The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic
Doc.
10283
20 September 2004
Report
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Rapporteur: Mr Rudolf Bindig, Germany, Socialist Group
Summary
The human rights situation in the ChechenRepublic remains catastrophic. The report strongly condemns human rights violations committed by all sides of the conflict, including the recent spate of despicable terrorist attacks against civilian targets, other killings committed by illegal armed formations and the numerous violations of human rights in the form of murder, forced disappearances, torture, hostage-taking, rape and arbitrary detention committed by members of different Federal and regional security forces during their “special” or “targeted” operations in the Chechen Republic and, increasingly, in neighbouring regions. The report concludes that a climate of impunity is still prevailing in the ChechenRepublic due to the fact that the Chechen and Federal law enforcement authorities remain either unwilling or unable to hold accountable for their actions the vast majority of perpetrators of serious human rights violations. The draft resolution and recommendation make concrete proposals to help solve the human rights crisis and urge in particular
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the Government of the Russian Federation to end the climate of impunity in the ChechenRepublic;
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the Russian State Duma to set up a Committee of enquiry to investigate the alleged abuses by different branches of the executive, in particular the different law enforcement bodies in the ChechenRepublic and in neighbouring regions;
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the Council of Europe’s member states to use every opportunity, in their bilateral and multilateral relations with the Russian Federation, to recall the need to respect human rights also in the fight against terrorism and separatism;
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the Committee of Ministers to ensure that the discussion and debate of the human rights crisis in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation remains a regular item on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers and Ministers’ Deputies, to ensure that such discussions cover reports and the follow-up of the implementation of recommendations made to the authorities by all bodies and mechanisms of the Council of Europe and to urge the Government of the Russian Federation to put an end to reprisals taken against any person in relation to the filing of an application to the European Court of Human Rights.
I. Draft resolution [Link to the adopted text]
1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses that the protection of human rights is the primary objective of the Council of Europe and it therefore solemnly condemns all criminal acts constituting serious human rights violations committed by all sides of the conflict in the Chechen Republic.
2. This includes in particular the recent spate of despicable terrorist attacks beginning with the downing of two airliners on 24 August 2004, the attack by a suicide bomber near Rizhskaya station in Moscow on 31 August 2004 and finally the hostage-taking of hundreds of innocent children and their family members in Beslan and the horrific bloodbath on 3 September 2004. There can be no excuse whatsoever for any such attacks on innocent civilians.
3. The Assembly also unequivocally condemns all other killings by illegal armed formations, such as that on 9 May 2004 of the President of the Chechen Republic, Akhmad Kadyrov, also causing other victims, and the numerous deaths involved in the co-ordinated attacks by armed fighters in Ingushetia, the Chechen Republic and Dagestan on 22 June 2004 and a similar large-scale attack in Grozny on 20 August 2004. Both the death of innocent bystanders and the “targeted” killings of persons considered by terrorists as responsible for crimes left unpunished are totally unacceptable. The conflict in the ChechenRepublic must be resolved by negotiation and criminals on all sides must receive their just punishment through appropriate judicial procedures.
4. The Assembly also strongly condemns the numerous violations of human rights in the form of murder, forced disappearance, torture, hostage-taking, rape and arbitrary detention committed by members of different Federal and pro-Russian Chechen security forces during their “special” or “targeted” operations in the Chechen Republic and, increasingly, in neighbouring regions.
5. As recent events show, the situation in the ChechenRepublic is far from normal. Whilst the reconstruction of some social infrastructures and the promise of the payment of compensation to persons whose houses were destroyed is a positive factor, real economic development requires trust between the Government and the people. The Assembly continues to believe that there can be no peace and no sustainable political settlement in the ChechenRepublic without bringing to justice the perpetrators of even the most serious human rights violations and without ensuring that no further such violations will be committed in future.
6. The dramatic human rights situation in the ChechenRepublic described in the texts adopted by the Assembly in April 2003 has unfortunately not improved significantly since then. The number of “special operations” or “sweeps” by security forces has in fact significantly decreased, in particular since the end of 2003. But arbitrary detentions, often followed by the “disappearance”, torture or severe beatings of detainees and the theft or destruction of property at the hands of security forces (Chechen and Federal) but also of certain rebel groups, are still occurring on a massive scale, especially as seen against the background of the small population of the Chechen Republic and the losses already suffered in previous years. A new frightening trend is that of hostage-taking of relatives of suspected terrorists in order to force them to give themselves up by threatening their relatives with torture and murder. Such methods are totally unacceptable criminal acts that must be stamped out by the Federal authorities.
7. The constitutional referendum of March 2003 and the elections for the Chechen President in October 2003 and August 2004 have given rise to new types of violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which now also concern the people’s right to free elections (Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR) and to freedom of expression (Article 10 of the ECHR).
8. The climate of impunity diagnosed by the Assembly in Resolution 1323 (2003) and Recommendation 1600 (2003) appears to be spreading to Ingushetia, where a number of abuses took place in 2003 and early 2004 that are reminiscent of those taking place in the Chechen Republic and which have remained largely unpunished. The conflict in the North Caucasus appears to be spreading like an epidemic, threatening the rule of law throughout the Russian Federation.
9. Regarding the elucidation of the crimes described in the report underlying Resolution 1323 (2003) and Recommendation 1600 (2003), very little progress has been made and new crimes committed in the meantime have not been met with any more successful action by the Chechen and Federal prosecutors.
10. Whilst 799 complaints were registered in 2003 with the Military Prosecutor’s Office, only three cases were referred to the courts in the same year. The 13 sentences passed by military courts in 2003 concerned investigations started between 2000 and 2002.
11. The Chechen civilian prosecutor’s office received 4763 applications in 2003, including 554 from the Office of the Special Representative. In the same year, the civilian prosecutors initiated 419 criminal cases, 15 of which were referred to court. 128 applications were transmitted to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, which in turn transmitted 60 applications to the civilian prosecutor’s office.
12. These figures are similar to those for the year 2002 and those received for the first months of 2004 do not look better. There is thus very little progress in the prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations by the national law enforcement bodies.
13. The Assembly is outraged that serious crimes have been committed and have not yet been elucidated against applicants and family members of applicants to the European Court of Human Rights. Such acts are totally unacceptable as they may deter applications to the Court, which is the centrepiece of the human rights protection mechanism established by the European Convention on Human Rights.
14. The preventive measures recommended by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, in particular as regards the modalities of special operations or “sweeps” carried out by security forces, such as the effective identification of all participants in such operations and the rapid and strict prosecution of any violations of the rules, have yet to be implemented.
15. Consequently, the conclusions drawn by the Assembly in Resolution 1323 and Recommendation 1600 (2003) remain valid: a climate of impunity is prevailing in the Chechen Republic due to the fact that the Chechen and Federal law enforcement authorities are still either unwilling or unable to hold accountable for their actions the vast majority of perpetrators of serious human rights violations.
16. The Assembly therefore, reiterating its exhortations in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution 1323 (2003),
i. urges the Government of the Russian Federation to end the climate of impunity in the ChechenRepublic,
a. by vigorously investigating and prosecuting all violations of human rights, without regard to the identity of the perpetrators;
b. by implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights;
c. by sending a clear signal from the highest political level that all security and law enforcement officials must respect human rights in the execution of their duties at all times;
d. by enabling systematic monitoring by national and international human rights organisations of human rights violations as well as of the measures taken by the competent authorities to track down and punish perpetrators;
e. and by facilitating access to the region by the national and international news media;
ii. urges the Russian State Duma to set up, as a matter of urgency, a parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate the alleged abuses by different branches of the executive, in particular the different law enforcement bodies in the Chechen Republic and in neighbouring regions such as Ingushetia, including the apparent dysfunctioning of the military prosecutor’s office in charge of the region;
iii. urges the member states of the Council of Europe to :
a. use every opportunity, in their bilateral and multilateral relations with the Russian Federation, to recall the need to respect human rights also in the fight against terrorism and separatism ;
b. continue applying the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in granting political asylum to applicants from the Chechen Republic, recalling that local human rights activists, lawyers and relatives of suspected independence fighters are among those most vulnerable to disappearance, torture and other most serious human rights abuses;
iv. supports the recommendation made by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in its Public Statement of 10 July 2003 that members of the federal forces and law enforcement agencies be reminded, through a formal statement emanating from the highest political level, that they must respect the rights of persons in their custody, that any violations will be the subject of severe sanctions and urges the Russian authorities to authorise without further delay publication of all reports of visits to the North Caucasus region by CPT experts;
v. welcomes the positive trend towards the establishment of regional ombudsmen in the Russian Federation and the initiative by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe and the Ombudsman for Human Rights of the Russian Federation to promote the establishment of a regional ombudsman for the ChechenRepublic.
II. Draft recommendation [Link to the adopted text]
1. The Assembly refers to its Resolution … (2004) on the Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, recalling that the continuing massive violations in the Chechen Republic are by far the most serious human rights issue in any of the Council’s member states and that the credibility of the whole Organisation depends on its ability to convince the Russian Federation to meet its commitments in this respect.
2. Considering the insufficient progress in holding perpetrators of human rights violations responsible, the Assembly reiterates all the recommendations addressed to the Committee of Ministers in Recommendation 1600 (2003).
3. In view of the gravity of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic, the Assembly recommends to the Committee of Ministers to ensure that the discussion and debate of the human rights crisis in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation remain a regular item on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers and Ministers’ Deputies and to ensure that such discussions cover reports and the follow-up of the implementation of their own recommendations as well as recommendations made to the authorities by all other bodies and mechanisms of the Council of Europe including: the Secretary General, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the Venice Commission and European Commission against Racism and Intolerance;
4. The Assembly invites the Committee of Ministers, in particular, to
i. urge the Government of the Russian Federation to end the climate of impunity in the ChechenRepublic ,
a. by vigorously investigating and prosecuting all violations of human rights, without regard to the identity of the perpetrators;
b. by sending a clear signal, at the highest level, that all security and law enforcement officials must respect human rights in the execution of their duties at all times, and that any violations will be subject to severe sanctions;
c. by putting an end to reprisals against any person taken in relation to the filing of an application to the European Court of Human Rights, ensuring that all allegations of such crimes are investigated promptly, thoroughly and independently and that all persons found responsible for such crimes are brought to justice;
d. by enabling systematic monitoring by national and international human rights organisations of violations committed by all sides and of the measures taken by the competent authorities to track down and punish perpetrators;
e. by establishing as soon as possible an independent Ombudsman for the Chechen Republic, who shall receive and process complaints about human rights violations in the region and continue the work of the former Special Presidential Representative’s Office, also making use of the files established by the latter, with the support of the Council of Europe experts;
f. and by facilitating access to the region by the national and international news media;
ii. step up the Council of Europe’s co-operation with the Government of the Russian Federation, focusing on the development of the rule of law in the ChechenRepublic and on concrete improvements of the human rights situation of the population of the ChechenRepublic, in order to contribute to the implementation of the requests under sub-paragraph 4.i.
III. Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Rudolf Bindig, Rapporteur
A. Introduction
1. This report is based on Order 586 in which the Assembly instructs its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to report back to it at one of its 2004 part-sessions on the implementation of Resolution 1323 (2003) and Recommendation 1600 (2003), as well as of the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.
2. As its predecessor, this report is again based on information made available by the competent Russian Federal and Chechen authorities, international organisations, NGO’s and journalists. I would again like to single out Memorial, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Stichting Chechnya Justice Initiative (SCJI), Amnesty International (AI) and the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) for their especially valuable assistance.
3. I should like to thank especially the Russian Delegation to the Assembly for organising my fact-finding visit to Moscow and the Chechen and IngushRepublics, together with Mr Gross, during the first week of June 2004, and the Russian, Chechen and Ingush authorities for their hospitality during our visit.
4. In accordance with the Order, this report will concentrate on following up the development of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution and recommendation in April 2003, and in particular the implementation of the Assembly’s and the Commissioner’ recommendations.
5. The report will be sub-divided into two parts: first, it will look into the follow-up given to last year’s recommendations, including an update on the results of the investigations into some of the most serious crimes described in last April’s report. Second, it will sum up the evolution of the human rights situation since last year.
