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  <p align="justify">The Council of Europe and the conflict in Northern Ireland</p>
  <p align="justify">Doc. 10245<br>
  </span>
  </b>
  
  2 July 2004</p>
  
  <b>
  
    <p align="justify">Report<br>
  </b>
  
    Political Affairs Committee<br>
    Rapporteur: Mr Miroslav Ouzk�, Czech Republic, European Democrat Group</p>
  
  <b>
  
    <p align="center">
    <i>For debate in the Standing Committee &#151; see Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure</i></p>
  </b>
  
  </font>
 
<hr size="1">
    <span lang="EN-GB">
  
  <p align="justify"><i>Summary</span></i></p>
  <p align="justify">The 
  Belfast/Good Friday Agreement concluded by the Governments of the United 
  Kingdom and Ireland in April 1998 provided an appropriate institutional 
  framework for the peace process in Northern Ireland and raised great hopes, 
  both in the two countries concerned and at international level, that a fair 
  and lasting settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland might be reached.</p>
  <p align="justify">Although the 
  situation in Northern Ireland has clearly improved, many difficulties have 
  been experienced in implementing the Agreement and it has not produced all the 
  desired results. The peace process has reached a difficult stage and risks 
  losing the wide public support it previously enjoyed.</p>
  <p align="justify">The draft 
  resolution suggests ways in which the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary 
  Assembly, in consultation with the British and Irish authorities, may help 
  advance the peace process in Northern Ireland.</p>
  <p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Draft resolution </b><font size="2">
  <b><span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Verdana" size="2"><i>[<a href="../../AdoptedText/TA04/ERES1389.htm">Link 
  to the adopted text</a>]</i></font></span></b></font></p>
  <p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its
  <a href="../../AdoptedText/TA98/eres1163.htm">Resolution 1163 (1998)</a> on 
  the Agreement on Northern Ireland. This Agreement, known as the Belfast 
  Agreement or the Good Friday Agreement, concluded by the Governments of the 
  United Kingdom and Ireland on 10 April 1998 following multi-party 
  negotiations, raised great hopes, both in the two countries concerned and at 
  international level, that a fair and lasting settlement of the conflict in 
  Northern Ireland might be reached.</p>
  <p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The representative institutions, co-operation arrangements and the legislative 
  reforms put in place by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement provided an 
  appropriate institutional framework for pursuing the peace process in Northern 
  Ireland, promoting co-operation between the North and the South of Ireland and 
  between the United Kingdom and Ireland and strengthening human rights 
  protection.</p>
  <p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  However, many difficulties have been experienced in implementing the Agreement 
  and it has not produced all the desired results. The main democratic 
  institutions in Northern Ireland &#150; the Assembly and the Executive &#150; have been 
  suspended since October 2002 and the province is under the direct 
  administration of the British Government. As a result, the peace process has 
  reached a difficult stage and risks losing the wide public support it 
  previously enjoyed.</p>
  <p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The situation in Northern Ireland has clearly improved as compared to that 
  which prevailed at the time of negotiation of the Belfast/Good Friday 
  Agreement.&nbsp; The period of violent conflict is at an end and, although 
  terrorist attacks and paramilitary activities have not completely ceased, 
  their scale has been considerably reduced and a return to widespread violence 
  seems unlikely.</p>
  <p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Nevertheless, this progress contrasts with the difficult and sensitive 
  situation which persists on the political scene.&nbsp; The problem of the 
  disarming of the paramilitary groups has not yet been resolved.&nbsp; 
