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Report | Doc. 12010 | 14 September 2009
The war between Georgia and Russia: one year after
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Summary
The Monitoring Committee deplores the fact that, one year after the tragic outbreak of the war between Georgia and Russia, little tangible progress has been achieved in addressing the consequences of this war, and that, in several areas, the situation has actually regressed. While Georgia has complied with most, albeit not all, demands of the Assembly, Russia has not complied with most of the key demands placed upon it. Having taken note of Russia’s argument that its non-compliance with the demands of the Assembly is the result of its diverging position with regard to the status of the two break-away regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), the Committee argues, for its part, that most demands have no relation to the status issue and therefore can not understand that Russia failed to comply even with them. It therefore considers that Russia’s non-compliance with the Assembly demands underscores its lack of political will to address the consequences of the war in a manner incumbent on a member state of the Council of Europe.
The report concludes by strongly urging the Russian authorities, before the end of the year, to give unrestricted access to European Union monitors to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, grant freedom of movement to Georgian civilians over the administrative boundaries of the two breakaway regions, recognise the right of return of Internally displaced persons (IDPs) from this conflict and to initiate credible investigations into alleged acts of ethnic cleansing.
A. Draft resolution
(open)1. One year after the outbreak of the tragic war between
two of its member states, Georgia and Russia, the Parliamentary
Assembly reaffirms its Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647
(2009), adopted on 2 October 2008 and 28 January 2009 respectively.
It considers that the demands on both countries, as well as the
de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, continue to
constitute a transparent, impartial and realistic roadmap to address
the consequences of this war, not only for the parties concerned
but also for the Assembly itself. The Assembly reaffirms its attachment
to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, as well
as the inviolability of its borders.
2. With regard to the independent international inquiry into
the origins and course of the conflict that was established by the
European Union, the Assembly notes that the mandate of the fact-finding
mission has been extended by the European Council until 30 September
2009. The Assembly welcomes the reported constructive co-operation
of both Georgia and Russia with this mission and resolves to return
to the issue of the causes and precise circumstances surrounding
the outbreak of the war once the international fact-finding mission
has presented its report.
3. The Assembly is seriously concerned by the continuing tension
and provocations along the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia which can only but destabilise the region as a whole. It
considers that the sole guarantee that such tensions will not escalate
into renewed fighting and hostilities is the immediate unrestricted
access of international monitors to both sides of the administrative
boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the deployment
of a new impartial international peacekeeping force in the region.
In this respect the Assembly:
3.1. deplores
the continued refusal of Russia and the de facto authorities to
allow European Union monitors access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia
and calls upon them to give the monitors immediate and unconditional
access to the territories under their de facto control;
3.2. deplores the closure of the United Nations Observation
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) as a result of the veto by Russia in
the United Nations Security Council;
3.3. deeply regrets that the proposal presented by the Greek
chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) for a continued OSCE presence, including a military monitoring
component, did not achieve consensus and calls upon Russia to reconsider
its objections to this proposal.
4. The Assembly notes the modest progress made in the first working
group, within the framework of the Geneva discussions, dealing with
the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It especially
welcomes the regular meetings held between the sides concerned within
the incident prevention mechanisms, but regrets that similar progress
has not been achieved in the second working group, dealing with humanitarian
issues and freedom of movement.
5. The Assembly is seriously concerned that further closure of
the administrative boundaries of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as
a result of the transfer of the control of the administrative boundary
to Russian FSB border guards, will lead to a further exodus of ethnic
Georgians from the Gali district in Abkhazia and the Akhalgori district
in South Ossetia. The Assembly is especially concerned about the
increased pressure placed on them to accept Abkhazian or South Ossetian
passports and the current total absence of an international presence
in these regions. The Assembly therefore calls upon Russia and the
de facto authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to remove any
impediments to the freedom of movement of Georgian citizens across the
administrative boundary lines.
6. The Assembly continues to be deeply concerned about the humanitarian
consequences of this war and therefore:
6.2. calls upon all parties to implement fully and effectively
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’ six principles
for urgent protection of human rights and humanitarian security,
and especially Russia and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia to fully and unconditionally ensure the right of return
of Internally displaced persons (IDPs) as result of the August 2008
hostilities.
7. The Assembly deeply regrets that excessive restrictions continue
to be placed on the access of international and humanitarian organisations,
including for humanitarian aid, to the break-away regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. In this respect, it:
7.1. welcomes the readiness expressed by the Georgian authorities
to address the concerns set out in the recent European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) opinion on the “Law
on the occupied territories of Georgia” and takes note of the amendments
that were initiated in the Georgian parliament and sent to Venice
Commission for opinion;
7.2. takes note of Russia’s efforts to provide humanitarian
aid to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and calls on Russia and the de
facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to immediately remove
all restrictions on the access, including with regard to the point
of entry, of international and humanitarian organisations and humanitarian
aid to the two regions.
8. The Assembly cannot accept the apparent reluctance of both
Georgia and Russia to investigate in a credible manner serious allegations
of violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed in
the course of the war, as well as in its aftermath, by their own
forces, or militia and civilians under their de facto control and
jurisdiction. It notes that the European Union inquiry will also
cover allegations of violations of human rights and humanitarian
law, as well as possible war crimes, committed by either side in
the course of the war. It therefore:
8.1. resolves to return to this issue, including the possible
consequences for the two member states concerned, in the light of
the conclusions of the European Union inquiry mission;
8.2. encourages the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to request the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court formally to
open an investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by either side in the course and aftermath of
the August 2008 hostilities.
9. The Assembly condemns Russia and the de facto authorities
of South Ossetia for not having brought resolutely to a halt and
seriously investigated the ethnic cleansing of ethnic Georgians
that by all accounts took place in South Ossetia during and after
the war and for not having brought the perpetrators to justice.
It recalls that, under international law, Russia bears responsibility
for violations of human rights and humanitarian law in those areas
that fall under its de facto control.