B. Implementation of Resolution 1323 (2003) and Recommendation 1600 (2003) and the Commissioner’s recommendations
i. Resolution 1323
Item 9.i. (Chechen fighters should immediately stop their terrorist activities and renounce all forms of crime; any kind of support for Chechen fighters should cease immediately):
6. It is clear that terrorist and other criminal activities by Chechen fighters has not stopped. The tab of incidents kept by the Secretary General’s experts on a monthly basis is telling. Almost daily, armed rebels have attacked Russian or Chechen security forces, killing and maiming hundreds of servicemen during 2003 and early 2004[1], but also representatives of local administrations, polling stations, and other administrative buildings. Terrorist attacks on targets outside the Chechen Republic have also continued, as sadly evidenced by the recent spate of terrorist attacks beginning with the downing of two airliners on 24 August, the attack by a suicide bomber near Rizhskaya station in Moscow on 31 August, and finally the hostage-taking of hundreds of innocent children and their relatives in Beslan, which has ended in the horrific bloodbath on 3 September. Other examples include the double suicide bombing of a rock concert in Moscow in July 2003 killing the attackers and 15 other persons, the attack on a passenger train in Yessentuki/North Caucasus (at least 42 killed) on 5 December 2003, that on the hotel “National” in Moscow on 9 December 2003 (6 killed, 12 injured), and on the Moscow metro on 6 February 2004 (40 killed, 134 injured). Most of these abominable crimes have not yet been fully elucidated. The Russian authorities hold Chechen “bandits”, or international terrorists responsible, flatly refusing to differentiate between Chechen nationalist oriented rebels and other, more radical field commanders and terrorist organisations. Representatives of Mr Maskhadov have consistently condemned any attacks on what they call “civilian targets”, claiming that their leader had given strict orders to avoid hitting any such targets.
7. With respect to the murder of President Kadyrov on 9 May 2004, the rebel “field commander” Shamil Bassayev has claimed responsibility for the attack, whilst more moderate rebel leaders have distanced themselves from the attack.
8. As regards the coordinated attacks by armed fighters in Ingushetia, the Chechen Republic and Dagestan on 22 June 2004 killing nearly 100 persons, representatives of the rebel side have declared that these were part of the new strategy of “large-scale military operations” announced by their leader in May 2004, replacing the “needle-prick tactics” of recent years that had prompted the Russian side to claim that the rebel forces had been practically eradicated. They claimed that 4000[2] fighters had participated in a series of large-scale attacks throughout the region, targeting military objectives and law enforcement officials who had “blood on their hands” and who had enjoyed impunity for too long. Some civilian casualties, which they regretted, had been caused by the security forces’ indiscriminate use of heavy weapons such as tanks and multiple rocket launchers in populated areas.
9. I deeply regret and condemn the new escalation of violence, including the attack on 13 July 2004 on the Acting President, Mr Abramov, whom we met in June and who impressed us with his pragmatic commitment to reconstruction and social progress, and the assassination of the leader of the Chechen branch of the United Russia party. I have also made this clear to all my interlocutors on the Chechen rebel side, stressing that any executions, and even more so extrajudicial ones, are totally unacceptable to the Council of Europe. I also took the initiative for a declaration by the Bureau of the Assembly on 25 June condemning these attacks, but also warning against any unlawful responses by the security forces.
The recent horrors show once again that this conflict cannot be resolved by military means alone. Crimes committed on all sides must be punished by appropriate judicial means. Impunity provokes new unlawful acts and leads to further escalation of violence.
Item 9. ii. (Russian forces to be better controlled and discipline enforced: all relevant military and civilian regulations, constitutional guarantees, international law, including humanitarian law and in particular the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the protocols thereto, and the European Convention on Human Rights as well as the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, should be fully respected during all operations, including full co-operation with the prokuratura before, during and after such operations):
10. This item is also the object of the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner’s recommendations, which the Russian side has accepted, but has not yet fully implemented. This subject has also been specifically taken up by the CPT (cf. appended Public Statement dated 10 July 2003).
11. It appears from studying a large number of descriptions of individual special operations carried out by federal forces submitted by human rights organisations that some improvement can be found compared to similar operations in earlier years, especially as concerns “collateral damage” inflicted on bystanders. Also, it appears that a larger number of arrests of suspects by federal forces is followed by a “happy ending” in the form of the release of such detainees, often after the valiant intervention of family members, neighbours and, in a number of cases, of law enforcement officials.
12. But it must be stressed that the implementation of such “targeted” or “special” operations - terms that have taken the place of those of “mop-up operations” or “sweeps” used earlier - is still far from the standards of the ECHR that the Russian Federation has subscribed to, and that the Commissioner has translated into practical recommendations. Disciplinary problems remain rampant, including problems such as alcoholism and corruption, which are still an important cause for numerous violations of fundamental rights of the Chechen population. Many cases of random shooting, beatings and looting are still reported as taking place during such operations. The best preventive remedy – the effective identification of all participants in such operations, and the rapid and strict prosecution of any violations of the rules, which are indeed in place – is still not being used systematically. On the contrary, such operations still take place primarily at night, and with all participants wearing masks. It has also been pointed out repeatedly that the increased “targeting” of special operations, which are limited to individual buildings or street sections, makes it more difficult for witnesses of abuses to speak out without being identified, as the number of witnesses is very much reduced.[3]
Item 9 iii.( in so far as the security situation allows, troops shall be confined to their barracks or withdrawn from the ChechenRepublic altogether)
13. The number of Federal servicemen (regular military forces, special forces of the Ministry of the Interior/Omon, and of the FSB) posted in the ChechenRepublic has remained substantially the same as in early 2003, at about 70.000. The withdrawal of about 1.200 men announced in March 2003 seems to be compensated by the stationing of an extra 1.200 Omon troops announced by the President in May 2004 during his visit after the assassination of President Kadyrov.
14. These forces are also by no means confined to barracks. The security situation, as illustrated by the higher number of violent incidents, may indeed justify the need for continued, visible presence of security forces – provided they fulfil their role correctly, in line with the recommendation in item 9 ii. of Resolution 1323 (2003).
Item 9 iv. (all those suspected of committing abuses be thoroughly investigated and, if found guilty, severely punished in accordance with the law, regardless of their rank and position)
15. This recommendation, which is absolutely central both as a precondition for national reconciliation and a lasting political settlement, and as the best possible preventive measure against new abuses, has unfortunately not been successfully implemented.
16. I have requested detailed information, from the office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, and from the Chief Prosecutor of the ChechenRepublic, on the results achieved concerning the investigation of a selection of crimes that have been brought to my attention from different sides.
17. Concerning the crimes listed in the April 2003 reports, the replies received were the following (the full text of my questions and of the replies received is appended):
18. As to the murder of numerous civilians in Alkhan-Yurt in December 1999, the preliminary investigation has been suspended in view of “contradictory evidence on the circumstances”, the relatives of the persons buried in the mass grave “not giving consent” to exhumation[4].
19. As to the mass executions in Novye Aldy and Novaya Katyama suburbs of Grozny (February/April 2000), the answer was merely that the “preliminary investigation continues”[5].
20. No reply was given as to the progress of the cases of the abduction of Ruslan Sh. Alikhadzhiyev (on 17 May 2000)[6] and of the killing of Madina Mezhieva and Amkhad Gekaev.
21. As regards the mass grave in the “Zdorovye” dacha estate and the special operation in the village of Mesker-Yurt, the “preliminary investigation continues”.
22. The cases of the abduction of S. Imakayev and of the murder of Kh. Yandiev (both pending before the European Court of Human Rights) are still being “investigated by the military prosecutor’s office”.[7]
23. Some progress seems to have been made only with regard to the cases of the murder of the former head of administration of the village of Alkhan-Kala, M.K. Umazheva, and of the torture of Alaudin Sadykov. In the former case, two wanted “bandits” were identified as perpetrators, one killed in the meantime “when he showed armed resistance”. In the latter, three interior ministry staff were identified as participants in the crime. One committed suicide, two others are sought by the police.
24. Concerning the cases brought to my attention after March 2003, of the 24 cases I submitted, I did not receive any reply for 10 cases. Whilst one case is still being checked up, two are being “investigated by the Military Prosecutor’s Office”. In another case, I was told that my information was mistaken, as the presumed kidnap victim, Mr N. Gatiev, had been arrested by court order for participation in illegal armed formations. In six other cases, I was told that “the preliminary investigation continues”, in four other cases the preliminary investigation has been suspended, two of which (a case concerning the murder of a village chief, Mr Tsitsayev, and a mine explosion near the village of Assinovskaya) after participants of the “bandit groups” who committed the crime were identified and are being sought. In one case, finally, that of the abduction and ill-treatment of Mr Z. Murdalov, a serviceman, Mr Sergei Lapin, has been indicted and is being tried before the Supreme Court of the ChechenRepublic. But I have learnt in the meantime that the proceedings against him have been suspended since October 2003, after he failed to appear in Court, because of his inability to stand trial due to mental illness. At the same time, Mr Lapin, after he was first dismissed from OMON, was reinstated as a police officer in the city of Nizhnevartovsk, where he was reportedly recently awarded a medal “For Protecting Public Order”.
25. The replies show that even after many years, no progress has been made in holding responsible the perpetrators even of such well-documented cases as those submitted to the Russian authorities for their comments. Interestingly, most of the exceptions, i.e. cases in which progress has been made towards identifying perpetrators, concern mostly attacks on village administration heads and security staff or other crimes attributed to rebel fighters.
26. The lack of progress in the Imakaev case is particularly worrying, as it directly affects access to the European Court of Human Rights[8]. I am deeply worried that another crime against an applicant to the Court in Strasbourg, Zura Bitiyeva, involving the murder of the applicant, of her husband, Ramzan Iduyev, their son Idris Iduyev and the applicant’s brother, Abubakar Bitiyev, has occurred and has not yet been elucidated. Only a one year old child survived the attack, which took place on 21 May 2003 in the Kalinovskaya settlement near one of the main military bases in the ChechenRepublic. According to eyewitnesses, a group of 15 armed men in camouflage uniforms had committed the above-mentioned killings of Mrs Bitiyeva and her family. Later the same morning, two other men – Turpal Imailov and Islambek Gadiyev – were shot in their homes, allegedly by the same group. In addition, I have been informed, in much detail, about several other cases in which family members of Strasbourg applicants have been harrassed, threatened or even become victims of crimes.
27. As regards prosecution statistics for 2003 and early 2004, these are unfortunately as dismal as those for 2002 that have prompted the Assembly to adopt Resolution 1323 and Recommendation 1600 (2003):
28. In 2003 and early 2004, the Office of the Special Representative for Human Rights in the Chechen Republic received 1799 applications, 547 of which concerning cases of missing persons, 71 of which were transmitted to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, and 554 to the Chechen Republic Prosecutor’s Office.
29. Following 799 complaints registered in 2003 with the Military Prosecutor’s Office (of which 367 contained information on kidnapping/illegal detention of 496 residents), investigators of the Military Prosecutor’s Office investigated 10 criminal cases on applications of Chechen residents, i.e. 1.25% of complaints. Of these, 3 cases were referred to the courts in 2003. The military courts passed 13 sentences in 2003 (two of which concerned investigations started in 2000, five started in 2001, and 6 started in 2002).
30. The Chechen civilian prosecutor’s office received 4763 applications in 2003, including 2242 concerning “illegal methods of investigation”, and 554 applications received from the Office of the Special Representative. In 2003, the civilian prosecutors initiated 419 criminal cases, 15 of which were referred to court. 128 applications from residents were submitted to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, which in turn submitted 60 applications to the territorial prosecutor’s office during the same period.
31. It should be noted that the number of actual violations is likely to exceed that of official complaints, as I was told by human rights activists that in a number of documented cases victims and their families have been discouraged from filing complaints by threats of reprisals.
32. In a number of cases, promising investigations by civilian prosecutors were aborted as soon as concrete leads point at the implication of members of the security forces.
33. As a result, it must be said that the climate of impunity noted in the 2003 report is still prevailing.[9]
Item 9 v. (the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights shall be implemented immediately by the Russian Federation)
34. According to information received by the Human Rights Commissioner’s Office, the recommendations, though accepted by the Russian authorities, are yet to be implemented. The Commissioner is planning to travel to the ChechenRepublic in the near future and will take up this issue.
Item 9. vi. (the Russian Federation authorise the publication of the reports of the CPT without further delay):
35. The Russian authorities, in June 2003 have still not allowed the publication of the reports of the CPT on its six visits to the ChechenRepublic, the most recent one in May 2003. The CPT has nevertheless issued, on 10 July 2003, a “Public Statement” (text appended hereto) pursuant to Article 10 para. 2 of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The CPT noted that there is “continued resort to torture and other forms of ill-treatment by members of the law enforcement agencies and federal forces operating in the Chechen Republic and that the action taken to bring to justice those responsible is slow and – in many cases – ultimately ineffective”, and made a number of recommendations.
36. The Assembly should throw its own weight behind the recommendations of the CPT, which are the result of very thorough investigations during the six visits to the most important detention facilities in ChechenRepublic, including the notorious ORB-2[10] in Grozny, and insist that the Committee of Ministers finally hold a thorough discussion based on the CPT’s findings.
Item 10 i. (better co-operation from the Russian authorities with national and international mechanisms of redress, both judicial and non-judicial)
37. As regards cooperation by the Russian authorities with the European Court of Human Rights, in the absence of contrary public information, it must be presumed that Russia is fulfilling her international obligations as State Party to the ECHR. In this context, it should be stressed that it is in Russia’s own interest to elucidate as soon as possible the crimes committed against applicants to the Strasbourg Court and members of their families (in particular, the Imakaev and Bitiyeva cases), and to efficiently protect all other applicants.
