1. Introduction
1. When is the status of Kosovo
going to be decided? “When?” is the question that people in Kosovo
ask. Finding a solution to the status issue has been felt as an
urgent matter for a long time. In June 2005 the Assembly itself
acknowledged that “the undecided status of Kosovo casts uncertainty
over the further political stabilisation of the entire region, including
its perspective of European integration, affects its economic recovery and
prevents a number of displaced persons and refugees from Kosovo
from reaching a decision whether to return to their homes”.
2. “When?” is an urgent question that still does not have an
answer. Since 1999 Kosovo has been in limbo: during this period,
although subject to the formal sovereignty of Serbia, it has been
administered by the United Nations under UN Security Council Resolution
1244, pending a political settlement of the status issue. Over these
eight years, important steps forward have been taken in restoring
normal living conditions for all the people of Kosovo, after a war
which left deep scars on all the communities of Kosovo: 15 000 deaths
amongst Kosovo Albanians; 3 000 deaths amongst Kosovo Serbs. Despite
these efforts of normalisation, there are still 2 047 people missing;
240 000 displaced persons, 200 000 of whom Kosovo Serbs, and a number
of unresolved issues.
3. In 2005, the Contact Group and the UN Security Council reached
the conclusion that standards implementation and the status process
should proceed hand in hand.
Since October 2005, there
have been two successive attempts to facilitate a negotiated and
commonly agreed solution which, unfortunately, have yielded no results.
4. It is not the first time that I am Rapporteur on Kosovo for
the Political Affairs Committee: in October 2007 my report on the
current situation in Kosovo was due for debate in the Assembly.
It was removed from the order of business by 65 votes to 63. Its
examination was moved forward to the January part-session 2006,
when the reference to the supervised independence of Kosovo as “the
solution which is liable to ensure the greatest chances of durable,
long-term peace and stability for Kosovo and the entire region,
in addition to being the one which corresponds to the will of the
majority of Kosovans”
was
deleted by amendment by 90 to 64 votes (with 11 abstentions). I
am convinced that this vote did not necessarily reflect the Assembly’s
opposition to the independence of Kosovo: as it was clear from the
debate, most members did not think it appropriate for the Assembly
to take a position while the status process within the UN was still
ongoing.
5. My present mandate is to follow developments as regards the
future status of Kosovo. In my capacity as a rapporteur, I have
tried to provide a balanced description of the developments as regards
status and the position of both sides. My work, however, would be
meaningless if I did not give my views on the status process and
its outcome. As a rapporteur, I am not bound by any duty of neutrality
or equidistance; on the contrary, I am bound by a duty to honestly
say what I think, knowing that I might be opposed by some and supported
by others.
2. The first chapter of the status process:
Mr Ahtisaari
6. In 2005, the UN Security Council
supported the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari, former President
of Finland, as Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for the
future status process for Kosovo.
7. A set of principles for the settlement of the status of Kosovo
was produced
soon after by the Contact Group, comprising France, Germany, Italy,
Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States, with a view
to supporting the Special Envoy in his work. These principles established
that the future status should:
- be
compatible with international standards of human rights, democracy
and international law;
- contribute to realising the European perspective of Kosovo;
- ensure multi-ethnicity and the respect of the rights of
communities;
- provide mechanisms to ensure the participation of all
communities in government, decentralisation being considered as
ameans to facilitate the coexistence of different communities;
- include specific safeguards for the religious and cultural
heritage;
- strengthen regional security and stability (no partition
of Kosovo, no union with any other country or part of a country;
no return to the pre-March 1999 situation; no unilateral solution
or use of force);
- include specific provisions on security arrangements;
- promote mechanisms to strengthen the enforcement of the
rule of law;
- ensure the sustainable economic development of Kosovo,
including its co-operation with international organisations and
international financial institutions;
- rely on a civilian international presence for some time.
8. It is significant that subsequently, in its statement of
31 January 2006, the Contact Group stated that the settlement should
be acceptable to the people of Kosovo.
9. Special Envoy Ahtisaari and his team worked with alacrity
and commitment, paying numerous visits to Belgrade and Pristina
and conducting extensive consultations. In the course of 2006, 15
rounds of talks with the Belgrade and Pristina negotiating teams
were organised. Some 14 of them focused on decentralisation, the
protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo, the economy,
and the protection of the rights of communities. In addition, in
July 2006 the Special Envoy presided over direct talks on the status
issue with the Serbian and Kosovo leadership.
