1. Introduction
1. The Council of Europe and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) signed a cooperation
agreement in 1992, one year after the Bank was set up. The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE, or “the Assembly”) has
since monitored the Bank’s work and has been reporting annually
on its activities in support of democracy, market-oriented reforms
and entrepreneurship. Its natural focus has been on Council of Europe
member states in central and eastern Europe but also their neighbouring countries
in central Asia. Over sixteen years of activity the EBRD has accomplished
a major part of its mission in central Europe and is now increasingly
concentrating on the more needy client countries in eastern and South-Eastern
Europe, as well as central Asian republics, while its major institutional
partners and shareholders – the European Union and the European
Investment Bank – are taking over the EBRD’s role in the new EU
member states.
2. The Assembly’s Committee on Economic Affairs and Development
appreciates the regular dialogue with the EBRD on the social, political
and economic aspects of the Bank’s work. This enables parliamentarians
from the Council of Europe’s 47 member states and observer countries
(that are among key donor and recipient countries of the EBRD) to
draw on the valuable information from the Bank in pursuit of their
work at national and international levels and to contribute their
views and proposals for the Bank’s future activity.
3. This report will provide an overview of the EBRD’s key activities
to date, in particular since the Assembly’s last report and debate
in June 2007, and will examine selected areas of activity. It will
look more closely at the macroeconomic development trends in the
Bank’s countries of operation, the progress of reforms in the Caucasus
and South-Eastern Europe, as well as the Russian Federation, Ukraine
and the Council of Europe neighbourhood. The rapporteur’s work relies
on various sources, including the media, the EBRD’s publications
and discussions in the Committee and with the Bank’s officials.
On behalf of the Committee, the rapporteur wishes to thank the EBRD
for hosting the Committee’s meeting at their headquarters in London
last January and all the assistance kindly provided throughout the
preparation of this report in the run-up to a debate in the Assembly
planned for June 2008.
2. Background and general overview
4. It is necessary to recall that
the EBRD’s work is driven by the mission to facilitate the transition
towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and
entrepreneurial initiative in the countries of central, SouthEastern
and eastern Europe, former Soviet republics in central Asia, and
Mongolia. The EBRD is a development bank with a mandate that combines
economic tasks with political aims: the Bank would invest only in
those countries that are committed to multiparty democracy, pluralism
and a market economy.
5. The Bank’s shareholders are all public bodies (61 member countries
represented by governments plus the European Union and the EIB);
however its prime attention is on the private sector even though
some investments also concern the public sector, essentially infrastructure
at national, regional or municipal level. The EBRD cofinances projects
that are deemed to be financially sound and aimed at advancing reforms,
while respecting the environment. It remains the largest institutional
investor in most of its client countries, generating added value
through investment finance, knowledge transfer, the promotion of
strong corporate governance and policy dialogue. Its contribution
has been complementary to the efforts of the international community, national
authorities and private sector entrepreneurs, and significant in
combining sound investment banking with development tasks.
6. The EBRD’s operational priorities seek 1. to assist the creation
of healthy financial sectors linked to the needs of local enterprises
and households; 2. to shape commercial policies and financial frameworks
for infrastructure development; 3. to support business start-ups
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 4. to underpin the
restructuring of ill-performing larger enterprises; 5. to build
equity investments; and 6. to promote a sound investment climate
and stronger institutions in the countries of operation through
policy dialogue.
7. The EBRD currently works in 29 countries of operation
although
by virtue of an agreement with the Czech authorities it will no
longer invest in that country as from 2008 whilst completing the
existing projects. The client countries are divided into three geographical
groups: central-eastern Europe and the Baltics (CEB),
SouthEastern
Europe (SEE)
and the
Commonwealth of Independent States plus Mongolia (CIS+M).
These countries
are also ranked and grouped according to their progress with reforms
as “early”, “intermediate” or “advanced” transition countries. Thus,
the group of “early transition countries” (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)
can benefit from specific initiatives designed to co-ordinate donor
assistance and help alleviate poverty by financing smaller projects
in the private sector, to support municipal infrastructure development
and to improve the legal environment.
8. In 2007 (see Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix), the EBRD had
substantially increased the share of operations in the early and
intermediate transition countries (including the Russian Federation)
to 90%, while gradually diminishing investment in the group of more
advanced countries. However, the share of commitments to the group
of early transition countries is only 9.2% for 2007 (or €514 million
to 92 investment projects) despite a 39% increase over the 2006
amount. Total EBRD investments in 2007 rose to €5.6 billion from
€4.9 billion in 2006. Conversely, in line with the EBRD’s strategy
of gradually reducing investments in the new EU member states, the
2007 business volume going to the CEB region decreased by 22% to
€546 million.
In relative terms, the advanced transition
countries in the CEB represented 10% of total investments in 2007
(14% in 2006), while the early and intermediate transition countries
accounted for 49% (versus 48% in 2006) and the Russian Federation
for 41% (versus 38% in 2006).
9. The EBRD’s new business strategy, which outlines the course
of work until 2010, specifically commits it to support the transition
countries in the south and in the east by taking greater risks than
private financial institutions commonly do. To meet the requirements
of the less advanced economies, the EBRD is prioritising smaller
investments. The number of small projects with a value of less than
€5 million rose by 32% to 182 in 2007. The strategy also emphasises
the commitment to energy efficiency investment and to promoting
regional and international co-operation.
10. It is important to note that while the EBRD has a subscribed
capital base of €20 billion (consisting of €5 billion paid-in and
€15 billion callable), the Bank finances its investments from the
funds raised on the international financial markets (currently on
very favourable terms as the EBRD enjoys a top AAA credit rating) and
does not directly use the shareholders’ capital. Sound risk management,
investment policies and a favourable situation in the Bank’s operating
environment generated impressive profits soaring to record levels in
2006: net profits reached €2.4 billion (compared with €1.5 billion
for 2005) thanks to one large equity divestment. The audited figures
put net profit for 2007 at €1.9 billion.
11. We should recall that the allocation of all profits for 2006
into reserves – as decided by the EBRD’s Board of Governors in May
2007 – was met with a protest by the United States (which is the
EBRD’s largest shareholder) arguing that at least one part of the
record returns should be paid out to shareholders in dividends. This
position was supported by several other EBRD shareholders and even
provoked some speculation in the media as regards the Bank’s mission
and future.
Australia, for
instance, announced its intention to sell its shares back to the
Bank by 2010. There have also been reports about certain countries
working behind the scenes to propose a merger between the EBRD and
the EIB. However, considering major differences between the shareholder
structure and the mandate of these institutions, such a merger simply
does not make sense in the foreseeable future.
What to do with the profits –
invest, return to shareholders or add to reserves – is a recurrent
question. However, it is clear that, given their low level and pace
of development, the early and intermediate transition countries
will definitely need EBRD’s assistance, and hence investment, in
the next decade. We hope that the Bank’s shareholders will hear
these countries which need and seek its support.
Assisting small enterprises
12. At the core of the EBRD’s mission
lies its support for SMEs and entrepreneurship. The EBRD provides finance
mainly through existing banks for lending on to small actors. Its
efforts to understand the obstacles to SME development include the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS),
carried out jointly with the World Bank every three years. These
studies show that despite numerous obstacles faced by small enterprises,
they have been a strong force for growth in many transition countries.
Recent developments in the Russian Federation have been particularly
important with simplifications of regulations, removal of bureaucratic
barriers and hence fewer opportunities for corruption.
13. One of the largest lending instruments is the micro and small
business programme whose strategic orientations were redefined in
2006. Since its establishment, the EBRD has invested (mainly through
credit lines run by local intermediary banks) more than €11.5 billion
under its small business programmes (with sub-loans and leases averaging
respectively €22 657 and €19 016) providing support across all of
the Bank’s countries of operation. However, supplying finance is
not the only aim: policy dialogue to improve the business environment
for small enterprises, business support to develop the skills of
entrepreneurs, technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of
intermediaries to lend efficiently and support for setting up greenfield
microfinance banks
or
non-bank institutions are vital additional activities.