38. As regards non-judicial mechanisms of redress, the office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Human Rights in the ChechenRepublic set up in 2000 and last held by Mr Sultygov was abolished by presidential decree in January 2004. I share the worries expressed by the President of the Assembly, Peter Schieder, and the Council of Europe’s then Secretary General Walter Schwimmer. The justification given by a spokesperson of the Kremlin that the then newly elected President of the Chechen Republic, Achmad Kadyrov, in fact already fulfilled the function of a representative for human rights is unsatisfactory, for two reasons: the first is that according to many reports from human rights defenders working in the Chechen Republic, the different security forces under the command of former President Kadyrov and his son, Ramzan Kadyrov, are themselves suspected of being responsible for a considerable share of the disappearances and other human rights violations; the second is that in those cases in which members of Russian forces are suspected of such violations, it is notoriously difficult for Chechen law enforcement officials to take successful action[11].
Item 10 ii. (call on member states of the Council of Europe to pursue all avenues of accountability with regard to the Russian Federation without further delay, including interstate complaints before the European Court of Human Rights and the exercise of universal jurisdiction for the most serious crimes committed in the Chechen Republic)
39. No interstate complaint has been introduced before the European Court of Human Rights, and no country has exercised universal jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed in the ChechenRepublic.
Item 10 iii. (if the efforts to bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses are not intensified, and the climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic prevails, the international community should consider setting up an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the Chechen Republic;
40. As regards efforts to bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses, it can hardly be said that they have been intensified, given the statistics cited above. The number of staff working for the military prosecutor’s office in the region[12] has not changed since 2002. In view of these numbers, it must be said that a climate of impunity still prevails in the ChechenRepublic. Nevertheless, the call for an international ad hoc tribunal, whilst welcomed by some NGO’s, has remained unheeded by the international community.
Item 10 iv. (urges the Russian Federation to ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court without delay)
41. Following the signature of the Rome Statute on 13 September 2000, a number of senior politicians have spoken in favour of ratification[13], and inter-ministerial work and expert consultations on necessary implementing legislation are under way[14]. Still, a final decision on ratification does not yet seem to be taken at the highest level.[15]
ii. Recommendation 1600 (2003)
Item 3. i. (call on the Committee of Ministers to reorient its assistance programmes in the North Caucasus towards an amelioration of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic as the priority objective, and allocate sufficient funds to these programmes to make a real difference)
42. The Council of Europe experts attached to the office of the Special Representative for Human Rights in the ChechenRepublic, Mr Sultygov, were withdrawn for security reasons in April 2003, after a bomb went off very close to their vehicle. Their task had been mainly to help monitor the human rights situation in the region and help in the registration of complaints from the population. Whilst the withdrawal of the experts was initially considered as only temporary, they were unable to return to Chechnya until the end of 2003, by which time a new agreement was reached between the Russian Federation and the Council of Europe. An exchange of letters between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, I. S. Ivanov, and the Secretary General, W. Schwimmer[16] spells out the details of the agreement, following which the permanent presence of Council of Europe experts is replaced by their involvement, at the request of the Russian side, in the implementation of concrete tasks within the framework of the agreed programme of cooperation in Chechnya. This programme includes items such as expertise in the legislative field in the Chechen Republic, the development of local self-government, psychological and social rehabilitation of women and orphans, human rights training for law-enforcement organs and local police and penitentiary institutions as well as seminars and training of Chechen students in the field of human rights. For security reasons, all activities with the exception of the library project are for the time being planned to take place outside the region. The new programme of cooperation, whilst quite modest in its approach, seems to correspond mostly to the priorities set by the Assembly. Its implementation is scheduled to begin in August with a seminar on election law in Moscow, in view of the presidential elections foreseen at the end of that month.
43. In my view, it is regrettable that a permanent presence of Council of Europe experts in Chechnya is no longer foreseen, though it must be said that their actual possibilities for action were always quite limited in view of the precarious security situation and their narrowly-defined mandate.
44. I was told during my mission to Chechnya that the database of human rights complaints the Council of Europe experts helped establish in Mr Sultygov’s office has been preserved and continues to be used by the current head of the office, Mr Nukhachiev. The Office of the Special Representative received 1799 new applications in 2003 and early 2004, 547 of which concerned cases of missing persons. The Office submitted 554 applications to the Chechen Republic Prosecutor’s office. Unfortunately, despite our requests, we were unable to pay a visit to this office, which had been moved from Znamenskoye to Grozny, during our mission in June 2004.
Item 3. ii. (ensure that non-governmental organisations active in preventing and documenting human rights violations in the ChechenRepublic, as well as those assisting their victims in different ways, are involved in the said assistance programmes)
45. The reply of the Committee of Ministers to Assembly Recommendation 1600 (CM/AS(2003)Rec1600final) dated 2 June 2003 states that the Council of Europe is in constant contact with NGO’s active in the Chechen Republic and that they are involved in the assistance programmes whenever possible. The NGO’s I consulted with in preparation of this report have let me know that they have not yet been involved in any of the Council of Europe’s assistance programmes.
Item 3. iii (take all possible measures to increase the effectiveness of the current mandate of the Council of Europe experts working in the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Human Rights in the Chechen Republic as regards their possibility of influencing the human rights situation)
(see above para. 42 to 44, comments on item 3.i.)
Item 3. iv. (urge the Government of the Russian Federation to fully comply with the recommendations addressed to it in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the above-mentioned Resolution 1323)
46. The Committee of Ministers states in its reply to Recommendation 1600 adopted on 28 May 2003 that regular discussions have taken place, since June 2000[17], in the Deputies on the basis of reports by the Secretary General on the work of the Council of Europe experts present in Chechnya under the item “Contribution of the Council of Europe towards restoration of the rule of law, respect of human rights and democracy in Chechnya”. Whilst the reply indicates that relevant recommendations by the Assembly are being taken into account during these discussions, a formal decision to urge the Government of the Russian Federation to comply with the above-mentioned Assembly’s specific recommendations has not been taken. In particular, a reference to such a decision is not included in the Committee of Ministers’ reply to Recommendation 1600. This omission marks a further step down in the strength of the Committee of Ministers’ reaction from its reply to Assembly Recommendation 1593 on the Evaluation of the prospects of a political solution to the conflict in the ChechenRepublic, adopted by the Deputies on the same day. In this document it is still said that “[I]n accordance with paragraph 4 of the recommendation, the Committee of Ministers duly brought the Assembly’s Resolution 1315 (2003) to the attention of the Government of the Russian Federation” – though without, as paragraph 4 of Recommendation 1593 had called for, pressing for expeditious action on it.
Item 4. (petition to the Committee of Ministers by virtue of paragraph 1 of its 1994 Declaration on compliance with commitments and recommendation to the Committee of Ministers to instruct the Secretary General to take specific measures under paragraph 4 of the said Declaration)
47. The Committee of Ministers’ reply to Recommendation 1600 does not include any express mention of the 1994 Declaration on compliance with commitments.[18] The Committee has also not taken a decision on any other occasion to give instructions to the Secretary General to “make contacts, collect information and furnish advice on the human rights situation in the ChechenRepublic”, as recommended by the Assembly. This omission is all the more regrettable as Paragraph 4 of the 1994 Declaration has been used several times before in response to concerns expressed by the Parliamentary Assembly[19].
48. The Assembly must continue reminding the Committee of Ministers as the Council of Europe’s executive organ that the continuing massive human rights violations in the Chechen Republic are by far the most serious human rights issue in any of the Council’s member states and that the credibility of the whole Organisation depends on its ability to convince the Russian Federation to meet its commitments in this respect[20]. In my opinion, the Committee of Ministers has done a poor job on this count, for “geopolitical” reasons, which have become less and less acceptable in recent times to the public opinions of many countries belonging to the Council of Europe and beyond.
C. The evolution of the human rights situation in the ChechenRepublic since 2003
i. Global assessment of the situation – statistics by “Memorial”
49. The dramatic human rights situation in Chechnya described in the texts adopted by the Assembly in January and April 2003 has unfortunately not improved significantly since then. The number of “special operations” or “sweeps” by the security forces seems to have somewhat decreased, in particular just before the referendum in March and the presidential election in October, and since the end of 2003. But arbitrary detentions, often followed by the “disappearance”, torture or severe beatings of detainees, and the theft or destruction of property at the hands of security forces (Chechen and Federal), but also of certain rebel groups, are still occurring on a massive scale, especially as seen against the background of the small population of the Chechen Republic, and the losses already suffered in previous years.
50. Statistics kept by “Memorial” reveal a total of 495 abductees for 2003 (177 in the first five months of 2004), of whom 156 (92) were released or ransomed back, 52 (13) found dead, and 287 (72) are still missing. The number of persons killed in the ChechenRepublic in 2003 was 446 (117 in the first five months of 2004), of which 297 (57) civilians, 72 (20) law enforcement officials, 1 (4) head of administration, 38 (12) presumed members of “rebel” forces, and another 38 (24) unknown persons. Whilst the statistics show a slight improvement for the beginning of 2004, the effects of the “change of strategy” announced by the rebels as shown in the large-scale attacks at the end of June are not yet taken into account. “Memorial” stresses that the numbers for the entire ChechenRepublic may be three to four times higher than its figures based on the incomplete monitoring of 25-30% of the territory. The true number of abductions is thus likely to be closer to 1500-2000 for 2003, and that of killings only just below. The significance of these numbers in relation to Chechnya’s population estimated at between 800.000 and 1 million is obvious. There is hardly a family that has not suffered a death or a disappearance.
51. A depressingly familiar picture is painted by the description in the Report by the Moscow Helsinki Group and “Memorial” Human Rights Centre (Chechnya 2003, Political Process through the Looking Glass) of a dozen of individual incidents, which took place in just over a week in early September 2003[21]. “Unknown armed people in masks and military uniforms” driving unmarked armoured or other vehicles, breaking into houses, beating up and abducting residents[22]; people arrested by Russian federal forces, some of them never to be seen again, others abandoned after being severely beaten up and tortured[23]; “chaotic gunfire” in urban districts[24], artillery attacks on villages[25], land mines killing inter alia a mother of nine and another of eight children and maiming other women and children[26].
ii. New categories of violations of the European Convention on Human Rights in the wake of the constitutional referendum and the Chechen presidential election
52. The constitutional referendum of March 2003 and the election for the Chechen presidency in October 2003 have given rise to new categories of human rights violations, now also including the people’s right to free elections (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR) and to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), in addition to continuing violations of the right to life (Article 2 ECHR), the prohibition of torture (Article 3 ECHR), and the rights to liberty and security (Article 5 ECHR), and to the protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), etc..
53. Violations of the Chechen population’s democratic rights were committed on the side of those in power by way of gross manipulations of the electoral process[27], including an unfettered use of administrative resources for one-sided propaganda, the intimidation and sometimes physical aggression and annihilation of adversaries, as well as by manipulating electoral lists and vote counts (including recourse to numerous “dead souls”).
54. A terrifying example[28] is the account of an incident on 9 September 2003, in the Starpromyslovy district of the city of Grozny, in the Katayama settlement, on Zhukovsky street: gunmen, presumably from the security service of Kadyrov, in cars without license plates (windows covered with Kadyrov’s portraits) stopped Bislan Khayauri for an ID check. After the inspection, they shot him dead using their assault rifles. Then they blocked off the neighbourhood where the house of the Khayauri family was located. Having fired at the house, the gunmen broke into it and partially destroyed, partially stole the property from the house. The victim’s father was a coordinator of the elections headquarters of Malik Saidullaev, one of the candidates for the Chechen presidency. Katayama residents are sure that Bislan’s assassination and the sack of the house were acts of deterrence and revenge on the part of Kadyrov’s supporters against backers of Saidullaev.
55. Violations of the people’s democratic rights were also committed by armed rebels who in turn attacked candidates and their supporters, as well as polling stations, in a number of violent incidents, some of which could have made many more victims but for the vigilance of the security forces.
56. An example[29] is that of Abdul-Wahid, mufti of the Vedeno district and his bodyguard, who were killed on 26 August 2003 in the village of Elistanzhi. According to villagers, a group of armed Chechens took them from their house at night and one of the killers read out some sort of an order, after which the mufti was shot dead and his bodyguard stabbed to death. Villagers point out that Abdul-Wahid was a close friend of Ahmat Kadyrov.
57. Another example[30] is the coordinated attack on the local TV station in the village of Sernovodsk in the Sunzha district, when Magomed Astamirov, the station’s director, was forced at gunpoint to play a videocassette with fighting scenes and an address by A. Maskhadov. Three other groups of paramilitaries simultaneously seized an electric power plant, opened fire on the local police station, and destroyed the local pre-election headquarters of Mr Kadyrov, after which they fired their guns in Lenina and Kirova streets, shouting “Allah Akbar!” and telling onlookers to go home and watch the local TV channel. Fortunately, there were no casualties.