10. By January 2007, Mr Ahtisaari had prepared a draft comprehensive
proposal for a Kosovo status settlement, which was presented to
the parties concerned the following month. Regrettably, at a high-level meeting
in Vienna in March, the Special Envoy could only observe that:
- there was no will from the parties
to move away from their previously stated positions; and that
- the potential of negotiations was exhausted.
11. As a result, Mr Ahtisaari finalised his proposal for submission
to the UN Security Council. This package included the final comprehensive
proposal for a Kosovo status settlement and the report of the Special
Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, with the
latter recommending supervised independence as the future status
of Kosovo. While the Kosovo Assembly endorsed the Ahtisaari package,
Belgrade considered it unacceptable unless overwhelmingly amended.
A rift became visible also in the Contact Group: whereas the United
States and the EU members of the Contact Group considered Ahtisaari’s
proposals as “fair and balanced” and “the best solution that will
advance stability not only in Kosovo but in the region as a whole”,
the
Russian Federation rejected them.
3. The
status process under the Troika
12. By the end of March 2007, there
were conclusive signs that it would not be possible to secure a
UN Security Council resolution on the follow-up to give to the Ahtisaari
package, given Russia’s opposition and the prospect of its veto.
This deadlock was not overcome but only circumvented by transferring
the process in the hands of the Contact Group. Under its aegis,
a Troika comprising representatives of the United States (Mr Frank
Wisner), the European Union (Mr Wolfgang Ischinger) and Russia (Mr Alexander
Botsan-Kharchenko) was set up, with the task of conducting an additional
one hundred and twenty day period of negotiations, and to report
back to the UN Secretary-General by 10 December 2007.
13. The mandate of the Troika is to stimulate compromise between
the two sides; it is not to propose solutions for the status issue,
let alone impose one. Moreover, whereas for the United States and
the EU members of the Contact Group 10 December is the final date
for finding a compromise, after which Ahtisaari’s package should
be implemented, for Russia there is no deadline for finding a compromise
and 10 December is only a deadline for reporting.
14. Since its establishment, the Troika has been very active and
has managed to organise six rounds of direct negotiations between
the two sides. A key stage in its work has been the elaboration
of 14 points aimed to pave the way for a solution. These are:
(1) Belgrade and Pristina will focus on developing the special
nature of their relations, with an emphasis on the historical, economic,
cultural and human dimensions;
(2) they will solve future problems peacefully and will refrain
from provocative acts;
(3) Kosovo will be integrated into regional structures;
(4) there will be no return to the pre-1999 status;
(5) Belgrade will not govern Kosovo;
(6) Belgrade will not re-establish a physical presence in
Kosovo;
(7) Belgrade and Pristina are determined to make progress
towards association and eventually membership of the European Union
and to move progressively towards Euro-Atlantic structures;
(8) Pristina will implement measures to enhance the welfare
of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities, particularly
though decentralisation, constitutional guarantees and protection
of cultural and religious heritage;
(9) Belgrade and Pristina will co-operate on issues of mutual
concern, including amongst others: fate of missing persons and return
of displaced persons; protection of minorities; protection of cultural
heritage; economic, energy and trade issues; fight against organised
crime; co-operation between municipalities and the government of
one of the two sides;
(10) Belgrade and Pristina will establish common bodies to
implement co-operation;
(11) Belgrade will not interfere in Pristina’s relationship
with international financial institutions;
(12) Pristina will have full authority over its finances;
(13) Kosovo’s EU Stabilisation and Association Process (tracking
mechanism) will continue unhindered by Belgrade;
(14) the international community will retain civilian and
military presence in Kosovo after status is determined.
15. In reply, during the direct
talks of 22 October, the Serbian side presented its position of
keeping formal sovereignty on Kosovo while granting it the widest
possible autonomy as a rewording of each of the Troika’s 14 points.
