Doc. 10696

3 October 2005

The Council of Europe and the European Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteur: Mr Luc Van den Brande, Belgium, Group of the European People’s Party

Summary

While appreciating and supporting the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched by the European Union (EU) in order to strengthen democratic stability, security and well-being in several EU neighbouring countries, the Parliamentary Assembly points out a potential for the Council of Europe’s contribution to the ENP in its core areas of excellence.

The ultimate economic and political objectives of the ENP and build on a commitment to common values in the field of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and the promotion of good neighbourly relations which lay in the Council of Europe field of competence.

Referring to its established practice in assisting committed states in their efforts to build sustainable democratic systems and to its monitoring procedures, the Assembly calls on the EU to make sure that there is no duplication in both Organisations’ actions.

Moreover, the Assembly stresses its readiness to become a forum for an inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue with those countries covered by the ENP which are not Council of Europe member states.

I.       Draft recommendation

1.       The Parliamentary Assembly expresses its appreciation and support for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched by the European Union (EU) in order to strengthen democratic stability, security and well-being in several EU neighbouring countries and prevent the emergence of a new division line in Europe.

2.       The ENP concerns only those EU’s neighbours which are not involved in the present accession or pre-accession procedure and covers 16 states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) as well as the Palestinian Authority. Five of these states are Council of Europe members, and the Parliament of one of them enjoys observer status with the Parliamentary Assembly. Russia, although not covered by the ENP, will be associated with certain partnership programmes in the framework of the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU.

3.       The ENP offers to these countries a privileged and increasingly close relationship with the EU involving a significant degree of economic integration and political co-operation in return for concrete steps being taken towards economic reform, good governance, human rights protection, democracy and the rule of law.

4.       The Assembly observes that the ENP has to be based on co-operation in an equal partnership between the EU and the Council of Europe, including a possible contribution of the latter to the ENP in its core areas of excellence. On the other hand however, there is a real risk of duplication if both Organisations’ actions are not co-ordinated.

5.       The Assembly recalls that the Council of Europe Third Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Warsaw on 16-17 May 2005, confirmed that European leaders’ wish to avoid overlapping between the activities of the main international organisations operating on the European continent. That implies a clear definition of areas of competence of each Organisation and mutual respect for their respective expertise in these domains.

6.       The relations between the Council of Europe and the EU – particularly in view of a report under preparation by Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, which is designed as a basis for the future Memorandum of Understanding between both Organisations, may constitute an important indication of the European leaders’ determination and political will to give substance to their declarations.

7.       Both Organisations have a long history of successful co-operation. However, some recent developments related to the establishment of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights may give rise to concerns about the duplication of actions.

8.       The ultimate economic and political objectives of the ENP are built on a mutual commitment to common values in the field of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and the promotion of good neighbourly relations which are inscribed in the Action Plans agreed individually with every country concerned. These are Council of Europe areas of excellence.

9.       The Assembly points out that the Council of Europe has an established practice in assisting committed states in their efforts to build sustainable democratic systems. It includes the development of national strategies, determination of measures to be taken, elaboration of legislation, setting deadlines for accession to international legal instruments, monitoring procedures and co-operation programmes aimed at consolidating democracy.

10.       Furthermore, non-member countries of the Council of Europe addressed by the ENP are also concerned by the Council of Europe’s commitment to develop dialogue with them following the Third Summit’s decision to increase inter-cultural and inter-religious contacts. This particularly concerns the southern Mediterranean region and the Middle East. The Council of Europe could become a useful forum for a dialogue on the basis of partnership.

11.       Contacts with countries in these regions have already been numerous, particularly at the parliamentary level. The proposed Tripartite Forum between the parliamentarians of the Knesset, Palestinian Legislative Council and the Parliamentary Assembly is a good example of co-operation. Further increase in relations may lead to the elaboration of a special status which would enable closer co-operation with countries from outside Europe.

12.       The Assembly notes with satisfaction that the European Parliament in its Resolution on “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a new framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (P5_TA(2003)0520)” made not only explicit reference to the Council of Europe mechanisms on which to build relations with some countries covered by the ENP but also clearly insisted on setting up a concrete co-operation with the Council of Europe.