58. On 2 September 2003, Saipuddin Tsitsayev, head of the administration of the village of Chechen-Aul near Grozny was killed at dawn, by unknown armed persons in masks who stormed in his house, dragged him into the yard and shot him dead[31]. According to the Russian authorities, participants of the “bandit” group who committed this crime have been identified in the meantime and are being tracked down.
59. These incidents are but examples chosen more or less at random. They illustrate together with other abuses the point of view of all NGO’s active in the region that the referendum and the presidential elections in 2003/2004 did not meet minimum standards for democratic elections.
60. Moreover, I share the NGO’s point of view that the security and human rights situation in Chechnya are still such that truly democratic elections could not take place this summer. Under the prevailing security conditions, meaningful election observation was also not possible. For these reasons, I declined the invitation to be present during the presidential election at the end of August, as I feared that my presence could be abused to lend international legitimacy to an exercise that is not, and cannot be termed a democratic election.
iii. Climate of impunity still prevailing in Chechnya, and spreading to Ingushetia
61. The climate of impunity diagnosed by the Assembly in Resolution 1323 and Recommendation 1600 is unfortunately still prevailing in the Chechen Republic[32], and it appears to be spreading to Ingushetia, where a number of abuses took place in 2003 and early 2004 that are reminiscent of those taking place in the Chechen Republic[33].
62. The replacement on the side of the Federal forces of large-scale “mop-ups” by smaller “targeted operations” has been described by NGO representatives as a false progress. Whilst fewer persons are affected by such operations, they amount in their view to quasi-legalised “death squad” activities. Because of the much smaller number of potential witnesses, it is also more dangerous for victims’ relatives to complain, as informers can be identified and subjected to reprisals much more easily.
63. A new frightening trend is that of hostage-taking of relatives of suspected rebel fighters in order to oblige them to give themselves up. A prominent case was that of Magomed Khambiev, who “voluntarily” surrendered to the Chechen authorities on 8 March 2004. On 1 March 2004, a large-scale “special operation” had been carried out in Grozny, Benoi and Nozhai-Yurt leading to the arrest of about 20 of his relatives. An ultimatum was then allegedly addressed to Mr Khambiev via the elders that they would “all be shot” unless he surrendered himself. After his surrender, the Khambiev family members were released again.[34] Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the assassinated President and leader of the “presidential guard”, has reportedly proposed to punish not only the fighters themselves but also their relatives.[35] Some incidents reported by Memorial in May 2004 and by IHF in September 2004[36] seem to show that these are not empty threats[37]. Needless to say that this goes straight in the face of the European Convention of Human Rights, which allows for the punishment only of those who committed criminal offences themselves, not their relatives.
64. During our meeting in June, the President of Ingushetia, Mr Zyazikov, impressed us with his candid recognition of growing security problems in his Republic. Insisting that “Ingushetia is not Chechnya”, he pledged that every disappearance would give rise to serious prosecutorial investigation. He had also steadfastly refused requests from certain organisations for permission to use vehicles without license plates. When we mentioned that we had seen such vehicles during our visit, he severely admonished the Minister responsible, in our presence. When we raised the case of the missing prosecutor, Rachid Ozdoev[38], he assured us of the unquestionable credibility of his father, who had earlier on the same day informed us personally of the circumstances of his son’s disappearance, at the “Memorial” office in Nazran. President Zyazikov assured us that he would do his utmost to clarify this case, and the other disappearances that have recently occurred in his Republic[39]. He fully agreed with our suggestion that the country urgently needs more law enforcement officials such as Rachid Ozdoev, who do their job with courage and determination, to serve and protect all law-abiding citizens, and who go after those who break the law, whoever they may be.
65. I am particularly saddened by the deterioration of the situation in Ingushetia, in particular after the series of coordinated attacks at the end of June 2004, as this Republic has shown a most impressive readiness to help the large number of refugees who crossed its borders during the two Chechen wars. With some help from the international community, for which President Zyazikov expressed his republic’s gratitude, the Ingush people, who number 480.000, accommodated over 500.000 refugees. I will not go into any details as regards the situation of the Chechen refugees in Ingushetia, who have been subjected to different types of pressures to make them return to Chechnya, as this is the topic of my colleague Iwinsky, who is preparing a report on the situation of the refugees for the Migration Committee.
66. I share worries expressed by NGO representatives that the situation in the ChechenRepublic can be likened to a cancer that threatens to spread throughout the Russian Federation. Members of the security forces who have spent some time in Chechnya and are rotated to other regions of the Federation are at risk of bringing home methods they have learnt and got away with in Chechnya. The nationalistic tone prevailing in many media, and the anti-caucasian sentiment spreading in the general population, and even in the courts, especially in the newly introduced jury trials[40], is also negative fall-out of the conflict in the ChechenRepublic.
67. I have prepared, in Appendix I, a selection of individual cases of abuses that have been brought to my attention by different NGO’s to raise in my report as examples, with the hope that public attention may contribute to their resolution.
68. The cases presented in some more detail in Appendix II are of particular significance to me personally, as they were brought to my attention by the suffering relatives who attended the meeting I had with them together with Andreas Gross at the Memorial office in Nazran.
69. The Kaplanov case[41] shows that not all abductions, not even all those committed by members of the security services, have a “political” background. But it also illustrates the reasons for the lack of confidence of citizens in the local, “street-level” law enforcement bodies. By contrast, several of the victims’ relatives we met, desperate as they were, implored us to inform President Putin of their plight – saying that if only he knew what is really going on, he would personally ensure that law and order be restored, and their relatives freed.
70. This attitude is reflected in the position of the main Russian and international non-governmental human rights organisations, who asked us to plead for the temporary instauration of a state of emergency, or direct presidential rule, and for the postponing of any elections until law and order would be restored in such a way. As parliamentarians working for human rights and democracy, Mr Gross and I were rather surprised that organisations such as Memorial, and regional representatives of other human rights groups pleaded for the introduction of martial law and the postponement of elections. They explained that they preferred calling a spade a spade, and hoped for a clear-cut assumption of responsibilities in such a case.
71. By contrast, the Federal and Chechen authorities continue to bet on “normalisation”, refusing any talks with the secessionist camp, which they attempt to stamp out by any means. Progress towards “normal life” is expected from planned injections of federal funds to further social development: reconstruction of social infrastructures, housing, disbursement of compensation promised to those whose houses or apartments were destroyed during the fighting.
72. During our mission in June, the Russian organisers made it a point of honour to show us a number of realisations in this sense, in Grozny and in Znamenskoye, including two camps for returning refugees (one consisting of small houses, the other a high-rise block of apartments), several schools, a kindergarten, an orphanage, a maternity hospital, a woodcrafting workshop, reconstructed administrative buildings, and last but not least Grozny University, which has re-opened. These realisations are of course positive signs that efforts are made, and bear fruit. But in view of the complete destruction of Grozny – it was enough to look out of the window as we were transported in a convoy of armoured vehicles from one point to the other – these efforts, however laudable, appear futile. Durable economic reconstruction and development necessitates the population’s trust in those governing them. Such trust in turn requires respect for human rights, in particular by members of the different law enforcement bodies. This truism must be repeated again and again, and the Council of Europe owes it to its important member state, the Russian Federation, not ever to give up.
D. Conclusion
73. The human rights situation in the ChechenRepublic remains catastrophic, and is threatening to spread to other regions of the Russian Federation, undermining the rule of law. The authorities’ efforts to improve the social situation have produced some results, but durable social and economic progress requires regaining the people’s trust. This in turn necessitates bringing to justice the perpetrators of the most serious human rights violations and taking the necessary measures to avoid the repetition of such abuses.
74. For this reason, I propose to reiterate the appeals to the Russian authorities, and to the illegal armed formations, to take the necessary measures to put an end to the climate of impunity prevailing in the Chechen Republic, as spelt out in the draft resolution, and in the recommendations by the CPT and by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.
75. I also propose, in the draft recommendation, to continue reminding the Committee of Ministers as the Council of Europe’s executive organ that the massive human rights violations in the Chechen Republic are by far the most serious human rights issue in any of the Council’s member states and that the credibility of the whole Organisation depends on its ability to convince the Russian Federation to meet its commitments in this respect.
APPENDIX I
A selection of Individual Cases of Human Rights Abuses
1. Eliza Gaitamirova “disappeared” on 15 January 2004. She had been arrested in December 2003 and held in a place of detention in Nalchik in Kabardino-Balkaria until 1 January 2004. A number of Chechen men were held alongside Ms Gaitamirova, but the relatives were given no information concerning their whereabouts[42].
2. Imram Ezhiev, head of the Society of Russian-Chechen Friendship’s information centre in the northern Caucasus, regional coordinator of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a member of a working group on human rights in Chechnya organised by the Presidential Human Rights Commission: he has been detained at least 17 times, last on 29 January 2004, shortly after he accompanied the head of the Russian Presidential Human Rights Commission, Ella Pamfilova, on a visit to IDP camps in Ingushetia. Several officers allegedly hit him on the back and beat his head against the wall, while threatening to hand the men over to the Russian federal forces, where they would “disappear” without a trace. Mr Ezhiev claimed that the police officers read the medical documents he carried with him and knew that he had a spinal injury when they hit his back. The next morning, Ms Pamfilova learnt that the men had been detained and upon her insistence, they were let go later that day. In March 2003, Mr Ezhiev had also been taken from his car by armed, masked men and held for approximately three days, during which he was reportedly tortured. His cousin Akhmed Ezhiev was shot and killed at his home in Shali on 18 December 2002.
3. In an “urgent action” dated 16 July 2004, Amnesty International informs about a new worrisome incident in which more than 40 police officers raided the Society’s office in Karabulak/Ingushetia on 12 July. According to AI, most of them wore masks and camouflage and carried machine-guns. They searched the office without showing an arrest warrant and apparently confiscated six videotapes, four computer discs and files containing testimonies of victims of human rights violations against civilians by Russian federal forces in Chechnya, as well as the names of the alleged perpetrators, and details of vehicles used to abduct civilians. Imran Ezhiev arrived during the search and told the police that their activities were illegal without a warrant. One officer allegedly shouted at him that it was illegal that he was born, and that he was a Chechen, and threatened that they would find something criminal about him. One of the human rights defenders of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, Khamzat Kuchiev, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in terrorism, shortly after the police claimed they had found two small plastic bags full of powder. Imran Ezhiev called the head of the Presidential Human Rights Commission, Ella Pamfilova, in Moscow, for help. She reportedly called the President of Ingushetia and asked him to intervene. As a result, Khamzat Kuchiev was released a few hours later, and the police apparently apologised to him, but asked that the NGO should not publicise the incident further. The Society nevertheless filed a complaint with the Office of the Procurator of Ingushetia, for illegal search of its office, arbitrary detention of Mr Kuchiev, and alleged fabrication of evidence.
4. Amnesty International remains seriously concerned for the safety of Imran Ezhiev and other members of the Society.
5. Aslan Davletukaev’s mutilated body was found on 16 January 2004 near Gudermes in Chechnya. Mr Davletukaev had been working with the Society for Russian-Chechen Friendship and had reportedly been kidnapped by Russian federal forces on 10 January.[43]
6. Arthur Akhmatukaev, a member of the Society for Russian-Chechen Friendship, who had recently married the niece of Imran Ezhiev (cf. above), “disappeared” after he was taken away on 4 August 2003 by Russian soldiers in an armoured vehicle.[44]
7. Aslan Shakhidovich Usmayev of the village of Tsentrovaya was found dead on 1 September 2003 in the eastern suburbs of Gudermes, near a filling station, some 150 m from a local police station. He had undergone an operation at Gudermes city hospital no. 2. On 31 August, at midnight, armed persons wearing masks arrived in a UAZ jeep and stormed into the hospital kidnapping A. Usmayev and a friend of his looking after him in the hospital. The same night Usmayev’s friend was released. The murder was not reported to the law enforcement bodies.[45]
8. Musa Khamkhoev and Ibragim Khashagulgov were killed and Akraham Kashagulgov wounded in an alleged attack on a civilian car by a military helicopter on 25 March 2004 near the Ingush village of Sleptsovskaya[46].
9. Maidat Tsitsaeva and five of her children were killed in the aerial bombing of her house in the village of Rigakhoy, in the Vedeno region of Chechnya.[47]
10. Zelimkan Murdalov disappeared on 2 January 2001. A member of the military, Sergej Lapin, has been prosecuted. The high-profile criminal proceedings are still going on.
