inspiring
    and knowledgeable presentations and contributions to the <a>debase </a>on
    this report in the Committee.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="2t" href="#2">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Recent
        and expected population trends in Europe</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This
    parsimonious overview of recent and expected population trends in the major
    subregions of Europe relates to the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century
    and the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. For the analysis of the
    demographic future use is made of the population scenarios of the United
    Nations<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title>[5]</a>, and desk review of
    pertinent literature. The general trends that appear from all projections
    are quite similar, with minor deviations depending on the underlying hypotheses
    on the future course of fertility, mortality and migration. They all present
    estimates of future population trends in several variants &#150; usually
    medium, high and low &#150; reflecting the range of uncertainty about future
    demographic events and processes. As a starting point, the medium variant
    scenarios will be considered.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="21t" href="#21">2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Population
        size</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The second
    half of the former century was still characterised by population growth in
    all major regions of Europe. This growth was strongest in what is now the
    Russian Federation, in Eastern Europe and in Southern Europe. </p>
  <p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the Russian Federation
    and in Eastern Europe, population started to decline at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.
    According to the medium population projection variant of the United Nations,
    this is also expected to happen in Southern Europe in a few years, followed
    by Western Europe after 2010 and finally by Northern Europe after 2030. The
    decrease is expected to be very strong in the Russian Federation, Eastern
    and Southern Europe, and more moderate in Western and particularly in Northern
    Europe (Figure 1).</p>
  <p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The data for the
    major European regions obviously mask decrease differentials for some individual
    countries that are ahead or behind in particular demographic processes. For
    instance, Germany &#150; West as well as East &#150; experienced already
    in the mid 1980 a population decrease. By contrast, Ireland will, due to
    its sustained relatively high fertility in the past decades, continue to
    grow in the first half of this century. </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Development
        of population size in the major regions of Europe, 1950-2050 (Index 1950
        = 100)</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182a.gif" WIDTH="463" HEIGHT="400"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; calculations on the basis of
      United Nations classification and medium variant population scenario (United
      Nations, 2001)</i></p>
  <p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The medium variants
    of international population scenarios usually hypothesize that fertility
    will partially recover and slightly increase, although not necessarily to
    replacement levels. This is by no means self-evident. Research shows that
    without substantial policy changes to underpin behavioural changes, fertility
    levels may be expected to remain low, and in some countries even fall to
    the levels observed in some Southern European countries that are 40 percent
    below replacement. The medium variants of most population projections or
    scenarios may, indeed, underestimate the expected population decrease. </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="22t" href="#22">2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Population
        age structure</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Trends </i></p>
  <p align="justify">13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; During the second
    half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the proportion of persons aged 65 and
    over in the total population has risen in all major regions of Europe, both
    numerically and as a share of the total population (Figure 2). The absolute
    size of the elderly more than doubled during the last 50 years from 46 to
    112 million people and their relative weight in the total population increased
    from 8% in 1950 to 14% in 2000. Europe has the oldest population in the world.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The
        recent and further expected increase of the elderly population (65+)
        in Europe, 1950-2050</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182b.gif" WIDTH="381" HEIGHT="432"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source:&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;calculations on the basis of
      the United Nations medium variant population scenario (United Nations,
      2001)</i></p>
  <p align="justify">14.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; However, cross-country
    differences continue to persist in Europe. The largest difference exists
    between Western and Eastern Europe where the progress in life expectancy
    stagnated and even regressed in the last third of the former century.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title>[6]</a> But
    also in the West some between-country differences in the pace of population
    ageing and the impact of changes in the age pyramid &#150; at the bottom
    (caused by fertility decline) and top (caused by longevity increase) &#150; on
    population ageing patterns are considerable. In the year 2001 Italy had the
    highest proportion of the elderly population (18 percent) while Ireland had
    the lowest (11 percent). Increasing longevity and more particularly persistent
    very low fertility, over past two to three decades, in Italy, Greece, and
    Spain, resulted in a rapid increase in the number and proportion of the aged.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title>[7]</a></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.1.1. The oldest old (80+)</i></p>
  <p align="justify">15.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The striking feature
    of population ageing is the increase of the 'oldest old', the population
    of 80&nbsp;years of age and over. The oldest old typically account for slightly
    more than 15 percent of the population 60+, but reach in some countries more
    than 20 percent. The highest figures are currently found in Switzerland and
    Denmark (20 percent), and Norway and Sweden (22 percent) (Figure 3). Currently
    there are 21 million above the age of 80 in Europe and the figure is expected
    to increase to 60 million in 2050.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The
        share of the population of 80 and more in the different regions of Europe</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182c.gif" WIDTH="408" HEIGHT="331"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: calculations on the basis of the United Nations
      medium variant population scenario (United Nations, 2001)</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.1.2. Working age population (15-64)</i></p>
  <p align="justify">16.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the second half
    of the 20th century, the population of working age (15-64) showed the tendency
    either to increase or to remain stationary in the different regions of Europe
    (Figure 4). However, as of 2010 it is expected to decrease throughout Europe. </p>
  <p align="justify">17.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The decrease in
    the size of the working age population and ageing of the work force affects
    many spheres of socio-economic life and choices that individuals make. They
    range from overall labour supply, income distribution, public spending for
    social protection, investments, to the general wealth of nations; and from
    individual patterns of work to spendings and savings over the life course.
    In terms of labour force ageing, the issue of productivity takes a prominent
    role. Since capacity for work is strongly dependent upon the phases of the
    individual life course, the labour supply and productivity are influenced
    by changes in population age composi�tion. Under the current labour market
    and social policy framework, further population ageing may be a cause for
    shortages of labour supply.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 4:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The recent and further
        expected variation of the population of working age (15-64) in Europe,
        1950-2050</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182d.gif" WIDTH="344" HEIGHT="385"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: calculations on the basis of the United Nations
      medium variant population scenario (United Nations, 2001)</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.1.3. Age at retirement</i></p>
  <p align="justify">18.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; From the beginning
    of the 20<sup>th</sup> century until about 1970, age at retirement among
    men has been clustering around age 65 in most European countries. Since the
    1970s the average age at retirement has been decreasing continuously. For
    women, the picture is more heterogeneous due to their increasing labour force
    participation from considerably lower levels than those for men. </p>
  <p align="justify">19.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Biological and societal
    perception of ageing evolved in opposite directions.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title>[8]</a> Figures
    for Germany and Sweden, for instance, illustrate clearly the trend observed
    for industrialized countries in general, namely a marked increase in life
    expectancy and a marked decrease of age at retirement (Figure 5).</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Development
        of life expectancy at birth and mean age at retirement in Germany and
        Sweden</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182e.gif" WIDTH="404" HEIGHT="429"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source:&nbsp;&nbsp; Avramov &amp; Maskova, 2003</i></p>
  <p align="justify">20.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The proportion of
    people aged 60 or more who are still in the work force is extremely low.
    Data for the European Union countries show that in the northern countries
    15 percent of men and 4 percent of women are working; in the southern countries
    the proportions are 12 percent and 3 percent respectively. In the western
    European countries the share of economically active people slumbered to as
    low as 7 percent among men and 2 percent among women. Almost all people are
    retired by age 65 and those who are close to the statutory age of retirement,
    aged between 60 and 65 who are still in the work force account for the minority
    of that age group. Between 60 and 65 only 26 percent of men and 9 percent
    of women are still working (Table 1).</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Table 1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Percent
        of working men and women in the European Union countries, by regions,
        and by age group </i></b></p>
  <table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
    <tr>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>Age group</b></td>
      <td width="125" colspan="2" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>Northern countries</b></td>
      <td width="125" colspan="2" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>Southern countries</b></td>
      <td width="125" colspan="2" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>Western countries</b></td>
      <td width="140" colspan="2" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>EU</b></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">&nbsp;</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Men</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Women</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Men</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Women</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Men</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Women</td>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Men</td>
      <td width="65" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Women</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">60-64</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">39.8</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">14.2</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">33.2</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">9.5</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">17.4</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">6.9</td>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">26.4</td>
      <td width="65" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">9.0</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">60+</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">15.4</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">4.3</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">12.1</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">3.4</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">6.7</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.9</td>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">10.1</td>
      <td width="65" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">2.8</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">65+</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">6.3</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.6</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">4.2</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.5</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">2.4</td>
      <td width="62" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">0.5</td>
      <td width="75" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">3.7</td>
      <td width="65" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.0</td>
    </tr>
  </table>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: Avramov, 2003 </i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Future perspectives for population
      ageing</i></p>
  <p align="justify">21.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The future ageing
    of European countries depends on their demographic past, and on the future
    course of fertility, mortality and also migration. </p>
  <p align="justify">22.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to the
    latest UN medium variant population scenario<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title>[9]</a> the
    population of 65 years and over will reach 33 percent in Southern Europe,
    and 28 to 29 percent in the rest of Europe by 2050 (Figure 2). These figures
    may be underestimated, because the progress in life expectancy might go faster
    and the fertility levels might remain below replacement level. The mortality
    decrease at higher ages might go on until the species-specific life span
    has been reached. Future population scenarios for Europe with total fertility
    rate (TFR) at replacement fertility (TFR = 2.1), species-specific life expectancy
    (e.g. male = 90; female = 95) and zero net migration lead to 35 percent elderly
    aged 60&nbsp;years and over by 2050<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title>[10]</a>.
    Strong below-replacement fertility levels, such as are nowadays observed
    in some regions of Italy<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title>[11]</a>,
    obviously would lead to much higher proportions of elderly. With a TFR of
    1.3 and the above mentioned species-specific life expectancy, elderly of
    60 years and over would account for 46 percent of the total population in
    2050.</p>
  <p align="justify">23.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Europe will experience
    in the coming decades a temporary acceleration of population ageing. The
    big ageing wave will start around 2010 when the post-war 'baby boom' cohorts
    will begin reaching the age group of 65+ and the 'baby bust' cohorts of the
    1970s and following years will reach middle age.</p>
  <p align="justify">24.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Due to the different
    initial age structures and fertility levels that vary between countries,
    differences in the shares of elderly will continue to persist. Furthermore,
    within country variation in population ageing, already characterised by the
    concentration of elderly in particular regions, is likely to be considerable. </p>
  <p align="justify">25.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; So far the progressing
    population 'greying' is mainly the result of the <a>'curve squaring strategy'</a>,
    by which life expectancy is brought closer to the biological potential lifespan.
    These efforts are generally expected to lead to further modest gains in the
    course of this century.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title>[12]</a> As
    was said before, not much progress has been made in the field of 'life-extending
    strategies'.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title>[13]</a> One has, however,
    to take into account that, in the future, bio-medical progress might allow
    to extend longevity beyond the present species-specific life span and that
    the ageing problem might consequently raise far above the level that can
    reasonably be expected now. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.2.1. Future expectations for the oldest old</i></p>
  <p align="justify">26.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The oldest old (aged
    80 years or over) are expected to be the fastest growing population group.
    During the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century their number should
    almost triple from current 22 to 65&nbsp;million persons. The highest rate
    of growth is projected for 2000-2015 with an almost 50% increase in absolute
    size. Between 2015 and 2030 a little slowdown of growth can be expected.