13.       If the commitment of the European leaders to ensure complementarity within European organisations is not to remain wishful thinking, expertise and measures which are at the disposal of the Council of Europe should be given full political recognition and be widely used in the implementation of the ENP as an added value for the EU.

14.       Therefore, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to:

14.1.       make proposals to the relevant authorities of the EU on concrete co-operation with a view to institutionalising the Council of Europe’s contribution to the ENP and give it appropriate political recognition, and in particular:

14.2.       develop more specific relations with non-member states concerned by the ENP, and in particular:

15.       Furthermore, the Assembly calls on the European Parliament:

15.1.       to support the Council of Europe’s initiative aimed at the institutionalisation of the Council of Europe’s contribution to the ENP;

15.2.       to propose to the relevant instances of the European Commission to associate the Council of Europe with the concrete task of assistance and monitoring of the democratisation process in the countries covered by the ENP;

15.3.       to step up joint co-operation programmes.

16.       The Assembly calls on the Council of Europe Congress on Local and Regional Authorities:

16.1.       to step up their contacts with local and regional authorities in non-member states covered by the ENP.

17.       The Assembly calls on the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights:

17.1.       to establish contacts in non-member states covered by the ENP with a view to future co-operation in the field of protection of human rights;

18.       The Assembly calls on the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission):

18.1.       to provide assistance for legislative and constitutional reforms with a view to develop self-sustained democratic institutions in countries covered by the ENP.

19.       The Assembly calls on the European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity (North-South Centre):

19.1.       to increase its action in the non-member states covered by the ENP.

20.       The Assembly resolves to :

20.1.       cooperate closely with the European Parliament in this field;

20.2.       step up contacts and intensify co-operation with the parliaments of the non-member states covered by the ENP and to initiate and set up training programmes for those parliaments

20.3.       develop a dialogue focused on democratic values with these parliaments;

20.4.       assess existing contacts with these parliaments with a view to developing co-operation agreements;

20.5.       use co-operation agreements in a dynamic way as a useful tool for increasing close relations;

20.6.       invite its members who are members of national parliaments in EU countries to urge their governments to comply with the commitments undertaken at the Third Summit in respect to the complementarity of the European organisations.

II.       Explanatory memorandum by Mr Van den Brande

I.       INTRODUCTION

1.       At the Third Council of Europe Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Warsaw on 16 and 17 May 2005, the leaders of the European countries expressed their determination to ensure concrete co-operation and complementarity between the Council of Europe and the European Union. In the Action Plan they agreed on the need to strengthen relations between both institutions in such a way as that respective achievements and expertise are taken into account in each other’s activities so as to be combined and streamlined without needless competition.

2.       Furthermore, they entrusted Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, to prepare – in his personal capacity - a report on the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Union. One can expect that the conclusions of this report will constitute the basis of a future memorandum of understanding which will be drafted with a view to creating a new framework of enhanced co-operation and political dialogue.

3.       Both organisations have a long history of successful co-operation including joint programmes and exchanges of expertise. However, some overlapping of activities exists and recent developments related to the establishment of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights may give rise to concerns about the duplication of actions.

4.       The momentum created by the Summit should not be lost. The coming months will verify the European leaders’ determination and political will to give substance to their declarations. The Parliamentary Assembly reacted immediately to the Summit’s decisions, adopting under urgent procedure, Recommendation 1712 (2005) on the follow up to the Third Summit, on which it took a clear political position on a number of questions. In particular, it expresses the wish that Mr Juncker’s report would provide a concrete roadmap for efficient co-operation and offers its full support to Mr Juncker’s mission.

5.       The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched by the European Union (EU) in 2004 in order to strengthen democratic stability, security and well-being in neighbouring countries, and prevent the emergence of new divisions in Europe constitutes great potential for co-operation between both organisations. On the other hand, there is a real threat of duplication, waste of energy and financial resources if actions are not co-ordinated.

6.       The ENP covers economic, judicial, people to people contacts, civil society and political co-operation, the first one not being in the Council of Europe’s area of competence. It builds however, on the mutual commitment of parties concerned in relation to the common values in the field of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and the promotion of good neighbourly relations. These uncontested areas of excellence of the Council of Europe play an important role in the ENP. In these areas co-operation between both organisations could be most fruitful and mutually beneficial.