11. Ramzan Musaevich Shaipov was abducted on 8 May 2004 from his home at 23 Lenin Street in Chiri-Yurt (Shalinski region) by Russian-speaking, unidentified men in camouflage uniforms. During his arrest, the soldiers used violence against his wife, three-year old son and small baby, which they threw on the floor. His wife saw the kidnappers making their escape in unmarked vehicles (Niva, Zhiguli-7 and Gazel). At the time, to Armoured Personnel Carriers were stationed on the edge of the village. Soldiers broke into the houses of the Shaipovs’ neighbours (the Astamirov and Aidamirov families) and went on the rampage, beating up inter alia 78-year-old Aldan Astamirov. Shaipov’s relatives complained to the regional department of internal affairs of the Shalinkski region, convinced of his innocence. The inhabitants of Chiri-Yurt, incensed by the arbitrary detention, set up a barricade on the road between Chiri-Yurt and Novye Atagi, demanding Shaipov’s release. Soldiers tried to disperse the picket by opening fire with automatic weapons over the heads of the crowd, but the civilians did not give way. The soldiers finally withdrew, but the Chechen authorities have nevertheless not responded to the demands of the inhabitants of Chiri-Yurt.[48]
12. Adam Medov disappeared on 15 June 2004 in Karabulak. On 17 June in the evening, his family was informed that their son was in the ROVD police station of the Sunzha district. Family members gathered at the police station, and policemen even offered two of his brothers to see him, although they were subsequently prevented from doing so. At about 23h30, policemen informed the family that Adam was being taken away, one ROVD police officer accompanying him to the “Kavkaz” checkpoint at the border to Chechnya. Since then, nothing is known about Adam Medov’s whereabouts, and ROVD police now deny that he was even at their station on 17 June at the said time[49].
13. Rasukhan Evloev and Ibragim Ismailov disappeared on 11 March 2004 near Nazran. At a traffic police checkpoint, ten armed camouflaged persons, one of whom allegedly showed an FSB identity card, forced the two young men to board one of their cars (VAZ-21099) and took them away, not to be seen since[50].
14. Temur Khambulatov was arrested on 18 March 2004 at his house in the village of Saveljevskaja, by a group of armed masked men travelling in military vehicles who told his mother that they belonged to the FSB and were taking her son to the nearest police station. On the next day, his mother was informed that he died in custody, most likely after having been severely tortured. The Prosecutor’s Office of Naursky regiona initiated criminal case # 40560.[51]
15. Said-Magomed Aliev, an employee of the Czech “People in Need Foundation”, was detained in Grozny on 14 April 2004, by armed masked persons.Five days later, his body was found by a sheppard.[52]
16. Zelimkhan Isaev was detained on 9 May 2004 by a group of about 15 armed, masked men. He was brought to the Urus-Martan ROVD (police) station. Only on 12 May, a lawyer hired by his family was allowed to see him. According to the lawyer, he showed traces of severe torture and needed urgent medical care. On 16 May at 11h30, he died of his wounds.[53]
17. Ibragim Tsurov, an Ingush lawyer and member of the Bar of Chechnya, worked as a lawyer at the Khankala military base in Grozny. On 26 April 2003, his car, in which he drove in the company of three servicemen who also worked in Kankhala, was overtaken by two other cars and several armed men in mask stopped his car, beat him and placed him in the boot of their car. They drove off and left the three servicemen standing unharmed. Mr Tsurov was never seen again. On 18 June 2003, the Grozny city prosecutor’s office opened an investigation and eventually referred the case to the Military Procuracy. The military procuracy opened an investigation, although it had refused to do so earlier. After more than a year, there has been no progress on the case. Mr Tsurov’s sister has desperately searched for her brother and even travelled to Kankhala, where she identified her brother’s car in the yard of the base. In attempting to obtain further information, she was threatened by military officials.
APPENDIX II
Cases transmitted during the meeting in Memorial’s Nazran office
1. Kidnapping of Bashir Adamovich Mutsolgov, born 1975, teacher, married with one very young daughter: On 18 December 2003, Bashir Adamovich Mutsolgov left his father's house to go to his own home, 50 m away. A white "Niva" jeep with tinted windows and its number obscured by mud (only the region of registration was visible, no. 26) pulled up, and armed men in uniform without insignia and black masks hit him in the stomach with a machine-gun butt and threw him in the car.
2. A passer-by informed police at the Karabalakskiy station, who gave chase and stopped the abductors, one of whom showed a special pass from the Regional Operational Force. The police let them go apparently without actually examining the pass. The abductors (in cars identified in the text) disappeared in the direction of the federal Rostov-Baku road. Persistent inquiries revealed the involvement of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation responsible for the Republic of Ingushetia and the ChechenRepublic and the Regional Directorate for the North Caucasus. Mr Mutsolgov was held in an underground cell at the FSB Directorate in Magas and taken the following day to Khankala in the Grozny district. This information was provided by staff of the aforementioned directorates who wished to remain anonymous. They also stated that he had been tortured and beaten into signing a confession to crimes of which he knew nothing. To date no other information is available on Mr Mutsolgov's whereabouts, the reason for his abduction or his state of health. The ill health of Mr Mutsolgov's elderly parents is made worse by not knowing what has happened and officials' refusal to say.
3. Abduction of Timur Mukhammedovich Yandiyev (born 1979): his son was abducted outside the Ingushenergo plant in Nazran on 16 March 2004 by six masked men in camouflage uniforms driving Gazel and Niva cars without registration numbers. The incident was witnessed by the Ingushenergo security staff, who telephoned the police.
The cars passed the Kavkaz-20 border post on the Ingushetian-Chechen border in the direction of Grozny, showing a Russian special services pass.
The prosecutor's office in Nazran has lodged criminal proceedings[54].
4. Letter dated 2 June 2004 from a retired federal judge, Boris Ozdoyev, whose son, Rashid Ozdoyev, born 1975, was abducted.
5. Rashid Ozdoyev worked in the prosecutor's office for ten years, the last two as assistant prosecutor of the Republic of Ingushetia, with responsibility for supervising the application of the law in the FSB Directorate for Ingushetia.
In that capacity he had criticised, verbally and in writing, the murders and abductions committed by FSB special operations staff and mobile detachments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He had handed the last such written statement to the Prosecutor General's office and the State Duma MP, Bashir Kodzoyev, when on a further training course in Moscow in early March.
6. On his way home, on 11 March, he was abducted in the Verkhniye Achaluki area of the Malgobek district of Ingushetia by members of the FSB and a mobile unit of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in three cars. Only four days later, at the father's insistence, did the prosecutor's office lodge criminal proceedings for abduction.
7. The father had to resort to making his own inquiries and an FSB officer in Ingushetia indirectly involved in the abduction had given details of witnesses having seen Rashid Ozdoyev driven to an FSB garage. Over two months later, the investigator had not yet managed to officially question those individuals, supposedly because the head of the FSB directorate, S.B. Koryakov, would not allow this. The father has a taped statement from the aforementioned FSB officer that his son was abducted on Koryakov's orders. His repeated petitions to the country's highest authorities have been ignored.
8. He says that the number of killings and abductions in Ingushetia has fallen thanks to the efforts of the Novaya Gazeta correspondent, Anna Politkovskaya, but the parents of over 40 abductees remain without news. Their only hope is that an international organisation will bring this to the attention of the Russian President.
9. We raised Mr Ozdoev’s case during our meeting in June with Ingush President Zyazikov , who emphatically and publicly promised us to personally follow up this case. On 2 August 2004, Novaya Gazeta published an article with the answer from Deputy Prosecutor General Sergej Fridinsky to an inquiry of Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov regarding Mr. Ozdoev’s case, which does not appear to answer all the questions raised by the Deputy, and by Mr Ozdoev’s father.[55] The further progress of investigations in this important case may well give an indication of the political will of the competent federal authorities to deal with alleged abuses of local FSB officials.
10. Petition to the head of the section supervising criminal investigations of the Prosecutor's office, A.N. Mazhidov, from Khadizhat Daudovna Kaplanova:
11. Her home was forcibly entered by masked armed men who arrived in a vehicle with 40-42 marked on the side. They searched the house demanding arms, US dollars, Russian money and gold items. Not obtaining these, they took away her son Isu Gilchiyevich Kaplanov (born 1965), her son-in-law, Ruslan Abuyazidovich Sadulayev (born 1962) and a neighbour, Movsar Musaitov. The subsequent criminal case, no. 13093, established that the abductors were the servicemen Dmitri Viktorovich Tikhonov, born 1971 and resident at ul. Zavodskaya 38/15, Yekaterinburg, and Sergey Borisovich Morozov, resident at ul. Vostochnaya 22-314, Sverdlovsk. The deputy head of operations, Magomed Akhmedovich Batayev, has stated that the abductees were taken to Khankala.
12. Mrs Kaplanova was aware of the involvement of Ayub Tsitsiyev, who had befriended her son at business college and lent him 1,000 US dollars with subsequent demands for interest. She had notified the investigator, R. Ibragimov. Tsitsiyev was questioned as a witness and admitted to hiring the aforementioned soldiers to collect the debt. Failing to collect the debt, they had taken her son and son-in-law away.
13. She had repeatedly sent intermediaries to ask Tsitsiyev to hand over the abductees, with promises that the debt would be paid, but he had categorically denied his involvement in the abductions. However, he did admit involvement, linked to the debt, to the case investigator M.A. Antipov in June 2003. She now calls for a criminal prosecution of Tsitsiyev.
14. The case investigator Klindukhov asked her to pay 65,000 roubles to Tsitsiyev, which she refused to do. Following her complaint to the prosecutor about the investigator, the case was handed to another investigator.
15. She asks for assistance in locating and obtaining the release of her son and son-in-law. The following page (page 9) is a letter adding that the prosecutor, Yu.A. Ponamarev, had gone to Yekaterinburg to take statements from the soldiers who had abducted her son (Tikhonov and Morozov) but they had been on a working trip to Moscow. After repeated trips to Yekaterinburg the investigator M.A. Antipov had obtained statements from them confirming their involvement. A statement from Tsitsiyev was also on the case-file, but it had disappeared when the case had been passed to another investigator. She complains of an ineffective investigation, which is now at a standstill.
APPENDIX III
Questions by Mr Bindig
(sent to the Russian authorities ahead of the fact-finding visit)
A. Introduction
As Rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic, Mr Bindig has been invited to visit Chechnya during the first week of June, together with his colleagues, Mr Gross of the Political Affairs Committee, and Mr Iwinski, of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population.
The purpose of this visit is to prepare the factual basis, in the most professional and neutral manner, of the report that he has been asked to prepare, and which he is hoping to submit to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights as soon as possible after his visit.
In order to prepare the visit, and thereby the future report, in the most efficient way, Mr Bindig would be most grateful if you could transmit the following questions to the competent Russian authorities, in particular to
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Mr Vladimir Ustinov, the Procurator General of the Russian Federation,
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the Chief Prosecutors of the Chechen and IngushRepublics, and the Chief Military Prosecutor responsible for the ChechenRepublic;
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Mr Vladimir Lukin, the newly appointed Commissioner on Human Rights in the Russian Federation, who I was informed is acting for the time being as the Russian federal coordinator for cooperation with the Council of Europe for the promotion of human rights in the Chechen Republic, and
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the President of the Chechen Republic, Mr Akhmad Kadyrov, who I was informed has assumed his full constitutional responsibilities for human rights in Chechnya, including the supervision of the Office of the former Special Representative of the Russian President for Human Rights in Chechnya, Mr Sultygov, and to the said Office itself.
The first set of questions (below B.) is of a more general, statistical nature, mainly intended to update the information concerning the year 2002 as presented in the letter of Mr Sultygov dated 28 February 2003 (Ref. No. A7-13/148)[encl.1]. The second set of questions (below C.) concerns the progress of ongoing procedures in individual cases that were either already mentioned in Mr Bindig’s previous report (Doc. 9732 dated 13 March 2003) [encl. 2] and in the letter dated 28 February 2003 from Mr S. N.Fridinskiy to Mr Sultygov (Ref. No. 46-1879-03)[encl.1], or that have been brought to his attention since then. The sources quoted are enclosed in photocopy for more convenient reference.
Whilst Mr Bindig will need the replies in order to complete his report later in June, he would be most greatful if he could be provided with part of this information before his planned visit in the first week of June so that any points that may need further clarification can be raised during the meetings foreseen then.
As you can see also from the selection of the individual cases in Appendix II, which include a number of terrorist outrages that are likely to be the responsibility of the one or other rebel faction, it is Mr Bindig’s intention to reach the fairest possible conclusions on the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic and on the efforts of the law enforcement structures to punish all those responsible for violations, regardless of their status or rank.
B. General/statistical questions
1. a. How many applications from individuals and groups of individuals has the Office of the Special Representative received in 2003, and since the beginning of 2004?
b. How many of these concerned cases of missing persons?
c. How many cases has the Office of the Special Representative submitted respectively to the Chechen Republic Prosecutor’s Office and to the Military Prosecutor’s Office in 2003, and since the beginning of 2004?