14. Essential and complementary business support from the EBRD
flows through the TurnAround Management and Business Advisory Services
(TAM-BAS) programmes. These donor-funded non-financial schemes seek
to improve enterprise management, performance and corporate governance
by providing experienced consultants, often former CEO level executives
of western businesses, to assist local companies on a wide range
of corporate matters, such as business advice and planning, marketing
research, cost accounting and cost reduction studies, product development,
marketing plans, IT solutions and strategy development (including
enterprise restructuring, reorganisation and management). The programmes
also help support employment and generate new projects for external
financing. Since 1993, the TAM-BAS programmes
have assisted
over 6500 enterprises in all countries of operation, except Turkmenistan.
The new TAM-BAS strategy for 2008 foresees more support (including
training) to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially
in rural areas of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This should
prove particularly useful in tackling the “brain drain” problem
or the loss of talented entrepreneurs through emigration.
15. For the Bank’s eight poorest countries of operation the Early
Transition Countries Initiative (ETCI) is particularly useful. It
is designed to encourage economic activity by using a streamlined
approach to financing more and smaller projects, mobilising more
investment, and accepting higher risk in the projects that the EBRD finances.
It also seeks to develop and adjust financing instruments dedicated
to the funding of local entrepreneurs and enterprises in order to
better address these countries’ specific needs, as well as to mobilise greater
donor support and to activate anti-corruption mechanisms.
Improving energy use
16. Rising energy prices, high
energy intensity and concerns over security of energy supplies are
sobering reminders that promoting energy efficiency across the transition
region is a vital, urgent and massive task. Many transition countries
depend on a single supplier of oil and gas, mainly from Russian
companies, and are in a weak bargaining position. With the EBRD’s
help, they are seeking to reduce this dependence by diversifying
the supply and addressing the inefficient use of energy, starting
with the private companies. Generally, a shift in fuel composition
towards more use of renewables is desirable, but the greatest opportunity –
and challenge – lies in improving energy efficiency and conservation.
Strong measures are necessary to support this effort.
17. Energy efficiency and renewable energy are the backbones of
the latest EBRD Energy Operations Policy, approved in July 2006.
This policy commits a total of €1.5 billion to energy projects in
the 2006-08 period, which means an almost 50% increase over previous
levels. To support this effort, the EBRD has employed a specialist
team working across sectors and projects. The EBRD’s energy efficiency
activity, the Sustainable Energy Initiative (SEI), aims to: 1. increase
security of supply (by reducing imports of increasingly expensive
fossil fuels); 2. improve competitiveness (by saving energy, costs
are reduced and cash flows improve); 3. save scarce capital resources
(saving energy is cheaper than building a new power plant); and 4. improve
the environment (both globally by reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and locally by reducing air pollution). With sustainable energy
investments of over €900 million in 2007, the EBRD has in fact reached
its three-year target in just over eighteen months.
18. In 2007, the SEI included €934 million in financing for a
total of 51 projects. Focus is placed on energy efficiency upgrades
for large industrial enterprises in energyintensive sectors (34%),
cleaner power energy supply, including switching fuels and efficiency
improvements with regard to generation, transmission and distribution
(30%), small energy users, such as SMEs and residential users (15%),
municipal infrastructure, including district heating, public transport,
solid waste and water (15%), renewable energy, including hydro, wind
and bio-fuels (7%), and carbon finance. By destination, 40% of all
financing goes to projects in the Russian Federation, while 26%
is committed to Ukraine, the Caucasus and central Asia, 23% to the
new EU members states and 1% to the Western Balkans. About one tenth
of all the EBRD’s energy investment is devoted to regional projects.
19. The three distinctive operational approaches include: defining
energy efficiency components in all relevant operations; 2. financing
small energy efficiency and renewable energy projects through local
banks with dedicated credit lines to SMEs and households; and 3.
combining project finance and carbon finance (as emissions trading
opportunities are commonly under-utilised). Providing free energy
audits funded by donors through technical co-operation has been
a particularly successful energy strategy component, as the grant element
has helped to enhance motivation and investment (with €1 of grant
yielding €5 of commercial finance).
Evaluating projects
20. A small team of 16 staff carries
out ex post evaluations of EBRD projects (technical co-operation
and investment operations) in order to determine whether the EBRD’s
mandate has been fulfilled and project outcomes have been in line
with expectations. Evaluation includes an assessment of accountability
(towards EBRD management and board of directors as well as the general
public), transparency (a prerequisite for accountability) and independence
(from operational activities). The evaluation team reports directly
to the board of directors, where the Audit Committee plays an important
role in reviewing the evaluation work and following up on recommendations.
The EBRD is also involved in a number of initiatives with a view
to harmonising international co-operation and evaluation.
The
challenges of the coming years include coping with a larger number
of operations ready for evaluation, continuing with the harmonisation
process and maintaining a good system for the follow-up of evaluation
recommendations.
21. The EBRD’s evaluation work measures and assesses the transition
impact,
environmental performance
and change, the Bank’s additionality (financial and nonfinancial),
financial performance, fulfilment of objectives, the EBRD’s investment
performance and bank handling. Between 1996 and 2006, the team evaluated
a total of 547 projects, 77% of which had an excellent or satisfactory
transition impact rating and 56% a successful or higher overall
performance rating. In 2007, the EBRD published 23 evaluation reports
on investment operations and six on technical co-operation operations,
covering about two thirds of projects ready for evaluation.
The evaluation
team also carries out special studies on targeted themes or sectors
and gathers and disseminates
the lessons learned.
The main studies
and evaluation reports are available on the EBRD website in a condensed
form.
Strengthening integrity
22. The transition to a market
economy has often taken place in environments characterised by weak institutions
and low standards of corporate and public governance. As a result,
corruption is endemic in most countries. According to the 2007 Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index (with corruption being
defined as the abuse of public office for private gain), several
countries of operation were ranked very high on the corruption scale.
Out of 179 countries, Uzbekistan was ranked 175, Turkmenistan 162,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan
150 and the Russian Federation 143. Other countries were ranked
more in the middle, such as Ukraine 118, Moldova 111, Albania 105,
and Armenia and Mongolia 99. From the start, the EBRD has been committed
to applying sound banking practices in all its financial operations
and is bound by the agreement establishing it to prevent its funds
from being illegitimately diverted from their intended purposes.
In order to ensure the highest level of integrity in its activities,
the EBRD has a number of mechanisms in place to combat corrupt,
fraudulent, coercive and collusive practices. This is particularly
relevant in dealing with politically exposed persons or entities.
23. In its first anti-corruption report of November 2006, the
EBRD outlines its strategy based on prevention, detection, investigation
and sanction. Preventive measures include guarding the integrity
of the EBRD (internal prevention and audit),
tackling corruption
where it occurs (external assistance),
and
participating in the global fight against corruption. With regard
to the latter, the EBRD actively works with a number of international institutions
and initiatives.
In 2006, the EBRD
and other international financial institutions created the International
Financial Institutions’ Anti-corruption Task Force (IFITF) to harmonise
the methods for combating corruption and fraud within operations
and projects. It particularly works towards enhancing information
sharing and a greater standardisation of the definitions of corrupt
or fraudulent practices. The rapporteur fully supports the EBRD’s
commitment to address corruption as a global problem which requires
solutions based on international co-operation and collaboration.
24. In order to improve the detection of fraud, corruption and
misconduct, the EBRD uses an integrity due diligence process for
screening clients and sponsors, as well as gathering information
through a compliance hotline and by offering protection to witnesses
and whistleblowers. Finally, in response to allegations of fraud and
corruption, it relies on both internal investigations (of staff
members, board members and senior management) and external investigations
(of both public and private sector individuals or entities). Moreover, the
EBRD’s Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) assesses complaints
with regard to EBRD-financed projects from local groups that may
be directly and adversely affected by a project. Finally, according
to its mandate, the EBRD engages fully only in countries that are
committed to democratic principles and strictly limits its operations
to the private sector in countries, such as Belarus and Uzbekistan,
with a poor human rights record. Due to a more risky environment
and increasing workload on integrity issues with the Bank’s move south
and east, it is necessary to further strengthen the compliance function.