    Nevertheless, the size of oldest old is projected to rise by further 9 million
    persons. After 2030 the growth will speed up again resulting in the absolute
    increase of oldest old by more than 22 million people up to 2050. By that
    time, the oldest old are, according to the UN medium variant, estimated to
    account for 7 percent in Eastern Europe, 10 percent in Northern Europe and
    some 12 percent in Southern and Western Europe (Figure 3), but again these
    figures may be underestimated. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>2.2.2.2. Future expectations for the population of working
      age</i></p>
  <p align="justify">27.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Against the background
    of a slight total population decline, the elderly population will be the
    only broad age group that is projected to grow in absolute numbers (by 76%
    in the period 2000-2050). The numbers of children under the age of 15 as
    well as population of working age (15-64) are expected to decrease in this
    period (by 30% and 24% respectively).<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title>[14]</a> However,
    the implications of population ageing for the future labour supply have to
    be qualified. In the first place, a distinction has to be made between the
    relative and the absolute numbers of the working age population. In the second
    place the outcomes differ according to the period taken into consideration.</p>
  <p align="justify">28.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The demographic
    scenarios made for the Council of Europe<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title>[15]</a> showed
    that the proportion of the population of working age (20-59) in the coming
    two decades is relatively insensitive to the widely differing assumptions
    on future fertility, mortality and migration they considered. This is largely
    due to the population momentum resulting from the post-war baby boom being
    of working age. Thereafter a decrease will follow (Figure 6; see also Figure
    4).</p>
  <p align="justify">29.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As far as the absolute
    numbers are concerned, obviously a different picture emerges. Again most
    of the above scenarios show no dramatic changes in the numbers of the population
    of working age until 2020, but thereafter an enduring decline is observed
    except in the case of increased fertility and high immigration. The present
    numbers of the population of working age can only be maintained around the
    present level by redressing fertility at replacement level and high immigration.
    Stationarity at a somewhat lower level can also be reached by means of replacement
    fertility only. In the case of below-replacement fertility levels, regard�less
    of the immigration level, the population of working age decreases continuously
    and more or less strongly after 2020.</p>
  <p align="justify">30.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The relative and
    absolute shrinking of the potential labour supply which is to be expected
    in the second quarter of this century in the case of ongoing low fertility,
    will, however, be preceded by the gradual ageing of the labour force, - a
    process that can be observed already since the smaller birth cohorts of the
    1960's and 1970's started entering the labour force. Recent trends in labour
    participation of the younger age groups strengthen the ageing effects on
    the labour supply because they remain longer in school, and thus enter the
    labour force at a higher age. The internal ageing of the working age population
    will on the one hand alleviate the pressure on the labour market and contribute
    to the decrease of the unemployment among the young adults, but on the other
    hand slow down the introduction of recently and better trained young people
    in the active age groups.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" title>[16]</a></p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="3" href="#3t">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Background
        factors of recent and expected population changes in population size
        and age structure</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">31.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Changes in population
    size and population age structure are proximately determined by changes in
    the basic demographic variables, i.e. partnership, fertility, longevity,
    and migration movements. Those demographic variables are, in their turn,
    determined by changes in underlying social determinants.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Proportion
        of the population in the economically active age group 20-59 in 20&nbsp;large
        European countries according to different scenarios </i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182f.gif" width="384" height="382"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: Prinz and Lutz, 1993</i></p>
   </font>
  
    
  
  <font SIZE="2">
  
  <table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
    <tr>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Hypotheses</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">TFR</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Life expectancy</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Annual immigrants</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Scenario 0</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.7</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">83.5?/89?</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">0,5 million</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Scenario 1</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.3</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">77.0?/83?</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Zero</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Scenario 2</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.3</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">77.0?/83?</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1 million</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Scenario 4</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1.3</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">90.0?/95?</td>
      <td width="148" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1 million</td>
    </tr>
  </table>
  
  
  
    <p align="justify"><b><a name="31t" href="#31">3.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    Demographic determinants</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">32.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; European societies, 
  in the past decades, continued to experience further changes in their 
  demographic structures and dynamics typical for the 20<sup>th</sup> Century as 
  a whole. Some changes even accelerated or resumed after a temporary slow down, 
  halt or temporary reversal. Notwithstanding the presence of some considerable 
  between-country variation in levels and trends, the following general changes 
  can be observed. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.1.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Partnership</i></p>
  <p align="justify">33.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Nuptiality has 
  decreased considerably in most countries, mainly as a consequence of the 
  postponement of the first marriage, but also, be it to a lesser degree, as a 
  result of a larger proportion of people not marrying at all. In the second 
  half of the former century the total first marriage rate fell in many 
  countries from close to unit to half or even less. Also remarriage rates 
  decreased. These spectacular declines in marriage and remarriage rates may, 
  however, not be interpreted as a sign of disintegration of the family as a 
  social unit. Marriage and remarriage appear to be replaced by other forms of 
  unions, mainly consensual unions, or are postponed. Eventually the large 
  majority of the couples marry.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" title>[17]</a> 
  Marriage rates, however, do no longer represent a correct picture of the 
  timing and intensity of family formation. In many countries the salient 
  decrease of nuptiality of the last decades slowed down and in some cases even 
  seems to stabilise at a stationary level (Figure 7).</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Total first marriage rate (women below age 50) in selected European countries</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182g.gif" WIDTH="378" HEIGHT="398"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Sources: Data from Council of Europe, 2002 and Sardon, 
  2002</i></p>
  <p align="justify">34.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In Western Europe 
  the postponed marriage is increasingly replaced or preceded by cohabitation or 
  'Living-Apart-Together' (LAT) relations. Unmarried cohabitation is increasing, 
  premarital as well as after separation, divorce or widowhood. However, there 
  is still a considerable between-country variation: in some of the Scandinavian 
  countries, premarital cohabitation is a quite generalised form of behaviour; 
  in countries such as France and the Netherlands, it is fast increasing; in 
  other regions, such as Flanders, Scotland, and Wales, and in Southern Europe 
  it is still a minority phenomenon. In most countries cohabitation occurs as a 
  premarital stage in the life cycle.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" title>[18]</a>
  </p>
  <p align="justify">35.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Some people have an 
  intimate relationship but maintain, temporarily, partly or completely, 
  separate households, in majority as a result of occupational or other 
  compelling circumstances, less often as a conscious choice. These are the 
  so-called LAT-relations (Living-Apart-Together). Some of them can be 
  classified as commuter marriages, others as visiting marriages. It is still a 
  minority phenomenon that will probably remain so given its financial costs, 
  and in some cases also its psychological stress. </p>
  <p align="justify">36.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Divorce has 
  increased substantially. The total divorce rate reaches in most western 
  European countries ca 30 percent, whereas in the Scandinavian countries, the 
  UK, and the US it is close to 50&nbsp;percent or even higher.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" title>[19]</a> 
  Eastern Europe shows a strong heterogeneity with the highest and the lowest 
  divorce rates. Just as in the case of nuptiality, divorce figures do no longer 
  measure the real prevalence of union separation. If separation figures of 
  cohabitant couples and divorce rates are combined, couple dissolution appears 
  to be a much frequent phenomenon. Divorce rates were still on the increase in 
  the 1990s, but in Northern Europe and in the United Kingdom where a high 
  prevalence was already recorded in past decades, a slowdown, stabilisation or 
  even a slight decrease can be observed. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.1.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Fertility</i></p>
  <p align="justify">37.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; After a temporary 
  post-World War II baby boom in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, 
  fertility resumed its decline &#150; in some countries in the 1960s and 1970s and 
  in others as late as the 1980s. By the end of the century fertility &#150; measured 
  by the total fertility rate, i.e. the average number of children that would be 
  born alive to a woman during her lifetime, calculated on the basis of the 
  age-specific fertility rates of a given year - reached unprecedented low 
  levels, notably in the Southern European countries. By the turn of the century 
  the total fertility rate seems to have stabilised at more or less strong 
  below-replacement levels. This stabilisation was already apparent in most 
  Northern and Western countries in the 1980s, but is now also observed in 
  Southern Europe albeit at very different below-replacement levels. In most 
  Eastern European countries fertility took a steep plunge after the collapse of 
  planned economy and it is unclear what the expected stabilisation level will 
  be (Figure 8).</p>
  <p align="justify">38.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Most (married) 
  couples in Europe want and get children. According to the fertility and family 
  surveys in the 1990s, it appears that in most European countries the achieved 
  fertility lies below the desired number of children.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" title>[20]</a> 
  When people say that they want or have wanted more children than they actually 
  have, the obvious hypothesis is that individuals encounter obstacles during 
  the family building phase that prevent them from having more children. 
  Socio-economic factors, notably prolonged education and partial 
  incompatibility between paid work and family life, relational factors such as 
  higher age of marriage as well as couple dissolution, and 
  biological-reproductive factors such as sub-fecundity after years of prolonged 
  education and pursuit of firm footing in the labour market, have been shown to 
  influence this discrepancy between the wish for more children and the 
  realisation of small families.</p>
  <p align="justify">39.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A recent, 
  statistically significant phenomenon in some countries with very low fertility 
  levels is the substantial increase in childless couples. For the western 
  territories of Germany, it is expected that almost one third of the women and 
  men born after 1960 will remain childless.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" title>[21]</a> 
  Concerning the timing of births, we observe that since the mid 1970s, both the 
  mean age at first birth and the average age at childbearing increased 
  continuously. In most countries, the age at first birth lies now between 25 
  and 29 years, and most couples get their last child before the woman is 35 
  years of age.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" title>[22]</a> The 
  postponement of births is one of the reasons for the decreasing or persistent 
  low fertility, since there is insufficient recuperation at higher ages, either 
  because of increasing sub-fecundity or because postponement easily leads to 
  renouncement once a particular lifestyle without children or with a small 
  number of children has been adopted.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" title>[23]</a> 
  The current very low total fertility rate probably underestimates somewhat the 
  final decadence that may be expected because the postponement of births will 
  be somewhat recuperated at higher ages. However, there is a general agreement 
  that it is unlikely that the expected recuperation will redress fertility at 
  replacement level.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" title>[24]</a> </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Total fertility rate (TFR) in selected European countries</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182h.gif" WIDTH="382" HEIGHT="430"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Sources:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Data from Chesnais, 
  1986; Coleman, 1996; Council of Europe, 2002; Sardon, 2002</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.1.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Life expectancy</i></p>
  <p align="justify">40.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Mortality continued 
  to decrease linearly in the 1990s. This is true for the decline in infant 
  mortality and especially for the reduction of mortality at higher ages. Life 
  expectancy at birth reaches in several countries more than 80 years for women 
  and more than 75 years for men (Figure 9). Eastern Europe has experienced a 
  serious health crisis in the three last decades of the former century with 
  stationary or even decreasing life expectancies. However, a beginning of 
  recovery has resumed in most recent years.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Life expectancy in the major European regions, 1950-2000</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182i.gif" WIDTH="398" HEIGHT="510"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source:&nbsp;&nbsp; Data from United Nations, 2001</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.1.4.&nbsp;&nbsp; Migration movements</i></p>
  <p align="justify">41.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The 20<sup>th</sup> 
  century saw four major periods of mass migration: the two World Wars, the 
  period of economic boom of the 1960s and the last decade of the century. Three 
  out of those four were connected to international or civic conflicts. </p>
  <p align="justify">42.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Up until the early 
  post World War II period, Europe was a continent that had more emigrants than 
  immigrants. Partly as a result of the post-transition stage more and more 
  European countries had exhausted their emigration potential and turned from 
  mainly emigration to mainly immigration countries. In recent years also the 
  Southern European countries as well as Ireland became immigrant countries, 
  partly due to return migration. Since the collapse of the communist regimes in 
  Eastern Europe, East-West streams have become much higher than before, but 
  they are still relatively modest and decreased even again the last years. On 
  the other hand, Eastern European countries became attractive to immigrants 
  from further east and the third world. Nevertheless, emigration still exceeds 
  immigration in this subregion. </p>
  <p align="justify">43.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the immediate 
  post-war period Western Europe received mainly displaced persons from Eastern 
  Europe and from former colonies. In the economic boom years of the 1960s and 
  early 70s, Western Europe attracted actively temporary migrant workers, first 
  from southern Europe (mainly Italy, but also Spain, Portugal and Greece), 
  later from Yugoslavia, Turkey, the Maghreb and the Indian subcontinent. The 
  oil crisis of the early 1970s resulted in the establishment of restrictive 
  immigration policies, limiting immigration to family reunion, political 
  refugees and asylum-seekers.</p>
  <p align="justify">44.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The restrictive 
  immigration policies of the mid-1970s slowed down the influx of migrants, but 
  immigration nevertheless continued steadily at a lower level. Family 
  immigration &#150; including both family reunification <i>stricto sensu</i> 
  ('family members joining the head of family who is already a resident') and 
  family formation ('family ties come about after the head of family entered the 
  host country') &#150; partially compensated the decline of the earlier type of 
  labour migration. Also the increasing push forces from developing countries 
  where the rising disbalance between labour demand and supply as a consequence 
  of the discrepancy between their demographic and economic development, and 
  lack of democracy and good governance resulted in increasing numbers of other 
  types of migrants: refugees, asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants. 