10. The Assembly deplores the fact that, one year after the August
2008 hostilities, little tangible progress has been achieved in
addressing the consequences of this war, and that, in several areas,
the situation has actually regressed. While Georgia has complied
with most, albeit not all, demands of the Assembly expressed in
Assembly Resolutions 1633
(2008) and 1647
(2009), Russia has not complied with most of the key demands placed
upon it in these resolutions.
11. The Assembly is fully aware of Russia’s argument that its
non-compliance with the Assembly demands is the result of its diverging
position with regard to the status of the two regions. The Assembly
underscores that most of its demands have no relation to the status
of the two regions and therefore can not understand that Russia
failed to comply even with these demands. It therefore considers
that Russia’s non-compliance with its demands underscores its lack
of political will to address the consequences of the war in a manner
incumbent on a member state of the Council of Europe. In addition,
the Assembly deeply regrets that the leadership of both the State
Duma and the Council of the Federation, as well as the members of
the Russian delegation to the Assembly have publicly opposed the
demands of the Assembly and dismissed the possibility for Russian compliance
with them.
12. The Assembly therefore strongly urges the Russian authorities,
before the end of this year, to:
12.1. give
unrestricted access to European Union monitors to both South Ossetia
and Abkhazia;
12.2. grant freedom of movement for Georgian civilians across
the administrative boundary lines and lift restrictions, including
with regard to the point of entry, of international and humanitarian
organisations and humanitarian aid to the two regions;
12.3. recognise formally and effectively the right of return
of all IDPs from the 2008 hostilities to their original place of
residence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
12.4. initiate a credible investigation into acts of alleged
ethnic cleansing committed by the South Ossetian forces allied to
it, or by civilians under its de facto jurisdiction and control.
13. The Assembly invites its Monitoring Committee to monitor the
follow up given by Georgia and Russia to Assembly demands and to
propose any further action to be taken by the Assembly as required
by the situation, in particular with regard to compliance with paragraph
12 of this resolution.
B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Van den Brande and Mr Eörsi, co-rapporteurs
(open)1. Introduction
1. This summer marked the first anniversary of the outbreak
of the tragic war between Georgia and Russia, two member states
of the Council of Europe. The consequences of this war, in legal,
political and humanitarian terms, have been a main point of focus
for the work of the Parliamentary Assembly over the last year. 
2. The basis for the Assembly’s position with regard to the consequences
of the war between Georgia and Russia is Resolution 1633 (2008), adopted in October 2008. In this Resolution, the Assembly
strongly condemned the outbreak of the war between Georgia and Russia
and considered that, during the war and its immediate aftermath,
both countries had violated human rights and principles of humanitarian
law, as well as the Statute of the Council of Europe and specific
accession commitments. The Assembly therefore formulated a series
of concrete demands to both Georgia and Russia, as well as the de
facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which together
provide a transparent, impartial and concrete roadmap to address
the consequences of the war. In addition to demanding that Russia
withdraw its recognition of independence of the two break-away regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to fully respect the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as the inviolability
of its internationally recognised borders, the Assembly demanded
that both Georgian and Russian authorities:
- implement fully and unconditionally the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular the obligation for Russia to withdraw its troops to their positions ex ante the war;
- co-operate fully in the establishment of an independent international investigation into the precise circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war;
- co-operate fully with all international monitoring missions - especially those from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union - and allow these monitors unrestricted access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- bring an immediate halt to, and investigate all reports of, human rights abuses and acts of ethnic cleansing in the two break-away territories and the so-called “buffer zone”;
- investigate any alleged violations of humanitarian law and the laws on the conduct of war that occurred during the war and bring the perpetrators to justice;
- ensure the right of return of all Internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of this conflict and implement the six principles outlined by the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe;
- work towards the creation of a new peacekeeping format and internationalise the peace keeping force.
3. These principles and demands were fully reconfirmed in Resolution 1647 (2009), adopted in January 2009. In addition, concerned about
the implications of the closure of the OSCE Mission in Georgia as
a result of Russian objections over its mandate, the Assembly called
in this resolution on all parties, and particularly on the Russian
authorities, to accept a formula for a mandate of the OSCE mission
in Georgia, including its military monitoring mission, that would
not prejudice the status of the two break-away regions, and to refrain
from any actions that would endanger the renewal of the mandate
of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).
4. Moreover, in Resolution
1647 (2009), the Assembly considered it to be unacceptable that
persons residing in the two break-away regions would not be protected
by the human rights protection mechanisms granted to them as citizens
of a Council of Europe member state, and that thus a human rights
protection black hole would exist within the Council of Europe area.
The Assembly therefore invited the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe to develop a comprehensive action plan to ensure that
the rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights
are effectively secured for persons residing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
This could include the establishment of a field presence in the
two break-away regions, as demanded by the Assembly in Resolution 1633 (2008), including an ombudsperson who could examine individual
applications in cases of human rights violations.
5. At the same time, the Assembly, in Resolution 1647 (2009), reconfirmed its conviction that the establishment of
a genuine dialogue would be the only way forward for the resolution
of the conflict and to secure long term stability in the region,
provided that minimum conditions for a meaningful dialogue, as outlined in
the Assembly resolutions, would be met. The Assembly therefore asked
the Bureau of the Assembly to set up a special ad hoc Committee
to establish a dialogue between the Georgian and Russian delegations
to the Assembly, in which possibly representatives of the Abkhaz
and South Ossetian communities, both those that favour independence
and those that favour integration with Georgia, would be able to
participate, subject to a consensus about the format and modalities
for their participation.
6. In this report, we will take stock of the developments over
the last year with regard to the consequences of the war, as well
as the compliance of both Georgia and Russia with the demands of
the Assembly as we have outlined above.
2. Implementation of the ceasefire agreement and security situation
7. The 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement contains 6
points:
- non-use of force;
- definitive cessation of hostilities;
- access for humanitarian aid;
- withdrawal of Georgian military forces to their usual bases;
- withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they held before the hostilities broke out. While waiting for an international body, the Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures;
- opening of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
8. A key requirement of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement
is the withdrawal of Georgian military forces to “their usual bases”
and of Russian military forces to “the lines they held before the
hostilities broke out”.