3. The Bank’s 2007 transition
report
i. Transition progress and
macroeconomic performance
25. The EBRD tracks transition
progress by scoring its client countries with regard to nine indicators
divided into four categories: 1. enterprises (large-scale privatisation,
small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring);
2. markets and trade (liberalisation of prices, trade and foreign
exchange system, and competition policy); 3. financial institutions
(banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities’ markets and
nonbank financial institutions); and 4. infrastructure. The nine
indicators relate to different stages of the transition process.
First-phase, “market-enabling”, reforms include small-scale privatisation,
price liberalisation and trade and foreign exchange liberalisation,
while second-phase, “market-deepening”, reforms involve large-scale
privatisation and financial institutions reform. The third-phase,
“market-sustaining”, reforms entail governance and enterprise restructuring,
competition policy and infrastructure reform.
26. First-phase reforms are by and large completed in most countries.
Progress last year has mainly been made in second- and third-phase
reforms, mostly in the financial sector and on competition policy,
although these are not yet completed in the more advanced transition
countries and have only begun in the early transition countries.
Infrastructure reform remains a major challenge for many countries
(especially in the energy sector to enhance energy security, the
diversity of supply and energy efficiency). In 2007, transition progress
slowed down and only 20 transition score upgrades were awarded in
total (which is the lowest since the start of the transition process).
Progress was concentrated in SEE (notably the Western Balkans),
which received half of the upgrades. In CIS+M countries with strong
market support (Georgia and Mongolia), much progress has been made
in stimulating the private sector, while financial sector reforms
have made headway in western CIS countries. Progress has been slow
or limited in the resource-rich CIS countries and CEB states which
receive large amounts of EU funds. In some CIS countries, the privatisation
process has stalled (or was even reversed). The slowdown in reform
pace in many CIS countries is widening the transition gap with CEB and
SEE. The newest country of operations, Mongolia, having started
at low levels, was the star reformer of the year with a total of
three transition score upgrades.
27. The main challenge for the CIS countries is to move beyond
first-phase reforms, which requires not only political will and
commitment but also institutional and legislative support. SEE should
keep the momentum to complete second-phase reforms and advance with
third-phase reforms. While further deepening of EU integration is
likely to support this process, political risks and uncertainties
are causes of concern in parts of the western Balkans, not least
following the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.
Finally, the CEB countries need to press forward with private sector
involvement in infrastructure and more efficient competition authorities.
28. In 2007, the transition region overall recorded the highest
average growth rate – 7% – since the establishment of the EBRD.
However, the level of estimated GDP in 10 countries – Bosnia and
Herzegovina, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Georgia,
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Tajikistan and Ukraine – has not yet reached pre-transition levels
of 1989. The high growth has primarily been driven by domestic demand
(both consumption and investment are up, especially in the CIS countries
and most notably in the Russian Federation), spurred by FDI inflows,
migrant remittances and the expansion of lending. With a particularly
strong demand for housing, construction is booming, while domestic credit
and investment are expanding fast across the region, except for
the CEB countries where investment rates have started to decline
somewhat in recent years.
29. As trade, especially with Asian countries, is expanding rapidly,
there has been strong growth in imports and a corresponding widening
of current account and budget deficits in most CEB, SEE and CIS
countries whereas resource-rich CIS countries accumulated large
trade and budget surpluses thanks to swelling profits from exports.
Trade among the CIS countries is still dominated by oil and gas.
These trends are likely to persist also this year.
30. Unemployment and poverty rates have continued to fall, boosting
the disposable income of the population. However, consumption and
investment are likely to slow down, which could moderate growth
rates in the near to medium-term future. There are also concerns
over overheating economies in many countries with high inflation
rates and large external imbalances. The competitiveness of the
Baltic states in particular is at risk, despite exports remaining
strong. Monetary policies have been tightened, while fiscal policy
has not. After Slovenia successfully introduced the euro in 2007,
only Slovakia seems fit to follow suit in 2009 while other advanced
countries in central Europe will take a few years to rein in inflation
and meet the fiscal criteria.
31. Turmoil in the global financial markets has so far had a limited
effect in the transition region in general. Nevertheless, there
are concerns over how they will affect the region, primarily countries
with large external financing needs (such as Kazakhstan), but pressures
remain also in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia. The
primary challenge for the financial sector lies in enforcement of
regulation and supervision.
32. Against the background of soaring world food prices (up by
nearly 40% in the year to December 2007, according to the UN Food
and Agriculture Organisation), there are clear incentives, also
for the EBRD, to invest in a significant untapped agricultural production
potential in eastern Europe and the CIS region, especially Kazakhstan,
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, where millions of hectares of
arable land could be reclaimed and returned to agricultural use
at no major environmental cost. In reaction to rising prices, some
governments in transition economies have responded by introducing
protectionist measures (such as price controls, increased subsidies
and restrictions on food exports) to protect domestic consumers.
However, these steps could prove counterproductive long term and
the EBRD is advocating restraint on interventions that might lead to
distortions in domestic markets and in favour of investment facilitation
along the entire agricultural value chain, while the most vulnerable
population could be better protected through targeted income support.
In 2007, the EBRD launched 40 projects in the agribusiness sector
worth €517 million (record annual volume).
33. Furthermore, to highlight the importance of these issues,
the EBRD organised a conference of private sector investors and
public sector officials at its headquarters in London in March 2008
and followed it up two months later with a special Agribusiness
Forum on the margins of its annual meeting in Kyiv. Policy dialogue on
agricultural investment in its client countries is top priority
for the EBRD and will be a central feature of its forthcoming agribusiness
sector strategy.
ii. Focus on people in transition
34. In 2006, the EBRD, together
with the World Bank, carried out a Life in Transition Survey, through
which 29 000 households were surveyed in 28 transition countries
plus
Turkey. The survey sought to measure how the transition process
has affected life satisfaction, absolute and relative living conditions,
attitudes to democracy and markets, and future aspirations.
35. Seventeen years of transition have clearly changed life dramatically
for most people. While overall more people are satisfied than dissatisfied,
general satisfaction is commonly higher in the richer, more advanced transition
countries. General satisfaction is hence higher in CEB and lower
in SEE and relatively mixed in CIS+M countries. Dissatisfaction
(with only 20% to 30% of the surveyed households being satisfied
with life today) is strongest in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, Moldova and Montenegro.
36. While most people believe their living standard to have improved
in absolute terms (especially in Albania, Belarus, Estonia, Tajikistan,
Mongolia and Uzbekistan), they also perceive a relative decline
in household wealth since the start of the transition process (with
the exception of Albania where most have seen a relative improvement).
Most people strongly support democracy, with Russian respondents
relatively less committed. Support for the market (versus planned)
economy is weaker than the support for democracy, but is still positive (and
especially high in Albania and Mongolia, but also in the new EU
member states). The younger, better educated, better off, more connected
and more mobile parts of the population have generally benefited
more from transition and are hence more satisfied and more supportive
of both democracy and the market than other groups.
37. The most striking feature of the transition process in many
countries is the emergence of a middle class. As a percentage of
the total population, the size of the middle class averaged 19%
in CEB, 12% in SEE and 8% in CIS+M. This is closely correlated to
democracy (as defined by the Freedom House),
that
is, the larger the middle class, the more democratic the country
(exceptions are Belarus and the Russian Federation, where the middle
class is larger than the democracy index would suggest). The transition
process has, however, also brought about negative income shocks
and destruction of human capital. Large groups have lost out and remain
dissatisfied, most commonly poorer, older, less educated and unemployed
sections of the population.