  Moreover, the higher fertility of the immigrants from developing countries 
  also contributed to the increase of the population of foreign origin. </p>
  <p align="justify">45.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the early 1990s 
  several countries also saw a temporary upsurge of immigrants due to the fall 
  of the iron curtain and to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the 
  Soviet-Union. In the last few years the recorded movements showed the tendency 
  to decline, but this is partly compensated by an increase of unrecorded and 
  irregular migration, the exact volume of which is not known.</p>
  <p align="justify">46.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The cumulative 
  effect of the recent migration movements has resulted in 21 million legally 
  resident foreigners in 1998<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" title>[25]</a>. 
  This figure obviously underestimates the real presence of the population of 
  foreign origin, due to the uncounted undocumented migrants, the naturalised 
  migrants, and the second and third generation migrants who also obtained 
  naturalisation status<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" title>[26]</a>.</p>
  <p align="justify">47.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Within Europe quite 
  substantial differences in the volume of migration can be observed (Figure 
  10). Most advanced welfare states have experienced moderate positive net 
  migration in the 1990s. Major exceptions are Germany, Austria and Luxembourg 
  with high migration inflows. The large influx in the first half of the 1990s, 
  in these countries has, however, slowed down in the second half of the 1990s. 
  Contrary to some expectations that a strong migration pressure would come from 
  the Central and Eastern European countries, the movement from east to west has 
  slowed down at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Major immigration 
  flows are from non-European countries into Europe.</p>
  <p align="justify">48.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Population and 
  family research on migrants or migrant families shows that the relational and 
  reproductive behaviour of European migrants is not very different from that of 
  the sedentary, the non-migrant population. Differences are, however, 
  significant for migrants coming from developing countries where patriarchal 
  family and traditional gender relations go hand in hand with high fertility. 
  Due to poor socio-economic integration policies of the host countries coupled 
  with ethnic and religious specificity of some migrant sub-groups they tend to 
  form cultural isolates, often cluster in particular urban districts or regions 
  and maintain the traditional family structures and gender relations. 
  Population research does however show that demographic integration measured by 
  decreasing fertility according to the duration of stay or according to 
  generation gradually occurs<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" title>[27]</a>.
  </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The proportion of migrants in selected European countries</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182j.gif" WIDTH="383" HEIGHT="453"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source:&nbsp;&nbsp; calculations based on Salt and 
  Clarke, 2002</i></p>
  <p align="justify">49.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Future migration 
  flows are extremely difficult to predict on a long-term basis, since they are 
  so sensitive to economic fluctuations and policy decision-making both in 
  receiving and sending countries. However, there is virtual unanimity about the 
  view that there is a substantial potential for continuing mass migration into 
  the EU from areas bordering Western Europe, both from Eastern Europe and from 
  the developing world<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" title>[28]</a>.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="32t" href="#32">3.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Underlying social determinants</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Family building</i></p>
  <p align="justify">50.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The major recent 
  changes in partnership and fertility have been explained by different, be it 
  not necessarily mutually excluding theories: some have emphasized the effects 
  of economic factors<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29" title>[29]</a>, others 
  have emphasized the role of cultural factors, and changes in values and 
  ideology<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30" title>[30]</a>. Still others have 
  drawn the attention to the changes in the gender relations and labour force 
  participation, more in particular of women, and the specific effects of the 
  second wave of emancipatory women's movement<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31" title>[31]</a>. 
  Some also point to the effects of the presence or absence of particular social 
  (public) policies, e.g. in the fields of childcare, reconciliation of work and 
  family life, housing, fiscal measures, family benefits, and replacement income<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32" title>[32]</a>.</p>
  <p align="justify">51.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; What precisely made 
  changes in family structures and processes generalise and accelerate in recent 
  decades, which some scholars have labelled 'the second demographic transition'<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33" title>[33]</a>? 
  A variety of explanations have been given, - the post WWII economic 
  development, the oil-boom, technological innovations in different domains 
  (from jet-planes, over TV and the Internet, to modern contraceptives and 
  medically safe abortion methods), women's emancipation, further changes in 
  cultural values, more particularly in the domains of individualisation and 
  secularisation. Some authors take an integrated approach in viewing the 
  recent, current and possible future changes in partnership and reproductive 
  behaviour as the result of the combined effect of changes in economic (e.g. 
  changes in production systems), cultural (e.g. secularisation), ideological 
  (e.g. second feminist wave), social (e.g.&nbsp;development of welfare state 
  policies), and technological features (e.g. modern contraceptive and abortion 
  methods; information and communication technologies) of advanced societies<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34" title>[34]</a>.</p>
  <p align="justify">52.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Particular 
  attention should be drawn to the contraceptive transition or revolution, which 
  took place since the mid sixties of the former century. It has been suggested 
  that modern contraceptives (and medical abortion methods) are the cause of the 
  renewed decline of fertility since the mid sixties. However, when one looks at 
  indicators such as wanted and desired number of children, there are not such 
  big differences before and after the spread of modern contraceptive methods. 
  What those methods mainly changed, was the number of un-timed and non-desired 
  children, i.e. they reduced considerably the former excess fertility. In 
  addition, as was argued above, modern contraceptives changed attitudes (and 
  behaviour) towards the decision process about having children. This does not 
  mean that desired number of children has not somewhat further decreased in 
  recent decades, but the cause of this phenomenon is not to be found in the 
  contraceptive transition, but in social, economic or cultural shifts. Modern 
  contraception was, however, instrumental in the reproductive changes. On the 
  other hand, the acquainted efficient control over fertility allowed or 
  favoured several other family-related processes: premarital sex became less 
  risky; marriage could be postponed or temporarily replaced by other types of 
  union formation. Perhaps it also facilitated multiple partnership and 
  extra-marital relations. However, for promiscuous males, modern contraceptive 
  methods are a disaster: the gene-spreading effect of their behavioural pattern 
  is strongly reduced, if not completely annihilated.</p>
  <p align="justify">53.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A special case 
  forms the recent steep fertility decline in Eastern Europe. The economic and 
  political changes after the collapse of the communist regimes were accompanied 
  by the abolishment or weakening of the highly socialised family protection 
  system, including high female labour participation, extensive coverage of 
  family allowances, wide availability of nurseries and daycare facilities and 
  of the social protection system in general<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35" title>[35]</a>.
  </p>
  <p align="justify">54.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; All in all, 
  modernisation resulted in a situation where individual and societal needs with 
  respect to intergenerational continuity no longer coincide. Individuals and 
  couples can, in modern living circumstances, be satisfied with one or two 
  children, whereas society needs, for its long-term continuity, a substantial 
  proportion of three and four child families to compensate for the childless 
  and one-child families. Moreover, the interrelations and interactions between 
  work, leisure and parenthood in the life course have evolved in such a way 
  that fertility is more and more postponed to higher ages where biological, 
  social or psychological factors prevent sufficient recuperation<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36" title>[36]</a>.
  </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Health</i></p>
  <p align="justify">55.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The continuous 
  increase in life expectancy in Western Europe during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> 
  century results from a decrease of all major groups of mortality causes, and 
  particularly the spectacular decrease of cardiovascular diseases in recent 
  decades. Behavioural changes as well as medical progress and health care 
  improvements are at the root of those trends. Central and Eastern Europe 
  achieved less progress in the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since the 
  mid sixties many were confronted with a real health crisis, resulting in a 
  decrease of life expectancy, mainly among men. In recent years a beginning of 
  recovery can be observed in most transition countries. This crisis is usually 
  explained by the effect of different causes which accumulated and interacted: 
  lower socio-economic growth, material deprivation, psychological stress due to 
  rapid social and political changes, harmful lifestyle and bad diet, lower 
  standard of medical services, poor health care organisation<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37" title>[37]</a>.
  </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>3.2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Potential for migration from 
  developing countries</i></p>
  <p align="justify">56.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The economic 
  discrepancy between Eastern and Western Europe - with a differential GDP ratio 
  of 15 - forms a strong push factor for further East-West migration, even in 
  the presence of high unemployment figures in the West. The overall level of 
  migration pressure from the East may be expected to remain high for a long 
  time. Eastern Europe &#150; including all of the former communist states - has a 
  population of 338 million inhabitants, high incidence of poverty and high 
  rates of unemployment, and is often characterised by political instability and 
  ethnic friction. Low educated people from these regions seek jobs in countries 
  of immigration in segments of the market that are unattractive to native 
  population, while those migrants who are highly skilled often accept jobs 
  below their professional skills.</p>
  <p align="justify">57.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The potential of 
  future immigration from developing countries can be expected to persist and 
  even to become much larger than in the past because of the combination of 
  their population and economic imbalances and the lack of democracy and good 
  governance that exist in many of those countries, leading both to economic and 
  political migration push factors<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38" title>[38]</a>. 
  Whereas the population of Southern Europe e.g. is, according to the UN medium 
  variant population prospects<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39" title>[39]</a>, 
  expected to decrease from 145 million in 2000 to 117 million in 2050, the 
  population of Northern Africa is expected to increase from 174 million to 303 
  million and the population of Western Asia from 188 million to 424 million. 
  The population increase in the developing countries will mainly affect younger 
  age groups and consequently lead to a huge demand for labour (Figure 11).</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 11:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Population size of age group 20-29 in Northern Africa and Southern Europe, 
  1950-2050</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182k.gif" WIDTH="400" HEIGHT="383"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source:&nbsp;&nbsp; calculations based on United Nations 
  (2001), medium variant scenario</i></p>
  <p align="justify">58.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In view of the 
  magnitude and strength of the push factors many researchers include in their 
  future population scenarios for Europe variants with high immigration figures<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40" title>[40]</a>.
  </p>
  <p align="justify">59.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Both the low and 
  high net immigration variants in the population scenarios of the Council of 
  Europe<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41" title>[41]</a> show that migration 
  can have a substantial effect on population size, but slows down the 
  population ageing only to a minor degree. In the 20 European countries 
  considered a continuous high net immigration of one million per year would 
  result in 65 to 80 million people (ca. 17%) more than under zero immigration 
  scenarios by the year 2050. These figures would even be higher if also the 
  effect of the repro�ductive contribution of the immigrant popula�tion would be 
  taken into consideration.</p>
  <p align="justify">60.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As far as age 
  structure is concerned, the high migration variants only influence the 
  intensity, but do not alter the direction of the changes in the age 
  composition. Contrary to its effect on population size, mass immigration 
  appears, in a long time perspective, to have no substantial effect on the 
  population age structure<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42" title>[42]</a>. </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="4t" href="#4">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Population challenges for the future </a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="41t" href="#41">4.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Context</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">61.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Future 
  population-related policies in Europe will have to take into account and be 
  implemented within the framework of generally accepted shifts in values, norms 
  and social rights in various domains:</p>
  <ul>
    <li>
    <p align="justify">European societies strongly value and function on the 
    basis of the availability of knowledge, education and information;</li>
    <li>
    <p align="justify">European citizens have high aspirations/expectations for 
    quality of life;</li>
    <li>
    <p align="justify">Knowledge and availability of effective birth control 
    methods is not only a generally accepted principle, but the use of such 
    methods is also a widely spread practice;</li>
    <li>
    <p align="justify">Increased and further increasing longevity is a generally 
    pursued goal;</li>
    <li>
    <p align="justify">Individual emancipation, and in particular emancipation 
    of women is a generally acquired principle;</li>
    <li>
    <p align="justify">European societies are, in general, highly secularised.</li>
  </ul>
  <p align="justify">62.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Notwithstanding all 
  this, Europe is characterised, within as well as between its societies, by a 
  salient ideological pluralism in attitudes and views with respect to several 
  crucial family and population issues. Some policy actors want our populations 
  further to increase, oppose measures in favour of the spreading of modern 
  contraceptives, are in favour of women returning to hearth and home, and argue 
  in favour of family model based on a sharp distinction between male and female 
  social roles. Others are of the view that population decrease will lower the 
  pressure on the environment, that immigration will contribute to the creation 
  of a desirable multicultural society and delete the notion of family from 
  their political discourse and replace it by consideration for individuals. 