  Furthermore, society in Northern Ireland remains deeply divided along 
  community lines. Mutual distrust and fear persist.&nbsp; The end of the 
  conflict has not yet turned into a true peace.</p>
  <p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Perpetuating the current situation and allowing hopes for peace to be dashed 
  would be unforgivable. It is of paramount importance, not only for the future 
  of the people of Northern Ireland but for the whole of Europe, that fresh 
  impetus be given to the peace process set in motion by the Belfast/Good Friday 
  Agreement.</p>
  <p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The Council of Europe and its Assembly, in consultation with the British and 
  Irish authorities, have a moral obligation to do everything in their power to 
  help advance the peace process in Northern Ireland.</p>
  <p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The Assembly therefore resolves to:</p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    study, in close co-operation with the British and Irish authorities and all 
    the parties concerned, the <span style="font-size: 10.0pt">
    reasons</span><span lang="EN-GB"> 
    why the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement has not produced the desired results;</span></p>
    <p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    consider, also in <span style="font-size: 10.0pt">consultation</span><span lang="EN-GB"> 
    with the British and Irish authorities, what contribution it can make:</span></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      to the <span style="font-size: 10.0pt">resumption</span><span lang="EN-GB"> 
      of political dialogue between the Northern Ireland political parties to 
      help give fresh impetus to the peace process within the framework of the 
      Belfast/Good Friday Agreement;</span></p>
      <p align="justify">b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      to <span style="font-size: 10.0pt">promoting</span><span lang="EN-GB"> 
      respect for human rights in the society of Northern Ireland and to 
      strengthening the relevant institutions;</span></p>
      <p align="justify">c.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      to <span style="font-size: 10.0pt">promoting</span><span lang="EN-GB"> 
      education aimed at reconciliation, respect for differences and a shared 
      future;</span></p>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    consider how both the positive and the negative lessons learned from the 
    implementation of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement might be used to help 
    settle other conflicts in Europe.</p>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  The Assembly also calls on:</p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    the political forces in Northern Ireland to:</p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      honour all the commitments entered into during the negotiations which led 
      to the&nbsp; conclusion of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement;</p>
      <p align="justify">b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      engage in a political dialogue which would achieve a breakthrough in the 
      implementation of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and revive the peace 
      process in Northern Ireland;</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    the <span style="font-size: 10.0pt">British</span><span lang="EN-GB"> 
    Government to:</span></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p align="justify">a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      make the democratic institutions of Northern Ireland fully operational 
      again, as soon as conditions allow;</p>
      <p align="justify">b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
      make full use of the Council of Europe expertise and experience to 
      strengthen the machinery for human rights protection and rebuild 
      confidence between the communities in&nbsp; Northern Ireland;</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="justify">iii.<span style="font-size: 10.0pt">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
    </span>
    <span lang="EN-GB">
  