38. Overall, people are less happy for the same reasons as in
other countries, that is, because of a decrease in income and fewer
public goods/services. However, the survey shows that attitudes
and values in most transition countries are not yet converging with
those in western Europe. Civil society is still emerging, with civic activism
relatively strong in some CEB
and SEE countries and relatively weak in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
In terms of civic membership,
figures
vary widely. The primary challenge is to adjust policies to reach the
dissatisfied groups and include them in the reform process.
39. Most people want governments to invest in health care (39%)
and education (23%), while others prioritise pensions (15%), housing
(12%), public infrastructure (4%) and environment (3%). Health care
and education are also expensive as they account for most of household
expenditure for public services (each category amounts to around
one third of household expenditure across the transition region).
This is also partly due to corruption (“unofficial payments”) in
several countries. While health care and education are what people care
for most, they are also quite discontent with the quality of these
public services (more so with regard to health care than with regard
to education). Dissatisfaction is generally higher in the SEE and
CIS+M countries than in CEB.
40. Improving public services would broaden support for reforms.
The private sector can bring in capital and knowhow and enhance
efficiency in the delivery of public services, but its involvement
also requires effective regulation, courts and administrative agencies,
open tendering, fair competition and transparency. The key challenge
is to create a quality public service structure of legal and political
frameworks that allows for efficiency gains at the same time as
it should provide affordable access for all. Greater transparency
and community-based monitoring in particular would engage and provide
people with a stake in the reform process.
41. Transition has brought on an upheaval in the labour markets
across the region. Many have left the labour force, while others
are long-term unemployed. Unemployment levels rose sharply at the
start of transition and have only recently begun to subside in a
few countries; they remain particularly high in most countries in
the western Balkans and in Turkmenistan. In the transition process,
there has been a significant reallocation of labour from the state
to the private sector and from manufacturing to services. The speed
of labour reallocation has varied greatly between the regions. The
percentage of working-age population in private employment surpassed
that in state employment in CEB in 1997-98 and in SEE in 2003/2004
but has yet to surpass it in CIS+M countries. Self-employment is
low, but increasing, especially in CIS+M. The self-employed and
the better skilled parts of the labour force are commonly more satisfied
and supportive of markets. Increasing employment is clearly a major
priority for all transition countries. To this end, they need to
invest more in upgrading skills through training and education,
improving conditions for entrepreneurial activity, bringing the long-term
unemployed back into the labour market, and improving labour mobility
(including flexible housing).
4. Reform progress and intra-regional
co-operation in the Caucasus
42. Reforms generally stalled in
the Caucasus last year (see Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix), as
only Georgia advanced more substantially by completing the privatisation
process and pushing forward with energy sector reforms, especially
as regards services. Armenia earned some praise for involving the
private sector in water management and thus improving supply. Both
Armenia and Georgia have by and large successfully completed first-phase
reforms, but are now having problems with advancing with third-phase
(and to some extent also second-phase) reforms. In Azerbaijan, reforms
are at a standstill as the beneficial economic situation seems to
have reduced the sense of urgency for reform.
43. Real GDP growth rates for 2007 are high at between 8% to 10%
in Armenia and Georgia, while Azerbaijan continues to be the fastest
growing country in the transition region (primarily thanks to the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and high oil prices). The absolute
levels of real GDP in Armenia and Azerbaijan are around 25% to 35%
higher than at the start of transition (and poverty levels have
fallen in both countries), while that of Georgia is only half the
1989 level. Armenia’s inflation rate continues to stay low at 3.5%,
while Azerbaijan’s rate is projected at 13.5% in 2007 (partly as
a result of the central bank restricting an appreciation of the
local currency). Azerbaijan’s Government balance is slightly positive,
but it has a large non-oil budget deficit as a result of a surge
in fiscal spending. Partly due to the Russian Federation’s ban on
imports of Georgian agricultural products, Georgia’s current account
deficit is expected to be as high as 16% in 2007 whilst the trade
sanctions as such are expected to accelerate the reorientation of
Georgian entrepreneurs towards western European markets. Azerbaijan,
on the other hand, should enjoy a current account surplus of 20%.
However, with regard to foreign investment, Azerbaijan, in contrast
to the other CIS countries and despite the booming growth rates,
has seen a slowdown and net decrease in flows since 2005 (due to
a reduced need for investment in energy infrastructure and capital
repatriation by foreign oil firms). FDI inflows to both Armenia and
Georgia are increasing, projected to account for 4.5% and 14.3%
of GDP respectively in 2007.
44. In the short term, strong growth is expected to continue in
the Caucasus region, driven by commodity trade (especially for oil
and metals), strong domestic consumption (fuelled by massive inflows
of migrant remittances), a booming property and construction sector
and a growing service sector. In the long term, however, growth
could stall as a result of political instability and unresolved
regional conflicts, vulnerability to changes in commodity and property
prices, the lack of economic diversification, limited export markets,
weak financial sectors, continued currency appreciation and barriers
to intra-regional trade. The main long-term tasks therefore lie
in diversifying the economies (and the sources of energy supply
in the case of Armenia and Georgia), managing commodity revenues
efficiently and transparently, promoting competition (by ensuring
a level playing field for all firms and by dissolving existing monopolies,
both public and private), accelerating post-privatisation restructuring,
continued development of the legal and regulatory frameworks, strengthening corporate
governance and transparency, developing physical infrastructure
and curbing corruption. There is also a need to improve access to
capital, enhance the overall business climate in order to attract
more investment, streamline the tax and customs administrations,
and increase bank mediation.
45. Apart from the regional office for the Caucasus in Tbilisi,
opened in September 2006, the EBRD has offices in all three countries.
By the end of 2007, cumulative EBRD commitments to the Caucasian
states totalled €1.5 billion (Armenia 10%, Azerbaijan 50% and Georgia
40%). In 2007 alone, €392 million were earmarked for 22 operations
in Armenia (20% of the total), 27 operations in Azerbaijan (31%)
and 27 operations in Georgia (49%), while nearly the double (€665
million) should be invested this year.
46. The EBRD’s strategic priorities in the Caucasus region centre
on support to micro, small and mediumsized businesses, natural resource
development and management, the financial sector (increasing intermediation
and upgrading skills), agribusiness (helping efficient processors
and retailers), transport infrastructure (with a focus on local
and regional networks), municipal services (water supply, heating,
urban mobility and energy efficiency projects), and the energy sector
(especially renewable energy, power sector improvements, and regional
projects).
5. Development prospects for
South-Eastern Europe
47. The political turbulences and
uncertainties of the 1990s have kept the economic development of
the SEE region well below potential. Most economic reforms took
off with the prospect of closer integration with the European Union.
Not surprisingly, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania appear, in recent
years, as the fastest reformers not only in South-Eastern Europe
but also the whole transition region. With their accession to the EU,
Bulgaria and Romania saw unemployment fall below 10%, rising wages
and a rapid expansion of credit to private enterprises and households
accompanied by better banking regulation and new dynamism in domestic investment,
insurance and leasing activities. The business environment significantly
improved in Croatia with steps for a comprehensive simplification
of regulations and strengthened competition policy. The relative prosperity
(in terms of GDP per capita) of Bulgaria and Romania is about one
third of the EU-25 average, while that of Croatia is about half
of the EU-25. The entering into force, in July 2007, of the expanded
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Interim Trade
Agreement with the EU are expected to further intensify regional
trade.
48. With 10 out of 20 transition reform upgrades for the EBRD’s
countries of operation, the SEE region made notable progress in
2007 (see Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix). Most reforms took place
in the Western Balkan countries, particularly as regards institutional
improvements, but the picture is mixed. Following its independence,
Montenegro
joined
the CEFTA in December 2006 and signed a stabilisation and association agreement
(SAA) with the EU in October 2007, thus demonstrating strong commitment
to an open trade regime and competition. Serbia signed such an agreement
with the EU in April 2008, and the last remaining country, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, is expected to sign an SAA in June 2008. Bosnia
and Herzegovina accelerated the privatisation of large state-owned
companies (particularly in Republika Srpska) and strengthened competition policy.