7.       The Council of Europe has established a practice in assisting committed states in their efforts to build sustainable democratic systems. It includes the development of national strategies, determination of measures to be taken, elaboration of legislation, setting deadlines for accession to international legal instruments, monitoring procedures, co-operation programmes aimed at consolidating democracy.

8.       Five of sixteen countries covered by the ENP are Council of Europe member states which allows for a certain degree of leverage; one has an observer status and some others have expressed their interest in obtaining such a status or to participate in Council of Europe‘s activities. Russia will be associated in the framework of the strategic partnership with the EU.

9.       Furthermore, the European leaders gathered at the Council of Europe Summit in Warsaw, expressed their commitment to a new dialogue between Europe and its neighbouring regions – the southern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Central Asia based on the democratic values. This means a clear encouragement to step up the dialogue with countries which are not Council of Europe member states but at the same time are covered by the EU Neighbourhood policy.

10.       These contacts have already been launched, particularly at the parliamentary level. The Council of Europe is on its way to becoming a unique forum for dialogue focused on democratic values based on partnership and co-operation with the Islamic world.

11.       The aim of this report is to stress the important contribution that the Council of Europe could make to the ENP. It will contribute to Mr Juncker’s reflection on future co-operation between the European Union and the Council of Europe.

II.       GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF ENP

12.       The idea which lies behind the European Neighbourhood Policy was first formulated by the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. The Council stated that the European Union should seize the opportunity offered by its enlargement to enhance relations with the neighbouring countries on the basis of shared values and avoid the creation of new divisions within Europe. To that end, the Council called for stronger relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the countries of the southern Mediterranean, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Process. At the Brussels European Council in June 2004, this circle of neighbours was extended to the South-Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

13.       The idea of a ring of friendly neighbouring countries has taken concrete shape over the last three years. In March 2003, the Commission outlined the proposed new policy in its Communication “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours”. On 12 May 2004, it presented a Strategy Paper and Country Reports which set out in concrete terms how the European Union can work more closely with its neighbours. The Strategy Paper defined principles, geographical scope, and method for implementing the ENP. Country by country differentiation is a key element of the ENP.

14.       The ENP concerns only those EU’s neighbours which are not involved in the present accession or pre-accession process. It covers in the East, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova; the Southern Caucasus countries: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; as well as all the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, as well as the Palestinian Authority. Thus, the Neighbourhood Policy is addressed to 16 states with a total population of approximately 400 million.

15.       The ENP does not cover countries that are candidates for EU membership (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia), nor the other western Balkan states which are potential candidates.

16.       With regards to Russia, the EU and Russia have decided to develop their Strategic Partnership as defined at the 2003 St. Petersburg Summit in compliance with but separately from the ENP. However, the co-operation with Russia will be supported financially through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

17.       The ENP offers a privileged and increasingly close relationship with the EU involving a significant degree of economic integration and political co-operation. It builds on mutual commitment to common values principally in the field of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.

18.       The ENP’s ultimate objective is to strengthen democratic stability, security and well-being in neighbouring countries of the EU in order to prevent the emergence of new divisions in Europe and its immediate surroundings.

19.       In return for concrete steps being taken towards economic reform, good governance, human rights protection, democracy and the rule of law, the EU offers enhanced preferential trade relations, increased financial and technical assistance, gradual participation in a number of EU policies and programmes, and, the most novel and far-reaching incentive of the ENP, a “stake” in the EU’s internal market, which is understood as a gradual participation in the internal market through approximating legislation and gradual integration of transport, energy, and telecommunication networks. As a matter of fact ENP is not the only way to strengthen co-operation.

20.       The ENP is explicitly designed to enhance and reinforce existing policy instruments. In particular, it complements the Barcelona Process, which will remain the nucleus of relations between the EU and its southern Mediterranean partners. Similarly, it complements the bilateral actions and dialogue taking place under the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements, existing Association Agreements, Common Strategies, MEDA and TACIS.

21.       The Commission, in its May 2004 Strategy Paper, stressed its added value, arguing that Union policy would thereby be “enhanced” and more focused, offering a greater degree of integration than envisaged in current instruments, upgraded in the scope of intensity of political co-operation, the definition of priorities and increased funding.

22.       The ENP is distinct from the issue of potential membership. However, it offers, in the long run, an enhanced relationship based on the European Economic Area (EEA) model, which would be “as close as possible without being a member”. Furthermore, it uses instruments derived from the pre-accession process, including Action Plans with agreed reform targets and a strong element of conditionality.