According to Serbia:
(1) the subject of the negotiations is to determine the future
status of Kosovo based on the principles defined by UNSC Resolution
1244. As a result, any departure from this subject would previously
require a change of Resolution 1244;
(2) all sides – including members of the Troika – should refrain
from unilateral steps;
(4) there will be no return to the situation prior to 1999
and the future order in Kosovo should be solved on the basis of
Resolution 1244;
(5) Serbia will not govern Kosovo within the competencies
which fall to the province under a future agree- ment;
(6) Serbian institutions will not be present in Kosovo in
affairs which are not within Belgrade’s competencies under the future
agreement;
(7) in their legislation and policies, Serbia and Kosovo will
progressively implement norms and standards in accordance with the
process of Stabilisation and Association with the EU. With full
participation in that process they will advance towards accession,
and finally membership;
(8) starting from an agreed solution between Belgrade and
Pristina confirmed by the UNSC, Kosovo will implement comprehensive
measures to promote the well-being of the Serbs in Kosovo and that
of other non-Albanian communities, especially through decentralisation
of the local authorities and constitutional guarantees;
(9) taking into consideration their exclusive competencies,
Belgrade and Pristina will co-operate on issues of common interest,
including the fate of missing persons and return of displaced persons;
physical protection of cultural heritage; economic, energy and trade
issues; fight against organised crime; and harmonisation with EU
stan- dards (unlike in the Troika’s 14 points, protection of minorities
is not mentioned);
(10) in these and other possible fields of co-operation, Belgrade
and Kosovo will form joint bodies to conduct affairs of common interest;
(11) except to the extent of its international obligations
as a subject of international law, Belgrade will not interfere in
Pristina’s relations with international financial institutions;
(13) the process of Stabilisation and Association (tracking
mechanism) for Kosovo will continue in co- operation with Belgrade;
(14) after the status of Kosovo is defined, the international
community will continue its civilian and military presence in Kosovo,
under a UN mandate.
16. Serbia agrees with the Troika’s
points 3 and 12.
17. For their part, during the period of engagement of the Troika,
the position of Kosovo Albanians continues to be that they will
not accept anything less than independence. In addition, however,
Pristina has drawn up a proposal for a friendship and co-operation
agreement to be made with Serbia once Kosovo achieves independence
and has committed to fully implementing minority rights.
18. The three-day Baden conference (Austria), at the end of November,
marked the end of the Troika-sponsored direct negotiations. As it
can be read in the Troika’s final statement, “the Troika explored
together with both sides every reasonable status outcome for Kosovo
to determine where there might be potential for a mutually acceptable
outcome. Regrettably, the parties were unable to reach an agreement
on Kosovo’s future status”.
4. Finding
a solution within the UN framework?
19. Two years since the beginning
of the status process no commonly-agreed solution has been found. What
happens next, also considering that the Contact Group and the UN
Security Council do not speak any longer with a single voice? Have
these additional four months of negotiations been instrumental to
induce a softening of the position of Russia, possibly towards its
abstention on a new UN Security Council resolution? It would not
seem so according to the statements of high-ranking Russian officials.
20. Russia explains its opposition to the independence of Kosovo
on the basis of the respect for the international legal order and
the principle of territorial integrity. I am not completely convinced
by this principled explanation. It is my impression that Kosovo
is caught up in an attempt by Russia to assert itself globally:
by defending the Serbian position, Russia can undermine the unity
and the credibility of the EU, block the eastward expansion of NATO,
and obstruct the political and military influence of the United
States in the Balkans. And, should independence come about, would
Russia hesitate in using it as a precedent where it would be in
its political interest to do so? Immediately after the Ahtisaari
package became public, the statements of the highest representatives
of the Russian leadership went exactly in this direction.
Diplomatically,
Kosovo indeed represents a win-win situation for Russia.
21. Serbia has repeatedly stressed that the status process should
be kept within the UN framework, and that only a new UNSC resolution
can supersede Resolution 1244. Of course it would be incommensurably preferable,
legally and politically, if the status process could be kept within
the UN but can it be concluded within such a framework, given the
diverging positions of states with veto rights?
5. What
could happen after 10 December?
22. The more 10 December approaches
the more the number of realistic scenarios shrinks.
The
current undetermined situation drags on, perhaps with new negotiations
23. Officially, nobody asks for the current undetermined situation
to drag on: formally everybody wants a satisfactory conclusion of
the status process. However, Serbia and Russia complain about the
imposition of “artificial deadlines” for the status negotiations
and would like to protract them for as long is necessary to reach a
negotiated solution. Kosovo Albanian leaders, instead, have consistently
stated that they will not engage in negotiations after the deadline
of 10 December.