2. a. How many applications has the Military Prosecutor’s Office received in 2003, and, separately, since the beginning of 2004 (including those submitted by the Office of the Special Representative) ?
b. How many staff members (professional staff/support staff) are dealing with these applications? How has the number of staff evolved since 2002?
c. How many of these applications have led to the institution of criminal cases?
d. How many of these cases were referred to the military courts?
e. How many of the applications received (above a.) were transmitted to the civil prosecutor’s office?
f. How many convictions have resulted from the cases referred to the military courts (above c.)?
g. What is the total number of convictions in 2003 and, separately, since the beginning of 2004?
h. How many of these convictions concern cases instituted in 2000 (24), 2001 (251) and 2002 (145)?
i. How many servicemen were convicted over the course of 2003?
j. How many of the servicemen convicted in 2003 were officers?
k. What was the breakdown of the servicemen convicted in 2003 according to the type of offenses concerned (in particular, murder, rape, assault/battery, theft)?
3. a. How many applications has the office of the Chief Prosecutor of the
ChechenRepublic received in 2003, and, separately, since the beginning of 2004 (including those transmitted by the Office of the Special Representative) ?
b. How many staff members (professional staff/support staff) are dealing with these applications? How has the number evolved since 2002?
c. How many of these applications concerned serious violations of human rights (disappearances, murders, torture, assault/battery) ?
d. How many of these applications (above b.) have led to the institution of criminal cases?
e. How many of these cases (above c.) were referred to the Criminal Courts?
f. How many of these cases (above d.) have resulted in convictions?
g. How many of the applications (above b.) were transmitted to the military prosecutor’s office?
C. Questions on the follow-up given to specific cases[56]
1. Cases already mentioned in Mr Bindig’s previous report (doc. 9732 of 13 March 2003) [encl.2] and in the letter dated 28 February from Mr S. N.Fridinskiy to Mr Sultygov (Ref. No. 46-1879-03) [encl.1]
a. Murder of civilians in the village of Alkhan-Yurt in December 1999 (case no. 49152)
b. Mass execution in the Novye Aldy suburb of Grozny (case no. 12011)
c. Murder of civilians in the Novaya Katayama suburb of Grozny (cases no. 12131 and 12038)
d. Abduction of Ruslan Shamiyevich Alikhadzhiyev (case no. 22025)
e. Mass grave in the “Zdorovye” dacha estate (case no. 21037)
f. Special operation in the village of Mesker-Yurt, Shalinskiy district (case no. 59113)
g. Abduction of S.-M. Imakayev (case no. 59140)
h. Murder of the former head of administration of the village of Alkhan-Kala, M.K. Umazheva (case no. 56185)
i. Killing of Madina Mezhieva and Amkhad Gekaev on 27 October 2001 (doc. 9732 para. 31)
j. Murder of Khadzhimurat Yandiev (doc. 9732 para. 33)
k. Torture of Alaudin Sadykov (doc. 9732 para. 41)
2. Cases brought to Mr Bindig’s attention after March 2003
a. Murder, on 2 September 2003, of Saipuddin Tsitsayev, head of the administration in the village of Chechen Aul (MHG/Memorial, p. 30) [encl.3]
b. Kidnapping, on 4 September 2003, of Irskhan Khaditovich Edilkhanov at 5 Melnichnaya street in the village of Khamby-Irze in the Achkoi-Martan district (MHG/Memorial, p. 30) [encl.3]
c. Kidnapping, on 7 September 2003, of five local residents in the village of Chiri-Yurt in the Grozny rural district (MHG/Memorial, p. 30) [encl.3]
d. Murder of three women, and maiming of three children, in a terrorist mine explosion, on 9 September 2003, in the village of Assinovskaya in the Sunzha district (MHG/Memorial p. 30/31) [encl.3]
e. Murder of Aslan Davletukaev, kidnapped on 10 January 2004 and found dead and mutilated on 16 January near Gudermes (IHF press release of 23 January 2004) [encl.4]
f. Kidnapping of Ruslan Soltakhanov, on 13 February 2004 (IHF press release of 26 February 2004 [encl.5]/AI UA86/04 of 27 February 2004 [encl.6])
g. Detention and killing of Roustam Dzakalaev, on 3 February 2004, in the village of Sleptsovskaja, Ingushetia (“Memorial” Bulletin February 2004) [encl.7]
h. Kidnapping, on 19 February 2004 in Osman-Yurt (Republic of Dagestan), of Nariman Gatiev (“Memorial” Bulletin February 2004) [encl.7]
i. Kidnapping, on 25 February 2004 in Urus-Martan, of Khasan Dombaev and Aset Dombaeva (“Memorial” Bulletin February 2004) [encl.7]
j. Killing of Umar Zabiev, wounding of Tamara Zabieva, on 10 June 2003 near the village of Galshki (Zunzhenskij district) in Ingushetia – case no. 23 60 00 32 of 11 June 2003 (HRW “Spreading dispair”, Sept. 2003, p. 18-19) [encl.8]
k. Kidnapping, on 4 July 2003, of Ali Astamirov (AFP journalist) in the center of Nazran (Ingushetia)
l. Murder of Zura Bitiyeva, Ramzan Iduev, Idris Iduev and Abubakar Bitiyev, Turpal Ismailov and Islambek Gadiev on 21 May 2003 (IHF/Still in a State of Terror, p. 11) [encl.9]
m. Ill-treatment of numerous residents of Samashki (Achkoy Martan district) during a “sweep operation” (zachistka) at the beginning of May 2003 (IHF/Still in a State of Terror, p. 12) [encl.9]
n. Kidnapping of Khamzat Osmaev on 12 January 2004 in the village of Plievo, on the outskirts of Nazran (Ingushetia) (AI UA 21/04 of 14 January 2004) [encl. 10]
o. Killing of Isa Magomedovich Musayev on 15 September 2003 in the village of Avtury in the Shali disctrict (MHG/Memorial, Chechnya 2003, p. 47) [encl.3]
p. Extrajudicial executions of nine persons from Duba-Yurt in early April 2004 (HRW press release, 13 April 2004) [encl.11]
q. Criminal investigation no. 45031 into the death of Samil Said-Khasanovich Akhmadov and alleged intimidation of Larisa Sadulaeva
r. Extrajudicial execution on 10 April 2004 of Anzor Pokaev at his parents’ homein the village of Starye Atagi
s. Disappearence of Animat Dugaeva and Kurbika Zinabdieva on 16 May 2003 in the village of Ulus-Kert (criminal case no. 54016 opened on 4 July 2003)
t. Disappearance of Zelimkhan Murdalov on 2 January 2001 (criminal case no. 15004 of 7 January 2001) – progress of the criminal proceedings against Sergei Lapin charged with Murdalov’s ill-treatment and kidnapping, since the trial began in October 2003 in Grozny
u. Death on 8 April 2004 of Maidat Tsitsaeva and five of her children in the aerial bombing of her house in the village of Rigakhoy in the Vedeno region of Chechnya [IHF/encl. 12]
v. Disappearance, on 15 January 2004, of Eliza Gaitamirova, subsequent to her arrest in December 2003 and her detention in Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria) until 1 January 2004.
w. Abduction, on 11 March 2004, of Rashid Ozdoev, an Ingush deputy prosecutor, near the village of Verkhnye Achaluki (AI/HRW/Memorial 8 April 2004) [encl.13].
x. Attack on a civilian car by a military helicopter on 25 March 2004 near the Ingush village of Sleptsovskaya killing Musa Khamkhoev and Ibragim Khashagulgov. (AI/HRW/Memorial 8 April 2004) [encl.13].
APPENDIX IV
APPENDIX V
Information on the investigation of criminal cases on crimes committed
on the territory of the ChechenRepublic and indicated in
part "C" of the request submitted by Mr R. Bindig
1. Persons, who committed crimes, who were identified and against whom criminal proceedings were instituted, or who were declared for federal search and will be detained:
a) Criminal proceedings were instituted against Sergei Lapin, who is accused of ill-treatment of Z. Murdalov who was abducted. The criminal case is referred to the Supreme Court of the ChechenRepublic.
b) Criminal case ? 12088 was initiated on torture of A. Sadykov. Participants in the crime are identified. They are staff members of the Khanty-Mansiysk interior bodies: Moskvin - committed suicide, Abdullaev and Zakharov are declared for search.
c) Criminal case ? 56185 was initiated on the murder of the former head of administration of the village of Alkhan-Kala M. Umazheva. It was proved that she was murdered by A. Mashugov on the order of the bandit group leader Kh. Tazabaev. Both were declared for search.
On February 23, 2004 Kh. Tazabaev was killed during the operation on his detention near the village of Ali-Yurt of the Nazran region (Republic of Ingushetia) when he showed armed resistance. A. Mashugov is still declared for search.
d) Information about kidnapping of N. Gitiev is not true. Criminal proceedings were instituted against him and he was arrested by the decision of the court for participation in illegal armed formations and illegal bearing and storage of arms and ammunition. On April 19, 2004 the criminal case was referred to court with a sentence.
2. Preliminary investigation suspended, operative-and-search operations are carried out on identification and detention of persons who committed crimes:
Criminal cases:
a) Criminal case ? 49152 - discovery of the bodies of A. Asuev, I. Usmanov, I. Muradov and M. Sultanov in Alkhan-Yurt with traces of fire(arm) injuries. There are contradictory evidence on the circumstances of causing body injuries. They may be a result of shelling of federal forces by members of illegal armed formations as well as exchange of fire between them.
The bodies were buried by the relatives before the examination by the investigation group and medical experts. The relatives do not give consent to exhumation.
b) Criminal case ? 42152 - murder of head of administration of the village of Chechen-Aul S. Tsitsayev and injury of his son, militiaman. Participants of the bandit group who committed this crime were identified. Operative-and-search activities are carried out, criminals are declared for search.
c) Criminal case ? 44070 -mine explosion of the workers of the state farm "Assinovuskiy" near the village of Assinovskaya - 2 women died and 5 were wounded.
Judging by the type of explosion mechanism a conclusion may be drawn that it was laid by participants of illegal armed formations. Persons who committed this act are in operational search.
d) Criminal case ? 48023 - murder of t. Ismailov, I. Gadiev, R. Iduev, Z. Bitieva, A. Bitiev in the village of Kalinovskaya. Operative activities are carried out in order to identify persons who committed this crime.
3. Preliminary investigation continues on the following criminal cases:
a) Criminal case ? 12011 - on (mass) murder of civilians in the Novye Aldy suburb of Grozny,
b) Criminal cases ? 12131, 12038 - on murder of civilians in the Novaya Katayama suburb of Grozny;
c) Criminal case ? 21037 - mass grave in the "Zdorovye" dacha estate;
d) Criminal case ? 59113 - special operation in the village of Mesker-Yurt;
e) Criminal case ? 35002 - abduction and murder of A. Dovletukayev from the village of Avtury;
f) Criminal case ? 37016 - kidnapping of A. Dombayeva;
g) Criminal case ? 22116 - killing of I. Musayev in the village of Avtury in the Shali district;
h) Criminal case ? 32025 - kidnapping and murder of 8 residents of the village of Duba-Yurt of the Shali district;
i) Criminal case ? 34046 - kidnapping and murder of A. Pokayev;
j) Criminal case ? 54016 - kidnapping of K. Zinabdiyeva and A. Dugayeva in the village ofUlus-Kert of the Shatoy district.
4. Criminal cases investigated by the military prosecutor's office:
-
on kidnapping of S. Imakayev;
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on disappearance of Kh. Yandieva;
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on death of S. Akhmadov;
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on death of M. Tsitsayeva and her children;
Information of the detention and further discharge of 5 residents of the village of Chiri-Yurt of the Groznensky district is being checked (up).
APPENDIX VI
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
Public statement concerning the ChechenRepublic of the Russian Federation
(made on 10 July 2003)
1. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has carried out six visits to the ChechenRepublic since the outbreak of the conflict which began in October 1999. During these visits, the Committee has interviewed in private hundreds of persons about their experiences whilst detained, and held talks with scores of federal and republican officials.
The CPT has witnessed for itself the extreme difficulties confronting the federal and republican authorities in their efforts to restore the rule of law and achieve a lasting reconciliation in this part of the Russian Federation. Acts causing great loss of life and human suffering have been, and continue to be, committed by combatants opposing federal power structures. The CPT condemns these acts and fully understands the need for a strong response from State institutions. However, that response must never degenerate into acts of torture or other forms of ill-treatment; a State must avoid the trap of abandoning civilised values.
2. On 10 July 2001, the CPT issued a public statement concerning the ChechenRepublic. It was prompted by the Russian authorities’ failure to cooperate with the Committee in relation to two matters: the carrying out of a thorough and independent inquiry into events at the Chernokozovo detention facility during the period December 1999 to early February 2000; and action taken to uncover and prosecute cases of ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in the Chechen Republic in the course of the current conflict.