23.       As regards financial assistance, a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) will from 2007 onwards, replace the current TACIS and MEDA programmes in the ENP partner countries and Russia. It should lead to important improvements in transparency and efficiency as the ENPI will use a “Structural Funds” approach based on multi-annual programming, partnership and co-financing. The Commission is proposing a total commitment of budgetary grant funds for the ENPI of € 14,029 million for the period 2007 to 2013. In addition, loan funds will be available from the European Investment Bank. That means that the financial assistance will be substantially increased as compared to present funds available under TACIT and MEDA programmes.

24.       A specific and innovative feature of the ENPI is its cross border co-operation component. Under this component, the ENPI will finance “joint programmes” bringing together regions sharing a common border.

III.       KEY AREAS FOR SPECIFIC ACTION UNDER THE ENP

25.       On 9 December 2004, the Commission presented a first set of draft Action Plans. Based on individual country reports they give a factual analysis of political, economic, social and institutional situation in the country concerned, and also give account of progress in implementation of bilateral agreements and related reforms.

26.       Action plans are key political documents for the further development of the relations under the ENP. They define a set of priorities and tasks whose fulfilment will be followed by a concrete step in bringing the country concerned closer to the EU. For each country, the Action Plan is an agenda for work with the EU over the next 3-5 years.

27.       The plans do not replace, but build on the existing Association or Co-operation Agreement with each partner. They make it possible to define more clearly and in a concrete way priorities and actions to be taken, and to link financial assistance more closely to the achievement of mutually agreed goals. The progress will be monitored on a regular basis and the Action Plans will be adapted accordingly.

28.       Although drawn on a common set of principles and values, they still differentiate between the individual partners by establishing tailor-made relationships based on the countries’ respective interests, capacities and goals. As well as the interests of the EU and the partner country concerned.

29.       Joint ownership of the process based on the awareness of shared values and common interests is essential. The EU does not seek to impose conditions or priorities on its partners. The Action Plans depend for their success on the clear recognition of mutual interests. The different starting points of the neighbouring states will entail different speeds and timetables

30.       The lists of priorities cover a number of key areas of interest for the EU and partner countries: political dialogue and reform (strengthening democracy, good governance and dialogue on human rights); economic and social reform (including promoting a good business and investment climate); trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s internal market, justice and home affairs (judicial reform and migration issues); infrastructure networks (energy, transport, information society), research, development, environment; and people-to-people contacts (education, culture and civil society).

31.       The rule of law occupies a central position in the EU’s policy of conditionality. It is seen by the EU as a pre-requisite for economic, social and political development, and as such has become a key element in the EU technical and financial assistance and its development co-operation and association programmes.

32.       Governance is a key component of policies and reforms for poverty reduction, democratisation and global security. This is why institutional capacity building, particularly in the area of good governance and the rule of law is one of the priority areas in all ENP Action Plans agreed so far.

33.       Moreover, a further aspect of the rule of law has emerged in EU policy: its link to security and defence policy as the rule of law is deployed in both conflict prevention and crisis management instruments. Therefore, the rule of law, democracy and human rights are still heavily emphasised within these various areas of interest.

34.       So far the ENP Action Plans have been agreed by the following countries: Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine. The EU hopes to finalise the negotiations with an additional five countries by the end of the year. Country reports were adopted in March 2005 on 5 more ENP countries, namely Egypt, Lebanon, and the South Caucasus

35.       For example, ENP Action Plans for Moldova and Ukraine are documents of about 30 pages each, listing hundreds of actions that the neighbour is expected to undertake – 300 bullet points in the case of Ukraine. The documents resemble the regular monitoring reports drawn up by the Commission for candidate members during the accession procedure. Indeed, the action plans contain the same list of requirements to meet the Copenhagen political and economic criteria as much as to acquiesce to the EU law.

36.       On the other hand, the ENP Action Plans for Tunisia and Morocco are relatively less focused on the questions of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights, and more concentrated on economic aspects, including illegal and legal migration. The questions of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights are more developed in the Action Plan for Jordan. The ENP Action Plan for the Palestinian Authority is nearly entirely devoted to these issues, economic questions being almost non-existent.