    the British and Irish 
    Governments to make full use of the Council of Europe&#146;s machinery and 
    instruments, in particular those concerning cross-border co-operation and 
    the protection of minorities, to foster exchanges between both parts of the 
    island of Ireland.</span></p>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Finally, the Assembly invites the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
  to:</p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    continue to offer the British and Irish authorities the benefit of the 
    Council of Europe&#146;s experience and expertise as regards implementation of 
    the provisions of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement relating to human rights 
    protection and the reform of policing and justice in Northern Ireland;</p>
    <p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    consider how the Council of Europe&#146;s activity programmes, in particular in 
    the fields of culture and education, might help to rebuild confidence 
    between the communities of Northern Ireland.</p>
  </blockquote>
  <p align="justify"><b>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Explanatory memorandum</b></p>
  <p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  On 24 September 2001, Mr Jurgens and others tabled a motion for a 
  recommendation entitled <i>Presence of the Council of Europe in Northern 
  Ireland </i>(<a href="../doc01/EDOC9202.htm">Doc. 9202 rev.</a>), which 
  proposed that the Committee of Ministers &#147;<i>institute a presence of the 
  Council of Europe in Northern Ireland dedicated to finding a way to end the 
  climate of hate and intolerance between the groups concerned</i>&#148;.</p>
  <p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  I was appointed Rapporteur in January 2003. As from the Assembly&#146;s April 2003 
  session I&nbsp;began establishing contacts with the co-signatories of the 
  above-mentioned motion for a recommendation and with members of the United 
  Kingdom and Irish Republic delegations, in order to discuss the need for such 
  a presence and how the Council of Europe might contribute to the peace process 
  in Northern Ireland.</p>
  <p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  On 10 June 2003 the committee authorised me to undertake fact-finding visits 
  to London and Belfast, as well as to Dublin, to hold direct talks with 
  representatives of the authorities of both states and the different political 
  forces involved. However, for various reasons beyond my control, I was unable 
  to undertake this visit until the second half of April 2004.</p>
  <p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  On 20 - 22 April 2004 I visited London and Belfast and had talks with members 
  of the United Kingdom delegation to the Assembly, representatives of the main 
  political parties in Northern Ireland and representatives of certain Northern 
  Irish institutions and NGOs. Regrettably, my planned meetings at the <i>
  Northern Ireland Office </i>(NIO), the UK government body responsible for 
  handling problems relating to Northern Ireland, did not take place owing to 
  the intergovernmental conference between the United Kingdom and the Republic 
  of Ireland.</p>
  <p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  On 15 and 16 June 2004, I visited Dublin and had talks with our Irish MP 
  colleagues and certain other political personalities. I also had the 
  opportunity to cross the border between South and North and travel to Newry 
  and Armagh, where I met the two Joint Secretaries to the North-South 
  Ministerial Council, and representatives of political and business circles 
  working in favour of peace and co-operation.</p>
  <p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  As your Rapporteur, I have endeavoured, during the visit and through my 
  contacts in Strasbourg, Paris and elsewhere, to answer the main question 
  raised by the motion for a recommendation, namely:</p>
  <p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Is it appropriate to recommend that the Committee of Ministers institute a 
  permanent presence, in the form of a Council of Europe office in Northern 
  Ireland? In other words, is such a presence necessary to put an end to the 
  conflict in Northern Ireland once and for all?</p>
  <p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  None of the persons I have spoken with have been in favour of establishing 
  such an office.</p>
  <p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  That ties in with my personal conclusion: I feel that it is unnecessary at the 
  present time to set up a Council of Europe office in Northern Ireland. It 
  would have been justified if there were a political and institutional vacuum 
  in this region, if there was no political plan for peace and no framework for 
  dialogue, reconciliation and co-operation, and if there was no international 
  presence.</p>