Subsequently, some steps forward have been made. The Russian authorities have issued a number of orders and instructions aimed at reinforcing control over the operations conducted by the federal forces. The structures of the civil and military prosecutors’ offices have been developed, and mechanisms for better co-ordination between them introduced. In the law enforcement sphere, there has been a progressive transfer of functions to Chechen Internal Affairs structures. Reference can be made to the gradual restoration of the court system and the resumption of lawyers’ activity. The CPT also wishes to highlight that in the course of its most recent visits, hardly any allegations were received of ill-treatment by staff working in Ministry of Justice establishments in the Chechen Republic, namely SIZO No 2 in Chernokozovo and the recently re-opened SIZO No 1 in Grozny.
3. However, in spite of sustained efforts by the CPT over the last two years, the Russian authorities have failed to tackle effectively major problems related to the Committee’s mandate. There is continued resort to torture and other forms of ill-treatment by members of the law enforcement agencies and federal forces operating in the ChechenRepublic. Further, the action taken to bring to justice those responsible is slow and – in many cases – ultimately ineffective. Consequently, the CPT has been obliged to make this second public statement.
4. In the course of the CPT’s visits to the Chechen Republic in 2002 and, most recently, from 23 to 29 May 2003, a considerable number of persons interviewed independently at different places alleged that they had been severely ill-treated whilst detained by law enforcement agencies. The allegations were detailed and consistent, and concerned methods such as very severe beating, the infliction of electric shocks, and asphyxiation using a plastic bag or gas mask. In many cases, these allegations were supported by medical evidence. Some persons examined by the delegation’s doctors displayed physical marks or conditions which were fully consistent with their allegations. Documentation containing medical evidence consistent with allegations of ill-treatment during periods of detention in law enforcement agencies was also gathered.
The allegations of ill-treatment received by the CPT concerned law enforcement establishments (Departments of Internal Affairs and certain Federal Security Service facilities) throughout the territory of the ChechenRepublic and related to both official and unofficial places of detention. As regards the latter, the Military Base at Khankala was referred to repeatedly.
5. One establishment stands out in terms of the frequency and gravity of the alleged ill-treatment, namely ORB-2 (the Operative and Search Bureau of the North Caucasus Operations Department of the Chief Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Southern Federal District) in Grozny.
ORB-2 has never appeared on any official list of detention facilities provided to the CPT. However, persons certainly are being held there, on occasion for very lengthy periods of time. In the course of its visits in 2002, the CPT received a large number of allegations of ill-treatment concerning this establishment which were supported in several cases by clear medical evidence gathered by its delegation. During the CPT’s most recent visit to the ChechenRepublic, in May 2003, further allegations were received, once again supported in some cases by medical evidence.
When the CPT re-visited ORB-2 in May 2003, it was holding 17 persons, some of whom had been there for several months. The persons detained were extremely reluctant to speak to the delegation and appeared to be terrified. From the information at its disposal, the CPT has every reason to believe that they had been expressly warned to keep silent. All the on-site observations made at ORB-2, including as regards the general attitude and demeanour of the staff there, left the CPT deeply concerned about the fate of persons taken into custody at the ORB.
The CPT has repeatedly recommended that a thorough, independent inquiry be carried out into the methods used by ORB-2 staff when questioning detained persons; that recommendation has never been addressed in a meaningful manner. To argue that “a formal, written complaint is required for action to be taken” is an indefensible position to adopt given the climate of fear and mistrust which currently pervades the ChechenRepublic, and constitutes a dereliction of responsibility. The CPT calls upon the Russian authorities to put a stop to ill-treatment at ORB-2 in Grozny.
6. In the course of its visits to the ChechenRepublic in 2002 and 2003, the CPT has gathered a considerable amount of information pointing to human rights violations during special operations and other targeted activities conducted by federal power structures, involving ill-treatment of detained persons and forced disappearances.
During the May 2002 visit, the CPT’s delegation met public prosecutors, military commandants and members of the local administration in Argun, Kurchaloy and Urus-Martan. They stated that large-scale special operations took place according to the provisions of Order No 80 of 27 March 2002 by the Commander of the Allied Group of Forces for the conduct of “anti-terrorist operations” in the North Caucasian region, with the participation of prosecutors, and that there were no complaints about illegal detention and subsequent disappearances. However, a certain number of targeted activities by unidentified forces were apparently conducted without prior notification to the local military commanders and prosecutors. The delegation’s interlocutors spoke of the appearance at night of units, whose members wore masks and drove in vehicles without number plates, and who took away Chechen inhabitants to unknown locations. Prosecutors said that they were powerless to find out who had performed such activities and to locate the whereabouts of the persons detained. Some of the detained persons subsequently reappeared, but were apparently so terrified that they refused to talk about what had happened to them, let alone lodge complaints; others had disappeared without trace or their bodies, frequently mutilated, had subsequently been found.
In its visit report, the CPT recommended that immediate measures be taken to exercise due control over all special operations and targeted activities in the Chechen Republic.In this connection, the Committee stressed the need for civil and military prosecutors to exercise close supervision, for complete lists to be drawn up of all persons detained for checks, and for information about their whereabouts to be provided without delay to their relatives.
7. The information at the CPT’s disposal indicates that serious problems remain in this area. According to reports received by the Committee, including via the Council of Europe’s experts based in Chechnya, the Prosecutor of the ChechenRepublic has assessed that from among the 565 criminal cases concerning abductions opened in 2002, there exists evidence in approximately 300 of the involvement of members of the federal forces. This matter was expressly raised with the Prosecutor by the CPT’s delegation when it met him in May 2003, and he did not contest the assessment attributed to him. As regards 2003, senior members of the Chechen Administration spoken to indicated that the problem of “disappearances” continued unabated (the figure of 233 being mentioned for the first four months of the year), and that there was evidence of the involvement of members of federal forces in a significant proportion of those cases. The Military Prosecutor of the Allied Group of Forces also acknowledged that there were cases of human rights violations by members of federal forces, including abductions during targeted activities; he referred to one specific case in January 2003, in respect of which trial proceedings would soon be opened. However, he emphasised that these violations were crimes by individual officers and were not a reflection of State policy.
The fact that the existing orders and instructions are not always respected is explicitly acknowledged in Order No 98/110 of 23 April 2003 by the Commander and Military Prosecutor of the Allied Group of Forces. Hopefully, this latest text will prove more effective than its predecessors. It is incumbent upon the Russian authorities to take adequate steps to ensure that operations by their forces are conducted in accordance with the law and standing orders and instructions, and that any violations committed during such operations are thoroughly and expeditiously investigated. In this connection, the CPT wishes to emphasise the importance of prosecutors being present not only during large-scale special operations but also when targeted activities are carried out; for the time being, such a presence is not guaranteed.
8. As regards action taken to bring to justice those responsible for acts of ill-treatment, illegal detention and disappearances on the territory of the ChechenRepublic, to date it has proven largely unproductive. A considerable number of cases have been opened in relation to crimes committed by members of the federal forces and law enforcement agencies. However, from the information provided by the Russian authorities to the CPT, it is clear that only a low proportion of cases have resulted in judicial proceedings, and that very few have led to sentences. Specific reference should be made to the investigations into violations committed by members of federal power structures during the special operations in Alkhan-Kala in April 2001, and Sernovodsk and Assinovskaya in July 2001; they have been slow and inconclusive, apparently due to the inability to identify the specific perpetrators. This can only contribute to a sense of impunity.
The CPT calls upon the Russian authorities to provide the Offices of the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic and the Military Prosecutor of the Allied Group of Forces for the conduct of “anti-terrorist operations” in the North Caucasian region with the staff, resources and facilities necessary for the effective investigation of cases involving allegations of ill-treatment, illegal detention and disappearances.
In this connection, the need to substantially reinforce the forensic medical services in the ChechenRepublic must be highlighted. At the present time they are not able to provide the support required by the criminal justice system to deal with the problems referred to above. The Forensic Medical Bureau of the ChechenRepublic faces enormous limitations in terms of resources, equipment and staff, and there are still no possibilities to perform full autopsies on the territory of the Republic. The CPT calls upon the Russian authorities to take the necessary steps, as a matter of priority, to enable the Forensic Medical Bureau of the ChechenRepublic to function adequately.
9. On numerous occasions in the course of its dialogue with the Russian authorities, the CPT has stressed the importance of members of the federal forces and law enforcement agencies in the Chechen Republic being reminded, through a formal statement emanating from the highest political level, that they must respect the rights of persons in their custody (including those detained during special operations and targeted activities) and that the ill-treatment of such persons will be the subject of severe sanctions. A direct message of this kind from that level would provide crucial - much needed - support to existing measures designed to counter ill-treatment in the ChechenRepublic. As far as the CPT can ascertain, such a message has not yet been delivered in a clear manner; it should be, without further delay.
10. In making this public statement, the CPT remains fully committed to continuing its dialogue with the Russian authorities. The Committee is determined to pursue its co-operation with the Russian authorities in order to assist them to abide, both in the ChechenRepublic and elsewhere in the Russian Federation, by the fundamental principle that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Failure to comply with that principle will render it impossible to create the climate of confidence which is an essential prerequisite for rebuilding civil society in the ChechenRepublic.
Reporting committee: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Reference to committee: Order No. 586 (2003)
Draft resolution and draft recommendation adopted by the Committee on 16 September 2004 with respectively 16 votes in favour, 3 votes against and no abstentions and 20 votes in favour, 3 votes against and 1 abstention
Members of the Committee: Mr Lintner (Chairperson), Mr Marty, Mr Jaskiernia, Mr Jurgens (Vice-Chairpersons), Mrs Ahlqvist, Mr Ak�am, Mr Aleuras, Mr Alibeyli (alternate: Mr R. Huseynov), Mr Arabadjiev, Mr Arias Ca�ete, Mrs Arifi, Mr Ates, Mrs Azevedo, Mr Barquero Vazquez, Mr Bartumeu Cassany, Mrs Batet Lama�a, Mrs Bemelmans-Videc, Mr Berisha, Mr Bindig, Mr Bokeria, Mr Bruce, Mrs Christmas-M�ller, Mr Cilevics, Mr Coifan, Mr Dell'Utri, Mr Engeset, Mrs Err, Mr Fedorov, Mr Fico, Mr Frunda, Mr Gedei, Mr Goris, Mr Grebennikov, Mr G�nd�z, Mrs Hajiyeva, Mrs Hakl, Mr Holovaty, Mr Ivanov, Mr Jakic, Mr Jurica, Mr Kaufmann (alternate: Mr Gross), Mr Kelber, Mr Kelemen, Mr Kovalev, Mr Kroll, Mr Kroupa, Mr Kucheida, Mrs Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Manzella, Mr Martins, Mr Masi, Mr Masson (alternate: Mr Hunault), Mr McNamara, Mr Monfils, Mr Nachbar, Mr Nikolic (alternate: Mr Jovaševic), Mr Olteanu, Mrs Ormonde, Mrs Pasternak, Mr Pavlov, Mr Pehrson, Mr Pellicini, Mrs P�tursd�ttir, Mr Piscitello (alternate: Mr Budin), Mr Poroshenko, Mrs Postoica, Mr Pourgourides, Mr Pullicino Orlando, Mr Raguz, Mr Ransdorf, Mr Rochebloine, Mr Rustamyan, Mr Spindelegger, Mr Stankevic, Mr Symonenko (alternate: Mr Shybko), Mr Takkula, Mr Varvitsiotis, Mr Wilkinson (alternate: Mr Lloyd), Mrs Wohlwend, Mr Zhirinovsky, Mr Žižic
N.B. The names of those members who were present at the meeting are printed in bold.
Secretariat of the Committee: Mr Schokkenbroek, Mr Schirmer, Mrs Clamer, Mr Milner
[1] The average death toll per day resulting from incidents reported in different media was between 1.5 (mid-September 2003) and more than 10 (July/August 2003), according to the “Chechnya in brief” reports regularly presented by the Secretary General’s staff. Whilst it is often difficult to assess which side was responsible for a given incident, the involvement of armed rebels is quite apparent in most cases involving firefights with Federal or Chechen security forces, attacks on such forces using mines or roadside bombs, and attacks on representatives of the pro-Russian Chechen administration and its locales.
[2] Other sources put the number of fighters involved at about 1500, and the official tally reproduced in most media, which only refer to events in Ingushetia, speaks of about 200.
[3] Chechnya – Last Appeal before Oblivion, Report on Moscow-Ingushetia mission, December 17-24, 2003 (Anne Le Tallec, ACAT (Action des Chr�tiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture), April 2004).
[4] IHF commented that in other cases (below) relatives had agreed to exhumations, which had nevertheless not been carried out.
[5] The mass executions have given rise to a detailed report by Memorial which points to the presence of Omon troops from St Petersburg and Ryazan troops in the area at the relevant time.
[6]a description of the military operation including the use of armoured vehicles and helicopters leading to the capture of the former Speaker of the Chechen Parliament can be found in the Amnesty International Urgent Action Bulletin, AI Index: EUR 46/42/00, 13 September 2000.