  Still others keep total silence on population matters, not wanting to be 
  suspected of sympathy of ancient pernicious population policies or to 
  intervene in family domains that they consider to be private matters. A 
  coherent and integrated view on a present-day population-related policy needs 
  is virtually absent in the mainstream policy debates both at European and 
  national levels. </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="42t" href="#42">4.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Challenges with respect to population size</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">63.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The desirable 
  population size can be discussed in three models: population increase, 
  population decrease and stationary population. When any of these models are 
  chosen irrespective of the pace of population changes, as a rule they reflect 
  ideological preferences. The pace of change in population size is the key 
  element for knowledge-based policy building, both in terms of rationale and 
  use of adequate instruments.</p>
  <p align="justify">64.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The population 
  growth ideology based on balance of power of sheer numbers of people seems 
  largely to have faded away in most industrial countries. Only in some of the 
  smaller newly emerged European states, both policy makers and the population 
  are worried about population decline in view of their small numbers and thus 
  favour population increase.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43" title>[43]</a> 
  In most countries, however, the debates do not focus on desirability of 
  population growth, but rather on the desirability of achieving a stationary 
  population model with a stable age structure. Minority voices are also heard 
  in favour of population decline. It is generally acknowledged that very fast 
  population growth that is not matched by a similar pace of socio-economic 
  development is not a desirable social goal and can hamper the well-being of 
  citizens.</p>
  <p align="justify">65.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Advocates of a 
  population decline are inspired by ecological and/or world population 
  considerations, whereas people who fear population decline are mainly 
  concerned with possible unfavourable socio-economic and political 
  consequences.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44" title>[44]</a> </p>
  <p align="justify">66.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The motives for 
  welcoming or advocating a population decline<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45" title>[45]</a> 
  fall into two categories, - the first is mainly concerned with North-South 
  inequities, and the second is primarily oriented towards ecological issues. 
  The developed world forms only one fifth of the world population and consumes 
  a disproportionately high share of the world's energy, food and other 
  resources. The same applies to environmental pollution, namely industrial 
  countries are the biggest polluters. From the point of view of redistri�butive 
  equity, many globally oriented scholars hold the view that a decrease of 
  population numbers in densely populated countries or regions might 
  substan�tially relieve the impact on the world's ecosystems. This relates to 
  the natural resources, the regenerating capability, and the healthy and 
  aesthetic environment. </p>
  <p align="justify">67.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; What is often not 
  taken into account is that in the highly industrialized part of the world, the 
  ecological impact of per capita consumption and the environmentally harmful 
  technology that produces consumption goods, have a greater impact than actual 
  population size. Furthermore it is by no means taken for granted that the 
  population is willing to substantially change its consumption patterns. 
  Finally, if a population decline is considered ecologically favourable and 
  socially advan�tageous over a limited period of time, long-term population 
  decline is obviously not an option since its ultimate effect is the 
  disappearance of the population.</p>
  <p align="justify">68.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The fear of a 
  continuous population decline<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46" title>[46]</a> 
  has also several foundations. Sometimes it is related to the economic, 
  cultural and especially political effects of decreases in sheer numbers. 
  Although it is acknowledged that in modern societies, sheer numbers no longer 
  have the same weight in political, military and economic competition as 
  previously, the population size is, especially with regard to the North-South 
  demographic differentials, still considered as a pertinent factor in these 
  respects. The effect of a continuous population decline under persistent 
  strong below-replacement fertility are, for a medium long period, much more 
  important than is usually imagined. <a>The population of Europe as a whole 
  (including the Russian Federation) according to some calculations/sources 
  would decrease from its 727&nbsp;million in 2000 to 167 million in 2100</a>, on the 
  hypothesis that the total fertility rate of Europe, nowadays averaging 1,37, 
  would remain constant at that level and that also the current life expectancy 
  would not change and no in- or out-migration would occur (Figure 12).<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47" title>[47]</a> 
  Thus, the debate about the relative weight of regions of the world replaces 
  the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century debates about the 
  relative weight of population numbers of neighbouring nations.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Figure 12.&nbsp;&nbsp; Population decrease in Europe 
  (including the Russian Federation) from 2000 to 2100, on the hypothesis of 
  constancy of Europe's 2000 fertility and mortality rates and assuming no in- 
  or out-migration.</i></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182n.gif" WIDTH="402" HEIGHT="474"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: calculations made on the basis of Demeny, 2003</i></p>
  <p align="justify">69.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; However, the 
  negative effects of a population decline are usually seen in a broader 
  context, and more particularly in relation to population ageing with which it 
  is often correlated. The combined effects of continuous population decline and 
  population ageing are thought to lower society's competitiveness and 
  adaptability<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48" title>[48]</a>, to diminish its 
  renewal of human resources<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49" title>[49]</a>, 
  and to decrease its possibilities to provide social security and health care, 
  and other social benefits.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50" title>[50]</a> In 
  conclusion, policy choices will have to be made: do our societies accept a 
  continuous or temporary population decrease? Or do they want to maintain their 
  population size at the current level? </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="43t" href="#43">4.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Challenges with respect to population age structure </a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">70.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Longevity gives 
  opportunities to individuals and society, but population ageing entails also 
  social costs. These costs are particularly significant in the domain of public 
  pension schemes, and health and care needs of elderly. </p>
  <p align="justify">71.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There can be no 
  doubt that most European coun�tries are going to experience a considerable 
  ageing wave after 2010, because the large post-war baby-boom cohorts and the 
  smaller age cohorts succeeding them will respectively have reached the age of 
  retirement and active life.</p>
  <p align="justify">72.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It may be expected 
  that the challenges of the population ageing will be increased due to the 
  combination of population 'greying' caused by a further increase of longevity 
  and by population dejuvenation caused by below-replacement fertility. </p>
  <p align="justify">73.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The first challenge 
  of population ageing concerns the need to adapt to population 'greying', which 
  will require a revision and adaptation of policies and strategies. The 
  population 'greying' as a demographic reality is not a matter of choice, 
  however, policy responses to the needs of elderly people and citizens in 
  ageing societies is general. Adapting to the new and evolving demographic 
  regime is a gradual process that started already many decades ago with public 
  pension and health care and public services for the elderly. There is probably 
  no way back to pre-industrial living circumstances where the extended family 
  network provided for the livelihood and care of the elderly.</p>
  <p align="justify">74.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The second 
  challenge of population ageing concerns population dejuvenation due to 
  below-replacement fertility. Dejuvenation exacerbates population ageing. 
  Policy choices have to be made whether to address this phenomenon or not. </p>
  <p align="justify">75.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The third challenge 
  concerns the increasing (aged) dependency ratio, i.e. the proportion of the 
  number of aged people on the number of people of active age. This issue 
  concerns the activity rates of the population of active age (15-64), as well 
  as the activity rates of the elderly (65+) themselves. In the future it can be 
  expected that both the number and the proportion of the population of active 
  age will decrease while at the same time large numbers of that age group are 
  inactive, because they are, willingly or unwillingly jobless. Likewise, the 
  number and proportion of the aged are already and will further increase 
  whereas their labour participation decreases. Policy options will have to be 
  decided concerning the desirability to activate both the (older) adults and 
  the (younger) seniors in order to reduce the aged dependency ratio. </p>
  <p align="justify">76.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The fourth 
  challenge concerns the compression of morbidity. Modernisation is 
  characterised by a revolutionary extension of life expectancy, whereby the 
  causes of death have largely shifted from external (i.e. infectious diseases) 
  to internal factors (i.e. senescent deterioration). This change encompasses 
  the danger that the gains in years might be accompanied by years of increased 
  frailty and disability. Expert opinion and research findings on this issue are 
  controversial. Some hold the view that the gains in years have been reached at 
  the expense of the quality of life<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51" title>[51]</a>, 
  others maintain that the senescent morbidity has been compressed in the last 
  years of life.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52" title>[52]</a> There is 
  probably some truth in both positions: the health condition of the large 
  majority of the younger elderly is satisfactory or has even been improved; the 
  major problem relies with the oldest old where degenerative conditions related 
  to senescence strike substantial proportions of the population.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53" title>[53]</a>
  </p>
  <p align="justify">77.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; These developments 
  will require policy choices with respect to the prevention of frailty at very 
  high age. </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="44t" href="#44">4.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Challenges with respect to immigration</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">78.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As a demographic 
  process migration can have substantial and diverse consequences in many 
  domains of economic, social and political life. The magnitude of the effects 
  depends in the first place on the size of the migrant flows and stocks, while 
  the type of effects depends on specific characteristics of the migrants and 
  the degree of their economic, social and cultural integration in the host 
  country. A crucial and, moreover, sensitive aspect of migration related to the 
  population dimension concerns the autochthone/allochthone relations resulting 
  from a continuing substantial immigration flow. </p>
  <p align="justify">79.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A variety of views 
  may be observed among scholars and policy makers as well as among the European 
  populations at large. Those views may be clustered around two key dimensions: 
  one concerning positive versus negative attitudes towards immigration as such, 
  and another opposing those who are in favour of ethnically pluralistic 
  societies to those who favour integration and eventually assimilation of 
  immigrants. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>4.4.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigration or no immigration? </i>
  </p>
  <p align="justify">80.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigration is a 
  response to various societal needs or goals, e.g. attraction of specific 
  qualifications (selective versus indiscriminate migration), safe haven for 
  asylum seekers and refugees, family reunification. In presence of specific 
  labour demands, immigrants can play an important role in the socio-economic 
  development of a country or region. Immigrants often contribute substantially 
  to the rejuvenation of the population, the reinforcement of the labour force, 
  the support of the social security system, the revival of depressed regions or 
  quarters, etc.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54" title>[54]</a> Whereas 
  migration may have a demographic impact, it is an answer predominantly to 
  non-demographic norms or goals of a given society. </p>
  <p align="justify">81.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigration should 
  also be considered from the viewpoint of the migrants themselves. Depending on 
  whether immigration is voluntarily or involuntarily induced, immigration is 
  usually a strategy to improve the migrants' living conditions and quality of 
  life, to allow them to achieve upward mobility, or to escape suppression or 
  persecution. Research shows that, notwithstanding their often less favourable 
  social position than that of natives, the majority of immigrants express the 
  opinion that their migration projects have succeeded and that they are 
  relatively well integrated. <a href="#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55" title>[55]</a>
  </p>
  <p align="justify">82.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The discussion is 
  here limited to the demographic rationale, i.e. the question whether mass 
  immigration can be used as a tool to compensate for population ageing and/or 
  population decline. </p>
  <p align="justify">83.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Research has shown 
  that mass immigration is not a quick-fix policy option for compensating for 
  the decline in the population size or for population ageing. Mass immigration 
  can help to reduce the decrease in the size of particular age groups and of 
  the population as a whole, but it raises many other societal questions. </p>
  <p align="justify">84.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Regarding effects 
  of immigration on population ageing, demographers have since long shown that 
  replacement migration is not a solution to demographic ageing, because the 
  average age of immigrants is only a little lower than that of natives and the 
  initially higher fertility of immigrants soon decreases to lower levels. 