9. The Georgian compliance with this requirement is being monitored
by international monitors who have concluded that the presence of
Georgian forces along the administrative boundary line is in compliance
with the 12 August ceasefire agreement.
10. However, Russia continues not to comply with the ceasefire
agreement in this respect as a result of its assertion that, with
its recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
the deployment of its troops in these two regions is no longer governed
by the ceasefire agreement, but by bilateral agreements with the
de facto authorities of these regions. However, we take note that
Russia also maintains military troops in Perevi, which is outside
the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia.
11. In our previous report, we described the ongoing militarisation
of the two break-away regions by Russia. Concerned about the deteriorating
effect of this militarisation on the overall security situation
along the administrative boundary lines (ABL) as well as in the
region in general, and taking into account the fact that this militarisation
takes place in clear violation of the ceasefire agreement, we firmly
asked for its immediate reversal by Russia.
we described the ongoing militarisation
of the two break-away regions by Russia. Concerned about the deteriorating
effect of this militarisation on the overall security situation
along the administrative boundary lines (ABL) as well as in the
region in general, and taking into account the fact that this militarisation
takes place in clear violation of the ceasefire agreement, we firmly
asked for its immediate reversal by Russia. 12. On 5 August 2009, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigori
Karasin, announced that by the end of the year Russia would deploy
1700 military troops in each of the break-away regions (Abkhazia
and South Ossetia). This is considerably less than the 3.700 troops
originally foreseen to be deployed in each of the break-away regions.
However, this number does not take into account the considerable
number of FSB troops deployed in each of the two regions to guard
its administrative boundaries.
13. Despite the concerns of the international community in this
respect, Prime Minister Putin, during his visit to Abkhazia on 13
August 2009, announced that Russia would spend US$ 500 000 000 in
2010 to reinforce its military bases in Abkhazia. In addition, Russia
is examining the possibility of establishing a major navy base at Ochamchire
in Abkhazia as a possible alternative home base for its Black Sea
Fleet, once the lease on its current Sebastopol base in Ukraine
runs out in 2017.
14. NATO organised military exercises in Georgia, from 6 May to
1 June 2009, which were strongly condemned by Moscow. Similarly,
Russia organised large scale military exercises, called Kavkaz 2009,
in July 2009 along the bolder with Georgia in which troops from
Abkhazia and South Ossetia participated. These exercises were strongly
condemned by the West, which felt they were reminiscent of the military
exercises that preceded the August 2008 war.
15. The situation along the ABL remains calm but tense, with provocations
and incidents regularly being reported. The situation was especially
tense in the period running up to the first anniversary of the war.
Both the Georgian authorities and the de facto authorities in South
Ossetia accused each other of opening fire with small arms and rocket
propelled grenade launchers over the administrative border. The
European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) announced that its monitoring
patrols did not see any evidence that would substantiate that any
shots were fired from the southern side of the ABL, and stressed
the importance of it having access to both sides of the ABL to investigate
all reported incidents.
16. In response to the increased tension along the ABL in the
run up to the first anniversary of the war, on 4 August 2009, Russia
placed its troops in South Ossetia on high alert, and both the Russian
and Georgian authorities accused each other of attempting to provoke
a new war in the region.
17. The continuing tensions along the ABL, as well as the fact
that both Russia and Georgia accuse each other of preparing themselves
for renewed warfare in the region in our opinion underscores the
continuing need for international monitors with full and unrestricted
access to both sides of the ABL, as well as the establishment of
a new impartial international peacekeeping force, as demanded by
the Assembly in Resolutions 1633
(2008) and 1647 (2009).
18. The opening of international discussions on the modalities
of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the sixth
point of the 12 August ceasefire agreement. During the Sarkozy-Medvedev
meeting on 8 September 2008, it was agreed that these talks would
start on 15 October 2008 in Geneva. Since then six rounds of talks
have taken place, the last one – at the time of writing – took place
on 1 July 2009. It was agreed that the talks would take place in
two working groups, one on the security situation and the other
on humanitarian issues and freedom of movement. While the first
working group has reached modest results, most notably with regard
to the establishment of incident prevention mechanisms with respect
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the second working group on humanitarian
issues has yet to achieve any tangible results. The talks in the
first working group are currently focusing on a possible agreement
on the non-use of force while the second working group agreed to
“move towards a comprehensive plan to address the multi-faceted displacement
issues”. The next round of talks is foreseen for 18 September 2009.
19. More specifically, a number of meetings took place in the
framework of the incident prevention mechanisms that were agreed
upon in the February 2009 Geneva talks, despite ongoing difficulties
and disagreements regarding their modalities.
20. The first meeting between the Georgian and South Ossetian/Russian
sides, in the presence of representatives of the European Union
and OSCE monitoring missions, took place on 23 April 2009. During this
meeting, a 24-hour hotline between the two sides was established
in line with the agreements reached in Geneva. The second meeting
in this framework took place on 29 May 2009 in Dvani, after it had
been postponed as a result of a disagreement over its venue. The
third meeting took place on 14 August 2009 in Dvani where a number
of shooting incidents, as well as alleged detentions and hostage
takings by the different sides, were discussed. The meeting was
described as constructive and having taken place in a very positive atmosphere
by the Head of the EUMM that facilitated the meeting. It was agreed
that the next meeting would take place on 3 September in the village
of Ergneti on the ABL.
21. The first meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz/Russian
representatives in the framework of the incident prevention mechanisms
was organised on 14 July 2009, in Gali, in the presence of representatives
of the EUMM and United Nations, in line with an agreement reached
at the 6th Geneva talks earlier that month. Follow-up meetings in
this framework took place in a reportedly equally constructive atmosphere
on 28 July and 11 August 2009. A fourth meeting is scheduled for
8 September 2009, again in Gali.
22. We welcome these meetings in the framework of the incident
prevention mechanisms as they are crucial in reducing tensions and
avoiding incidents or outbreaks of violence. In addition, we note
with satisfaction that the hotline established between the Georgian
and South Ossetian/Russian sides is reportedly working well and has
been used to secure the release of several persons detained by one
side or the other. We hope and expect that all parties will take
all measures to ensure that the hotline will continue to operate
as intended.