[7] According to information received by SCJI, this is no longer the case. In a letter dated 10 July 2004 to Marzet Imakaeva, the prosecutor’s office informed her that the criminal investigation into her husband’s abduction was closed for “lack of a criminal offense”. The letter states that Russian military servicemen had detained her husband in accordance with the law and had later released him. Mrs Imakaeva takes note of the official confirmation of her husband’s detention by Russian troups, which contradicts the Government’s earlier submissions in the case, including a memorandum of 26 September 2003 to the Strasbourg Human Rights Court, in which the Government representative states that “unidentified” persons in camouflage uniforms detained S.-M. Imakaev and that there is “insufficient” evidence to suspect the involvement of Russian federal forces. But Mrs Imakaeva finds implausible the scenario presented by the Government regarding her husband’s alleged release, and intends to appeal against the prosecutor’s office’s decision to close the criminal investigation.
As regards the case of Khadjimurat Yandiev, SCJI informed me that the Military Procuracy of military unit 20102 had refused to open a criminal case on the grounds that no crime had been committed. The military procuracy referred to the fact that the victim’s body had never been located and that on the video footage of his arrest by federal forces (which also shows that Kh. Yandiev was beaten during his arrest and that the commanding officer ordered him to be excecuted) the actual execution was not shown.
[8] At the meeting in Moscow on 31 May with Deputy General Prosecutor Sergeij Fridinskij, we were told that the allegedly “disappeared” Mrs Imakaeva had turned up in the United States, where she had obtained political asylum. I asked (HRW) for clarification, who gave me the following information: the Imakaev family members who left for the United States several months ago are:
1. Marzet Imakaeva (applicant)
2. Seda Imakaeva ~24 (Marzet's daughter), Shamil Imakaev, ~4 (Seda's son, Marzet's grandson)
3. Magomed-Emir Imakaev~18 (Marzet's son), his wife, Kheda Imakaeva,~16.
The ones who disappeared (and have unfortunately NOT reappeared in the United States, or anywhere else), are:
1. Said-Khusein Imakaev (Marzet's son), disappeared in December 2000, was 23 then
2. Said-Magomed Imakaev (Marzet's husband), disappeared June 2, 2002.
[9] This is also the conclusion of the major non-governmental human rights organisations.
[10] The Operative and Search Bureau of the North Caucasus Operations Department of the Chief Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Southern Federal District.
[11] according to the replies received from the Russian authorities, the Chechen Republic Prosecutor’s office transmitted 128 applications to the Military Prosecutor’s Office in 2003. In the same year, the Military Prosecutor’s office, which had also received 799 applications directly from Chechen residents concerning wrongful acts of servicemen, investigated a total of 10 criminal cases, and referred 3 to the courts.
[12] 94 prosecutors and investigators in seven subordinate prosecutors’ offices in the region
[13] for example, Former Justice Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov and State Duma deputy speaker Vladimir Lukin, cited in CICC/Europe/CIS/Russian Federation (6 May 2002)
[14] a conference on this topic was held in Moscow on 4-5 February 2004 by the Russian Association of International Law
[15] see Pravda.ru of 7 May 2002 : “PACE, which seems to be versatile for views and members, constantly criticizes Russia for its violation of human rights in Chechnya and passes proper resolutions. The PACE resolutions, happily, do not oblige us to anything. Though the ICC is another thing. The ICC could institute criminal proceedings.”
[16] completed by a letter dated 28 June 2004 from Mr Lukin, the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation designated as the Federal interlocutor for the purposes of the joint programme between the Russian Federation and the Council of Europe, addressed to the Director General of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe, Mr Schumann.
[17] This date coincides closely with the petition of the Committee of Ministers by the Secretary General under the 1994 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the fulfillment of commitments; see below under Item 4.
[18] I was informed that earlier drafts of the reply had included a reference to the seizure, in June 2000, of the Committee of Ministers by the Secretary General under para. 1 of the 1994 Declaration.
[19] in relation to Ukraine in 2001, Georgia in 2001, 2002, and 2003 and Moldova in 2002 (cf. doc. Monitor/Inf (2004) 1 dated 22 January 2004).
[20] The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, in a public appeal dated 27 October 2003 extensively citing Assembly Recommendation 1600, has strongly urged the Committee of Ministers to address the Chechnya question.
[21] pages 30-31.
[22] for example, on 4 September 2003, at around 4.45 am “agents of an unknown law-enforcement structure of the Chechen Republic” arrested and drove away in a gray UAZ-452 vehicle without license plates Irskhan Khaditovich Edilkhanov (born in 1984) living at 5 Melnichaya street in the village of Khamby-Irze (Lermontovo) of the Achkhoi-Martan district.
[23] on 7 September 2003 arrest of five local residents by Russian federal forces in the village of Chiri-Yurt in the Grozny rural district. According to the sources cited in the report (p. 30), two of the detainees were abandoned on the outskirts of the village after being severely tortured and beaten up. The whereabouts and fate of the other three detainees are unknown.
[24] On 10 September 2003 around 11 pm in the Avtarkhanovsky (Leninsky) district of Grozny. According to residents, the fire came from the federal forces check-point at the end of the sixth microdistrict. Residents spent the night in fear, but luckily, there were no casualties.
[25]7 September 2003: town of Urus-Martan; 11 September 2003: village of Makhety in the Vedeno district (no casualties, but serious damage to property).
[26]9 September 2003: Mart Makhauri (mother of eight), Rosa Adayeva (mother of nine, including a baby of 9 months) and another woman (a still unidentified refugee) killed and three children injured in the explosion of a “self-made” landmine in the village of Assinovskaya in the Sunzha district on their way from a tomato field. The mine exploded under the tractor carriage transporting the women and children. On the scene of the explosion, a plastic bottle with a remote control and lines going sideways were discovered. A demining unit demined another similar mine at the scene of this terrorist attack that failed to explode. A criminal case was initiated by the prosecutor’s office of the Sunzha district.
[27] An edifying testimony is that of Alexander Mnatsakanyan, in: Chechnya 2003, Political Process through the Looking Glass, Moscow Helsinki Group/Memorial, p. 11: “Generally speaking, when it comes down to electoral violations, officials immediately get hit with an odd mix of blindness and visions. They saw lines to ballot boxes in deserted Grozny. They also watched inspired and merry people. But they somehow overlooked the fact that a French journalist took part in the voting after he produced his French (sic!) passport. It came unnoticed that scores of people, for the sake of an experiment, were voting as “new arrivals” at several polling stations. They failed to see a huge armed red-neck standing right behind a person watching closely what he was writing in the ballot. I, on the other hand, saw that with my own eyes.”
[28] source: “Memorial” Human Rights Centre, in: Chechnya 2003 […], p. 26.
[29] Source: Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, in: Chechnya 2003, Political Process Through the Looking Glass, MGH/Memorial, p. 21
[30] described in some more detail by “Memorial” HumanRightsCenter in: Chechnya 2003 […], p. 31
[31] source: MHG/Memorial, Chechnya 2003, Political Process through the Looking Glass, p. 30
[32] References to the “prevailing climate of impunity” in the Chechen Republic are also made in the Secretary General’s information document on the Council of Europe’s response to the situation in the Chechen Republic (SG/Inf(2004)3 dated 16 January 2004, para. 54) and in the US Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2003 on Russia (page 3, with reference to my 2003 report, and page 13: “a climate of lawlessness, corruption and impunity flourished”); see also FIDH report (no. 328/2) titled “Chechnya - Terror and Impunity: a Planned System”, and a paper dated 20/06/2004 by Memorial on “How the Procuracy helps to organise impunity in Chechnya”; as regards the still most disappointing law enforcement statistics, see above para. 27-31.
[33] see “Ingushetia : Enforced � disappearances �, extrajudicial killings and Unlawful Detentions, December 2003 – June 2004”, IHF, 4 August 2004
[34] source : Caucasian Knot /News /2004.
[35] according to NTV (cited in www.lenta.ru, 9 June 2004), Ramzan Kadyrov said:
“We shall punish their relatives in compliance with the law. They are helping the bandits and they keep saying that they are helping their relatives, their brothers and sisters. But no, it is the bandits that they are helping. We shall punish their relatives in compliance with the law. And if there is no such law, we will ask for it. We will address the State Duma of the Russian Federation with a request to adopt such a law so that they could be punished. Without this the war in Chechnya shall never be over.”
[36] the case of Sultanbek Kagirov, detained on 10 December 2003, allegedly in order to oblige one of his brothers, who is a rebel fighter, to turn himself in.
[37] In a special operation on 2 May 2004 in Noibera village (Gudermes region), Veziev Pakhrudi, aged 50, resident in Zhukov Street, was allegedly detained by “Kadyrov’s men”, on the accusation that his son was a member of the Chechen armed resistance. Also on 2 May, in Alleroi village of Kurchaloevski region, Kadyrov’s men allegedly set fire to the house of Said-Hasan Turlaev, whose son, according to villagers, belongs to the armed resistance. For a considerable time, the security services allegedly refused to allow Said-Hasan’s 22-year-old daughter to leave the burning house, whose life was saved only by the intervention of the neighbours. The Buzurkaev family home was also burnt; their son also belongs to the armed resistance. 9 relatives of members of the illegal armed forces were taken hostage (Sheikh-Akhmed Buzurkaev, 50, Ramzan Avdarkhanov, 70, Ahmed Avdarkhanov, Aslan Butzugov, Arsen Minkailov, Isa El’siev, and three members of the Aisultanov family. Butzugov, El’siev, Minkailov, Buzurkaev, R. Avdarkhanov, and one member of the Aisultanov family were later released; as to the fate of the other 3 hostages, there was no information as of the end of May.
On 4 May, again in Alleroi village, Taus Buzurkaeva was allegedly arrested without the Procurator’s sanction by internal affairs ministry troops under the command of Roman Ediev, formerly a member of Kadyrov’s security services. She was accused of being the mother of a member of the illegal armed forces (source: Memorial Bulletin, May 2004).
[38] cf. Appendix II. para. 4 pp.
[39] see also Appendix I para. 3: President Zyazikov has apparently intervened personally, following a call for help by the Society of Russian-Chechen Friendship, to have one of its activists, Khamzat Kuchiev, freed from illegal detention by security forces.
[40] Family members of the victims of Captain Ulman, who was acquitted by a jury in Rostov-on-Don on 29 April 2004 because he killed his civilian victims by order of his superior, whom we met at the “Memorial” office in Nazran, told us about the humiliation they suffered in the courtroom. They were under the impression that the members of the jury, who openly fraternised with the accused, saw the victims and their relatives as the true culprits. The acquittal has been appealed by the Military Prosecutor’s office. On 26 August, the Russian Supreme Court has annulled the judgement of the Rostov court. The case will be retried before another military tribunal.
[41] presented in Appendix II. para. 10 – 15.
[42] source: AI note 24 February 2004 ; this case is one of those about which I had asked for information prior to my visit to Chechnya, and for which I did not receive a reply yet.
[43] source : AI note 24 February 2004
[44] source : AI note 24 February 2004
[45] source : � Memorial � Human Rights Centre, in : Chechnya 2003 […], p. 22.
[46] source : AI/HRW/Memorial 8 April 2004; case submitted to the Russian authorities for comments, no answer received to date.
[47] source : IHF/Memorial 22 April 2004 ; case submitted to the Russian authorities for comments ; according to the reply received, it is being “investigated by the military prosecutor’s office”.
[48] source : Memorial Bulletin May 2004.
[49] The IHF report dated 4 August 2004 on Enforced Disappearances in Ingushetia (p. 9-10) provides further detail on this case and informs that “Memorial” forwarded a complaint from Mr Medov’s relatives to the EctHR in Strasbourg on 16 June 2004, which is said to be treated by priority.
[50] Further detail in the above-mentioned IHF report of 4 August 2004, p. 8.
[51] Further detail in the above-mentioned IHF report, pp. 4—6.
[52] Further detail in the above-mentioned IHF report, pp. 6-7.
[53] Further detail in the above-mentioned IHF report, pp. 7-9.
[54] The IHF report on enforced disappearances of 4 August 2004 (p. 8) has reprinted extracts of a letter dated 22 April 2004 (2/581) by the Ingush Prosecution Service to the father of the abducted, which shows that the numbers of the special “tags” by the alleged kidnappers presented during the checkup correspond to codes of actual (official?) cars.
[55]cf. IHF, Ingushetia : enforced � disappearances �, extrajudicial killings and unlawful detentions, December 2003-June 2004, 4 August 2004, p. 4-5.
[56] Please note that in order to save space and avoid repetition, the incidents referred to are not each time described as “alleged”. As long as legal certainty has not been established by a court judgment, it must be understood that all the incidents brought to the attention of Mr Bindig can only be “allegations”, albeit substantiated ones.