  <p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  It is not my role as your Rapporteur on a specific subject to retrace the 
  history of the conflict in Northern Ireland. For this I refer you to the 
  excellent report presented to the Assembly by our former colleague Mr Mota 
  Amaral in June 1998 (<a href="../doc98/edoc8134.htm">Doc. 8134</a>).</p>
  <p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  It should be recalled that the current situation in Northern Ireland and the 
  relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland on the 
  Northern Ireland question are the result of the 1998 Belfast Agreement (also 
  known as the Good Friday Agreement). The Assembly welcomed this agreement in 
  its Resolution 1163 (1998).</p>
  <p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Although the tensions and divisions have not yet been finally erased, the 
  agreement put in place the political and institutional framework for a lasting 
  peaceful settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland, with due regard for 
  human rights. Mr Mota Amaral&#146;s report, mentioned above, provides detailed 
  information about the machinery set up by the Agreement<i>.</i></p>
  <p align="justify">13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Admittedly, the peace process set in motion by the Belfast Agreement has not 
  yet produced all the desired results and is currently deadlocked. Some of the 
  institutions established by the agreement, namely the Northern Ireland 
  Assembly and Executive, are still suspended.</p>
  <p align="justify">14.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  All the people I have spoken with agree that the situation in Northern Ireland 
  has clearly improved since the negotiation of the Belfast Agreement. There is 
  no longer a state of war, and although terrorist attacks and paramilitary 
  activities have not completely ceased, they have been considerably scaled down 
  and a return to violence on a large scale seems unlikely.</p>
  <p align="justify">15.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Thanks to the efforts of the United Kingdom and Irish Governments on the 
  transfrontier and bilateral aspects of the Agreement, and with the help of the 
  North-South institutions set up for the purpose, economic development in the 
  region and trade between the North and the South of Ireland have progressed. 
  Life seems to be returning to normal.</p>
  <p align="justify">16.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  However, this apparent normalisation contrasts with the continuing deadlock at 
  the political level. The problem of disarming the paramilitary groups has yet 
  to be resolved. Furthermore<b>,</b> society remains deeply divided along 
  community lines in Northern Ireland. Mutual distrust and fear persist. The end 
  of the war has not yet turned into true peace.</p>
  <p align="justify">17.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  I believe that the peace process launched by the Belfast Agreement must be 
  given a fresh impetus, with certain readjustments if necessary, and the 
  institutions established by it must be made operational again (e.g. the 
  Assembly) and strengthened. All the people I have spoken with, including 
  representatives of the main political parties in Northern Ireland, are in 
  favour of this.</p>
  <p align="justify">18.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  However, I have good reason to doubt - and these doubts have been confirmed in 
  the talks I&nbsp;have held - that the permanent posting of a few Council of Europe 
  officials in Belfast can provide a miracle solution to the deadlock, or, <i>a 
  fortiori</i>, take the place of those institutions.</p>
  <p align="justify">19.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  On the other hand, I am convinced that, even without this permanent presence, 
  the Council of Europe and its Assembly can and must contribute to the 
  continuation of the peace process in Northern Ireland.</p>
  <p align="justify">20.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Given that this does not come fully within the scope of the motion, I shall 
  confine myself to putting forward a few preliminary ideas regarding this 
  contribution.</p>
  <blockquote>
    <p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    make a careful analysis of the reasons why the Belfast Agreement has not 
    produced the hoped-for results. Although I was able to obtain a number of 
    opinions on this subject in the course of my meetings, a more detailed and 
    fine-tuned analysis and, especially, a clearly defined mandate are necessary 
    to answer this question, which is extremely sensitive for all the parties 
    involved. Hasty conclusions would serve only to impede the rebuilding of 
    trust, as would over-simplification of the nature of the conflict, reducing 
    it to a clash between Catholics and Protestants. A fresh motion for a 