3. International monitoring missions
23. In Resolutions 1633
(2008) and 1647 (2009), the Assembly demanded that Russia, Georgia and the
de facto authorities in South Ossetia co-operate with all international
monitoring missions, specifically those of the UN, OSCE and the
European Union, and explicitly insisted that those observer missions
should be given full and unconditional access to the areas under
the control of Russia and the de facto authorities. In addition,
in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement of 8 September 2008, Russia agreed
to allow UN observers to remain in Abkhazia and to allow OSCE monitors
access to all of their previous areas of deployment, including in
South Ossetia.
24. While Georgia has given full co-operation to the international
monitoring missions and has allowed them unrestricted access to
all areas under its control, Russia and the South Ossetian de facto
authorities have refused, and continue to refuse, access of the
European Union and OSCE monitors to South Ossetia. Similarly, while
Russia and the de facto authorities of Abkhazia originally continued
to allow access of UN monitors, access of European Union monitors
to the areas under their control was, and is still, refused.
25. On 22 December 2008, Russia blocked the extension of the mandate
of the OSCE Mission in Georgia, as a result of which the mission
started to close down. However, on 12 February 2009, the OSCE Permanent Council
extended the mandate of the OSCE Military Observers until 30 June
2009, although this did not affect the mandate of the OSCE Mission
itself. Convinced about the importance of a continued OSCE Presence
in the region, including a military monitoring component, the Greek
Chairmanship of the OSCE continued to search for a status-neutral
formula for an OSCE presence that would be acceptable to all sides.
On 8 May 2009, the Greek Chairmanship presented a proposal to the
Permanent Council that foresaw the establishment of an “OSCE Office in Tbilisi” that, in
relation to the conflict, would be responsible for implementing humanitarian
projects, including those identified in the second working group
of the Geneva talks, as well as for facilitating the exchange of
information with the OSCE co-chair of the Geneva talks. In addition,
the proposal of the Greek chairmanship included the deployment of
“OSCE Monitors in the framework of the
implementation of the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008”.
These monitors would be based in both Karaleti and Tskhinvali, and
report directly to the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre
of the OSCE based in Vienna. Regrettably, on 14 May 2009, the Greek
Chairman-in-Office announced that it suspended the negotiations
for a continued OSCE presence in Georgia until further notice, as
a result of the lack of consensus on the proposal. In an official statement,
the European Union expressed its regret over the suspension of the
negotiations and called on Russia in particular to “show the necessary
political will and urgently reconsider their position in a constructive spirit”.
In the meanwhile, the proposal of the Greek Chairmanship of the
OSCE remains formally on the table.
26. On 15 February 2009, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
1866 (2009) in which it extended the Mandate of the United Nations
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), based in Abkhazia, until 15
June 2009. Regrettably, on 15 June 2009, Russia used its veto in
the Security Council to block an extension of the mandate of UNOMIG,
effectively closing down the observer mission that has been present
in Abkhazia since 1993. In a joint statement with Ms Corien Jonker,
rapporteur of the Assembly for the humanitarian consequences of
the war, we expressed our strong concern about the departure of
the UN from Abkhazia as a result of this veto and especially our
fears that, as a result, Abkhazia could sink into a human rights
black hole, which could lead to an exodus of ethnic Georgians from
the Gali region.
27. As a result of Russia’s refusal to renew the mandates of the
OSCE and UN missions in Georgia, the European Union Monitoring Mission
is currently the only international organisation that is monitoring
the implementation of the 12 August ceasefire agreement, albeit
without access to the two break-away regions. We strongly condemn
the refusal of Russia to allow the extension of the mandates of
the two OSCE and UN missions, as well as its refusal to allow access
of European Union monitors, which does nothing to reduce the tensions
and negatively affects the stability in the region and the security
of all its inhabitants.
4. Respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia
28. In Resolution
1633 (2008), the Assembly condemned the recognition by Russia of
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and called upon Russia “to withdraw its recognition of the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and respect fully the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as the inviolability
of its frontiers”. The Assembly confirmed this position
in its Resolution 1647
(2009).
29. The Russian authorities, including members of both chambers
of the Russian parliament, have made it clear on several occasions
that Russia will not withdraw its recognition of the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and have called upon other states
and the international community to recognise the new geopolitical
reality in the region and to accept the independent status of these
two regions.
30. In line with this position, Russia, on 17 September 2008,
signed, far-reaching “friendship and co-operation” treaties with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were unanimously ratified by the
State Duma and the Council of the Federation on 29 October and 11
November 2008 respectively. Under these treaties, Russia pledged
to help the two break-away regions to protect their borders and
assumed responsibility for their control. The signatories granted
each other the right to set up military bases on their respective
territories. The treaties also formalised economic co-operation
between Russia and the two break-away regions, and allowed dual citizenship
for Russian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian residents.
31. On 30 April 2009, the de facto authorities of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia signed border control treaties with Russia that give
Russia the full control over the borders of these two break-away
regions. As a result of these treaties, FSB border guards have been
deployed in recent months to guard the administrative boundaries of
these two regions. Their deployment has reportedly made the crossing
of the ABL by civilians increasingly more difficult. On 3 August
2009, the Georgian authorities issued a statement in which they
allege that the Russian border troops were trying to shift the ABL
southwards. This is a cause of concern.
32. In a move clearly related to the first anniversary of the
war, President Medvedev visited Tskhinvali on 13 July 2009 and Prime
Minister Putin visited Abkhazia on 13 August 2009. On both occasions,
the European Union issued an official statement in which it considered
these visits “incompatible with the principle of territorial integrity
of Georgia nor helpful for the international efforts to stabilise
the region”.
33. We are extremely concerned by a recent statement to RIA Novosti
of the de facto South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, that South
Ossetia would have territorial claims beyond the ABL and that “today
it is necessary to raise the issue of returning these lands to Ossetia”.
Such provocative statements only raise tensions further and undermine
the stability of this already volatile region. They should be condemned
in the strongest terms.