The latter aspect of reform was also visible in Serbia and “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Romania advanced significantly
with regard to reform in the financial sector.
49. Despite relatively strong growth rates (at an average of around
6%), real GDP levels are still below their 1989 levels in all of
the western Balkans countries except Albania and Croatia. Unemployment
remains stubbornly high in many countries (above 30% in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Montenegro,
and above 20% in Serbia, although some of those registered as unemployed
are in fact working in the informal economy). Wages have, however,
increased in most SEE countries. Inflation rates have been fairly
stable during the last decade but inflation pressure has been mounting
throughout the region since the autumn of 2007 due to higher food
and energy prices. As most SEE countries are bound by fixed exchange
rate regimes, fiscal policy is the primary instrument to maintain
price stability. Although most countries have maintained budget
surpluses, government balances are worsening in some countries (particularly
large budget deficits are recorded in Albania and Croatia), especially
following tax reductions and increasing expenditure for social benefits
and public wages.
50. Trade deficits continue widening as growing exports have not
been able to match increasing imports as a result of strong domestic
demand and insufficient domestic production. The average current
account deficit for the entire SEE region is expected to be around
12% of GDP in 2007 (being particularly large in Bulgaria and Montenegro).
Such deficits could cause long-term problems with competitiveness,
especially for countries with fixed exchange rates. Nevertheless,
foreign investment inflows continue to grow following large privatisations
in many countries, particularly in Croatia and Serbia. While Bulgaria
and Romania are the largest recipients in absolute terms, the largest
recipient in relative terms is Montenegro, where FDI inflows accounted for
more than one quarter of GDP in 2006.
51. A move towards the third stage of reforms and closer intra-regional
economic integration will test the maturity of institutions and
the political will of the national elites. The EBRD notes that markets
and regulations are still very fragmented along national borders,
hampering the build-up of essential infrastructure networks, delaying
much needed structural reforms and weakening the region’s external
competitiveness. Although countries in South-Eastern Europe have
seen large inflows of foreign capital, much of this went into real
estate and only marginally into productive investment or infrastructure
upgrades. The poor condition of the road network and widespread
electricity blackouts continue to hurt regional trade, development
and competitiveness. Of all the transition countries, those in South-Eastern
Europe enjoy the most secure gas supply; however they lag behind
the levels of most western European countries in terms diversification
of sources for gas imports.
52. While increasing political stability, further regional integration
and closer ties with the EU will encourage growth and the reform
process in SEE (especially in the Western Balkans), concerns with
regard to current account deficits, competitiveness, fiscal relaxation
and inflationary pressures (following from increasing prices and
rising wages) remain. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe,
set up in 1999, has built solid platforms for democracy and structural
reforms before evolving, in 2007 and 2008, into a Regional Co-operation
Council (RCC, headquartered in Sarajevo) involving a more grassroots
approach to development projects, with more regional ownership and
initiative, simpler co-ordination and closer parliamentary and civil
society involvement at national level. We hope that with the continued
assistance of the international community and inspiration from other
successful regional co-operation schemes,
the RCC will
mobilise the region’s countries in capacity building, shifting from
primitive rivalry to healthy intra-regional competition and co-operation.
6. Working with the Russian
Federation and Ukraine
Russian Federation
53. For nearly a decade the Russian
Federation has enjoyed strong and sustained growth propelled by comfortable
revenue from commodities-dominated exports. The current account,
budget surplus, foreign exchange reserves, foreign and domestic
investment, GDP per capita and the disposable income of the population
have all swollen despite persistent double-digit inflation (some
10% in 2007), currency appreciation, worsening capacity constraints,
bureaucracy and the slow pace of institutional and structural change.
In the last two years, the Russian Federation’s economic growth
(of about 7.2% in 2007 and 6.7% in 2006) was outstripped by neighbouring
CIS countries far less endowed with resources (Armenia, Belarus,
Georgia, Ukraine and the central Asian republics), even though they
started from a lower base. While the Russian Federation made much
progress in liberalising trade and hence towards membership of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), it is still locked in a number of
trade disputes with countries such as Georgia, Moldova and Poland.
Net foreign investment inflows into the Russian Federation were
expected to boom in 2007 (almost tripling in value on 2006) and
were increasingly going to non-energy related sectors (such as production facilities
to meet the growing demand for consumer goods).
54. In the EBRD’s view, reform progress last year in the Russian
Federation was minimal, with some noteworthy steps to implement
railway reform and the expansion of the banking sector. First-phase
reforms are not yet entirely completed (in fact, in some cases,
the state’s role in the economy has actually grown) and there is
much room for progress with regard to second-phase and third-phase
reforms. Key challenges, as identified by the EBRD, include structural
diversification of the economy (allowing for more private sector
participation), more transparent tender procedures for public sector
infrastructure contracts (again to stimulate more private investment)
and containment of fiscal expansion and price rises (one of the
country’s main macroeconomic concerns).
55. The Russian Federation remains the main target country for
the EBRD’s involvement and investment. The Bank aims to promote
further diversification of the Russian economy beyond natural resources,
with emphasis on regional development and knowledge-intensive industries.
In 2007, it invested about €2.3 billion (or about 41% of the year’s
business volume) in the Russian Federation, essentially outside
Moscow and St Petersburg, spread across the corporate sector (33%
of the total), financial institutions (29%), infrastructure and
energy projects (28%), and the trade facilitation programme (10%).
The EBRD does a very valuable job advising foreign investors, assisting
company development (especially by acquiring equity capital and participating
in management), initiating energy efficiency audits, stimulating
know-how transfer, bridging the gaps in understanding between the
Russian and the western European communities, and promoting good governance
and policy dialogue with federal and regional authorities. We would
hope that the Russian authorities will take advantage of EBRD’s
expertise for developing major infrastructure projects to ease multiple bottlenecks.
56. We should recall that during the EBRD annual meeting in Kazan
on 20 and 21 May 2007, the Russian authorities announced the establishment,
within about two years, of a Russian Development Bank. The new entity
– a state corporation, the Bank for Development and Foreign Economic
Affairs (Vnesheconombank), or VEB for short – was, in fact, set
up by reorganising the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the
USSR (earlier known as Vnesheconombank of the USSR). Its main task
is to promote the competitiveness and diversification of the Russian
economy through the “financing of investment projects aimed at development
of infrastructure and implementation of innovative projects”. Priority
is to be given to projects carried out on the basis of public-private
partnerships and all investment projects considered will have to
comply with environmental efficiency standards.
57. Although it is not yet quite clear what sort of relationship
there could be between the EBRD and the VEB (hopefully – the bond
of co-operation and complementarity), the latter seems more involved
in particularly large projects, such as a recently announced US$2
billion loan to the state oil company, Rosneft. This commitment is
equivalent to more than a half of the EBRD’s total business volume
in many operations in the Russian Federation last year. According
to the latest information available to the rapporteur, the EBRD
and VEB signed, in February 2008, a memorandum of understanding
to work together to promote, among other objectives, the diversification
of the Russian economy, the renewal of infrastructure and the development
of public-private partnerships (PPPs). They will explore the possibility
of co-financing projects in areas such as transport infrastructure,
energy and municipal services, or in sectors with significant environmental
and energy efficiency potential, as well as projects which contribute
to the diversification of the Russian economy and the development
of regions. The two banks are already co-ordinating their efforts
on several important PPP projects that are being developed in the
transport sector and will also consider setting up a special unit, together
with other interested organisations, in order to assist the process
of project preparation for PPPs in infrastructure.