  Immigrants themselves age and both natives and immigrants need ever more 
  immigrants to compensate for the population ageing and to replace them. Only 
  huge numbers of migrants would succeed in slowing down or neutralize the 
  ageing process, but would result in a phenomenal increase in population size.<a href="#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56" title>[56]</a> 
  Moreover, a massive immigration would not necessarily supply migrants with the 
  required qualifications for the economic needs or opportunities of European 
  countries. Given the fact that unemployment is nowadays already strongly 
  concentrated among the less educated and less trained population strata, and 
  particularly among less well-trained immigrants and second-generation 
  migrants, a massive immigration would inevitably reinforce this problem. </p>
  <p align="justify">85.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigration 
  policies, therefore, should have clearly defined goals and be preceded by an 
  impact analysis of the long-term demographic, socio-economic and political 
  effects.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="5" href="#5t">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Policy options</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">86.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Two types of policy 
  strategies address demographic processes of ageing and changes in the size and 
  age composition of the population. Responsive policies aim to adapt societal 
  structures to the demographic changes, while modifying policies aim to change 
  the demographic determinants, namely fertility levels, the volume of migration 
  or life expectancy in order to achieve desirable population size and balanced 
  age composition.</p>
  <p align="justify">87.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Adapting and 
  changing policies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both can be 
  integrated in various combinations. Adaptive policies are, in all cases, 
  indispensable. Long-term strategies aimed at achieving stationary population 
  will also require policies to modify the current demographic regimes. A 
  fundamental difficulty in reconciling immediate and long-term policy effects 
  reside in the fact that short-term adaptive policies more or less correspond 
  to the political time schedule of elections in democratic countries, while 
  long-term strategies require transcending this temporal dimension and 
  including intergenerational dimension of population friendly policies.</p>
  <p align="justify">88.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The policy options 
  here discussed relate to the above-mentioned population challenges and are not 
  mutually exclusive. They can be and ought to be combined in an integrated 
  manner in a comprehensive population policy framework.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="51t" href="#51">5.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Policy options with respect to fertility</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Context </i></p>
  <p align="justify">89.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Discussions on the 
  desirability to maintain population stationarity, invariably lead up to the 
  question how to increase the below-replacement fertility. Spontaneous 
  fertility recovery is unlikely to materialize<a href="#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57" title>[57]</a> 
  and adequate policies will need to be set in place.</p>
  <p align="justify">90.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Up to date, with 
  the exception of France, none of the EU countries has an explicit fertility 
  enhancing policy. Many European states, however, do have family- or 
  child-oriented policies that support having and raising children or more 
  general social policies that facilitate the combination of work and 
  parenthood. Most scholars are of the view that such measures have had only 
  modest positive effects on the number of children people want and finally get, 
  but at the same time admit that absence of such measures might have resulted 
  in even lower fertility levels than those that have been achieved.<a href="#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58" title>[58]</a> 
  Fertility period (short-term) effects, due to changes in the localisation of 
  births in the life course, do not always result in increased final descendence. 
  Already in 1986 some scholars concluded that even extensive and costly 
  measures resulting in short-term positive results, hardly ever lead to 
  long-term spectacular effects on the average number of children of female 
  generations.<a href="#_ftn59" name="_ftnref59" title>[59]</a> Econometric 
  researches in France resulted in the conclusion that a full compensation of 
  the costs of a child would enhance the final descendence by approximately 0,5 
  child per women.<a href="#_ftn60" name="_ftnref60" title>[60]</a>Acknowledging 
  the limited results which have been obtained so far, it should also be 
  acknowledged that measures taken may not have addressed the fundamental causes 
  of current reproductive patterns, or that measures were largely insufficient 
  to have noticeable effects.<a href="#_ftn61" name="_ftnref61" title>[61]</a>
  </p>
  <p align="justify">91.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On the other hand, 
  several scholars point to the striking differences in fertility levels between 
  the Nordic countries and the Southern European countries and relate the higher 
  Nordic fertility levels to the strong emancipatory policies that have been 
  developed towards women and the generalised social protection policies.<a href="#_ftn62" name="_ftnref62" title>[62]</a> 
  The number of children people want or get is partly dependent upon their 
  individual needs and aspirations, but also on the socio-cultural, 
  socio-economic and political context of their society that provide an enabling 
  framework.</p>
  <p align="justify">92.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The two other 
  demographic mechanisms by which a below-replacement fertility can be 
  compensated - immigration and increasing longevity - are usually only 
  considered as short-term solutions. Increasing longevity only temporarily 
  compensates deficit fertility to maintain population numbers, and is 
  associated with accelerated population 'greying'. Compensating deficit 
  fertility by means of immigration may equally be of a temporary and partial 
  nature: in the long run it would lead to considerable ethnic population 
  change. Moreover, immigration seems also to be an inappropriate long-term 
  solution to compensate for population ageing because immigrants contribute 
  quite fast to the ageing process and consequently would have to be 
  supplemented by ever growing numbers of new immigrants to keep the population 
  age structure in balance.</p>
  <p align="justify">93.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Analysts perceive 
  the present position of the current advocates of fertility promoting policies 
  as distinct from the older pro-natalist views formulated before World War II, 
  because a stationary instead of an expanding population is used as a point of 
  reference.<a href="#_ftn63" name="_ftnref63" title>[63]</a></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based on the 
  hypothesis that it is desirable to redress fertility at or around replacement 
  level</i></p>
  <p align="justify">94.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; From the literature 
  it appears that this aim will require a comprehensive and multifaceted policy 
  effort in domains such as gender relations, family and child relations, 
  environmental design, child and family values, life course organisation.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.2.1. Gender equality and emancipatory policies</i></p>
  <p align="justify">95.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Research<a href="#_ftn64" name="_ftnref64" title>[64]</a> 
  shows the need to eliminate existing inequities with respect to gender, not 
  only taking into consideration that women still have a higher parental 
  investment in children than men, but also because modern society is still 
  largely designed to suit men. Policies in this field may not only have to be 
  of a structural nature, mainly to facilitate the combination of motherhood 
  with other activities, in particular participation in the labour force, but 
  also deal with the existing male mentality towards gender related task 
  divisions with respect to child caring and rearing, so that men can fully 
  share family responsibilities with their partners.<a href="#_ftn65" name="_ftnref65" title>[65]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">96.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Traditional 
  attitudes concerning gender roles and power relations, gender based abilities 
  and remaining forms of gender discrimination in the labour force regarding 
  employment selection, wages, occupational positions and alike are still 
  strongly present and impair both the conceptualisation and implementation of 
  modern family- and population-oriented policies. Public policies need to 
  combat traditional value orientations on gender differences, gender based (in)abilities 
  and gender biased relations. </p>
  <p align="justify">97.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; They need also to 
  eliminate remaining forms of gender discrimination in the labour force 
  regarding employment selection, wages and occupational positions. Public 
  policies need further to strengthen measures reconciling labour and family 
  life, more particularly in the fields of childcare facilities and legal 
  provisions in the domain of parental leave and re-integration in labour force. 
  Moreover, work time flexibility and variability, adapted to family needs, 
  should be promoted. Furthermore, public policies should promote greater job 
  stability for both men and women. Last but not least, family friendly and 
  child related policies need to be universalistic and benefits granted 
  irrespective of the type of family and household forms.</p>
  <p align="justify">98.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Policies and 
  measures are also needed that may contribute to changing attitudes and 
  behaviour of men with respect to household and child-caring tasks.&nbsp; Conditions 
  must be created so that men can benefit from part-time working conditions in 
  order to be able to take part in household activities and the upbringing of 
  children, without negative professional consequences.</p>
  <p align="justify">99.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Gender equality in 
  the domain of family-work relations might be favoured by a generalised 
  reduction of working time. A promising field of action seems to consist of 
  involving private firms in the development of work patterns which develop a 
  family friendly labour organisation, enhance gender equality and facilitate 
  workers to have the number of children they want.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.2.2 Family and child-friendly policies</i></p>
  <p align="justify">100.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The necessity to 
  eliminate existing parent-linked financial inequities is often stressed. 