5. Investigation into the precise circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war, as well as into alleged violations of human rights and international law in the course of the war and its aftermath
34. Clarity about the precise circumstances that led
to the outbreak of the war, as well as the exact sequence of events
in August 2008 is an essential prerequisite to start any process
of reconciliation. This is especially true in the context of the
continuing controversy over the start of the war and the diametrically
opposed views on, as well as complete negation of any share of responsibility
for, these events by both Russia and Georgia. A key tenet of Assembly Resolution 1633 (2008) was therefore that an independent, impartial international investigation
into the precise circumstances that led to the August 2008 war between
Georgia and Russia should be established.
35. In a fact that was welcomed by the Assembly, on 2 December
2008, the European Union established an independent fact-finding
mission on the conflict in Georgia to investigate the origins and
course of the conflict, including with regard to international law and human rights and the accusations
made in that context. This mission, which
is headed by the Swiss diplomat, Ms Heidi Tagliavini, has
a sufficiently broad geographical and temporal mandate to investigate
all possible causes of the conflict. Both Georgia and Russia expressed
their full support for, and willingness to co-operate with, the
European Union fact-finding mission as called upon by the Assembly.
and human rights and the accusations
made in that context. This mission, which
is headed by the Swiss diplomat, Ms Heidi Tagliavini, has
a sufficiently broad geographical and temporal mandate to investigate
all possible causes of the conflict. Both Georgia and Russia expressed
their full support for, and willingness to co-operate with, the
European Union fact-finding mission as called upon by the Assembly.36. The Union’s fact-finding mission was originally due to have
presented its report to the parties in the conflict, the Council
of the European Union, the OSCE and the United Nations by 31 July
2009. However, on 27 July 2009, the Council of the European Union
decided to extend the mandate of the fact-finding mission for two
more months, reportedly to allow the mission more time to evaluate
new material it obtained at a late stage in its inquiry. In line
with paragraph 2.5 of Resolution 1647 (2009), we will only return
to the circumstances of the war, as well as the issue of the co-operation
of both countries with the independent international investigation,
when the European Union fact-finding mission has presented its report.
37. In the meantime, the parliament of Georgia established its
own investigation into the circumstances of the war. The ad hoc
Committee which was tasked to conduct this inquiry was chaired by
a member of the parliamentary opposition. It published its report,
following several months of hearings of key Georgian decision makers,
on 18 December 2008. The report largely confirms the official version
of the Georgian government of the events that led to the outbreak
of the war. We are not aware of the establishment of any similar
inquiry, with the same scope, composition and mandate, by the Parliament
of Russia, despite indications given to us by the Chairman of the
Council of the Federation that the Council was considering setting
up a committee to investigate the origins of the war, as well as
the actions of the Russian authorities in relation to this.
38. As mentioned in our previous report, evidence
and witness testimonies reproduced in several reports by the OSCE
and by organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch give credence to the claims that both Russia and Georgia committed
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in
the course of the war and that Russia closed its eyes to, and possibly
abetted, violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law by the de facto authorities during the aftermath of the war.
Under international law, it is the responsibility of the states
concerned to investigate violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed by persons under their de facto jurisdiction.
A key demand of the Assembly in Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647 (2009) has therefore been that both Georgia and Russia fully investigate
any alleged violations of human rights, humanitarian law and the
laws on the conduct of war that occurred during the war and its
aftermath, including by its own citizens or persons under its de
facto control and jurisdiction, and to bring any perpetrators to
justice.
evidence
and witness testimonies reproduced in several reports by the OSCE
and by organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch give credence to the claims that both Russia and Georgia committed
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in
the course of the war and that Russia closed its eyes to, and possibly
abetted, violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law by the de facto authorities during the aftermath of the war.
Under international law, it is the responsibility of the states
concerned to investigate violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed by persons under their de facto jurisdiction.
A key demand of the Assembly in Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647 (2009) has therefore been that both Georgia and Russia fully investigate
any alleged violations of human rights, humanitarian law and the
laws on the conduct of war that occurred during the war and its
aftermath, including by its own citizens or persons under its de
facto control and jurisdiction, and to bring any perpetrators to
justice.39. The General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia has opened an investigation
into deliberate violations of international humanitarian law in
the course and aftermath of the war, irrespective of the side which
has allegedly committed such violations. However, the Georgian authorities
claim that this investigation is hindered by the lack of access
of the competent authorities to the former conflict zone, as a result
of which it is not able to finalise the investigations or bring
any charges.
40. The Investigative Committee of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Russia has conducted an investigation into genocide committed
by Georgian troops against Russian citizens, as well as into crimes committed
against the Russian military. On 7 August 2009, this investigation
was extended to February 2010, in order to allow the Prosecutor’s
Office to finalise a report to be submitted to the International
Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights. However,
during the visit of the Monitoring Committee’s co-rapporteurs for
Russia to Moscow on 9-11 March 2009, the Deputy Head of the Investigative
Committee confirmed that the committee did not plan to open an investigation
into alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law during the war by Russian citizens, Russian military forces or the South Ossetian
forces allied to it.
Russian military forces or the South Ossetian
forces allied to it.41. We find the lack of any serious investigation by both countries
into the alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law
committed by “their own side” in the course and aftermath of the
war disturbing and totally unacceptable.
42. In the case of Georgia, serious allegations have been made
that indiscriminate weapon systems (Grad Rocket Systems) were used
against civilian or mixed civilian-military targets and that their
use in themselves was in violation of Article 51(4) of Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions. It seems to us that access to the former conflict
zone is not necessary to investigate the decision to use such weapon
systems, and, as appropriate, charge those with command responsibility.