24. In my opinion, a distinction should be made between “artificial
deadlines” and the complete absence of any time perspective: more
than two years of unfruitful efforts have made it crystal clear
that the two positions cannot be reconciled. Supporting open-ended
negotiations now, without any meaningful sign that they might come
to an end, is not entirely fair: those who do so know very well
that the absence of any time frame is likely to exasperate Kosovo
Albanians and perhaps precipitate unilateral acts.
25. It has also been suggested to me that perhaps the Serbian
public would currently not be prepared to accept Kosovo’s independence
and that such an outcome could destabilise Serbia’s political environment. Instead,
in some years’ time, possibly when Serbia is at the doorstep of
membership in the European Union, the option of independence could
be reconsidered and accepted without causing public and political
turmoil. I am afraid that this idea is a very diplomatic way of
asking for the current situation to drag on, for a lapse of time which
would be unacceptable for the majority of Kosovans.
26. This undefined scenario, for me, would be the most detrimental:
first of all it is unfair for the people of Kosovo who, irrespective
of their ethnicity, need normality and a prospect for the future;
but it would also be dangerous for Europe, because it would create
a long-term frozen conflict in the Western Balkans.
The
Kosovo Assembly makes a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI)
27. In the absence of a negotiated solution, and in the face of
the inability of the United Nations to impose one, a unilateral
declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly represents the
most realistic scenario. Although aware of the gravity of such a
choice, the Kosovo Albanian leadership, irrespective of political
colour, feel the pressure of responding to the expectations and
the frustration of the Kosovo Albanian people and of the need to
achieve a clear status for the benefit of all the Kosovo communities
within a reasonable time frame. Consistent statements made by the
highest PISG figures, as well as by the victors in the elections
for the Kosovo Assembly of 17 November, indicate that the UDI is
an option.
28. Even so, Kosovo Albanian leaders assured me that this choice
would be made only after having secured support from the United
States and the European Union, or at least a critical mass of EU
members.
29. I was also told that, in the case of a UDI, the Ahtisaari
package would be fully implemented, including the provisions on
decentralisation, which give large autonomy to Serbian municipalities.
6. What
could be the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence?
30. Despite having been raised
in the media and in the academic and think-tank community as a test-balloon,
the partition of Kosovo is not an option and, as such, has not been
discussed in the negotiations. It would not even be of great advantage,
as the majority of Kosovo Serbs live south of the River Ibar.
31. Similarly, an awkward statement by Mr Ischinger that any solution
mutually agreed upon by the parties would be acceptable – which
seemed to contradict the principle set by the Contact Group that
the status settlement should respect Kosovo’s current borders –
has been subsequently clarified and the principle of the preservation
of current Kosovo’s borders reiterated.
32. Nonetheless, during my visit my attention was drawn to the
possibility of partition occurring de facto, as a “spontaneous”
reaction by Kosovo Serbs in the northern part of Kosovo to a unilateral
declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly. On the other
hand, I was also told that even if Kosovo Serbs in northern Kosovo
might “close” the border for some time, this situation would not
be sustainable and security conditions would be easily restored
by the Kosovo Force (Kfor).
33. In either case, the partition of Kosovo would be the worst
possible scenario for the region, because it would imply an acceptance
of ethnicity as a criterion for establishing borders and would risk
creating destabilising effects. This aspect was mentioned to me
in Skopje by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Milososki, who,
while confirming the support of his country for the Ahtisaari package,
stressed the risk of manipulation of this precedent by extremist
groups, in his country and in the region. I would like to express
my gratitude to Mr Milososvki
- whom
I was only able to give a one-week notice request
- who came out of a cabinet meeting to see me and spoke
openly and directly with me for over an hour.
34. Serbian officials often refer
to mass exodus as one of the consequences of Kosovo’s independence.
I am not totally convinced that independence would cause largescale
population movements: I have the impression that, during these years,
many Kosovo Serbs have come to accept the idea to remain in Kosovo irrespective
of its status; some of them are prepared to work within the system
or would be prepared to do so if they did not fear Belgrade’s retaliation,
which could result in a refusal to pay salaries, pensions or a dismissal from
employment. On the other hand, the media effect of those Kosovo
Serbs who might be leaving their homes in Kosovo could generate
a chain-reaction, could be exploited to increase tensions and, in
the worst case scenario, to foment violence.