  Children are not only to be seen as an individual gratification to their 
  parent(s), but also as important for societal life and continuity. Some 
  scholars are even of the opinion that societal efforts to be developed in this 
  domain might prove to be of a dimension that is comparable to the one attained 
  in the course of this century in the field of public policy for education, 
  health and welfare care.<a href="#_ftn66" name="_ftnref66" title>[66]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">101.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Other authors, moreover, 
  argue that inequities with respect to parenthood not only concern the cost of 
  children (including the opportunity costs), but also the costs of care, 
  protection, and insurance of the adults. In pre-modern societies, adult 
  welfare care and survival were largely safeguarded by the number of children 
  one had raised, whereas in modern culture, societal structures among others in 
  the form of the social security system, have largely taken over those 
  functions. The idea of relinking social security to fertility as suggested by 
  several scholars<a href="#_ftn67" name="_ftnref67" title>[67]</a> aims at 
  eliminating parenthood-linked inequity by levelling off the differences in 
  self-investment and parental investment, and en�hancing the status and value 
  of children in modern society.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.2.3. Creation of a more child-friendly environment
  </i></p>
  <p align="justify">102.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The organisation and 
  functioning of modern society is in many respects child-unfriendly. In many 
  urban environments more care and place is given to cars than to playgrounds 
  and safe paths for children. Considerable work has to be done in creating a 
  child-friendly town and country planning. Also much stronger childminding 
  facilities should be provided in all kinds of social contexts &#150; work, leisure, 
  gatherings, etc., so that it appears clearly that children are welcome and are 
  a constituent in our societies.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.2.4. Promoting child and family oriented values </i>
  </p>
  <p align="justify">103.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If all of the 
  above-mentioned measures might contribute to eliminate inequities and, 
  consequently, help people to have the number of children they want without 
  having to be deprived of the privileges and advantages adults without 
  dependent children can enjoy, they may, but will not necessarily increase the 
  desired number of children to such an extent that long-term generational 
  replacement at the population level is guaranteed. Indeed, in most countries, 
  the frequency distribution of desired family size does not ensure long-term 
  population replacement (Figure 13; Table 2). Increasing the desired number of 
  children in the population means the bridging of the gap between individual 
  parental needs and societal reproductive needs. This is, however, largely a 
  matter of value change, necessitating the extension of the principle of 
  reciprocal altruism between individuals to the relationship between 
  individuals and society. Low fertility might, consequently, also require the 
  valuation of behavioural variation in reproduction. In the absence of 
  substantial and continuous immigration flows, long term generational 
  replacement can only be guaranteed when quite a large number of women surpass 
  the one or two child family size, in order to compensate for those who cannot 
  or do not want to have children or who have only one child.<a href="#_ftn68" name="_ftnref68" title>[68]</a></p>
  <p align="justify"><b>Figure 13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Frequency distribution of minimum wanted number of children in selected 
  European countries (1988 -1997)</b></p>
  <p align="justify"><img src="Pictures/EDOC10182m.gif" WIDTH="438" HEIGHT="515"></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: calculations on the basis of the Fertility and 
  Family Survey database (UN/ECE-Population Activities Unit, Geneva) </i></p>
  <p align="justify">104.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Often the question is 
  raised how modern, secularised states can influence norms and values. An 
  arduous task should be assumed in education, where nowadays population and 
  family issues are usually totally out of the horizon. But much more can be 
  done for creating a family and child friendly climate that reflects a high 
  valuation of the presence of (several) children. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.2.5. Rethinking the life course perspective of work, 
  parenthood and retirement </i></p>
  <p align="justify">105.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The current toolbox of 
  family-friendly measures might, in the end, prove to be insufficient to 
  resolve the dilemmas facing individual women and men with respect to genuine 
  gender equity, on the one hand, and on the other hand, dilemmas of modern 
  societies with respect to intergenerational continuity and redistribution of 
  resources between generations.Public policies have so far rather badly managed 
  the economy of time of individuals and families in de life-long perspective.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><i>Table 2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Fertility variance necessary to maintain long-term inter-generational 
  re�placement </i></b></p>
  <div align="center">
    <table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
      <tr>
        <td width="156" rowspan="2">
        <p align="justify"><i>Number of children</i></td>
        <td width="197" colspan="2" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>Alternative models</b></td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>% women</b></td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify"><b>% women</b></td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">0</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">10</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">15</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">1</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">10</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">20</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">2</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">45</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">10</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">3</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">30</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">50</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">4</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">5</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">5</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">&nbsp;</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">&nbsp;</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">&nbsp;</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td width="156" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">Average: 2,1</td>
        <td width="96" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">100</td>
        <td width="101" valign="top">
        <p align="justify">100</td>
      </tr>
    </table>
  </div>
  <p align="justify"><i>Source: Cliquet and Balcaen, 1983</i></p>
  <p align="justify">106.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; To reconcile the peak 
  years of family formation with competition in the labour market, the entire 
  life course perspective of employment and retirement might have to be 
  rethought so as to give more free time and resources to young families and to 
  create conditions for active ageing that entails also the option of working at 
  higher ages long after children have gained autonomy. The existing policies 
  targeted at women's (and men's) emancipation, fertility enhancement and family 
  building apparently do not completely suffice to redress fertility at 
  replacement levels. More fundamental societal reforms may be necessary to 
  achieve the reproductive goals set, first in the domains mentioned above 
  (gender emancipation, child- and family-friendly policies, reproductive values 
  and norms), second in the domain of the organisation of the entire life 
  course.<a href="#_ftn69" name="_ftnref69" title>[69]</a></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options 
  based on the hypothesis that it is undesirable or unfeasible to influence 
  fertility</i></p>
  <p align="justify">107.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In this hypothesis, 
  other demographic instruments and economic policies will have to be 
  stimulated, but they will, in the long term, not resolve all of the population 
  concerns and might, in some cases, produce other population problems. In the 
  long run the current population concerns expressed can only be fundamentally 
  resolved by redressing the fertility levels at or around replacement level. It 
  might take some time, however, to reach a general political consensus on this 
  issue.</p>
  <p align="justify">108.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Non-fertility targeted 
  policies might, <i>inter alia</i>, include selective immigration (see section 
  5.3. below), activating the inactive and increasing economic productivity.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.3.1. Activating the inactive</i></p>
  <p align="justify">109.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The problem of the 
  decreasing labour force can be (temporarily) relieved by investing in 
  unemployed people, by increasing female labour force participation, and 
  especially by reducing pre-pension schemes and increasing age at retirement 
  (see also section 5.2. below).</p>
  <p align="justify">110.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Many countries are 
  confronted with high unemployment rates among their younger adults. Much 
  larger efforts should be done to employ the unemployed, including the possible 
  necessity to provide them with additional training or retrain them.<a href="#_ftn70" name="_ftnref70" title>[70]</a>It 
  is often thought that the forthcoming shrinking of the population of working 
  age will substantially contribute to the dilution of unemployment, because the 
  present reserve labour supply which is available in the unemployed population 
  will be absorbed. However, the future might be more complex than this 
  expectation may suppose. The development of the relationship between labour 
  supply and unemployment is not necessarily straightforward. The increasing 
  concentration of unemployment among less qualified and less able people forms 
  an indication that, in a technologically progressive culture, a shortage of 
  labour supply might co-exist with an assorted unemployed population.</p>
  <p align="justify">111.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In recent decades, 
  female employment has considerably increased, especially among the age groups 
  25 to 45. As far as the possible compensatory effect of female labour 
  participation is concerned, the recent trends in female activity levels, the 
  ongoing increase in female educational levels, the results of opinion surveys 
  on labour participation intentions, the evolution of gender emancipatory 
  ideology and the slowly improving policy efforts to facilitate the combination 
  of motherhood and gainful employment, all allow to suppose that a further 
  increase in female labour participation might also be expected for the near 
  future, but at the same time this trend could contribute to the maintenance of 
  very low fertility levels and thus to the acceleration of the ageing process.</p>
  <p align="justify">112.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A simulation study for 
  the Netherlands where female employment is still quite limited showed that the 
  increase of female labour participation might largely compensate the effects 
  of population ageing in the near future. A similar study in France<a href="#_ftn71" name="_ftnref71" title>[71]</a>, 
  where female labour participation is already quite high, however, proved that 
  increasing female employment has only a temporary effect on compensating the 
  decrease of the labour supply due to population ageing. It should be stressed 
  that in the most advanced countries, female labour participation has come 
  close to that of males, which means that some extension in this domain is 
  still to be envisaged for the near future, but that in the long term, the 
  existing female labour reserve will soon get exhausted.</p>
  <p align="justify">113.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Furthermore, it can be 
  questioned whether female labour participation might not, due to women's 
  larger parental investment and desire to interrupt their career in view of 
  taking care themselves of their children during the first years of their life, 
  continue to lie somewhat below the quantitative levels of men, especially in a 
  society where compensatory facilities for such an investment, for instance in 
  the form of financial allowances, temporary maternal leave, parental leave, 
  part-time labour participation, might gain in importance.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.1.3.2. Increasing productivity</i></p>
  <p align="justify">114.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Increasing productivity 
  is obviously an important instrument to partially compensate for increasing 
  demographic dependency ratios. Technological innovation leading to higher 
  productivity per head is one of the important factors that might counteract 
  the expected decrease in labour supply.<a href="#_ftn72" name="_ftnref72" title>[72]</a> 
  However, the introduction of technological innovation in the production 
  process is in turn partly dependent upon the influx into the labour force of 
  recently educated young people. Labour-embodied technical change requires an 
  increased educational investment in people, first of all in young people, and 
  when the share of their influx decreases, also of adults.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="52t" href="#52">5.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Policy options with respect to longevity</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Context</i></p>
  <p align="justify">115.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The increased life 
  expectancy in modern society is a 'triumph of modernisation' and is generally 
  welcomed. </p>
  <p align="justify">116.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Contrary to the 
  biological ageing process which resulted in a lengthening of life and 
  opportunities to prolong an active life up to a much higher age than ever 
  before in human history, social ageing developed in an opposite direction, 
  with more and more people, retiring at ever younger ages, either because 
  society excluded them from the labour force, or because people, being 
  unsatisfied with their work conditions, took advantage of the early retirement 
  schemes.</p>
  <p align="justify">117.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The considerable 
  progress made in the living conditions of older people - most are in good 
  health, many are better educated, increasing numbers own their own house, and, 
  compared to former generations, the majority is financially better off than 
  ever before &#150; required a major public involvement.</p>
  <p align="justify">118.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The early retirement 
  schemes were installed in order to give the numerous cohorts of young 
  unemployed adults a possibility to join the labour force, but companies 
  largely used those schemes to rearrange and reduce their work force. Older 
  workers were ejected, but not replaced by younger ones.</p>
  <p align="justify">119.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It may be expected that 
  further medical progress will not only further push the life expectancy up to 
  the biological species-specific life span, but that scientific inventions may 
  even succeed in lengthening the life span beyond its present threshold. </p>
  <p align="justify">120.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is possible that 
  healthy behaviour associated with less smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, better 
  diet, more physical activity, more careful traffic behaviour, less stress at 
  work, and protected sexual behaviour, will be increasingly accepted and 
  practiced by larger proportions of the population. They would have a positive 
  effect on population 'greying' and on further compression of morbidity to 
  still higher ages.<a href="#_ftn73" name="_ftnref73" title>[73]</a></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based on the 
  hypothesis that it is desirable to deal with population 'greying'</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.2.2.1. Active ageing</i></p>
  <p align="justify">121.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In recent decades, many 
  European countries developed policies allowing, encouraging or even forcing 
  people into pre-retirement schemes. Not only the labour force participation of 
  men over 65 further decreased, but between the ages of 55 and 64 proportions 
  in paid labour also dropped considerably. The early retirement schemes were 
  often introduced as a measure that was meant to foster youth employment. In 
  practice it not only missed the political target, combating exclusion of young 
  people from the labour market, but produced an ever decreasing labour force 
  participation and occupational exclusion of older adults. This notwithstanding 
  the fact that the health conditions, educational levels, and technological 
  support mechanisms are continuously improving and allow most older people to 
  work up to a much higher age than in the past.<a href="#_ftn74" name="_ftnref74" title>[74]</a> 
  Today there is a general consensus that the early retirement schemes, 
  originally justified by the need to create employment for the arriving 
  generations and to replace expensive older workers due to the seniority pay 
  system by young unemployed people, proved ineffective and highly costly for 
  the society. The push out of the workforce of older workers was done at the 
  expense of long-term public financing. Early retirement policies largely 
  failed because the private sector took advantage of them to restructure and 
  cut back its work force, rather than to replace older by younger workers. The 
  outcome of reforms was that very few new jobs were created for young adults by 
  means of pre-pension schemes offered to older workers and that the cost of the 
  economic restructuring was partly shifted from the private to the public 
  sector.</p>
  <p align="justify">122.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The unfavourable effects 
  of population ageing (increasing elderly dependency ratio) can be counteracted 
  by promoting an active ageing policy, keeping older, able workers much longer, 
  though in a variable and flexible way, in the work force. Early pension 
  schemes should, consequently, be reduced and legal and de facto age of 
  retirement gradually increased.</p>
  <p align="justify">123.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Virtually all authors 
  addressing the policy implications of population ageing suggest that the 
  current policies with respect to retirement age should be revised<a href="#_ftn75" name="_ftnref75" title>[75]</a>. 
  At the 1988 ECE-conference on the Economic and Social Implications of Ageing 
  in the ECE-Region this was the most recurrent policy theme. A French scenario 
  analysis shows that increasing the age at retirement with a few years would be 
  sufficient to maintain the labour supply in the first half of the present 
  century at its current level.<a href="#_ftn76" name="_ftnref76" title>[76]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">124.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The need to increase, 
  via appropriate stimulating measures, the formal and <i>de facto</i> age at 
  retirement, albeit taking into account intra- and inter-individual variability 
  with respect to needs and abilities was also a major conclusion of the recent 
  Network for Integrated European Population Policy (NIEPS) workshops on Ageing, 
  Intergenerational Solidarity, and Age-specific Vulnerabilities, organized by 
  11 governmental population institutes in Europe.<a href="#_ftn77" name="_ftnref77" title>[77]</a> 
  Simulation studies also show that such an increase in retirement age has a 
  positive effect on public spending<a href="#_ftn78" name="_ftnref78" title>[78]</a> 
  and allows maintaining the labour supply in the coming decades.<a href="#_ftn79" name="_ftnref79" title>[79]</a> 
  In this context it needs to be mentioned that the UN Second World Assembly on 
  Ageing, Madrid, 8-12 April 2002<a href="#_ftn80" name="_ftnref80" title>[80]</a>, 
  agreed that &#147;older persons must have the opportunity to work for as long as 
  they wish and are able, in satisfying and productive work&#133;&#148;.</p>
  <p align="justify">125.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Of course, it may be 
  argued that the raise of the statutory age at retirement, if introduced as a 
  partial, segmented measure, may offset efforts to reduce the unemployment 
  among the younger age groups. The policy discourse is strong on reiterating 
  the need to provide work for the unemployed youth, for the inactive women of 
  all ages, and for older persons; it remains weak on integrated 
  standard-setting and strategies to effectively reach a broad population base. 