37.       Thus, despite many general similarities and clauses, the lists of priorities in different ENP Action Plans also point out varying goals of the EU in different regions as well as differentiating between individual countries.

IV.       RELEVANCE OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPERTISE IN AREAS COVERED BY THE ENP AND ITS POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION

38.       As the EU’s ENP is still in its developmental stage, the Council of Europe has to play fully its essential role in this action programme. The present report offers elements to reflect on the role that the Council of Europe has to play within the ENP as a substantial added value to the EU.

39.       An obvious comparative advantage for the Council of Europe in getting more involved in EU neighbourhood policy is that 5 of the 16 countries covered by the ENP, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are already its members, and one, namely Israel, enjoys observer status with the Parliamentary Assembly.

40.       Membership in the Council of Europe demonstrates a commitment to the rule of law and democracy, as well as respect for human rights which are key elements of the ENP Action Plans. All 5 countries mentioned above, have been guided through the democratisation process by the Council of Europe which first defined democratic standards, assisted in the development of national strategies and then in the process of building sustainable democratic systems.

41.       On accession to the Council of Europe each of these countries has undertaken a number of commitments which to a large extent overlap with priorities enlisted in the ENP Action Plans. In the Council of Europe, the accomplishment of commitments is closely monitored both at intergovernmental and parliamentary levels. This should provide an opportunity for the Council of Europe to become a more visible partner within the ENP for the South Caucasus republics, Ukraine and Moldova.

42.       Russia's membership in the Council of Europe gives this organisation a clear advantage in the area of co-operation towards meeting democratic standards, monitoring commitments and developing political dialogue.

43.       As far as Belarus is concerned, even if its accession procedure to the Council of Europe is frozen, scope still exist in this country for co-operation between the Council of Europe and the EU to stimulate developments in the fields of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights - especially freedom of information - both at interparliamentary and intergovernmental level. In the wake of the Presidential elections in Belarus in 2006, for instance, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly have expressed their willingness to re-launch the activities of the Parliamentary Troika. On the other hand, the Council of Europe is currently discussing a plan to support democratic reform in Belarus at Ministers' Deputies level.

44.       The same applies to some other countries of the Mediterranean region covered by the ENP, which have expressed their interest in possibly acquiring an observer status at the Council of Europe and to participate in several of its activities. The procedure for granting the observer status set up by the Committee of Ministers in Resolution (93) 26 implies that the interested states accept the democratic standards and values.

45.       The Council of Europe could make an essential contribution to the ENP’s objectives by developing special relations with the Mediterranean countries - non members of the Council of Europe - which would allow the Organisation to fill the void in leading the struggle to achieve democratic and economic reforms on the African and Asian continents. Redefining the status of an observer country or establishing a special status of associate members that would allow the Mediterranean countries to become closer to the Council of Europe after achieving a certain degree of democratisation and progressively signing the human rights conventions would be an option.

46.       In any case, the Council of Europe maintains some contacts, mainly at the parliamentary level, with all these countries, and following the decisions taken by the Third Summit, it will probably step them up. The “co-operation agreements” introduced by the Parliamentary Assembly are a useful tool for dialogue and contacts, where “observer status” is problematic.

47.       A good example of these contacts is the initiative to establish a Tripartite Forum composed of the parliamentarians from the Knesset, the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Parliamentary Assembly with a view to discussing common problems. Furthermore, following recent visits by the Rapporteur on the Middle East to Israel, Palestinian Authority and Jordan, the Assembly resolved to increase contacts with all parliaments from the region. These contacts might focus on the dialogue on democratic values.

48.       The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights as well as the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities have important role to play in their fields of action. The establishment of contacts with the civil society and local authorities could lead to more developed co-operation and dialogue.

49.       Moreover, taking into account its mission and expertise, the Council of Europe can play an important role in other areas covered by the ENP Action Plans including social cohesion, migration, border management, fight against organised crime, corruption, education, culture, civil society, and environment. The North-South Centre which has developed a lot of contacts with the countries concerned could be instrumental to this end.

50.       At intergovernmental level, the Council of Europe has developed numerous joint co-operation programmes with the European Union aimed at consolidating democracy in the States which joined the Organisation during the last decade. However, the Council of Europe contribution to these programmes should be upgraded and its work could be accorded more explicit political recognition and support.