35. At the moment the situation in Kosovo is calm and Kfor claims
to be capable of maintaining security in all possible scenarios,
including in the north where its presence has recently been reinforced.
Similarly, Kfor does not consider the existence of small Serbian
militia groups in the north of Kosovo as a meaningful threat.
36. The events of March 2004, however, should act as a warning.
Unfortunately, it cannot be excluded that, in a climate of great
tension such as that created by a UDI, violence could be sparked
by even a trivial incident, for Serbian agents provocateurs, charged
with fomenting violence in Kosovo
37. In my meetings with the highest Serbian officials, I was told
very firmly that, in response to a unilateral – and therefore unlawful
– declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians, there would
be a legitimate political and diplomatic reaction from the part
of Serbia. Never during my meetings was the possibility of resorting
to violence raised as an option; in fact, it has openly been excluded
by President Tadic after the Baden conference. Some analysts, however,
predict the establishment of roadblocks or the obstruction of electricity supplies
as possible retaliation.
38. I want to say that we all are indebted to Kfor for its efficiency
and competence and to the new French general in command, Xavier
de Marnhac, who was for me someone in whom one could have complete confidence.
7. Achieving
a unanimous EU position
39. It is fundamental that the
EU succeeds in achieving unity or at least wide internal support
on the status issue, and on its attitude in case of a UDI.
40. A solid single position by the EU is important in many respects:
- politically, to give credence
to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially
in a region like the Balkans, which is a priority in the context
of defence and enlargement;
- to ensure the smooth functioning of the future EU mission
in Kosovo, which should replace the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK);
- given that most EU member states are also NATO members,
to ensure that Kfor can continue to be operational in all the different
scenarios, including if necessary in the absence of a UNSC resolution
and in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence by the
Kosovo Assembly.
41. EU members such as Cyprus (with its northern part), Greece
(with its unrecognised minorities, and a great concern over the
situation in Cyprus), Romania (with its Hungarian minorities), Slovakia
(with its Hungarian minorities) and Spain (with its Basque countries
and Catalonia) have expressed concerns about the impact that Kosovo’s
future status, in particular Kosovan independence, could have for
their own situation. Other EU members would prefer the process to
remain within the UN framework and would be very cautious in the
absence of a UNSC resolution.
42. It is to be hoped that reluctant EU states will have now drawn
their conclusions: the parties were given an additional chance to
reach a negotiated solution, failing which leaving Kosovo in a limbo
represents an even greater risk than its independence. According
to the press, it would seem that, at the moment, only two EU states
are not prepared to move from their previous positions.
8. The
Kosovo issue in Serbian politics
43. The failure of the Troika to
facilitate a negotiated solution opens an even more delicate period
for the domestic situation in Serbia, which should be on the eve
of a presidential election.
44. I believe that the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Prime
Minister Kostunica is key to finding a solution to the status issue
and to ensuring that, even in the event of a UDI, the situation
in Serbia remains peaceful. It is understandable and legitimate
for a government to be concerned about defending the territorial integrity
of its country. However, it is my impression that until now the
government, and the DSS in particular, has relied on a populist
and nationalist discourse to distract the Serbian public from the
real problems of the country, first of all its economic and social
situation, unemployment and the need for democratic reforms. In fact,
it seems to me that the Kosovo issue has somehow been used by the
DSS to present itself as the balancing element in Serbian politics:
by waving the threat of an alliance with the Serbian Radical Party
(the largest political force in parliament), the DSS has retained
for itself a position of power which is surprising given its relatively
small representation.
45. On the other hand, the threat of precipitating Serbia into
the hands of radical forces is a blackmail argument which is used
both internally, in Serbia, and externally, with the international
community, and in particular the European Union.
46. It is also a strange factor in the whole complicated equation
that, while Serbia has throughout very clearly stressed its commitment
to maintain sovereignty over Kosovo – even to the extent of a constitutional referendum
stating this in which Kosovo Albanians did not vote – there has
been no meaningful effort at reconciliation. In Kosovo I was told
that Serbia was only interested in territory, not the people living
in it. Otherwise, in order to maintain Kosovo with its 90% Albanian
population and the memory of the war with Serbia, the Serbian Government
would have engaged in a huge effort of reconciliation for this to
work.
47. The weeks to come will show whether the current government
coalition is prepared to face all the possible scenarios and whether
it will be able to counterweight those political forces that want
to divert Serbia from its European path.