43. Equally, on numerous occasions, the Assembly has made it clear
that, under international law, Russia has the duty to protect the
human rights of the inhabitants of the areas under its de facto
control and to prosecute any human rights violations committed by
persons under its de facto jurisdiction. The arguments related to
the status of the two regions, used by the Russian authorities to
deny any responsibility in this respect, are in our view clearly
not acceptable and are legally invalid. Even if we were to accept
Russia’s argument that the two break-away regions are now independent
entities, we note that a large number of alleged human rights violations
against ethnic Georgians by South Ossetian militia took place before
the recognition of independence of the two break-away regions by
Russia, during which time Russia recognised it was in control, as
clear from its acceptance of the ceasefire agreement. Moreover,
the ongoing investigation in South Ossetia by the Investigative
Committee of the General Prosecutor’s Office of Russia into genocide
committed by Georgian troops against Russian citizens, as well as
into crimes committed against the Russian military, clearly shows
that Russia has the capacity and possibility to conduct such an
investigation in that region. The status argument is in our view
used merely to mask the underlying lack of political will to effectively
investigate any alleged human rights abuses by the South Ossetian
forces allied to it, in areas under its control.
44. As mentioned in our previous report, more than 3 300 applications
have been filed with the European Court of Human Rights by ethnic
South Ossetians against Georgia. On 16 January 2009, the Court announced that
it would urgently examine seven applications of South Ossetians
against Georgia, which it considers to be representative of the
over 3 300 similar applications that have been filed with it. These
cases have now been communicated to the Georgian Government under
Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. In addition,
the Georgian Human Rights NGO “The 42nd Article of the Constitution”
has assisted Georgian citizens in filing applications with the Court
against Russia in relation to the war. On 18 March 2009, we were informed
by the Court that over 100 cases had been filed against Russia,
involving approximately 600 Georgian applicants. Moreover, as we
reported earlier, Georgia has filed an inter-state application against
Russia with the European Court of Human Rights and, on 12 August
2008, on the request of the Georgian authorities, the European Court
of Human Rights indicated interim measures to both Russia and Georgia
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
45. Georgia also filed with the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Hague a request for the indication of provisional measures
in order to preserve its rights under the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination “to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory
acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist
militia and foreign mercenaries”. On 15 October 2008,
the ICJ held that the case fell under its jurisdiction and ordered
provisional measures to be taken by both Georgia and Russia. On
2 December 2008, the President of the court fixed 2 September 2009
as the time-limit for the filing of a Memorial by Georgia and 2
July 2010 as the time-limit for the filing of a Counter-Memorial
by the Russian Federation.
46. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over
possible war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the
conflict between Russia and Georgia and the Prosecutor of the ICC
has reportedly started his preliminary analysis of information received.
Such a preliminary analysis is the first formal step in deciding
whether to seek authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open
a formal investigation, but no further information has been received
about the intentions of the Prosecutor.
6. The humanitarian situation
47. The humanitarian consequences of the war between
Georgia and Russia have been given great importance by the Assembly
and were the issue of two reports prepared by the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Population of the Assembly. The last report on the humanitarian
consequences was debated during the April part-session of the Assembly
and led to the adoption, on 29 April 2009, of Resolution 1664 (2009). The findings and conclusions contained in this report
and resolution remain fully topical and valid. In this report, we
will therefore limit ourselves to the political aspects of the current
humanitarian situation.
48. Of the originally 130 000 ethnic Georgians displaced as a
result of the conflict, 26 000 have not been able to return to their
original place of residence, which in the large majority of cases,
is in the areas controlled by the de facto authorities of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and remain in temporary shelter in Georgia.
In addition, of the approximately 35 000 persons of ethnic South
Ossetian origin that fled to Russia, around 1200 still remain in
North Ossetia.
49. In Resolution 1633
(2008) the Assembly demanded that Georgia, Russia and the de
facto authorities fully and effectively implement the six principles
for urgent protection of human rights and humanitarian security,
which were drawn up by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the
Council of Europe after his visit to the region in August 2008.
50. A key aspect of these six principles, to which the Assembly
has attached great importance in its debates, is the acceptance
of the principle of freedom of return for IDPs as well as the freedom
of movement of civilians across the ABL.
51. As mentioned in our previous reports, the return of IDPs to
ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is extremely
difficult if not impossible. The de facto authorities in Tskhinvali
have indicated that the return of IDPs would be guided by international
principles, but dependent upon three conditions: security, voluntary
return and guarantee of adequate living conditions. In addition,
IDPs that participated in the hostilities are reportedly not allowed
to return, while IDPs that would return are reportedly obliged to
accept South Ossetian passports, which would imply a loss of their
Georgian citizenship. The de facto Abkhaz authorities have indicated
that they would allow a return of IDPs to the Gali district, but
that returns beyond this area would not be possible as a result
of security concerns.
security, voluntary
return and guarantee of adequate living conditions. In addition,
IDPs that participated in the hostilities are reportedly not allowed
to return, while IDPs that would return are reportedly obliged to
accept South Ossetian passports, which would imply a loss of their
Georgian citizenship. The de facto Abkhaz authorities have indicated
that they would allow a return of IDPs to the Gali district, but
that returns beyond this area would not be possible as a result
of security concerns. 52. The return of IDPs to the break-away regions is further complicated
by fears among IDPs that they would be forced to take South Ossetian
or Abkhazian “citizenship” if they return, as well as concerns for
their security and safety, especially in the absence of international
organisations and monitors in the break-away regions. The situation
is compounded by the restrictions on freedom of movement over the
ABL, which has become increasingly more difficult since the deployment
of FSB Border guards in the framework of the co-operation agreements
that were signed between Russia and the de facto authorities of
these two regions.
53. In this respect, we are especially concerned about the situation
in the Akhalgori district in South Ossetia, which is a predominantly
ethnic Georgian area that was not affected by the war and which,
prior to the war, had never been under the control of the de facto
authorities. We fear that the increasing difficulties in movement of
persons and goods across the ABL, as well as the increasing pressure
to accept South Ossetian passports, could lead to a new exodus of
ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia.
54. As confirmed by the latest report of the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Population, the ethnic Georgian villages in the Tskhinvali
region have been razed to the ground, bulldozed over and no longer
exist. This systematic destruction of ethnic Georgian villages,
combined with the effective impossibility for ethic Georgian IDPs
to return, confirm that this region was ethnically cleansed of ethnic
Georgians. It is unacceptable that ethnic cleansing has been allowed
to take place unimpeded in the Council of Europe area, and we find
the failure of Russia and the de facto authorities to bring these
practices to a halt and their perpetrators to justice, as demanded
by the Assembly, equally unacceptable.