  There is a clear necessity to address the work/unemployment/inactivity matrix 
  by redesigning the work pattern for all age groups in an integrated 
  work/family-friendly/social and retirement policy context.<a href="#_ftn81" name="_ftnref81" title>[81]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">126.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Whereas in the past 
  decades, policies in many countries were oriented towards the decrease of the 
  retirement age or the creation of facilities for earlier retirement, &#150;&nbsp;an 
  advantage which was in many cases seized by a considerable proportion of the 
  active population at still younger ages&nbsp;&#150;<a href="#_ftn82" name="_ftnref82" title>[82]</a> 
  the health conditions, educational level and social abilities of the 
  population at more mature ages &#150;&nbsp;the younger seniors&nbsp;&#150; increased quite 
  considerably, thus lengthening the individual period of performance 
  possibilities.<a href="#_ftn83" name="_ftnref83" title>[83]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">127.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Just as in the case of 
  female emancipation, the demographic ageing might form a stimulating factor to 
  (re)valorise the societal role of the new generations of younger seniors whose 
  bio-social abilities and capacities are substantially improving thanks to 
  their better health status and higher training, and to take full advantage of 
  the variation in biological ability and psychological willingness to continue, 
  full- or part-time, occupational activity.</p>
  <p align="justify">128.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Given the complex nature 
  of the problem and the different and opposite interests that are involved, a 
  holistic policy should be pursued in which employment, retirement, health and 
  welfare policies are integrated, promoting at the same time increasing 
  employment opportunities for older people, reducing easy exit pathways, while 
  at the same time protecting the most disadvantaged and vulnerable workers. 
  Policies should be developed by means of soft reforms, i.e. measures that may 
  stimulate older workers to retire later, but leave the social protection 
  element largely untouched. Examples of such types of reform are the inclusion 
  of long transition periods in the pension reform plans and support for older 
  workers' participation by giving them fewer obligations and more privileges, 
  such as additional leave, increased holiday entitlement, a workload reduction, 
  age limits for irregular work, exemption from working overtime, and part-time 
  retirement.<a href="#_ftn84" name="_ftnref84" title>[84]</a> </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.2.2.2. Adapting the social protection system</i></p>
  <p align="justify">129.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The social protection 
  system &#150; pension system, health care and other public funded care &#150; will have 
  to be adapted to keep it sustainable in a long-term perspective.</p>
  <p align="justify">130.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The traditional pension 
  systems in Europe should be reformed and adapted to the new demographic 
  regime. They should be neutral, fair, and robust with respect to the further 
  expected increase of longevity. Pension reforms should be part of an 
  integrated policy together with population policies and welfare and labour 
  market reforms.<a href="#_ftn85" name="_ftnref85" title>[85]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">131.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Each isolated specific 
  adaptive measure to population ageing on itself &#150; pension system reforms, 
  changing labour participation, activating older people, increasing 
  immigration, redressing fertility &#150; will help but will not resolve the 
  problem. An integrated, multi-sectorial policy, involving all of those 
  measures, will be needed to address adequately the long-term challenge of 
  population ageing.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.2.2.3. Intergenerational solidarity</i></p>
  <p align="justify">132.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Although most measures 
  will have to be of an organizational or financial nature and pertain to 
  specific problems, population ageing might also necessitate behavioural 
  changes, and more particularly require the strengthening of intergenerational 
  solidarity with a view to maintaining or redressing intergenerational equity 
  in life opportunities and options.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based on the 
  hypothesis that it is undesirable to activate the older adults</i></p>
  <p align="justify">133.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In this hypothesis it 
  will be necessary to deal with population size and age structure deficiencies 
  by means of other demographic processes such as increasing fertility (see 
  Section 5.1.2. above) and/or increasing immigration (see Section 5.3.2. 
  below), socio-economic processes such as increasing work force participation 
  of unemployed and women (see Section 5.1.3.1. above), and 
  economic-technological processes such as increasing productivity (see Section 
  5.1.3.2. above). </p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="53t" href="#53">5.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Policy options with respect to immigration</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Context</i></p>
  <p align="justify">134.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; International migration 
  is a fundamental characteristic of modern, globalising society. Partnership, 
  educational aspirations, scientific cooperation, economic activity, 
  ideological convictions, leisure and tourism make people transcend their 
  national borders and settle in other countries. Modern communication and 
  transportation means, moreover, facilitate strongly international mobility.</p>
  <p align="justify">135.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Migrants, more 
  particularly from developing countries, try to improve their economic 
  opportunities, their standard of living, their freedom of expression, their 
  quality of life in general. However, immigration towards developed countries 
  cannot resolve the demographic problems of developing countries. Europe cannot 
  accommodate the huge numbers of potential migrants from developing countries 
  without disturbing profoundly its own social, economic and political cohesion, 
  stability and security. The demographic pressures and the demographic-economic 
  disbalances in surrounding developing regions require demographic and 
  socio-economic policies in those countries themselves.</p>
  <p align="justify">136.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Mass immigration of 
  foreigners is seldom welcomed by native populations. Ethnic substitution is 
  undesired by nation states. In-group/out-group relations are particularly 
  difficult to manage in case of strongly perceived differences between various 
  communities and especially where combined with differences in economic 
  opportunities and competition. Racism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia are deeply 
  embedded drives in the human that erupt easily in case of economic or other 
  forms of group competition.<a href="#_ftn86" name="_ftnref86" title>[86]</a></p>
  <p align="justify">137.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Multiculturalism appears 
  to be in many respects socially <a>dysfunctional </a>and very expensive. 
  Everywhere immigrants need to adapt to their host country in practically all 
  important domains of social life &#150; language, laws, values and norms. In all 
  European countries pluralism in private matters of philosophical or religious 
  beliefs, including vestiary and culinary customs, is tolerated. However, these 
  features are not the key markers of collective identity.</p>
  <p align="justify">138.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigrants are expected 
  to integrate into their host country in all aspects of social life, with the 
  exception of their beliefs and behaviour that have a purely private character 
  and are not against the law. However, immigrants from more distant cultures 
  have seldom been adequately assisted and helped to integrate adequately in 
  their new country and much policy efforts need to go into that direction. </p>
  <p align="justify">139.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Research shows that 
  immigration can compensate for decreases in population size, but it can not, 
  in the long run, prevent population ageing process.</p>
  <p align="justify">140.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A major difficulty for 
  the development of migration policies lies in the existence of profound 
  differences in views regarding benefits and costs of immigration. There is no 
  consistent view about ways to manage migration flows and facilitate social and 
  cultural integration of immigrants. Whatever option with respect to migration 
  countries one may chose, the development of a coherent and comprehensive 
  implementation strategy is necessary. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based on the 
  hypothesis that immigration is a desirable instrument to compensate perceived 
  deficiencies in population size and age structure in Europe</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.2.1. Selective immigration</i></p>
  <p align="justify">141.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigration must be 
  selective and numerically adjusted to the specific labour needs and reception 
  capacity of the host country. Complex modern societies cannot cope, without 
  provoking or experiencing serious social strive and disorder, with 
  indiscriminate or mass immigration. Immigration needs to be sustainable for 
  the receiving country, and must contribute to the society's welfare, security, 
  stability and cohesion.</p>
  <p align="justify">142.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Compensating for both 
  population size and age structure deficiencies requires a basket of measures 
  of which migration might be one of the minor components. Possible shortages on 
  the labour market should first be addressed by valuing, mobilising and 
  integrating the existing reserves of manpower of native as well of foreign 
  origin, the latter often being confronted with higher than national average 
  rates of unemployment, instead of enabling enterprises to recruit labour at no 
  cost for themselves but shifting the cost to the society at times of economic 
  restructuring of firms.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Immigrant integration</i></p>
  <p align="justify">143.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immigrants, more 
  particularly of ethnic distant origin, need active integration policies to 
  avoid creation of ethnically/genetically stratified societies. People migrate 
  in order to improve their living conditions and their quality of life. 
  Inadequate integration, especially of second and third generation migrants, 
  can result in ghetto formation, limited opportunities to upward social 
  mobility or full participation in all aspects of social life in the host 
  country. </p>
  <p align="justify">144.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Integration of migrants 
  implies also the acceptance by the national population of the cultural 
  identity and values of the immigrants as far as they are not against the law 
  or in conflict with fundamental European values concerning individual 
  development, educational opportunity, gender equality, human dignity, 
  democracy and individual's place in society in general. All forms of racism, 
  ethnocentrism and xenophobia, both among the national population and the 
  immigrants, should be combated.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Illegal migration </i></p>
  <p align="justify">145.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The potential for 
  immigration from developing countries is so huge, given the demographic and 
  economic disbalances in many developing countries, that Europe cannot absorb 
  all of the existing and expected migration pressures. Illegal immigration 
  must, consequently, be adequately controlled.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.2.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Compensating for brain drain</i></p>
  <p align="justify">146.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Developed countries may 
  decide to compensate their failure to produce themselves in due time and in 
  sufficient numbers educated and qualified workers in particular fields, to 
  attract highly qualified immigrants ('brain gain') from developing countries. 
  The 'brain drain' the latter may experience would require economic and 
  cultural compensation measures.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.2.5.</i><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </i><i>Development cooperation</i></p>
  <p align="justify">147.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The considerable 
  migration potential from developing countries cannot be absorbed by developed 
  countries without destabilising them socially, economically and politically. 