Ukraine
58. The year 2008 started with
long-awaited good news for Ukraine: after fifteen years of multilateral
talks, on 5 February the WTO General Council formally endorsed Ukraine’s
WTO membership. Soon thereafter, the EU and Ukraine launched negotiations
towards a free trade agreement that would pave the way for the abolition
of the EU import quotas for Ukrainian-made products, especially
steel. Ukraine’s reformers see these keynote developments as an
important recognition of the country’s regional and global engagement
and a gateway to more prosperity as an increasingly strong industrial
and agricultural powerhouse. On 16 May 2008, Ukraine became the
WTO’s 152nd member.
59. Ukraine’s economic growth remains strong and relatively stable
at around 7% growth in real GDP. It is mostly driven by private
domestic consumption, high international prices for metals and increased
investment. While inflation fell between 2005 and 2006, it reached
nearly 13% in 2007. As a result of underlying pressures (mainly
in the food and energy sectors and the national currency peg to
the dollar) that have been intensifying, inflation is hitting 30%
in the first months of this year and the scope for intervention
by the national central bank is limited. Like in the Russian Federation,
inflation is one of the main worries from a macroeconomic perspective
and the government deficit is worsening. Although foreign investment
inflows are expected to remain high, Ukraine recorded it first current
account deficit in eight years in 2006 and it was expected to worsen
to 3.7% of GDP in 2007 following soaring values of energy and consumer
goods imports. Prospects of closer ties with the EU have clearly
spurred market reform in Ukraine which has almost completed first-phase (market-enabling)
reforms and is moving to second-phase (market-deepening) reforms.
In 2007, the EBRD awarded Ukraine a transition score upgrade for
progress in securities markets and nonbank financial institutions
reform.
60. While the short-term growth outlook is favourable with expectations
of high demand for the country’s agricultural and commodity exports,
Ukraine’s competitive advantage underpinned by cheap energy and
labour is fading. Rising inflation is causing a real appreciation
of the exchange rate. The rapid growth in external borrowing and
bank lending in foreign currency makes the economy vulnerable to
external financial shocks. A slow reform process and political squabbling
would clearly hurt the country’s long-term growth potential. Key challenges,
as seen by the EBRD, include lowering barriers to market entry,
reducing tax and regulatory burdens on enterprises, further development
of the domestic capital market (including greater transparency and
better enforcement of property rights), stronger banking supervision
and greater exchange rate flexibility (to contain external risks
and shocks).
61. The EBRD has been active in Ukraine since 1993. It now has
two resident offices (in Kyiv and Dniepropetrovsk), with a total
of 36 staff. In Ukraine, the EBRD primarily finances investments
in fixed assets, working capital and trade facilitation for leading
local and foreign companies. By the end of 2007, the EBRD had financed
a total of 155 projects in Ukraine, worth over €3 billion (72% of
which was allocated to the private sector) while another €3 billion
was additionally attracted through co-financing partners, including
from other transition countries such as Poland and Serbia. In 2007
alone, the EBRD commitments to Ukraine amounted to €647 million
(somewhat down from the record level of €789 million in 2006), making
Ukraine the Bank’s third largest recipient of funds (after the Russian
Federation and Poland). It also successfully launched its lending programme
in the local currency, hryvnia.
62. EBRD financing in Ukraine has generally been devoted to agri-business
(25%), financial institutions (21%), transport (18%), industry (16%)
and the energy sector (6%), while the current projects show greater attention
to energy (22%), financial institutions (20%, including credit lines
for SME development and energy efficiency, as well as mortgages
and guarantees), property (16%), general investment (15%), transport
(10%) and natural resources (10%). We should note the significant
allocation of resources towards the energy efficiency programme
(worth €100 million) to help Ukrainian companies tackle very high
energy intensity (which is more than three times higher than in
the EU and is thus undermining the country’s competitiveness) and activities
via the Nuclear Safety Account (for which the EBRD administers donor
funds of the international community), namely the start of the construction
of the new shelter over the damaged Reactor 4 in Chernobyl and the
last stage of work to complete the spent fuel storage facility at
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which should lead to the transformation
of Chernobyl into a safe and environmentally stable area.
63. Following the latest adjustment of the country strategy for
Ukraine, in September 2007, the EBRD will further promote energy
efficiency and security throughout all sectors of the economy; improve
the efficiency and reliability of key infrastructure, power generation,
transmission and distribution and of the oil and gas transport systems;
support competitiveness and higher corporate governance standards
in the local private sector; assist FDI; and further develop the
capital markets (including financing in local currency). Pursuant
to the programme of co-operation in the public sector, the EBRD
intends to scale up its participation in public sector projects
to between €200 million and €400 million between 2007 and 2009.
This year Ukraine hosted the annual meeting and business forum of
the EBRD in May 2008.
7. Developments in the Council
of Europe neighbourhood
64. Several EBRD client countries
– Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia (since 2006), Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – belong to the Council of Europe’s
neighbourhood. When this Assembly debated, in January 2008, the
situation in the republics of central Asia (Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan), multiple shortcomings in the political, economic
and social spheres of these countries were highlighted.
It was noted that the performance
of these countries as regards respect for human rights, the rule
of law and promotion of the principles of democracy ranged from
limited improvement to complete failure, with reforms and transformations
stagnant. The Assembly voiced concern, amongst other things, about
corruption, lack of accountability and the public authorities’ failure
to deliver basic services in the social, economic, education and
health protection fields. It concluded that the Council of Europe,
building on its experience of transition in central and eastern
Europe, could contribute to redefining the scope of reforms in central
Asia and should promote stability, good governance, institutional
modernisation, accountability, the strengthening of national capacities
and the establishment of reliable co-operation with these states
in addressing common threats.
65. As regards Kazakhstan, the Assembly has had a closer relationship
with this country’s parliament since the conclusion of a co-operation
agreement in 2004. In November 2006 the Parliament of Kazakhstan
applied for observer status with the Assembly. This matter is currently
under consideration. Importantly, Kazakhstan already enjoys observer
status with the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
and is eager to accede to several Council of Europe open conventions.
Moreover, the Assembly and the Parliament of Kazakhstan co-organised,
in 2005, a Euro-Asian Forum on Migration, in Almaty; this could
give rise to further such initiatives.
66. The rapporteur believes that in the light of the Assembly’s
earlier deliberations and its resolve to strengthen political dialogue
with the central Asian states, not least as advocated for in
Resolution 1599 (2008),
the
Assembly might consider associating in future the parliaments of
the central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, with its debates
on the EBRD and on the state of human rights and democracy.
67. In contrast to most other development banks, the EBRD has
a clear political mandate in that it aims to assist only those countries
that are committed to and applying the principles of multiparty
democracy, pluralism and market economics, with respect for the
rule of law and human rights being implicit in the mandate. This commitment
clearly affects the EBRD’s work in the Council of Europe neighbourhood
area where the road to democracy seems long and bumpy. Thus, the
Bank’s involvement in Belarus and in central Asia needs to strike a
delicate balance between lending support to good projects and avoiding
support to governments (or enterprises) that do not respect human
rights and democratic governance, while using its authority to advance policy
dialogue and encourage vital reforms.
68. The EBRD is particularly concerned by Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s
continued failure to advance towards multi-party democracy, pluralistic
society and a market-based economy. This concern has a bearing on
its work in these countries. In both countries, for example, the
Bank focuses on stimulating private sector development “provided
that there is no direct or indirect link to the government or government
officials” as well as on policy consultations to assist and monitor
political and economic reform efforts. Across the region, it also gives
priority to infrastructure projects that enhance cross-border cooperation
but in which certain links with governments are unavoidable. Some
progress in Turkmenistan has been noted recently (especially as
regards the unification of the exchange rate and attempts at political
liberalisation) but was not deemed sufficient to change the Bank’s
country strategy.
69. The five former Soviet republics in central Asia (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
and Mongolia are among the fastest
growing countries in the transition region, with real GDP growth
projected at an average of 8.8% in 2007. Nevertheless, in the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan, real GDP levels in 2006 were still 15%
to 20% less than the 1989 levels. While growth in the Kyrgyz Republic
has remained modest after the political turmoil in 2005, it could
increase (projected at 7.5% in 2007) following investments from
Kazakhstan and large inflows of migrant remittances (primarily from
the Russian Federation). The strong growth in recent years has contributed
to falling poverty levels, particularly in the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia
and Uzbekistan.