    resolution seems desirable for this purpose, and I am prepared to table one;</p>
    <p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    encourage a resumption of political dialogue between the political parties 
    of Northern Ireland, and set that dialogue in a broader context. By way of 
    an example, I would suggest organising, within the framework of a meeting of 
    the Political Affairs Committee, a colloquy or round table on the <i>
    settlement of conflicts in Europe</i>, attended by representatives of the 
    political parties of Northern Ireland and by political leaders involved in 
    the settlement of other conflicts;</p>
    <p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    focus attention on the question of respect for human rights, which is 
    essential to rebuild trust between the communities and dispel fears. The 
    Assembly, via the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, and the 
    Secretary General of the Council of Europe could contribute towards 
    strengthening the Human Rights Commission which was set up in Northern 
    Ireland following the Belfast Agreement, but which is experiencing 
    difficulty in becoming fully operational. A contribution could also be made 
    to the debate on the drafting of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
    Other activities in this area could focus on human rights information and 
    education, reform of the police in Northern Ireland and dialogue with civil 
    society and NGOs;</p>
    <p align="justify">iv.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    promote education oriented towards reconciliation, respect for differences 
    and a shared future. The Council of Europe has invaluable experience in this 
    field and should put it into practice so that the new generations in 
    Northern Ireland, whichever community they belong to, can be brought up to 
    live together.</p>
  </blockquote>
  <hr color="#000000" width="50%" size="1">
  <p style="margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm" align="justify"><i>
  Reporting Committee: </i>
  Political Affairs Committee.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Reference 
  to Committee: </i>
  Reference 2653 of 28.09.2001</p>
  <p style="margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: .0001pt" align="justify">
  <i>Draft Resolution </i>
  unanimously adopted<b> </b>by the Committee on 
  21 June 2004</p>
  <p style="text-align: justify; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm"><i>
  Members of the Committee&nbsp;</i>: 
  MM. <b>Jakic</b><span style="layout-grid-mode: line"> 
  (Chairperson), <b>Margelov</b> (Vice-Chairperson), Ms Spindelegger 
  (Vice-Chairperson), <b>Ate</b></span><b></b> 
  (Vice-Chairperson), Ms Aguiar, Akhvlediani, de Aristegui, <b>Arzilli</b>, <b>
  Atkinson</b>,&nbsp; <b>Azzolini</b>, Ban�&#154;, Berceanu, Bianco (alternate: <b>
  Provera</b>), Blankenborg, Van den Brande,
  Cekuolis,
  <span style="layout-grid-mode: line">Davern (alternate: <b>O&#146;Keeffe</b>), <b>
  Dreyfus-Schmidt,</b> Ms Druviete (alternate: <b>Kast</b>), 
  Mr Duivesteijn, Ms Durrieu,&nbsp;MM. <b>Elo</b>, Glesener, <b>Goulet</b>, <b>Gross</b>, 
  Hedrich, Henry, <b>H�rster</b>, Iwinski, <b>Jahi</b></span><b>c,</b> 
  Jova&#154;evic, <b>Judd</b>, <b>Kalezic,</b> 
  Karpov, Klich, Ko�i, Kosachev (alternate: <b>Kolesnikov</b>), Kostenko, <b>Lindblad</b>,
  <b>van der Linden, 
  Lloyd</b>, 
  Loutfi, <b>Magnusson</b>, Mart�nez-Casa� (alternate: <b>Puche</b>), Marty 
  (alternate: <b>Reimann</b>), <b>Matu&#154;ic,</b>
  <b>Medeiros Ferreira</b>, Meimarakis (alternate: <b>Papadimitriou</b>), <b>
  Mercan</b>,&nbsp; Mignon, <b>Mihkelson,</b> Mme <b>Narochnitskaya</b>,&nbsp;Ms&nbsp;Nemcova, 
  MM. <b>Nemeth</b>, <b>Oliynyk</b>, <b>Ouzk�, 
  Pangalos</b>, 
  Ms Petrova-Mitevska, Ms P�tursd�ttir,&nbsp; Ms Pintat Rossell, MM. <b>
  Pourgourides</b>, <b>Prentice,</b> Prijmireanu, Prisacaru, <b>de&nbsp;Puig</b>, 
  Pullicino Orlando, Ranieri (alternate: <b>de Zulueta</b>), <b>Roth,</b> <b>
  Severin</b>, Ms Severinsen, MM.&nbsp; <b>Seyidov, Slutsky</b>, Tabajdi, <b>
  Tekelioglu, Torosyan</b>,
  <b>Toshev,</b> Ms <b>Tritz</b>, MM. Vakilov (alternate: <b>Mollazade</b>), <b>
  Wielowieyski</b>, Ms Wohlwend (alternate: <b>Brunhart</b>), Ms <b>Wurm,</b> M. 
  Zacchera.</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Ex-officio</i>: 
  MM. Davis, <b>E�rsi,</b> Einarsson, Russell-Johnston</p>
  <p style="margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: .0001pt" align="justify">
  <b>N.B.&nbsp;: The names of the 
  members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold</b></p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Head of the 
  Secretariat : </i>Mr Perin</p>
  <p align="justify"><i>Secretaries 
  to the Committee</i>: Mrs 
  Ruotanen, Mr Chevtchenko, Mr Dossow</p>
  
  <p style="text-align: justify">&nbsp;</p>
  </blockquote>
  </body>
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