9. My
personal conclusions
48. When is the status of Kosovo
going to be decided? In more than two years, the potential for negotiations has
been exhausted. The positions of Pristina and Belgrade cannot be
reconciled. Encouraging the continuation of negotiations knowing
that there cannot be a common ground means creating a frozen conflict in
the Balkans, with all the consequences that this would entail for
regional and European stability, as well as for the full attainment
of the standards for Kosovo. The status of Kosovo should be determined
as a matter of urgency. The precondition for this status to be durable
is that it is backed by the widest international support, in particular
the EU and its member states.
49. Why should Kosovo serve as a precedent? It is, indeed, a
unique situation which I cannot see anywhere else in Europe, where
the UN decided that status should be determined, and for which a
unanimously accepted UN Special Envoy proposed independence.
50. I shall repeat my personal view that, in the absence of a
mutually accepted solution, independence is the only viable solution.
51. I have listened attentively to the core arguments of the Serbian
leadership: the Badinter Commission took a firm position that in
the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, administrative borders
should be maintained. This position was reiterated in the Rambouillet
Agreements. Why, then, should it be different in the case of Kosovo?
Besides, depriving Serbia of its territorial integrity would mean
undermining the international legal order and would risk opening
the Pandora’s box of proliferating demands for territorial secession,
both in the region and outside. What Kosovo needs is not so much
independence as good governance, solid institutions, economic recovery,
good relations with its neighbours.
52. In spite of acknowledging the basis of these arguments in
general, I still think that the tension between the principle of
self-determination and the respect of territorial integrity need
not in each and every case be resolved in favour of the latter.
In fact, the case of Timor Leste shows very well that, in very special circumstances,
the United Nations can also decide in favour of the establishment
of an independent state, regardless of the principle of territorial
integrity.
53. Without wanting to draw any parallels, I would like to recall
the words of the Contact Group that in Kosovo “the disastrous policies
of the past lie at the heart of the current problems”:
Kosovo’s autonomy
was stripped in 1989; the following year, Kosovo declared itself
independent and in 1992 Ibrahim Rugova was elected president; the
Albanians established a parallel underground system; a war ensued
during which atrocities were committed against both sides but to
a greater extent against the Albanian population – for which the
current democratic Serbian leadership has never made a public apology.
It is not a matter of punishing Serbia by dismembering it, but to
ask ourselves:
- Is it unreasonable
to question Serbia’s moral right to govern Kosovo?
- Is it realistic to think that Kosovo could go back to
Serbia’s sovereignty, even a formal one? How long would this situation
last?
54. I believe that Serbia would do much better without Kosovo:
it could then turn to its real problems and pursue its democratic
and European vocation.
10. Dissenting
opinion by the delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic
of Serbia
10.1. General
remarks
The delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of
Serbia considers that Lord Russell-Johnston has carried out substantial
work in preparing the report on developments as regards the future
status of Kosovo, and understands this as an effort to keep the
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly informed of the situation
in the province.
However, keeping in mind all the goals, competences, principles
as well as mechanisms of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe, the Serbian delegation has raised doubts whether the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should produce documents
in which it states clear positions on the status questions of one
of its member states. Furthermore, the reservations and doubts were
raised with regard to the opinion on whether the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe should take the liberty and invite bodies
such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose solutions
on a UN member country. It is clear that the primary goal of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is to address issues referring
to the state of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and
fight against challenges such as discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance,
terrorism, trafficking of human beings, crime and violence, as well
as to back political, legislative and constitutional reforms. Therefore,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should not take
stands on the issues which lie within the sole competence of the
United Nations. Also, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe should not exert pressure upon UNSC member countries to
impose the solution (Council of Europe Statute, Article 1.c, “Participation in the Council
of Europe shall not affect the collaboration of its members in the
work of the United Nations and of other international organisations
or unions to which they are parties”). Therefore, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe should strive to promote ways
which could assist in solving the problems, in accordance with its
own values, that is through dialogue and compromise.
Since the draft resolution has already been produced, the
delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia considers
that certain points, which are already included in this report,
should be completely presented, in full detail, in order to retain
the comprehensive and fully accurate approach.