70. Although inflation is quite high in most countries (especially
in Uzbekistan with 12.2%), budgets are more or less under control
(except in Tajikistan where deficit is projected at 14% of GDP in
2007). In terms of external balances, resource-rich Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan are displaying current account surpluses as they continue
to benefit from high oil and gas price (with Uzbekistan’s surplus
hitting 20% of GDP in 2007). However, in Kazakhstan, also resource-rich,
a substantial trade surplus is offset by negative balances in services,
income and net current transfers. The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan
suffer from relatively large current account deficits. Foreign investment
inflows into central Asia are mainly concentrated in Kazakhstan
and Mongolia, although in relative terms they also benefit neighbouring
economies. Recent turmoil in the global financial markets has put
particular pressure on Kazakhstan’s banking sector (around half
of the flows into the Kazakh banking sector come from abroad) and
the international rating agency, Standard & Poor’s, lowered Kazakhstan’s
sovereign rating from “stable” to “negative” in April this year.
71. Since joining the EBRD in 2006, Mongolia has made remarkable
transition headway and was the star reformer in 2007 with three
transition score upgrades for largescale privatisation, competition
policy and banking reform. Its economic growth last year was impressive
with GDP up by 9.9%. The other central Asian countries made no progress
in 2007, although Kazakhstan made some steps to accelerate regulatory adjustment
in its banking sector and the road sector reform. On the whole,
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and, to some extent, Tajikistan,
are close to completing the first phase transition reform. Turkmenistan,
the least reformed country in the whole transition region, and Uzbekistan
continue to lag behind.
72. Against the backdrop of a difficult political environment
in Belarus, the EBRD’s work there has been fairly limited for the
past decade. A new country strategy adopted in December 2006 commits
the EBRD to deepen its involvement with the private sector in Belarus
over 2007 and 2008, focusing on microfinance and small enterprises.
Despite some improvements in macroeconomic management and performance,
state control over the Belarus economy remains very tight, accountability
mechanisms are weak and progress in structural and institutional
reform has been minor. Whilst in most transition countries the share
of the private sector in GDP ranges from 55% to 80%, a corresponding
figure in Belarus is only 25% (a similar rate is observed only in Turkmenistan).
73. Thanks to the abolition of the “golden share” rule (whereby
the state has the right to interfere with the management of privatised
enterprises) in the banking sector in August 2006, Russian investors
(including the Vnesheconombank, a state corporation akin to a sovereign
fund) rushed in to acquire large stakes in three Belarusian mid-size
banks and in August 2007 Belarus obtained its first sovereign ratings
from major rating agencies. In December
2007, the EBRD with seven international partners
launched
the new Belarusian Bank for Small Business aiming to finance small
entrepreneurs with loans ranging from US$100000 to US$200000. The
same year the EBRD also initiated a micro and SME credit line responding
to moves by the Belarus authorities to simplify and reduce taxation
for small enterprises; it will also continue providing advisory
services to smaller entrepreneurs via the TAM-BAS programmes if
donor funding is secured.
74. With the changes in terms of oil trade with the Russian Federation
since early 2007, the Belarus economy is under pressure of significant
rises in energy prices resulting in a slowdown in GDP growth (down to
a still impressive 8.6% for 2007), rising inflation (at about 7.5%
in 2007), widening trade and current account deficits (both at least
at 6% of projected GDP in 2007) and rising external debt (up by
38% in the first half of 2007). Although prices are largely controlled
and wages are centrally controlled by the government, the country’s
households will soon feel the inevitable increases in energy costs.
Absorbing the effects of the energy price rises requires bold adjustments
in domestic policies to completely pass on real energy prices to
domestic users, cutting subsidies, pursuing enterprise restructuring
and rationalising energy use. The EBRD could usefully extend its
activity programme in Belarus by encouraging local private enterprises
to invest in energy efficiency.
75. The immediate challenges, in economic terms, for the countries
in the Council of Europe neighbourhood are to continue with market
liberalisation and promote the diversification of production. This
is important for both the resource-rich countries, which need to
move beyond the energy sector, and the resource-poor countries,
which need to be less dependent on remittances from abroad. Regional
trade should also be enhanced with a view to fostering competition,
freeing the flow of goods and lowering price variations which, according
to a 2005 EBRD working paper,
within
one country are just as large as variations across countries due
to rent-seeking by enforcement agencies at the numerous internal
check points. Also, the borders with Uzbekistan are considerably
more difficult to cross in relative terms than those with Kazakhstan
or the Kyrgyz Republic. Of the six countries concerned, only the
Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia are members of the World Trade Organization
while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are observers. There are also a
number of free trade agreements between central Asian countries
and a series of bilateral co-operation agreements with the EU but they
are not effectively used.
76. With the exception of Mongolia, “tight grip” governments and
long-term leaders are merely the norm, rather than the exception
(especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Elections are neither
free not fair and most countries are a long way from being democratic,
with no valid opposition, restrictions on public gatherings, excessive
use of force (including the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005)
and tightly controlled media. Although the human rights situation
in the Kyrgyz Republic has improved greatly after the ousting of
President Akayev in 2005 (the “Tulip” or “Pink” Revolution) and
the instalment of a more democratic government, the country still
faces political uncertainty in its attempts to sustain democracy.
In 2007, Freedom House,
in its comparative assessment
of political rights and civil liberties, classified Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as “not free”, the Kyrgyz
Republic as “partly free” and Mongolia as “free”.
With regard
to press freedom (evaluated in terms of legal environment, political
influences and economic pressures), all five republics in central
Asia and Belarus were categorised as “not free” in 2007, while Mongolia
was classified as “partly free”.
Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter
II above, the central Asian republics and Belarus (except for Mongolia,
ranked more in the middle) are very high on the Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index.
77. In central Asia, the EBRD needs to be particularly vigilant
to ensure that in cases where its investments are targeted at private
enterprises they do not indirectly support the abuse of human rights,
including the use of child labour. This would be the case if the
investments, either directly or through credit lines, went for example
to textile companies using cotton harvested by children in their
production. Recent media reports
have created an intense debate on the use
of child labour during the cotton harvest in central Asia. Human rights
groups, such as Human Rights Watch,
estimate that around 450000 children
are mobilised each year in cotton harvesting in Uzbekistan which
is the world’s second largest cotton exporter. There is a similar problem
in Turkmenistan, where children are reportedly enrolled for uncompensated
participation in the annual cotton harvest. Although supposedly
to a lesser extent, children are employed in agricultural areas
also in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic during the harvest season.
78. Central Asia is a region of high geopolitical importance and
deserves more attention from, and involvement by, European countries.
The five landlocked central Asian states face many common threats (terrorism,
drug and arms trafficking, corruption) and challenges (poverty,
unemployment, desertification, chemical pollution of land/water,
governance, the legal status of the Caspian Sea) and are highly interdependent
in terms of transport routes, population movements, water resources,
and energy supplies. They would gain enormously from more pragmatic
and effective co-operation, both economically and politically, going
beyond words and papers to deeds. One area where the EBRD and the
Council of Europe could jointly assist the region’s countries is
via a possible replication of the schools of political studies,
on the basis of the Council of Europe’s existing programme for member
states and an EBRD-driven donor conference.