51.       The role of the Venice Commission in providing assistance on the legislation and constitutional reform in several countries covered by the ENP cannot be underestimated. Its present involvement in the constitutional reform in Armenia, and the importance attached to this process by the European Union constitutes the best example of potential for a Council of Europe contribution to the ENP’s objectives.

52.       The Council of Europe could also encourage its members to take a greater role in regional co-operation initiatives, and work with neighbours that fall within their area of interest.

V.       CONCLUSIONS

53.       The stability and prosperity of its neighbours is certainly in the European Union's interest. Any instability including economic problems in its immediate neighbourhood could have a deep impact on the situation in the European Union itself. Democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights are preconditions of stability and have to go hand in hand with the degree of commitment and contribution to those countries. Their consolidation belongs at the core responsibility of the Council of Europe.

54.       The EU has to take advantage of the knowledge and expertise of the Council of Europe in this field in with a view to setting up a real partnership. Our Organisation, which sets up democratic standards, promotes democratic values and has among its member's countries covered by the ENP, has to be recognised and fully involved in co-shared responsibility. The European leaders gathered at the Warsaw Summit have clearly expressed their wish concerning the European architecture based on complementarity and co-operation.

Reporting Committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Reference to Committee: Doc. 10537, Ref. 3083, 29.04.05

Draft Recommendation unanimously adopted by the Committee on 03.10.05

Members of the Committee: Mr Abdülkadir Ateş (Chairperson), Mr Latchezar Toshev (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Dick Marty (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (Vice-Chairman), Mr. Giuseppe Arzilli,  Mr Claudio Azzolini, Mr Miroslav Beneš, Mr Radu-Mircea Berceanu, Mr Gerardo Bianco, Mr Haakon Blankenborg, Mr Giorgi Bokeria, Mrs Beáta Brestenká, Mr Doros Christodoulides, Mrs Anna Čurdová, Mr Noel Davern (alternate: Mr Patrick Breen), Mr Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr Adri Duivesteijn, Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mikko Elo, Mr Joan Albert Farré Santuré, Mr Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Daniel Goulet, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich, Mr Jean-Pol Henry, Mr Joachim Hörster, Mr Ivan Ivanovski, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Mr Elmir Jahić, Mr Ljubiša Jovašević (alternate: Mr Ivan Brajović), Mr Ivan Kalezić, Mr Oleksandr Karpov, Mr Oskars Kastēns, Mr Petro Koçi, Mr Yuriy Kostenko, Mrs Darja Lavtižar-Beble, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Frano Matušić , Mr Evagelos Meimarakis (alternate: Mrs Elsa Papadimitriou), Mr Murat Mercan, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Mr Marko Mihkelson, Mr Joāo Bosco Mota Amaral, Mrs Natalia Narochnitskaya (alternate: Mr Ilyas Umakhanov), Mr Zsolt Németh, Mrs Carina Ohlsson, Mr Boris Oliynyk, Mr Algirdas Paleckis (alternate: Mr Jonas Čekuolis), Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mrs Sólveig Pétursdóttir, Mr Gordon Prentice, Mr Dumitru Prijmireanu, Mr Gabino Puche, Mr Lluís Maria de Puig (alternate: Mrs Marěa Rosario Fátima Aburto), Mr Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando (alternate: Mr Leo Brincat), Mr Umberto Ranieri (alternate: Mrs Tana de Zulueta), Mr Michael Roth, Lord Russell-Johnston, Mr Jan Rzymełka, Mr Peter Schieder, Mrs Juana Serna (alternate: Mr Julio Padilla),Mr Adrian Severin, Mrs Hanne Severinsen, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky, Mr Michael Spindelegger, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Lord Tomlinson, Mr Tigran Torosyan, Mrs Marianne Tritz, Mr Vagif Vakilov (alternate: Mr Azim Mollazade), Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Varujan Vosganian, Mr Andrzej Wielowieyski, Mr David Wilshire, Mr Bart van Winsen, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mr Marco Zacchera,

Ex-officio: MM. Mátyás Eörsi, Mats Einarsson

N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold

Head of the Secretariat: Mr Perin

Secretaries to the Committee: Mrs Nachilo, Mr Chevtchenko, Mrs Sirtori-Milner