55. We deeply regret that, contrary to Assembly demands, undue
restrictions are still being placed on the access of international
and humanitarian organisations to the two break-away regions.
56. As mentioned in our previous report, the Venice Commission
of the Council of Europe adopted an opinion on
the “Law on the occupied territories of Georgia”, following concerns
that some of the provisions in this law could be at odds with principles
of international law, including with the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Georgian authorities subsequently promised that they
would co-operate closely with the Venice Commission in order to
address its concerns as expressed in its opinion. Although we are
not aware that any amendments to the “Law on the occupied territories
of Georgia” have been introduced in parliament, we have been informed
that the co-operation with the Venice Commission on this issue is
ongoing in a constructive manner.
on
the “Law on the occupied territories of Georgia”, following concerns
that some of the provisions in this law could be at odds with principles
of international law, including with the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Georgian authorities subsequently promised that they
would co-operate closely with the Venice Commission in order to
address its concerns as expressed in its opinion. Although we are
not aware that any amendments to the “Law on the occupied territories
of Georgia” have been introduced in parliament, we have been informed
that the co-operation with the Venice Commission on this issue is
ongoing in a constructive manner.57. In mid-August 2009, Georgia seized two vessels in its national
waters, one with cargo destined for Abkhazia and one with cargo
originating from Abkhazia, under the provisions of the “Law on the
occupied territories of Georgia”. Without wishing to pass a judgement
on the merits of this action from a legal point of view, we are
concerned that such seizures could increase the tensions in the
region.
58. In Resolution 1647
(2009), the Assembly expressed its concern that a human rights
black hole would exist within the Council of Europe area and that
persons residing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not be effectively
covered by the human rights protection mechanisms granted to them
as citizens of a Council of Europe member state. In that respect,
we strongly welcome the fact that the European Committee for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CPT) was
able to carry out a visit, from 27 April to 4 May 2009, to Abkhazia
which received full co-operation from the de facto Abkhaz authorities and
was granted access to all places of detention they wished to visit.
This is a positive development which we hope will be followed by
the de facto authorities in South Ossetia. We understood that this
visit was facilitated by UNOMIG and therefore hope that the latter’s
departure will not imperil the possibilities of future visits of
this kind.
7. Additional demands of the Assembly
59. In Resolutions 1633
(2008) and 1647 (2009), the Assembly called upon all parties to work towards
the creation of a new peacekeeping format and internationalised
peacekeeping force. In the view of the Assembly, the establishment
of such a new peacekeeping format and internationalised peacekeeping
force is essential for the security and stability in the region.
While the establishment of new security mechanisms is formally part of
the mandate of the Geneva talks, no progress has been achieved,
to date, with regard to this important demand of the Assembly.
60. Following a recommendation by the Assembly in Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647 (2009), the Bureau of the Assembly decided, on 30 January 2009,
to establish an ad hoc committee of the Bureau on promoting dialogue
between the Georgian and Russian delegations in the Assembly”. This
ad hoc committee met twice, first on 12 March 2009 in Paris and
secondly on 30 March 2009 in Valencia (Spain). However, after consultations
with the chairmen of both delegations concerned, the President of
the Assembly decided not to convene a further meeting of the ad
hoc committee for the time being and until such time as the circumstances are
more conductive for a dialogue between both delegations.
8. Conclusions
61. With regard to the precise circumstances surrounding
the outbreak of the war, and the role of Russia and Georgia in it,
we continue to recommend that the Assembly returns to this issue
when the independent international inquiry mission established by
the European Union has presented its report, which is now foreseen
for 30 September 2009. Therefore, we have not touched upon this
issue at this stage. In this report and in line with our mandate,
we have rather taken stock of the developments with regard to the
consequences of the war, one year after its tragic outbreak, in
August 2008. In this respect, regrettably, we have to conclude that
little, if any, progress has been made since our first debate on
this issue with regard to addressing the consequences of the war.
In fact, in a number of areas, the situation has actually regressed.
62. Among the crucial demands made by the Assembly in its Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647 (2009), which we outlined at the beginning of this report,
only one – the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the outbreak
of the war and the co-operation of both Georgian and Russian authorities
with this inquiry – has been fully complied with by both sides.
The conclusion we reached at the end of our January 2009 report,
which was adopted by the Assembly in Resolution 1647 (2009), therefore remains fully valid: while Georgia has complied with
most, albeit not all, demands of the Assembly, Russia has not complied
with the majority of key demands made by the Assembly in Resolution 1633 (2008).
63. As we described above, the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement
has clearly not been implemented by Russia, as demanded by the international
community, including the Assembly. Russian troops have not only failed
to return to their places and strengths ex ante the war, but, on
the contrary, Russia has actually drastically increased the number
of troops deployed in the two break-away regions and now maintains
permanent military bases in them.
64. While we welcome the fact that that the majority of the IDPs
as a consequence of this war have returned, the right of return
is still denied to ethnic Georgians that fled from South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. With the departure of UNOMIG and the increasing restriction
of movement of civilians over the ABL, as well as the mounting pressure
to obtain South Ossetian or Abkhazian passports, there is a serious
risk of a new exodus of ethnic Georgians from the Gali and Akhalgori
districts.
65. Despite demands of the Assembly, as well as other international
organisations, no monitoring missions have been given access to
South Ossetia and the only observer mission that had access to Abkhazia, UNOMIG,
was closed down as a result of a Russian veto in the United Nations
Security Council. Similarly, the OSCE mission, including its military
monitoring mission, has been closed down as a result of Russia’s
refusal to accept the status neutral proposal of the Greek chairmanship
of the OSCE. As a result, while a year ago three monitoring missions
were present in Georgia, and one had access to at least one of the
break-away regions, only the European Union Monitoring Mission now
remains, but without access to either South Ossetia or Abkhazia.
The presence of international monitors, with unrestricted access
to both sides of the ABL is crucial for the stability of the region.