8. Joint EBRD activities with
other institutions
79. The EBRD co-operates with other
institutions with regard to technical co-operation, grant investment
co-financing, and lending. The Bank’s Technical Co-operation (TC)
Funds Programme involves €1.3 billion in contributions from almost
50 donor agencies. The programme supports over €35 billion of investments
(which amount to 43% of the entire EBRD portfolio). For every euro
in TC funds, the EBRD and its partners invest another €55. Co-operation
donors are primarily government aid agencies, including EU entities
(60%), but also foreign and finance ministries (30%) and other international
financial institutions and initiatives (10%). In a few cases, TC
involved co-operation with private entities. In 2007, the EBRD committed
some €98 million to 261 assignments, targeting its efforts east
and south. The TC funds focus on preparing and implementing investment
projects (70% of commitments), but also on improving the investment
climate. With regard to the former, funds are allocated to project
implementation (46%), advisory services (26%), project preparation (24%),
training (3%) and sector studies (1%).
80. There are three different types of TC funds: 1. cooperation
funds, through which bilateral donors can support EBRD activities
when they conform to aid or foreign policy objectives (such as under
the SEI); 2. multi-donor funds (such as the Early Transition Countries
Multi-Donor Fund, linked to the ETC Initiative, through which 15
donors provide untied support to the eight poorest countries of
operation); and 3. special funds through which contributions are
made to the EBRD to support a specific programme (such as the Russia
Small Business Fund and the Central Asia Risk Sharing Special Fund).
Recent trends in donor
funding show a greater focus on the poorest countries, a shift from
bilateral to multilateral funds, support for climate change and
SEI, emphasis on reporting and results, more involvement from recipient
countries, engagement in the harmonisation agenda (via the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee) and greater demand for grant investment
co-financing (although donors are generally still reluctant).
81. Grant investment co-financing involves non-recourse financing
for goods and services contracts, incentive payments and other non-TC
grants. Between 2004 and 2007 almost €470 million were awarded by the
EBRD as co-financing grants, mostly for infrastructure investments,
but increasingly also for incentive payments to banks and borrowers.
A
co-financing grant can be in the form of an EBRD-donor co-operation agreement,
parallel donor funding, or funding managed by the EBRD but disbursed
by donors. As with TC funds, co-financing efforts are also seeking
to move to the east and to the south. Significant challenges remain in
the Western Balkans, the Russian regions, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
82. As mentioned in last year’s report (
Doc. 11300), the EBRD signed a memorandum of understanding with the
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Commission in December
2006, committing the institutions to work together on jointly financed
projects in the Caucasus, central Asia, Moldova, the Russian Federation
and Ukraine with regard to energy, transport, telecommunications
and environmental infrastructure. So far, the EIB and the EBRD have
co-financed almost 80 projects. There is much scope for their enhanced co-operation,
especially on cross-border infrastructure projects in the EU neighbourhood
area. The EBRD also has a bilateral co-operation agreement with
the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) but no new project was
launched or jointly financed in 2007.
9. Prospects and challenges
83. Despite the turbulence in international
financial markets caused by the sub-prime housing loan crisis in the
United States, the spill-over effects on the EBRD’s countries of
operation have been fairly limited. The effects of rising energy
and food prices, which constitute a relatively high proportion of
the average household income in transition countries, are far more
painful to these economies and consumers. Inflation has been rising
considerably (often beyond estimates and projections) thus eroding
purchasing power, public finances and economic growth. The competitive
advantage based on relatively low costs is fading away even more rapidly
and is further accentuated by the continued “brain drain”. In the
more advanced transition countries, restructuring and reforms accomplished
so far help to cushion external pressures whilst the less advanced countries
will continue to rely substantially on remittances and foreign investment
to sustain economic growth.
84. The EBRD expects a moderation of growth rates across the region
in 2008 (down to about 6% on average from 7.3% in 2007), especially
in South-Eastern Europe and the CIS, with largest downward revisions in
respect of Kazakhstan, Romania, Ukraine and Tajikistan, and upward
revisions for growth outlook in Mongolia and Turkmenistan. Macroeconomic
risks and uncertainties have also led to reduced lending to households
and prudential tightening in the Baltic countries whilst Kazakhstan
has experienced an abrupt halt in banks’ external funding. As inflation
is surging, there are clear disincentives for bank deposits (with
real returns turning negative) and investment, especially in local
currencies. In the light of increased volatility in financial markets,
monetary tightening and poorer access to funds of international
financial markets is to be expected in all the EBRD’s countries
of operation.
85. Incentives to invest in energy efficiency and energy savings
across the region have never been as high as they are now. Because
rising energy costs are directly feeding inflation, by tackling
energy waste the EBRD can help its countries of operation address
inflationary trends. The EBRD has put in place a new monitoring tool
– the Index of Sustainable Energy – that will enable benchmarking
of progress with energy efficiency efforts, the development of renewable
energy sources and policies for tackling climate change in its client countries.
Whereas the index level for central European states shows a high
degree of convergence
with major
western European economies (Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands), most states in eastern and South-Eastern Europe
and central Asia are lagging behind considerably. The EBRD will continue
stimulating a systemic change in this field, notably as regards
profound legal, regulatory, institutional and technological adjustment.
At the same time, its new Environmental and Social Policy will ensure
that social, health, safety and gender equality aspects are systematically
built in through projects supported.
86. The EBRD’s determination, as confirmed by the board of governors
at the annual meeting in Kyiv on 18 and 19 May 2008, to reinvest
80% of its profits targeting in particular the poorest and hence
the neediest countries via a strategic reserve fund, thus increasing
its risk taking but also the added value of its action, is the right
way forward. It is reassuring to know that the Bank has the capacity
and resources to employ about €5.6 billion in investment operations
every year until at least 2011 when the Bank’s new five-year strategy should
be agreed. We welcome a donation of some of the profits (€135 million)
to the Chernobyl Shelter project (towards accelerating work to complete
the confinement structure) and the creation of a Shareholder Special Fund
for supporting technical co-operation aimed at project preparation
assistance. The latter will be endowed with €115 million of the
EBRD’s own funds which will supplement the existing donor assistance
of some €80 million a year. This pooling of resources will significantly
boost aid to “early transition countries” and Western Balkan states,
in line with the strategic redeployment of activities to the east
and southeast of the European Union as decided in 2006.
87. A gradual withdrawal from more advanced client countries in
central Europe, that are now in the European Union, will enable
the EBRD to concentrate on countries with huge and largely untapped development
potential. Following the application of Turkey to become an EBRD’s
country of operations, the Bank may decide, in October 2008, to
extend its activities to this country thereby opening the doors
to a more diversified field of activity going beyond the strict
interpretation of its core mission in transition countries despite dissenting
voices from the United States, Australia and New Zealand that fear
that this way the EBRD focus on the neediest countries may be diluted
or that Turkey’s bid for EU membership may thus be weakened. We trust
that the EBRD will make a careful analysis of how Turkey’s application
could be best accommodated without compromising the Bank’s level
of involvement in the less advanced transition countries. This may
well imply the need to increase the Bank’s annual volume of operations
beyond the current cap. Finally, although it is not yet on the agenda,
the EBRD should stand ready to assist North Korea,
when circumstances would permit,
in order to facilitate its transition to a market economy and integration
into the global community.
88. The comfortable profits that the Bank earned in the last few
years show that more risk taking is possible and beneficial (to
both the EBRD and its client countries) when underpinned by a sound
investment and banking approach, as well as a careful selection
of projects. The EBRD has proved to be a creative institution capable
of adapting to the varying needs of its clients, constantly diversifying
the services and products it offers. In the coming years, it will
need to be particularly vigilant about the integrity of its project
partners and the management of a wider range of smaller operations
whilst stimulating reform attitudes on the part of the authorities
it is engaged with through policy dialogue. Moreover, it should
persevere with the most valuable work of spreading high corporate
ethics standards and the concept of corporate social responsibility.
89. We trust the Bank will remain focused and ambitious under
the new cycle of leadership it is entering. In welcoming the election
of Thomas Mirow as the new President of the EBRD, the Assembly wishes
to pay tribute to the outstanding talent and deep engagement of
Jean Lemierre in steering the EBRD for the past eight years. During
those years, the EBRD tripled the volume it invests and earned a
solid reputation of an innovative partner for progress in transition
countries.