10.2. Comprehensive
reference to the documents the rapporteur used
The rapporteur has stated in the last sentence of paragraph
3 of the draft resolution, “After six rounds of direct talks, the
Troika has concluded that the parties have been unable to reach
a compromise”. However, if the aim is to provide a more detailed
and complete view into this matter, one would have to mention that
the Troika has expressed its regrets, whilst stating that “a negotiated
settlement is in the best interest of both parties”.
The rapporteur has recalled in paragraph 6, line 4, of his
draft document, that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe has in its previous Resolution
1533 taken a favourable position with regard to an “internationally-imposed
solution”, should a deadlock protract negotiations beyond a reasonable
time frame”. However, the accurate reference to Resolution 1533 would be a wider quote with regard to this position,
which gives a completely different sense to it. With this in mind,
it has to be stated that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe has taken a favourable position to an “internationally-imposed
solution as the last and extreme resort”, “should a deadlock protract
negotiations beyond a reasonable time frame”.
In addition, it is important to underline that contrary to
the rapporteur’s statement that “the potential for finding a compromise
has now been exhausted” (paragraph 6, line 1, of the draft resolution),
the Troika has never mentioned that the potential for finding a
compromise has been exhausted, but only that the agreement was not
reached during their one hundred and twenty-day mission.
10.3. Amendments
moved by the Serbian delegation
The Serbian delegation moved the following oral amendments
to the draft resolution at the Political Affairs Committee meeting
on 11 December in Paris:
In paragraph 2, after “15 rounds of talks” insert the following
“of which only one referred to the status itself and lasted not
more than two hours”.
This needs to be included in order to provide the Assembly
with a complete insight into the manner in which the negotiations
were conducted under Mr Ahtisaari’s auspices, explaining that during
the 15 rounds of talks only a segment of one round was dedicated
to the question of status.
In paragraph 5, in the second sentence, line 5, delete the
words: “it prevents displaced persons and refugees from Kosovo from
reaching a decision whether to return to their homes”.
Our amendment basically expresses our firm doubt that any
status settlement would enable displaced persons and refugees to
return to their homes. In fact, the return of these people was part
of the package of UN standards that was set before the process of
determining Kosovo’s status began (“Standards before status”). Moreover,
independence would most likely discourage most of the nonAlbanian
population from returning to their homes.
Paragraph 6 should be replaced with the following paragraph:
“As a consequence, the Assembly
concludes that, as the most recent stage in negotiations has not resulted
in compromise, alternative ways should be envisaged to secure the
continuation of the talks and the compromised solution in the near
future, with a view to preventing Kosovo from becoming a powder keg
and ultimately a frozen conflict in the Balkans. In this context,
recalling that, in its Resolution
1533 (2007), it took a favourable position on an ‘internationally-imposed
solution as the last and extreme resort’, should ‘a deadlock protract
negotiations beyond a reasonable time frame’, the Assembly calls
on members of the Council of Europe who are also members of the
UNSC before resorting to any other solution to strive to overcome
existing differences and do everything in their power to find the
way to reach a timely compromise as the only guaranteed basis for
the peace and stability in the region.”
The amended paragraph was proposed because the rapporteur
has omitted to add that an imposed solution is the last and extreme
resort, particularly bearing in mind that the Troika report has
not said that the end of their mission means an end to the negotiations
and further talks, that all possible means of reaching a compromise
were exhausted or that it is time for the imposition of a solution.
Furthermore, one could question whether the imposed solution contravenes
the UN Charter, and international law.
In paragraph 7, after the word “independence”, delete the
rest of the sentence. The explanation is the same as in the amendment
above.
In paragraph 8, after the word “any”, insert the words “unilateral
action and”. It is important to stress that unilateral acts do not
contribute to peace and stability, and in fact have quite the opposite
effect.
10.4. Reference
to the rapporteur’s view on the role of the EU in this matter
The Serbian delegation strongly disagrees with paragraph 9
of this draft resolution, where the rapporteur invites EU member
states “to endeavour to achieve a single position on the issue of
the future status of Kosovo, as well as on the attitude towards
a possible unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo
Assembly”. Unilateral acts, by their very nature, undermine and
hinder stability, particularly in this very set of circumstances;
EU countries should not be asked to get involved in something that
falls within the jurisdiction of the UNSC.
This remark of the Serbian delegation fully corresponds to
the principles on which the EU was founded (consolidated version
of the Treaty on European Union, Provisions on a Common Foreign
and Security Policy, Article 11: “The Union shall define and implement
a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign
and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: to safeguard
the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity
of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve
peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles
of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter,
including those on external borders”). Therefore, the delegation
of Serbia will submit an additional amendment in this regard at
the next meeting.