  Migration pressures from developing countries can only be adequately reduced 
  by stimulating the social and economic development in those countries 
  themselves. Europe might contribute to this by intensifying substantially its 
  development cooperation.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>5.3.3.&nbsp;&nbsp; Policy options based on the 
  hypothesis that immigration is not a desirable instrument to compensate 
  perceived deficiencies in population size and age structure in Europe</i></p>
  <p align="justify">148.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In this hypothesis it is 
  clear that population size and age structure deficiencies must inevitably be 
  corrected by other demographic processes such as increasing fertility (see 
  Section 5.1.2. above), socio-economic processes such as increasing work force 
  participation of unemployed, women and older adults (see Sections 5.1.3.2. and 
  5.2.2. above), and economic-technological processes such as increasing 
  productivity.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b><a name="6t" href="#6">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Conclusions</a></b></p>
  <p align="justify">149.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the fundamental 
  policy goals of European democracies have produced many beneficial effects on 
  the quality of life of their citizens, they have not yet or sufficiently 
  succeeded in dealing adequately with some societal-demographic interactions 
  that will, in the present cultural, economic and political context, result in 
  a forthcoming population decline and a further population ageing, and in 
  particular a further population dejuvenation due to fertility decline. </p>
  <p align="justify">150.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If European societies 
  are willing to take up the demographic challenges in the domains of population 
  decline and population ageing, they will have to pursue a general societal 
  consensus on the future course of their population dynamics and structures and 
  on the population-related policies to deal with those challenges. </p>
  <p align="justify">151.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The expected population 
  decline and further population ageing need to be addressed by comprehensive 
  and long-term designed population-related policies. These policies need to be 
  partly responsive to the new demographic regime in Europe, but will, in the 
  long term, also have to include policies to modify trends. All of the basic 
  demographic phenomena &#150; fertility, longevity and migration &#150; will have to be 
  addressed. </p>
  <p align="justify">152.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Population 'greying', 
  resulting from an increase in longevity, will have to be addressed by 
  responsive policies to adapt social institutions and processes to the newly 
  emerging population age structure, but also by modifying policies to 
  re-activate and re-integrate the younger seniors in the workforce and in 
  society in general. Immigration is not an adequate instrument to compensate 
  for population 'greying'. </p>
  <p align="justify">153.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Population decline can 
  partially and temporarily be compensated by immigration which, however, raises 
  many other societal problems. On the long term, policies will have to address 
  the current reproductive behavioural patterns. Redressing fertility to or 
  around generational 'replacement level' will require addressing the 
  fundamental causes of low fertility and will require quite substantial changes 
  in values, gender relations, economic processes, financial policies, 
  environmental planning and the economy of time of the entire life course 
  perspective of work, parenthood and retirement. </p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Reporting committee:</i> Committee on Migration, 
  Refugees and Population.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Reference to committee</i>:
  <a href="../doc03/EDOC9805.htm">Doc. 9805</a>, Reference No. 2842 of 27 May 
  2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Draft recommendation unanimously adopted</i> by the 
  Committee on 26 April 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify">Members of the Committee: <i>Wilkinson</i> (Chairperson),
  <i>de&nbsp;Zulueta</i> (1<sup>st</sup> Vice-Chairperson), S�ndergaard (2<sup>nd</sup> 
  Vice-Chairperson), <i>Branger</i> (3<sup>rd</sup> Vice-Chairperson), Akg�n, 
  Akhvlediani, Alibeyli (alternate: <i>Aliyev</i>), de&nbsp;Ar�stegui,&nbsp; Bernik,
  <i>Bilozir</i>, <i>Bousakla</i>, Braun, Brinkel (alternate: <i>van Thijn</i>),
  <i>Brunhart</i>, Cabrnoch, <i>�avusoglu</i>, Christodoulides, <i>Cilevics</i>, 
  Cliveti, Dacic, Danieli, Debarge (alternate: <i>Jacquat</i>), Debono&nbsp;Grech, <i>
  Dedja</i>, Dmitrijevas, <i>Einarsson</i>, Err, <i>Fedorov</i>, Filipiov�, 
  Freiherr&nbsp;von&nbsp;und&nbsp;zu&nbsp;Guttenberg, Grissemann (alternate: <i>Himmer</i>), <i>
  Grzesik</i>, Grzyb, <i>G�l�i�ek</i>, Hagberg, <i>Hancock</i>, Higgins, <i>
  Hoffmann</i>, <i>Ilascu</i>, <i>Iwinski</i>, Jova&#154;evic, <i>Lord&nbsp;Judd</i>, 
  Karpov, Kirilov, K�s�-Kov�cs, Kulikov (alternate: <i>Provkin</i>), <i>
  Kvakkestad</i>, Lambert, Le&nbsp;Guen, Liapis, Loutfi, Masi, Naro, Nasufi, <i>Nessa</i>,
  <i>Olin</i>, <i>Popa</i>, Prijmireanu, <i>Puche</i>, Pupovac, Ragu&#158;, <i>
  Rakhansky</i>, Reymann, <i>Saks</i>, <i>Shakhtakhtinskaya</i>, Skarph�dinsson, 
  Slutsky (alternate: <i>Glukhovskiy</i>), Stamm, Stoisits, St�bgen, Szab� 
  (alternate: <i>Platvoet</i>), <i>Tekelioglu</i>, <i>Tk�c</i>, <i>Torosyan</i>, 
  Vera&nbsp;Jardim, Verivakis (alternate: <i>Katseli</i>), <i>Vermot-Mangold</i>, 
  Vieira, Wray (alternate: <i>Etherington</i>), Y��ez-Barnuevo (alternate: <i>
  Agramunt Font de Mora</i>), Zhirinovsky.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting 
  are printed in italics.</i></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Secretariat of the committee: </i>Mr Lervik, Mrs Nachilo, 
  Mrs Sirtori-Milner, Ms Kostenko</p>
  <hr color="#000000" size="1">
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title>[1]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Tk�c <i>et al.,</i> 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title>[2]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Cliquet &amp; Thienpont, 1995.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title>[3]</a><span lang="FR">
  <a href="http://www.coe.int/T/E/social_cohesion/population/publications">
  www.coe.int/T/E/social_cohesion/population/publications</a>. </p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title>[4]</a> CBGS, 2003; 
  Avramov &amp; Cliquet, 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title>[5]</a> United 
  Nations, 2001.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title>[6]</a> e.g. Bobak, 
  1999.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title>[7]</a><span lang="IT"> 
  e.g. Golini, 1999; Avramov &amp; Maskova, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title>[8]</a> Avramov &amp; 
  Maskova, 2003</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title>[9]</a> United 
  Nations, 2001</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title>[10]</a> Prinz and 
  Lutz, 1993.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title>[11]</a> Golini, 
  1999.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title>[12]</a> e.g. 
  Olshansky <i>et al.</i> 2001.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title>[13]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Gordon <i>et al.</i>, 1979.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title>[14]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Avramov &amp; Maskova, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title>[15]</a> Prinz and 
  Lutz, 1993.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" title>[16]</a> OECD, 
  2000.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" title>[17]</a> e.g. 
  Council of Europe, 2002.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" title>[18]</a> e.g. 
  Trost, 1979; Da Vanzo &amp; Rahman, 1993; <strong style="font-weight: 400">
  Carmichael, 1995; </strong>Prinz, 1995; Schoenmaeckers &amp; Lodewijckx, 1999; 
  Corijn &amp; Klijzing, 2001</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" title>[19]</a> for data, 
  see Council of Europe, 2002; Sardon, 2002</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" title>[20]</a> e.g. van 
  Peer, 2002</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" title>[21]</a>Dorbritz 
  and Schwarz, 1996</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" title>[22]</a> for data 
  see: Council of Europe, 2002</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" title>[23]</a> e.g. 
  Lesthaeghe, 2001</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" title>[24]</a> e.g. 
  Bongaarts, 2002</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" title>[25]</a> Salt, 
  2000</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" title>[26]</a> Council 
  of Europe, 2002</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" title>[27]</a> e.g. 
  Lesthaeghe, 2000; Courbage, 2003</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" title>[28]</a> e.g. 
  Collinson, 1993.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29" title>[29]</a> e.g. 
  Easterlin, 1980; Becker, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30" title>[30]</a> e.g. 
  Lesthaeghe, 1995.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31" title>[31]</a> e.g. 
  Chafetz, 1995.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32" title>[32]</a> e.g. 
  Golini, 1999; Avramov, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33" title>[33]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Lesthaeghe &amp; van de Kaa, 1986</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34" title>[34]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Roussel, 1989; Romaniuk, 1990; Cliquet, 1991</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35" title>[35]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Chesnais, 1996; Dorbritz &amp; Philipov, 2003</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36" title>[36]</a> Avramov &amp; 
  Cliquet, in preparation</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37" title>[37]</a> e.g. 
  Bobak, 1999; Vallin <i>et al.</i>, 2001</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38" title>[38]</a> e.g. 
  Golini, 1999; Demeny 2003</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39" title>[39]</a> United 
  Nations, 2001</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40" title>[40]</a> e.g. 
  Prinz &amp; Lutz, 1993; De Beer &amp; van Wissen, 1999; United Nations, 2001</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41" title>[41]</a> Prinz and 
  Lutz, 1993</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42" title>[42]</a> e.g. 
  Espenshade, 1987; Blanchet, 1988; Lesthaeghe, <i>et al.</i>, 1988; Steinmann, 
  1991; Wattelar &amp; Roumans, 1991; Prinz &amp; Lutz, 1993; United Nations, 2000</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43" title>[43]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  DIALOG, 2002</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44" title>[44]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  e.g. Cliquet, 1993.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45" title>[45]</a><span lang="DE-CH">e.g. 
  Ehrlich &amp; Ehrlich, 1990.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46" title>[46]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  e.g. Teitelbaum &amp; Winter, 1985.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47" title>[47]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  Demeny, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48" title>[48]</a>
  <span lang="FR">e.g. Chesnais, 1985.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49" title>[49]</a><span lang="FR">e.g. 
  Calot <i>et al.</i>, 1990.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50" title>[50]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Johanet <i>et al.</i>, 1990.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51" title>[51]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Olshansky <i>et al.</i>, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52" title>[52]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Fries, 1989.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53" title>[53]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  REVES, 1993.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54" title>[54]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Collinson, 1993&nbsp;; Moreau <i>et al.</i>, 1990.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55" title>[55]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Courbage, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56" title>[56]</a> e.g. 
  Espenshade, 1987; Blanchet, 1988; Lesthaeghe et al., 1988; Prinz &amp; Lutz, 1993; 
  Steinmann, 1991, Wattelar &amp; Roumans, 1991; United Nations, 2000.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57" title>[57]</a> e.g. 
  Council of Europe, 1985.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58" title>[58]</a> e.g. 
  Leeuw, 1984; 1986; Ekert, 1986; H�hn, 1987; 1988; 1989; Chesnais, 1985; Calot, 
  1997.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref59" name="_ftn59" title>[59]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  H�hn &amp; Schubnell, 1986.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref60" name="_ftn60" title>[60]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  Ekert, 1986.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref61" name="_ftn61" title>[61]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  e.g. Cliquet, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref62" name="_ftn62" title>[62]</a><span lang="DE-CH"> 
  e.g. Hoem, 1990; <strong>Sundstr�m, 1992; </strong>Chesnais, 1996; McDonald, 
  2000; CBGS, 2003; Avramov &amp; Cliquet, 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref63" name="_ftn63" title>[63]</a> e.g. 
  Lesthaeghe, 1989.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref64" name="_ftn64" title>[64]</a> CBGS, 
  2003; Avramov &amp; Cliquet, 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref65" name="_ftn65" title>[65]</a> United 
  Nations, 1975; 1984; 1994.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref66" name="_ftn66" title>[66]</a> Romaniuc, 
  1990</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref67" name="_ftn67" title>[67]</a> 
  Schreiber, 1955; von Nell-Breuning, 1979; Swidler, 1986, Demeny, 1987; Prinz, 
  1992.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref68" name="_ftn68" title>[68]</a> Council 
  of Europe, 1985</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref69" name="_ftn69" title>[69]</a> Avramov &amp; 
  Cliquet, 2003; 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref70" name="_ftn70" title>[70]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Coleman, 1992; Gallie, 2002.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref71" name="_ftn71" title>[71]</a>
  <span lang="FR">Blanchet &amp; Marchand, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref72" name="_ftn72" title>[72]</a>
  <span lang="FR">e.g. Blanchet &amp; Marchand, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref73" name="_ftn73" title>[73]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Chamie &amp; Cliquet, 1999.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref74" name="_ftn74" title>[74]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  Schultz <i>et al.</i>, 1991; Worsley, 1996.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref75" name="_ftn75" title>[75]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Legar� &amp; Desjardins, 1988.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref76" name="_ftn76" title>[76]</a> Blanchet 
  &amp; Marchand, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref77" name="_ftn77" title>[77]</a> Avramov &amp; 
  Cliquet, 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref78" name="_ftn78" title>[78]</a> e.g. 
  Bogaert and Festjens, 1993.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref79" name="_ftn79" title>[79]</a> e.g. 
  Blanchet and Marchand, 1991.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref80" name="_ftn80" title>[80]</a> United 
  Nations, 2002.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref81" name="_ftn81" title>[81]</a><span lang="IT"> 
  Avramov &amp; Maskova, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref82" name="_ftn82" title>[82]</a><span lang="IT"> 
  Schm�hl, 1989.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref83" name="_ftn83" title>[83]</a><span lang="IT"> 
  Ferraro &amp; Wan, 1990.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref84" name="_ftn84" title>[84]</a> e.g. 
  Hagmann, 1994; WHO, 2002; Avramov &amp; Maskova, 2003; Avramov &amp; Cliquet, 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref85" name="_ftn85" title>[85]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. CBGS, 2003.</p>
  <p align="justify"><a href="#_ftnref86" name="_ftn86" title>[86]</a><span lang="FR"> 
  e.g. Reynolds <i>et al.,</i> 1987; Thienpont &amp; Cliquet, 1999.</p>
  <p align="justify">&nbsp;</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>