We therefore call upon Russia to accept the proposal of the Greek
OSCE chairmanship, which is still formally on the table, for an
OSCE presence, including a military monitoring component, in the
region, and to give unrestricted access to European Union monitors
to South Ossetia and Abkhazia
66. Excessive restrictions continue to be placed on the access
of international and humanitarian organisations, including for the
provision of humanitarian aid, to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
Georgian authorities have indicated that they will address all concerns
raised in the opinion of the Venice Commission on the “Law on the
occupied Territories of Georgia”, but Russia and the de facto authorities
continue categorically to refuse access to international organisations
and the provision of humanitarian aid, reportedly with the exception
of the International Red Cross, coming from the rest of Georgia.
67. As mentioned above, we find the apparent reluctance of Russia,
and to a lesser extent Georgia, to investigate allegations of violations
of human rights and humanitarian law by their “own side” during
and, where relevant, in the aftermath of the war unacceptable. We
note however that the investigation of the European Union inquiry
mission will also cover alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian
law as well a possible war crimes during the course of the conflict.
We will therefore return to this issue and its consequences for
the two countries concerned, including possible sanctions, when
the Assembly discusses the report of the inquiry commission.
68. The Russian political leadership has made it clear on several
occasions that it will not withdraw its recognition of the two break-away
regions and has called upon other countries to accept this “new
reality”. The question of the status of the two regions, and Russia’s
diverging position on it with the rest of the international community,
is often used to justify the non-implementation of the other demands
made by the Assembly. However, this argument cannot withstand close
scrutiny, as most of the Assembly’s demands have no bearing on the
status of these two regions. We conclude that the issue of status
is used to hide, or mask, the lack of political will to comply with
the Assembly’s demands.
69. In this respect, in the light of the overwhelming evidence
that numerous villages near Tskhinvali were ethnically cleansed
of ethnic Georgians, we strongly condemn, and find unacceptable,
the failure by Russia and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia
to bring these practises to a halt and their perpetrators to justice. We
stress that, under international law, Russia bears responsibility
for violations of human rights and humanitarian law in those areas
that fall under its de facto control. Moreover, the dispute over
the status of the two break-away regions can not be an impediment
as a large number of these alleged crimes took place before Russia’s
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and the ongoing
investigation by the Russian General Prosecutor in South Ossetia
into alleged crimes committed by Georgian troops demonstrates that
the Russian authorities have the capacity to conduct an investigation
as demanded by the Assembly in South Ossetia.
70. Similarly, free movement of civilians over the ABL, as well
as the unrestricted access of international organisations and humanitarian
aid to the two break-away regions, irrespective of their entry point,
is not related to the status of the two regions. In this respect,
we take note that since the signing of the border control treaties
between Russia and the two break-away regions on 30 April 2009,
the Russian authorities currently have full control over the “borders”
of these two regions.
71. We find it unacceptable that, one year later, key demands
made by the Assembly, in particular those that are not related
to the status of the two regions, continue not to be complied with.
There is clearly a lack of political will to address the consequences
of the war in a manner incumbent on a member state of the Council of
Europe.
72. We therefore consider it inevitable that the Monitoring Committee
challenges the credentials of the Russian delegation at the opening
of the January 2010 part-session, if the Russian authorities:
- have not given unrestricted access for European Union monitors to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- have not granted freedom of movement for Georgian civilians across the ABL and lifted restrictions, including on the point of entry, on the access to the two regions for international and humanitarian organisations as well as humanitarian aid to South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- have not formally and effectively recognised the right of return of all IDPs from the 2008 hostilities to their original place of residence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- have not initiated a credible investigation into the alleged ethnic cleansing, by the South Ossetian forces allied to it, and/or by civilians under its de facto jurisdiction and control.
73. Moreover, taking into consideration the evident reluctance
of both Russia and Georgia to investigate possible violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law during the war and
in its aftermath, we encourage the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to request the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court formally
to open an investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by either side in the course and aftermath of
the august 2008 hostilities.
74. Lastly, we call upon Georgia to amend the “Law on the occupied
territories of Georgia”, in order to address all concerns that were
raised in the recent Venice Commission opinion on this law.
***
Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Reference to committee: Resolution 1115 (1997), Resolution 1647 (2009) and Reference No. 3575 of 29 May 2009
Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 9 September 2009
Members of the committee: Mr Serhiy Holovaty (Chairperson), Mr György Frunda (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (2nd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Leonid Slutsky (3rd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Aydin Abbasov, Mr Pedro Agramunt Font de Mora, Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mrs Meritxell Batet Lamaña, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr József Berényi, Mr Luc van den Brande, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Ms Lise Christoffersen, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Georges Colombier, Mr Telmo Correia, Mrs Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Juris Dobelis, Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Ms Mirjana Ferić-Vac, Mr Giuseppe Galati, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr József Gedei, Mr Marcel Glesener, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hagberg, Mr Holger Haibach, Ms Gultakin Hajibayli, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Mrs Olha Herasym’yuk, Mr Andres Herkel, Mr Kastriot Islami, Mr Mladen Ivanić, Mr Michael Aastrup Jensen, Mr Miloš Jevtić, Mrs Evguenia Jivkova, Mr Hakki Keskin, Mr Haluk Koç, Mrs Katerina Konečná, Mr Jaakko Laakso, Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr René van der Linden, Mr Eduard Lintner, Mr Pietro Marcenaro, Mr Bernard Marquet, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Miloš Melčák, Mrs Nursuna Memecan, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mrs Yuliya Novikova, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mrs Elsa Papadimitriou, Mr Alexander Pochinok, Mr Ivan Popescu, Mrs Maria Postoico, Mrs Marietta de Pourbaix-Lundin, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mrs Mailis Reps, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Ilir Rusmali, Mr Armen Rustamyan, Mr Indrek Saar, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Kimmo Sasi, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Sergey Sobko, Mr Christoph Strässer, Mrs Chiora Taktakishvili, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mrs Özlem Türköne, Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Mr José Vera Jardim, Mr Piotr Wach, Mr Robert Walter, Mr David Wilshire, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mrs Karin S. Woldseth, Mrs Gisela Wurm, Mr Andrej Zernovski.
N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee: Mrs Chatzivassiliou, Mr Klein, Ms Trévisan, Mr Karpenko