10.5. Concluding
remarks
The official position of Serbia, regarding the future status
of Kosovo, is that it is necessary to have a compromise solution,
reached in a peaceful manner through negotiations, thus preserving
regional and wider stability. A solution should be based on the
UN Charter, UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Helsinki Final Act which
refers to the territorial integrity of states. In addition, conclusions
of the European-founded Badinter Commission stated that the dissolution
of the SFR Yugoslavia shall be based solely on the lines of administrative
borders of the former republics (Kosovo is a province of Serbia,
and it was never one of the six Yugoslav republics).
We believe that it is necessary to analyse and discuss the
issue of Kosovo, in terms of the state of human rights, the rule
of law and democracy. It is vital to continue to suggest how the
situation in these fields can be improved. We believe that the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe should deal with real life problems,
instead of the status issue itself, and it should use its capacity
to produce concrete results in this respect. This draft resolution
clearly addresses the issue of status, and the Serbian delegation
believes that if the circumstances are such, stronger reference
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should be
made to the principles stemming from the spirit of the core values
embodied in this Organisation, through the promotion of dialogue
and compromise as its basic tools.
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Reference to committee: Reference No. 3324 of 16 March 2007.
Draft resolution adopted with 14 votes in favour, 7 against
and 3 abstentions, and draft recommendation unanimously adopted
by the committee on 11 December 2007.
Members of the committee: Mr Abdülkadir Ateş (Chairperson),
Mr Konstantin Kosachev (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Zsolt
Németh (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Giorgi Bokeria (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mr Claudio Azzolini,
Mr Denis Badré, Mr Radu Mircea Berceanu,
Mr Andris Bērzinš, Mr Alexandër Biberaj,
Mrs Guðfinna Bjarnadóttir, Ms Raisa Bohatyryova, Mr Predrag Bošković,
Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Lorenzo
Cesa, Mr Mauro Chiaruzzi, Ms Elvira Cortajarena,
Ms Anna Čurdová, Mr Rick
Daems, Mr Dumitru Diacov, Mr Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Ms Josette Durrieu, Mr Frank Fahey, Mr Joan
Albert Farré Santuré, Mr Pietro Fassino (alternate: Mr Pietro Marcenaro), Mr Per-Kristian Foss,
Ms Doris Frommelt, Mr JeanCharles Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens,
Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Davit Harutiunyan, Mr Serhiy Holovaty,
Mr Joachim Hörster, Mrs Sinikka
Hurskainen, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński,
Mr Bakir Izetbegović, Mrs Corien W.A. Jonker, Ms Darja Lavtižar-Bebler,
Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Mikhail Margelov (alternate:
Mr Victor Kolesnikov), Mr Tomasz
Markowski, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Murat Mercan, Mr Mircea
Mereută, Mr Dragoljub Mićunović (alternate: Mr Željko Ivanji), Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Ms Nadezhda Mikhailova, Mr Aydin
Mirzazada, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral,
Ms Natalia Narochnitskaya, Mrs Miroslava Nĕmcová, Mr Hryhoriy
Nemyrya, Mr Fritz Neugebauer, Mrs Kristiina Ojuland, Mr Theodoros
Pangalos, Mr Aristotelis Pavlidis, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John
Prescott (alternate: Mr John Austin),
Mr Gabino Puche, Mr Lluís Maria
de Puig, Mr Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Lord Russell-Johnston, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Ingo
Schmitt, Ms Hanne Severinsen,
Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky,
Mr Rainder Steenblock, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Baroness Taylor of Bolton
(alternate: Mr Denis MacShane),
Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Mihai
Tudose, Mr José Vera Jardim, Ms Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Björn Von Sydow,
Mr Harm Evert Waalkens, Mr David Wilshire,
Mr Wolfgang Wodarg, Ms Gisela Wurm, Mr Boris Zala, Mr Krzysztof Zaremba.
Ex officio: Mr Mátyás
Eörsi, Mr Tiny Kox.
NB: The names of those members present at the meeting are
printed in bold.
See 4th Sitting, 22 January 2008 (adoption of the draft resolution,
as amended, and the draft recommendation); and Resolution 1595 and Recommendation
1822.